Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Suhail Butt And Others vs Arif Mahmood Sheikh1986 SCMR 1827 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-16
  evictiontemporary injunctioncivil suit maintainabilityrent restrictionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an eviction application filed by the respondent landlord under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, wherein the Rent Controller ordered the deposit of arrears and future rent. The petitioners challenged this order by instituting a civil suit and seeking a temporary injunction. The trial court dismissed the injunction application, and subsequent appeals and revisions before the Additional District Judge and the High Court were likewise dismissed. The petitioners then sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court heard the learned counsel and held that no prima facie case was made out to justify the issuance of a temporary injunction or the institution of a civil suit in cases of this nature. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, affirming the lower forums' decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant challenge an order passed by a Rent Controller under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance by filing a separate civil suit?
  • Whether a temporary injunction can be granted against an interlocutory rent deposit order passed in eviction proceedings?
  • Does the institution of a civil suit lie to challenge rent restriction orders of a Rent Controller?
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• Muhammad Siddique vs The State1986 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murdergrave and sudden provocationdeath penaltylesser sentencecriminal appealabduction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant Muhammad Siddique broke off his daughter's childhood engagement to Sher Ahmed, who subsequently abducted the daughter in retaliation. Enraged, the appellant armed himself with a gun, went to the house of Sher Ahmed's father, Faiz Muhammad, and demanded her return. Upon not receiving the desired response, the appellant deliberately shot and killed Faiz Muhammad, Faiz Muhammad's wife Mst. Mehr Nishan, and a house guest, Muhammad Rafique. The trial court and High Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death for the murders. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court solely to examine whether the extreme penalty of death was warranted given the mitigating circumstance of grave and sudden provocation caused by the abduction of the appellant's daughter. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant is not entitled to leniency because his actions did not amount to sudden and indiscriminate firing in the heat of the moment; rather, he deliberately and selectively targeted and executed multiple victims, including an innocent teenager.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the abduction of a daughter by the son of the deceased constitutes a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Does deliberate and selective targeting of multiple victims negate the plea of grave and sudden provocation for the purpose of sentencing?
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• Muhammad Siddique vs Muhammad Shoaib1986 SCMR 1207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-13
  ejectmentpersonal needbona fide needlandlord and tenantappellate courtconstitutional petitionsufficiency of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment application filed by the respondent against the petitioner on the ground of personal and bona fide need for a shop. The Rent Controller dismissed the application on 15 May 1985, finding the need not genuine, but the appellate court reversed this decision and accepted the landlord's testimony regarding his bona fide need. The petitioner challenged this factual conclusion through a constitutional petition in the High Court, arguing that the solitary statement of the landlord was insufficient to establish bona fide need. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appellate court committed no legal or procedural illegality, as the law does not require a specific number of witnesses and it is the quality of evidence that determines acceptance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's view and dismissed the petition, ruling that there was no legal error in the impugned judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the solitary statement of a landlord is sufficient to establish bona fide personal need for ejectment?
  • Does the law require any particular number of witnesses to prove a fact in ejectment proceedings?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding personal need in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Siddique vs Allah Rakha And Another1986 SCMR 1544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-12
  remand ordersettlement of landagricultural landSakni landJamabandiPartition of 1947writ jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which had remanded a property dispute case to the Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision. The core legal question concerned the proper determination of the nature and character of the disputed land as it existed at the time of Partition on August 14, 1947—specifically, whether it was classified as agricultural land or Sakni (urban/building) land. The petitioner had been transferred the land based on records from 1944-45 and 1950-51, which indicated agricultural usage; however, the High Court found that the critical special Jamabandi for the year 1946-47 had been overlooked. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order of remand was legally sound and did not warrant interference, as it was necessary to resolve the factual ambiguity regarding the land's classification at the relevant time. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with the observation that the petitioner remained at liberty to raise all available legal pleas during the remand proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court order remanding a case to a Settlement Commissioner for fresh determination of land character subject to interference if relevant records were previously overlooked?
  • Does the classification of land as agricultural or Sakni at the time of Partition require specific evidentiary findings from the relevant Jamabandi records?
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• Muhammad Siddique And Others vs The Chief Settlement Commissioner1986 SCMR 1237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-11
  leave to appealexcess allotmentresumed areasettlement schemedisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, allottees of resumed land, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 29-10-1985, which declared the resumption of excess allotted land held by the respondents to be without lawful authority. The core legal question concerned whether respondents could retain excess land allotted to them beyond their entitlement and whether the authorities were justified in resuming it for pending claims under the relevant settlement laws. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the inhibition of the Chief Settlement Commissioner's powers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act and the liability of allottees to surrender excess land under Settlement Scheme No. 1 required formal examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, directed that petitioners in possession not be disturbed subject to conditions, and ordered security. The key principle laid down is that excess land obtained beyond entitlement is generally subject to surrender for settling pending claims unless protected by specific statutory provisions or instructions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allottee can retain land obtained in excess of their entitlement under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the power to resume excess allotted land for the satisfaction of pending claims?
  • Are allottees liable to surrender excess land under Settlement Scheme No. 1 if they do not fall within protective clauses?
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• Muhammad Sher And Another vs Muhammad Sher And Other1986 SCMR 1592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-01
  pre-emption suitsale pricequestion of factwrit jurisdictionpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld concurrent factual findings regarding the sale price in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a finding of fact regarding the sale price determined by revenue authorities could be interfered with by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the determination of the sale price is a question of fact, which cannot be successfully challenged in writ jurisdiction, and consequently refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower forums and the High Court. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact affirmed through concurrent lower judicial or revenue forums are immune from interference under constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination of a sale price in a pre-emption suit is a question of fact?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding a sale price be successfully challenged in the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Zilladar1986 SCMR 1373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-07
  evacuee propertysettlement schemeadditional evidencemisreading of evidenceremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises out of a civil revision dismissed by the Lahore High Court concerning the disposal of an evacuee property. The core legal question involved whether the lower appellate court and the High Court based their judgments of reversal on the misreading and ignoring of vital evidence regarding the identity and transfer of the suit-house, particularly concerning allegations of forgery and the refusal to summon original settlement records and additional evidence. The Supreme Court held that the unjustified refusal to summon the original record and the overlooking of material irregularities regarding disputed house numbers, altered dates, and ignored oral testimony resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Court established the principle that in cases involving serious allegations of record tampering and conflicting transfer claims of evacuee property, the examination of original records is imperative, and ignoring vital evidence constitutes a material irregularity warranting a remand of the case for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the refusal to summon original settlement records in a case involving allegations of forgery constitutes a material irregularity?
  • Can a judgment of reversal by an appellate court be sustained when vital evidence regarding the identity of property is ignored?
  • Is an appellate court justified in rejecting an application for additional evidence when such evidence is necessary for a just decision?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Nawab Bibi And Other1986 SCMR 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-07
  State landlease cancellationLivestock Breeding Schemepossessioncolonization of government landswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging concurrent administrative and judicial orders cancelling a lease of State land granted to the petitioner under the Livestock Breeding Scheme. The core legal question is whether the petitioner's possession and lease were lawful in the absence of official delivery of possession under section 10(4) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to establish lawful possession in terms of an order passed under section 10(4) of the said Act, rendering the initial lease order legally ineffective and his possession illegal. Furthermore, the Court noted that the ten-year term of the lease had already expired. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the unexceptionable orders of the Board of Revenue and the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a lease of State land under the Livestock Breeding Scheme takes legal effect without official delivery of possession under section 10(4) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  • Can a lessee continue to remain in possession of State land under the shadow of litigation after the expiry of the lease term?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Khushi Muhammad And Other1986 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-04
  amendment of pleadingsjudicial discretionwrit jurisdictionconsent ordertrial court procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court passed in a writ petition. The petitioner contended that the High Court's order, which included the phrase "after allowing the landlord to amend his pleadings," effectively precluded the trial court from exercising its judicial discretion to examine the merits of the proposed amendment. The petitioner argued that the consent given by the parties was limited to merely seeking an amendment, not a mandatory direction to allow it. The Supreme Court examined the impugned order and held that the language used by the High Court did not constitute a fait accompli. The Court clarified that the phrase in question was subject to the terms of the consent recorded earlier in the order, meaning the trial court retained the discretion to evaluate the amendment application on its merits. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petition, holding that the High Court's order did not improperly fetter the trial court's discretion, and dismissed the petition accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court order allowing a party to seek an amendment to pleadings automatically mandate that the amendment must be granted?
  • Can a trial court exercise its discretion to examine the merits of an amendment application despite a prior order allowing the party to seek such an amendment?
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• Muhammad Sharif Through Legal Heirs And Others vs Abdul Majid1986 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-18
  land disputeevacuee propertypossession suitremand orderbinding findingcost of improvementconcurrent findings of factpetition for leave to appealcivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a land dispute concerning evacuee property, where the respondent filed a suit for possession and demolition of construction. The core legal question revolved around whether an observation made by an Additional District Judge in a remand order, stating that the defendant was "entitled to the cost of improvement," constituted a binding finding in subsequent proceedings. The Supreme Court held that such an observation, made when setting aside the trial court's judgment and remanding the case for a fresh trial, was not a binding finding. The original judgment having been set aside, the observation was "thrown overboard" and superseded by the findings recorded after re-trial. The Court upheld the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts, which determined that the plaintiff's share could be met from vacant land, rendering the plaintiff unconcerned with the defendant's construction. The petition was dismissed, as the findings were factual and called for no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Does an observation made in a remand order, which sets aside a trial court's judgment and remands the case for fresh trial, constitute a binding finding in subsequent proceedings?
  • Do concurrent findings of fact by lower courts warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a plaintiff's claim for possession be satisfied from vacant land, even if the defendant has constructed on a portion of the disputed property?
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• Muhammad vs Mst. Maryam Bibi And Another1986 SCMR 1982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-21
  habeas corpussui juriscustody of detenuSection 491 Cr.P.C.Offence of Zinaleave to appealconflicting statements
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court order passed under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which granted custody of an alleged detenu, Mst. Nur Safia, to the respondents. The petitioner, the husband of the detenu, alleged that the detenu had been abducted and that the respondents were involved in criminal activities, including Zina, for which an F.I.R. had been registered. The High Court, relying on the detenu's statement that she was sui juris and wished to accompany the respondents, ordered her release into their custody, despite her earlier contradictory statement recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, implicating the respondents. The petitioner contended that the High Court failed to consider the bona fides of the habeas corpus petition, which he argued was filed to create a defense for the accused. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the conflicting statements and the potential misuse of the habeas corpus jurisdiction required examination. The Court ordered the detenu to be lodged in Darul Aman pending the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, have a duty to inquire into the bona fides of a habeas corpus petition?
  • Should a court grant custody of an alleged detenu to individuals accused of criminal offenses involving that same detenu based solely on her statement of being sui juris?
  • Is it appropriate for a court to disregard a statement recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, in favor of a later statement made in court when determining the custody of an alleged detenu?
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• Muhammad Sharif And Others vs Administrator Thal And Other1986 SCMR 1423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-22
  leave to appealretrospective effectvested rightsjurisdiction of civil courtpending actionsallotment cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their Regular Second Appeal. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners was allotted government land in 1950, which allotment was cancelled in 1957 without notice. The petitioners filed a civil suit in 1966, which was eventually dismissed by the trial court after ex parte proceedings were set aside. The District Judge dismissed the subsequent appeal on the ground that civil court jurisdiction was barred retrospectively by the Thal Development (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance 1975, a view upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a statute taking away the jurisdiction of civil courts applies retrospectively to pending actions and suits instituted before the bar of jurisdiction came into force. The Supreme Court held that statutes affecting rights of action or taking away vested rights are presumed not to apply to pending actions unless express words compel such an interpretation. Finding the matter worthy of consideration, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statute taking away the jurisdiction of civil courts apply retrospectively to pending actions instituted before the enactment of the bar?
  • Can a statute affecting a right of action be construed to apply to pending proceedings in the absence of express words?
  • Whether the cancellation of a land allotment without notice can be challenged in a civil court despite subsequent statutory bars on jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Sham and Others vs Allah Dad Khan1986 PLD Supreme Court 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-25
  sale-deedfraud and misrepresentationparol evidencefailure of considerationpartitionrendition of accountsburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a direct appeal under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the appellants' suit for possession by partition and rendition of accounts. The core legal question involves whether a registered sale-deed can be proven invalid through oral evidence regarding non-payment of consideration and fraudulent misrepresentation, notwithstanding the bar under Section 92 of the Evidence Act and recitals acknowledging receipt of consideration. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that parol evidence is admissible under the first proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence Act to prove the invalidity of a document due to fraud, misrepresentation, or failure of consideration, and that formal recitals acknowledging receipt of sale consideration are rebuttable. The key principle laid down is that the rules of evidence do not bar a court from lifting the veil to ascertain the true nature of a transaction and determine whether a document is vitiated by fraud or failure of consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether parol evidence is admissible under Section 92 of the Evidence Act to prove that a registered sale-deed is invalid due to fraud or failure of consideration?
  • Is an acknowledgment of the receipt of sale consideration in a registered sale-deed conclusive, or can it be rebutted by independent evidence?
  • Does the mere registration of a sale-deed operate to pass title when the consideration has not in fact been paid and the transaction is vitiated by misrepresentation?
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• Muhammad Shafiq vs The State1986 SCMR 1048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-03
  culpable homicidesudden fightright of private defencemurderprovocationpremeditationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant for murder and other offences under sections 326 and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the offense committed by the appellant constituted murder or fell under Exception IV to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code as a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, arising from a sudden fight without premeditation. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred by failing to consider Exception IV to section 300 after disbelieving the prosecution's motive and rejecting the plea of private defence. The Court found that the altercation arose spontaneously from a dispute concerning children, involving a sudden quarrel and scuffle without undue advantage or cruel manner. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction under section 302 and the death sentence, altering the conviction to Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code, while modifying other related convictions and sentences accordingly. The key principle laid down is that where a sudden fight occurs without premeditation upon a sudden quarrel and neither party takes undue advantage, the offence falls under Exception IV to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code rather than murder.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sudden fight arising from an immediate dispute over children without premeditation attract Exception IV to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can a conviction for murder be altered to culpable homicide not amounting to murder when injuries are sustained by both parties during a sudden scuffle?
  • Is it material which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault in a case covered by Exception IV to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• Muhammad Shafiq vs Abdul Hayee And Other1986 SCMR 1016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-02
  revisional jurisdictioninherent powers of High Courtdisputed propertyleave to appealconcurrent jurisdictionattachment of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from proceedings involving property disputes under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions presented for consideration involve the competency of an application filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after the Sessions Judge had already exercised revisional powers under Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the same subject matter. Specifically, the Court seeks to determine whether Section 561-A can be invoked to correct alleged errors in an order passed during the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, particularly given the concurrent revisional powers held by the High Court and the Sessions Judge. Furthermore, the Court is tasked with examining whether the underlying proceedings and orders passed therein conform to the statutory requirements set forth in Sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Pending the final disposal of the appeal, the Supreme Court suspended the impugned order and directed the attachment of the disputed property.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 competent after the exercise of revisional powers by the Sessions Judge under Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the same subject matter?
  • Can the High Court exercise powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to correct errors in an order passed by a Sessions Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
  • Do the orders passed in the proceedings conform to the requirements of Sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Shafiq And Others vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 1456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-01
  constitutional petitionlachesdelayspecial leave to appealsettlement commissionerwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two civil petitions for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of constitutional petitions by the High Court. The petitioners challenged orders passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner dating back to 1960 and 1967 respectively, through a writ petition filed in 1975, alongside a belated review application against an earlier 1970 judgment. The core legal question concerned whether a constitutional petition suffering from an unexplained and inordinate delay and laches could be entertained by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition and the review application was unexceptionable, given the prolonged and unexplained inaction of the petitioners in pursuing the matter. The ratio decidendi is that long and unexplained laches disentitles a party to discretionary constitutional remedies, and petitions filed after extensive delays without justification are liable to be dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition can be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay?
  • Does an unexplained long period of inaction bar a party from seeking relief under writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a belated review application against a long-standing High Court judgment be entertained without sufficient explanation for the delay?
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• Muhammad Shafi vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-17
  evacuee propertydeed of associationforgerypending proceedingsrepeal of lawsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of a residential property under the evacuee property laws. The petitioner, an occupant who was initially transferred the property, alleged that during his period of mental illness and hospitalization, the respondent forged a deed of association to secure the transfer in his own name. The petitioner challenged this transfer upon recovery, but his application was dismissed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner then filed a revision petition before the Settlement Commissioner, which was referred for inquiry but remained unresolved when the Settlement Department was wound up under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition in limine, holding that no case was pending. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that there was considerable force in the petitioner's plea that his revision petition was indeed pending at the time of the repeal and was thus saved by Section 2 of the Repeal Act. Finding prima facie indications of forgery, the Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revision petition filed before the Settlement Commissioner prior to the repeal of the settlement laws constitutes a pending proceeding saved by Section 2 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975?
  • Can a Deputy Settlement Commissioner refuse to entertain an application challenging a transfer based on an allegedly forged deed of association on the ground of lack of jurisdiction to review an order of an officer of equal jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Shafi vs Muhammad Said1986 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-02
  personal useejectmentlandlord and tenantleave to appealnew plea at supreme courtrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which upheld the Rent Controller's order directing the petitioner-tenant to hand over possession of the demised shop to the respondent-landlord for personal use. The landlord sought ejectment to conduct motor welding and denting work along with his adult sons. The High Court re-examined the evidence and found the landlord's personal need established, dismissing allegations of ulterior motives. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner raised new pleas regarding a bar on eviction due to a rent agreement and the alleged unsuitability of the small shop for the proposed business, which were neither pleaded below nor substantiated. The Supreme Court held that factual and legal pleas not raised in the courts below cannot be entertained for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, though a four-month extension to vacate was granted based on the petitioner's solemn undertaking.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new factual or legal plea for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not raised in the courts below?
  • Does the acceptance of advance rent by a landlord in a rent agreement bar their right to seek ejectment of the tenant for personal use?
  • Whether the sufficiency of evidence regarding a landlord's personal need for rented premises can be re-examined to interfere with concurrent factual findings?
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• Muhammad Shafi And Others vs Muhammad Ilyas1986 SCMR 451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-29
  ejectmentpersonal requirementdeath of landlordsubstitution of legal representativesamended petitionurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment petition filed by an original landlord against a tenant under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on grounds including default, damage, and personal need. During proceedings, the original landlord died, and his children were substituted as petitioners. They amended the petition to plead their own bona fide personal requirement, leading evidence in support. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, but the Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and ordered ejectment. The Lahore High Court accepted the tenant's constitutional petition, holding that the original landlord's personal requirement did not enure for the benefit of legal representatives. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the legal representatives could maintain an independent plea of personal requirement in their own right as landlords through an amended petition. However, because the lower appellate court had proceeded on the misconception that the original cause of action survived rather than evaluating the appellants' independent claim, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case to the Additional District Judge for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the personal requirement of a landlord for a non-residential building enure for the benefit of his legal representatives after his death?
  • Can legal representatives of a deceased landlord amend an ejectment petition to plead their own independent personal requirement?
  • Does a landlord's personal action on the ground of personal requirement survive to his legal representatives if it has not matured into an order of eviction?
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• Muhammad Shafi And Others vs CH. Fazal Elahi And Other1986 SCMR 1210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-26
  necessary partiesnon-joinder of partiesreversionerscivil proceduredeclaratory suitprocedural justiceremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit filed by collateral reversioners challenging a sale of property by Mst. Mehtab Bibi. The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs' failure to implead all personal law heirs of the deceased vendor, Mst. Mehtab Bibi, despite a prior appellate court direction to do so, was fatal to the suit. The High Court had dismissed the appeals, refusing to exercise equitable discretion to allow the impleading of the omitted heirs after an eleven-year delay. The Supreme Court held that while the appellate court's earlier direction to implead the heirs had attained finality and remained uncomplied with, the interests of justice required a proper adjudication on the merits. The Court determined that the plaintiffs should be granted a final opportunity to implead the necessary parties, provided they pay costs to the contesting defendant. The key principle laid down is that procedural defaults, such as the failure to implead necessary parties, should not preclude a decision on the merits where the interests of justice and proper adjudication necessitate allowing an opportunity for rectification, even after significant delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to implead all legal heirs of a deceased defendant in a civil suit necessitate the dismissal of the suit?
  • Can an appellate court grant an opportunity to implead necessary parties even after a significant delay in compliance with a prior remand order?
  • Is a direction given by an appellate court regarding the impleading of parties binding if it remains unchallenged?
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• Muhammad Sarwar vs Muhammad Shafi1986 SCMR 1638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-03
  execution proceedingsdeclaratory suitejectmentidentity of propertymaintainabilityconsequential relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a landlord-tenant dispute where the respondent obtained an eviction order against a tenant under Section 13 of the Sind Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. During execution, the petitioner intervened under Order XXI Rule 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, claiming the property being executed upon was his own property under a different municipal number, which led the executing court to restrict execution. The respondent then filed a suit under Order XXI Rule 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to declare that the property under both numbers was identical and belonged to him. The trial court decreed the suit, but the first appellate court reversed it on technical grounds of maintainability. The High Court restored the trial court's decree, finding the property was identical and the petitioner had no independent title. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the suit was maintainable as the execution had been frustrated, and a separate prayer for possession was unnecessary because the declaratory decree revived the respondent's right to execute the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit under Order XXI Rule 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable where execution proceedings have been frustrated by a third-party intervener claiming a change in property numbers?
  • Is a plaintiff seeking a declaration of title in respect of a property subject to an eviction order required to pray for possession in the same suit, or does the declaration revive the right to execute the eviction order?
  • Can a party in a property dispute simultaneously assert independent ownership of the property and claim protection as a co-tenant under rent restriction laws?
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• Muhammad Sanadi And Others vs Mian Abdul Mali Shah1986 SCMR 135(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-06
  show-cause noticepaper booksSupreme Court proceduredefault in filingappellate practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a show-cause notice issued to the Advocate-on-Record for the appellants due to a failure to file the required paper books. Mr. Safdar Hussain appeared in response on behalf of the appellants and submitted the paper books directly in Court. Upon the submission and physical filing of the paper books during the hearing, the Court decided to discharge the show-cause notice. The core principle addressed relates to compliance with court directives and procedural requirements regarding the timely filing of paper books in appellate proceedings before the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • What action is taken by the Supreme Court when an appellant fails to file paper books within the stipulated time?
  • Can a show-cause notice issued for non-filing of paper books be discharged upon subsequent submission in court?
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• Muhammad Saleem And 2 Others vs District Judge, Bhakkar And Other1986 SCMR 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-06
  ex parte decreesetting aside ex parte decreeservice of summonsleave to appealsubstantial justiceconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from three petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petitions arising from orders setting aside ex parte decrees in civil suits for perpetual injunctions. The core legal question concerned whether the ex parte decrees were lawfully set aside despite contentions regarding the validity of counsel's representation and the absence of personal service on the respondents. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact that the respondents were not duly served despite the trial court's order and that their purported counsel was not duly constituted justified setting aside the ex parte decrees in the interest of substantial justice. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that findings of fact and discretionary orders aimed at substantial justice do not warrant interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte decree can be set aside when the respondents were not personally served despite a specific court order for their service?
  • Does the service of notice on an advocate who was not duly constituted as counsel bind the respondents?
  • Whether the High Court's refusal to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding service and representation warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Muhammad Saeedur Rehman And Others vs D.S.C. Jhelum And Other1986 SCMR 135(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-07
  dismissal for non-prosecutionshow-cause noticeadvocate-on-recordsecurity depositsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a show-cause notice issued to the appellants due to the death of their Advocate-on-Record, specifically addressing their failure to deposit the required security and to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for non-prosecution. No appearance was made on behalf of the appellants in response to the notice. The core legal question concerned the consequence of failing to comply with procedural requirements and directives of the court following the demise of the appellant's counsel. The court held that in the absence of any appearance or compliance in response to the show-cause notice, the appeal must be dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an appeal is liable to be dismissed for non-prosecution when the appellants fail to respond to court notices regarding procedural defaults such as non-payment of security after the death of their authorized counsel.

  Questions settled

  • What is the consequence of failing to respond to a show-cause notice regarding the non-deposit of security after the death of an Advocate-on-Record?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed for non-prosecution when no one appears on behalf of the appellants in response to a court notice?
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• Muhammad Sadiq vs Punjab Labour Court No. 1 And Other1986 SCMR 272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-19
  workman definitionindustrial relationswrongful dismissalsupervisory capacityconcurrent findings of factwrit jurisdictionlabour lawmanagerial functions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent orders of two Labour Courts reinstating the petitioner, a former Pastry Chief, who had been dismissed from service. The core legal question is whether the petitioner, who supervised four employees and earned a consolidated salary of Rs. 860 per mensem, qualifies as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, thereby entitling him to seek redress for wrongful dismissal. The High Court had reversed the Labour Courts' findings, concluding the petitioner performed managerial duties and was thus excluded from the definition of a workman. The Supreme Court, noting the conflicting interpretations regarding the nature of the petitioner's duties and the scope of judicial review over concurrent findings of fact by Labour Courts, granted leave to appeal. The key principle highlighted is that the determination of 'workman' status requires an assessment of the basic nature and true character of the work performed, rather than being influenced by incidental duties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person employed in a supervisory capacity who performs manual work in exceptional situations qualify as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Is a High Court justified in re-assessing evidence to reverse concurrent findings of fact made by Labour Courts in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the definition of 'workman' under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 require the nature of duties to be construed disjunctively regarding manual or clerical work?
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• Muhammad Sadiq vs Muhammad Khan1986 SCMR 1567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-01
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionco-sharercivil revisionleave to appealadditional evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the civil revision filed by the petitioner vendee and upheld the pre-emption decree granted in favour of the respondent. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner possessed an equal right of pre-emption based on a prior alleged purchase of land in the same Khatta. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts and the High Court rightly treated the petitioner's alleged prior sale-deed as spurious and an afterthought, noting the lack of marginal witnesses, absence of registration, failure to mention the document in pleadings, and late procurement after the institution of the suit. Furthermore, the alternative plea regarding another sale and unaddressed additional evidence was correctly rejected as an abandoned and belated afterthought. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a vendee can claim an equal right of pre-emption based on an unregistered and unproved prior sale-deed procured after the institution of the pre-emption suit?
  • Can an appellate court be faulted for not disposing of an application for additional evidence when the application was not pressed during the hearing?
  • Whether a plea regarding an alternative sale not raised before the trial court can be entertained as a valid defense in pre-emption proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq Salima Bibi vs Mst. Rehmat Bibi And Other1986 SCMR 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-01
  pre-emptionrival pre-emptorrestoration of suitabatementleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a successful pre-emptor against a Lahore High Court judgment dated 14-6-1980, which had allowed a revision petition by rival pre-emptors, set aside prior orders, restored the rival pre-emptor's suit, and ordered that the pre-emption decree in favour of the petitioner not extend to the rival pre-emptor's rights. Two competing pre-emption suits had been filed concerning a sale of land. The rival pre-emptor's suit was initially dismissed when his counsel reported no instructions on the date fixed for examining abatement and recording evidence, while the petitioner's suit was subsequently decreed. Applications for restoration and setting aside dismissal under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 were dismissed by lower courts, but the High Court restored the rival pre-emptor's suit, finding sufficient cause for non-appearance. The core legal question concerns the implications and legal efficacy of restoring a rival pre-emptor's suit against an existing, unconditional pre-emption decree held by another pre-emptor. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these implications, allowing proceedings in the restored suit to continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the restoration of a rival pre-emptor's suit affects an unconditional pre-emption decree already held by another pre-emptor?
  • Did the High Court properly exercise its revisionary jurisdiction in setting aside the dismissal of the rival pre-emptor's suit?
  • What are the legal implications of restoring a pre-emption suit after a decree has already been passed in a consolidated proceeding?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq And Others vs Malik Taj Muhammad And Other1986 SCMR 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-29
  petition for leave to appealconcession in High Courtreopening of controversydismissal of petitionsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by way of a petition for leave to appeal arising from a civil or constitutional dispute adjudicated in the High Court. The core legal question addressed by the Court is whether a controversy already conceded by a party in the High Court remains open for subsequent adjudication before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court recalled its earlier order of dismissal, restored the petition to file upon hearing the petitioners' counsel, but ultimately dismissed the petition on the short ground that the matter was no longer open for adjudication due to the express concession made by the petitioners in the High Court. The key principle laid down is that a party who has made a concession before a lower court is precluded from reopening or agitating the same controversy in subsequent proceedings before the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party reopen a controversy in the Supreme Court after making a concession on the matter in the High Court?
  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal can be dismissed on the short ground of a previous concession made by the petitioner?
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• Muhammad Sabir Hussain And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-06
  criminal petitionleave to appealmurderre-appraisal of evidencecontradictory judgmentalteration of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from cross-petitions challenging a judgment of the High Court which altered convictions, reduced sentences, and partially acquitted accused persons originally convicted of murder and related offences by the trial court. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's appreciation of evidence and the sustainability of its findings regarding the alteration of charges and acquittal of co-accused. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court suffered from material contradictions and failed to properly address the critical issues in the case, thus requiring a de novo re-examination. The key principle laid down is that where a High Court judgment in a capital case contains internal contradictions and fails to judiciously evaluate the evidence, the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal to re-appraise the record and ensure proper administration of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court judgment suffering from material contradictions in appreciating evidence warrants a de novo re-examination by the Supreme Court?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted to challenge both the reduction of sentence and the acquittal of co-accused in a murder case?
  • Whether consecutive sentences under section 304(Part-I) and section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 are sustainable when arising from the same incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Riaz Dar vs The Secretary, Local Government And Other1986 SCMR 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-25
  constitutional petitionshow-cause noticeremoval of municipal chairmanlocal governmentleave to appealpremature petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Chairman of a Municipal Committee, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that disposed of his constitutional petition against a show-cause notice issued for his removal under section 29 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner contended that the proceedings were mala fide, amounted to double vexation following earlier remedial measures under section 157 of the same Ordinance, and that he was not associated with a subsequent inquiry report. The Supreme Court held that since the competent authority's jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 29 was undisputed, it was premature to invoke constitutional jurisdiction against a mere show-cause notice before raising factual and legal objections before the competent authority itself. The Court affirmed the High Court's refusal to interfere at that stage, emphasizing that the competent authority must first address these objections through a speaking order, and accordingly refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained against a show-cause notice issued by a competent authority under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  • Whether the High Court should interfere in administrative proceedings before the competent authority has examined factual and legal objections raised by the affected party?
  • Does the initiation of remedial measures under section 157 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 bar proceedings for removal under section 29 of the said Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Razzaq And Others vs Muhammad Din1986 SCMR 1379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-07
  pre-emptionagricultural landmunicipal limitsright of pre-emptionleave to appealsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns whether a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit must maintain the right of pre-emption up to the date of the decree, and the effect of land being included within municipal limits prior to the decree. The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must possess the right to pre-empt on the date of sale, the date of filing the suit, and the date of passing the decree. Since 15 Kanals of the disputed agricultural land became part of the municipal limits of Sialkot before the decree—thereby exempting it from the law of pre-emption—the dismissal of the suit regarding that portion was correct. The key principle laid down is that the loss of the right of pre-emption due to inclusion of land in municipal limits before the trial court's decree defeats the claim pro tanto.

  Questions settled

  • Must a plaintiff maintain the right of pre-emption on the date of the passing of the decree?
  • What is the effect of including pre-empted agricultural land within municipal limits before the decree is passed?
  • Does the inclusion of suit land in a municipal area exempt it from the law of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Razzaq And Others vs Khaki Jan And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-05
  criminal petitionreappraisal of evidenceenhancement of sentencemurder convictionlife imprisonmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal petitions: one filed by the accused challenging their conviction and sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and another filed by the complainant seeking enhancement of the sentence awarded to the accused from imprisonment for life to death. Regarding the accused's petition, the Court observed that the arguments presented merely sought a reappraisal of evidence, which the Court declined to undertake, finding no justification to interfere with the impugned judgment. Regarding the complainant's petition for sentence enhancement, the Court reviewed the High Court's reasoning for awarding the lesser sentence of life imprisonment and found those reasons to be sound and valid. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that neither the conviction nor the sentence warranted interference and dismissed both petitions as being without merit. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the Supreme Court will not typically re-examine factual findings or evidence in a petition for leave to appeal unless a significant legal error is demonstrated, and that sentencing discretion exercised by lower courts will be upheld if based on valid reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court undertake a reappraisal of evidence in a criminal petition for leave to appeal?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the High Court?
  • Is the enhancement of a sentence from life imprisonment to death mandatory in murder cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Zafar Ullah And Another1986 SCMR 1380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-19
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationmurder caseconsistency in bailleave to appealco-accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which granted pre-arrest bail to the respondent in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the grant of pre-arrest bail to the respondent was legally sustainable, particularly when other co-accused persons, who were similarly placed and attributed no specific role in the physical injuries to the victims, had already been granted bail after arrest. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to interfere with the High Court's decision. The Court held that since the petitioner had not challenged the bail granted to other co-accused persons who occupied the same category as the respondent, cancelling the respondent's bail on technical grounds would serve no useful purpose. The Court reasoned that if the respondent were arrested, he would inevitably be entitled to bail again on the principle of consistency, given that similarly situated co-accused were already at liberty. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Should bail be cancelled on technical grounds if the accused would be entitled to bail again due to the status of similarly placed co-accused?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against a bail order where the petitioner has failed to challenge the bail of similarly situated co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1986 SCMR 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-20
  settlement lawsagricultural landreview powerconstitutional jurisdictionestoppelpublic auctiondisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute concerning the transfer of a house situated in village Dewala, D.I. Khan, initially claimed by both the appellant and respondent No. 3 as part of agricultural land or an independent house under settlement laws. The core legal questions involved whether a Deputy Settlement Commissioner's review order passed without prior permission under section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 vitiated subsequent proceedings, and whether the High Court was justified in setting aside concurrent factual findings of settlement authorities in writ jurisdiction regarding the classification of the property. The Supreme Court held that respondent No. 3, having expressly conceded the house's independent status and value before the authorities, was estopped from challenging the initial review order, and the High Court erred in re-appreciating factual determinations in constitutional jurisdiction. The Court laid down the principle that a party who unequivocally submits to the jurisdiction and concedes a property's status during administrative proceedings cannot later challenge the foundational review order, and concurrent findings of departmental authorities on property classification should not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party who concedes the status and value of a property before settlement authorities is estopped from subsequently challenging the foundational review order?
  • Does the definition of land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 encompass buildings not used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient to agriculture?
  • To what extent can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Muhammad Saleem And Another1986 SCMR 1716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-18
  sentence mitigationmurder convictionleave to appealquantum of sentencevital part of bodyage of offender
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against a High Court judgment that reduced the respondent's sentence for murder from death to life imprisonment. The respondent had been convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The High Court, while maintaining the conviction, mitigated the sentence based on the respondent's young age (approximately 16 years), the fact that only a single blow was inflicted, and the existence of a prior altercation between the parties. The petitioner challenged this reduction, arguing that there was no evidence on record to substantiate the respondent's age, that the single knife blow was delivered to a vital part of the body (the chest), and that the earlier altercation did not provide sufficient grounds for mitigation. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court was legally justified in reducing the sentence under the circumstances presented, specifically examining the validity of the mitigating factors relied upon by the lower court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior altercation between the parties constitute sufficient grounds for mitigating a sentence of death to life imprisonment in a murder case?
  • Can a court reduce a sentence based on the offender's age if there is no evidence on the record to substantiate that age?
  • Is the infliction of a single knife blow to a vital region of the body a relevant factor in determining whether to maintain a death sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rahim, Lecturer and 28 Others vs Muhammad Aurangzeb, Lecturer and 94 Other1986 SCMR 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-09
  seniority disputead hoc appointmentregularization of servicecivil service senioritybatch senioritypublic service commissioninter se seniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals regarding the determination of inter se seniority between lecturers recruited through the Public Service Commission under the West Pakistan Education Service (Class II Collegiate, Branch) (Men's Section) Rules, 1962, and those ad hoc appointees regularized under a Government notification dated February 28, 1970. The core legal question was whether the 1970 Order, which regularized ad hoc appointees with effect from January 1, 1970, overrode the seniority rights of regular recruits from the 1967 and 1968 batches who were selected by the Commission but joined service after the notification date. The Supreme Court held that the 1970 Order did not create a conflict with the Rules, as it explicitly excluded posts for which the Commission had already recommended candidates. Consequently, the regular recruits of the 1967 and 1968 batches retain their seniority based on their selection and recommendation, irrespective of their actual joining date. The principle established is that where specific rules govern seniority based on selection, and a subsequent regularization order excludes already recommended posts, the seniority of regular recruits is preserved according to their batch merit, and the date of actual induction into service does not override established batch seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the date of actual joining service override the seniority assigned by the Public Service Commission for regular recruits?
  • Does a regularization order for ad hoc employees supersede the seniority rights of regular recruits selected through the Public Service Commission?
  • Can the seniority of regular recruits be determined by their date of selection rather than their date of appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique vs Faqir Muhammad and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-14
  pre-emptiontenant definitionlesseeland reforms regulationretrospective effectleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These are petitions for leave to appeal arising from a judgment regarding the right of pre-emption claimed by a lessee of agricultural land. The petitioner, who was in cultivating possession of the suit land as a lessee, filed a pre-emption suit asserting a preferential right as a 'tenant' under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (M.L.R. 115). The trial court, appellate court, and Board of Revenue all ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, the High Court allowed a writ petition filed by the respondents, holding that the Land Reforms Regulation (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance (V of 1982) amended the definition of a tenant to expressly exclude a lessee, thereby negating the petitioner's preferential right. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that section 2 of the Amending Ordinance was prospective in effect, as other sections were expressly given retrospective effect while section 2 was not. The Supreme Court found the contentions worthy of consideration and granted leave to appeal, ordering that status quo be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amendment to the definition of 'tenant' under the Land Reforms Regulation (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 is retrospective or prospective in operation?
  • Does a lessee in cultivating possession of agricultural land retain a preferential right of pre-emption as a tenant after the enactment of the Land Reforms Regulation (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 1982?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq vs Muhammad Nawaz And Other1986 SCMR 773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-06
  murderacquittaldying declarationleave to appealwitness credibilityappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the acquittal of the respondents by the High Court in a murder case. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in its appraisal of evidence, specifically regarding the reliability of a dying declaration and the credibility of an eyewitness. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s acquittal was justified. It reasoned that the dying declaration was unreliable because the severity of the deceased's neck injury made a coherent statement unlikely, and the use of a thumb-impression for a literate deceased raised doubts about its authenticity. Furthermore, the Court upheld the rejection of the eyewitness's testimony due to his unnatural conduct in releasing the accused after apprehension and his failure to promptly report the incident. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts may properly reject evidence, including dying declarations, where the physical condition of the declarant or the conduct of witnesses renders the prosecution's narrative inherently doubtful or inconsistent with the objective facts of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dying declaration be rejected if the nature of the injury makes it physically improbable for the deceased to have made a coherent statement?
  • Does the unnatural conduct of an eyewitness, such as failing to report a crime promptly or releasing the accused after apprehension, justify the rejection of their testimony?
  • Is an appellate court justified in doubting a dying declaration where a literate deceased's thumb-impression is used instead of a signature?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq vs Khushi Muhammad1986 SCMR 973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-11
  pre-emption suitexecution proceedingsstay of executioninterlocutory applicationinfructuousleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal arising from a common order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed applications for the stay of execution proceedings in pre-emption suits. The petitioner had sought to stay the execution of decrees passed in favor of the respondents while their Regular First Appeals were pending before the High Court. Upon inquiry, the High Court determined that the impugned decrees had already been executed and that possession of the suit properties had been delivered to the decree-holders. Consequently, the High Court held that the request for suspension of the decrees had become infructuous and dismissed the stay applications. The Supreme Court of Pakistan reviewed the circumstances and found the High Court's order to be unexceptionable, noting that once a decree has been fully executed and possession transferred, the question of suspending or staying the execution proceedings no longer arises. Accordingly, the petitions were found to be without merit and were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application for the stay of execution proceedings be granted after the decree has already been executed and possession delivered?
  • Does the execution of a decree render a pending application for the stay of execution proceedings infructuous?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq vs Abdur Rahman And 5 Other1986 SCMR 1978 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-23
  bail cancellationmurderinvestigation reportblind murdertentative assessmentSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for special leave to appeal filed for the cancellation of bail granted by the Lahore High Court to eight respondents accused of murder. The core legal question concerns whether the reports of multiple investigating officers concluding the matter to be a blind murder can form a valid basis for granting bail to accused persons where eyewitnesses are closely related. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while police investigation reports are not binding on courts, they can be duly considered at the bail stage. The Court found that the High Court properly exercised its discretion in granting bail to seven of the respondents due to doubts regarding the presence of eyewitnesses in the middle of the night. However, bail granted to one specific respondent was cancelled because his identity was sufficiently established by distinct evidence showing he lured the deceased from his home. The key legal principle laid down is that police investigation reports, though non-binding, are relevant material at the bail stage, and bail may be sustained or refused based on the tentative assessment of the individual participation and identity of each accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether reports of investigating officers are binding on courts at the bail stage?
  • Can police investigation reports be taken into consideration when deciding on the grant of bail?
  • Does the presence of closely related eyewitnesses in a murder case affect the tentative assessment of evidence for bail purposes?
  • Whether bail once granted to an accused can be cancelled when there is distinct evidence establishing his identity and participation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq Alias Pheeka vs The State1986 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-21
  culpable homicidemurderocular testimonymedical evidenceabscondencecriminal petitionlife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner to life imprisonment under Section 304(I) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Sessions Judge, which was maintained by the High Court. The core legal question involved the assessment of ocular testimony, medical evidence, and the propriety of the conviction and sentence for culpable homicide not amounting to murder following an incident involving a fatal knife blow. The Supreme Court considered the medical evidence showing a fatal stab wound, the absence of injuries on the accused, and the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it, affirming the conviction and sentence. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony is supported by consistent medical evidence establishing a fatal injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and the accused fails to establish a right of private defence or mitigating circumstances, the conviction and sentence concurrently maintained will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court regarding a conviction under Section 304(I) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be interfered with when supported by ocular and medical evidence?
  • Can an accused claim the right of private defence when no injuries were sustained during the occurrence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will condone a delay in filing a petition where the sentence involves life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafi And 6 Others vs Khalid Rauf And Another1986 SCMR 1685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-28
  landlord and tenantejectmentdenial of titlestatutory groundsconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld their ejectment order from a shop. The respondent sought eviction on grounds of personal need and reconstruction, while the petitioners contested the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, finding no such relationship. However, the District Judge reversed this, holding the relationship existed and that the petitioners' denial of title automatically terminated the tenancy, leading to ejectment. The High Court dismissed the subsequent constitutional petition. Before the Supreme Court, the core legal question involved whether denial of the landlord's title automatically results in eviction without establishing statutory grounds. The Supreme Court held that while the finding on the relationship of landlord and tenant was a question of fact not open to challenge in constitutional jurisdiction, statutory grounds for eviction must still be established. The Court laid down the principle that mere denial of title and forfeiture does not automatically result in an eviction order without the statutory grounds being made out and properly put in issue. Leave to appeal was accordingly granted on this ground.

  Questions settled

  • Is a finding on the relationship of landlord and tenant open to challenge in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the denial of a landlord's title automatically result in an eviction order without establishing statutory grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qasim Chang vs Federal Service Tribunal And Another1986 SCMR 1656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-14
  WAPDA employeecivil servantdepartmental representationService Tribunal jurisdictionlimitation periodleave to appealservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal as time-barred. The petitioner, an employee of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), was removed from service under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958. Following his removal, the petitioner filed a departmental representation before approaching the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that WAPDA employees are not civil servants for the purposes of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and thus lack the right to make departmental representations under Section 22 of that Act, rendering the appeal filed after the statutory limitation period inadmissible. The core legal question concerns whether WAPDA employees, deemed civil servants under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, possess the right to file departmental representations under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, as a prerequisite to invoking the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. Finding that the legal issues raised are of first impression and substantial public importance, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative interpretation of the statutory provisions governing the service rights of WAPDA employees.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Water and Power Development Authority considered civil servants for the purposes of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does a WAPDA employee have the right to file a departmental representation under Section 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, before approaching the Service Tribunal?
  • Is a departmental representation a mandatory prerequisite for a WAPDA employee to invoke the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nazir vs Muhammad Ali And Another1986 SCMR 1441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-16
  appeal against acquittalextra-judicial confessioncircumstantial evidenceappreciation of evidencestock witnessmiscarriage of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal against acquittal arose from a murder conviction set aside by the Lahore High Court. The prosecution alleged that the respondent murdered the deceased, Maqsood Anwar, relying on an extra-judicial confession, motive, and recovery of incriminating items. The High Court acquitted the respondent, finding the extra-judicial confession unreliable due to the witness's relationship with the complainant and improvements made in testimony, and casting doubt on the recovery evidence, noting the recovery witness was a 'stock witness' for the police. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's reasoning was flawed or constituted a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were not based on misreading of evidence and that the mere possibility of a different opinion on the appreciation of evidence is insufficient to set aside an acquittal. The Court affirmed that circumstantial evidence, such as the accused sleeping in a different room of the same premises, was insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other reliable proof. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the mere existence of another possibility regarding the appreciation of evidence a sufficient ground for setting aside a judgment of acquittal?
  • Can a judgment of acquittal be set aside based solely on the circumstance that the accused was present in the same premises as the deceased during the night of the occurrence, where they were sleeping in different rooms?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Muhammad Saeed Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-09
  quo warrantodisqualificationdepot-holderacademic controversyZilla Councilnomination papersresignation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the qualification of a Zilla Council member who was a depot-holder. The core legal question was whether the respondent remained disqualified as a depot-holder at the time of filing nomination papers, given that he had submitted a resignation that had not yet been formally accepted by the Food Department. The High Court had held that the relationship was one of principal and agent, and since the respondent had expressed an intention to resign, he was effectively relieved of the agency regardless of formal acceptance, thus removing the disqualification. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the controversy was no longer live. The Court noted that subsequent legislative changes via Ordinance IV of 1981 had removed the disqualification for depot-holders, rendering any further adjudication academic and futile. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will decline to exercise its jurisdiction when the underlying legal controversy has been resolved by subsequent legislation, making the requested relief practically valueless.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the underlying legal controversy has been rendered academic by subsequent legislation?
  • Is the relationship between a depot-holder and the Food Department considered one of principal and agent such that resignation is effective upon expression of intent?
  • Can a constitutional petition challenging a member's qualification be dismissed if the disqualification has been removed by a subsequent change in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Daud Khan And Other1986 SCMR 710 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-25
  criminal appealleave to appealacquittalre-appraisal of evidenceeyewitness testimonymurderattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two Criminal Petitions for Leave to Appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which acquitted the respondents, Daud Khan and Arshad Khan, of charges related to murder and attempted murder. The respondents were initially convicted by trial courts for the murder of Amir Khan and causing injuries to Lal Khan, with sentences of life imprisonment and fines. The High Court subsequently acquitted both accused, citing doubts regarding the presence of eyewitnesses based on minor contradictions and medical evidence. The petitioner challenged this acquittal, arguing that the High Court's decision relied on surmises and conjectures, ignored the testimony of an injured witness whose presence was corroborated by physical injuries, and failed to adhere to the principles governing the safe administration of criminal justice. Upon reviewing the record and the arguments presented, the Supreme Court found substance in the petitioner's contentions. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions, determining that a re-appraisal of the entire evidence is necessary to ensure justice, as the High Court's reasoning regarding the eyewitnesses and medical evidence appeared flawed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of an injured witness in a criminal occurrence provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction?
  • Can an appellate court acquit an accused based on minor contradictions in eyewitness testimony?
  • Is a re-appraisal of evidence warranted when an acquittal judgment is based on surmises and conjectures rather than the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz And Others vs Mst. Ismat Jan1986 SCMR 1238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-06
  power of attorneyauthentication of documentsland giftlimitationvoid transactioninheritance rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a Regular Second Appeal regarding a disputed land gift. The core legal question was whether a power of attorney, purportedly executed by the original owner while residing in Indonesia, was legally authenticated and proved, thereby validating the subsequent gift of land made by the attorney to his own sons. The respondent, the sister of the attorney, had challenged the gift to recover her share of the ancestral property. The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, holding that the document in question failed to meet the necessary legal requirements for authentication, as it was not executed before or authenticated by a Notary Public, Court, Judge, Magistrate, or authorized representative. Furthermore, the Court upheld the finding that the gift was void, rendering the suit not barred by limitation. The key principle laid down is that a power of attorney executed abroad must strictly comply with established authentication procedures to be admissible and valid for transferring property rights.

  Questions settled

  • Is a power of attorney executed abroad valid if it is not authenticated by a Notary Public, Court, Judge, Magistrate, or authorized representative?
  • Does a void gift of land trigger the bar of limitation in a suit for recovery of inheritance share?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz And Another vs The State And Another1986 SCMR 1509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-02
  illegal gratificationcorruptionleave to appealsentencingpublic servantcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had partially accepted an appeal by a Patwari convicted under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The trial court had originally sentenced the accused to imprisonment and a fine for accepting illegal gratification. The High Court set aside the imprisonment sentence but maintained and reduced the fine, stipulating that failure to pay would result in detention. The accused challenged the conviction, while the State challenged the leniency of the sentence, specifically arguing that the sentence imposed was not commensurate with the gravity of the offence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan condoned the delay in the State's petition and granted leave to appeal in both petitions. The core legal question addressed is whether the sentence imposed by the High Court adequately reflects the gravity of the corruption offence committed by the public servant, necessitating a full review of both the conviction and the sentencing quantum.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sentence of fine alone, without imprisonment, adequately address the gravity of a corruption offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal in cross-petitions challenging both the conviction and the quantum of sentence in a corruption case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nasrullah vs Azizul Qadir And Other1986 SCMR 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-22
  rent disputeleave to appealcompromiseextension of timevacation of premiseslandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the High Court dismissing a writ petition in a rent dispute. During the proceedings, the petitioner's counsel chose not to press the petition on its merits and instead requested additional time to vacate the residential premises. The respondent-landlord consented to granting a four-month grace period, subject to the conditions that the petitioner delivers vacant possession of the house by the specified date and pays the monthly rent in advance for this extended period. The Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted this mutual agreement, granting the petitioner four months to vacate the premises under the agreed-upon terms, and consequently dismissed the petition with no order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can grant an extension of time to a tenant to vacate premises based on a mutual agreement between the parties?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed as not pressed on merits if the tenant only seeks time to vacate the premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naqi vs Chief Settlement Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 830 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-09
  settlement lawsproperty transferconstitutional jurisdictiondemolished propertyrevision petitionallotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed constitutional petitions concerning the transfer of property under settlement laws. The petitioner, having been allotted a Chaubara that was subsequently demolished, sought the transfer of a shop (U/355) as compensation. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was entitled to the transfer of a shop in lieu of a demolished structure and whether a second revision petition had been validly pending and subsequently decided by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having lost possession of the demolished Chaubara and failing to seek reconstruction or alternative allotment, could not claim the transfer of a separate shop. Furthermore, the Court declined to interfere with the factual findings regarding the status of the second revision petition, noting that such findings, made during the reconstruction of records, were not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that a claimant cannot, based on the allotment of a non-existent property, secure the transfer of an entirely different property without legal entitlement or possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claimant secure the transfer of a property based on the previous allotment of a structure that has since been demolished?
  • Is a finding of fact made during the reconstruction of lost records subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the transfer of a shop in lieu of a demolished Chaubara constitute a valid transfer under settlement schemes when the claimant is not in possession of the shop?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem And 2 Others vs Additional District Judge, Multan1986 SCMR 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-03
  dismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of suitgood causepre-emption suitleave to appealrevision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the restoration of a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerned whether sufficient and good cause was shown by the plaintiff for his non-appearance on the date fixed for evidence, leading to the dismissal of his suit for non-prosecution, thus justifying its subsequent restoration by the trial court after remand. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had indeed demonstrated good cause, noting that the plaintiff was a heart patient who suffered a heart attack and left the court premises before the case was called, while his counsel was engaged in court for bail matters. Consequently, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower forums that the restoration was lawful and properly ordered. The key principle laid down is that sudden medical emergencies substantiated by record, coupled with counsel's unavoidable preoccupation, constitute sufficient good cause for setting aside a dismissal for non-prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff suffering a sudden medical emergency like a heart attack constitutes good cause for non-appearance to justify the restoration of a dismissed suit?
  • Does the absence of counsel due to engagement in other criminal proceedings amount to sufficient ground for setting aside an order of dismissal for non-prosecution?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere in concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the sufficiency of cause shown for the restoration of a civil suit under revisional or constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mushtaq And Others vs The State And Other1986 SCMR 1521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-24
  criminal petitionculpable homicidemurder convictionmitigating circumstancessentence reductionleave to appealjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition filed by a complainant challenging the High Court's decision to alter the convictions of the respondents, Muhammad Mushtaq and Niamat Ali, from murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to culpable homicide under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondents had been convicted by the trial court for the murder of Nawab Din, with Mushtaq sentenced to death and Niamat to life imprisonment. The High Court reduced these convictions based on the deceased's age and the nature of the injuries. The Supreme Court examined the High Court's reasoning, finding the mitigating factors cited—specifically the age of the deceased—to be irrelevant given the gravity of the injuries inflicted, which included a fatal head fracture. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal regarding the conviction and sentence of Muhammad Mushtaq, noting the lack of sound legal basis for the High Court's reduction of the charge, while refusing leave in the case of Niamat Ali, whose conviction under Section 304-II was maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Can the age of a deceased victim serve as a valid mitigating factor to reduce a conviction from murder to culpable homicide?
  • Is the reduction of a sentence from death to imprisonment for life based on irrelevant mitigating factors legally sustainable?
  • Under what circumstances may the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against a High Court's alteration of a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mubin vs Abdul Hakim And Other1986 SCMR 651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-12
  revisional jurisdictionDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) ActProduce Index Unitssoil classificationquestion of fact vs lawsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a Settlement Revision under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, concerning the classification of land abandoned in Bikaner State and its corresponding Produce Index Units (P.I. Units). The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 21 of the Act, could substitute its own findings of fact regarding soil classification and P.I. Units for those determined by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by conducting an elaborate inquiry into factual matters and substituting its own findings, as Section 21 restricts the High Court to questions of law. The Court affirmed that the classification of soil and the determination of P.I. Units are essentially questions of fact, not subject to interference in revision unless there is a manifest misreading of the record. The key principle laid down is that the High Court cannot, under the guise of revisional jurisdiction, re-evaluate evidence to reach a different factual conclusion or substitute its own assessment for that of the competent Settlement Authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, extend to the determination of disputed questions of fact?
  • Is the classification of soil and the assignment of Produce Index Units a question of law or a question of fact?
  • Can the High Court substitute its own findings of fact for those of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in a revision petition under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Manzoor vs National Bank of Pakistan1986 SCMR 1366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-17
  recovery suitlimitation periodbalance confirmation slipmortgage deedcivil petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil suit for the recovery of a loan filed by the respondent National Bank of Pakistan against the petitioner Muhammad Manzoor, which was decreed by the trial court, upheld in appeal by the Additional District Judge, and further dismissed in limine by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the respondent's recovery suit was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the suit was within time because the limitation period was validly extended prior to its expiry through the execution of a mortgage deed and the subsequent signing of a Balance Account Slip by the petitioner acknowledging the outstanding debt. The key principle laid down is that the execution of a mortgage deed and the signing of a balance confirmation slip prior to the expiration of the original limitation period effectively extends limitation for filing a recovery suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the execution of a mortgage deed prior to the expiry of the original limitation period extend the time for filing a recovery suit?
  • Whether signing a Balance Account Slip effectively extends the period of limitation for the recovery of a loan?
  • Can a debtor challenge a Balance Account Slip without producing evidence to disprove their signature?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif vs The Senior Civil Judge, Sialkot And Other1986 SCMR 329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-07-02
  election disputesecrecy of ballotinvalid ballot papersPunjab Local Council Election Rulesvitiation of electionballot marking
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two election appeals arising from a dispute over the validity of ballot papers where election staff recorded identity card numbers on the back of the ballots. The lower courts held that this practice violated the principle of secrecy of the ballot and contravened Rule 29 of the Punjab Local Council Election Rules, 1979, thereby vitiating the entire election. The appellants challenged this, relying on Rule 40(4)(b) of the same Rules, arguing that ballot papers are only invalid if the voter themselves marks or writes something that identifies them, not if election officials do so. The Supreme Court noted that both parties relied on the precedent of Niaz Ahmad v. Azizuddin (PLD 1967 SC 466), which required interpretation and potential modification or amplification. Given that the precedent was established by a five-judge bench, the Court determined that these appeals necessitated consideration by a larger bench of at least five judges to resolve the conflict regarding the interpretation of the election rules and the effect of official markings on ballot secrecy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recording of identity card numbers on the back of ballot papers by election staff violate the principle of secrecy of the ballot?
  • Under Rule 40(4)(b) of the Punjab Local Council Election Rules, 1979, are ballot papers invalidated only by markings made by the voter, or also by markings made by election officials?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif vs Officer on Special Duty, Central Record Office, Lahore AndAnother1986 SCMR 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-12
  allotment of landsuccessor-in-interestmukhbari applicationrestoration of allotmentreverification of entitlementforeclosed questionreview petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from the cancellation of an allotment of land made to the petitioner as the successor-in-interest of deceased claimants, which was cancelled on the ground of fraud. The petitioner's initial challenges to the cancellation were dismissed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, with a review petition dismissed in 1967. Subsequently, the petitioner obtained new records from India and sought restoration of the allotment. The High Court, in a subsequent writ petition, directed the Central Record Office to reverify the petitioner's entitlement but explicitly held that the petitioner could not reopen the previously cancelled allotment, a position accepted by the petitioner's counsel at the time. The petitioner's subsequent attempt to restore the allotment was dismissed by the High Court on the basis of the earlier judgment. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the petitions for leave to appeal, held that the question of the petitioner's entitlement to the land originally allotted stood foreclosed by the Supreme Court's 1967 dismissal of the review application.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner seek the restoration of a cancelled land allotment based on newly obtained records if the cancellation has already been upheld by the Supreme Court in a final review order?
  • Does a concession made by a party's counsel before the High Court, stating they do not wish to reopen a cancelled allotment, bind the party in subsequent proceedings?
  • Whether a question of entitlement to land stands foreclosed once a review application challenging its cancellation is dismissed by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif vs Hakim Nisar Ahmed And Other1986 SCMR 650 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-17
  ejectmentpersonal requirementlandlord and tenantrent controlbona fide needleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an eviction order against a tenant, Muhammad Latif, initiated by the landlord, Hakim Nisar Ahmed, on grounds of personal requirement for his son, unauthorized subletting, and default in rent payment. The Rent Controller ordered eviction based on personal requirement and unauthorized subletting. The Additional District Judge upheld the eviction solely on the ground of personal requirement, a decision subsequently affirmed by the Lahore High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the ejectment application was incompetent because another shop owned by the landlord had become vacant prior to the filing of the application, rendering the current eviction unnecessary. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that it is the prerogative of the landlord, not the tenant, to determine which premises are suitable for the specific trade or business intended for their family member. Finding no merit in the petition, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the landlord has the discretion to choose the property best suited for their bona fide requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant dictate which of a landlord's properties should be used to satisfy the landlord's personal requirement?
  • Is a landlord's ejectment application incompetent if another property owned by the landlord becomes vacant before the application is filed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif Bhatti And Another vs The Chairman, A.E.B.(E) WAPDA1986 SCMR 935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-28
  service grievance noticeService Tribunal jurisdictionWAPDA Efficiency and Discipline Rulesindustrial relationsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The two petitions under Article 212(3) of the Constitution raise a common question of law concerning whether a service grievance notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, filed under a misconception of law, can be considered sufficient compliance with rule 11 of the Water and Power Development Authority (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, to invoke the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act read with section 17 of the Water and Power Development Authority Act. A further question examined is whether non-compliance with rule 11 of the said rules could be ignored in entertaining and adjudicating the petitioners' appeals. Noting a divergence of opinion on the matter, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative pronouncement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a service grievance notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance be taken as sufficient compliance with rule 11 of the Water and Power Development Authority (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978?
  • Whether non-compliance with rule 11 of the Water and Power Development Authority (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978 can be ignored for entertaining and adjudicating appeals by the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif And Another vs Muhammad Fazil And 2 Other1986 SCMR 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-19
  petition for leave to appealconstitutional petitionlandlord and tenantevacuee propertycivil court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition, which challenged an appellate order setting aside an eviction decision on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant was not proved. The core legal question concerned whether observations made by the High Court regarding the potential lack of jurisdiction of a civil court over evacuee property would prejudice the petitioners' future legal recourse. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the grievance regarding the High Court's observations was justified, as it could prejudice the petitioners' civil suit. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it to the extent of quashing the High Court's observations concerning the civil court's jurisdiction over evacuee property, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The key principle laid down is that superior courts should avoid making observations on matters such as civil court jurisdiction that might prejudice a party's right to seek independent legal remedies regarding property title.

  Questions settled

  • Whether observations made by the High Court regarding the jurisdiction of a civil court over evacuee property should be quashed if they prejudice a party's title suit?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal to address prejudicial observations made by a lower court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khurshid vs Wazirzada And Other1986 SCMR 181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-12
  post-conviction bailbail cancellationmandatory sentenceSection 302 P.P.C.Section 426 Cr.P.C.illegal sentencejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which granted bail to respondents convicted of various offenses, including murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion under Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, by granting bail to convicted persons based on the fact that the trial court had erroneously awarded a five-year sentence for a Section 302 offense, rather than the mandatory death or life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the trial court committed a legal error in sentencing, and the High Court further erred by applying the criteria of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898—which governs pre-trial bail—to a post-conviction bail application under Section 426. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and cancelled the bail. The judgment establishes that bail under Section 426 cannot be justified by relying on an illegal, lenient sentence imposed by a trial court in contravention of mandatory sentencing provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 based on an illegally lenient sentence imposed by a trial court?
  • Does the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to bail applications filed under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a sentence of five years imprisonment for an offense under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 legally valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan vs Syed Abdul Khaliq and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 717 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-02
  election petitiondisqualificationsubsisting contractgovernment contractorstatutory interpretationpenal statutecontract performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an election dispute where the Election Tribunal declared the election of the returned candidate, Muhammad Khan, null and void, citing a disqualification under Article 10(2)(b)(8) of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977, due to a subsisting government contract. The core legal question was whether a contract is considered 'subsisting' for disqualification purposes if the contractor has physically completed the work within the stipulated time, even if final measurements and payments occurred post-nomination. The Supreme Court held that the disqualification clause must be strictly construed, as it is penal in nature. The Court determined that where a candidate has performed their contractual obligations within the agreed timeframe and communicated an intention to cease being an approved contractor, the contract does not remain 'subsisting' merely because administrative formalities like final measurements or payments are pending. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, ruling that the candidate suffered no disqualification. The principle laid down is that for disqualification to apply, a candidate must have a subsisting interest in both the contract and its active execution; completed performance terminates this interest.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government contract remain 'subsisting' for election disqualification purposes if the contractor has completed the work but final payment is pending?
  • Should election disqualification provisions be interpreted strictly or broadly?
  • Can a candidate unilaterally terminate their status as an approved government contractor to avoid disqualification?
  • Does the mere pendency of administrative formalities like final measurements constitute a subsisting interest in the execution of a contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan vs Muhammad Khan And Other1986 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  bail after leave to appealappeal against acquittalpost-leave baildelay in hearingcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed against the acquittal of the respondents, who were initially convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and subsequently acquitted by the High Court. After leave to appeal was granted and non-bailable warrants were issued, the respondents surrendered. Pending the hearing of the appeal, the respondents applied for bail. The core legal question concerns the discretion of the court to grant bail to respondents in an appeal against acquittal after leave has been granted, particularly when the appeal is delayed. The Supreme Court held that one of the applicants, who was attributed a minor role and had faced a significant delay of over a year without the appeal being fixed for hearing, should be released on bail, while the bail applications of the remaining two applicants were dismissed. The key principle laid down is that post-leave bail in appeals against acquittal may be considered in cases involving lesser attribution coupled with unreasonable delay in the fixation of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted to respondents in an appeal against acquittal after leave has been granted by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a minor attribution coupled with a delay in fixing the appeal for hearing constitute sufficient ground for granting bail?
  • What is the principle applied when considering a bail application pending the hearing of an appeal against acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 1252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-04
  criminal petitiondouble murderreappraisal of evidenceenhancement of sentenceconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two criminal petitions: one filed by the accused convicts against their convictions and sentences for double murder, and the other filed by the complainant for the enhancement of those sentences. The core legal question involves whether the Supreme Court should reappraise the evidence and interfere with concurrent factual findings of the courts below regarding convictions and the reduction of sentences. The Supreme Court held that it is not inclined to enter into a reappraisal of evidence or reverse concurrent findings of fact reached by the lower courts when no valid legal contention is raised, and further held that the reasons recorded by the High Court for awarding lesser sentences are tenable. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will generally decline to reappraise evidence to upset concurrent findings of fact in criminal petitions where no substantial question of law is presented.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court reappraise evidence to reverse concurrent findings of fact reached by courts below when no legal contention is urged?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere with an impugned judgment reducing a sentence where the reasons recorded by the High Court are tenable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khalid vs The State1986 SCMR 1956 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-10
  criminal appealmurder convictiongrave and sudden provocationdefence versionappellate interferenceconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner, Muhammad Khalid, for the murder of his wife, Mst. Naseem Akhtar, under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and for house-trespass under Section 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment and fines by the trial court, which were subsequently maintained by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts erred in rejecting the petitioner's defence version, which claimed the act was committed under grave and sudden provocation after he allegedly discovered his wife in a compromising position with a stranger. Upon reviewing the judgments of the courts below, the Supreme Court found that the defence version had been properly evaluated and correctly rejected by the lower courts. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the plea lacked merit and dismissed the petition, thereby affirming the conviction and sentences imposed upon the petitioner. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the credibility of a defence plea when properly considered by lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the rejection of a defence plea?
  • Does the discovery of a spouse in a compromising position automatically constitute grave and sudden provocation for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Kamil And Others Muhammad Kamil And Others vs Additional Settlement Commissioner And Another Settlement and Rehabilitation, Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 128 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jameel And Others vs Zahoor Ahmad1986 SCMR 1088 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-07
  ejectmentpersonal bona fide needlandlord and tenanturban rent restrictionspecial leave to appealconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an ejectment order passed against the tenant petitioners by the Rent Controller, which was subsequently reversed by the District Judge and upheld in second appeal by the Lahore High Court. The respondent-landlord sought the ejectment of the petitioners from a shop in Shahi Bazar, Bahawalpur, on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement for his business, as he operated an adjacent shop and needed space for extension and storage. The core legal question was whether the landlord's requirement was bona fide and whether he was entitled to seek vacation of a rented or owned property despite occupying other premises. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide need of the landlord, recorded by the first appellate court and the High Court, were based on proper appreciation of evidence and warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that a landlord has a right to seek the ejectment of a tenant for personal use notwithstanding the occupation of other rented premises, and concurrent findings of fact on bona fide need, if not based on misreading of evidence, are binding in appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord can seek ejectment of a tenant for personal use when already occupying other premises?
  • Are concurrent or non-concurrent findings of fact regarding bona fide need binding in second appeal if not based on misreading of evidence?
  • Can a landlord claim a shop in good faith for the extension of an existing business and storage of goods?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ittefaq vs The State1986 SCMR 1627 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-10
  concurrent sentencessentencing errorimprisonment for lifecriminal procedurecorrection of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a correction in a sentencing order where the trial court, having originally awarded death sentences, failed to specify that the subsequent sentences of imprisonment for life and imprisonment under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 should run concurrently. The Supreme Court observed that the consecutive running of these sentences violated the statutory requirements set forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Specifically, the Court noted that the trial court's omission to order concurrent sentencing was an error in light of the modification of the original death penalty. Relying on established precedent and the interest of justice, the Court held that all sentences of imprisonment awarded to the petitioner must run concurrently rather than consecutively. This judgment reaffirms the principle that where multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed, the court must ensure compliance with the statutory provisions governing the concurrent running of such sentences to avoid illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Does the consecutive running of multiple sentences of imprisonment violate the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct that sentences of imprisonment run concurrently when the trial court failed to specify such an order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Israr And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 558 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Raja Muhammad Asghar and Others s1986 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-07
  pre-emptionretrospective operationstatutory notificationvested rightsMangla Dam displaced personsdecree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent. During the pendency of the suit, the Board of Revenue issued a notification under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913, declaring that no right of pre-emption would exist for three years regarding certain sales in favour of displaced persons affected by the construction of the Mangla Dam. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the notification extinguished the pre-emptor's right before the decree. The appellate courts reversed this, holding the notification was prospective and did not affect accrued rights. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that a pre-emptor must possess the right of pre-emption on the date of sale, the date of filing the suit, and the date of the decree. Where a notification under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 is issued during the pendency of a suit and before a decree is passed, it effectively extinguishes the right of pre-emption, preventing the court from granting a decree.

  Questions settled

  • Must a pre-emptor's right to pre-empt subsist continuously from the date of sale up to the date of the decree?
  • Does a notification issued under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 during the pendency of a suit extinguish a pre-emptor's right if no decree has yet been passed?
  • Can a pre-emption notification taking away the right of pre-emption affect a case where a decree has already been obtained by the pre-emptor prior to its promulgation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Muhammad Shafi And Other1986 SCMR 728 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-12
  partition suitconcurrent findings of factleave to appealmisreading of evidencesecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which accepted a Regular Second Appeal and modified the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts regarding the partition of disputed property. The respondent had filed a suit for possession through partition, to which the petitioner contested ownership regarding items Jeem and Dal. The trial court and the District Judge held in favour of the petitioner, finding that items Jeem and Dal belonged to him. However, the High Court reversed these concurrent findings of fact and ordered the entire property, including Jeem and Dal, to be partitioned. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the High Court legally erred in setting aside concurrent findings of fact and misread the documentary evidence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised require detailed examination, and directed that the interim order shall continue pending the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial and first appellate courts in a second appeal?
  • Does the misreading of a documentary agreement by the appellate court warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether properties claimed to be exclusively owned by a defendant can be subjected to partition without resolving ownership disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Mansab And Other1986 SCMR 609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-16
  leave to appealacquittalprivate defencebenefit of doubtinjuries on accusedreappraisal of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby the conviction and sentences of three respondents under section 302/34 and section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were set aside and they were acquitted. The core legal question involves evaluating the correctness of the High Court's appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the right of private defence, the explanation of injuries on the accused, the reliability of the motive, and the credibility of eyewitness and recovery evidence in a murder trial. The Supreme Court held that the view taken by the High Court was reasonable and supported by the record, noting that the prosecution failed to plausibly explain the incised injuries sustained by the respondents, that the defence version was corroborated by medical evidence, and that material flaws existed in the prosecution's case regarding motive, the informant's status, and weapon recoveries. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the extension of the benefit of doubt to the respondents and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's acquittal of the accused on the basis of an unexplained injury on the accused's side and a plausible right of private defence warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the injuries sustained by the accused undermine the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • Whether the recovery of weapons from an open public place after a significant delay can be safely relied upon to sustain a conviction?
  • Does a judgment of acquittal proceeding on grounds well accepted for the safe administration of criminal justice call for interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Rafi And 2 Others vs The Province of Punjab, Lahore1986 SCMR 680 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-11
  medical college admissiondeduction of marksextra chanceconstitutional petitionnecessary partiesinter-court appealsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court setting aside a single judge's decision and upholding the Provincial Government's admission policy for medical colleges. The core legal question was whether the government's rule deducting ten marks for each extra chance availed or attempt made to improve marks in F.Sc./B.Sc. examinations was arbitrary, and whether failure to implead affected students was fatal to the constitutional petitions. The Supreme Court held that the government possesses the lawful authority to frame such admission policies in the broader academic interest without judicial interference unless proven unreasonable or arbitrary, and that failing to implead necessary parties whose admissions would be affected is fatal to the maintainability of the writ petition. The key principles established are that executive policy regarding educational admissions is a matter of administrative discretion entitled to judicial deference if not arbitrary, and that affected beneficiaries must be impleaded as necessary parties in constitutional petitions challenging admissions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Provincial Government has the right to lay down a policy deducting marks for extra chances in F.Sc. examinations for medical college admissions?
  • Is the rule deducting ten marks for each additional attempt made to pass or improve marks in the Intermediate Examination arbitrary?
  • Does the failure to implead students who would be affected by the success of a constitutional petition against medical college admissions render the petition fatal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and Others vs Mirza Muhammad Hussain and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-07-03
  specific performanceagreement to sellGovernment landproprietary rightsColonization of Government Lands Actcontingent contractoral agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a decree for specific performance of an oral agreement to sell Government land. The original grantee (since deceased) entered into an oral agreement with the respondent to transfer the land once proprietary rights were conferred by the Provincial Government, receiving the consideration in advance. After proprietary rights were subsequently conferred on the deceased grantee's legal heirs, they refused to perform the contract and sold the land to the appellants. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an agreement to sell Government land, entered into prior to the acquisition of proprietary rights, is void or barred under Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court's judgment, following its own Full Bench precedent. The Court held that an agreement to sell contingent upon the acquisition of proprietary rights is not an impermissible transfer or charge under Section 19 of the Act, nor does it violate public policy, making it legally enforceable once proprietary rights are conferred.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell Government land executed before the acquisition of proprietary rights violate Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912?
  • Is a suit for specific performance maintainable upon an agreement to sell land where performance is postponed until proprietary rights are conferred by the Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal And Others vs Abdul Hamid1986 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-26
  pre-emptioncourt feeleave to appealdeficiency in court feecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal filed by the vendees, Muhammad Iqbal and others, challenging the dismissal of their Regular First Appeal (R.F.A.) in a pre-emption suit initiated by the respondent, Abdul Hamid. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the procedural implications of a plaintiff deliberately fixing a nominal court fee in a pre-emption suit and whether, under such circumstances, the trial court or appellate court is justified in allowing the plaintiff to subsequently rectify the deficiency in the court fee. The Supreme Court, upon hearing the petitioners' counsel and the respondent's representative, determined that the petition raised substantial questions of law worthy of further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to specifically consider the effect of the deliberate under-valuation of the court fee and the propriety of permitting the deficiency to be made up. The Court ordered the provision of security in the amount of Rs. 2,000 and allowed the parties to file additional documents for the final hearing on the same record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deliberate fixing of a nominal court fee in a pre-emption suit preclude the plaintiff from later making up the deficiency?
  • Under what circumstances should a court allow a plaintiff to rectify a deficiency in court fees in a pre-emption case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal And Another vs Secretary to the Government of Punjab And Other1986 SCMR 835 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-10
  service tribunalseniorityofficiating executive engineersclass i service of engineersleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the consolidated judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding the fixation of seniority in the cadre of officiating Executive Engineers in Class I Service of Engineers in the Irrigation Department of the Government of Punjab. The core legal question involves the proper interpretation and application of seniority rules, specifically rule 15.2 and rule 15.4, concerning temporary Engineers, Class II Officers, and promotees regarding continuous officiation versus cadre seniority. The court granted leave to consider whether the Tribunal misconstrued the explanation to rule 15.2 and whether the relative seniority of the parties was correctly determined. The court held that the contentions raised by the petitioners regarding continuous officiating service and the applicability of the rules required deeper consideration, thereby granting leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • How is seniority determined for Class II Officers and temporary Engineers holding posts of Executive Engineers under rule 15.2?
  • Whether continuous officiation as an Executive Engineer determines seniority in Class I Service under the applicable rules?
  • Does the explanation to rule 15.2 apply to cases of promotion from Assistant Executive Engineers to Executive Engineers in the manner interpreted by the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal And Another vs Secretary to Government of Punjab1986 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-30
  service seniorityencadrizationup-gradation of statusIrrigation Engineers Services (Class I) Rules 1967civil servicestatutory interpretationservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a seniority dispute within the Irrigation Department of the Government of Punjab, specifically regarding the interpretation of the Irrigation Engineers Services (Class I) Rules, 1967. The core legal question was whether the government's notification granting "Class I status" to all Graduate Engineers ipso facto resulted in their encadrization into the Class I service, thereby requiring their induction at the junior Class I level regardless of their existing rank. The Supreme Court held that the mere up-gradation of status via notification does not constitute encadrization into the service established by the 1967 Rules. The Court clarified that the Rules of 1967 prescribe specific procedures for filling vacancies through absorption and promotion, which must be strictly followed. The Tribunal's reliance on the up-gradation notification to determine seniority was found to be legally flawed. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and directed that seniority lists be redrawn in accordance with the statutory provisions of the 1967 Rules, emphasizing that administrative up-gradation cannot override the established statutory framework for service recruitment and seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the administrative up-gradation of status to Class I automatically result in encadrization into the Irrigation Engineers Service?
  • Must seniority in the grade of Executive Engineer be determined by the rules governing promotion rather than by the date of up-gradation to Class I status?
  • Does the Irrigation Engineers Services (Class I) Rules, 1967 require the department to classify vacant posts and fill them through specific absorption and promotion procedures?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nabi And Others vs Muhammad Munir Ahmad And Other1986 SCMR 1321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-17
  bailbail cancellationvacation judgesessions trialcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court which accepted the application of respondent No.1 and set aside the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Gujrat, dated 15-8-1985, through which bail was allowed to the petitioners. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting bail by a Sessions Judge who was merely attending to urgent matters during vacations rather than trying the case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court was fully justified in setting aside the bail order granted under such circumstances. The petition was dismissed with the observation that the trial judge should make every effort to dispose of the Sessions Trial expeditiously at the defence stage before the end of the year.

  Questions settled

  • Was the High Court justified in setting aside an order of bail granted by a Sessions Judge who was merely attending to urgent matters during vacations?
  • Can a Sessions Judge not trying the main case grant bail during vacation periods?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ilyas vs Muhammad Din And Other1986 SCMR 594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-10
  evictionleave to appealjudicial admissionrent restrictionappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns five petitions for leave to appeal filed by the same petitioner against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the District Judge's decision to set aside eviction orders previously granted by the trial court. The petitioner sought the eviction of the respondents from specific premises under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1969. The appellate court had reversed the eviction decree, reasoning that the petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence establishing that the premises occupied by the respondents were part of the property transferred to the petitioner. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the lower appellate court and the High Court erred by disregarding a judicial admission made by the respondents before the trial court, wherein they acknowledged their occupation of the premises in question. The Supreme Court, finding that the issue regarding the weight and effect of this admission required further consideration, granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower courts wrongly refused to rely on the respondents' statement. The Court directed the preparation of the record and expedited the hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judicial admission made by a respondent regarding occupation of premises is binding upon the appellate court?
  • Can an appellate court set aside an eviction order if it determines that the petitioner failed to prove the property was transferred to them?
  • Does the failure of lower courts to consider a specific admission of fact by a party warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ilyas Khan vs Muhammad And Other1986 SCMR 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-25
  mutationagreement for salespecific performancerevenue recordslimitationrevisional jurisdictionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the mutation of land in the revenue records. The petitioner claimed ownership of the disputed land based on an agreement for sale executed in 1960. Following the death of the vendor, the Mukhtiarkar mutated the land in favor of the vendor's heirs. On appeal, the Assistant Commissioner reversed this and mutated the land in the petitioner's name, which was subsequently set aside by the Commissioner on the ground that mutation cannot be effected on a mere agreement for sale without a registered sale-deed. The Member, Board of Revenue, subsequently remanded the matter to the Mukhtiarkar. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition against the remand order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, holding that since a civil suit for specific performance was already pending, the civil court was the appropriate forum to decide the questions of title and locus standi. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a revisional order passed on the merits by the Board of Revenue is not rendered invalid even if intermediary appellate orders were allegedly time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Can revenue authorities effect a mutation of land in the revenue records solely on the basis of an agreement for sale in the absence of a registered sale-deed?
  • Is a revisional order passed on the merits by the Board of Revenue rendered void or invalid if the intermediary appellate orders before the lower revenue authorities were allegedly time-barred?
  • Should a constitutional court interfere with a revenue remand order when a civil suit for specific performance of the underlying agreement is already pending before a civil court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Idrees vs Additional District Judge, Lahore And Other1986 SCMR 981 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-09
  rent disputedenial of tenancyagreement to sellpart performancepossession protectionlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This rent matter arose from a petition where the petitioner denied the relationship of landlord and tenant with respondent No. 3. The petitioner contended that the original owner, respondent No. 4, had executed an agreement for sale in his favour and claimed protection of his possession under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could invoke the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A to protect his possession. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner did not enter into possession of the property under or in terms of the contract/agreement for sale with respondent No. 4, he could not claim protection under the said provision. The Supreme Court found no force in the petition and dismissed it accordingly. The key principle laid down is that protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is not available to a party who did not obtain possession of the property under the terms of the agreement for sale.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person claim protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 if possession was not obtained under the agreement for sale?
  • Is a tenant entitled to deny the landlord-tenant relationship based on an unfulfilled sale agreement without entering possession pursuant to it?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim And Others vs The State And Other1986 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Miss Mumtaz And 9 Other1986 SCMR 1643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-17
  residual propertypermanent transfer deedproperty disputeadministrative jurisdictionwrit petitionejectment proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves three connected petitions for leave to appeal concerning property disputes and related ejectment proceedings. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Administrator (Residual Properties) possessed the jurisdiction to re-examine the status of a property already transferred via a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) and whether the authority could disregard prior administrative orders that had previously classified the property as 'available'. The Supreme Court held that the matter regarding the property's status had been closed once and for all, and no further investigation into the property's availability was permissible once the P.T.D. had been issued. The Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the writ petitions, upholding the principle that administrative authorities exercising jurisdiction under repealing legislation cannot reopen matters involving properties that have already been validly disposed of and transferred. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused as the Court found no merit in the contentions raised.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Deputy Administrator (Residual Properties) re-examine the status of property after a Permanent Transfer Deed has been issued?
  • Does an administrative authority have the jurisdiction to reopen matters regarding property disposal that have already been finalized by previous settlement authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Lal Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-09
  evacuee propertysettlement commissionerfraud and misrepresentationpre-emptiondiscretionary reliefjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, concerning land originally allotted to the petitioner as a Jammu and Kashmir refugee, which he later had allotted in the name of a respondent and subsequently sold to his sons. A pre-emption suit was filed against the sale, prompting the petitioner to challenge the allotment in revision, which was allowed by the Settlement Commissioner upon the respondent's concession. Upon an application by the pre-emptor alleging fraud and misrepresentation, the Settlement Commissioner recalled the order and directed a rehearing, a decision upheld by the High Court despite arguments regarding the repeal of evacuee property laws. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner retained jurisdiction to entertain the application and recall the order after the repeal of the relevant evacuee laws. The Supreme Court held that given the petitioner's conduct and the fraudulent manner in which the initial order was obtained, discretionary relief was rightly refused by the High Court on technical grounds of jurisdiction. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner has jurisdiction to recall an order secured through fraud and misrepresentation after the repeal of the evacuee property laws?
  • Does a party obtaining an order through collusion and concession have the right to claim finality of such an order?
  • Is the High Court justified in refusing discretionary relief under constitutional jurisdiction to a party whose conduct involves fraud?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain And Another vs Ali Gohar1986 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-19
  pre-emptionco-sharersuperior right of pre-emptionconcurrent findingsquestion of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent, Ali Gohar, who claimed a superior right of pre-emption over the suit land based on his status as a co-sharer, a participator in amenities and appendages, and an owner of contiguous land. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, a decision subsequently upheld by the District Judge and the Peshawar High Court. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the respondent retained his status as a co-sharer in the suit property despite the petitioner's contention that an official partition had occurred, thereby extinguishing the respondent's superior right. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts had concurrently determined the issue of the respondent's superior right based on a proper appreciation of the evidence. The Court affirmed that the finding regarding the respondent's status as a co-sharer was a finding of fact and that no substantial question of law was presented to warrant interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding regarding the status of a pre-emptor as a co-sharer constitute a question of fact?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts in a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haq And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-25
  jail petitionleave to appealre-appraisal of evidenceinterested witnessesmurdercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition was filed by two real brothers, Muhammad Suleman and Muhammad Haq, against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding their conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jhelum. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, interested witnesses, and the sustainability of conviction where several co-accused were acquitted and recoveries were disbelieved. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that a re-appraisal of the evidence was justified given that out of nine initially charged individuals seven were acquitted, weapon recoveries were discarded, and the eye-witnesses were close relatives of the deceased. The key principle laid down is that leave to appeal may be granted for a comprehensive re-appraisal of evidence when the prosecution relies on closely related witnesses, recoveries are disbelieved, and a vast majority of the co-accused have secured acquittals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether re-appraisal of evidence is justified when multiple co-accused are acquitted and eye-witnesses are closely related to the deceased?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the testimony of related eye-witnesses when weapon recoveries are disbelieved?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Samar Gul And Other1986 SCMR 1179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-04
  review petitionlimitation periodacknowledgment of liabilityagencyrevenue recordmortgagee rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 12th September 1985, which had previously determined that a fresh period of limitation accrued to the plaintiffs under Section 19 of the Limitation Act 1908. The petitioner contended that the documents relied upon to establish acknowledgment of liability were not signed in accordance with the statutory requirements. The Court examined the nature of the memos issued by the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, noting that these documents, which led to mutations in the revenue record, effectively acknowledged the Government's status as a mortgagee. The Court held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner acted as an agent for the Central Government, rendering the memos binding acknowledgments in writing. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioner had failed to raise the issue of the sufficiency of this evidence during the original appeal proceedings. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petitioner could not re-argue the matter at the review stage, dismissing the petition for lack of substance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party re-argue the sufficiency of evidence in a review petition if the issue was not raised during the original appeal?
  • Do memos issued by the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner acknowledging government rights constitute an acknowledgment in writing under the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner act as an agent for the Central Government regarding the administration of evacuee land rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Habibullah Khan And Another1986 SCMR 143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-12
  evacuee propertyearmarking schemeN.C.H. Formlimitationfinding of factdisplaced person
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of evacuee property under the settlement laws. The respondent, a non-claimant displaced person in possession of the property since 1947, had submitted an N.C.H. Form for its transfer. However, the local settlement authorities, believing no form had been filed, transferred the property to the appellant through an earmarking scheme. The Settlement Commissioner later set aside the appellant's transfer, finding that the respondent had indeed submitted his form, making the property unavailable for earmarking. The High Court's Single Bench set aside this order because the Settlement Commissioner had not addressed the issue of limitation. However, the Division Bench restored the Settlement Commissioner's order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the Settlement Commissioner failed to address the limitation issue, this defect was insignificant because the respondent's prior submission of the N.C.H. Form was a finding of fact. Consequently, the property was legally unavailable for earmarking, and the respondent, as an occupant who applied for transfer, could not be denied the property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property can be legally transferred through an earmarking scheme if the occupant has already submitted an N.C.H. Form for its transfer?
  • Can a finding of fact by a Settlement Commissioner based on documentary evidence be interfered with by a Single Judge in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure of an appellate or revisional authority to address a question of limitation invalidate its order if the opposing party had no legal entitlement to the property in the first place?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Bahar And Other1986 SCMR 1513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-25
  leave to appealalteration of convictionsentence reductionmurdercriminal petitionappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two connected criminal petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that modified convictions and sentences in a murder and assault case. The trial court had convicted the respondents under sections 302/34, 307/34, and 452/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. On appeal, the High Court acquitted two co-accused and altered the conviction of the primary respondents from section 302 to section 304-II, reducing their sentences. The petitioner, the brother of the deceased, challenged the alteration of conviction and the reduction of sentences for the primary respondent, arguing that the High Court's reasoning was flawed despite rejecting the defense's plea of self-defense. The Supreme Court examined the nature of the injuries inflicted, specifically a lacerated wound on the deceased's head, and found that the petitioner's arguments regarding the High Court's justification for leniency carried considerable force. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court was legally justified in altering the conviction and reducing the sentence of the primary respondent in the circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Was the High Court justified in altering the conviction from section 302 to section 304-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 after rejecting the defense's plea of self-defense?
  • Does the nature of the injury inflicted on the deceased provide sufficient grounds to challenge a High Court's reduction of sentence in a murder conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Allah Bachya and 2 Other1986 SCMR 860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-16
  pre-emptionremand of casedismissal in defaultscope of remandagricultural landsuperior right of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two consolidated appeals concerning pre-emption suits filed by the appellant regarding agricultural land. The trial court initially decreed the suits after deciding issues relating to court-fee, waiver, and superior right of pre-emption in favour of the plaintiff, while determining specific sale prices under issues 4 and 5. Upon appeal, the District Judge remanded the cases to the trial court for a fresh decision exclusively on issues 4 and 5. Subsequently, due to the non-appearance of the appellant's counsel on a date of hearing post-remand, the trial court dismissed the entire suits in default. Applications for restoration and subsequent appeals and revision petitions filed by the appellant were dismissed by the lower forums. The Supreme Court granted leave, held that the remand was limited solely to issues 4 and 5, and ruled that the trial court acted without competence in dismissing the entire suits in toto when findings on superior pre-emptive rights had already attained finality. The appeals were allowed and the suits were remanded to the trial court for a fresh determination strictly on issues 4 and 5.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court dismiss an entire suit in default when the case was remanded to it for a fresh decision on specific issues only?
  • Whether the dismissal of a suit in toto is competent after findings on foundational issues such as superior right of pre-emption have already been finalized in favour of the plaintiff?
  • What is the legal effect of a remand order that restricts the trial court's jurisdiction to specific issues?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif And Others vs Sub. Sadiq Hussain And Other1986 SCMR 1985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-19
  pre-emptionnon-joinder of partiesres judicatacivil revisionleave to appealprocedural defectappellate procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed two Civil Revisions arising from consolidated pre-emption suits. The core legal question was whether the failure of one set of pre-emptors to implead rival pre-emptors as respondents in their appeal rendered that appeal incompetent due to non-joinder, thereby necessitating the dismissal of the connected appeal on the principle of res judicata. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the technical omission to implead rival pre-emptors was inconsequential because no relief was sought against them, and all parties were effectively before the appellate court in the connected proceedings. The Court established that where rival parties are already present in connected appeals, the failure to formally implead them is a procedural defect that does not cause prejudice or render an appeal incompetent, especially when the appellate court has the power to add parties and no objection was raised by the affected parties themselves. Consequently, the technical plea regarding non-joinder did not justify granting leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to implead rival pre-emptors as respondents in an appeal render the appeal incompetent due to non-joinder?
  • Can an appellate court overcome a technical omission of non-joinder by adding a party already present in connected proceedings?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to a consolidated suit where one appeal is allegedly incompetent due to a procedural defect?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Gulzar vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-05
  settlement lawearmarking listcomposite propertyconstitutional jurisdictiontransfer of propertymunicipal survey number
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in setting aside orders of the Settlement authorities on a writ petition, and whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner wrongly entertained a time-barred appeal without expressly condoning delay. The dispute involved a composite property in Kot Daska comprising a residential unit and shops, which were disposed of through an earmarking list under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Both parties participated in the earmarking and were transferred distinct portions based on the published list and application forms. Subsequently, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner altered entitlements based on pre-independence municipal numbers, a decision reversed in appeal and revision. The High Court, however, invoked its constitutional jurisdiction and restored the original transfer documents. The Supreme Court held that the property's identity was conclusively established by the official earmarking list, application forms, and transfer documents, and the Settlement authorities lacked jurisdiction to unsettle these entitlements by relying on divergent pre-independence municipal records. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, rendering the limitation question inconsequential.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Settlement authorities have jurisdiction to alter property entitlements on the basis of pre-independence municipal records when properties were disposed of through an official earmarking list?
  • Does the High Court correctly interfere in constitutional jurisdiction when Settlement authorities ignore material identifying documents such as earmarking lists and transfer forms?
  • Whether the failure of an appellate authority to expressly condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 vitiates an order when the jurisdictional aspect is otherwise resolved?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Feroze Khan vs Khalique Dad Khan And 28 Other1986 SCMR 930 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-06
  condonation of delaylimitationsufficient causetime-barred appealpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a second appeal against an order of the Additional District Judge. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether sufficient cause was shown for condoning a delay of eight days in filing the petition for leave to appeal, where the appellant sought condonation on the ground of serious floods affecting travel from Sargodha to Lahore. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay, particularly as the supporting affidavit was sworn on the day prior to filing without accounting for the interim gap, and the respondents successfully rebutted the flood allegations with documentary evidence and affidavits. The Court reaffirmed the principle that the delay of each day must be adequately explained when seeking condonation under the Limitation Act, and failure to do so results in the dismissal of the appeal as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appellant is required to explain the delay of each day when seeking condonation of delay?
  • Does an unsubstantiated plea of floods affecting travel constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay under the Limitation Act?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed as time-barred when the appellant fails to rebut documentary evidence disproving the grounds for delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fazil vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 1990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-11
  evacuee propertySettlement Scheme No. VIItransfer of propertylandlord and tenantallotteeoccupation rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee shop in Jhelum, originally allotted to the appellant and subsequently rented to respondent No. 4. Both parties applied for the transfer of the property under Settlement Scheme No. VII. The core legal question was whether the original allottee or the tenant in actual occupation is entitled to the transfer of the property under the scheme. The Supreme Court held that the tenant's occupation is derivative of the landlord's title and does not constitute occupation in his own right. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the allottee, rather than the tenant, is entitled to the transfer. The key principle laid down is that for the purposes of Settlement Scheme No. VII, occupation must be in one's own right; where a person is in actual occupation as a tenant, their possession is legally deemed to be the possession of the landlord, thereby disqualifying the tenant from claiming transfer rights against the allottee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant in actual occupation of evacuee property is entitled to its transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • Does the occupation of a tenant constitute occupation in one's own right for the purpose of transferring evacuee property?
  • Can a tenant in possession of evacuee property claim transfer rights against the original allottee under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farooq Khan vs Karachi Club And Other1986 SCMR 1330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-08
  back benefitsindustrial relationslabour courtrecovery of duesdismissal from servicestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Accountant at the Karachi Club, challenged a High Court judgment that set aside orders granting him back benefits. Initially, the petitioner was dismissed for misconduct, but a Labour Court ordered his reinstatement without back benefits, allowing for a fresh inquiry. Subsequently, the petitioner's post was abolished, rendering his appeal against the initial order infructuous. Despite the abolition of the post, the employer conducted an inquiry and dismissed him without back benefits. The petitioner then sought back benefits under Section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, which the Labour Court granted. The High Court, however, ruled that Section 51 only permits the recovery of money due under a settlement or award and does not authorize the determination of disputed claims. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court failed to properly consider the scope of subsection (2) of Section 51 regarding the recovery of dues. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether Section 51 encompasses the determination of such claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 provide for the determination of disputed dues claimed against an employer?
  • Is the recovery mechanism under Section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 limited only to money already determined as due under a settlement or award?
  • Can an employee claim back benefits under Section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 following an inquiry conducted after the abolition of their post?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 1970(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-05
  statutory baildelaymurdersuspension of sentencepost-conviction bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court which rejected the petitioners' bail application. The petitioners, accused of an offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, had been detained in jail for more than two years without the hearing of their appeal commencing. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to statutory bail under Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 due to the delay in the commencement of their appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that despite the High Court's rejection of bail on the ground that the appeal had been fixed for hearing, the continued delay of several months without the hearing actually commencing entitled the petitioners to bail. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and ordered the release of the petitioners on bail subject to furnishing adequate sureties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person detained in jail for more than two years without the hearing of their appeal commencing is entitled to bail under Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a bail application under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be rejected solely because the appeal has been fixed for hearing, if the hearing does not actually commence within a reasonable time thereafter?
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• Muhammad Dawood And 3 Others vs The State1986 SCMR 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-04
  leave to appealcriminal appealappreciation of evidenceright of private defenceinitial aggressormurderlife imprisonmentfair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against their conviction and life imprisonment for murder and causing injuries, which had been upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the lower courts had properly evaluated the evidence, particularly regarding the motive, the identity of the initial aggressor, and the overall balance of justice, given the history of altercations between the parties. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the case required further examination. The Court observed that the lower courts failed to adequately consider the defence's plea that the complainant party were the initial aggressors, noting that the complainant party had initiated confrontations on multiple occasions. The Court determined that a just balance had not been maintained and that the petitioners had not received proper justice. The key principle laid down is that courts must ensure a balanced judicial assessment of conflicting evidence, especially when the complainant party initiates confrontations and the defence raises a plausible plea of aggression, necessitating deeper scrutiny to ensure that the accused receive a fair trial and that justice is truly served.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to properly evaluate a defence plea of aggression warrant the granting of leave to appeal?
  • Is it necessary for a court to consider the history of altercations between parties when determining the initial aggressor in a criminal case?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal if it finds that the lower courts failed to maintain a just balance in assessing evidence?
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• Muhammad Bashir And Others vs Bashir Ahmad And Other1986 SCMR 1545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-31
  urban settlementtransfer of propertysettlement schemewrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition arising out of an urban settlement case concerning a disputed house. The core legal question is whether property already transferred to a respondent on a C.H. Form remains available for transfer to a fresh applicant who subsequently submitted an N.C.H. Form under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly concluded that nothing could be transferred to the petitioners because the property in question was not available at the relevant time. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a previously transferred property cannot be treated as available for subsequent fresh transfer applications under the settlement schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether property already transferred on a C.H. Form remains available for transfer to a fresh applicant?
  • Can an N.C.H. Form application lead to the transfer of property when the property is not available?
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• Muhammad Bashir And 5 Others vs Hayat Muhammad And Another1986 SCMR 1158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-05
  pre-emptionrevenue recordmutationmisreading of evidenceagricultural landco-ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the pre-emption of agricultural land. The petitioners, who purchased land in Gujranwala via a registered sale-deed, faced pre-emption suits filed by the respondents claiming superior rights as co-owners. The trial court initially dismissed the suits, finding that the petitioners had improved their status through Mutation No. 50 prior to the suits' institution. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, and the Lahore High Court upheld that reversal. The core legal question was whether the lower appellate court erred in its assessment of the evidence regarding the validity and authenticity of Mutation No. 50. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the High Court, which had noted significant discrepancies in the revenue records, including physical tampering with the register pages, inconsistent line colors, and testimony from a Girdawar Qanungo denying his signatures on the mutation. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly identified these evidentiary flaws, concluding that the mutation was unreliable. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that courts may interfere when evidence is misread or when revenue records exhibit clear signs of fabrication.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court disregard a mutation entry if the underlying revenue record shows signs of tampering or fabrication?
  • Is the testimony of a revenue official denying their signature on a mutation sufficient to invalidate that mutation?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere in cases where lower courts have misread the evidence regarding the authenticity of revenue documents?
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• Muhammad Banaras vs The State1986 SCMR 1587 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-30
  leave to appealmurdercapital sentenceocular testimonymedical evidencemotivebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his conviction and death sentence for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while answering the murder reference in the affirmative. The core legal questions involved whether ocular testimony contradicted by medical evidence and the acquittal of a co-accused could sustain a capital conviction, and whether the failure of the prosecution to prove motive warranted the reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that the eyewitness testimony remained credible despite minor discrepancies regarding distance, that the acquittal of a co-accused on the basis of benefit of doubt did not necessitate corroboration, and that the conviction was well-founded. However, the Court held that the failure to establish motive reacted on the question of quantum of sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but granted leave to appeal exclusively to examine the question of sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused on the ground of benefit of doubt require corroboration of eyewitness testimony against the remaining accused?
  • Can minor discrepancies between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding distance and number of shots be attributed to a genuine mistake by witnesses?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove motive warrant the reduction of a capital sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether the High Court's dismissal of an appeal against a death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was sustainable on the provided evidence?
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• Muhammad Bakhsh vs The State1986 SCMR 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-21
  criminal appealdismissal for non-prosecutiondecision on meritsappellate powersanti-corruptionspecial judge appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted by the Special Judge Anti-Corruption under sections 409, 420, and 465 read with 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and sentenced to imprisonment and fines. His appeal before the High Court of Sind was dismissed for non-prosecution due to the absence of the appellant and his counsel. A subsequent application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for restoration and disposal on merits was also dismissed. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether an admitted criminal appeal could be dismissed for non-prosecution. Holding that a criminal appeal once admitted must be decided on merits after perusing the record pursuant to section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that these provisions equally govern appeals filed under section 10 of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the matter for decision afresh on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal appeal once admitted to regular hearing by the High Court can be dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Does the absence of the appellant or his pleader relieve the appellate court from the duty of perusing the record and deciding the appeal on merits under section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Are the provisions of Chapter 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to appeals filed under section 10 of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958?
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