Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• A. Ismailjee & Sons Ltd. vs Pakistan1986 PLD Supreme Court 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  barter contractexchange of goodsbreach of contractmeasure of damagesimputed knowledgepenal interestsale of goods
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arise out of a civil suit filed by the plaintiffs against the Government of Pakistan seeking specific performance or alternatively damages for breach of a barter contract. Under the written agreement, the Government was to supply certain rusted tubings in exchange for steel bars and angles. The Government subsequently repudiated the contract, alleging lack of proper authority and fraud, and failed to complete delivery. The trial court decreed the suit for damages, which was modified on appeal by the High Court. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined the legal nature of barter and exchange contracts, the application of section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872 regarding the measure of damages, and the doctrine of imputed knowledge concerning sub-sales. The Supreme Court held that the contract was validly executed with proper authority, that the Government had imputed knowledge of the intended resale using special couplings, and that the measure of damages should be based on the established book value of the goods by consent. The appeals were disposed of accordingly, modifying the decretal amount.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a barter or exchange contract is governed directly by the Sale of Goods Act, 1930?
  • What is the correct measure of damages for non-delivery in a contract of barter or exchange under section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872?
  • Can knowledge of the buyer's intention to resell be imputed to the seller based on trade practices and the nature of the goods?
  • Whether pendente lite interest can be awarded on an unascertained claim for damages before the principal sum is determined by the court?
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• Zulfiqar vs The State1985 SCMR 783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-04
  murderdying declarationocular testimonyinterested witnessesdiscrepanciessentence modificationtransportation for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court upholding the appellant's conviction for the murder of Muhammad Yaqoob and altering his sentence. The core legal question involved the re-appraisal of ocular testimony from interested witnesses and discrepancies between the First Information Report and the dying declaration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the discrepancies between the dying declaration and the ocular testimony were minor and immaterial, and that the presence of the eye-witnesses at the scene was natural. The Court upheld the conviction of the appellant based on consistent dying declarations, reliable ocular testimony, medical evidence, and motive. However, noting that the occurrence took place before the coming into force of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972, the Court modified the sentence from imprisonment for life to transportation for life. The key principle laid down is that minor discrepancies between dying declarations and ocular accounts do not discredit an otherwise consistent and trustworthy prosecution case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies between a dying declaration and an F.I.R. are sufficient to discard the prosecution case?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a criminal appeal arising from concurrent findings?
  • Whether transportation for life should be substituted for imprisonment for life for an offense committed before the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972?
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• Zulfiqar Ali Toor, City Magistrate And 7 Others vs Punjab Service1985 SCMR 904 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-20
  senioritycivil servantsinitial recruitmentpromoteesservice tribunalinter se seniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against the judgment of the Punjab Services Tribunal dismissing the petitioners' appeal in a seniority dispute. The core legal question concerns the determination of inter se seniority between direct appointee magistrates and promotee magistrates under the applicable statutory framework, specifically whether the West Pakistan Civil Servants (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964 or the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 governs the field. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to section 23(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, pre-existing rules not inconsistent with the Act continue to be deemed as rules framed under the Act, thereby making rule 9(3) of the 1964 Rules applicable for determining the seniority of promotees vis-a-vis initial appointees appointed prior to the enforcement of the new 1974 rules. The key principle laid down is that older service rules saved under transition provisions govern inter se seniority where the new statutory provisions require a prescribed manner and new rules have not yet occupied the field.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the seniority of civil servants appointed prior to the framing of the new service rules is governed by the pre-existing rules saved under section 23(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Do persons appointed by promotion in a particular year rank senior to persons appointed by initial recruitment during the same year under rule 9(3) of the West Pakistan Civil Servants (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964?
  • How is the inter se seniority between direct appointees and promotees determined under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
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• Zulfiqar Ahmad vs Gulzar Khan And Another1985 SCMR 2000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-13
  evacuee propertyconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionproperty disputePermanent Transfer DeedBoard of RevenueHigh Court interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a property dispute over a room situated between two adjacent evacuee houses, House No. 245/251 and House No. 246/252 in Sibi. The appellant, Zulfiqar Ahmad, claimed the room was part of his house, while the respondent, Gulzar Khan, claimed it as part of his. Following the enactment of the Evacuee Properties Law Repeal Ordinance, 1974, the pending dispute was transferred to the Board of Revenue. The Member, Board of Revenue, determined the room was part of the appellant's property and ordered its transfer. The High Court subsequently set aside this order via a Constitutional Petition, asserting the room was already included in the respondent's Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.). The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the Board of Revenue's factual determination. Relying on the principle established in Begum Shams-un-Nisa v. Akbar Abaasi, the Court ruled that even if an authority's jurisdiction is questioned due to legal changes, the High Court should not interfere with a bona fide, just, and proper order aimed at rectifying a wrong. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the Board of Revenue's order.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction with a bona fide and just order passed by an authority even if that authority's jurisdiction is questioned due to subsequent changes in law?
  • Is a finding of fact by the Board of Revenue regarding the inclusion of a room in a property transfer subject to interference by the High Court in writ jurisdiction?
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• Zoyab vs Hakim Muhammad Fazal Haque1985 SCMR 1600 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-08
  ejectmentpersonal bona fide needleave to appealrent controllandlord-tenant disputeburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court affirming an ejectment order against the petitioner, a tenant of a shop in Karachi. The respondent-landlord sought ejectment on grounds of default, subletting, and the personal bona fide need of his son. While the Rent Controller rejected the grounds of default and subletting, the ejectment was granted solely on the ground of personal need. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that the respondent provided contradictory statements regarding the availability of other shops in the same market, specifically alleging that the respondent had rented out other shops during the pendency of the litigation, thereby undermining the claim of personal need. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the respondent's son was employed in the Sind Secretariat, rendering him unavailable for the proposed business. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence and the conflicting testimonies regarding the occupancy status of other shops, found that the record required re-examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the claim of personal need was bona fide.

  Questions settled

  • Does the renting out of other properties by a landlord during the pendency of an ejectment suit negate the claim of personal bona fide need?
  • Is a landlord required to prove that a shop allegedly occupied by a trespasser was not voluntarily re-let to a new tenant?
  • Does the employment of a landlord's son in government service preclude a finding of personal bona fide need for business premises?
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• Ziaul Haq vs The State1985 SCMR 1912 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-25
  criminal petitionre-appraisal of evidenceconcurrent findingsimpersonationforgerymatriculation examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Ziaul Haq against his conviction under sections 468 and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, after the High Court maintained the said convictions while setting aside his conviction under section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question involved the propriety of interfering with concurrent findings of fact regarding impersonation in a Matriculation Examination form. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petition merely sought a re-appraisal of evidence, which is impermissible against concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts on a question of fact. The petition was accordingly dismissed as having no merit. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not re-appraise evidence to interfere with concurrent factual findings of lower courts where no legal infirmity is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence on a question of fact when there are concurrent findings by the courts below?
  • Can a conviction under sections 468 and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained in an impersonation case based on concurrent factual findings?
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• Zia Mohiuddin Khan vs Secretary General, Finance, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan And Other1985 SCMR 969 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-31Read full judgment →
• Zahid Hussain And Others vs Abdul Attique1985 SCMR 1016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-01
  ejectmentpersonal requirementdefault in rentres judicataleave to appealrent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the petitioners-tenants' rent appeal against ejectment orders passed on the grounds of personal requirement and default in rent payment. The core legal questions involved whether a second eviction petition on the ground of personal requirement is barred when an earlier petition failed, and whether default in rent payment was established. The Supreme Court held that the previous petition did not bar the fresh proceedings because the requirement urged was based on different grounds, and further noted that no evidence was examined on merits in the previous ex parte proceedings. Furthermore, the default in rent payment stood established as the tenants failed to produce receipts for certain periods, and the Court declined to interfere with concurrent findings of fact and the exercise of discretion regarding eviction. The key principle laid down is that a subsequent ejectment petition for personal requirement is maintainable when the prior petition was not decided on merits and involved different grounds, and that established default in rent payment justifies eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second eviction petition on the ground of personal requirement is barred when an earlier petition failed?
  • Does the principle of res judicata under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to rent controller proceedings?
  • Whether the Supreme Court interferes with the concurrent exercise of discretion by lower courts in directing eviction on the ground of default?
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• Zafrullah Khan vs Punjab Public Service Commission And Other1985 SCMR 1193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-17
  public service commissionconstitutional jurisdictionselection processinterview procedureadministrative lawappointmentstatutory duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the selection process for the post of Mines Labour Welfare Officer. The petitioner challenged the High Court's decision, which had directed the Punjab Public Service Commission to re-examine candidates after finding that the initial selection process was flawed because the Commission failed to interview all eligible candidates, specifically excluding the respondent. The core legal question was whether the High Court could direct the Commission to re-evaluate candidates when the selection process was deemed procedurally unfair and whether a subsequent appointment notification rendered the constitutional petition infructuous. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's direction for the Commission to perform its statutory recommendatory role in accordance with law was appropriate. The Court affirmed that the exclusion of eligible candidates from the interview process invalidated the selection, and a subsequent appointment notification did not displace the grievance regarding the Commission's improper functioning. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, maintaining the High Court's order for a fresh, comprehensive evaluation of the competing candidates.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court direct a Public Service Commission to re-examine candidates if the initial selection process was procedurally flawed?
  • Does a subsequent appointment notification issued during the pendency of a constitutional petition render the petition infructuous?
  • Is the exclusion of an eligible candidate from an interview process by a Public Service Commission a valid ground for judicial intervention?
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• Yusuf vs Mst. Rabia1985 SCMR 1066 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-09
  rent appealnon-prosecutiondismissal of appealsufficient causere-admission of appealstatutory appealSind Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court order dismissing an application for the re-admission of a rent appeal, which had previously been dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioner contended that Section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, mandated the appellate authority to decide the appeal on merits, regardless of the appellant's absence. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the appellate authority is not required to consider the merits when the appellant fails to prosecute the appeal. The Court affirmed that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, governs the hearing of statutory appeals in the High Court unless explicitly excluded. Consequently, the High Court possesses the inherent power under Order XLI, Rule 17, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution when the appellant fails to appear. Furthermore, the Court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the absence of his counsel and himself. The petition was dismissed, upholding the High Court's refusal to re-admit the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, mandate an appellate authority to decide an appeal on merits even when the appellant fails to appear?
  • Does the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, govern the procedure for hearing statutory appeals in the High Court?
  • Can a High Court dismiss a statutory appeal for non-prosecution under Order XLI, Rule 17, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
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• Yusuf Khan And 24 Others vs Wader Muhammad Siddique And 2 Other1985 SCMR 1692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-09
  Dastoor-ul-Amal Diwani KalatHakim-e-Adalatrejection of plainttwo-tiered forumjurisdiction of Deputy CommissionerCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court setting aside an order of the Deputy Commissioner Kachhi at Dhadar and remanding the case for fresh disposal. The respondents had filed a suit for declaration and possession of land under the Dastoor-ul-Amal Diwani Kalat, which the Deputy Commissioner dismissed on the ground of limitation. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Commissioner, acting as Hakim-e-Adalat under the Dastoor-ul-Amal, was competent to exercise powers under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure to reject a plaint or dismiss a suit without transmitting the case to the Kazi for trial. The Supreme Court held that the trial forum under the unamended Dastoor-ul-Amal is a two-tiered system comprising the Hakim-e-Adalat and the Kazi, and that sections 7, 20, and 22 of the Dastoor-ul-Amal were not repealed or replaced by the Code of Civil Procedure in this regard. The Court affirmed that the Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction to reject a plaint or dismiss a suit on limitation or merits himself, but must frame issues and transmit the case to the Kazi.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Deputy Commissioner as Hakim-e-Adalat is competent to reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure under the unamended Dastoor-ul-Amal Diwani Kalat?
  • Does the Deputy Commissioner possess the jurisdiction to dismiss a suit on the ground of limitation without transmitting the case to the Kazi?
  • Whether sections 7, 20, and 22 of the Dastoor-ul-Amal Diwani Kalat stand repealed and re-enacted by the Code of Civil Procedure by virtue of the Central Laws (Statute Reforms) Ordinance, 1960?
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• Yara vs The State1985 SCMR 1861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-03
  murderocular evidenceinterested witnesscorroborationrecovery of weaponmoonlight identificationdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the appellant's appeal against his conviction and death sentence under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution's case rested on the ocular testimony of the deceased's husband, who witnessed the attack from a roof, and the recovery of a blood-stained hatchet (Toka) at the appellant's instance. The trial court had acquitted three co-accused on the principle that the uncorroborated testimony of interested witnesses is insufficient for conviction, but convicted the appellant due to the corroborative recovery of the weapon. The appellant challenged the reliability of the eye-witnesses and the recovery witnesses due to their relationship with the deceased. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the husband's presence at the scene was natural, his identification of the appellant under moonlight was reliable, and the recovery of the weapon was proved by consistent testimony. The Court reaffirmed that the testimony of close relatives cannot be discarded solely on account of relationship if it is otherwise credible and corroborated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the testimony of an interested or related witness if it is supported by independent corroborative evidence?
  • Whether the recovery of a weapon of offence can be discarded solely because the recovery witnesses are closely related to the deceased?
  • Is identification of an accused during the night reliable if the witness is familiar with the accused and the incident occurred under bright moonlight?
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• Yar Muhammad And Others vs Gul Muhammad1985 SCMR 1609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-03
  Section 145 CrPCpossession disputecriminal revisionmagisterial procedureland disputeattachment of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Baluchistan High Court judgment upholding the dismissal of applications filed under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, concerning land disputes. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate followed the mandatory procedural requirements of Section 145 and whether the dismissal, based on existing material and admissions rather than a full evidentiary trial, was legally sound. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Magistrate had complied with the essential procedural steps, including affording parties a hearing and considering the material on record. The Court clarified that Section 145 proceedings do not determine ownership or the right to possess, but only actual possession. It established that Magistrates may rely on admissions and material placed on record to dismiss applications where no genuine dispute exists or where the applicant's claim is demonstrably meritless. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that if a Magistrate cannot determine possession, they should not decide in an uncertain manner but should instead proceed under Section 146, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, while noting that Section 145 is not a substitute for civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential procedural steps a Magistrate must follow in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 authorize a Magistrate to determine ownership or the right to possess property?
  • What should a Magistrate do if they are unable to determine actual possession in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a Magistrate rely on admissions and material placed on record by parties to dismiss an application under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without recording further evidence?
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• Yar Muhammad And 3 Others vs Settlement Commissioner (L), Lahore1985 SCMR 1346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-27
  land allotmentfraudulent allotmentimpersonationlocus standidisplaced personsnatural justicesettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition concerning a land allotment dispute. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, claiming as successors-in-interest to one Mst. Aisha Bibi, were entitled to notice and a hearing before the cancellation of an allotment made in her name. The Supreme Court held that since Mst. Aisha Bibi had died in 1965, the allotment made in her name in 1967 was obtained through fraudulent impersonation. Consequently, the Court ruled that no valid or valuable rights accrued to the petitioners through this fraudulent transaction. The Court affirmed that the failure to provide notice to the petitioners before the cancellation of such a void allotment was of no legal consequence. The principle laid down is that an allotment procured through the impersonation of a deceased person is fraudulent and void, conferring no locus standi upon successors-in-interest to challenge subsequent administrative orders restoring the land to rightful temporary allottees. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allotment obtained through the impersonation of a deceased person confer any legal rights upon the successors-in-interest?
  • Is a party entitled to notice before the cancellation of an allotment that was procured through fraud?
  • Do successors-in-interest have locus standi to challenge the cancellation of an allotment that was void ab initio?
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• Wilayat Khan vs Reham Dad And Other1985 SCMR 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-14
  local council electionelection petitionrecount of votesframing of issuescivil procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his writ petition challenging the Election Tribunal's order dated 22-10-1983. The parties had contested a Local Council Election where a tie was resolved by drawing lots in favor of the petitioner. Respondent No.1 challenged the election via an election petition under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. The Election Tribunal recounted the votes upon the respondent's narrowed objections, found one vote cast for the petitioner to be invalid, and declared the respondent successful. The core legal question was whether the Election Tribunal's failure to frame formal issues under the Election Petition Rules vitiated the recount and decision. The Supreme Court held that strict compliance with civil procedure was not necessary in such matters, provided the Tribunal did what was essential to resolve the dispute, and that substantial justice had been done. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether strict compliance with the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure is necessary for an Election Tribunal?
  • Does the failure of an Election Tribunal to frame issues vitiate the recount of votes?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an election order where substantial justice has been done?
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• Water and Power Development Authority vs Abid Hussain1985 SCMR 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-20
  Service Tribunalinterlocutory orderstatus quoleave to appealquestion of law of general public importancetermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), sought leave to appeal against an interlocutory order passed by the Service Tribunal, which clarified the scope and effect of a previously issued status quo order concerning the termination of the respondent's services. The core legal question involved whether the interlocutory clarification issued by the Service Tribunal regarding the status quo order warranted interference under the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the impugned order was interlocutory in nature, subject to modification during the pendency of the main appeal, and was based on a factual determination regarding the employment status of the respondent at the relevant time. The Court laid down the principle that an interlocutory order of a Service Tribunal resting on factual determinations and lacking any substantial question of law of general public importance does not meet the requirements for granting leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does an interlocutory clarification of a status quo order by a Service Tribunal raise a question of law of general public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted against an interim order of a Service Tribunal that is subject to modification and depends on factual determinations?
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• Warris Ali vs Nazir And 4 Other1985 SCMR 1212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-10
  acquittalmurderleave to appealcriminal petitionconcurrent findingsunlawful assembly
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner, Warris Ali, challenging the acquittal of the respondents, Nazir, Rehmat, Hassan, and Allah Ditta, who were accused of the murder of Ashiq Ali. The respondents were originally tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, who acquitted them of charges under sections 148 and 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The State subsequently filed an appeal against this acquittal, which was dismissed by the High Court. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking to overturn the High Court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the arguments presented by the petitioner's counsel were identical to those raised before and rejected by the courts below. The Court found that the High Court had delivered a well-reasoned judgment that addressed the evidence and legal contentions appropriately. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there were no valid grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of acquittal recorded by the lower courts. The petition was accordingly dismissed for lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal where the lower courts have provided well-reasoned judgments?
  • Can a petitioner successfully challenge an acquittal in the Supreme Court by merely repeating arguments already rejected by the High Court?
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• Waris Ali And Others vs Ghulam Rasool And Another1985 SCMR 967 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Waqar Ul Haq vs The State1985 SCMR 974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-15
  post-arrest bailplea of alibiexculpatory confessioninvestigation opinionmurderprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the Lahore High Court's order refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was accused of firing fatal shots at the deceased. The petitioner contended that he was innocent, relying on a plea of alibi supported by affidavits of ninety-six notables, multiple police investigations declaring him innocent, and an exculpatory confession by a co-accused claiming sole responsibility. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the co-accused's confession and tentatively found it to be exculpatory rather than a true confession, as it raised a plea of self-defence. The Court held that the plea of alibi and the opinions of the investigating officers regarding innocence could not be evaluated at the bail stage in the face of prima facie material linking the petitioner to the shooting. The Court affirmed that such matters, including the alleged false implication due to enmity, are within the domain of the trial court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with the observation that the petitioner may repeat his bail application after some evidence is recorded.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of alibi be conclusively evaluated by the court at the stage of deciding a bail application?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an investigating officer's opinion of innocence when deciding a bail application in the face of prima facie incriminating material?
  • Can an exculpatory statement by a co-accused claiming self-defence serve as a valid ground for granting bail to the principal accused?
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• Waqar Ahmad vs Rab Nawaz And Another1985 SCMR 1481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-29
  criminal petitionstolen propertyacquittalre-assessment of evidencerecovery witnessdelayed FIRbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which set aside the conviction and sentence of the respondents under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for being in possession of stolen ornaments. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in re-assessing the evidence and acquitting the respondents based on material discrepancies, unreliable recovery witnesses, and suspicious circumstances surrounding the investigation and delayed lodging of the First Information Report. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the respondents were rightly acquitted by the High Court as the prosecution case suffered from fundamental flaws, including a manipulated recovery, false statements by key recovery and police witnesses, and an unexplained, highly suspicious one-month delay by the complainant in reporting the theft. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution evidence is riddled with material contradictions, interested and untruthful witnesses, and manipulated recoveries, the appellate court's acquittal order is well-founded and will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in setting aside a conviction under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the recovery witnesses and police officials are found to be unreliable and untruthful?
  • Does an unexplained and prolonged delay in lodging the First Information Report regarding stolen valuables render the prosecution case suspicious?
  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained when material links in the investigation and the identification of the accused are shrouded in mystery and manipulation?
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• WAPDA Through Its Chairman vs Saeed Ahmad1985 SCMR 1887 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-03
  misconductdismissal from serviceservice tribunalefficiency and discipline rulesnatural justicebiasWAPDA
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by WAPDA against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the dismissal of the respondent, its Chief Auditor. The respondent had been dismissed from service under the West Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, for alleged misconduct after giving a statement as a defence witness before a Summary Military Court levelling allegations against the Chairman and senior officers of WAPDA. The core legal questions involved whether WAPDA was justified in dispensing with regular inquiry proceedings, whether statements made by an employee as a witness in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings could form the basis of arbitrary departmental action, and whether the Chairman could act as a judge in his own cause when his personal conduct was challenged. The Supreme Court held that the action taken by WAPDA was arbitrary, lacked a firm foundation since no authentic text of the deposition was ever supplied, and violated fundamental notions of justice as the Chairman was an interested party. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's reinstatement of the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer can dispense with regular inquiry proceedings and proceed under summary provisions based on assumptions without a firm foundation of evidence?
  • Does an employee giving evidence as a defence witness in a court or military tribunal render himself liable to departmental disciplinary action for misconduct based on that testimony?
  • Can a departmental head whose personal conduct and integrity are questioned initiate and finalize disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate who deposed against him?
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• Wall Muhammad And Others vs Inamul Hassan Khan And Other1985 SCMR 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-04
  displaced personsbig mansiontransfer of propertysuo motu reviewdelegation of powerslimitationletters patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court challenges the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the appellants' appeal regarding the transfer of a big mansion known as Dinga Singh Building in Lahore under the Displaced Persons laws. The core legal questions involved whether the Letters Patent Appeal was rightly dismissed as time-barred, whether the delegatee of the Chief Settlement Commissioner was competent to exercise suo motu review powers, and whether the summary disposal of the review application was arbitrary. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's finding on limitation was unexceptionable, that the delegatee was duly competent to handle the review case pursuant to valid notifications, and that neither party held a vested statutory right of transfer since they were merely competing bidders. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Letters Patent Appeal filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation is liable to be dismissed when no sufficient ground for condonation of delay is established?
  • Whether an officer invested with the delegated powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner is competent to review an order passed by a predecessor officer?
  • Whether parties competing for the transfer of a big mansion under settlement laws possess a vested statutory right to obtain the property?
  • Whether the summary disposal of a review application by a delegatee authority constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power when higher bids are submitted subsequently?
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• Wali Muhammad vs Ghulam Hyder And Other1985 SCMR 2021 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-10
  pre-emption rightspermanent Haritenancy terminationnatural justiceleave to appealrevenue orderscivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's revision petition regarding agricultural land rights. The petitioner, a permanent Hari, claimed a right of pre-emption over land he had cultivated since 1947. Following a dispute involving the termination of his tenancy by the Mukhtiarkar under the Sind Tenancy Act, 1950, the Assistant Commissioner subsequently recognized the petitioner's right of pre-emption. However, the respondents challenged these revenue orders in a civil suit, which was ultimately decreed in their favor by the Additional District Judge on grounds of procedural unfairness and the absence of a formal pre-emption prayer in the original application. The High Court upheld this decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner’s contentions—specifically regarding whether the respondents were afforded a sufficient opportunity of hearing during the revision proceedings and whether the pre-emption claim was validly raised—merited further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to resolve these substantial questions of law and procedure regarding tenancy and pre-emption rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a party to raise a specific prayer in an initial application preclude an appellate authority from considering that prayer if it was raised in the memo of appeal?
  • Can a civil court set aside revenue orders on the grounds of violation of natural justice if the aggrieved party had an opportunity to represent their grievance in subsequent revision proceedings?
  • Is a permanent Hari entitled to a right of pre-emption under the Land Reforms Regulation upon the sale of the land they cultivate?
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• Wali Ahmad vs Collector, Land Acquisition And Other1985 SCMR 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-20
  land acquisitioncompensation enhancementprotest against awardestoppelclosing of evidenceprocedural defaultreference to court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a land acquisition dispute where the appellant challenged the dismissal of his reference under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The core legal questions were whether the trial court correctly invoked Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to close the appellant's evidence, and whether the appellant was estopped from seeking enhanced compensation for failing to explicitly record a protest on the receipt (Qabzul Wasul) despite having filed for a reference beforehand. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in closing the evidence, as the adjournments were routine rather than granted specifically for the appellant's default. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellant’s prior application for a reference and the submission of a bond (Zamanatnama) clearly indicated his protest against the award. The absence of a protest note on the receipt was deemed a technicality. The Court established that a party is not estopped from challenging compensation if the intent to protest is evidenced by prior filings or bonds, and that Order XVII, Rule 3 cannot be invoked for routine adjournments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court close evidence under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the adjournment was not granted specifically for the party's default?
  • Does the absence of a protest note on a receipt (Qabzul Wasul) estop a landowner from seeking enhanced compensation if a reference application was already pending?
  • Is a bond (Zamanatnama) filed by a landowner sufficient evidence of protest against a land acquisition award?
  Read full judgment →
• Walayat and Others vs Muhammad Shafi and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-12
  evacuee propertytransfer ordersettlement departmenttrespasserlimitationpower of attorneypossession based on title
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal by the defendants challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment decreeing the plaintiff's suit for possession of land based on a transfer order issued by the Settlement Department. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for possession of evacuee property against alleged trespassers is governed by Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act 1908, whether trespassers can challenge a transfer order issued by a competent settlement authority, and whether the non-appearance of the plaintiff as a witness vitiates the suit when an authorised attorney testifies. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a suit filed shortly after acquiring title via a transfer order against trespassers is based on title and falls under Article 144, not Article 142. The Court laid down that persons who are neither allottees nor entitled to transfer cannot dispute a transfer made in favour of another under the settlement laws, and that an authorised attorney's testimony does not prejudice the principal's case where the attorney is competent to institute and pursue the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for possession of property acquired through a settlement transfer order against trespassers is governed by Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a trespasser or a person with no independent entitlement challenge a transfer order issued by a competent authority under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the non-appearance of a plaintiff in the witness-box vitiate the suit when their authorised attorney has validly instituted the proceedings and testified?
  • Whether property demarcated on a site plan countersigned by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner is sufficiently identifiable for the grant of a decree for possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Wajid Ali (Represented By Legal Heirs) vs Syed Sajid Ali (Represented By Legal Heirs)1985 SC M R401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  arbitration in second appealreference to arbitrationpowers of appellate courtmisconduct of umpirearbitration actconstitutional appeal as of rightcontinuation of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the plaintiff arose from a High Court judgment making an umpire's award the rule of the court and dismissing a suit concerning land ownership. The core legal questions involved whether an appellate court in a regular second appeal has the power under section 21 of the Arbitration Act to refer a dispute to arbitration, whether such reference must be confined strictly to questions of law, and whether the umpire's award suffered from judicial or personal misconduct. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court, possessing all powers of the court of first instance, is competent to make a reference to arbitration during a second appeal, that the proceedings of a suit and appeal form an intrinsic unity making reference to facts permissible, and that no misconduct on the part of the umpire was established. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court hearing a regular second appeal has the power under section 21 of the Arbitration Act 1940 to refer a dispute to arbitration?
  • Can a reference to arbitration during a second appeal extend to controversies of fact, or must it be strictly confined to questions of law?
  • Does section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940 curtail or control the constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What constitutes sufficient ground for revoking the authority of an umpire or setting aside an award based on personal or judicial misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• W.Z. Ahmad vs Dr. A.A.Khan And Other1985 SCMR 1518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-14
  evacuee propertydemarcationsettlement hierarchyproperty transferDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958provisional transfer orderpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the demarcation of evacuee property, specifically Bungalow No. S-41-R-8, Lahore. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner, tasked with implementing a prior order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, possessed the authority to re-interpret the division of the property or if his role was limited to ministerial demarcation. The Chief Settlement Commissioner had previously exercised his power under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, to divide the property based on the parties' respective possession. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner’s attempt to re-interpret the term "occupation" and alter the division was legally flawed, as he lacked jurisdiction to revisit the substantive division already finalized by the superior authority. The Court affirmed the principle that subordinate authorities in the settlement hierarchy must implement, rather than re-adjudicate, the orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, the High Court’s decision to remand the case for proper demarcation in accordance with the original order was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subordinate Settlement Commissioner have the authority to re-interpret the division of property ordered by the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • Is the role of a Settlement Commissioner during the implementation of a transfer order limited to ministerial demarcation?
  • Can a Settlement Commissioner alter the scope of a property division order passed under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Vice Chancellor, University of Punjab And 2 Others vs Muhammad Zahur Nasir1985 SCMR 802 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-18
  natural justicedisciplinary proceedingseducational institutionsexamination malpracticedomestic tribunalsburden of prooffair hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment setting aside a University Disciplinary Committee's order that disqualified a student for examination malpractice. The student had been found guilty of conspiring to inflate his marks after his result sheet showed higher marks than the original award list. The core legal question was whether a disciplinary body in an educational institution can presume a student’s guilt solely because they benefited from unauthorized record tampering, without providing evidence of the student's complicity or a fair opportunity to defend. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while domestic tribunals are not bound by the strict technical rules of evidence, they must adhere to the principles of natural justice. The Court ruled that mere benefit from an inflated result does not constitute sufficient proof of guilt. A decision cannot rest on conjecture or suspicion; it requires tangible evidence linking the accused to the misconduct. Consequently, the failure to provide the student an opportunity to confront the involved staff rendered the disciplinary proceedings unfair and the resulting order unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a disciplinary committee in an educational institution presume a student's guilt solely because the student benefited from an error or forgery in examination records?
  • Are domestic tribunals in educational institutions required to adhere to the principles of natural justice when conducting disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the absence of strict technical rules of evidence in domestic tribunals allow them to base disciplinary findings on conjecture or suspicion?
  Read full judgment →
• Utility Stores Corporation vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal1985 SCMR 1931 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-22Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat Khan And Others vs Gul Khan And Other1985 SCMR 902 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-28
  pre-emptionexemption certificateAdditional CommissionerCommissionerGeneral Clauses Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the validity of a pre-emption exemption certificate issued by an Additional Commissioner rather than the Commissioner himself. The core legal question is whether a certificate issued by an Additional Commissioner regarding the exemption of property sale from the law of pre-emption can be legally deemed as a certificate issued by the Commissioner under the applicable statutory definitions. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the view taken by the High Court, based on the statutory definition, is correct and that the Additional Commissioner is included within the definition of Commissioner. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an Additional Commissioner is empowered to issue a pre-emption exemption certificate as the statutory definition of Commissioner expressly includes an Additional Commissioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of Commissioner under the General Clauses Act 1956 include an Additional Commissioner?
  • Can an Additional Commissioner validly issue a certificate exempting a property sale from the law of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Din vs Syed Muhammad Abdul Aziz Sharqi and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-04
  composite propertyindustrial concernhorizontal divisionsettlement lawsconstitutional petitiondisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of the appellant's constitutional petition regarding the transfer of a composite property comprising a printing press on the ground floor and a residential portion on the upper floors under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether a building housing an industrial concern on one floor could be horizontally divided to transfer the upper residential floors independently to a prior allottee under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the upper residential portion, having independent access and not being situated within the premises of the industrial concern, could be lawfully divided and transferred separately in accordance with the Act and administrative instructions issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The Court laid down that an industrial concern located in only one tenement of a building does not bar the horizontal division and separate transfer of other independent residential tenements, and that the statutory embargo against treating residential buildings situated within the premises of an industrial concern as a house applies only when the residential building falls strictly within the integrated premises of the industrial unit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a composite building containing an industrial concern and residential units can be horizontally divided under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does the statutory definition of a house under section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 bar the transfer of an upper residential floor as an independent unit when a printing press is located on the ground floor?
  • Are the instructions issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of tenements where an industrial concern is located in only one tenement repugnant to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Tufail Masih vs The State1985 SCMR 838 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-02
  murderdeath sentencecommutation of sentencemotivegrave and sudden provocationstrangulationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of his employer by strangulation, alongside convictions for causing hurt under section 323. The core legal question concerned whether the absence of a proven motive and the presence of verbal abuse and insults by the deceased immediately preceding the incident warranted the commutation of the death sentence to imprisonment for life. By majority view, the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the conviction based on reliable eyewitness testimony but altered the death sentence to imprisonment for life along with a fine, reasoning that the circumstances revealed a display of bad temper and annoyance arising from insults. The key principle laid down is that while an eyewitness account is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction, mitigating circumstances such as grave annoyance and lack of premeditated motive can justify the substitution of the death penalty with life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of a clear motive and the presence of verbal abuse by the deceased can serve as a mitigating circumstance to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can a first information report be used as substantive evidence without being put to its maker for corroboration or contradiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the hurling of abusive language by a deceased employer amount to sufficient provocation to deprive a normal person of self-control?
  Read full judgment →
• The Superintendent of Police Headquarter, Lahore And Others vs Muhammad Latif1985 SCMR 885 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-18
  writ jurisdictionService Tribunalcivil servantleave to appealjurisdictional barterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its writ jurisdiction to set aside an order of the Service Tribunal, and whether a civil servant could bypass the constitutional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 on the ground that the case did not involve a substantial question of law of public importance. The High Court had held that because the Service Tribunal's order was based on no evidence and violated mandatory police rules, and did not present a substantial question of law of public importance, writ jurisdiction was available. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the petition raised a substantial question of law of public importance regarding the scope of the High Court's powers under its writ jurisdiction to set aside orders of the Service Tribunal, and the interpretation of Article 212 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has the jurisdiction under its writ jurisdiction to set aside or review orders passed by the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the limitation of an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution to substantial questions of law of public importance permit the High Court to exercise writ jurisdiction where no such question is deemed to exist?
  • Can the High Court in its writ jurisdiction reverse a finding of fact rendered by the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Mukhtar alias Mokhi1985 PLD Supreme Court 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-15
  leave to appealculpable homicidemurder convictionocular testimonyappellate interferencesentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the State against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had altered the respondent's conviction from Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (murder) to Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) and reduced his sentence to the period already undergone. The respondent had been convicted by the trial court for the murder of the deceased, supported by ocular testimony, recovery of blood-stained weapons, and motive. The High Court, while accepting the credibility of the prosecution's ocular evidence and circumstantial proof, nonetheless reduced the conviction solely on the premise that the witnesses did not hear the conversation preceding the attack. The Supreme Court found this reasoning insufficient to justify the alteration of the conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court was legally justified in acquitting the respondent of the murder charge and altering the conviction to culpable homicide based on the evidence presented on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Is the absence of evidence regarding the conversation preceding an attack sufficient grounds to reduce a conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  • Can an appellate court alter a conviction under Section 302 to Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when it has otherwise accepted the credibility of the prosecution's ocular and circumstantial evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• The Province of Punjab vs Zia Ul Hassan And 4. Other1985 SCMR 1217 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-23
  leave to appealland acquisitioncompetency of appealreturn of memorandum of appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Province of Punjab against Zia ul Hassan and others, reported as 1985 SCMR 1217. The core legal questions for examination are whether the appeals filed on 11 February 1978 were competently instituted in view of sections 26 and 54 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Order XLI, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the return of the appeal memoranda by the court office for a requirement not mandated by law could curtail a right already properly exercised. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions, ordered the interim order to continue, and directed that the appeal be heard on the present record with liberty for parties to file additional documents. The key principle laid down concerns the protection of a properly exercised right of appeal against improper administrative returns by court offices.

  Questions settled

  • Whether appeals filed under the Land Acquisition Act read with Order XLI, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are competently filed?
  • Can the act of the court office in returning memos of appeal for something not required by law impede or curtail a right of appeal already properly exercised?
  Read full judgment →
• The Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore and Others vs Anisurrehman Khan1985 PLD Supreme Court 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-17
  departmental inquirymisconductpolice disciplinecriminal trialservice tribunaladministrative discretionshow-cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the dismissal of two police officers following allegations of misconduct. The core legal question was whether the competent authority was legally obligated to await the outcome of a criminal trial before initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings, and whether the authority’s decision to adopt summary proceedings instead of a regular inquiry was valid. The Supreme Court held that departmental proceedings and criminal trials are distinct in scope and purpose; thus, the authority is not required to await a judicial verdict. The Court affirmed that under the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, the competent authority possesses the discretion to determine the mode of inquiry based on the facts and circumstances, and this discretion is not controlled by the officer's past service record or external press reports. The principle laid down is that departmental disciplinary action is independent of criminal prosecution, and the choice of procedural mechanism (summary versus regular inquiry) rests with the competent authority, provided it is exercised fairly and not perversely. The Tribunal's interference with this administrative discretion was deemed legally unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Is a competent authority legally required to await the outcome of a criminal trial before initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the scope of a departmental inquiry necessarily coincide with the scope of a criminal trial?
  • Can a Service Tribunal interfere with the discretion of a competent authority to choose between summary proceedings and a regular inquiry under the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975?
  • Are an officer's past service record and press reports relevant factors in determining the type of departmental inquiry to be conducted?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi (Now1985 SCMR 1908 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-23
  sales taxconcurrent findings of factincome-tax referenceappellate jurisdictiontax exemptiongenuineness of sales
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals were directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning income-tax references. The core legal question was whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the genuineness of sales and the status of purchasers as licensees under the Sales Tax Act. The Department argued that the Sales Tax Officer had conducted an inquiry and made findings against the respondent, which the appellate forums had overturned. The Supreme Court held that the Department failed to demonstrate any legal infirmity in the findings of the appellate forums. The Court emphasized that the findings subject to review before the High Court were those of the appellate forums, not the initial Sales Tax Officer. Since the Department could not show that the appellate findings suffered from any legal error, the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal in a tax reference?
  • Does the failure of the Department to show legal infirmity in appellate findings justify the dismissal of an appeal against a High Court judgment?
  • Are findings of fact made by appellate forums in tax matters subject to interference by the High Court if they do not suffer from legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Of Sales Tax Lahore Zone, Lahore. vs M/s. S. MuhammadPTCL 1985 (CL.) 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-19
  limitationcondonation of delaypetition for leave to appealcertificate of fitnessincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax Lahore Zone, Lahore, against an order of the Lahore High Court dated 11-5-1973. The petition was filed on 28-7-1976, resulting in a delay of 954 days. The core legal question addressed is whether the time spent pursuing an incompetent application for a certificate of fitness under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Act can be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. The Court held that since the certificate application was refused on the ground of incompetence and that determination was not challenged, the time spent thereon cannot be excluded, rendering the petition hopelessly time-barred. The petition was accordingly dismissed on the ground of limitation, establishing that time spent on incompetent proceedings cannot be excluded for limitation purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Can the time spent in prosecuting an incompetent application for a certificate of fitness be excluded for limitation purposes?
  • What is the effect of failing to challenge the determination that an application for a certificate of fitness is not competent?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Of Income Tax, vs M/s. Abdul Karim TransportPTCL 1985 (CL.) 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  territorial jurisdictionincome tax assessmentprincipal place of businesstax return disclosurestatutory barIncome Tax Act 1922
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer, Gujranwala, to assess the respondent for the 1963-64 assessment year. The respondent had initially disclosed its principal place of business as Gujrat in its tax return. Following administrative bifurcations of tax circles, the case was transferred to the Gujranwala Circle. Although the respondent initially objected to the transfer, it did not pursue the matter until the appellate stage before the Income Tax Tribunal, which annulled the assessment for lack of jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the assessee was barred from challenging territorial jurisdiction under the Income Tax Act, 1922, given the disclosure of its business location in the return. The Supreme Court held that the second proviso to Section 64(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, precluded the assessee from questioning the place of assessment once it had declared its principal place of business in the return. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the Tribunal was not legally justified in annulling the assessment.

  Questions settled

  • Is an assessee precluded from challenging the territorial jurisdiction of an Income Tax Officer if the assessee declared the principal place of business in its tax return?
  • Does the second proviso to Section 64(3) of the Income Tax Act 1922 bar an assessee from questioning the place of assessment after declaring its business location?
  • Can an objection to territorial jurisdiction, once abandoned by an assessee during assessment proceedings, be revived at the appellate stage before the Income Tax Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs R. G. Chapman1985 PLD Supreme Court 329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-14
  earned income reliefnon-resident assesseetotal incomecharging sectionincome tax deductionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a common judgment of the High Court of Sind concerning whether a non-resident assessee was entitled to earned income relief under section 15-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, despite the provisions of section 17(1) of the Act. The core legal question was whether section 17(1) as a charging section permits the deduction of earned income allowance under section 15-A. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court and the Tribunal were correct in determining that earned income relief is allowable under the statutory scheme, as 'total income' is computed in the manner laid down in the Act, which includes deductions and allowances such as those under section 15-A. The Court ruled that no repugnancy existed between section 17 and section 15-A prior to the specific restrictive amendment introduced later by the Finance Act of 1965. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a non-resident assessee liable to pay tax at the maximum rate is entitled to earned income relief under section 15-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Does section 17(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, exclude the deduction of earned income allowance?
  • How is the expression 'total income' to be construed in the context of computation provisions under the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner 'of Income-Tax, Rawalpindi vs Messrs Abdul Karim1985 PLD Supreme Court 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-28
  territorial jurisdictionincome-tax assessmentprincipal place of businessstatutory bartax returnnullity of assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether an income-tax assessment was a nullity due to the Income-tax Officer's lack of territorial jurisdiction. The respondent-assessee filed a return disclosing its principal place of business in Gujrat. Following the bifurcation of administrative circles, the case was transferred to the Gujranwala Circle. Although the assessee initially objected to the transfer, the objection was not pursued until the matter reached the Income-tax Tribunal, which annulled the assessment. The core legal question was whether the assessee, having declared its principal place of business in its return, was statutorily barred from challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the assessment officer under the Income-tax Act. The Supreme Court held that the assessment was valid. The Court ruled that under the second proviso to section 64(3) of the Income-tax Act, an assessee who has declared their principal place of business in a return is precluded from subsequently challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the assessing officer. Consequently, the Tribunal was not legally justified in annulling the assessment, and the High Court's judgment affirming the Tribunal was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can an assessee challenge the territorial jurisdiction of an Income-tax Officer after having declared a specific principal place of business in their tax return?
  • Does the second proviso to section 64(3) of the Income-tax Act preclude an assessee from questioning the place of assessment if they have stated their principal place of business in their return?
  • Is an assessment order a nullity if the assessee fails to pursue an objection regarding territorial jurisdiction during the assessment proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• The Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs and Others vs Aslam Ali Shah1985 PLD Supreme Court 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-28
  service tribunalterms and conditions of servicejurisdiction of high courtrepresentation by counseldisciplinary proceedingscivil servantconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the departmental authorities challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court which held that a civil servant facing departmental inquiry proceedings is entitled to be represented by a counsel despite rule 10-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. The core legal question was whether the High Court had the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to entertain a writ petition regarding interlocutory matters pertaining to terms and conditions of service, specifically representation by counsel in disciplinary proceedings, or if such matters fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants, including disciplinary proceedings, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212(2) of the Constitution, ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court laid down the principle that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain petitions or interfere with interlocutory departmental orders concerning the terms and conditions of service of civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to entertain a writ petition concerning the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  • Whether matters relating to disciplinary proceedings and service terms fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • Can a civil servant invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court against an interlocutory order passed in departmental disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Thomas D'souza vs Louis D Silva1985 SCMR 1664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-10
  ejectmentex parte orderabsentee tenantsub-lettingpower of attorneyrent controllerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of an appeal by the Sind High Court, which upheld an ex parte order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller. The respondent-landlord had filed an ejectment application against his tenant on the grounds of non-payment of rent and unauthorized sub-letting. Notice was served on the tenant by publication, whereupon advocates filed a vakalatnama signed by the petitioner, who claimed to be the tenant's agent and attorney. The petitioner's application to be joined as a party was dismissed, and subsequently, an ex parte ejectment order was passed when no written statement was filed. The core legal question concerns the competency of ejectment proceedings against an absentee tenant and the executability of an ex parte eviction order against an agent. The Supreme Court held that the ejectment application was competent notwithstanding the tenant's absence, and the High Court committed no illegality in upholding the ex parte order. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that an absentee tenant's proceedings remain competent and an attorney acting for the tenant cannot claim independent occupation to defeat an ejectment order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ejectment application against an absentee tenant is competent?
  • Can an ex parte order of eviction be passed when no written statement is filed by the tenant or his authorized agent?
  • Does an agent and attorney holding a power of attorney for a tenant occupy the premises in an independent capacity?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chief Settlement Commissioner vs Muhammad Yousaf And Other1985 SCMR 694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-07
  settlement proceedingsnotified officerevacuee propertyexecutive directionjurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Chief Settlement Commissioner sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a constitutional petition, declaring certain orders passed by the Settlement Commissioner and the Member, Board of Revenue to be without lawful authority. The core legal question concerned whether a notified officer under the evacuee laws could delegate or refer a matter for final decision to the Chief Settlement Commissioner instead of deciding it personally, and whether executive instructions could override statutory duties. The Supreme Court held that the notified officer was legally bound to dispose of the matter finally and could not abstain from exercising jurisdiction, nor could executive directions erode or curtail the statutory powers conferred by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that statutory mandates cannot be bypassed by administrative circulars.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a notified officer can refer a matter required to be decided under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement Act), 1958 to the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • Can executive directions override the provisions of the Evacuee Property Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
  • Is a notified officer bound to dispose of a pending proceeding finally under the repealed evacuee laws?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chairman,Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore vs The Settlement1985 SCMR 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-15
  evacuee trust propertyallotment cancellationjurisdiction of ChairmanWaqf propertyleave to appealstatus quoDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the status of land measuring 186-1/2 Kanals in District Sargodha. The petitioner, the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board, contends the land is evacuee trust property, having devolved from Guru to Chela until 1947, and subsequently vested in the Board. The core legal question is whether the determination of the property's status as evacuee trust property, and the assessment of the bona fide nature of its prior allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these submissions, noting that the petitioner had not been a party to earlier departmental proceedings. The Court ordered the maintenance of the status quo regarding the alienation of the property by the respondent allottee pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board have the exclusive authority to determine whether a property is evacuee trust property under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975?
  • Is the decision regarding the bona fide nature of an allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 vested in the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board?
  Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain And Others vs Member, Board of Revenue And Other1985 SCMR 1375 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-25
  constitutional petitionmutationallotment of landdelay in filingleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a constitutional petition before the High Court challenging the attestation of a mutation treating Mst. Begum Bibi as a full owner of allotted property, which order was maintained up to the Board of Revenue. The High Court dismissed the petition on the grounds of a four-year delay in filing and the subsequent cancellation of the allotment as being in excess of her entitlement. In seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the delay was excusable due to unclear legal positions regarding allotted property, subsequently addressed by Punjab Act 25 of 1975, and disputed the record regarding the cancellation of the allotment. The Supreme Court held that the petition raised a question of law requiring further consideration and consequently granted leave to appeal, subject to furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay of four years in filing a constitutional petition against a revenue mutation order can be condoned when the underlying legal position about allotted property was unclear?
  • Does the subsequent cancellation of a land allotment affect pending proceedings regarding the attestation of a mutation treating the allottee as full owner?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Wajid Ali Shah And Another vs The Chairman, Federal Land1985 SCMR 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-18
  land reformsfederal land commissionprovincial governmentlease cancellationconstitutional petitionproprietary rightsrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through leave of the Supreme Court challenged a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing the appellants' constitutional petition against an order of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission, which had cancelled a lease granted to the appellants by the Provincial Government under the Land Reforms Regulation No. 115. The core legal question concerned whether the Federal Land Commission possessed the jurisdiction to interfere with and cancel a lease of state-owned land granted by the Provincial Government under paragraph 19 of the Regulation. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgments, holding that land resumed under paragraph 15 of Land Reforms Regulation No. 115 vests in the Provincial Government in its proprietary capacity, and authorities under the Regulation cannot exercise jurisdiction over such proprietary interests. The Court laid down the principle that the ownership and leasing powers of the Provincial Government regarding resumed state lands under paragraph 19 remain unaffected by the Land Reforms Regulation, rendering interference by the Federal Land Commission unlawful.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Land Commission can exercise revisional jurisdiction over state land leased by the Provincial Government under paragraph 19 of Land Reforms Regulation No. 115?
  • Do the authorities established under Land Reforms Regulation No. 115 have jurisdiction over the proprietary interests and land ownership rights of the Provincial Government?
  • Does paragraph 18 of Land Reforms Regulation No. 115 apply to land that vested in the Government under paragraph 15 of the Regulation?
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• Syed Tausif Ahmed Zaidi vs Mst. Naheeda Nighat1985 SCMR 1602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-06
  landlord and tenant relationshiprent evictionappreciation of evidencesecond appealdocumentary evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a rent dispute where the Rent Controller initially dismissed the respondent's eviction application, finding no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The Additional District Judge reversed this decision on appeal, concluding that the respondent was the owner and the petitioner was indeed her tenant, a finding subsequently upheld by the High Court upon a second appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of the evidence regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower appellate court and the High Court correctly evaluated the evidence. The Court emphasized that documentary evidence, specifically a document executed by the respondent to facilitate the petitioner's issuance of a ration card as a tenant, conclusively established the relationship. The principle laid down is that where documentary evidence, such as a document used by a tenant to obtain official benefits, corroborates the landlord's claim, it serves as cogent proof of the tenancy relationship in the absence of rebuttal evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a document executed by a landlord to facilitate a tenant's ration card issuance constitute sufficient proof of a landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Can a High Court in second appeal uphold a finding of fact regarding a tenancy relationship based on an independent reappraisal of evidence?
  • Is the absence of rebuttal evidence by a tenant significant when the landlord has produced cogent documentary proof of the tenancy?
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• Syed Tasleem Ahmad Shah vs Sajawal Khan Etc.1985 SCMR 585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-23
  specific performanceadjournmentclosing of evidencesecond appealleave to appealremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal in limine of the petitioner's second appeal concerning a civil suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The core legal question involves the proper interpretation and applicability of Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the closing of a party's evidence upon default following an adjournment. The trial court had closed the defendants' evidence and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, but the first appellate court set aside the judgment and remanded the case for fresh decision after allowing the defendants to lead evidence, a view upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3 apply only where an adjournment has been granted to a party at its own instance to produce evidence or perform an act, which was not the case here since the adjournment had been requested by the plaintiff. Furthermore, as the evidence of both parties had concluded before the trial court during the pendency of proceedings, a decision on merits was most appropriate. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply when an adjournment was granted at the request of the opposite party rather than the defaulting party?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in setting aside a trial court's judgment that prematurely closed a party's evidence under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can leave to appeal be refused when subsequent events during the pendency of proceedings, such as the completion of evidence, render a technical interference unnecessary?
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• Syed Sultan Shah vs Government of Baluchistan And Another1985 SCMR 1394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-20
  pro forma promotionarrears of payback benefitsservice tribunalwrongful withholding of promotionFundamental Rule 17seniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan arose from the judgment of the Service Tribunal Baluchistan, which had denied the appellant arrears of pay following his pro forma promotion as Tehsildar from 26-10-1968, relying on Fundamental Rule 17. The core legal question was whether a civil servant, granted pro forma promotion after being wrongfully kept back from promotion due to departmental proceedings, can be lawfully denied the arrears of pay and allowances of the higher post under Fundamental Rule 17. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that Fundamental Rule 17 cannot be invoked to justify or perpetuate a wrongful act by the authorities. The Court laid down the principle that when an official is wrongly prevented from rendering service in a higher post to which they were admittedly entitled, the logical consequence of granting pro forma promotion and ante-dated seniority is the allowance of all ancillary financial benefits, including arrears of salary, unless valid ex officio justification exists for denial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant granted pro forma promotion is entitled to arrears of pay for the period of such promotion under Fundamental Rule 17?
  • Can the authorities invoke Fundamental Rule 17 to deny financial benefits when an official is wrongfully kept back from promotion?
  • What are the logical consequences of granting pro forma promotion and ante-dated seniority regarding ancillary financial benefits?
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• Syed Shafi Shah And Others vs Makhdum Ul Mulk Syed Ghulam Miran1985 SCMR 1794 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-20
  constitutional petitionright of hearingland reformsrevisionreview petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition is directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court passed in a constitutional petition. The core legal question revolves around whether an order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner in revision without providing an opportunity of being heard to the affected parties violates procedural requirements and renders the order a nullity. The Supreme Court held that since the impugned High Court judgment proceeded on an agreed premise between the parties that the Chief Land Commissioner disregarded sub-rule (3) of rule 12 of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Rules, 1959 by failing to grant a hearing, the High Court correctly set aside the order and remanded the matter for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to provide a hearing in revision proceedings render an order of the Chief Land Commissioner a nullity under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Rules, 1959?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court judgment that proceeds on an agreed premise between the contesting parties?
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• Syed Safdar Ali vs The State1985 SCMR 1941 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-07
  briberycorruptionreasonable doubtappreciation of evidencecriminal appealtainted moneyfalse implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant, a Head Clerk, for accepting a bribe under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the demand and acceptance of the bribe beyond reasonable doubt, given the inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and the defence's plea of false implication due to enmity. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellant. The Court noted significant discrepancies in the testimony regarding the signaling process and the appellant's actions during the raid. Furthermore, the Court found the defence's contention that the complainant may have stealthily placed the money in the drawer to be plausible. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence, emphasizing that when prosecution evidence is inconsistent and fails to rule out the possibility of a frame-up in the face of established enmity, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a material discrepancy in the testimony of prosecution witnesses regarding the signaling process during a trap raid warrant the acquittal of the accused?
  • Can a conviction for bribery be sustained when the defence establishes a plausible motive for false implication and the prosecution evidence is inconsistent?
  • Is the benefit of the doubt applicable when the prosecution fails to prove the demand and acceptance of a bribe beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Syed Pir Kamal vs Munir Shah And Other1985 SCMR 1466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-18
  acquittalocular testimonyappreciation of evidencecriminal appealforensic evidencewitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the acquittal of respondents Munir Shah and Hassan Shah, who were accused of murdering Mazhar Abbas. The prosecution alleged that the respondents fired fatal shots at the deceased while he slept in his 'Bethak'. The trial court had convicted the respondents, but the High Court acquitted them, finding the ocular testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses unreliable and the recovery of the crime weapons suspicious. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's reappraisal of the evidence was legally flawed. The Supreme Court held that the High Court provided adequate, reasoned grounds for disbelieving the presence of the eyewitnesses, noting their inability to explain their presence at the scene and contradictions regarding the crime scene conditions. Furthermore, the Court upheld the High Court's rejection of the forensic evidence, noting the improbable manner of weapon recovery and the potential for planting evidence. The Court affirmed that an appellate court's reappraisal of evidence, when based on sound reasoning, cannot be lightly set aside. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court's acquittal based on a reappraisal of evidence be set aside if the court provided adequate reasons for its conclusion?
  • Does the failure of eyewitnesses to provide a reasonable explanation for their presence at the scene of a crime justify rejecting their testimony?
  • Is the recovery of crime weapons and matching empties reliable if the manner of production is found to be highly improbable?
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• Syed Muhammad Mukarram And Others And Syed Muhammad1985 SCMR 1490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-04Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Anwar Advocate vs Sheikh Abdul Haq1985 SCMR 1228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-26
  ex parte decreesubstituted serviceservice of summonsspecific performancecivil procedurelimitationdue diligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that reversed a trial court's order setting aside an ex parte decree. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in ordering substituted service and whether the proviso to Order IX, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, cured the lack of proper service. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's resort to substituted service was unjustified because the ordinary methods of service, as prescribed by Order V, Rules 9-17, had not been exhausted. The Court further held that the proviso to Order IX, Rule 13, which excuses irregularities in service if the defendant had knowledge of the hearing, does not apply to cases of illegality where the defendant lacked knowledge of the specific date on which ex parte proceedings were initiated. The key principle laid down is that substituted service is a measure of last resort that cannot be ordered without exhausting ordinary service methods, and the proviso to Order IX, Rule 13 does not validate ex parte decrees where the defendant was not duly served.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court order substituted service without first exhausting the ordinary methods of service prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the proviso to Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to cases involving illegality in the service of summons?
  • Is an ex parte decree sustainable if the defendant had no knowledge of the specific date of hearing on which the ex parte proceedings were initiated?
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• Syed Mahboob Ali And Others vs Ghulam Rabbani And Other1985 SCMR 938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-11
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantdefault in renttentative rent orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their ejectment appeal by the Sind High Court. The respondents had filed an ejectment application on the grounds of default in rent payment, subletting, and damaging the property. The petitioners denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, but the Rent Controller ruled against them and ordered their ejectment after finding them to be defaulters in rent. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the Rent Controller was legally bound to pass a tentative rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance and could not pass a final eviction order without it. The Supreme Court held that where tenants do not assert having paid or tendered any rent, the Rent Controller is justified in ordering eviction without taking further proceedings. The petition was dismissed, following the precedent set in Muhammad Yousaf v. Asghar Hussain.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Rent Controller is competent to pass a final order of ejectment without passing a tentative rent order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance where the tenant denies the relationship of landlord and tenant and fails to tender rent?
  • Does the failure to pass a tentative order for deposit of rent vitiate an ejectment order against a defaulter tenant who has not tendered any rent?
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• Syed Lal Hussain Shah vs Kausar Hussain Shah1985 SCMR 572 (2 ) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-10
  review petitioncivil petition for special leave to appealSupreme Court of Pakistandismissal of review
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition filed against the order of the Supreme Court dated 8-3-1980 passed in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No.212 of 1980. The core legal question before the court was whether sufficient grounds existed to warrant a review of the court's earlier order. The Supreme Court heard the arguments presented by the learned Advocate-on-Record and held that no proper ground for review of the order had been made out. Consequently, the court dismissed the review petition. The key principle laid down is that a review of a court's order requires valid and proper grounds, failing which the petition must fail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proper grounds were made out for the review of the court's order dated 8th March, 1980?
  • Can a review petition be entertained without establishing proper legal grounds for review?
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• Syed Jaffar Hussain And 4 Others vs The Additional Rehabilitation1985 SCMR 1076 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-17
  revision petitionlacheslimitationwrit jurisdictionrehabilitation authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the petitioner against the dismissal of a revision petition by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on the ground of laches. The core legal question concerns whether the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner was competent to dismiss a revision application on the ground of laches given that the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act prescribes no period of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner possessed the discretion to either entertain the revision petition and decide it on merits or to dismiss it on the ground of laches, and where such discretion was exercised lawfully and without caprice, it warranted no interference in writ jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that authorities possess inherent discretion to refuse belated revision petitions on grounds of laches and negligence even if the statute prescribes no fixed period of limitation, provided such discretion is exercised reasonably.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner can dismiss a revision application on the ground of laches when no period of limitation is prescribed under the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act?
  • Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with the discretionary order of a rehabilitation authority dismissing a revision petition for delay?
  • Does the absence of a statutory limitation period preclude authorities from refusing to entertain unduly belated revision petitions?
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• Syed Intizar Ali vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 1805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-18
  settlement lawsagreement of associationprovisional transfer orderspecific performanceestoppelproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of property under settlement laws. The appellant and the contesting respondent had previously applied for a joint transfer of properties, agreeing to a specific share distribution of one percent and ninety-nine percent respectively. Following subsequent litigation and a reduction in the property size transferred, the appellant attempted to resile from the joint transfer agreement regarding the remaining property, arguing that the association was limited only to the portions ultimately excluded. The core legal question was whether the appellant could unilaterally withdraw from a long-standing agreement of association that had been acted upon by the parties and the settlement authorities for over a decade. The Supreme Court held that the appellant could not resile from the agreement. The Court affirmed that the jointness of the transfer and the agreed-upon shares remained binding despite the reduction in the extent of the property transferred. The principle established is that parties cannot resile from an agreement of association that has been acted upon, subscribed to, and maintained throughout protracted litigation, as such conduct creates a binding obligation regardless of subsequent administrative modifications to the property's scope.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party resile from an agreement of association after it has been acted upon and maintained throughout protracted litigation?
  • Does a reduction in the extent of property transferred by settlement authorities invalidate an existing joint transfer agreement between parties?
  • Is a joint transfer order dependent on the formal filing of an agreement of association if the parties have otherwise acted upon the joint application?
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• Syed Ikram Gardezi vs The State And Another1985 SCMR 963 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-08
  self-incriminationproduction of documentscriminal complaintsecondary evidenceCode of Criminal Procedurefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a criminal complaint under Sections 406 and 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 282 of the Companies Act, wherein the trial court ordered the accused to produce certain documents under Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The accused challenged this order, invoking constitutional protections against self-incrimination under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arguing that an accused cannot be compelled to produce incriminating evidence. The Supreme Court, however, found it unnecessary to adjudicate the constitutional and legal questions regarding the scope of Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against an accused person. The matter was resolved when the appellant voluntarily agreed to produce the majority of the requested documents. Regarding the remaining documents, the appellant stated they were not in his possession. The Court disposed of the appeal by recording the appellant's undertaking and noting that the respondent could seek to produce secondary evidence for the missing documents in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person be compelled to produce documents that might incriminate them in a pending criminal case?
  • What is the procedure when an accused claims that requested documents are not in their possession?
  • Is secondary evidence admissible when the primary documents are not available with the accused?
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• Syed Hayat Shah vs The Province of Baluchistan And Other1985 SCMR 2006 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-29
  civil litigationcompromise decreeinterim managementrent collectionAmanatproperty title disputeex parte decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan following an appeal concerning a dispute over land title, specifically regarding shops and a bus stand. The appellant had previously secured an ex parte decree from the Court of Qazi Khuzdar, which was subsequently challenged by the respondents before the Majlis-e-Shoora, where execution was stayed. During the proceedings, the parties reached a mutual compromise. The core legal question involved the interim management of the disputed property and the rent generated therefrom pending the final resolution of the civil litigation. The Court accepted the compromise, holding that the parties are bound to pursue the civil litigation to its final forum. The Court directed that the Deputy Commissioner, Khuzdar, shall collect rent from the subject property and deposit it as 'Amanat' in a profit-bearing bank account. Upon the final adjudication of the civil litigation, the principal amount and accrued profits shall be disbursed to the party entitled under the final decree. The appeal was disposed of in terms of this agreement.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court dispose of an appeal based on a compromise deed agreed upon by the parties?
  • How should rent generated from disputed property be managed pending the final outcome of civil litigation?
  • Is a party bound by the final judgment of the last available forum in civil litigation pursuant to a compromise agreement?
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• Syed Ghulam Shah vs Mst. Hawa Bai And Other1985 SCMR 2035 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-10
  execution of decreeejectment orderrent litigationdiscretionary jurisdictionabuse of processlimitationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal concerns a protracted rent litigation initiated in 1967 against the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, Bachal Bibi, resulting in an eviction order. Following the dismissal of various appeals and the failure of subsequent civil suits filed by the petitioner and others to obstruct execution, the petitioner challenged the execution of the ejectment order in Execution Application No. 109 of 1978. The core legal questions addressed were whether the execution proceedings were time-barred and whether the executing court possessed the requisite competence to execute the original ejectment order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition in limine. The Court held that the petitioner had engaged in a classic instance of avoiding the execution of a valid order for over a decade, thereby depriving the decree-holder of the fruits of their decree. The Court affirmed the High Court's rejection of the petitioner's pleas. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in favor of a party who has abused the process of law to obstruct the execution of a valid decree for an inordinate period.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judgment-debtor successfully obstruct the execution of a valid ejectment order for over a decade through protracted litigation?
  • Is the Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction available to a petitioner who has abused the legal process to avoid execution of a decree?
  • Does an executing court have the competence to execute an ejectment order despite the passage of time and multiple intervening legal proceedings?
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• Syed Azhar Imam Rizvi vs Mst. Salma Khatoon1985 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-03
  tenant evictiondefault in payment of rentnotice of transferSection 13-A noticedeposit of rent orderres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Sindh High Court dismissing the tenant's appeal against an eviction order passed on the ground of default in payment of rent. The petitioner-tenant argued that he was not served with a formal notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 regarding the transfer of property to the respondent-landlady, that the pendency of eviction proceedings absolved him of paying rent until a Section 13(6) deposit order was made, and that the second eviction application was barred under Section 14 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that service of the copy of the initial ejectment application mentioning the sale constituted substantial compliance with Section 13-A. The Court held that pendency of an application or absence of a Section 13(6) deposit order does not relieve a tenant of the statutory obligation to pay or offer monthly rent. Furthermore, the default for the subsequent period provided an independent cause of action not barred by res judicata or Section 14. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does service of a copy of an eviction application disclosing the sale of property constitute sufficient notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does the pendency of eviction proceedings or lack of a Section 13(6) deposit order absolve a tenant from paying or tendering monthly rent to the landlord?
  • Does a subsequent application for eviction based on a fresh period of rent default bar the application under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
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• Syed Ashfaq Hussain vs Syed Tahir Hussain1985 SCMR 1369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-18
  sale of goodsalternative reliefsuit for possessionrecovery of pricecontractual liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute between two cousins regarding the sale of a tractor. The respondent (plaintiff) had sold a tractor to the petitioner (defendant) for Rs. 5,000, but the petitioner failed to pay the agreed amount. Consequently, the respondent filed a suit for the possession of the tractor or, in the alternative, for the recovery of the sale price. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, granting the alternative relief of recovery of Rs. 5,000. This decree was upheld by the Additional District Judge and subsequently by the Lahore High Court in a Regular Second Appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the respondent was only entitled to sue for the price, not possession. The Supreme Court observed that the trial court's decree explicitly granted the alternative relief of Rs. 5,000. The Court held that since the petitioner was free to discharge his liability by paying the decreed amount in execution, there was no ground for interference. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff seek alternative relief for possession of a chattel or recovery of its price in a suit for breach of contract?
  • Does a decree granting alternative relief allow a defendant to discharge liability by paying the monetary amount in execution?
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• Syed Amjad Ali Shah vs Iqbal Ahmad Farooqi and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-21
  urban rent restrictionevictionpersonal requirementchange of userresidential buildingcommercial uselandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals concern the eviction of tenants from urban properties originally constructed as residential units but subsequently utilized for commercial purposes. The core legal question is whether a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant from such premises on the ground of personal residential requirement, notwithstanding the property's current commercial use. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the character of a building remains residential for the purposes of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, regardless of its actual usage, unless conversion permission is obtained from the Rent Controller under Section 11. The Court established that the unauthorized conversion of a residential unit into a commercial one does not legally alter the building's character. Consequently, a landlord is not barred from seeking eviction for personal residential use under Section 13 simply because the property was previously rented for business purposes. The Court emphasized that the Rent Restriction Ordinance does not intend to permanently deprive landlords of their residential property rights due to such commercial leasing arrangements.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord evict a tenant from a residential property used for commercial purposes on the ground of personal residential requirement?
  • Does the conversion of a residential building to commercial use without permission under Section 11 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 legally change the character of the building?
  • Does the definition of 'building' in the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 allow for the eviction of a tenant from a property based on its original residential character despite its current commercial use?
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• Sultan vs Jam Ali And Other1985 SCMR 1810 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-16
  criminal appealappeal against acquittalmurderself-defencecross-casebenefit of doubtland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by leave of the court, was filed by the complainant brother of the deceased to challenge the acquittal of four respondents by the High Court of Lahore from charges under section 302/307/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The underlying incident arose from a violent clash over land possession in Village Dagger Aulakh, District Bhakker, resulting in the death of one person and injuries to several others from both the complainant and defence parties. The trial court had convicted the respondents, but the High Court set aside the convictions, finding the prosecution genesis unnatural, the defense version probable, and noting significant weaknesses in the prosecution's narrative and independent corroboration. The Supreme Court examined the competing versions of the incident, the evidence regarding land possession, and the established principles governing appeals against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no legal error in appreciating the evidence and that the acquittal was justified given the probabilities of the case. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the convictions for murder and attempted murder based on the improbability of the prosecution's genesis?
  • Does an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal when another view of the evidence is possible but no legal error is shown in the appreciation of evidence?
  • How should a court evaluate competing versions of a violent occurrence involving cross-cases and injuries on both sides?
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• Sultan vs Azhar Ali Shah And Other1985 SCMR 592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-03
  pre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plaintremand orderlimitationfinality of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the central legal question was whether the suit should have been dismissed as time-barred due to the late payment of a court-fee deficiency. The trial court had initially rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, but an appellate court remanded the case, directing the trial court to determine the deficiency and grant time for payment. The plaintiffs complied with this subsequent order. The trial court, however, dismissed the suit upon remand, citing the precedent in Walayat Khan v. Khalil Khan, arguing that the plaintiffs' default had created vested rights for the defendant. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court was bound by the un-agitated remand order which had attained finality. The Court distinguished the present case from Walayat Khan, noting that the plaintiffs had complied with the court's direction upon remand. The key principle established is that once a remand order directing the determination and payment of court-fee deficiency attains finality, the trial court must comply, and upon payment, the defect in the plaint is cured retrospectively from the date of filing.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court have the authority to disregard a remand order that has attained finality?
  • When a deficiency in court-fee is made good pursuant to a court order, from what date is the defect in the plaint deemed to be removed?
  • Can a trial court dismiss a suit as time-barred after a remand order has specifically directed it to determine and allow time for the payment of court-fee deficiency?
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• Sufi Mir Zaman Khan (Deceased) Through Fazlur Rehman And Others vs Mst. Shahro And Another1985 SCMR 2063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-17
  leave to appealpower-of-attorneyexecution of documentadmission in written statementattestation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the judgment of the High Court. The core legal question examined by the court is the correctness of the High Court's view that a power-of-attorney executed by respondent No. 2 in favour of Khuda Bakhsh was invalid due to a lack of attestation by witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that the execution of the said document was specifically admitted by the executant in his written statement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider this question. The key principle relates to the legal effect of a specific admission of the execution of a document in pleadings vis-a-vis formal requirements of attestation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a power-of-attorney invalid for lack of witness attestation when its execution is specifically admitted by the executant in a written statement?
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• Subedar Major (Retd.) Gul Khan And Others vs The State And Other1985 SCMR 1679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-14
  Section 145 Cr.P.C.breach of peaceattachment of propertymagisterial proceedingsdispute over possessiontermination of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Baluchistan High Court judgment that rejected a reference seeking to set aside a Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order terminating proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in upholding the termination of proceedings where the petitioners themselves had argued that the proceedings were incompetent due to the absence of a dispute regarding physical possession and the lack of apprehension of a breach of peace. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly refused to interfere, noting that the petitioners' own stance in the lower courts undermined the necessity of the Section 145 proceedings. The Court affirmed that where a party admits that the conditions precedent for initiating Section 145 proceedings—namely, a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace—are absent, the magistrate is justified in dropping the proceedings. Regarding the petitioners' concern over a lingering attachment order, the Court clarified that if the attachment order survived the termination of the main proceedings, the petitioners were at liberty to approach the magistrate for its vacation.

  Questions settled

  • Can proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be sustained when the parties themselves admit there is no dispute regarding physical possession?
  • Is a magistrate justified in dropping proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if there is no longer an apprehension of a breach of peace?
  • Does the termination of main proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically vacate an existing order of attachment of property?
  Read full judgment →
• Suba And Another vs Rehmat Ali1985 SCMR 1831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-17
  pre-emptionagricultural landconcurrent findings of factleave to appealtenancy rightsRegular Second Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning the sale of agricultural land. The petitioners, who purchased the land, contested the respondent's pre-emption suit by asserting a superior right of pre-emption based on their status as tenants. The trial court, after evaluating the evidence, concluded that the petitioners were not tenants on the land in dispute and decreed the suit in favor of the respondent. This decision was subsequently upheld by the Additional District Judge on appeal and by the High Court in a Regular Second Appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners sought to challenge these findings. The Supreme Court observed that all three lower courts had reached a concurrent finding of fact regarding the petitioners' lack of tenancy status. As the petitioners failed to raise any significant question of law or demonstrate any misreading or omission of evidence by the lower courts, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by lower courts in a pre-emption suit?
  • Does a claim of superior pre-emption right based on tenancy require proof of tenancy status?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when no question of law or misreading of evidence is demonstrated?
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• State Through National Bank Of Pakistan vs Mumtaz Ahmad And Other1985 SCMR 1264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-25
  clarification applicationprivate complainantpublic prosecutorsummons casescriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application seeking clarification of a previous court order dated 30-1-1984, specifically regarding whether a private complainant's counsel should be regarded as a Public Prosecutor in cases under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958. The core legal question is whether the term 'hear the complainant' under Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitles a private complainant to be represented and addressed by counsel during a summons case trial. The Supreme Court dismissed the application, holding that the contention is misconceived. The ratio laid down is that the expression 'hear the complainant' in Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not mean the complainant is entitled to engage a counsel to address arguments; rather, it means the complainant shall be required to make statements like other witnesses before evidence is examined.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the expression 'hear the complainant' in Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitles a private complainant to address arguments through counsel?
  • Can a complainant's counsel be regarded as a Public Prosecutor in trials under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958?
  • What is the true import of the requirement to hear the complainant under Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in summons cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Star Textile Mills Ltd. And 5 Others vs K.E.S.C. And Another1985 SCMR 2049 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-25
  electricity supplysecurity depositdisconnection of supplystatutory interpretationconstitutional petitioncontractual obligations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns six petitions for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed constitutional petitions filed by textile mills challenging demands for additional security deposits by the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (K.E.S.C.). The petitioners, having entered into electricity supply agreements, were issued notices by the K.E.S.C. demanding additional security deposits under threat of supply disconnection, citing insufficiency of existing security. The core legal questions involve whether the K.E.S.C. retains the power to disconnect electricity due to insufficient security following amendments to the Electricity Act, 1910, by Ordinance No. LXII of 1979, and whether contractual clauses regarding security deposits can override statutory provisions. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying these as questions of general public importance. As an interim arrangement, the Court ordered the petitioners to deposit the disputed amounts in court, permitting the K.E.S.C. to withdraw such funds upon furnishing a bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the Nazir of the High Court. The Court directed that the appeals be prepared and fixed for hearing within six months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the K.E.S.C. can disconnect electricity supply on the ground of insufficient security following the amendments made to the Electricity Act, 1910 by Ordinance No. LXII of 1979?
  • Whether contractual clauses regarding security deposits can prevail over the statutory provisions of the Electricity Act, 1910?
  • Does Section 24 of the Electricity Act, 1910 authorize the disconnection of electricity supply due to insufficient security?
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• Sohail vs The State And Other1985 SCMR 981 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-11-17
  cancellation of bailmurderprincipal accusedrule of paritycommitment to session
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court cancelling the post-arrest bail previously granted to the petitioner in a murder case under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following his commitment to the Court of Sessions for trial. The petitioner sought parity, arguing that his father and brother, who were co-accused, had been granted bail by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the petitioner stood on the same footing as the co-accused. The Court observed that the co-accused were not named in the First Information Report, whereas the petitioner was specifically named as the principal accused and attributed with inflicting the fatal injury. The Supreme Court held that this distinction fully justified the High Court's cancellation of bail under the established precedent. Dismissing the petition, the Court affirmed that bail may be cancelled upon commitment when the principal role in a capital offense is attributed to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused named in the F.I.R. as the principal offender who committed the fatal injury can claim bail on the ground of parity with co-accused not named in the F.I.R.?
  • Does commitment of an accused to the Court of Session for trial justify cancellation of bail where specific fatal role is attributed to him?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Asghar Bhatti vs Board of Intermediate & Secondary1985 SCMR 1465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-19
  unfair meansexamination malpracticewrit jurisdictionjurisdictional objectionappellate procedureadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order of the Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education punishing him for using unfair means during an examination. The High Court declined to interfere in its writ jurisdiction. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the punishment was imposed by an Enquiry Officer who lacked the requisite authority, arguing that under Rule 17 of the relevant examination rules, such decisions are reserved for the Standing Committee, the Chairman, or the Board. The Supreme Court observed that while this point was raised in the writ petition, the High Court's judgment was silent on the matter, implying it was not argued during the hearing. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner failed to specifically challenge the Enquiry Officer's jurisdiction in his initial memorandum of appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the matter was not a fit case for interference and dismissed the petition, establishing that a party cannot raise a jurisdictional objection for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not specifically agitated in the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a jurisdictional objection before the Supreme Court if it was not specifically agitated in the memorandum of appeal or during the High Court proceedings?
  • Does the silence of a High Court judgment on a specific ground of a writ petition create a presumption that the point was not urged during the hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj Ul Haq vs Abdur Rashid And Another1985 SCMR 1057 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-15
  service tribunalposting orderservice rulesadministrative lawjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against an order passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad. The core legal question was whether the Federal Service Tribunal correctly determined that the posting order of the petitioner, Siraj-ul-Haq, as Assistant Director (Directory) by the Director-General, T & T, Islamabad, was violative of the applicable service rules. The Supreme Court, after hearing the petitioner's counsel, upheld the decision of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Court held that the Tribunal's finding, which declared the petitioner's posting order to be contrary to the rules, illegal, and inoperative, was based on a correct interpretation of the relevant service regulations. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal's judgment, effectively affirming the direction that the respondent's case be considered and decided on its merits. The judgment reinforces the principle that administrative appointments must strictly adhere to established service rules and that findings of fact by a specialized tribunal regarding such compliance are generally not subject to interference if based on a correct reading of the law.

  Questions settled

  • Did the Federal Service Tribunal err in declaring the petitioner's posting order illegal and inoperative?
  • Is a finding by the Service Tribunal regarding the violation of service rules subject to interference by the Supreme Court if based on a correct reading of those rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Sind Employees Social Security Institution vs Fatehally Chemical Ltd.1985 SCMR 1897 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-21
  sine die adjournmentdiscretionary powersocial security courtmultiplicity of proceedingsleave to appealincentive bonus
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind dismissing an appeal filed under section 64 of the Sind Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965. The core legal question was whether the Social Security Court acted illegally or without jurisdiction in adjourning an appeal sine die to await the final decision of the Supreme Court on a material question of law already pending before it. The Supreme Court held that the Social Security Court possesses the discretionary power under section 62 of the said Ordinance to adjourn the hearing of an appeal for sufficient grounds, and such a discretionary order—supported by reasons and aimed at avoiding multiplicity of proceedings—will not be interfered with unless shown to be arbitrary or capricious. The Court laid down the principle that the adjournment of a proceeding for an indefinite period awaiting a superior court's verdict on a binding point of law is a matter of judicial discretion dependent on the circumstances of each case, and appellate courts will not normally interfere with such discretionary management of cases where no prejudice is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Social Security Court has the jurisdiction to adjourn the hearing of an appeal sine die pending the decision of the Supreme Court on a question of law?
  • Under which provision does the Social Security Court derive its discretionary power to adjourn the hearing of an appeal?
  • Will the Supreme Court normally interfere with a discretionary order of a lower court to adjourn proceedings?
  • Does the adjournment of an appeal sine die to avoid multiplicity of proceedings constitute an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion?
  Read full judgment →
• Sind Agricultural Development Bank vs Khurshid Ali Khan1985 SCMR 2075 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-06
  sublettingsecond appealejectmentburden of prooffindings of factrent control
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court setting aside an appellate judgment of the Additional District Judge and restoring an eviction order against the appellant-Bank. The landlord sought eviction on the ground that the statutory tenant had unauthorisedly sublet the demised premises to a second respondent. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, but the first appellate Court reversed this finding, holding as a matter of fact that the landlord failed to prove subletting. The High Court, in a second appeal, re-evaluated the evidence and interfered with this finding of fact. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the finding of fact of the first appellate Court in a second appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interference with the concurrent or first appellate Court's finding of fact, which was well-supported by evidence, was unjustified in law. The appeal was allowed, and the order of the first appellate Court dismissing the ejectment application was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court in a second appeal?
  • Does the burden of proof to establish subletting lie heavily on the landlord?
  • Can a second appeal be maintained against a finding of fact supported by evidence on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikander Ali Khan Petitoner vs Mst. Muqarrab Jehan Begum and Other1985 SCMR 2079 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  leave to appealmaintenance allowancefamily lawquantum of maintenanceinterim stay order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the operational date of a maintenance decree and the quantum of the maintenance allowance fixed by the courts below. The core legal questions involve determining whether a maintenance decree should be operative from the date of the institution of the suit or from the date of separation, and whether the maintenance allowance was erroneously calculated by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that these questions require further consideration and accordingly granted leave to appeal. The Court laid down that substantial questions regarding the computation and operative date of maintenance allowances warrant a full hearing and modified the interim stay order pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • From which date can a maintenance decree be made operative?
  • Whether the maintenance allowance fixed by the trial court was correctly assumed by the High Court?
  • Under what conditions may an interim stay order regarding maintenance payments be modified during a pending appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Ali vs Khushi Mohammad And Another1985 SCMR 656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-03
  Lambardari grantPedigree Livestock Breeding Schemeevacuee propertygovernment landprospective operationland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a dispute over the entitlement to land previously held by an evacuee Lambardar. The core legal question was whether the land in question remained attached to the office of Lambardar, thereby entitling the petitioner, who was reinstated as the permanent Lambardar, to the grant, or whether the land reverted to the Government as general land upon the departure of the original evacuee holder. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, holding that the grant was not attached to the office of Lambardar but was instead made under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme of 1960. The Court found that the initial grant to a non-Lambardar confirmed the land was not restricted to Lambardari tenure. Furthermore, the Court established that government instructions regarding Lambardari grants were prospective in operation and could not be applied retrospectively to the disputed grant. Consequently, the petitioner could not claim a right to the land by virtue of his office, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a land grant held by an evacuee Lambardar automatically remain attached to the office of Lambardar after the evacuee's departure?
  • Can government instructions regarding land grants be applied retrospectively to grants made prior to their promulgation?
  • Does a grant made under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme of 1960 confer a right to the land based on the office of Lambardar?
  Read full judgment →
• Sifatullah Khan And Others vs Mrs. M.U. Khattak And Other1985 SCMR 1425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-16
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionsuperior righttransfer by gifttransfer by salesubsisting rightlimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a pre-emption suit filed by Mrs. M.U. Khattak to challenge a sale of land, which was contested through intermediate gifts and subsequent sales. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court remanded the matter, and the Peshawar High Court dismissed the subsequent revision petition filed by the legal representatives of the defendant, holding that a gift of property by a vendee does not constitute a valid 'transfer' under section 17 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act to defeat a pre-ceptor's right. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the term 'transfer' under the pre-emption statute is strictly limited to sale or encompasses gifts. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that where donees had transferred the suit property to a person having an equal or superior right to the pre-emptor within the period of limitation, the validity of the initial gift is not the central issue, and the pre-emptor must maintain their right of superiority up to the date of the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does a transfer of property by way of gift by a vendee constitute a valid transfer under section 17 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act to defeat a pre-emption suit?
  • Must a pre-emptor preserve their superiority of right not only on the date of the institution of the suit but also on the date of the decree?
  • What is the legal effect when a donee transfers the suit property to a person having an equal or superior right to that of the pre-emptor within the period of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Shukarud Din And 4 Others vs Malik Jan Muhammad And 2 Other1985 SCMR 1207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-23
  pre-emption suitrejection of plaintcourt fee determinationCode of Civil ProcedureCourt Fees Actleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that set aside a trial court's decision to reject a plaint in a pre-emption suit. The trial court had rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, citing the plaintiff's negligence and mala fide conduct regarding the payment of court fees, specifically alleging the plaintiff manipulated net profit calculations to underpay. The High Court, however, overturned this decision, criticizing the trial court for failing to properly ascertain the facts and apply the relevant legal provisions regarding court fee determination, directing the trial court to proceed afresh to determine the exact court fee payable. The Supreme Court, reviewing the petition, noted that recent precedents, specifically Shahna Khan v. Aulia Khan, Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan, and Gulzar Hussain v. Abdur Rehman, established the correct legal approach for such matters. Finding the High Court's judgment to be in conformity with this established law, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming that the trial court must properly determine court fees rather than summarily rejecting the plaint.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court justified in rejecting a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 solely on the grounds of alleged negligence in calculating court fees without first attempting to ascertain the correct amount?
  • Does the court have an obligation to determine the exact court fee payable under the Court Fees Act 1870 before resorting to the rejection of a plaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Zaman vs Muhammad Ishaq and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-06
  land reformcivil court jurisdictionouster of jurisdictionMartial Law Regulation 115pre-emptionreturn of plaintLand Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a civil suit filed by the appellant challenging a land exchange transaction, alleging it was a disguised sale intended to defeat pre-emption rights and violated the provisions of Martial Law Regulation 115. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by res judicata, but the appellate court set aside that finding, instead directing the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper forum, citing the bar of jurisdiction under paragraph 26 of Martial Law Regulation 115. The core legal question was whether civil courts retained jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes concerning land transactions governed by Martial Law Regulation 115. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while civil courts possess general jurisdiction, they must defer to the Land Commission in matters where the Commission is specifically empowered to determine the dispute. The Court affirmed that where a controversy falls under the purview of the Land Commission, the Commission’s decision is final. Consequently, the lower court’s decision to return the plaint for adjudication by the appropriate Land Reform forum was legally correct and consistent with established jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Does paragraph 26 of Martial Law Regulation 115 exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters the Land Commission is empowered to determine?
  • Is the Land Commission empowered to resolve specific disputes between parties regarding the implementation of Martial Law Regulation 115?
  • Can a civil court return a plaint for presentation to the Land Commission when the subject matter of the suit falls within the Commission's jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs Noor Elahi And Another1985 SCMR 1530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-24
  contempt of courtdisobedience of court orderrestoration of possessionjudicial officerunqualified apologySpecific Relief Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a contempt petition filed by Sher Muhammad against Noor Elahi and a Civil Judge, alleging disobedience of a Supreme Court order dated 12-3-1985. The Supreme Court had previously granted Noor Elahi possession of certain shops until 31-3-1985. However, Sher Muhammad executed an ejectment order on 14-3-1985, dispossessing Noor Elahi. Subsequently, Noor Elahi filed a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, and the Civil Judge ordered restoration of possession to Noor Elahi on 7-4-1985, despite the Supreme Court's deadline having passed. The core legal question was whether the parties and the judicial officer committed contempt by violating the Supreme Court's specific timeline for possession. The Court held that all parties, including the petitioner and the Civil Judge, had technically violated the order. However, given the unique circumstances and the Civil Judge's unqualified apology for his bona fide mistake, the Court declined to initiate contempt proceedings. The key principle laid down is that while judicial officers must strictly adhere to superior court orders, an unqualified apology for a bona fide error may mitigate contempt liability.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party be held in contempt for executing a decree in violation of a Supreme Court order granting temporary possession?
  • Does a judicial officer commit contempt by passing an order that restores possession beyond a date previously set by the Supreme Court?
  • Can an unqualified apology mitigate contempt of court proceedings arising from a bona fide judicial error?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad And Another vs Rana Badar Munir And Another1985 SCMR 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-05
  pre-emptiondisplaced personstemporary allotmentcivil court jurisdictionleave to appealsaleable interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal addresses the competency of a suit for pre-emption concerning land allotted to displaced persons from Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The trial court and the Additional District Judge initially held that civil courts lacked jurisdiction over such matters, citing the specific scheme for temporary allotment of rural evacuee agricultural land under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956. However, the High Court reversed this decision, relying on the Supreme Court's precedent in Haji Sultan Muhammad v. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 1973 SC 347), interpreting it to allow pre-emption claims in civil courts. The petitioners challenged this, arguing the High Court misconstrued the precedent, which actually established that temporary allottees do not possess a saleable interest in such lands, thereby precluding the right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court found that the High Court's application of the precedent required further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the legal principles regarding the saleable interest of temporary allottees were correctly applied to the facts of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for pre-emption competent in respect of land allotted to displaced persons from Azad Jammu and Kashmir?
  • Do temporary allottees of rural evacuee agricultural land possess a saleable interest sufficient to support a claim of pre-emption?
  • Did the High Court correctly interpret the precedent regarding the right of pre-emption for temporary allottees?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Alam And Others vs Ahmad Khan And Other1985 SCMR 1006 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-09
  suit for possessionadverse possessioncontradictory pleading and evidencesecond appealconcurrent findingsejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondents filed a suit for possession alleging forcible occupation of a portion of their land by the petitioners. In their written statement, the petitioners claimed ownership of the disputed land through adverse possession for over twenty years. However, during the evidentiary stage, the petitioners led evidence showing they were in possession of entirely different land in an adjoining village rather than the suit property. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, and the appellate court and the High Court in second appeal both upheld the decree, finding that the petitioners had contradicted their pleadings through their evidence. The Supreme Court considered the petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners could not succeed by taking a completely different stand in evidence from the one pleaded in their written statement, and no ground was made out to interfere with the unanimous findings of the three courts below. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party succeed in a suit for possession by leading evidence that contradicts the plea of adverse possession taken in the written statement?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by three lower courts when the petitioner's evidence contradicts their pleadings?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Ahmad vs Muhammad Hanif1985 SCMR 1464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-19
  pre-emption suitleave to appealquestion of factreappraisal of evidencesale price determination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, Sher Ahmad, against a judgment of the High Court in a pre-emption suit. The dispute originated from the determination of the sale price of the suit land. While the trial court fixed the price at Rs. 30,000, the Additional District Judge reduced it to Rs. 13,854 on appeal. Subsequently, the High Court accepted the respondent's appeal and restored the price to Rs. 30,000, concluding that the price stated in the sale deed was genuine and paid by the vendee. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had wrongly determined the price. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the determination of the sale price is a question of fact. The Court affirmed the principle that it will not grant leave to appeal for the purpose of reappraising evidence to set aside a High Court's finding on a question of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal for the purpose of reappraising evidence regarding a question of fact?
  • Is the determination of the sale price of land in a pre-emption suit considered a question of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Afzal Khan vs Mst. Shamim Firdous And Other1985 SCMR 1352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-09
  interim orderwrit petitionexecution proceedingsdower suitsurety bondbank guarantee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against an interim order passed by the High Court in a writ petition concerning a dower suit decree. The core legal question involves the propriety of allowing execution proceedings to continue and permitting the withdrawal of the decretal amount upon furnishing security, given a prior surety bond. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the previous surety bond was furnished before the Additional District Judge and had no relevance to the High Court proceedings. However, acknowledging the petitioner's concern regarding the potential difficulty of recovering the amount if the writ petition succeeds, the Court modified the interim order. The key principle laid down is that while execution proceedings in a dower decree may not be stayed during a pending writ petition, the withdrawal of the decretal amount by the decree-holder must be secured through a Bank Guarantee from a scheduled bank to safeguard the judgment debtor's interests.

  Questions settled

  • Whether execution proceedings in a dower decree should be stayed during the pendency of a writ petition?
  • Can a surety bond furnished before a lower appellate court be relied upon in proceedings before the High Court?
  • Under what conditions may a decree-holder be permitted to withdraw a decretal amount while a constitutional petition against the decree is pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Riaz Ahmad vs Muhammad Saeed Akhtar And Other1985 SCMR 1704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-19
  pre-emptionsale or exchangequestion of factsecond appealmisreading of evidencenon-reading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the primary dispute was whether the underlying transaction constituted a sale or an exchange. The trial court initially characterized the transaction as an exchange, rendering it non-pre-emptiable. However, the appellate court (Additional District Judge) reversed this finding, determining that the transaction was in fact a sale, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court in a second appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the characterization of the transaction as a sale or exchange is essentially a question of fact. The Court ruled that because the petitioner failed to demonstrate any misreading or non-reading of the relevant evidence by the appellate court, the High Court was fully justified in refusing to interfere with the factual findings on second appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination of whether a transaction is a sale or an exchange is a question of fact?
  • Can a High Court interfere in a second appeal with a finding of fact regarding the nature of a transaction without proof of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Yousuf vs Muhammad Fazil And Another1985 SCMR 1011 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-10
  petition not pressedwithdrawal of petitioneviction orderwrit petitionstay order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against an interlocutory or remand order. During the hearing, the petitioner's counsel sought to withdraw the petition to avoid any potential prejudice to the petitioner's pending writ petition in the High Court, which challenges the subsequent appellate judgment passed by the District Court following the impugned remand order. The counsel chose not to press the petition, relying on an undertaking given by the respondent's counsel that the underlying eviction order would not be executed for a period of fifteen days, thereby enabling the petitioner to approach the High Court for a fresh interim stay order. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the petition as not pressed, observing that the dismissal would not prejudice the petitioner's case currently pending before the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition be dismissed as not pressed when the petitioner seeks to pursue remedies in a pending writ petition before the High Court?
  • Whether an undertaking regarding the non-execution of an eviction order can facilitate the withdrawal of a petition before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad vs Ghulam Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-14
  criminal petitionacquittalmurderinterested witnessescorroborationmedical evidenceSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the complainant against the acquittal of the respondents for the murder of Zakir Ali. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the respondents based on interested eye-witness testimony, previous enmity, discrepancies with medical evidence, and lack of independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the acquittal by the High Court was fully justified as the prosecution witnesses were closely related, had a pre-existing enmity with the accused, and their testimony lacked necessary independent corroboration and suffered from discrepancies. The petition was consequently dismissed as meritless. The key principle laid down is that conviction for a capital charge cannot be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of interested and inimical witnesses when material discrepancies exist between their statements and the medical evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal by the High Court can be interfered with when the prosecution relies on interested eye-witnesses with a history of enmity?
  • Is independent corroboration necessary for the testimony of related and inimical eye-witnesses in a murder trial?
  • Does a discrepancy between ocular testimony and medical evidence justify setting aside a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Hussain vs Kamal Din And Another1985 SCMR 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-15
  Urban SettlementProperty TransferConstitutional JurisdictionLocus StandiSettlement AuthoritiesFinality of Transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which allowed a constitutional petition regarding an Urban Settlement dispute. The core legal question was whether a property unit, which had been finally transferred to the respondent's predecessor-in-interest in 1962, could be subjected to further division in 1972 by Settlement Authorities to carve out portions for the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the property unit, having been finally transferred in 1962, had become an independent and separate entity. Consequently, the Settlement Authorities lacked the lawful authority to partition or alter the unit by removing integral components such as a staircase or terrace. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision to set aside the orders of the Settlement Authorities, noting that the petitioner lacked the locus standi to challenge the transfer of an independent unit already vested in another party. The key principle laid down is that once a property unit is finally transferred under settlement laws, it attains the status of an independent property, immune to subsequent fragmentation or alteration by settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property unit that has been finally transferred under settlement laws be subsequently divided to carve out portions for other claimants?
  • Does a party have locus standi to challenge the transfer of an independent property unit that has already been vested in another person?
  • Are orders passed by Settlement Authorities to partition a previously finalized property transfer considered to be without lawful authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Amin vs Muhammad Sharif1985 SCMR 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-06
  review petitionex parte evictionrent controllerinherent powerstenant evictionnecessary party
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed by an ejected tenant seeking review of an order refusing leave to appeal against an eviction order. The core legal questions involve the competency of an appeal against an order of the Rent Controller setting aside an ex parte eviction order, the existence of inherent powers under the rent control legislation to recall such orders, and the effect of deleting a purported necessary party from the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the conclusion that the ex parte order of eviction suffered from no legal defect and was final could not be recalled, as no inherent power existed under the Rent Control Ordinance to set aside such an order. Furthermore, a person who is not an aggrieved person cannot affect the petitioner's claim by their absence. The key principle laid down is that Rent Controllers lack inherent powers to set aside final ex parte eviction orders in the absence of explicit statutory provision, and appeals against orders setting aside ex parte orders are subject to statutory limitations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller possess inherent powers under the Rent Control Ordinance to set aside a final ex parte order of eviction?
  • Whether an appeal is competent against an order of the Rent Controller setting aside an ex parte order of eviction?
  • Does the deletion of a person who is not an aggrieved person vitiate eviction proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Abdus Sattar vs Malik Muhammad Afzal and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-07
  ejectmentpersonal needlease agreementexpiry of tenancyRent Controllerquasi-judicialprocedurebona fide requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the High Court, which upheld the eviction orders passed against him by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge. The petitioner contended that an 11-month lease agreement executed in 1971 restricted the landlords from seeking ejectment except on the ground of default. He further argued that the Rent Controller's order was void because evidence was recorded in a companion case and copied into his file without separate proceedings. The Supreme Court held that upon the expiration of the 11-month term without renewal, the tenancy became subject to the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Court affirmed that a Rent Controller acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and is not bound by the strict procedural formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Where the parties agreed to adopt evidence recorded in a companion case, reasonable opportunity was afforded, and concurrent findings of fact on bona fide personal need were unassailable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the expiration of a fixed-term lease subjects the landlord-tenant relationship to the governing provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is a Rent Controller required to strictly adhere to the procedural rules prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 during ejectment proceedings?
  • Does adopting evidence recorded in a companion case by agreement of parties invalidate an ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide personal need be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Shaukat Ali vs The StatePTCL 1985 (CL.) 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-15
  smugglingpolyester clothcustoms offencereduction of sentencefineleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by Shaukat Ali against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained his conviction but reduced his sentence of imprisonment. The petitioner and his co-accused were apprehended while transporting Japanese polyester cloth concealed underneath coal in a truck. They were tried and convicted by the trial court under the Customs Act 1969. On appeal, the High Court reduced the petitioner's sentence of rigorous imprisonment from three years to one and a half years while maintaining the fine. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the conviction on merits and contended that the fine of Rs. 5,000 was excessive. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's guilt was fully established on the merits. Furthermore, considering that the smuggled cloth was valued at Rs. 43 lacs, the Court determined that the fine imposed was not excessive. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a fine of five thousand rupees is excessive under the Customs Act 1969 when the value of the smuggled goods is forty-three lac rupees?
  • Can a conviction under Section 156(1)(89) of the Customs Act 1969 be sustained where smuggled goods are found concealed underneath a legal cargo in a truck driven by the accused?
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• Shaukat Ali Mirza vs The State1985 SCMR 1508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-13
  prevention of corruptiondisproportionate assetsforfeiture of propertydiscriminationsuspension of fundamental rightsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction under Section 5-C of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, while acquitting him on other charges. The petitioner challenged the conviction on the grounds of discrimination, arguing that Section 5-C of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which applies to provincial government servants and mandates property forfeiture, is discriminatory when compared to Section 5(1)(e) of the same Act, which applies to central government employees and lacks a forfeiture provision. The petitioner contended this disparity violates the equality clause of the Constitution of 1973. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that regardless of the merits of the discrimination argument, the petitioner could not invoke the equality clause because Fundamental Rights were suspended at the time. The key principle laid down is that where Fundamental Rights are suspended, a party cannot challenge the validity of a penal statute on the basis of an alleged violation of those rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can a penal statute be challenged on the basis of discrimination when Fundamental Rights are suspended?
  • Does Section 5-C of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 provide for the forfeiture of property disproportionate to known sources of income?
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• Sharif And Others vs Muhammad Amir1985 SCMR 1214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-26
  pre-emption suitamendment of plaintclerical mistakevested rightscivil revisionKhasra numbersleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld a trial court's decision to allow an amendment to a plaint in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff could amend the plaint to correct Khasra numbers and Khata details of the suit land, given that the defendants argued this amendment prejudiced their vested rights by substituting property descriptions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the amendment was permissible because it merely corrected clerical errors arising from incorrect information provided by the Patwari, rather than changing the fundamental subject-matter of the suit. The Court found that the transaction itself, identified by its mutation number and date, remained consistent and the defendants were never in doubt regarding the subject-matter of the litigation. The key principle laid down is that amendments to a plaint intended to correct bona fide clerical mistakes in property descriptions, which do not alter the identity of the suit property or the transaction, are justifiable and do not infringe upon the vested rights of the opposing party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff amend a plaint to correct clerical errors in Khasra and Khata numbers if the underlying transaction remains unchanged?
  • Does an amendment to correct property description in a pre-emption suit necessarily prejudice the vested rights of the defendant?
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• Sharif Ahmad vs Nazir Ahmad And Other1985 SCMR 1372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-25
  inheritance disputeconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdictioncivil courtquestion of fact and lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging the orders of the Revenue Authorities, including the Member, Board of Revenue, regarding a dispute over inheritance. The core legal question concerns the appropriate forum for adjudicating complicated questions of law and fact relating to inheritance, specifically involving issues of religious conversion and determination of heirs. The Supreme Court held that where a matter involves complex questions of law and fact requiring evidence regarding whether a deceased embraced Islam and the identification of legal heirs, the proper forum is a court of general jurisdiction rather than constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Court affirmed the principle that High Courts rightly decline to interfere under writ jurisdiction in property and inheritance disputes necessitating extensive factual inquiry and evidence, directing aggrieved parties to seek their remedy before a civil court.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition the proper forum for resolving complicated questions of law and fact involving inheritance and determination of heirs?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order directing a party to seek remedy before a civil court in an inheritance matter?
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• Shan Muhammad vs Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab And Another1985 SCMR 1673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-22
  land reformsmartial law regulationresumed landtenant entitlementcultivating possessionconstitutional petitionland commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of 90 kanals of agricultural land resumed from a declarant under Martial Law Regulation No. 64. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of Paragraph 97 of the executive instructions issued under the Sale Scheme, specifically whether the "resumption order" date refers to the final order after exhaustion of appellate remedies, and whether the requirement to prove a previous tenant left wilfully or was legally ejected applies to claims under clause (b). The Supreme Court held that clauses (a) and (b) of Paragraph 97 must be read conjunctively, meaning the entitlement of an original tenant persists unless they voluntarily left or were legally ejected. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the land authorities that the respondent was the rightful tenant in possession and that the appellant failed to establish his claim. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the High Court correctly refused to interfere with the factual determinations made by the competent land commission authorities regarding the possession and entitlement of the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Are clauses (a) and (b) of Paragraph 97 of the Land Reforms Instructions to be read conjunctively?
  • Does the entitlement of an original tenant to purchase resumed land cease if they are not in possession at the time of the passing of the resumption order?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding a tenant's possession recorded by competent land authorities subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Shamsul Islam Khan vs Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation1985 SCMR 1996 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-14
  rent evictionbona fide personal requirementlandlord and tenantmisreading of evidencepleading requirementsrent control
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had set aside a Rent Controller's order directing the eviction of the respondent. The appellant landlord had sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment and bona fide personal requirement for extending his adjacent hotel business. The High Court had overturned the eviction, reasoning that the landlord's desire for increased rent negated his claim of bona fide personal need and that the specific nature of the requirement was insufficiently pleaded. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine these findings. The Supreme Court held that a landlord's desire to maximize income does not inherently negate a bona fide personal requirement; a landlord may legitimately pursue increased rent and, upon failure to secure it, seek eviction for personal use. Furthermore, the Court found the High Court misread the eviction application regarding the specification of need, as the landlord had sufficiently stated the intention to extend hotel facilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court restored the Rent Controller's order regarding personal requirement, emphasizing that pleading requirements must be viewed pragmatically.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's attempt to increase rent negate the bona fide nature of a personal requirement for the premises?
  • Is a landlord legally required to provide exhaustive details of personal need in an eviction application beyond stating the intended use?
  • Can a High Court set aside an eviction order based on a misreading of the pleadings regarding the landlord's stated need?
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• Shamsherwan vs The State1985 SCMR 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-17
  common intentionvicarious liabilitymurdercorroborative evidencemedical evidenceocular testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of the deceased. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and his absconding co-accused attacked the house of the complainant out of a domestic grudge, during which the co-accused fired the fatal shot killing the deceased, while the appellant fired at his own children. The core legal question was whether the appellant could be vicariously convicted for murder under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code when ocular witnesses did not attribute any fatal injury or firing at the deceased to him, and common intention was lacking. The Supreme Court of Pakistan partly accepted the appeal, holding that medical evidence is merely corroborative and cannot replace ocular testimony, and that common intention to kill the deceased was not established. The Court laid down the principle that vicarious liability under section 34 cannot be sustained without proof of a pre-arranged plan or shared intent regarding the specific crime committed, and set aside the murder conviction while maintaining sentences for other offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Whether medical evidence can be treated as substantive evidence to base a conviction when it contradicts or exceeds ocular testimony?
  • Can section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code be invoked to sustain a murder conviction where the accused lacked a common intention to commit the specific murder?
  • Is the presence of pellet injuries on a deceased person sufficient to establish a capital charge against an accused without supporting eye-witness testimony?
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