Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Shamim Pervez And Others vs Noor Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 1278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-20
  evacuee propertyurban settlementconstitutional jurisdictiondiscretionary relieftransfer of propertydirect vs indirect claimantslimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which arose from an urban settlement dispute regarding the transfer of evacuee property. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, acted beyond its authority by dividing the disputed property between two sets of claimants based on their respective possession, rather than transferring the entire property to one party. The Supreme Court held that the High Court did not exceed its jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the High Court’s decision to grant relief only to the extent of the portion in the respondents' possession was a valid exercise of its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction, rather than a formal division of property under settlement laws. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the respondents, as direct claimants, held a superior claim over the petitioners, who were indirect claimants. The Court also rejected the argument that the respondents' appeal was time-barred, noting that the Settlement Commissioner had decided the revision on merits, thereby waiving the limitation issue. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction grant partial relief to claimants by dividing property based on possession?
  • Does a decision on merits by a Settlement Commissioner in revision proceedings cure a potential defect of limitation at the lower appellate stage?
  • Are direct claimants entitled to preference over indirect claimants in the transfer of evacuee property?
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• Shamim Ahmad vs Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 878 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-08
  service lawseniority disputepro forma promotionhonourable acquittalretrospective promotionservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his seniority status relative to respondents 2 to 7. The Tribunal had previously rejected the petitioner's claim, noting that the respondents were promoted in 1966 through the prescribed manner via the Public Service Commission, while the petitioner was promoted later in 1974. The petitioner argued that he should be granted pro forma promotion retrospectively based on government instructions regarding honourable acquittal after suspension. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that the petitioner failed to provide evidence demonstrating that he would have been promoted at the same time as the respondents had he not been under suspension. Consequently, the Court held that in the absence of proof that the petitioner would have been promoted but for his suspension, no grounds existed to interfere with the Tribunal's decision. The petition was dismissed as the petitioner could not substantiate his claim for retrospective seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant claim retrospective promotion after honourable acquittal without evidence that they would have been promoted but for their suspension?
  • Does the Punjab Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to adjudicate claims regarding seniority based on retrospective promotion under Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974?
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• Shahid Alias Babu vs The State1985 SCMR 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-03
  criminal appealsentence reductionappellate delaymitigating circumstancesPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of a criminal conviction under sections 366 and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, originating from an incident in 1968. The trial court convicted the petitioner in 1969, and his appeal remained pending before the High Court for approximately fifteen years before being dismissed and maintaining the conviction. Upon conversion of the petition into an appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the core legal question concerned the appropriate quantum of sentence given the extreme delay in the final disposal of the case and the subsequent passage of sixteen years. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the conviction itself but held that, considering the lengthy delay, the fact that both parties were now married with grown-up children, and that serving further imprisonment would not serve the ends of justice, the sentence of imprisonment should be reduced to the period already undergone. The key principle laid down is that inordinate and unexplained appellate delay, coupled with subsequent rehabilitation and passage of time, can be a mitigating factor for reducing a sentence of imprisonment to that already undergone.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inordinate appellate delay can constitute a mitigating ground for reducing a sentence of imprisonment?
  • Does the passage of a long period of time since the commission of an offence justify reducing a sentence to the term already undergone?
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• Shahbaz Ahmad And Others vs Muhammad Shafi And Other1985 SCMR 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-04
  territorial jurisdictionpre-emption suitlimitation periodadministrative ordercivil procedurestatutory interpretationWest Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged a pre-emption suit filed against them, arguing it was time-barred because it was initially instituted in the Court of the Administrative Civil Judge, Sialkot, rather than the Court of the Civil Judge, Daska, where the property was located. The central legal question was whether internal administrative correspondence between the High Court and the District Judge, directing that cases relating to Daska Tehsil be instituted in Daska, constituted a 'direction to the contrary' under Section 10(2) of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, thereby restricting the territorial jurisdiction of the Sialkot Civil Judge. The Supreme Court held that such internal correspondence did not amount to a valid 'direction to the contrary.' The Court established the principle that for a restriction on a Civil Judge's statutory jurisdiction to be effective against the public, it must be formally notified and publicized. Because no such formal notification was issued, the suit was deemed validly instituted in the Sialkot court, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does internal administrative correspondence between a High Court and a District Judge constitute a 'direction to the contrary' under Section 10(2) of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962?
  • What is the requirement for a valid restriction on the territorial jurisdiction of a Civil Judge posted to a district?
  • Is a suit filed in a court with general district-wide jurisdiction valid even if an administrative order suggests filing in a specific sub-division?
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• Shah Sultana And Another vs Syed Shaukat Ali And 3 Other1985 SCMR 1568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-23
  specific performanceimmovable propertytime of the essencecontractual obligationssecond appealconcurrent findingsreadiness and willingness
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order dismissing a Regular Second Appeal, thereby maintaining a trial court decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could successfully challenge the decree on the grounds that time was of the essence of the contract and that the purchaser failed to perform his obligations within the stipulated period. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the purchaser had demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform the contract, evidenced by his presence at the Sub-Registrar's office and written notices. The Court held that the question of whether time is of the essence is a question of fact dependent on the parties' intention, surrounding circumstances, and conduct, which must be raised and adjudicated upon during the trial. Since this plea was not raised in the lower courts, it could not be introduced at the second appeal stage or before the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Is the question of whether time is of the essence in a contract for the sale of immovable property a question of law or a question of fact?
  • Can a party raise the plea that time was of the essence for the first time during a second appeal if it was not raised or adjudicated upon in the trial court?
  • Does a presumption of service apply to a notice sent to the correct address of the addressee?
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• Shah Muhammad vs Election Tribunal, Urban Local Council, Chishtian1985 PLD Supreme Court 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-21
  election petitionballot paper validityPresiding Officer signaturePunjab Local Council Election Rules 1979mandatory vs directoryexclusion of votespetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an election dispute regarding Unit No. 10, Municipal Committee, Chishtian under the Punjab Local Council (Election) Rules, 1979. The petitioner was initially declared successful, but the Election Tribunal set aside the result after excluding two unsigned ballot-papers counted for the petitioner and adding a tendered ballot-paper to the respondent's tally. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, dismissing the petitioner's writ petition. The core legal question was whether the requirement under Rule 34(2)(d) read with Rule 40(4)(a) of the Punjab Local Council (Election) Rules, 1979—that ballot-papers must be signed by the Presiding Officer—is mandatory or directory, and whether unsigned ballot-papers must be excluded from the count. The Supreme Court held that the relevant rules contain express and categorical terms defining unsigned ballot-papers as invalid and requiring their exclusion. Distinguishing prior precedents under earlier election statutes, the Supreme Court affirmed that the provisions are mandatory and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of Rule 34(2)(d) read with Rule 40(4)(a) of the Punjab Local Council (Election) Rules 1979 mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Whether ballot-papers lacking the signature of the Presiding Officer must be mandatorily excluded from the count as invalid under the Punjab Local Council (Election) Rules 1979?
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• Shah Muhammad And Another vs Bakhtawar And Another1985 SCMR 1496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-29
  specific performanceagreement to sellsubsequent purchasergood faithnotice of contractburden of proofleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  Shah Muhammad and Muhammad Hadees petitioned for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that accepted a second appeal filed by Bakhtawar. The dispute arose when Abdul Hayee agreed to sell land to Bakhtawar, but subsequently sold the same land to the petitioners. Bakhtawar filed a suit for declaration and, alternatively, specific performance of the contract, which the trial court decreed for specific performance. The District Judge allowed the subsequent purchasers' appeal, but the High Court reversed it. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were protected as bona fide purchasers for value without notice under section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to plead, discharge the onus, or prove that they were transferees in good faith without notice, especially since one petitioner admitted knowledge of the prior agreement during cross-examination. The Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, ruling that subsequent purchasers with notice of a prior contract are not protected, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent purchaser claiming protection under section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act bears the burden of proving good faith and lack of notice?
  • Can specific performance of a contract of sale be enforced against a subsequent transferee who had notice of the original contract?
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• Shah Muhammad And 5 Others vs Muhammad Saleem And Another1985 SCMR 1723 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-02
  pre-emptioncantonment limitsquestion of factappellate stagepleadingsjudicial noticeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the defendants (petitioners) sought to defeat the claim by arguing, at the appellate stage, that the suit property fell within Cantonment limits, thereby exempting it from pre-emption laws. The core legal question was whether an appellate court is obligated to adjudicate a new plea regarding the factual status of land location based on a notification, without the matter having been pleaded or evidenced at the trial stage. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' dismissal of this plea, holding that the inclusion of land within Cantonment limits is a question of fact requiring proper pleadings, issues, and evidence. The Court affirmed that while judicial notice may be taken of a notification, it cannot substitute for the necessary factual determination of whether specific land falls within the scope of that notification. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, establishing that a party cannot introduce a new factual defense in appeal without having established the foundational facts through proper trial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party introduce a new factual plea regarding the location of land within Cantonment limits for the first time during an appeal?
  • Does the judicial notice of a notification dispense with the requirement to prove the factual application of that notification to the property in dispute?
  • Is a pre-emptor required to maintain a superior right of pre-emption until the date of the decree?
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• Shafqat Ali And Others vs Liaquat Ali And Other1985 SCMR 1151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-13
  murderunlawful assemblyvicarious liabilitybenefit of doubtmedical evidencecommon objectrestoration of conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the murder of Muhammad Latif. The core legal questions involved the propriety of altering the conviction of certain accused from section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to section 304 (Part-I), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the acquittal of other co-accused who were present at the scene armed with firearms but caused no physical injuries. The Supreme Court held that the merciless nature of the 22 injuries inflicted, including several sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, negated the conclusion that the accused merely intended to teach a lesson, thereby warranting restoration of the conviction under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Furthermore, the Court held that the active participation of the armed co-accused as part of an unlawful assembly, corroborated by forensic evidence matching recovered crime empties, precluded extending them the benefit of the doubt. The key principle laid down is that where medical evidence demonstrates brutal and fatal injuries, the intent to kill is established, and members of an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons are vicariously liable for murder under section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 notwithstanding the absence of direct physical blows attributed to them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the infliction of multiple severe injuries on vital parts of the body negates an intention merely to cause hurt and establishes an intention to kill under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can co-accused members of an unlawful assembly be convicted under section 302 read with section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when they were armed with deadly weapons and present at the crime scene but inflicted no direct physical injuries on the deceased?
  • Is the recovery of crime empties matching firearms recovered from specific accused sufficient corroboration of their participation in an unlawful assembly?
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• Shafiur Rehman Khan vs Punjab Industrial Development Board And Other1985 SCMR 2074 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-07
  service terminationconstitutional petitionmaster and servantdeclaratory reliefleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Labour Welfare Officer of Paras Textile Mills Ltd., sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition and Intra-Court Appeal by the Lahore High Court concerning the termination of his service and abolition of his post. The core legal question was whether the General Manager of Paras Textile Mills Ltd. was competent to terminate the petitioner's service and abolish the post, and whether such action violated section 24-A of the Factories Act. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was appointed by the General Manager, whose appointment letter permitted termination upon notice or payment in lieu thereof, and that any alleged violation of the Factories Act carried prescribed penalties rather than entitling the petitioner to declaratory relief in constitutional jurisdiction. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, establishing that constitutional jurisdiction will not be invoked to grant declaratory relief for statutory violations that carry specific statutory penalties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked to grant declaratory relief for a violation of the Factories Act?
  • Is an employee appointed by the General Manager of a mill subject to termination by the same authority under the terms of the appointment letter?
  • Does the abolition of a post in violation of the Factories Act entitle an employee to reinstatement through a constitutional petition?
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• Shafi Muhammad And Others vs Mst. Shafiat Begum And Other1985 SCMR 1947 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-11
  inheritance disputeMuslim Family Laws Ordinanceadmissibility of evidencejudicial admissionleave to appealrevenue proceedingspre-deceased son
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an inheritance dispute wherein the respondent claimed a share in the estate of her grandfather under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, asserting she was the daughter of a pre-deceased son. The trial court dismissed her suit, but the District Judge reversed this decision, relying on an observation by an Assistant Commissioner in prior revenue proceedings as an admission of the respondent's lineage by the petitioner. The High Court upheld this decree in revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether such an observation by a revenue officer, made in the context of suggesting an amicable settlement, constitutes a valid legal admission of a disputed relationship sufficient to sustain a decree for inheritance. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court’s reliance on said observation as a binding admission was legally flawed, as it did not constitute admissible evidence of the disputed relationship. Consequently, the Court stayed the execution of the decree pending final adjudication, emphasizing that judicial findings must rest on competent, admissible evidence rather than administrative remarks.

  Questions settled

  • Does an observation by a revenue officer regarding a potential amicable settlement constitute a binding legal admission of a disputed relationship?
  • Can a court rely on administrative observations from revenue proceedings as conclusive evidence of lineage in an inheritance suit?
  • What constitutes a valid judicial admission of fact in inheritance litigation?
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• Sh. Safdar Rashid vs Additional District Judge And Other1985 SCMR 653 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-23
  ejectmentrent matterwrit petitionpersonal requirementleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition arising from a rent matter. The landlady sought the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant on the grounds of default in rent and personal requirement of the premises for use as a shop. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment based on personal need, and the Additional District Judge dismissed the tenant's appeal. The High Court subsequently dismissed the tenant's writ petition on merits. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the writ petition filed by the petitioner was not even competent under the circumstances, and the High Court had rightly dismissed it with a well-reasoned judgment on merits. Consequently, finding no grounds for interference, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower forums and the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition against concurrent orders in a rent matter is competent under the circumstances?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a well-reasoned High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition in a rent dispute without valid grounds?
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• Sh. Muhammad Zaki And Another vs Income Tax Officer1985 SCMR 1262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-16Read full judgment →
• Sh. Daw00d Ahmad vs District Judge, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 881 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-09
  ejectmentspecial oathtenantdiscretionary jurisdictionconstitutional petitionrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner-tenant's ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller on the basis of a special oath offered by the tenant himself. The core legal question was whether a tenant, having invited an ejectment decision upon a special oath, can subsequently challenge the resulting order or argue that the case must still be decided through independent judicial determination. The Supreme Court held that a party who initiates and invites a decision based on a special oath is barred from questioning his own offer and its compliance, and such conduct properly disentitles him to discretionary relief. The Court affirmed that participating in and inviting such a procedure estops a party from challenging the resulting judicial order, and the High Court correctly refused to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant challenge an ejectment order passed on the basis of a special oath offered by the tenant himself?
  • Whether an ejectment proceeding resolved through a special oath requires further independent judicial determination of the merits?
  • Does a party who invites a decision on a special oath become barred from questioning its compliance?
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• Sh. Barkat Hussain vs Additional Settlement Commissioner And 161985 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-25
  constitutional jurisdictionurban agricultural landduplicate allotmentsettlement commissionercancelled allotmentverified claimpost-remand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examines whether the High Court acted competently in setting aside, within its constitutional jurisdiction, the orders of the Additional Settlement Commissioner passed under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The core legal question concerned the validity of cancelling a prior confirmed urban agricultural land allotment and making a duplicate allotment to subsequent parties. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in reversing findings of fact and treating a validly confirmed allotment as a mere pending proposal, noting that cancellation without proper notice to the legal heirs was void and that subsequent duplicate allotments of already-disposed land are nullities. The Court established that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be used to interfere with factual determinations of settlement authorities supported by the record regarding duplicate allotments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can competently interfere with findings of fact recorded by a settlement authority in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can a confirmed allotment of land be lawfully cancelled without proper notice to the allottee or their legal heirs?
  • Is a subsequent allotment of land that was already validly confirmed in favor of another claimant considered a nullity?
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• Sh. Anwar Hussain, Assistant Director, Labour Welfare, Lahore1985 SCMR 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-22
  civil servantseniorityad hoc promotionservice tribunal jurisdictiontime-barred appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant working as an Assistant Director Labour Welfare, sought leave to appeal against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal which had denied him seniority as a Labour Officer from 12-1-1966. The petitioner was initially appointed on a temporary basis subject to the approval of the Public Service Commission, and later promoted on an ad hoc basis. His regular promotion was subsequently ante-dated to 12-2-1970. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that promotion to the post of Labour Officer required consultation and approval from the Public Service Commission or Selection Board, which was not forthcoming prior to 2-2-1970, rendering his earlier service ineligible for regular seniority calculation. Furthermore, the Court held that the Service Tribunal correctly found the service appeal to be time-barred as time spent seeking a review against the rejection of a representation cannot be excluded, and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to interpret orders passed prior to July 1969. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ad hoc service prior to regular promotion can be counted for the purpose of seniority?
  • Does the Punjab Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate on orders passed prior to July 1969?
  • Can the time spent in pursuing a review petition against the rejection of a representation extend the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
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• Sh. Amar Maftoon vs Government of the Punjab And Another1985 SCMR 1778 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-10
  service lawpromotion regularizationown pay and gradeservice tribunalleave to appealsalary entitlementsannual increments
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves cross-petitions for leave to appeal arising from a service dispute concerning the regularization of promotion and salary entitlements of a government teacher. The petitioner, a teacher in N.P.S. 16, was adjusted to a post in N.P.S. 17 on his own pay and grade, with his promotion subsequently regularized effective from 20-9-1983. The petitioner sought retrospective regularization from his date of joining, 13-5-1981, along with corresponding salary and allowances. The Punjab Service Tribunal granted him the minimum of N.P.S. 17 and annual increments from 13-5-1981 but denied the request for earlier regularization of the promotion itself. Both the employee and the provincial government filed petitions for leave to appeal against the Tribunal's decision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, identifying that the petitions raised substantial questions of law of public importance regarding the interpretation of service rules and financial entitlements upon promotion, granted leave to appeal in both petitions to examine the validity of the Tribunal's order concerning the effective date of promotion and the entitlement to increments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant claim retrospective regularization of promotion to the date of initial adjustment on own pay and grade?
  • Is an employee adjusted to a higher post on own pay and grade entitled to annual increments in that higher scale prior to formal regularization?
  • Does the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court extend to both the employee's claim for earlier regularization and the government's challenge to the award of increments?
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• Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Irrigation and Power1985 SCMR 689 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-06
  service tribunalpromotion quotaacting chargestop-gap arrangementcivil service recruitmentleave to appealvacancies calculation
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal were filed by the Government of the Punjab against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The respondents, serving as Overseers (Sub-Engineers), had been holding acting charges as Sub-Divisional Officers on a stop-gap basis. The Government terminated these acting charges to accommodate graduate Engineers. The core legal question was whether the respondents were entitled to be considered for promotion against a 20% quota reserved for their class under the relevant service rules, and whether the Tribunal correctly ordered the Department to identify vacancies period-wise to determine eligibility. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal’s decision to require the Department to calculate vacancies and consider the respondents for promotion based on the established 20% quota was correct. The Court found no question of law of public importance warranting interference, noting that the Government possessed the necessary data to perform the required calculations. The key principle laid down is that where service rules prescribe a quota for promotion, the Department is obligated to identify vacancies chronologically and consider eligible candidates accordingly, rather than arbitrarily terminating stop-gap arrangements without adhering to the prescribed promotional framework.

  Questions settled

  • Is the termination of an acting charge of a civil servant valid if the department fails to consider the employee for a reserved promotion quota?
  • Does a dispute regarding the calculation of promotional vacancies constitute a question of law of public importance justifying leave to appeal?
  • Can a Service Tribunal direct a government department to identify vacancies period-wise to ensure compliance with service recruitment rules?
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• Sawar vs Gulfam Hussain1985 SCMR 1012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-22
  leave to appealpre-emptioncompromise decreesale-deedrevenue recordscivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a civil revision stemming from a pre-emption decree passed in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. The petitioner's father had previously sold land to the respondent's father, which was subjected to a successful pre-emption suit decreed on the basis of a compromise in 1964. The petitioner asserted that a subsequent 1978 sale-deed executed in his favour by the respondent's father was not a fresh sale, but merely a document executed in confirmation of the earlier pre-emption decree. Nonetheless, the respondent filed a successful pre-emption suit regarding this transaction, leading to concurrent findings against the petitioner. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the transaction sought to be pre-empted was in fact a sale and to address related questions arising from the execution and revenue records.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent document executed in confirmation of an earlier pre-emption decree constitutes a sale subject to pre-emption?
  • Can a transaction framed as a sale-deed be treated as merely completing documentation for a prior pre-emption decree?
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• Sarfraz And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-02
  murderocular evidencesentence commutationmotivecorroborationcriminal petitionlife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the conviction of the petitioners for murder but commuted their death sentences to life imprisonment. The core legal questions were whether the ocular evidence was reliable given the alleged lack of lighting at the crime scene, and whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence from death to life imprisonment based on the rejection of the prosecution's motive. The Supreme Court held that the ocular evidence provided by the relatives of the deceased was credible and corroborated by the recovery of weapons, despite the delay in sending them to the Chemical Examiner. Regarding the sentence, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision to impose life imprisonment, reasoning that the motive alleged by the prosecution was too remote and lacked immediacy. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution fails to establish a convincing immediate motive for a pre-meditated murder, the imposition of the lesser sentence of life imprisonment is legally justified and appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of related eye-witnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder when corroborated by the recovery of weapons?
  • Does a delay in sending recovered crime weapons to the Chemical Examiner necessarily invalidate the recovery evidence?
  • Is the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment justified when the prosecution's alleged motive is found to be remote or doubtful?
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• Sardar Muhammad vs The State1985 SCMR 1035 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-09
  murdercapital punishmenteye-witness testimonycriminal appealleave to appealbrutal murderdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and death sentence for the murder of Bashir Ahmad under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution had sufficiently established the petitioner's guilt through eye-witness testimony, medical evidence, and recovery of the weapon, and whether the capital sentence was justified given the circumstances. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution's case was supported by the testimony of three natural eye-witnesses, whose presence was justified, and corroborated by the recovery of the blood-stained weapon and clothing from the petitioner at the scene. The medical evidence confirmed the brutality of the attack, noting twenty-three injuries. The Court held that the petitioner, having been provided shelter by the deceased, committed a brutal murder following a dispute over his immoral conduct toward the deceased's wife. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the conviction and the capital sentence were appropriate given the cruel and ghastly nature of the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of eye-witnesses who are related to the deceased sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the recovery of a blood-stained weapon and clothing from the accused at the scene corroborate eye-witness testimony?
  • Is the imposition of the death penalty justified when the accused commits a brutal murder against a benefactor who provided him shelter?
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• Sardar Muhammad vs Muhammad Sharif And Another1985 SCMR 1681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-04
  evacuee propertyPermanent Transfer DeedSettlement Scheme No. VItransfer of propertyfactual determinationremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee property plot measuring 8 Marlas in Nawan Kot, Lahore. The petitioner claimed possession and construction on the plot since 1950, while the respondent claimed a larger area including the disputed plot, supported by a Permanent Transfer Deed issued in 1965. Following prior litigation, the Lahore High Court remanded the matter to the Settlement Commissioner to determine if any evacuee area remained available for transfer to the petitioner after the respondent's prior transfer. The Settlement Commissioner concluded that the entire available evacuee area had already been transferred to the respondent, leaving no land for the petitioner, and that the petitioner's possession actually fell within the respondent's validly transferred property. The High Court upheld this finding, noting it aligned with revenue records and spot inspections. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Settlement Commissioner had factually determined the absence of available evacuee land, and the petitioner was precluded from challenging these factual findings after acquiescing to the initial remand order without appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner challenge factual findings regarding the availability of evacuee property after acquiescing to a remand order?
  • Does a prior Permanent Transfer Deed issued to one party preclude the subsequent transfer of the same land to another claimant?
  • Is a finding by a Settlement Commissioner regarding the availability of evacuee land based on spot inspection and revenue records conclusive?
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• Sardar Muhammad vs Muhammad Saleem and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-25
  produce index unitsrehabilitation settlement schemevested rightexcess allotmentchahi jhalaricancellation of allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the classification and computation of produce index units for Chahi Jhalari land allotted to the appellant under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The core legal question is whether the confirmation of land allotment based on an initial incorrect evaluation created a vested right that could not be altered retrospectively by subsequent instructions issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the instructions issued on 17th May 1960 were merely clarificatory and reiterated the pre-existing principles enshrined in the Produce Index Booklet and paragraph 16(3) of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme (Part-II), and that excess land obtained through a wrong application of the Scheme does not create a permanent vested right. The ratio decidendi is that an unlawful or excess allotment does not vest in an allottee, and authorities are empowered to rectify classification errors and withdraw excess land without violating vested rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the confirmation of an land allotment based on an incorrect classification creates a permanent vested right in the allottee?
  • Can instructions issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner clarifying the evaluation of Chahi Jhalari land be deemed to have retrospective effect?
  • Are settlement authorities empowered to cancel and withdraw land found to be in excess of an allottee's actual entitlement?
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• Sardar Muhammad Aslam vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-08
  settlement proceedingsevacuee propertydivisibility of houseservant quartersconcurrent findings of factwrit jurisdictionSettlement Scheme No. VIIIappurtenant property
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of a dispute regarding the transfer and division of evacuee property comprising two distinct plots, Plot No. 75 (a house) and Plot No. 76 (servant quarters), under settlement laws. The primary legal questions were whether structures built on distinct plots could be treated as separate units rather than appurtenant property under Section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether the High Court in writ jurisdiction was justified in overturning concurrent findings of fact recorded by Settlement Commissioners. The Supreme Court held that since the properties were situated on separate, individually demarcated plots meant for independent construction, the quarters on Plot No. 76 could not be deemed appurtenant to the house on Plot No. 75. The Settlement Commissioners possessed lawful competence to divide the premises and treat them as distinct residential units. The High Court had erroneously interfered with these concurrent factual findings. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and Plot No. 76 was ordered transferred to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether structures constructed on separate, individually demarcated plots can be treated as appurtenant outhouses under Section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does the Settlement Authority possess the jurisdiction and competence to divide adjacent structures on distinct plots and treat them as independent residential units?
  • Is the High Court justified in reversing concurrent findings of fact reached by Settlement Authorities regarding the divisibility and valuation of evacuee property in writ jurisdiction?
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• Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sial And 3 Others vs Government of Pakistan1985 SCMR 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-12
  state land leasenatural justicerenewal of leaseadministrative discretionstud farm grantright to be heardresumption of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against High Court judgments involving the resumption of state land leases (stud farms) by the Punjab Government. The core legal question was whether the government could resume these leases or refuse their renewal without granting the lessees a hearing. The appellants argued they were entitled to renewal under the terms of their grants, while the government contended the leases had expired. The Supreme Court held that while the government possessed the discretion to renew or resume leases, this discretion could not be exercised arbitrarily. Because the refusal to renew was predicated on allegations of the tenants' poor performance (a 'bad record'), the principles of natural justice mandated that the tenants be provided an opportunity to defend themselves against such adverse findings before a final decision was reached. Consequently, the Court set aside the Division Bench's judgment, affirming that the authorities must act fairly and observe natural justice when making decisions that adversely impact a party's established interest in land tenure.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of natural justice require that a lessee be heard before the government refuses to renew a lease based on allegations of poor performance?
  • Can administrative authorities exercise discretion to resume state land leases without providing an opportunity for the affected tenant to defend their record?
  • Are the conditions of a land grant issued under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, enforceable against the government?
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• Sardar Muhammad And Others vs Muhammad Afzal And Other1985 SCMR 1221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-15
  leave to appealregular second appeallimitationtime-barred suitconcurrent findingsgift
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the High Court dismissing the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal. The core legal matter involves a challenge to a gift of land made by the deceased Ghulam Ghaus in favour of his grandsons, which was subsequently contested by his other sons upon his death. The trial court, the district judge in appeal, and the High Court concurrently dismissed the suit as being barred by time. The Supreme Court heard the petitioner's counsel and observed that he failed to demonstrate that the suit was within time. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings regarding the suit being time-barred were unexceptionable, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal on the ground of lacking merit. The key principle affirmed is that where concurrent lower courts dismiss a suit as time-barred and the petitioner fails to establish limitation, leave to appeal will be refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit challenging a gift can proceed when concurrently found to be barred by time?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted against the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal when the petitioner fails to establish limitation?
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• Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan Durrani vs Province of Punjab1985 SCMR 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-24
  review petitiondismissal from serviceappointing authoritydelegation of powersdisciplinary proceedingsconstitutional protectioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed by a former Deputy Superintendent of Police (D.S.P.) challenging the Supreme Court's earlier judgment which upheld his dismissal from service. The petitioner argued that his dismissal and the issuance of his charge-sheet were invalid because they were not executed by the Governor, who was his appointing authority. He further contended that any delegation of the Governor's disciplinary powers to the 'Government' was ultra vires under Article 181(1) of the 1956 Constitution, which prohibited dismissal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. The Court rejected these contentions, noting that the dismissal order was, in fact, passed by the Governor. Furthermore, the Court found that the initial charge-sheet was duly authenticated as being issued 'By Order of the Governor' and that the proceedings were validly continued under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Discipline and Efficiency) Rules, 1959. The Court held that since the final dismissal order was issued by the competent authority, the review petition lacked merit and was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him?
  • Does the authentication of a charge-sheet 'By Order of the Governor' satisfy the requirement that the Governor must issue the charge-sheet?
  • Is a delegation of disciplinary powers by the Governor to the 'Government' ultra vires under the 1956 Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanaullah vs The State1985 SCMR 1488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-22
  leave to appealcorruptionillegal gratificationtrap raidappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a police constable, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his appeal against conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency and credibility of the prosecution evidence regarding the demand and recovery of tainted bribe money during a raid. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding the creditworthiness of the prosecution witnesses and the recovery of the tainted money from the petitioner's pocket were unexceptionable. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact on the credibility of prosecution witnesses in a corruption case warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Is the testimony of police officers and the complainant sufficient to maintain a conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the recovery of tainted money from the pocket of an accused constitutes sufficient proof of acceptance of a bribe?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleem Akhtar Bhalli And Others vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Communications and Works Department, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-07
  seniority disputeservice lawcivil servantinduction into servicetemporary engineerpro forma promotionPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns nine petitions for leave to appeal against judgments of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding seniority disputes among Engineers in the Communications and Works Department. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, initially recruited as Temporary Engineers, were entitled to seniority benefits under the West Pakistan Service of Civil Engineers (Buildings and Roads) Class-I Rules, 1967, specifically by carrying forward seniority from lower grades despite never being formally inducted into Class II service. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, holding that the petitioners could not claim such seniority benefits without formal induction into the service, a process requiring consultation with the Public Service Commission. The Court affirmed that seniority is generally reckoned from the date of continuous appointment in a grade, and administrative notifications or provisional lists do not confer legal status or vested rights where statutory requirements for induction remain unfulfilled. Furthermore, the Court clarified that merit-based promotions to higher grades, such as Superintending Engineer, do not automatically entitle an officer to pro forma seniority following reinstatement from removal. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant claim seniority benefits based on lower-grade service without having been formally inducted into the relevant service class?
  • Does a government notification or seniority list acquire legal efficacy solely because it remained unchallenged by affected parties?
  • Can a departmental authority dispense with the requirement of consulting the Public Service Commission for the purpose of inducting officers into service?
  • Does reinstatement in service after removal under Martial Law Regulation 114 automatically entitle an officer to pro forma promotion and seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Ahmad vs Mst. Asma Khatun1985 SCMR 696(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-12
  ex parte decreecivil revisionlimitationexecution proceedingsconstructive noticequestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision against an ex parte decree. The petitioner, having been divorced from the respondent, faced a suit for the recovery of dowry, resulting in an ex parte decree after he failed to appear in court. Subsequently, the petitioner's brother filed an objection petition against the execution of the decree, which was dismissed. The petitioner's later appeal against the ex parte decree was dismissed as time-barred, and the High Court affirmed this decision. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was unaware of the ex parte decree and whether the lower courts erred in their findings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was aware of the decree, noting that his brother's objection petition regarding the execution proceedings served as constructive notice. The Court affirmed the dismissal, establishing the principle that questions of fact, such as knowledge of an ex parte order, cannot be re-agitated at the appellate stage when evidence suggests awareness.

  Questions settled

  • Can a question of fact regarding knowledge of an ex parte decree be agitated in a revision petition?
  • Does the filing of an objection petition by a family member against the execution of a decree constitute evidence of the judgment debtor's knowledge of that decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Saifullah vs The State1985 SCMR 410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-05
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonyfalsification of eye-witnessestelegram evidencecriminal appealacquittalcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the death sentence of the appellant, Saifullah, convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Ghulam Qasim. The prosecution relied upon ocular testimony from two alleged eye-witnesses, a recovery of a blood-stained knife, motive, and medical evidence. The Supreme Court examined the effect of two official telegrams dispatched by an Assistant Station Master based on information from a cabinman, which indicated the crime was discovered after a train was delayed due to an unclosed railway gate. Upon re-evaluating the evidence, the Court held that the occurrence was unwitnessed and that the alleged eye-witnesses were not present at the scene. Consequently, the Court excluded the ocular testimony, rendered the corroborative recovery evidence insufficient, and laid down the principle that contemporaneous official communications and independent railway operational evidence can falsify subsequent oral testimonies of ocular witnesses, warranting an acquittal when no reliable direct evidence remains to connect the accused to the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contemporaneous official telegrams can be used to falsify the presence of alleged eye-witnesses in a murder trial?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained solely on recovery evidence when the ocular testimony has been excluded?
  • What is the effect of material contradictions between a prosecution witness's trial statement and their earlier police statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Said Gul vs Mst. Sosan Jan And Other1985 SCMR 1013 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-23
  occupancy tenanttenant-at-willrevenue recordmutationland tenancycivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a civil revision in a land tenancy dispute. The petitioner sought a declaration that he and his ancestors were occupancy tenants of the suit-land and had thus become owners by operation of law, alleging that revenue entries recording them as tenants-at-will were void due to fraud and collusion. The core legal questions pertained to whether the discontinuance of occupancy tenancy was established by the record and whether a change in tenancy status requires a formal mutation. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the discontinuance of the petitioner's occupancy tenancy since 1946-47 were supported by overwhelming documentary and oral evidence, and further held that the lack of a separate mutation did not render the change illegal, particularly where subsequent ejectment proceedings established the tenant-at-will status. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the discontinuance of occupancy tenancy can be interfered with when supported by documentary evidence?
  • Does a change in tenancy status from occupancy tenant to tenant-at-will necessarily require a formal mutation to be legally valid?
  • Can subsequent ejectment proceedings properly establish and validate a party's status as a tenant-at-will?
  Read full judgment →
• Safdar Ali Wahla And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 1748 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-08
  criminal appealassaultuse of forcesole testimonycorroborationconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal petitions for special leave to appeal filed by Safdar Ali Wahla and Abdul Majid against a High Court judgment that upheld their convictions. The petitioners challenged their conviction under Section 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arguing that the allegations did not satisfy the legal requirements because no force was used against the complainant. Additionally, the petitioners contended that the prosecution's case relied solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant, Saeeduddin (P.W. 3), which they argued was insufficient for conviction. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions. Regarding the first argument, the Court held that the contention was misconceived when read in light of the definition of assault provided in Section 351 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Regarding the second argument, the Court found no material defects in the complainant's testimony that would necessitate independent corroboration or warrant interference with the conviction. Consequently, the Court dismissed both petitions, affirming the lower court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of assault in Section 351 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 support a conviction under Section 353 where the use of force is contested?
  • Can a conviction be maintained solely on the testimony of a complainant without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed Ahmad Alias Saeed Akbar vs The State1985 SCMR 1455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-20
  circumstantial evidenceFirst Information Reportsubstantive evidencemurder convictioncriminal appealhostile witnessesrecovery of weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his wife, sentenced to life imprisonment. The core legal questions were whether a First Information Report (FIR) constitutes substantive evidence capable of forming the basis of a conviction, and whether circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain such a conviction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in treating the FIR as substantive evidence, reaffirming the established rule that an FIR is not substantive evidence but may only be used to contradict or corroborate its maker. However, the Court upheld the conviction based on the cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of the deceased’s body from the appellant's house, the recovery of blood-stained clothing from the appellant, and the recovery of the weapon of offense. The Court established that circumstantial evidence, when consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and incompatible with innocence, is legally sufficient to support a conviction, provided it excludes every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the accused's guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a First Information Report be treated as substantive evidence to base a conviction?
  • Under what circumstances can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence?
  • How can a First Information Report be utilized during a criminal trial if it is not substantive evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Sadiq Shah vs Qurban Shah And Other1985 SCMR 979 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-07
  bailbail cancellationcommon objectunlawful assemblyfurther inquirycriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to respondents Nos. 1 to 9, who were implicated in a case registered under Sections 148, 149, 302, and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 following an incident arising from a long-standing land dispute resulting in injuries and the subsequent death of an injured party. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in granting post-arrest bail to the respondents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court exercised its discretion properly, noting that the intention of the respondents was not to commit murder and their conduct warranted further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that no grounds existed for the cancellation of bail and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that where the common object and intention of accused persons require further inquiry and do not prima facie reflect an intent to murder, the grant of bail by the High Court will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted to accused persons by the High Court can be cancelled when their common intention requires further inquiry?
  • Does causing blunt weapon injuries in a land dispute warrant the cancellation of post-arrest bail under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Was the discretion exercised by the High Court in granting bail proper in the absence of an intention to commit murder?
  Read full judgment →
• S.S. Qureshi And 15 Others vs The Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs1985 SCMR 1953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-30
  service tribunalseniority disputeinductionforeign affairs grouplimitation perioddepartmental representationpromotion eligibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the Service Tribunal regarding the seniority, induction, and promotion of Section Officers in the Foreign Affairs Group. The core legal questions involve the competency and time-bar of service appeals against induction notifications, the maintainability of successive departmental representations, the validity of permanent induction into the Foreign Affairs Group without fulfilling pre-conditions, and whether a rule of eligibility for promotion creates an enforceable right to be promoted from the date of eligibility. The Supreme Court held that the respondents' appeals before the Tribunal were barred by time and incompetent because the induction notifications issued in 1977 were not challenged within the prescribed limitation period, successive representations are not recognized by law, and the promotion orders could not serve to revive time-barred grievances regarding induction. Furthermore, a provisional seniority list not circulated for objections cannot furnish a cause of action, and eligibility alone does not confer a right to promotion. The appeals were accordingly accepted and the Tribunal's order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal against an induction order is time-barred if the initial departmental representation was not made within thirty days of the notification?
  • Does a second or subsequent departmental representation extend the period of limitation when the service rules do not provide for such a second representation?
  • Can a promotion order of another authority be treated as a final departmental order for the purpose of challenging a distinct induction notification under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Does eligibility for promotion automatically confer a legal right to be promoted from the exact date eligibility was attained?
  • Can an uncirculated provisional seniority list furnish a valid cause of action for a civil servant to challenge seniority before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• S.M.Mohsan Zaidi vs Syed Gauhar Ali1985 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-02
  statutory tenancyexecution of decreeejectment proceedingsevacuee propertyobjection petitionpossession in own rightsettlement laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from the dismissal of a revision petition by the Lahore High Court, concerning an attempt by the appellant to resist the execution of an ejectment order against property transferred under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the appellant, claiming to be a legal heir of the original occupant, was in possession of the disputed premises in his own right, thereby rendering the eviction order against the judgment-debtors non-binding upon him. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the appellant failed to prove he was in possession of the property in his own right at the time of transfer. The Court held that to successfully resist execution under Order XXI, Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objector must affirmatively establish possession in good faith on their own account or on behalf of someone other than the judgment-debtor. Furthermore, statutory tenancy under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, requires proof of possession at the time of property transfer, which the appellant failed to demonstrate.

  Questions settled

  • What must an objector establish to successfully resist the execution of an eviction order under Order XXI, Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a person claiming to be a legal heir of a deceased tenant automatically entitled to statutory tenancy under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, without proving possession at the time of transfer?
  • Can an eviction order be resisted by an occupant who fails to prove they were in possession of the property in their own right at the time of its transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• S.M. Yusuf And Another vs Settlement Commissioner (Sind) And Other1985 SCMR 2045 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-09
  transfer of propertysettlement authoritieslocus standileave to appealauction purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of an urban plot in Karachi, initially subjected to conflicting claims by the petitioners as allottees with alleged permanent construction and by a third-party auction purchaser. Following protracted litigation culminating in a previous Supreme Court judgment, the Settlement Commissioner transferred the plot to the petitioners. Successors-in-interest of the auction purchaser successfully challenged this transfer in the High Court, which quashed the Settlement Commissioner's order on the ground that permanent construction was not established. The petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, contending that the respondents lacked locus standi because their lack of entitlement to the transfer had been conclusively foreclosed by prior judicial decisions up to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the respondents had the requisite locus standi to challenge the Settlement Commissioner's order in light of the finality of earlier adjudications concerning the property's transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party whose lack of entitlement to the transfer of a disputed property has been foreclosed by prior judicial decisions possesses the locus standi to challenge a subsequent transfer order?
  • Can the High Court set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner passed pursuant to remand directions without considering the conclusive findings of superior courts?
  • Whether the absence of permanent construction on a disputed plot deprives an allottee of transfer rights when prior appellate judgments have left the matter for reconsideration?
  Read full judgment →
• S.M. Tufail Ahmad vs Kafiluddin Ahmad and 2 Other1985 SCMR 1976 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-22
  service extensionsuperannuationabatement of suitreview applicationlimitation periodcivil revisionService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Assistant Administrative Officer, challenged the refusal of his request for a three-year extension in service beyond his superannuation date. He initially filed a civil suit seeking a declaration regarding his entitlement to the extension. The trial court dismissed the suit, citing the abatement of the proceedings under the Service Tribunal Ordinance, 1973. The petitioner subsequently filed a review application, which was dismissed on grounds of being time-barred and lacking merit. A revision application to the High Court was also dismissed, affirming the trial court's decision. Upon seeking leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined the procedural history. The Supreme Court held that the review application was clearly time-barred, having been filed eight months after the initial order, and the trial court correctly dismissed it on that basis. Consequently, the High Court's dismissal of the revision application was upheld. The Court affirmed the principle that a review application filed well beyond the statutory limitation period is not maintainable, and a revision against such a dismissal is liable to be rejected on that ground alone.

  Questions settled

  • Is a review application maintainable if filed after the expiration of the statutory limitation period?
  • Does the promulgation of the Service Tribunal Ordinance 1973 cause the abatement of pending civil suits regarding service matters?
  • Can a revision application be dismissed solely on the ground that the underlying review application was time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Roshan Ali vs Noor Khan and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-25
  pre-emptionremand orderbinding precedentconstitutional lawevacuee propertyallotment of landfinality of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a regular second appeal in a pre-emption matter concerning agricultural land allotted to a refugee and subsequently sold. The core legal question was whether a remand order, which had become final under section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and was based on an earlier view of the law, precluded the application of a subsequent enunciation of law by the Supreme Court delivered during the pendency of the proceedings pursuant to Article 189 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional mandate making its decisions binding on all courts overrides the finality of a remand order under the Code of Civil Procedure, provided the proceedings are still pending and the matter is not a past and closed transaction. Consequently, the subsequent enunciation of law regarding the permanent nature of allotments and pre-emptibility governed the case. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a binding enunciation of law by the Supreme Court under Article 189 of the Constitution override the finality of a remand order under section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in pending proceedings?
  • Whether a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court can reopen a past and closed transaction?
  • Are agricultural land allotments to Jammu and Kashmir displaced persons pre-emptible under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
  Read full judgment →
• Riazul Haq vs Seth Khushi Muhammad and ANOTHERs1985 PLD Supreme Court 223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-16
  equality of votesdrawing of lotselection petitionelection tribunalreturning officerspecial judge anti-corruptionpublic servantillegal gratificationjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two separate matters decided by the Supreme Court. The first matter, concerning an election dispute, examines whether an Election Tribunal or a Returning Officer is mandated to draw lots in the event of an equality of votes under the relevant local government legislation. The core legal question was whether the Returning Officer could draw lots upon remand or if the Election Tribunal itself was required to perform this function. The court held that rule 16(1) of the Punjab Local Councils (Election Petition) Rules, 1979 makes it mandatory for the Election Tribunal to itself draw lots in cases of equality of votes, rendering any remand to the Returning Officer for that purpose unlawful. The second matter involves a criminal petition concerning the jurisdiction of a Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, to try a private person under section 162 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core question was whether a non-public servant could be tried by a Special Judge. The court held that offences under section 162 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 are exclusively triable by a Special Judge under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958, notwithstanding that the accused is not a public servant, laying down the principle that private persons committing offences under sections 161 to 166 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Special Judges.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for an Election Tribunal to itself draw lots in the case of equality of votes under rule 16(1) of the Punjab Local Councils (Election Petition) Rules, 1979?
  • Can an Election Tribunal remand a case to a Returning Officer to draw lots upon an equality of votes?
  • Does a Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, have jurisdiction to try a person who is not a public servant for an offence under section 162 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Are offences under sections 161 to 166 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 exclusively triable by a Special Judge under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Hussain Qureshi And Others vs Settlement Commissioner (L), Multan And Other1985 SCMR 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-16
  land allotmentauction cancellationremand orderrevenue recordspecial JamabandiDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Acturban building site
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute over the allotment and subsequent auction of an urban plot in Multan, involving competing claims between original allottees and auction purchasers. The primary issue was whether the High Court erred in setting aside the auction and the Settlement Commissioner’s orders without remanding the case for a proper determination of the land's nature (agricultural versus building site) based on the relevant revenue records. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that the High Court should not have decided the nature of the land itself but should have remanded the matter to the notified Settlement authorities to determine the land's classification using the special Jamabandi records. The judgment affirms that when a lower authority fails to base its findings on the correct statutory records, such as the special Jamabandi for land classification, the appropriate judicial remedy is to remand the case for a fresh decision based on the proper evidence rather than adjudicating the factual classification at the appellate level.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is empowered to determine the nature of land classification without remanding the matter to the Settlement authorities?
  • Does the Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to declare land as a building site under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Is the determination of land nature based on special Jamabandi a prerequisite for valid allotment under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Ahmad vs Um E Salma1985 SCMR 1740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-07
  pre-emptiontenantKhasra Girdawarisuperior right of pre-emptionrevenue recordssale-deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the defendant vendee against the dismissal of his Regular Second Appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed the lower courts' decrees in favor of the respondent pre-emptor. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether the appellant's claim of being a tenant of the disputed land—and thereby possessing a superior right of pre-emption—was duly established in accordance with law, particularly regarding entries in the revenue records. The Supreme Court held that the revenue entries (Khasra Girdawari) explicitly recorded the appellant's possession in the capacity of a vendee rather than a tenant, and such entries could not be selectively accepted while rejecting the character of possession shown therein. Furthermore, revenue records are presumed to relate to the state of things prevailing on the date they are prepared and cannot be ante-dated. The key principle laid down is that the nature of possession recorded in revenue documents as that of a vendee cannot be altered to that of a tenant to claim a superior right of pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an entry in the Khasra Girdawari showing possession as a vendee can be construed as possession in the capacity of a tenant for claiming pre-emption?
  • Can a part of a revenue record entry be accepted while rejecting the remaining part that indicates the nature of possession?
  • Do revenue records raise a presumption of ante-dating possession prior to the date on which they are prepared?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmatullah And Others vs Yusaf And Other1985 SCMR 1274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-19
  transfer of propertysuo motu revisionlocus standisettlement commissionerpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal challenging the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court regarding the transfer of disputed property. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners had the locus standi to question a property transfer made in favour of the respondents in 1960, given that the departmental authorities and the High Court found no proof that the petitioners had ever filed the requisite transfer forms, and further noted their delay of over a decade in approaching the authorities. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-filing of forms and the conduct of the petitioners precluded any interference. The Court concluded that the petitioners lacked locus standi to challenge the transfer. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party lacking proof of filing requisite transfer forms possess the locus standi to challenge the transfer of property?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to interfere with concurrent departmental findings regarding the non-filing of settlement forms after a prolonged delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehamt Ali vs Javed Ur Rehman And Other1985 SCMR 698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-23
  ex parte orderrent controlejectmentsufficient causeleave to appealprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of writ petitions regarding an ex parte ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller. The respondent-landlords filed for the petitioner's ejectment from a shop on grounds of lease violation and property reconstruction. Following the petitioner's failure to appear, the Rent Controller passed an ex parte order. The petitioner's subsequent application to set aside the ex parte order was dismissed by the Rent Controller, a decision upheld by the District Judge on appeal and subsequently by the High Court in writ jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had demonstrated sufficient cause for his non-appearance to justify setting aside the ex parte order. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had correctly evaluated the evidence and concluded that the petitioner failed to establish sufficient cause. The Court found that the petitioner's actions were a deliberate attempt to prolong proceedings to maintain unauthorized occupation of the premises. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' findings on the lack of sufficient cause.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application to set aside an ex parte order in rent proceedings requires the demonstration of sufficient cause for non-appearance?
  • Can a party prolong legal proceedings to maintain occupation of demised premises through repeated appeals and applications?
  Read full judgment →
• Raza Muhammad vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 1267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-15
  property disputecompromise agreementlocus standisettlement of propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a property dispute over a composite property in Vehari. The property was originally transferred to respondent No. 4, Mst. Waheedan, in 1959. Following a dispute with the petitioner, Raza Muhammad, who occupied a portion of the shop, the parties entered into a compromise on November 25, 1967. Under this agreement, specific portions of the shop and the Chaubara were allocated to the petitioner, while the remaining portions were allocated to Mst. Waheedan. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having accepted the terms of the 1967 compromise, retained the legal standing to subsequently claim the property portion allocated to Mst. Waheedan. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was bound by the terms of the compromise, which had remained unchallenged. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petitioner lacked the locus standi to assert claims over the property portion transferred to Mst. Waheedan. The key principle laid down is that a party is strictly bound by the terms of a valid compromise agreement and cannot subsequently agitate claims contrary to that settlement.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party bound by the terms of a compromise agreement regarding property transfer?
  • Does a party have locus standi to claim property that was previously allocated to another party via a binding compromise?
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• Raza Khan vs The State1985 SCMR 1032 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-10
  kidnappingabductionminor victimcriminal intentleave to appealdeath sentencestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his conviction and sentence of death under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the abduction of a minor girl. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner forcibly abducted the victim, a minor, and was apprehended by the victim's father and others while carrying her. The petitioner denied the allegations, claiming fabrication by the police and the complainant. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court concern whether the prosecution sufficiently established the victim's age as under ten years, which is a statutory prerequisite for the application of Section 364-A, and whether the prosecution proved the requisite criminal intent specified in the statute. The Supreme Court, noting the petitioner's contentions regarding the lack of evidence on age and intent, as well as the alleged withholding of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution, granted leave to appeal to re-examine the evidence and the appropriateness of the sentence imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the age of the victim being under ten years a condition precedent for a conviction under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Must the prosecution prove a specific criminal intent from the list provided in Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to secure a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Rasib And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murderocular testimonymedical evidencetime of deathdigestion processdeath sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the conviction and death sentence of appellant Rasib and imprisonment for life of appellant Gulzar under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mohammad Feroz. The core legal question was whether discrepancies between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence regarding the time of death, based on the state of digestion of food in the stomach and small intestines, were sufficient to discard direct eyewitness accounts. The Supreme Court held that medical opinion based on digestion is an unreliable and flexible guide that cannot override trustworthy and natural ocular testimony coming from an unimpeachable source, particularly when the medical data is scanty. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether medical evidence regarding the state of food digestion in the stomach can override direct and reliable ocular testimony?
  • Does an opinion on the time of death based on digestion data possess sufficient certainty to discard an eyewitness account?
  • Whether multiple knife blows inflicted on a sleeping victim constitute an extenuating circumstance warranting a lesser sentence than death?
  Read full judgment →
• Rao Khalil Ul Rehman vs Allah Bakhsh And Other1985 SCMR 1266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-14
  land allotmentmortgagee unitsinheritance claimlocus standiRehabilitation Settlement Schemeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding a land allotment dispute. The petitioner challenged an allotment of 86 Kanals of land originally made to one Abdul Ghani on 17-1-1961. The petitioner's initial claims, based on mortgagee units and inheritance from Mst. Rashidan, were rejected by the authorities on the grounds that the petitioner had already received allotments exceeding his entitlement and lacked locus standi. The High Court, in the impugned order, upheld the rejection, finding that allotments against mortgagee units were not permissible under the relevant scheme and that the petitioner had already received his full share of inheritance. Furthermore, the Court noted that the inheritance had not devolved prior to the date of the original allotment. The Supreme Court found no legal defect in the High Court's reasoning, affirming that the petitioner's claim was barred by the provisions of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, maintaining the validity of the original allotment in favour of the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allotment of land be claimed against mortgagee units under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme?
  • Does a person have locus standi to challenge a land allotment if they have already received allotments in excess of their entitlement?
  • Is an inheritance claim valid for land allotment purposes if the devolution occurred after the date of the original allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Muhammad Yasin vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Establishment Division, Rawalpindi1985 SCMR 1761 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-26
  civil servantcompulsory retirementqualifying servicepensionwar serviceservice tribunaljurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by a civil servant under Article 212(3) of the Constitution examined whether his compulsory retirement under section 13(ii) of the Civil Servants Act was based on a completed qualifying service of 25 years. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to count his prior military war service towards qualifying service for pension under rule 357-AA of the Civil Services Regulations, which depended on whether his subsequent appointment as a temporary Superintendent of Police in the Punjab Additional Police was to a pensionable post. The Supreme Court held that the post held by the appellant was indeed a pensionable post under the relevant provincial rules and notifications, notwithstanding its temporary nature or short duration, thereby entitling him to count his war service and successfully complete the threshold 25 years of qualifying service. Consequently, the retirement order was competently passed, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether military war service can be counted towards qualifying service for pension under rule 357-AA of the Civil Services Regulations?
  • Does service rendered on a temporary post in a temporary department constitute service in a pensionable post for the purpose of pensionary benefits?
  • Can a civil servant challenge the validity of a compulsory retirement order on grounds outside the scope of leave granted by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Muhammad Akbar Deceased. Represented By Maj. Lal Khan And Others vs Iftikhar Jillani Deceased, Represented By Ijaz Jillani And Other1985 SCMR 944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-08
  customary lawalienation of landtenancy rightsIslamic injunctionsreversionary rightsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the alienation of agricultural land. The core legal question is whether the Federal Shariat Court's declaration in Muhammad Ishaq v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1981 FSC 278)—which held that customary law allowing collaterals to challenge alienations by a male full owner is repugnant to Islamic injunctions—extends to the alienation of tenancy rights held under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. The High Court had distinguished the present case, ruling that the Federal Shariat Court's decision was limited to full ownership rights and did not apply to tenancy rights. The petitioners contended that the underlying principle of the precedent, which invalidated customary restrictions on alienation as contrary to Islamic law, should apply broadly to all such customary restraints. The Supreme Court found that the question raised is of general public importance and involves a significant point of law regarding the scope of the Federal Shariat Court's ruling. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the customary restrictions on the alienation of tenancy rights remain valid.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Shariat Court's declaration regarding the repugnancy of customary law to Islamic injunctions extend to the alienation of tenancy rights under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912?
  • Can collaterals challenge the alienation of tenancy rights based on agricultural custom after the promulgation of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance XIII of 1983?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Khushbakhtur Rehman And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 1314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-13
  CognizanceCriminal ProcedureCourt of SessionChallanPrivate ComplaintWithdrawal of ComplaintQuashment of Proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing a quashment petition regarding criminal proceedings. The core legal question concerned the powers and duties of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session, specifically whether cognizance is taken of the offender or the offence, and whether a Magistrate can selectively send only certain accused to the Sessions Court. The Supreme Court held that under Section 190(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence as a whole, not of specific offenders. Consequently, once cognizance is taken of an offence triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate must send the entire case to that Court, regardless of whether the police placed specific accused in column 2 or 3 of the challan. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the trial court retains the power to summon accused placed in column 2, and the withdrawal of a private complaint is permissible without violating the principles established in Nur Elahi v. The State. The key principle established is that cognizance is of the offence, granting the trial court jurisdiction over all involved persons.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Magistrate take cognizance of an offender or an offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a Magistrate required to send the entire case to the Court of Session once cognizance is taken of an offence exclusively triable by that court?
  • Can a trial court summon an accused person who was placed in column 2 of the police challan?
  • Does the withdrawal of a private complaint in a murder case necessarily invalidate ongoing proceedings in a challan case?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Aurangzeb And Others vs The Additional Rent Controller, Lahore1985 SCMR 876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-08
  ejectment proceedingsrent controllerstriking off defenceshort deposit of rentleave to appealtenancy dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld orders from the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge striking off the petitioners' defence in ejectment proceedings. The Rent Controller had ordered the tenants to deposit arrears and future rent; upon their failure to comply fully, their defence was struck off. The petitioners argued that the shortfall was minimal, resulted from inadvertence, and should have been adjusted against a security deposit held by the landlord. The Supreme Court found that the petitioners failed to provide any valid legal ground for the short deposit before the lower courts and did not claim that the order was misunderstood or that compliance was impossible. Consequently, the Court held that the lower courts acted with competence and jurisdiction in striking off the defence due to the proved default. The petition was dismissed, though the Court granted the petitioners four months to vacate the premises, conditional upon the payment of all outstanding and future rent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant's defence be struck off for a short deposit of rent in ejectment proceedings?
  • Is a security deposit held by a landlord automatically adjustable against a court-ordered rent deposit?
  • Does a failure to provide a valid explanation for a rent deposit shortfall justify striking off a defence in rent proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Rais Khan And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 1170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-17
  rapeSection 376 PPCcorroborationuncorroborated testimonyprosecutrix evidencedelay in FIRacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and sentencing of two appellants under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for rape. The prosecution alleged that the appellants forcibly abducted the prosecutrix to their residence and committed rape under threat. The trial Magistrate convicted both accused, and the High Court reduced one sentence due to young age while maintaining the other. The core legal question was whether the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix, marked by material contradictions and unsupported by independent evidence or significant resistance marks, could sustain a conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution evidence was inconclusive and unsafe to support a conviction without independent corroboration. It noted material contradictions between the prosecutrix's statement and the FIR, unexplained delay in reporting, lack of expected injuries or marks of resistance, and failure of related witnesses to intervene or support her narrative. The appeal was allowed, and both appellants were acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for rape be safely based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix when there are material contradictions in her statements?
  • Does the absence of marks of resistance or personal injuries on a prosecutrix create reasonable doubt regarding non-consensual sexual intercourse?
  • What is the evidentiary effect of unexplained delay in lodging an FIR in a rape prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Rahim Bakhsh through Legal Heirs and Others vs Mst. Pathani through Legal Heirs and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-31
  occupancy tenancylimitation periodcondonation of delaypreparation and delivery of copiesregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Regular Second Appeal arising out of a land suit regarding occupancy tenancy. The primary question on merits concerned whether the respondent side had abandoned their occupancy tenancy before 1952, while a preliminary objection regarding limitation was also raised. The Supreme Court observed that the appeal lacked force on merits in light of established precedents, and further held that the petition for leave to appeal was barred by limitation. The Court examined whether the time between the preparation and delivery of copies could be excluded as a matter of right under section 12 of the Limitation Act or considered under section 5 for condonation of delay. Holding that the appellant failed to satisfactorily explain each day of delay after the expiry of the limitation period, the Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time between the preparation and delivery of copies can be excluded as a matter of right under section 12 of the Limitation Act or dealt with under section 5 for condonation of delay?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed as time-barred when each day after the expiry of the period of limitation is not satisfactorily explained?
  Read full judgment →
• Rahat Javed vs Abdul Bashir And Other1985 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-20
  locus standievacuee propertytransfer of propertyforged willsettlement schemeSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the transfer of an evacuee property known as Ishar Dass Building, McLeod Road, Lahore. The core legal question concerns the locus standi of the petitioner, claiming through his late father as a legatee under an alleged will executed by the original evacuee owner, to seek the transfer of the property and contest the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to establish the locus standi of his predecessor-in-interest, noting that the alleged will appeared to be a forged document and that the predecessor had long claimed merely as an attorney before belatedly setting up a will. The ratio decidendi is that a party cannot claim locus standi to seek the transfer of evacuee property based on a belated and unsubstantiated assertion of a will when earlier proceedings and conduct point to forgery and inconsistent claims. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person claiming as a legatee under an alleged will have locus standi to seek the transfer of evacuee property when the authenticity of the will is seriously doubted?
  • Can a belated plea of a will be accepted when the predecessor-in-interest previously litigated the matter solely as an attorney of the evacuee owners?
  Read full judgment →
• Qurban Ali vs The State And Another1985 SCMR 1667 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-17
  revisional jurisdictionjoinder of accusedF.I.R.police challancriminal procedureprima facie casemurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which had set aside a trial court's order joining a respondent, Mst. Mehrun-Nisa, as a co-accused in a murder case. The complainant had initially lodged an F.I.R. without naming the respondent, who was subsequently placed in column 2 of the police challan. Although the trial court initially joined her as an accused based on witness testimony, the High Court quashed this order, finding that the F.I.R. and medical evidence contradicted the subsequent allegations against her, suggesting they were a concoction and an afterthought. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its revisional jurisdiction in setting aside the trial court's order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interference was justified because the trial court had failed to consider the F.I.R. and medical evidence, which rendered the allegations against the respondent unreliable. The principle laid down is that revisional courts may interfere with trial court orders when such orders ignore material evidence like the F.I.R. and medical reports, thereby failing to establish a prima facie case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in its revisional jurisdiction set aside a trial court's order joining a person as a co-accused if the order ignores material evidence like the F.I.R. and medical reports?
  • Is it legally permissible for a trial court to join an accused based on testimony that contradicts the initial F.I.R. and medical evidence?
  • Does the failure of a trial court to consider the F.I.R. and medical certificate when adding a co-accused constitute a valid ground for High Court interference in revision?
  Read full judgment →
• Qazi Muhammad Daud And Another vs Muhammad Ayub And Other1985 SCMR 1966 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-07-01
  limitation perioddelivery of possessionpre-emptionsale-deed recitalterminus a quoregistration of deedphysical possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning whether a recital in a sale-deed regarding the delivery of possession constitutes the starting point of limitation for a pre-emption suit. The core legal question is whether a mere formal recital of delivery of possession in a sale-deed is per se sufficient evidence to establish the factum of actual physical possession for computing limitation under Article 10 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that a formal recital of possession in a sale-deed is weak evidence and insufficient on its own to establish actual physical possession as against third-party pre-emptors, and thus the period of limitation must be computed from the date of registration of the deed when actual physical possession is not otherwise proved. The key principle laid down is that the law insists on visible physical possession as notice to pre-emptors, and a bare recital in a document without independent evidence cannot serve as the terminus a quo for limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a recital in a sale-deed as to the delivery of possession is per se sufficient to constitute the starting point of limitation in a pre-emption suit?
  • Does a formal recital of possession in a sale-deed bind a third-party pre-emptor regarding the date of delivery of possession?
  • From what date must the period of limitation be computed under Article 10 of the Limitation Act when actual physical possession is not independently proved aside from the sale-deed recital?
  Read full judgment →
• Qazi Abdul Samad vs Principal, Khyber Medical College And Another1985 SCMR 1447 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-16
  cancellation of admissionquashing of resultforged documentsshow-cause noticeconcealment of factsmedical college admissionexamination rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an appeal concerning the cancellation of the petitioner's F.Sc. certificate and subsequent medical college admission due to concealment of material facts and use of forged documents regarding previous academic attempts. Initially, the Peshawar High Court struck down the cancellation orders for want of a pre-decisional hearing, allowing the Board to proceed afresh. After a proper show-cause notice was served and the appellant failed to adequately respond, the Board quashed his examination results and cancelled his certificates pursuant to its examination rules. The High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition, prompting the appellant to approach the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the cancellation of the certificate and admission was lawful, timely under the relevant limitation rules, and procedurally compliant. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the action taken by the Board was within the permissible limitation period given the earlier remand proceedings, and that the appellant's fraudulent conduct disentitled him to equitable relief. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education has the power to quash an examination result and cancel a certificate upon discovering the concealment of material facts?
  • Does the limitation period for quashing an examination result under the relevant Board rules stop running during the pendency of litigation involving remand for a fresh hearing?
  • Is a petitioner who conceals past academic failures and submits fabricated certificates entitled to discretionary relief in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Qasim Khan vs Nawab Khan And Other1985 SCMR 926 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-12-17
  pre-emptionequity of redemptionexemption from pre-emptionco-sharerconstruction of housesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a sale of land, where the vendees purchased the property for the construction of houses, was exempt from the right of pre-emption under the relevant statutory provisions. The petitioner sought to pre-empt a sale of equity of redemption regarding specific land shares. The trial court, the appellate court, and the High Court concurrently held that the sale was exempt from pre-emption because the vendees had purchased the land for the purpose of constructing houses, and the area involved was within the permissible limits. The Supreme Court upheld these concurrent findings, noting that the vendees had become co-sharers and the land was purchased for house construction. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that sales of land for the specific purpose of house construction, within statutory limits, are exempt from pre-emption claims.

  Questions settled

  • Is a sale of land for the purpose of constructing houses exempt from the right of pre-emption?
  • Can a vendee who becomes a co-sharer in land resist a pre-emption suit if the land was purchased for house construction?
  Read full judgment →
• Qadar Bakhsh vs Inspector General of Prisons, Punjab And Other1985 SCMR 570 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-03
  leave to appealservice tribunallimitationcondonation of delayincompetent reviewdismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed his service appeal against dismissal from service as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing an incompetent review application should have been condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal duly considered the application under section 5 and dismissed it on merits, finding no justification for filing the incompetent review application, and properly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone the delay. The court laid down the principle that the discretionary refusal to condone delay by a tribunal upon proper consideration of merits does not warrant interference or leave to appeal when no point of law of general importance is involved, thereby affirming the dismissal of the time-barred appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Should the time spent pursuing an incompetent review application be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • Does the refusal by a service tribunal to condone delay raise a point of law of general importance warranting leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Punjab Urban Transport Corporation Ltd. vs Muhammad Rafiq1985 SCMR 1937 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-22
  constitutional petitiondisciplinary actionmisconductmaster and servantleave to appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The Punjab Urban Transport Corporation Limited sought leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed its constitutional writ petition arising from disciplinary action taken against Muhammad Rafiq, the respondent. The respondent, a conductor, was found guilty of misconduct for pocketing fare amounts without issuing tickets. The Labour Court had interpreted the inquiry report as an exoneration and ordered reinstatement with full back benefits, a view upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the facts found in the inquiry report constitute punishable misconduct and whether the lower tribunals misread the evidence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions regarding the interpretation of the inquiry report and the nature of the misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Whether facts found in an inquiry report constitute misconduct punishable with the penalty imposed?
  • Whether the lower judicial forum committed a misreading of evidence regarding the findings of the inquiry report?
  Read full judgment →
• Punjab Road Transport Board vs B.D Burney And Another1985 SCMR 910 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-31
  retrenchmentre-employmentindustrial relationsstanding ordersreinstatementlabor courtsurplus employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the decision of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had ordered the reinstatement of respondent No.1. The core legal question concerns the rights of a retrenched employee under labour laws to be re-employed when a vacancy subsequently arises, rather than having a junior employee promoted. The Supreme Court held that the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was fully in consonance with the law and did not suffer from any legal error. The key principle laid down is that under the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, retrenched workmen have a preferential right to re-employment over other persons when the employer proposes to fill vacancies within the prescribed period following retrenchment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retrenched employee has a preferential right to re-employment when a vacancy arises within one year of retrenchment?
  • Does the promotion of a junior employee to a post instead of recalling a retrenched workman violate labour laws?
  • Whether the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal has the jurisdiction to set aside a retrenchment order based on subsequent vacancies?
  Read full judgment →
• Punjab Livestock, Dairy and Poultry Development Board, Lahore vs Sh.1985 SCMR 1729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-01
  ex parte decreeleave to appealservice of summonsstatutory corporationcivil procedureexecution proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte decree passed against a statutory corporation in a civil suit for monetary recovery. The core legal questions involve the competency of the application to set aside the ex parte decree, the sufficiency of service by registered post, and the proper exercise of judicial mind by the trial court under procedural law when proceeding ex parte. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal for an authoritative pronouncement on the subject, ordering the investment of the decretal amount in Khas Deposit Certificates and staying execution proceedings in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application to set aside an ex parte decree was competently filed by a statutory corporation?
  • Did the trial court properly apply its mind while proceeding ex parte under Order IX Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether service of notice by registered post was legally sufficient in the circumstances of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of the Punjab Through Collector, Sheikhupura vs Anjuman1985 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-16Read full judgment →
• Province of the Punjab And Others vs Syed Abbas Hussain Shah And Other1985 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-02
  land reformgift of landexcess land unitsLand Commissiontransfer of propertywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Province of the Punjab against a judgment of the High Court. The respondent, a declarant under Martial Law Regulation No. 64 of 1959, possessed excess land units and was permitted by Land Commission authorities in 1961 to gift this excess area to his daughter. However, the transaction was never completed, and the respondent retained ownership and possession of the land until he sold it in 1969. Upon the sale, Land Commission authorities reopened the matter, determining the gift was incomplete and the land remained with the respondent. A learned Single Judge of the High Court reversed this finding in a writ petition. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court was legally justified in concluding that the respondent's mere declaration of intent to transfer the excess area was sufficient to constitute a valid gift, despite the lack of completion of the transaction and the respondent's continued exercise of ownership rights over the property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a mere declaration of intention to transfer excess land under Martial Law Regulation No. 64 of 1959 constitutes a completed gift?
  • Can a gift of land be considered valid if the transaction was never completed and the donor retained possession and ownership?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab vs Bashir Ahmad Nasir1985 SCMR 1070 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-25
  adverse remarksannual confidential reportservice tribunalterms and conditions of serviceexpunction of remarkspetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of Punjab sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had allowed the respondent Magistrate's appeal and expunged adverse remarks regarding his integrity recorded in his character roll for the period between 1-1-1975 and 5-6-1975. The core legal question was whether a service appeal before the Tribunal was competent regarding the expunction of adverse remarks, and whether the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the refusal to expunge the remarks. The Supreme Court held that the matter of recording and expunction of adverse remarks in annual confidential reports relates to the terms and conditions of service under the applicable rules and instructions, making the service appeal competent. Furthermore, the Court held that the Tribunal's factual finding that the authorities acted arbitrarily in refusing to expunge the 1975 remarks while expunging nearly identical 1974 remarks by the same reporting officers was unexceptionable. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recording and expunction of adverse remarks in annual confidential reports constitute a matter concerning the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the refusal of the government to expunge adverse remarks?
  • Can adverse remarks be retained when similar remarks for an adjacent period by the same reporting officers have been expunged without distinguishing reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Through The Chief Conservator Of Forests, Punjaband Others vs Muhammad Afzal And Other1985 SCMR 880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-06
  public auctiontimber saleunilateral cancellationconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Province of Punjab against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside the unilateral cancellation of a timber auction sale. The respondents were the highest bidders at a public auction held by the Divisional Forest Officer on June 5, 1978, which bids were formally accepted on June 7, 1978. Subsequently, the Chief Conservator of Forests unilaterally cancelled the transaction. The core legal question was whether the competent authority could unilaterally cancel a completed sale transaction without lawful justification. The Supreme Court held that since the sale transaction was fully completed, the Chief Conservator had no right or scope in law to cancel it unilaterally, especially when the grounds urged before the Supreme Court were neither part of the original cancellation order nor raised before the High Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that completed government auction sales cannot be arbitrarily undone.

  Questions settled

  • Can a competent authority unilaterally cancel a completed public auction sale transaction?
  • Whether a plea not raised before the High Court or in the original order can be urged for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Through Secretary To Government Of The Punjab1985 SCMR 1800 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-06
  service terminationdeclaration suitpetition for leave to appealmaster and servantillegal termination
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Province of Punjab, filed a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts, which had declared the termination of the respondent's service vide order dated 3-12-1966 to be illegal, void, and of no legal effect, and dismissed the petitioner's subsequent appeal and revision. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in declaring the service termination unlawful. The Supreme Court heard the counsel for the petitioner and held that no question of law or principle of general importance had been violated by the courts below. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the decisions of the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the termination of service declared void by lower courts warranted interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Did the courts below violate any law or principle of general importance in decreeing the respondent's suit regarding illegal termination?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Education Secretary and Another vs Mufti Abdul Ghani1985 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-08
  rent restrictionlandlord-tenant relationshipeviction proceedingstitle disputeestoppeldisplaced personssummary procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from eviction proceedings initiated under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, where the appellants challenged the respondent's status as landlord, asserting the property was transferred to a school rather than the respondent. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller can order eviction without resolving a substantial dispute regarding the landlord's title and the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The Supreme Court held that the respondent failed to establish ownership of the plot or the building beyond reasonable doubt, as the property was transferred to the school under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. Consequently, the Court set aside the eviction orders. The judgment laid down that a Rent Controller must distinguish between genuine title disputes and vexatious ones; if a landlord's title is doubtful, the Controller should not order eviction but may direct the parties to a civil court. Furthermore, the rule of estoppel under the Evidence Act 1872 does not apply where the dispute involves a paramount owner or arises after the tenancy's commencement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller proceed with an eviction application without first resolving a genuine dispute regarding the landlord's title?
  • Does the rule of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872 apply to all disputes over title between a landlord and tenant in rent restriction proceedings?
  • Should a Rent Controller dismiss an eviction application where the landlord fails to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant beyond reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Through Collector, Gujranwala And Others vs Ch.1985 SCMR 660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-21
  temporary injunctioninterlocutory orderdiscretionary jurisdictionland acquisitioncivil revisionpublic purpose
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a civil suit initiated by landowners challenging the government's acquisition of their property for a housing scheme in Tehsil Wazirabad, District Gujrat. The respondents sought a declaration that the acquisition was not for a public purpose and requested a permanent injunction against the government. The trial court granted a temporary injunction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which was subsequently upheld by the Additional District Judge and the High Court in civil revision proceedings. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the grant of an interim injunction warranted interference by the apex court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court's exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in granting the temporary injunction was appropriate and legally sound. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will generally decline to interfere with the discretionary exercise of power by trial courts regarding interlocutory orders unless a clear legal error or miscarriage of justice is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by a trial court in granting a temporary injunction?
  • Can a civil suit be maintained to challenge the acquisition of land for a housing scheme on the grounds that it is not for a public purpose?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab and Others vs Muhammad Tufail1985 PLD Supreme Court 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-08
  ejectmentrequisition of propertymala fideslandlord and tenantinterim stayrent defaultnationalized school
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the eviction of the Government from a building it had rented for a nationalized school. The landlord had successfully obtained an ejectment order from the Rent Controller due to non-payment of rent, which the Government subsequently attempted to circumvent by issuing a requisition order for the same building. The High Court invalidated the requisition order on grounds of mala fides. Before the Supreme Court, the Government sought an interim stay of the eviction, arguing that the displacement of the school would cause hardship to the students. The Supreme Court dismissed the stay application, holding that the Government, as a tenant, is subject to the same legal obligations as any other tenant under the rent laws. The Court emphasized that running a school does not exempt a tenant from paying rent or complying with statutory requirements. It further observed that such tenants bear a greater responsibility to act lawfully to avoid causing disruption to students through their own defaults.

  Questions settled

  • Does the operation of a school in a rented building exempt the tenant from the obligations imposed by the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can the Government use its power of requisition to circumvent an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller?
  • Is the potential inconvenience to students a valid legal ground for staying an eviction order against a school tenant who has defaulted on rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab And Others vs Messrs Mian Muhammad Saleem &.Co.1985 SCMR 1215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-23
  arbitration awardmisconduct of arbitratorrule of courtleave to appealconcurrent findingscontractual dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a contractual dispute between the Province of Punjab and Messrs Mian Muhammad Saleem & Co. regarding outstanding payments, which was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the respondent for Rs. 20,964.45. The petitioner challenged the award, but the Senior Civil Judge made it the rule of the court, rejecting the petitioner's objections. Subsequent appeals to the District Judge and a revision petition to the High Court were unsuccessful. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the respondent's claim was time-barred and that the respondent was estopped from asserting it. The Supreme Court addressed the core legal question of whether the arbitrator had misconducted himself. Finding that the lower courts had concurrently determined no misconduct occurred—noting only a minor typographical error that was duly corrected—the Court held that the petitioner failed to establish grounds to vitiate the award. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that in the absence of proven misconduct, an arbitral award remains immune from judicial interference.

  Questions settled

  • Does a typographical error in an arbitration award constitute misconduct sufficient to vitiate the award?
  • Can an arbitral award be challenged on grounds of limitation and estoppel when concurrent findings of fact by lower courts have rejected claims of arbitrator misconduct?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an arbitral award that has been made the rule of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Baluchistan vs Messrs Saleem Brother1985 SCMR 1585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-14
  arbitration awardrule of the courtterritorial jurisdictioncause of actionlimitationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which upheld the District Judge's order making an arbitration award a rule of the court. The disputes arose from a contract for the construction of a bridge. The respondents had filed an application under the Arbitration Act for the appointment of a sole arbitrator, which was done by consent of the parties. The arbitrator made an award in favor of the respondents, which was subsequently challenged by the petitioner on grounds of territorial jurisdiction, an inflated claim, limitation, and lack of opportunity to defend. The Supreme Court held that the former High Court of Sind and Baluchistan had territorial jurisdiction since part of the cause of action, including the execution of the contract and financial transactions, arose within Karachi. The Court further held that factual pleas such as limitation must be raised before the arbitrator, and that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to defend the proceedings. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act where the contract was executed and financial transactions took place within its local limits?
  • Can a plea of limitation involving factual controversy be raised for the first time when challenging an arbitration award if it was not raised before the arbitrator?
  • Whether an arbitration award can be set aside on the ground of an inflated claim without supporting evidence of misconduct or illegality?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Bakhsh And Others vs The State1985 SCMR 2068 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-27
  criminal appealacquittalcompromisereduction of sentencemitigating circumstancesudden fight
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court setting aside the acquittal of the appellants in part and convicting them under sections 326 and 304, Part-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellants should be reduced in view of an out-of-court compromise reached between the parties. The Supreme Court held that considering the parties had compromised inter se and wished to live in peace and amity, reducing the appellants' sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone would be in the interest of justice. The key principle laid down is that a compromise between parties in criminal matters, while not resulting in acquittal where offenses are non-compoundable, can be considered as a mitigating circumstance for the reduction of sentence to foster future peace and harmony.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence of imprisonment be reduced in view of an out-of-court compromise between the parties?
  • Whether a compromise between parties can be treated as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Badshah Alias Pir Khan vs The State1985 SCMR 2070 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-06
  death sentencesection 302 PPCsection 149 PPCconstructive liabilitymitigating circumstancesexpectancy of lifeuniformity of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was brought by the appellant, an elderly man aged 75, after being convicted under Sections 302 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for three counts of murder and sentenced to death by the trial court, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the death sentence was justified or if mitigating factors—such as constructive liability, advanced age, the murder of his son the preceding day, and the principle of sentencing uniformity relative to co-accused awarded life imprisonment—warranted a reduction to life imprisonment.

  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the death sentence. The Court held that the attack was cold, calculated, and concerted rather than sudden or impulsive. It ruled that constructive liability under Section 149 PPC in a premeditated attack does not preclude the imposition of the capital penalty, nor does leave to appeal create a legitimate expectancy of life to mitigate a legal sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does constructive criminal liability under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 preclude the imposition of the death penalty for murder?
  • Can the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court create an expectancy of life sufficient to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Does the principle of sentencing uniformity require that a principal accused receive the same lesser sentence of life imprisonment awarded to co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervez Yasmin Pirzadi vs Syed Mahboob Ali Shah1985 SCMR 1101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-15
  ex parte decreespecific performancecompromiseconditional orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a defendant in a suit for specific performance, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which had restored an ex parte decree against her. The trial court had initially passed an ex parte decree, which the parties subsequently agreed to set aside through a conditional compromise order requiring payment of costs by a specific date, failing which the application for setting aside the decree would stand dismissed. The petitioner failed to pay the costs within the stipulated time, leading the trial court to dismiss her application. Although the District Judge allowed her appeal, the High Court accepted the plaintiff's revision petition and restored the ex parte decree. The Supreme Court considered whether the court was bound to examine the justification for an ex parte decree notwithstanding a compromise, and whether the time for payment of costs could be extended. The Supreme Court held that the parties' binding compromise regarding both the setting aside of the decree and the timeline for payment of costs must be upheld, and no legal infirmity existed in the High Court's judgment. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court is under a duty to examine the justification for passing an ex parte decree notwithstanding a compromise entered into between the parties for its setting aside?
  • Does a trial court retain jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of costs stipulated in a conditional compromise order setting aside an ex parte decree?
  • Whether a compromise order regarding the setting aside of an ex parte decree and the timeline for paying costs is binding on the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervez Mahmood vs The State1985 SCMR 696(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-07
  interim bailbail confirmationmisappropriationrestitutioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for the confirmation of interim bail granted to the petitioner in a criminal case involving allegations of misappropriation. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether, given the specific circumstances of the case—namely, that the alleged shortfall of Rs. 5,000 was rectified by the petitioner within six days of the occurrence—the interim bail previously granted should be confirmed. The Supreme Court, after considering the submissions of the petitioner's counsel and the Additional Advocate-General, held that the interim bail should be confirmed. The Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, thereby confirming the interim bail granted on 4-9-1984. The judgment implicitly reinforces the principle that where an alleged financial misappropriation is promptly rectified by the accused, such conduct may be a relevant factor in the court's assessment of whether to grant or confirm bail, particularly when the trial is expected to commence in the near future, as the prima facie case against the accused may be weakened by the restitution of the funds.

  Questions settled

  • Can the prompt restitution of an alleged misappropriated amount be a relevant factor in confirming interim bail?
  • Does the likelihood of a trial commencing in the near future support the confirmation of interim bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Akhtar vs The State1985 SCMR 1422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-10
  common intentionvicarious liabilitymurdersimple injuriesdying declarationalteration of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, armed with a knife, joined a co-accused (who had already inflicted fatal injuries on two victims) and caused simple injuries to one of the victims. The trial court and the High Court both convicted the appellant of murder on the basis of vicarious liability and sharing a common intention on the spur of the moment. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellant shared a common intention to kill. The Court held that common intention must be judged from all facts and circumstances. Since the appellant arrived after the fatal blows had already been dealt, and only caused simple injuries on non-vital parts, he did not share a common intention to kill. Consequently, his conviction was altered from Section 302 to Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who arrives at the scene after fatal blows have already been inflicted and causes only simple injuries on non-vital parts can be held vicariously liable for murder under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • How should common intention be evaluated and judged under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the accused's individual act only caused simple injuries without sharing a common intention to kill?
  Read full judgment →
• Percy Joseph vs The Additional District Judge, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-05
  ejectmentex parte orderlimitationlandlord and tenantwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment proceeding wherein an ex parte order of ejectment was passed against the petitioner by the Rent Controller. The petitioner's application to set aside the ex parte order and his subsequent appeal were both dismissed, the latter being dismissed on the ground of limitation. A constitutional writ petition challenging the ejectment order was likewise dismissed by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist to confer jurisdiction upon the Controller, and that the appeal was not time-barred as the requisite certified copy had not been furnished. The Supreme Court held that both contentions had been duly considered and properly rejected by the High Court, and that no case was made out for the issuance of a writ. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against an ex parte ejectment order can be dismissed on the ground of limitation when the certified copy of the order had not been furnished?
  • Can a Rent Controller assume jurisdiction in an ejectment proceeding in the absence of the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to issue a writ against the concurrent orders of the lower forums in an ejectment matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan vs Messrs Zeal Pak Cement Factory Ltd_1985 SCMR 1968 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-21
  income taxtax holidaystatutory interpretationextraneous considerationindustrial expansionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from constitutional petitions challenging the Central Board of Revenue's refusal to grant income-tax exemptions to two assessees under Section 15-BB(4) of the Income Tax Act. In the first case, a cement manufacturer was denied exemption for its fourth kiln despite having previously received exemption for its third kiln under identical circumstances. In the second case, a textile manufacturer was denied exemption for its combing sets and granted only a qualified exemption for its doubling frames. The Central Board of Revenue justified its decisions on the ground that the expanded units were not 'independent' of the existing machinery and buildings. The High Court allowed the constitutional petitions, holding that the statutory requirement was only that the unit or process be 'identifiable', not 'independent'. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the tax authority cannot import extraneous words or conditions into a statute. The Court ruled that adding the word 'independent' to 'identifiable industrial unit' or 'identifiable industrial process' was an impermissible intermeddling with legislative intent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory tax authority import extraneous conditions or words into a statute to deny a tax exemption?
  • Whether an expanded industrial unit must be completely independent of the existing undertaking to qualify as an 'identifiable industrial unit' under Section 15-BB(4) of the Income Tax Act?
  • Is the Central Board of Revenue bound to grant a tax exemption once all statutory requirements are satisfied?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways vs Ghulam Sarwar1985 SCMR 1596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-14
  service tribunallimitation periodcompetency of appealleave to appealservice matters
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of a Service Tribunal. The core legal question presented is whether an appeal filed before the Tribunal was time-barred, given that it was directed against an order dated 6-2-1979, or alternatively, whether the appeal was incompetent due to the failure to specify the impugned order. The Supreme Court observed that the Service Tribunal had failed to expressly address these critical issues regarding limitation and competence. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions of law and procedure. As an interim measure, the operation of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal was stayed pending the final adjudication of the appeal. The judgment establishes that a Tribunal is legally obligated to expressly deal with and decide upon objections regarding the limitation period and the competency of an appeal before it, and failure to do so constitutes a legal error warranting appellate intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal before a Service Tribunal competent if the impugned order is not specified?
  • Does a failure by a Service Tribunal to address objections regarding limitation constitute a ground for granting leave to appeal?
  • Can an appeal filed against an order dated 6-2-1979 be considered time-barred if filed on 13-5-1982?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Electrical and Mechanical Constructors Ltd., Lahore vs Abdul Rashid And 5 Other1985 SCMR 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-24
  interim injunctionvaluation of suitcourt-feesappellate jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court returning a memorandum of appeal for presentation to the District Judge on the ground of valuation. The petitioner had purchased land by a registered sale-deed, following which the first respondent instituted a suit for a mandatory injunction regarding the same land and obtained an ad interim injunction. The petitioner's application under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recall of the injunction was dismissed, and his subsequent appeal to the High Court was returned because the High Court held that under section 12 of the Court Fees Act it could not interfere with the plaintiff's valuation of the suit in an interlocutory appeal. The core legal question concerns the interpretation and application of section 12 of the Court Fees Act regarding a court's power to examine suit valuation in interlocutory proceedings, alongside the propriety of the interim injunction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the High Court's view based on section 12 of the Court Fees Act required examination and that the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting the interim injunction warranted re-examination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with the valuation of a suit made by a plaintiff in an interlocutory appeal under section 12 of the Court Fees Act?
  • Whether an appeal against an order relating to an interim injunction in a suit valued below the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court should be filed in the High Court or the District Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Banking Council And Another vs Ali Maohtaram Naqvi And Other1985 SCMR 714 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-07
  joinder of partiesnecessary and proper partiesbank nationalizationcivil procedurestatutory bodyinterlocutory ordermultiplicity of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an interlocutory order of the High Court of Sind, whereby the Pakistan Banking Council and its member, Mr. Altaf Ahmad, were added as defendants in a pending civil suit filed by a borrower against Habib Bank Limited regarding a breach of contract for a development loan. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction and was justified in law to add the petitioners as parties under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court of Pakistan partly allowed the appeal, holding that while the Pakistan Banking Council was a proper party due to its direct statutory directives affecting the subject matter and loan facilities in dispute, the individual member (petitioner No.2) acted solely in his official capacity without personal liability or interest, making his joinder unjustified. The key principle laid down is that a statutory body issuing binding directives connected to the subject matter of a pending suit may constitute a proper party for effective adjudication, but individual officers acting purely in their official capacity cannot be personally impleaded without specific allegations of personal malice or interest.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a statutory body issuing directives concerning loan facilities is a proper party to be joined in a suit between a borrower and a nationalized bank under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an individual member of a statutory council be impleaded personally in a suit when acts attributed to him were performed strictly in his official capacity?
  • What constitutes a proper party versus a necessary party for the complete and effectual adjudication of a dispute under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Nusrat vs Zulfiqar And Another1985 SCMR 1402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-21Read full judgment →
• Noora And Others vs Mst. Matloob Bibi1985 SCMR 2080 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-07
  pre-emptionleave to appealrejection of plaintcourt fee deficiencyZar-e-Samanfresh plearevision application
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a revision application against a decree for pre-emption of land. The petitioner argued that the respondent failed to deposit the required Zar-e-Saman within the stipulated timeframe, thereby rendering the suit liable to dismissal. Additionally, the petitioner contended that the plaint should have been rejected due to a deficiency in court fees. The Supreme Court observed that the argument regarding the failure to deposit Zar-e-Saman was a fresh plea not raised before the High Court. Regarding the court fee issue, the Court noted that the trial court had not issued a specific order directing the payment of additional court fees. Relying on the precedent established in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan, the Court held that the plaint could not be rejected in the absence of such an order. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition in limine, affirming that new pleas cannot be introduced at the appellate stage and that the rejection of a plaint for deficient court fees requires a prior judicial order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a fresh plea for the first time before the Supreme Court that was not argued before the High Court?
  • Can a plaint be rejected for deficient court fees without a prior order from the trial court directing the payment of such fees?
  • Does a failure to deposit Zar-e-Saman within the stipulated time automatically result in the dismissal of a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs The Member Election Commission, Punjab And Other1985 SCMR 1178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-22
  nomination papersretrospective orderremoval from servicedisqualificationelection petitionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the rejection of the petitioner's nomination papers for election to the Provincial Assembly, which was upheld by the Member Election Commission and the High Court. The petitioner, a former Zilledar, was dismissed from service on 19-10-1983, with the order directed to take effect retrospectively from 29-7-1981, later modified to removal from service. The core legal question is whether an executive authority can give retrospective effect to a departmental removal order, and whether the petitioner was disqualified under section 10(2)(b)(3) of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977 on the ground of removal from service for misconduct within three years. The Supreme Court held that executive authorities lack the power to make departmental orders operate retrospectively unless expressly authorized by rules; hence, the removal order took effect from the date it was passed (19-10-1983) rather than the retrospective date. Consequently, the three-year disqualification period had not elapsed by the time of the election, rendering the petitioner disqualified. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executive authority pass a departmental removal or dismissal order with retrospective effect without express statutory or rule authorization?
  • From which date does a departmental removal order take effect when it purports to operate retrospectively?
  • Whether a person removed from government service is disqualified from contesting an election if the prescribed three-year period has not elapsed since the actual date of the removal order?
  • Can election authorities and superior courts refuse to give effect to a patently unlawful retrospective departmental order in collateral proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Settlement Commissioner, Hyderabad And Other1985 SCMR 1120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-23
  settlement lawsproperty transferconstitutional jurisdictionpossessionfactual findingswrit jurisdictionappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment concerning the transfer of property under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with factual findings made by Settlement Authorities regarding the possession and entitlement of parties to specific portions of a building, particularly a "big hall." The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court held that the appellant failed to establish his possession of the disputed hall on the crucial date of December 21, 1958. The Court affirmed that the High Court properly reviewed the evidence, finding that neither party had demonstrated a valid entitlement to the hall, thereby necessitating its disposal by the relevant authorities under the law. The judgment reinforces the principle that constitutional jurisdiction does not permit interference with findings of fact unless they are perverse or arbitrary, and that a party must strictly demonstrate actual possession on the relevant statutory date to substantiate a claim for property transfer under settlement regulations.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings of Settlement Authorities in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is proof of possession on the crucial date a prerequisite for property transfer under settlement laws?
  • Does a party have locus standi to challenge the disposal of property if they have failed to establish their own entitlement to it?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Sarwar Khan and 2 Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-27
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionexecution of decreesurety bondcivil revisionlawful authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Noor Muhammad against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the High Court. The petitioner had executed a surety bond in a recovery suit. After the suit was decreed, the executing court issued warrants of attachment against the petitioner, who objected, claiming he had never executed the surety bond. His objection was dismissed by the executing court, and his subsequent civil revision was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge. He then challenged these orders through a constitutional petition, which was likewise dismissed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition was competent against orders passed by a court of competent jurisdiction merely on the ground that the decision on a question of fact or law was incorrect. The Supreme Court held that where a court has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it has jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly, and an incorrect decision does not render it without lawful authority. The petition was dismissed with costs as frivolous.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is competent against an order passed by an executing court having jurisdiction to decide the matter?
  • Does an incorrect decision on a question of fact or law by a court of competent jurisdiction render its order without lawful authority?
  • Can a surety bond executed during trial be enforced in execution proceedings against an objector?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Ilahi vs Sher Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 1001 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-11
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantevacuee trust propertytransfer of propertyestoppelrent controllersettlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an ejectment order against the petitioner. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner, as a tenant, could deny the landlord's title to the property, specifically where the property was claimed to be evacuee trust property. The Supreme Court held that the respondent's title remained valid because the property had been transferred to him prior to 1968, a transfer protected by the Chief Settlement Commissioner's instructions, which ensured such transfers would not be disturbed. The Court further held that the Rent Controller could not go behind the valid Transfer Order issued in the respondent's favour. Additionally, the Court affirmed the principle of estoppel, ruling that the petitioner, having entered the premises as a tenant under the respondent and having executed a written undertaking to pay rent, was legally precluded from denying the landlord's title. The petition was dismissed, though the Court granted the petitioner time to vacate the premises by consent of the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant deny the title of his landlord after having entered into a tenancy agreement and provided a written undertaking to pay rent?
  • Does a declaration by a Settlement Commissioner that property is evacuee trust property automatically invalidate a prior transfer of that property made to an individual?
  • Can a Rent Controller go behind a valid Transfer Order issued by the Settlement Organization?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Hussain vs Muhammad Salim1985 SCMR 893 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-09
  acquittalleave to appealcondonation of delaylimitationcriminal appealright to liberty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against the acquittal of respondents who were initially convicted by the trial court for offences under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but subsequently acquitted by the High Court. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether a one-day delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal should be condoned, given the petitioner's failure to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay caused by the Advocate-on-Record. The Court held that the petition was time-barred and declined to condone the delay. The ratio of the decision emphasizes that where an acquittal has been granted, the respondents acquire valuable rights to life and liberty, which cannot be lightly disturbed, especially when the delay in filing an appeal is not satisfactorily explained, even if the delay is minimal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a one-day delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal be condoned without a satisfactory explanation?
  • Does an acquittal judgment confer a valuable right to life and liberty upon the respondents that warrants strict adherence to limitation periods?
  Read full judgment →
• Nizam Din And Another vs Faqir Muhammad And 8 Other1985 SCMR 1492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-16
  revisional jurisdictionpower of reviewdisplaced persons settlementlimitation actcivil proceedingscode of civil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examines whether the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under a special statute, possesses the power to review its own decision. The matter arose from conflicting property allotments under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1951. The High Court had initially dismissed a revision petition as time-barred, holding that section 5 of the Limitation Act was inapplicable, but subsequently entertained a review petition and restored the revision by applying section 14 of the Limitation Act. The appellants challenged the competency of the review. The Supreme Court held that proceedings brought before the High Court under section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1951, are civil in nature and, by virtue of section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, are governed by the Code. Consequently, the High Court possesses the inherent and statutory power under section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to review its orders, distinguishing it from special jurisdictions where such provisions are expressly or impliedly excluded. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has the power to review its decision given in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1951?
  • Are proceedings brought before the High Court under section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1951, of a civil nature governed by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding review of judgments apply to the High Court exercising special revisional powers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1951?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir And Another vs Member, Board of Revenue Lahore And Another1985 SCMR 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-19
  land reformssuo motu reviewfraudallotment cancellationtenancy rightsconstitutional jurisdictionforgery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed writ petitions challenging the cancellation of land allotments. The core legal question was whether the Chief Land Commissioner could exercise suo motu review powers after a delay of nearly six years to set aside land allotment orders based on allegedly forged tenancy records. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the cancellation of the allotments. The Court held that the appellants had obtained the land through fraudulent entries in the Khasra Girdawari Register and Form LC-IX, which were manipulated to create fictitious tenancy rights. The Court affirmed the principle that fraud vitiates all solemn proceedings, and constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to protect or perpetuate benefits obtained through fraudulent means. Furthermore, the Court ruled that there is no time limit for the exercise of suo motu revisional or review powers in such circumstances, as established in precedent. Consequently, the Court refused to exercise its discretion to aid parties who secured land through collusion.

  Questions settled

  • Can constitutional jurisdiction be exercised to protect benefits obtained through fraud?
  • Is there a time limit for the exercise of suo motu review powers under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Rules 1959?
  • Does fraud vitiate solemn proceedings in land allotment cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Muhammad Taqi And Other1985 SCMR 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-25
  evacuee propertylocus standiauctionremand ordersettlement schemepermanent transfer deedrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment regarding the transfer of evacuee shops. The core legal questions concern whether the appellants possessed the locus standi to challenge the auction of the shops and whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction by suo motu cancelling the auction after a remand order limited to verifying the filing of transfer forms. The Supreme Court held that the appellants lacked locus standi as they were not in possession at the time of the auction and had no established entitlement to the property. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court’s finding that the Additional Settlement Commissioner acted beyond the scope of the remand order by cancelling the auction, as his authority was confined to specific verification. The Court established the principle that a person without a valid entitlement to the transfer of evacuee property lacks the standing to challenge its disposal by public auction. Additionally, it reaffirmed that authorities acting on remand must strictly adhere to the scope of the remand order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person who lacks entitlement to the transfer of evacuee property have the locus standi to challenge its disposal by public auction?
  • Can an Additional Settlement Commissioner suo motu cancel an auction when the scope of the remand order is limited to verifying the filing of transfer forms?
  • Is a Permanent Transfer Deed issued by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner open to judicial scrutiny if issued in the proper exercise of authority?
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• Nazir Ahmad vs Abdul Qayyum Bhatti And Other1985 SCMR 634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-09
  temporary injunctionstatus quointerim reliefcivil revisionSupreme Court petitiondiscretionary orders
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction before the Senior Civil Judge, Gujrat, along with an application for a temporary injunction. Although an initial status quo order was passed, it was subsequently vacated by the trial court on 30-10-1979. The petitioner's appeal before the District Judge was dismissed on 2-2-1980, and a subsequent civil revision in the High Court was also dismissed in limine. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether interference was warranted against concurrent discretionary orders of the lower courts refusing to grant interim relief. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the case did not present a fit ground for interference under discretionary jurisdiction, particularly as no serious question of law was involved. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with concurrent discretionary orders refusing interim relief unless a serious question of law or a patent illegality is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent orders of lower courts refusing interim relief?
  • Does the refusal of a temporary injunction by courts below warrant interference when no serious question of law is involved?
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• Nazar Hussain vs Muhammad Alias Muhammad Ali And Other1985 SCMR 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-05
  leave to appealcommon intentionsentence reductionextenuating circumstancescriminal liabilitymurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal matter concerning the murder of Manzoor Hussain. The trial court convicted four respondents under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing one to death and three to life imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court acquitted two respondents, upheld the conviction of the first respondent but reduced his sentence to life imprisonment, and altered the conviction of the third respondent to Section 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the sentences of the first and third respondents. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's discretion regarding the first respondent, noting that the motive—suspected illicit relations involving the respondent's fiancée—constituted an extenuating circumstance. However, regarding the third respondent, the Court found a prima facie case that his participation warranted liability under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, rather than the lesser charge applied by the High Court. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal specifically to examine the conviction of the third respondent while dismissing the petition regarding the others.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in imposing a lesser sentence for murder when extenuating circumstances exist?
  • Does the participation of an accused in a joint criminal act warrant conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than a lesser offense?
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• Nawabzada Muhammad Shah Khan vs Chairman, Tribunal Land Disputes And Other1985 SCMR 552 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-17
  land disputewrit petitionexecution proceedingsproperty possessiontribunal findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition impugning an order of the High Court upholding the decision of the Chairman, Tribunal Land Disputes, Dir, Swat and Chitral at Mardan. The core legal question concerns whether the Tribunal's observation allowing respondents to claim additional land from the petitioner, without specifying boundaries, area, or Khasra numbers, was lawful and capable of execution. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that the petitioner was declared owner of a specific extent of land (52 Sattas), and any excess land allegedly in his forcible possession could legitimately be claimed by the respondents, rendering the observation unperverse. The petition was accordingly dismissed as being without substance, affirming the principle that ambiguous possessory claims of excess land do not invalidate general findings of entitlement where specific boundaries are yet to be ascertained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an observation by a land tribunal regarding unclaimed or excess land without specific boundaries and Khasra numbers is sustainable?
  • Can execution proceedings be initiated based on general observations in a tribunal order regarding land possession?
  • Whether a High Court order upholding a tribunal's finding on land ownership warrants interference under constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Nawab Khan Represented By Legal Heir And Others vs Zarif Khan And Other1985 SCMR 1428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-02
  co-sharerundivided estatefeeding the estoppelpartitionspecific performanceland possessionvendee rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a dispute over the possession of land purchased by the appellant from co-sharers of an undivided estate. The core legal questions were whether a vendee of a co-sharer is entitled to specific plots of land exceeding the vendor's share, whether the principle of feeding the estoppel under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 applies to subsequent acquisitions, and whether a vendee can claim compensation from other lands of the vendor absent an indemnity clause. The Supreme Court held that a vendee of a co-sharer steps into the shoes of the vendor, acquiring the vendor's share in the joint property. The Court found the partition proceedings flawed for excluding the vendee's interest and granted the appellant a decree for possession corresponding to the vendors' share in the specific land. However, the Court rejected the claim for compensation from other lands, affirming that in the absence of an express indemnity clause, a vendee cannot claim land beyond the vendor's share in the specific property transferred. The principle established is that a vendee of a co-sharer is entitled to the vendor's share in the joint property, subject to partition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a vendee of a co-sharer in an undivided estate acquire the right to specific plots of land exceeding the vendor's share?
  • Can a vendee claim compensation from other lands of the vendor if the specific land purchased is lost during partition, in the absence of an indemnity clause?
  • Does the principle of feeding the estoppel under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply to a vendee when the vendor subsequently acquires an interest in the property?
  • Is a partition of joint property valid if it excludes the interest of a vendee who purchased a share from a co-sharer?
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• Naveed Textile Mills Ltd. vs Assistant Collector (Appraising) Custom House, Karachi and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-16
  customs duty exemptionstatutory interpretationfiscal statutediscretionary powerjudicial reviewconstitutional jurisdictionS.R.O. 702(1)/80
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the interpretation of a fiscal statutory instrument, specifically S.R.O. 702(1)/80, which denied customs duty exemptions for imported automatic cone-winders. The core legal question was whether the "explanation" within the notification, which disqualified these machines from exemption on the premise that they were substitutes for locally manufactured cone-winders, could be challenged in constitutional jurisdiction on the ground that such local manufacture did not exist. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the government's power to grant or revoke exemptions under Section 19 of the Customs Act 1969 is discretionary and wide in amplitude. The Court determined that the explanation constituted a policy decision and legislative motivation, which is not subject to judicial review or factual inquiry regarding the accuracy of the underlying premise. The key principle laid down is that where a statutory exemption is granted under wide discretionary powers, the disclosure of reasons or factual premises within the notification does not render the exercise of power justiciable, as courts cannot conduct factual inquiries into the policy motivations behind such legislative measures.

  Questions settled

  • Is the government's power to grant or revoke customs duty exemptions under Section 19 of the Customs Act 1969 subject to judicial review regarding the factual accuracy of the reasons provided?
  • Can an explanation in a statutory notification be challenged on the basis that its underlying factual premise is incorrect?
  • Does the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court extend to conducting factual inquiries into the policy motivations behind a fiscal notification?
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• Naveed Textile Mills Ltd. And Other vs Assistant Collector (Appraising) Custom House, Karachi & OtherPTCL 1985 (CL) 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs duty exemptionstatutory interpretationfiscal statutesconstitutional jurisdictiondiscretionary powertextile industryjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the interpretation of S.R.O. 702(I)/80, a fiscal notification issued under the Customs Act, 1969. The petitioners, textile mills, challenged the notification's explanation, which denied customs duty exemptions to automatic cone-winders by classifying them as substitutes for locally manufactured goods. The core legal question was whether the court could review the factual accuracy of this classification or if the government's declaration constituted an unreviewable policy decision. The Supreme Court held that the government's power to grant or revoke exemptions under Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 is discretionary and broad. The Court ruled that the explanation in the notification represented a policy motivation rather than a jurisdictional fact; therefore, it was not subject to factual enquiry or judicial review. The Court affirmed that where the exercise of power does not require the satisfaction of jurisdictional facts, the underlying reasons or factual premises stated by the delegator cannot be challenged in constitutional jurisdiction. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is the government's power to grant or revoke customs duty exemptions under Section 19 of the Customs Act 1969 discretionary?
  • Can a court in constitutional jurisdiction conduct a factual enquiry into the reasons or premises stated in a legislative notification?
  • Does an explanation in a statutory instrument necessarily limit the scope of the provision it explains?
  • Are factual assertions made within a government notification regarding the substitutability of goods subject to judicial challenge?
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