Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Jamil Represented By His Legal Heirs vs Ahmad Zaman Khan1985 SCMR 1701 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-09
  allotment of landindustrial concernbrick-kilnrehabilitation commissionerproperty disputeadministrative order interpretationremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a property dispute regarding the allotment of a brick-kiln situated on land designated as Khasra No. 396. The core legal question was whether an earlier order by the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner, directing the allotment of the Khasra to sitting allottees, constituted a final rejection of the appellant’s pending claim for the transfer of the brick-kiln as an industrial concern. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interpreting the Commissioner's order as a final rejection, as the order explicitly reserved the appellant's claim for future consideration. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment, which treated the entire land as agricultural and excluded the appellant, was set aside. The Court established the principle that administrative orders must be interpreted in their entirety, and a general direction to allot land does not automatically extinguish specific, reserved claims regarding industrial concerns situated within that land unless expressly adjudicated upon. The matter was remanded for a factual determination regarding the status of the appellant's application and the actual size of the brick-kiln.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general order for the allotment of land to sitting allottees automatically extinguish a pending claim for an industrial concern located within that land?
  • Can an administrative order be interpreted as a final rejection of a claim when the authority explicitly reserves that claim for future consideration?
  • Is a party estopped from challenging a transfer when they have previously objected to the factual basis of that transfer in related proceedings?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs Muhammad Ismail And Other1985 SCMR 1111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-28
  election petitionrecount of votesinvalid voteswrit jurisdictionlocal council electiondismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an election dispute concerning a Local Council seat in Union Council Khulal, District Sialkot. Following the election, the petitioner was initially declared successful. However, the Election Tribunal, upon an election petition filed by respondent No. 2, ordered a recount. The recount revealed that a significant number of votes cast for both the petitioner and respondent No. 2 were invalid because they pertained to a different ward. Consequently, respondent No. 2 was found to have secured more valid votes and was declared the winner. The petitioner challenged this in the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the writ petition in limine. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the Tribunal erred by failing to recount the votes of the third candidate. The Supreme Court held that this contention was not raised before the High Court and, regardless, would not have altered the election outcome, as respondent No. 2's valid vote count remained superior to the third candidate's total votes even if all the latter's votes were valid. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to recount votes of a third candidate invalidate an election result when that candidate's total votes are insufficient to surpass the winner's valid vote count?
  • Can a petitioner raise a contention before the Supreme Court that was not pressed before the High Court?
  • Is a High Court justified in dismissing a writ petition in limine when the petitioner cannot demonstrate the invalidity of a factual finding made by an Election Tribunal?
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• Muhammad Ismail And Others vs Mst. Rashidan Begum And Other1985 SCMR 1268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-18
  land settlementrepealed statuteSettlement Commissioner jurisdictionconstitutional petitionallotment disputestatutory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition regarding land settlement proceedings. The core legal question was whether a Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a fresh application under Sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, after the statute had been repealed. The petitioners, claiming to be informants, sought to challenge an allotment previously restored to the respondents by initiating new proceedings under the repealed Act. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner, as a creature of statute, lacked general jurisdiction akin to a civil court to declare an allotment a nullity. The Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal, reasoning that the Settlement Commissioner's authority was limited to the specific powers conferred by the statute, which did not extend to entertaining fresh applications under a repealed law, particularly when the matter did not constitute a pending case. The principle laid down is that a statutory authority cannot exercise jurisdiction beyond the scope of the enabling statute, especially after its repeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner entertain a fresh application under a repealed statute?
  • Does a Settlement Commissioner possess general jurisdiction to declare a land allotment a nullity?
  • Is a Settlement Commissioner authorized to act outside the specific powers conferred by the enabling statute?
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• Muhammad Ismail and Others vs Mst. Mussarat Zamani and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-04
  specific performanceagreement to sellWest Pakistan Land Reforms Regulationalienation of holdingssubsistence holdingcontract enforcementstatutory prohibition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land. The core legal question was whether an agreement to sell land is rendered void or unenforceable by the restrictions on alienation contained in paragraph 25(4) of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959. The appellants argued that the agreement was hit by the statutory prohibition against alienating subsistence holdings. The Supreme Court held that an agreement to sell is distinct from the actual alienation (sale) of property. The statutory prohibition applies to the act of alienation, not the preliminary agreement. Consequently, an agreement to sell is not void ab initio, provided it can be performed in a manner consistent with the law. The Court established that the crucial date for determining compliance with statutory prohibitions is the date of the actual transfer of title. Since the enforcement of the agreement in this case did not necessitate a violation of the Regulation, the decree for specific performance was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell agricultural land violate the prohibition on alienation under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959?
  • Is an agreement to sell land void ab initio if the actual sale might be restricted by statutory provisions?
  • What is the crucial date for determining whether an alienation of land violates the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959?
  • Can a court grant a decree for specific performance if the underlying agreement could potentially be performed in a legal manner?
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• Muhammad Ismail And Others vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-10
  pre-emptiontenant's right of pre-emptionjurisdiction of CollectorLand Reforms Regulation 1972agricultural landco-sharercivil court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a dispute concerning the pre-emption of agricultural land purchased by the appellants. The core legal question involved the jurisdiction of the Collector to entertain and decide pre-emption suits where one of the plaintiffs claimed a preferential right solely on the basis of village ownership rather than tenancy, and whether a decree for pre-emption could extend beyond the actual tenancy of the pre-empting tenants. The Supreme Court held that the transfer of the suit concerning a non-tenant plaintiff to the Collector was ultra vires, rendering the Collector's decree without jurisdiction as to that part, and that a tenant's right of pre-emption under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 is strictly confined to the land comprised in their tenancy. The Court laid down that pre-emption suits involving mixed claims must be appropriately segregated, with tenant-related claims adjudicated by the Collector and non-tenant ownership claims returned to the civil court, setting aside the judgments of the lower fora and remanding the matter back to the Collector.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Collector have jurisdiction to try a pre-emption suit where a plaintiff claims a preferential right based solely on village ownership rather than tenancy?
  • Can a decree for pre-emption in favour of tenants extend to land that is not in their cultivating possession but in the possession of other tenants?
  • What is the proper procedure when a pre-emption suit contains claims both under paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 and ordinary ownership rights?
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• Muhammad Ishtiaq And Another vs Haji Fazal Karim And Another1985 SCMR 1974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-26
  leave to appealproperty disputelocal commissionersettlement mapevictionconcurrent findingsboundary dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which affirmed the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Additional District Judge regarding a property dispute. The core issue involves whether the petitioners' structures, described as Jhuggis, are situated within the specific area of 308 square yards on plot No. 396-A, Artillery Maidan Quarters, Karachi, which was transferred to the respondent. The lower courts relied upon a Settlement Map and a report from a court-appointed local Commissioner to conclude that the structures were indeed located on the respondent's plot. The petitioners challenged this finding, arguing that the evidence, including the Commissioner's sketch and report, failed to substantiate the location of the structures within the allotted area. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the contentions raised by the petitioners deserved consideration. Furthermore, by consent of the parties, the Court appointed a new Commissioner under the Supreme Court Rules to investigate the boundaries and location of the plot and submit a fresh report, while restraining the eviction of the petitioners pending the final decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court appoint a Commissioner to investigate and record evidence regarding property boundaries during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Does a challenge to the factual findings of lower courts regarding property location constitute a valid ground for granting leave to appeal?
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• Muhammad Ishaque vs Muhammad Sharif1985 SCMR 1711 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-05
  specific performanceagreement to sellliquidated damagesabandonment of claimsubsequent vendeenotice of agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld a decree for the specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff-respondents, by serving a notice on the vendor demanding liquidated damages for a breach of contract, had effectively abandoned their right to seek specific performance against the subsequent vendees. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the lower courts' findings of fact regarding the validity of the agreement and the absence of contract alteration. The Court held that merely serving a notice demanding liquidated damages does not constitute an abandonment of the relief of specific performance, particularly when the vendor failed to comply with the notice or compensate the plaintiffs before the suit was instituted. The principle laid down is that seeking liquidated damages via notice does not automatically preclude a party from pursuing specific performance, especially where the subsequent vendees had notice of the prior agreement and the vendor did not satisfy the damages claim prior to litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does serving a notice demanding liquidated damages for breach of contract constitute an abandonment of the right to seek specific performance?
  • Can a plaintiff pursue specific performance against a subsequent vendee after having issued a notice to the original vendor demanding liquidated damages?
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• Muhammad Ishaque And Another vs Muhammad Bashir And Other1985 SCMR 31 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-04
  evacuee propertyabatement of proceedingsreview jurisdictiondelegation of powersSettlement Commissionerjudicial discretionlegal representatives
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the transfer of evacuee property in Mandi Bahauddin, which was subject to conflicting claims between the appellants and respondents. The core legal questions were whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in setting aside the abatement of writ petitions following the death of the appellants, and whether a Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to review an order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner without express delegation of review powers. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision to set aside the abatement was a valid exercise of judicial discretion, as there was no evidence of lack of diligence by the respondents. Regarding jurisdiction, the Court held that a Settlement Commissioner lacks the inherent power to review orders passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner unless such power is explicitly delegated via an official Gazette notification under the relevant statute. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the power of review is a creature of statute and cannot be implied from the transfer of a case. The appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner exercise the power of review of an order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner without an express Gazette notification delegating such power?
  • Does the transfer of a case under Section 32-A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 inherently invest a Settlement Commissioner with the power of review?
  • Is the setting aside of an abatement under Order XXII, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 a matter of judicial discretion based on sufficient cause?
  • Can a delegatee exercising revisional powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 claim an inherent power to review orders passed in their capacity as a delegatee?
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• Muhammad Ishaq And Others vs Shah Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-01
  limitationsuo motu examinationland settlementappellate forumrevisional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises out of a land settlement case from a judgment of the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether an appellate or revisional forum is under a mandatory legal duty to examine suo motu the question of limitation regarding proceedings instituted before a lower forum when the point is not pressed or raised before it. The Supreme Court held that while a court or forum is bound under section 3 of the Limitation Act to examine limitation regarding matters instituted directly before itself, it is under no such legal obligation to examine the limitation of proceedings before a lower forum unless the plea is specifically raised and pressed. The ratio decidendi is that higher appellate or revisional forums are not legally obliged to examine suo motu the limitation of lower forums if the party fails to raise or press the issue. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate or revisional court under a legal duty to examine suo motu the question of limitation regarding proceedings instituted before a lower forum when not raised or pressed?
  • Does section 3 of the Limitation Act require a higher forum to examine the limitation of matters originating before a lower forum without a specific plea?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere if the High Court fails to examine the time-bar of a lower forum's proceeding that was not agitated before it?
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• Muhammad Iqbal vs Muhammad Tahir and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-16
  criminal appealmurdercorroboration of evidencerecovery of weaponchemical examineracquittalmitigating circumstancesgrave and sudden provocation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of three respondents and the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment for a fourth respondent in a murder case under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court correctly appreciated the evidence, specifically regarding the corroboration of ocular testimony through the recovery of blood-stained weapons. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in disregarding the recovery of a blood-stained knife from respondent Muhammad Tahir simply due to a delay in submission to the Chemical Examiner, absent any evidence of tampering. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal of Muhammad Tahir, convicting him under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentencing him to life imprisonment. The acquittal of the other two respondents was upheld, and the sentence reduction for the main accused, Waheeduddin, was maintained due to mitigating circumstances involving provocation. The key principle laid down is that a delay in forensic examination does not inherently invalidate a recovery as corroborative evidence if the weapon's integrity remains unchallenged.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in sending a recovered blood-stained weapon to the Chemical Examiner automatically invalidate its use as corroborative evidence?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ocular testimony corroborated by the recovery of a weapon, even if forensic analysis is delayed?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon at the instance of an accused sufficient to corroborate ocular testimony if the accused had exclusive knowledge of its concealment?
  • Does the discovery of illicit relations between the deceased and the accused's family constitute a mitigating circumstance for sentencing in a murder case?
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• Muhammad Iqbal And Another vs Muhammad Alamgir And Other1985 SCMR 1935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-22
  limitationfraud and misrepresentationcivil procedurearbitration awardsupreme court leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a dispute over Property No. 138-Anarkali, Lahore, which was referred to arbitration and culminated in a rule of court judgment. Respondents filed an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside the judgment on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. The Senior Civil Judge dismissed the application as barred by time relying on Article 173 of the Limitation Act 1908, but the High Court subsequently held that such applications are governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908, following a conflicting view from another High Court. The petitioners challenged this view before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerns the appropriate period of limitation applicable to an application filed under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to authoritatively resolve the divergence of views among the High Courts regarding the applicable limitation article.

  Questions settled

  • What is the applicable period of limitation for an application filed under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does Article 173 or Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 govern an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Muhammad Ilyas And Others vs Syed Shujaat Ali And Other1985 SCMR 1388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-04
  Bogus claimInformer's entitlementEvacuee LawsRepealing lawsVendees' rightsLocus standiPreclusionFinality of findingsAllotmentConstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned vendees from allottees of a bogus claim seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of their constitutional petitions by the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions revolved around the entitlement of an informer to land resumed from a bogus allotment, the vendees' claim to the property under repealing Evacuee Laws, and the re-opening of settled factual findings regarding the informer's claim. The Supreme Court held that the informer's entitlement, having been finally verified before the repeal of Evacuee Laws, could not be re-opened. The Court also ruled that the vendees were precluded from raising new grounds regarding the informer's locus standi and entitlement, as these grounds were available but not raised in earlier litigation. The Court affirmed that possession follows the allotment and adjustment of a verified pending claim, and vendees from an erstwhile allottee of a bogus claim must yield to the better entitlement of the informer. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can the genuineness and correctness of an informer's claim be re-opened after the repeal of Evacuee Laws if it was finally verified before the repeal?
  • Are vendees from an erstwhile allottee of a bogus claim entitled to the property under repealing Evacuee Laws as bona fide purchasers in possession?
  • Can a party raise a new ground concerning an informer's entitlement in subsequent litigation if it was available but not raised in earlier proceedings up to the Supreme Court?
  • Does possession of land follow the allotment and adjustment of a verified pending claim?
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• Muhammad Iftikhar Tahir vs The State1985 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-20
  bailrule of consistencypolice investigationmurdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from the dismissal of a pre-arrest or post-arrest bail application by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner, Muhammad Iftikhar Tahir, along with co-accused, was charged with offences under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was entitled to bail based on a police report finding him innocent, and whether the rule of consistency applied given that a co-accused had been granted bail. The Supreme Court held that the principle of consistency was inapplicable because the co-accused's case was distinguishable on facts, notably having been found innocent in three successive investigations and benefiting from grave doubts regarding the place of occurrence, whereas the weight of evidence in the petitioner's case, including eye-witness accounts and injuries, supported the prosecution. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key legal principle laid down is that the rule of consistency in bail matters cannot be invoked mechanically; it requires factual parity, and a police opinion of innocence must be evaluated against the overall weight of evidence collected during investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rule of consistency applies for the grant of bail when the facts and circumstances of the co-accused's case are distinguishable?
  • Can an accused claim bail as of right merely because a police officer found him innocent during investigation?
  • Does a police opinion of innocence override the weight of eye-witness evidence and injuries at the bail stage?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Muhammad Bakhsh And Other1985 SCMR 1216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-23
  pre-emptionconsent decreeburden of proofsale of landconcurrent findings of factexecution of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought to challenge a pre-emption decree obtained by respondent No. 1 against respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The petitioner claimed to have purchased the suit land from respondents Nos. 2 and 3 prior to the pre-emption decree, obtaining a separate consent decree for possession. However, the petitioner failed to intervene in the original pre-emption suit or disclose the alleged purchase during those proceedings. The District Judge and the High Court concurrently found that the alleged sale was not proved, characterizing the transaction as a shady attempt to deprive the pre-emption decree-holder of his rights. The Supreme Court affirmed these findings, noting the suspicious conduct of the petitioner and the vendors in failing to disclose the transaction in the proper legal forum at the appropriate time. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner could not stall the execution of the pre-emption decree, as the alleged sale was unsubstantiated and the petitioner's conduct lacked merit. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who fails to intervene in a pre-emption suit subsequently stall the execution of a pre-emption decree based on an unproven, undisclosed prior purchase?
  • Does the failure to disclose an alleged sale during relevant legal proceedings affect the credibility of that transaction?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-proof of a sale subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Muhammad Anwar And Another1985 SCMR 1349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-27
  murderacquittalself-defenseocular testimonydying declarationcriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment acquitting the respondent of a murder charge under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's ocular testimony and dying declaration, and in accepting the respondent's admission of the act while simultaneously granting him the benefit of his plea of self-defense. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court’s appreciation of evidence was based on sound inferences and that there were no compelling reasons to interfere with the acquittal. The Court affirmed that where the prosecution fails to establish the charge against an accused, the accused's statement in defense must be accepted in its entirety. Consequently, because the prosecution failed to prove its case, the respondent was entitled to the full benefit of his plea of self-defense, rendering the acquittal legally justified.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove its case require the court to accept the accused's statement in its entirety?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal based on the appreciation of evidence if the trial court's conclusions were supported by the record?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of a plea of self-defense if the prosecution fails to prove the charge?
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• Muhammad Hussain Alias Kook vs The State1985 SCMR 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-12
  criminal appealocular testimonychance witnessmurder convictionbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidencefalse implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for murder under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony, in the absence of corroborative recovery evidence and amidst a credible defense plea of enmity, was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s case was unsafe to rely upon. The Court observed that the primary eye-witness was a chance witness whose testimony was riddled with material contradictions and inconsistencies compared to his earlier statements. Furthermore, the complainant’s admissions regarding prior police involvement in smuggling investigations supported the appellant's defense of false implication. The Court concluded that the occurrence was un-witnessed and the F.I.R. was a product of post-occurrence deliberation and consultation. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, allowed the appeal, and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reinforces the principle that where ocular evidence is unreliable and contradicted by the surrounding circumstances, it cannot form the basis for a criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on ocular testimony when the witnesses are chance witnesses and their testimony is riddled with contradictions?
  • Does the admission by a complainant regarding prior enmity and police involvement in smuggling investigations constitute sufficient grounds to cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Is it safe to maintain a conviction where the F.I.R. appears to be the result of post-occurrence deliberation and consultation?
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• Muhammad Hayat And Others vs Dost Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 1056 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-12
  pre-emptionwaiver of pre-emptionfinding of factsecond appealright of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a second appeal concerning a pre-emption decree granted in favour of the respondents. The petitioners, who were the vendees, challenged the decree primarily on the issue of waiver, arguing that the respondents had waived their right of pre-emption. The petitioners contended that the vendor had advertised the sale in a newspaper, made direct offers to the respondents, and announced the sale by beat of drum, all of which the respondents were aware of. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions. The Court held that the High Court had already reached a finding of fact against the petitioners regarding the evidence of waiver, and the petitioners failed to produce the alleged newspaper advertisement. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that mere knowledge of an intending pre-emptor about a sale, which subsequently becomes the subject of a pre-emption suit, does not constitute a waiver of the right of pre-emption. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere knowledge of an intending pre-emptor about a sale constitute a waiver of the right of pre-emption?
  • Can a finding of fact by the High Court be challenged in a petition for leave to appeal when it is supported by evidence?
  • Is the failure to produce evidence of an alleged newspaper advertisement fatal to a plea of waiver in a pre-emption case?
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• Muhammad Hanif vs Hassan Mohiuddin1985 SCMR 1975 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-29
  leave to appealremand of caserelationship of landlord and tenantRent Controllerrent proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dated 24-2-1985, whereby the High Court allowed the respondent's appeal and remanded the rent matter to the Rent Controller to frame a preliminary issue regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant, afford parties an opportunity to lead evidence, and decide the issue afresh. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in remanding the case when the Rent Controller had already determined the issue of the relationship of landlord and tenant on the basis of evidence produced by the parties prior to passing an order for the deposit of rent. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioner's counsel required consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, allowed the petition, directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record, and ordered that the proceedings before the Rent Controller remain in abeyance pending the final decision of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in remanding a rent case for a fresh decision on the relationship of landlord and tenant when the Rent Controller has already decided the issue upon evidence?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court remand a matter to the Rent Controller for framing a preliminary issue?
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• Muhammad Hanif And Others vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore1985 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-20
  evacuee propertysettlement caseconstitutional jurisdictionquestion of factdemarcationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed constitutional petitions filed by rival contesting parties in a settlement case concerning the transfer of evacuee property. The core legal question involves the challenge to the transfer orders and the classification of the disputed property as partly agricultural and partly residential. The Supreme Court held that the classification of property as agricultural or otherwise is a question of fact based on findings that do not merit interference in constitutional jurisdiction, noting that the real dispute pertained to demarcation rather than the validity of the transfer orders. The Court dismissed the petitions with the observation that the parties may approach the competent forum for demarcation. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities regarding the nature of property are binding and cannot be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction, and disputes limited to property identity should be resolved through demarcation before a competent forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of whether a property is agricultural or residential constitutes a question of fact immune from constitutional interference?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact rendered by a Settlement Authority?
  • What is the appropriate remedy when the real dispute between parties relates to the demarcation and identity of transferred evacuee property?
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• Muhammad Hanif And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-16
  murdercompromisemitigating circumstancesdeath sentencesentence reductioncriminal appeallife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of two appellants for the murder of their step-mother under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court sentenced both to death, which the High Court upheld, though it reduced the sentence of one appellant to life imprisonment. Following a compromise between the appellants and the heirs of the deceased, the core legal question was whether a compromise between parties in a murder case, even in the absence of monetary compensation, constitutes a valid mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence. The Supreme Court held that while the conviction was fully justified, the compromise reached between the parties served as a significant mitigating factor. Relying on established precedent, the Court affirmed that a compromise, even without monetary compensation, is a valid ground for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment. Consequently, the Court maintained the convictions but reduced the death sentence of the remaining appellant to life imprisonment, while granting both appellants the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the computation of their sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise between the accused and the heirs of the deceased be considered a mitigating circumstance in a murder case?
  • Is the payment of monetary compensation a mandatory requirement for a compromise to be accepted as a ground for reducing a death sentence?
  • Does a compromise between parties justify the acquittal of an accused person whose conviction for murder is otherwise fully justified?
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• Muhammad Ghazanfar vs Amjad Rashid And Other1985 SCMR 814 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-25
  ejectment petitionwithdrawal of petitionfinal orderstatutory appealrent restrictionres judicataconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of an appeal against a Rent Controller's order permitting the withdrawal of an ejectment petition with leave to file a fresh one. The core legal question was whether such an order constitutes a final order, thereby triggering the right of appeal under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Supreme Court held that an order allowing the withdrawal of an ejectment petition effectively terminates the proceedings and must be treated as a final order of dismissal, rendering an appeal competent under Section 15 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. However, the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's refusal to set aside the order, reasoning that the petitioner was not prejudiced. The Court established that the petitioner could adequately protect their interests by invoking Section 14 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 in the subsequent proceedings to seek summary rejection of the new petition if it raised substantially the same issues as the former, thereby rendering the challenge to the initial withdrawal order unnecessary and academic.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order by a Rent Controller allowing the withdrawal of an ejectment petition with permission to file a fresh one considered a final order?
  • Does an order permitting the withdrawal of an ejectment petition constitute an appealable order under Section 15 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a party seek the summary rejection of a fresh ejectment petition under Section 14 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 if it raises issues already decided in a former proceeding?
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• Muhammad Fazil vs Mirza Moor Hussain And Another1985 SCMR 930 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-19
  bailmurderfurther inquirypolice investigationjudicial discretioncancellation of bailunlawful assembly
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against orders of the Lahore High Court granting bail to several accused persons charged with murder and attempted murder under sections 302, 307, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in granting bail, particularly where conflicting police reports existed regarding the innocence of one accused and where no specific overt acts were attributed to others. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's exercise of discretion was based on plausible reasoning. Regarding the accused whose innocence was disputed by different police officers, the Court affirmed that the matter constituted a case for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Regarding the other accused, the Court held that the absence of specific allegations of effective firing justified the grant of bail. The principle laid down is that where there is a genuine conflict in investigation findings or a lack of specific attribution of criminal acts, the grant of bail remains a matter of judicial discretion not to be lightly interfered with by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Is a case where police investigation reports are conflicting regarding an accused's innocence a fit case for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a discretionary order of the High Court granting bail if the reasoning is plausible?
  • Does the absence of specific allegations of effective firing against co-accused justify the grant of bail in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fayyaz And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 1766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-09
  murderculpable homicide not amounting to murdersudden fightheat of passionpremeditationprivate defencesentence reductionappealException IV to Section 300 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, granted leave by the Supreme Court, challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that had reduced the appellant's death sentence under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the appellant's act, involving a single knife blow during an altercation, fell under Exception IV to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code, thereby constituting culpable homicide not amounting to murder rather than murder. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances, including an exchange of abuses, grappling, and a solitary blow inflicted without premeditation during a sudden fight in the heat of passion, fully satisfied the conditions of Exception IV to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code. The Court emphasized that it is immaterial which party offered the provocation or committed the first assault in such cases. Consequently, the conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, was set aside, and the appellant was convicted under Section 304, Part-I, Pakistan Penal Code, receiving a sentence of 10 years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder if the act occurred during a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation?
  • What are the conditions for applying Exception IV to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Is it material which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault when considering Exception IV to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does a solitary blow inflicted during grappling and an altercation without premeditation fall under Exception IV to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din vs The State1985 SCMR 1046 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-15
  jail petitionmurderdeath sentenceeyewitness accountred-handed arrest
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a jail petition filed by Muhammad Din against his conviction and sentence of death for the murder of Mst. Hamidan Bibi. The prosecution case states that the petitioner, who was residing in the complainant's house, attacked and fatally injured the deceased with a razor following a dispute over his continued stay in the house after the complainant's marriage. Eyewitnesses apprehended the petitioner red-handed at the spot with the weapon and subsequently lodged an FIR. The trial court and appellate forums found the evidence reliable, noting the prompt FIR, ocular testimony, medical evidence, and injuries sustained by the accused. The core legal question examined was whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the guilt of the petitioner was established to the hilt by direct ocular testimony, immediate apprehension at the scene with the weapon, and supporting medical evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the ocular testimony supported by immediate apprehension at the scene is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the presence of injuries on the accused corroborating the assault support the prosecution case?
  • Whether unexplained delay in filing a jail petition can be condoned when a sentence of death is involved?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din And Others vs Settlement Commissioner (Land) And Other1985 SCMR 635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-01
  evacuee landsettlement commissionerspecial jamabandiinheritance disputewrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from evacuee agricultural land disputes in Gujranwala. The core legal question revolves around whether the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court correctly barred the re-examination of the inheritance of Makhu based on official special Jamabandi entries from 1947, and whether oral evidence could override documentary records. The Supreme Court held that official records exchanged between India and Pakistan regarding land entitlements take precedence over oral statements, and previous binding judicial determinations foreclosing the inheritance question cannot be reopened. The key principle laid down is that rehabilitation and settlement entitlements must be determined strictly with reference to official special Jamabandi entries rather than contradictory oral testimonies, and matters finally concluded by competent courts cannot be relitigated under the guise of fresh material.

  Questions settled

  • Whether oral statements can override official special Jamabandi entries prepared regarding evacuee property?
  • Can a question of inheritance finally decided by the High Court be re-opened before a Settlement Commissioner?
  • Does an entitlement for evacuee land in Pakistan depend on official documents exchanged between India and Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs Assistant Commissioner And Another1985 SCMR 655 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-21
  leave to appealconstitutional petitionno-confidence resolutionlocal bodyprocedural irregularitymajority vote
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging a no-confidence resolution passed against the petitioner as Chairman of a local body. The core legal question concerns whether alleged procedural irregularities committed before and during the meeting convening the no-confidence resolution vitiate the outcome. The Supreme Court held that leave to appeal must be refused, determining that minor procedural technicalities should not be used to impose the leader of a thin minority on a body, especially when twelve out of seventeen members voted against the petitioner. Furthermore, the court held that factual inquiries into procedural irregularities are not warranted at this stage. The key principle laid down is that substantive democratic expressions of a clear majority in local bodies will not be overturned on the basis of minor procedural technicalities or require extensive factual inquiries without compelling grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Can a no-confidence resolution passed by a clear majority be set aside on the ground of minor procedural technicalities?
  • Will the Supreme Court conduct a detailed factual enquiry to determine procedural irregularities in a no-confidence meeting at the leave to appeal stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh Alias Muhammadi vs The State1985 SCMR 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-11
  solitary eye-witnessconvictionleave to appealsentence computationcriminal appealmurdertheft
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner, Muhammad Bakhsh, for the murder of Ahmad Bakhsh and the theft of his mare. The petitioner was convicted by the Sessions Judge under sections 302 and 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving life imprisonment and one year of rigorous imprisonment, respectively, to run concurrently. The Lahore High Court maintained these convictions and sentences. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction, based on the testimony of a solitary eye-witness, was sustainable and whether the petitioner was entitled to any relief regarding his sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the findings of the courts below. The Court held that the testimony of a solitary eye-witness is sufficient for conviction when the witness is credible and lacks enmity or motive to falsely implicate the accused. Furthermore, the Court granted the petitioner the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the computation of his sentence, while otherwise upholding the lower courts' judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the testimony of a solitary eye-witness?
  • Is the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a convict serving a life sentence?
  • Does the absence of enmity between a witness and an accused strengthen the reliability of a solitary eye-witness testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azam And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-01
  murdercircumstantial evidencelast seen togethercriminal appealconvictionacquittalSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts convicting the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a taxi driver whose body was found with a slit throat. The core legal question was whether the circumstantial evidence, specifically the 'last seen' theory and recovery of the victim's car, was sufficient to maintain the convictions and death sentences. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish the identity of one appellant who was not properly identified, it was fully sufficient as to the remaining two appellants who were last seen with the deceased and found in possession of the victim's vehicle. The court laid down the principle that the 'last seen' evidence coupled with the recovery of the deceased's property from the accused constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain a murder conviction under Section 302/34.

  Questions settled

  • Whether circumstantial evidence consisting of the 'last seen' theory and recovery of the victim's vehicle is sufficient to maintain a conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the conviction of an accused be sustained where his identity as the person last seen with the deceased is not established beyond reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azam Ali And 35 Others vs Government of the Punjab1985 SCMR 1408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-23
  ad hoc appointmentcivil judgestermination of servicecompetitive examinationservice tribunalregularization
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who were appointed as ad hoc Civil Judges after failing to qualify in the aggregate of the 1980 competitive examination, sought leave to appeal against the Punjab Service Tribunal's dismissal of their appeal against termination. Their ad hoc appointments were subject to the condition that they must qualify in the next competitive examination to secure regular appointment, failing which their services would be terminated. The petitioners failed the subsequent 1981 examination, leading to their termination. They contended that their appointments should be treated as regular under Section 2(2) of the Civil Servants Act and that the rules were impliedly modified. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prescribed rules for recruitment were neither relaxed nor changed. The appointments were explicitly ad hoc and made otherwise than in accordance with the prescribed rules. Consequently, the termination of their services was lawful, in accordance with the terms of their appointment, and did not violate any vested rights. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad hoc civil servant can claim a vested right to regular appointment or continuation in service despite failing to qualify in the prescribed competitive examination?
  • Does an ad hoc appointment made outside the prescribed rules of recruitment automatically convert into a regular appointment under the Civil Servants Act?
  • Can the terms of an ad hoc appointment, which mandate termination upon failure to pass a subsequent competitive examination, be legally enforced?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Awais Shahid vs Government of Punjab And Other1985 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-11
  quo warrantolocus standijudicial appointmenteligibility criteriaex officio functionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a serving Civil Judge, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of two constitutional petitions by the Lahore High Court. The first petition challenged his exclusion from competing for Additional District and Sessions Judge vacancies reserved for practising lawyers. The second petition sought a writ of quo warranto against the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court regarding the constitution of a selection committee for these judicial appointments. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, while serving as a Civil Judge, was ineligible to apply for positions specifically reserved for practising lawyers. Regarding the second petition, the Court ruled that the selection committee members were performing functions ex officio as High Court Judges, not holding a separate public office, and thus a writ of quo warranto was inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court determined the petitioner lacked locus standi to challenge the selection process due to his ineligibility. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petitions and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a serving Civil Judge eligible to compete for judicial vacancies reserved for practising lawyers?
  • Can a writ of quo warranto be issued against High Court Judges performing selection committee duties?
  • Does a candidate lacking eligibility for a post have locus standi to challenge the selection process for that post?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Nazar Muhammad, And Other1985 SCMR 1384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-04
  pre-emption suitlimitation periodmutation of salepossession of landKhasra Girdawarileave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld a decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the suit for pre-emption was barred by limitation, specifically regarding the date of the completion of the sale and the subsequent taking of possession. The petitioner argued that the suit was filed beyond the statutory period of one year, contending that possession had transferred on an earlier date. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the lower courts, which had consistently held that the change of possession was not reflected in the Khasra Girdawari and that the plaintiff-respondent had only learned of the sale when the vendee demanded a share of the produce. The Court held that since the attestation of the mutation occurred after the suit was filed and the claim of possession transfer was not effectively proven, the suit was not time-barred. The principle laid down is that the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commences from the date of taking possession or the attestation of mutation, and factual findings regarding the date of possession by lower courts will not be disturbed absent effective rebuttal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 commence from the date of possession or the attestation of mutation?
  • Can a suit for pre-emption be considered timely if the plaintiff institutes the action within one year of learning about the sale, despite the vendee's claims regarding an earlier date of possession?
  • Are findings of fact regarding the date of possession, when consistently held by trial and appellate courts, subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Muhammad Tufail1985 SCMR 1382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-03
  specific performancefraudulent misrepresentationilliterate partyburden of proofconcurrent findingscontract to sellKhasra Girdawari
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell land, which was dismissed by the trial court, the first appellate court, and the High Court. The respondent had successfully contended that the petitioner fraudulently obtained his signature on an agreement to sell, misrepresenting it as a lease deed. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in finding the agreement to sell tainted based on the evidence presented, specifically regarding the respondent's illiteracy and the nature of the transaction. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting that the respondent was an illiterate simpleton and that the Khasra Girdawari entries identified the petitioner as a lessee, not a vendee. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to prove that the agreement was read out, explained, and understood by the respondent. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that relief for specific performance can be denied where the underlying document is tainted by fraud and the petitioner fails to establish the validity of the transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Can specific performance be refused if the underlying agreement to sell is tainted by fraud?
  • Is a contract binding if an illiterate party was not provided with an explanation of the document's contents?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Election Tribunal And Other1985 SCMR 2103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-07
  election petitionnomination papersappointment of agentconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his election petition regarding an election to a Municipal Committee. He contended that the successful respondent's nomination paper was invalid because the respondent was not present in Gujrat on the filing day and his agent was a minor. The Election Tribunal and subsequently the Lahore High Court in constitutional jurisdiction dismissed his claims, holding that any irregularity in appointing an agent that did not materially affect the result could not disenfranchise voters, and that the nomination papers validly filed by the proposer were in order. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment was in full accord with well-settled principles of law, as there was no illegality or lack of jurisdiction by the Tribunal. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a candidate from the municipality on the day of filing nomination papers invalidate the nomination?
  • Whether the appointment of a minor as an agent invalidates election nomination papers when the papers are duly proposed, seconded, and accepted?
  • Can constitutional jurisdiction be invoked against the decision of an Election Tribunal in the absence of illegality or lack of jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam (through His L. R.) vs Wazir Muhammad1985 PLD Supreme Court 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-14
  evictionpersonal needdeath of landlordheritable estaterent defaultlegal representativesactio personalis moritur cum personasecond appealRent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered an appeal arising from an eviction application against a tenant on the grounds of default in rent payment and bona fide personal need of the landlord for a commercial shop under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Rent Controller and District Judge ordered the tenant's eviction. During the pendency of the tenant's second appeal in the High Court, the landlord died. The High Court allowed the tenant's appeal, holding that the personal need extinguished upon the landlord's death and setting aside the default finding despite the tenant's earlier concession and failure to press preliminary issues. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that once an order of eviction is lawfully passed during the landlord's lifetime, it becomes a perfected, heritable right forming part of his estate. The legal representatives are entitled to defend and enforce the eviction order, subject to statutory limits. The Court restored the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of eviction obtained by a landlord on the ground of personal need extinguish upon the landlord's death during appellate proceedings?
  • Can legal representatives enforce an eviction order based on personal need obtained by a deceased landlord during his lifetime?
  • Can an appellate court set aside a finding of fact based on a concession made by a party's counsel before the Rent Controller?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf And Others vs Province of West Pakistan1985 SC-M R 707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitioncompulsory acquisition chargesreference to courtlocal authoritymarket value compensationstatutory interpretationlegislation by reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922 for a development scheme in Rawalpindi. The Collector fixed compensation without awarding compulsory acquisition charges, prompting the Provincial Government to make a reference under section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 at the instance of the Rawalpindi Improvement Trust. The District Judge reduced the compensation, and the High Court dismissed the subsequent appeals by the landowners. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the reference by the Provincial Government for an acquisition made for a local authority was competent, and whether the Court was under a duty under section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to allow 15% compulsory acquisition charges. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government was legally competent to make the reference under section 18(3) even when land is acquired for a local authority. Furthermore, the Court held that the exclusion of section 23(2) by the local Act was ultra vires, and therefore landowners are mandatorily entitled to 15% additional compensation for compulsory acquisition regardless of whether they specifically claimed it earlier.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference made by the Provincial Government under section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is competent when land is acquired for a local authority?
  • Is the Provincial Government's right to seek a reference under section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 restricted only to acquisitions made for the purposes of the Government?
  • Whether the court is under a mandatory duty under section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to award 15% additional compensation for compulsory acquisition even if not specifically claimed?
  • What is the legal effect of the incorporation of one statute by another through legislation by reference?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif vs Election Tribunal, M.C. Gujranwala And Other1985 SCMR 1706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-02
  election petitionconstitutional jurisdictionappreciation of evidenceleave to appealElection Tribunaldiscretionary poweradditional evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging an Election Tribunal's decision to declare his election void. The core legal questions concerned whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional errors by improperly appreciating evidence, admitting ballot papers as evidence, and refusing to summon the Presiding Officer as a witness. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's findings were based on the appreciation of evidence, which fell within its jurisdiction, and that the refusal to allow additional evidence at a belated stage was a valid exercise of discretionary power. Consequently, the Court found no legal error warranting interference in the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction and refused leave to appeal. The judgment establishes that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to re-appraise evidence or challenge the discretionary procedural decisions of an Election Tribunal, provided the Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction and considered all relevant aspects of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with an Election Tribunal's decision based on the appreciation of evidence?
  • Does an Election Tribunal have the discretion to refuse the production of additional evidence at a belated stage?
  • Is the production of ballot papers by voters to prove they were not allowed to cast them permissible evidence in an election petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anis vs Secretary, Ministry of Communications And Other1985 SCMR 547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-20
  Service Tribunal jurisdictionseniority disputedepartmental representationstatutory barretrospective reliefservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a decision of the Service Tribunal, which had denied the petitioner's request for ante-dating his seniority and pay benefits. The petitioner, despite being recognized as senior to the respondents in his technical trade, argued that an initial misplacement at the time of his appointment in 1960 prevented his timely selection for a training course and subsequent promotion. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal regarding departmental decisions made prior to July 1, 1969, specifically when the petitioner sought to challenge the rejection of his representation filed years later. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that the bar under the Service Tribunals Act, 1974, precluded relief for departmental orders issued before the statutory cutoff date. The Court established the principle that in determining jurisdiction, the substance of the relief sought is the material factor, rather than the date on which a departmental representation was rejected or the date of the final order impugned.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against a departmental order made before July 1, 1969?
  • Is the date of the rejection of a departmental representation the relevant date for determining the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under the Service Tribunals Act, 1974?
  • Does the substance of the relief sought determine the applicability of the jurisdictional bar under the Service Tribunals Act, 1974?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amir And 2 Others vs The State1985 SCMR 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-19
  post-arrest bailmurderfurther inquirycriminal appealsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the bail application of the petitioners, Muhammad Amir, Bashir, and Jehan, who along with others were accused of the murder of Muhammad Ramzan. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail given the nature of the allegations and the specific role attributed to each accused. The Supreme Court held that the case of petitioners Muhammad Amir and Jehan fell within the scope of 'further inquiry' under criminal jurisprudence, noting that Muhammad Amir used the blunt side of a hatchet despite carrying a revolver, and the medical report did not substantiate the injury attributed to Jehan on a non-vital part. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to both petitioners. The key principle laid down is that where specific roles attributed to accused persons and the medical evidence create reasonable doubt regarding intent or the nature of injuries on non-vital parts, the case warrants further inquiry, making it a fit case for the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the role attributed to an accused carrying a firearm but using a blunt weapon creates a case for further inquiry regarding bail?
  • Does an unsubstantiated injury on a non-vital part of the deceased by an accused justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • When can a petition for leave to appeal in a criminal matter be converted into an appeal and allowed for the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin And 4 Others vs Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore1985 SCMR 164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Alias Muhammad Ali And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 1048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-16
  murder convictionocular testimonyleave to appeallife imprisonmentappreciation of evidencecriminal appealeyewitness reliability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon the petitioners for the offense of murder. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the ocular testimony provided by the prosecution witnesses was sufficient to sustain the conviction, given the arguments regarding the reliability of the evidence and the absence of blood-stained recoveries. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the findings of the courts below were sound. It determined that the testimony of the eyewitnesses was natural, truthful, and corroborated by the medical evidence, thereby establishing the guilt of the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed that eyewitnesses who lack direct enmity with the accused and whose presence at the crime scene is justified can be safely relied upon to establish guilt in a capital case. Furthermore, the Court held that where the accused have already been granted the lesser sentence of life imprisonment and the benefit of statutory sentence computation, no further interference with the sentence is warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on ocular testimony alone when recovery evidence is not blood-stained?
  • Is the testimony of an eyewitness reliable if they have no direct enmity with the accused?
  • Does the granting of the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude further interference with a sentence by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs The State1985 SCMR 933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-19
  illegal gratificationcorruptiontrap raidappreciation of evidenceleave to appealcourt readercriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former court Reader, sought leave to appeal against his conviction for accepting illegal gratification under Section 161, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The prosecution alleged the petitioner demanded a bribe from a complainant to facilitate court proceedings, resulting in a successful trap operation supervised by a Magistrate. The petitioner contended he was falsely implicated following an altercation with the complainant and argued that his defence evidence was improperly disregarded by the lower courts. The Supreme Court examined the record, noting that the Magistrate supervising the raid provided clear testimony regarding the exchange of money and its recovery, which the trial and appellate courts correctly prioritized over the testimony of casual defence witnesses. The Court held that the lower courts applied appropriate standards in evaluating the evidence and that the petition essentially sought a re-appraisal of evidence, which was not warranted. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court's preference for the testimony of a supervising Magistrate over casual defence witnesses in a corruption trap case be considered legally flawed?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when it essentially seeks a re-appraisal of evidence already considered by the lower courts?
  • Does the failure to suggest the names of defence witnesses to prosecution witnesses during cross-examination affect the weight given to the defence evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs Rizwan Hussain And Other1985 SCMR 1259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-20
  settlement operationscomposite propertyindivisible propertytime-barred appealleave to appealtransfer of propertylocal occupant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a local occupant of a residential portion within a composite property, sought leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing his Letters Patent Appeal. The property in question had been transferred jointly to other claimants in 1959. The petitioner's initial claim form was rejected in 1959, and he failed to challenge the transfer until 1961. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the transfer of the residential portion despite the property being declared indivisible and the petitioner's significant delay in challenging the transfer. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the property was indivisible and the petitioner had acquiesced to the transfer by paying rent to the respondents. Furthermore, the Court found the petitioner's challenge to be time-barred, as he had failed to file an appeal within the prescribed period. The Court affirmed that in the absence of a valid challenge to the transfer order and given the indivisible nature of the property, the petitioner had no legal entitlement to the transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Is a local occupant entitled to the transfer of a portion of a composite property that has been declared indivisible?
  • Can a petitioner challenge a property transfer order after a significant delay and after having accepted the transfer by paying rent?
  • Does the joint transfer of a composite property to multiple claimants support the finding that the property is indivisible?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali And Others vs And Other1985 SCMR 1281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-12
  trade union electiondismissal from serviceunfair labour practiceworkman statusleave to appealinterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the validity of a trade union election. The petitioners, who were union members and candidates, were dismissed from service by their employers for alleged misconduct prior to the election. They challenged their dismissal before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) as an unfair labour practice, obtaining an interim order allowing them to participate in the election. Although they were elected, the first respondent challenged the election under Section 8(7) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, arguing that the dismissed petitioners were no longer 'workmen actually engaged or employed' under Section 7(1)(d) of the Ordinance, thereby violating the statutory 75% representation requirement for actual employees in the union executive. The High Court upheld the Labour Court's decision to set aside the election, ruling that dismissed employees do not retain the status of workmen for union executive purposes and that the NIRC's interim order was without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to determine these novel and authoritative questions of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a workman dismissed from service, whose dismissal is sub judice before a competent forum, continues to enjoy the status of a workman within the meaning of Section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 for the purpose of contesting union elections?
  • Whether the 75 per cent representation requirement of actual workmen in a trade union executive under Section 7(1)(d) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 is violated by the participation of dismissed employees whose cases are pending adjudication?
  • Whether the Chairman of the National Industrial Relations Commission has the jurisdiction under Regulation 32 of the National Industrial Relations Commission Regulations to issue an interim order preserving a dismissed employee's right to contest union elections?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram vs Ghulam Hitssain And Other1985 SCMR 1026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-21
  leave to appealmurderculpable homicidereduction of sentenceappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  Muhammad Akram filed a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 29-4-1980, which acquitted the respondent Ghulam Hussain of the charge under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and altered his conviction to section 304-I, reducing his sentence to the period already undergone. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder and reducing the sentence accordingly. The Supreme Court held that, upon reviewing the evidence and the reasons provided in the impugned judgment, the High Court was fully justified in its findings and in acquitting the respondent of the original murder charge. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, establishing that appellate interference is unwarranted where the lower court's appreciation of evidence regarding sudden provocation or altered intent is sound.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from section 302 to section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere with an acquittal and sentence reduction where the High Court's reasoning is supported by the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram vs Chairman, WAPDA And Other1985 SCMR 1406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-21
  service tribunalsenioritycivil servantleave to appealpromotion
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant working as an Assistant in WAPDA, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the decision of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 28th March, 1983. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to seniority over certain named colleagues who were promoted earlier while working in separate divisions. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to point to any material to unsettle the factual basis of the Tribunal's decision and that the petition raised no substantial question of law warranting interference. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, laying down the principle that factual findings of the Service Tribunal regarding separate departmental seniorities and delayed legal recourse will not be disturbed under constitutional jurisdiction without solid legal grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against a factual determination of seniority by the Service Tribunal?
  • Does separate divisional seniority preclude a clash in seniority claims for promotion to a higher grade?
  • Is a belated claim for seniority affected by failure to timely resort to legal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram And Others vs The State1985 SCMR 843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-12
  criminal appealmurderreasonable doubtbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidenceunlawful assemblyacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants under Sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Zafar Ali. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, given the conflicting testimonies and the implausibility of the prosecution's narrative regarding the abduction and subsequent murder of the deceased. The Supreme Court scrutinized the evidence, noting significant inconsistencies in the statements of the eye-witnesses and the investigating officers, particularly concerning the place of occurrence and the recovery of incriminating evidence. The Court held that the prosecution's version of events was uninspiring and riddled with contradictions, rendering the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments of the lower courts, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution evidence is inherently improbable, contradictory, and relies on unreliable recovery witnesses, the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused, necessitating their acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of significant inconsistencies in eye-witness testimony and investigating officer reports warrant the acquittal of the accused?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution's narrative of the sequence of events is inherently improbable and unsupported by reliable evidence?
  • Should the benefit of doubt be extended to the accused when the recovery of incriminating weapons and blood-stained clothing is supported only by witnesses of questionable credibility?
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• Muhammad Akbar vs Theprovince of the Punjab Through Divisional1985 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-04
  remand orderarbitration proceedingsSection 14 Arbitration Actleave to appealopportunity to produce evidenceacademic interestrebuttal evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against an order of the Lahore High Court remanding an arbitration matter back to the trial court. The High Court had accepted the respondent's appeal and directed the lower court to decide an application under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act after affording both parties an opportunity to produce evidence and rebuttal regarding objections. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court's remand order warranted interference. Refusing leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the impugned order of remand was fair and justified. The Court further observed that no interim stay had been granted against the remand order, the petitioner had failed to instruct counsel for several years regarding the subsequent proceedings, and the matter had become merely of academic interest. Consequently, the Court found no justification for interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of remand passed by the High Court providing both parties an opportunity to lead evidence on objections under the Arbitration Act warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal should be dismissed as having only academic interest where the petitioner fails to pursue the case or update counsel after an unstayed remand order?
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• Muhammad Akbar vs Muhammad Rafi And Other1985 SCMR 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-25
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionauctionlocal bodycontractual rightsadministrative lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which declared the auction of rights to organize a cattle fair by the Zilla Council, Sialkot, to be without lawful authority. The core legal question involves the scope of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, specifically whether a local body's decision to grant contract rights via negotiation, rather than strict adherence to an advertised auction, is subject to judicial interference in the absence of a specific statutory violation. The petitioner contends that in the absence of explicit rules or laws governing such contracts, the local body possessed the authority to dispose of rights through negotiation or auction, and that a third party lacked the standing to challenge this process via writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the determination of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 in reviewing the administrative actions of local bodies regarding contract disposal constitutes a significant legal question requiring further examination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to interfere with a local body's decision to award a contract through negotiation rather than auction?
  • Can a third party challenge the validity of a contract awarded by a local body in the absence of a specific statutory violation?
  • Is a local body authorized to enter into contracts for the disposal of rights through negotiation if no specific law or rule prohibits such a procedure?
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• Muhammad Akbar Khan vs Government of Baluchistan And Another1985 SCMR 1978 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-09
  probationary perioddeemed confirmationcivil servanttermination of serviceretrospective legislationjudicial branch rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the termination of a probationary civil servant, Muhammad Akbar Khan, who was appointed to the P.C.S. (Judicial Branch) in 1979. The core legal question was whether the appellant had attained the status of a confirmed employee by operation of law upon the expiry of his maximum probationary period, thereby rendering his subsequent termination unlawful, despite retrospective legislative amendments. The Supreme Court held that the appeal must fail. The Court analyzed the relevant statutory framework, including the Baluchistan Civil Servants Act 1974 and the West Pakistan Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules 1962. It determined that under the applicable rules, the appellant’s probationary period was deemed extended due to the absence of confirmation orders. Crucially, the Court found that the appellant’s services were dispensed with prior to the expiry of the maximum permissible extended probationary period. Consequently, the termination was lawful. The principle laid down is that where a probationary period is deemed extended by operation of law, a probationer does not acquire the status of a confirmed employee until the maximum extended period has fully expired without intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Does a probationer automatically acquire the status of a confirmed employee if no orders are passed by the expiry of the initial probationary period?
  • Can a civil servant's services be dispensed with during the deemed extended period of probation?
  • What is the legal effect of the absence of confirmation orders upon the expiry of the initial probationary period under the West Pakistan Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmed vs Mst. Aziz Begum1985 SCMR 1962 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-24
  rent evictiondefault in rentleave to appealwaiverappellate practiceconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, the District Judge, and the Sind High Court, which ordered the eviction of the petitioner-tenant on the grounds of default in rent payment. The respondent-landlady had sought eviction, alleging the petitioner failed to pay rent from June 1965 onwards, alongside outstanding arrears. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the lower courts erred in their factual findings regarding the default and whether the petitioner could introduce a new plea of 'waiver' regarding the payment of rent at the appellate stage. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts provided cogent reasons for their findings on the default. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the plea of waiver, not having been raised before the High Court or the courts below, could not be entertained for the first time before the Supreme Court. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not permit the introduction of new factual pleas that were not agitated in the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of waiver regarding rent payment be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not agitated in the lower courts?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding rent default subject to interference by the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Muhammad Afzal vs Mst. Rabia Bibi1985 SCMR 1905 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-22
  habeas corpusillegal custodyNikahnamarestitution of conjugal rightsfamily court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court, which had allowed a habeas corpus application filed by the respondent mother for the custody of her daughter, directing the girl to go with her mother based on a concession regarding section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, despite a disputed age and a produced Nikahnama showing marriage to the petitioner, her first cousin. The core legal question concerned the propriety of handing over custody in habeas proceedings where illegal detention was not established and a valid marriage deed was presented. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition because the alleged detenue was not produced before the court and could not be traced. The court held that the appropriate remedy for the petitioner husband is to file a suit for restitution of conjugal rights before the Family Court, which is better equipped to record evidence and ascertain the true facts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy when the fact of illegal detention is disputed and a marriage is claimed?
  • What is the proper remedy for a husband seeking custody of his wife when her whereabouts are untraceable in habeas proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Centrei, Lahore1985 PLD Supreme Court 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-16
  Intra-Court AppealLaw Reforms Ordinanceoriginal orderconstitutional petitionevacuee propertyremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's Letters Patent Appeal as incompetent under the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The core legal question was whether an Intra-Court Appeal against an order passed under Article 199 of the Constitution is barred when the original order in the proceedings was subject to appeal, revision, or review, notwithstanding the subsequent repeal of the governing statute and remand of the case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the expression 'original order' refers to the order with which the proceedings under the relevant statute commenced, rather than an order passed after remand following the repeal of the statute. The key principle laid down is that the competency of an Intra-Court Appeal under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 is determined by whether the original commencement order in the administrative hierarchy was subject to an appellate or revisional remedy under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal is competent under section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 when the original order in the proceedings was subject to revision under the repealed statute?
  • What is the precise meaning of the expression 'original order' under the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  • Does the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and the subsequent passing of a fresh order on remand alter the character of the 'original order' for the purpose of determining the competency of a Letters Patent Appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdul Rauf vs Mst. Mahmooda Begum1985 SCMR 1960 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-26
  rented premisespersonal usebona fide requirementlandlord and tenantevictionsummary evictionproperty rights of wife
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that ordered the eviction of a tenant under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller, when adjudicating an application under Section 14 of the Ordinance, may inquire into the bona fides of a landlord's personal need for the premises, specifically when the landlord is a wife living in her husband's house. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller's inference—that a wife's claim to her own property is mala fide simply because she resides in her husband's house—is legally unsustainable. The Court affirmed that a wife has an independent right to hold and occupy her own property, and the mere fact of living with a husband does not negate her right to seek eviction for personal use under Section 14. The Court concluded that the Rent Controller's reasoning was conjectural and dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the challenge to the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a wife have an independent legal right to seek eviction of a tenant from her own property despite residing with her husband?
  • Can a Rent Controller infer that a landlord's claim for personal use is mala fide solely because the landlord resides in a spouse's house?
  • What is the scope of the restriction in Section 14(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 regarding a landlord's existing occupation of property?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhabbat Ali And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-12
  criminal appealmurderreasonable doubtocular testimonydelayed FIRbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for the murder of Khushi Muhammad under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, given the alleged inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR), the improbability of the eye-witness accounts, and the suspicious nature of the recoveries. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The Court found the eye-witness testimony unreliable due to the impossibility of hearing noise from a distance of over a furlong in January, the lack of explanation for the delay in reporting the crime, and the failure to secure blood-stained evidence from the scene. Furthermore, the Court deemed the recoveries of weapons days after the arrest highly improbable. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellants, and extended the benefit of this acquittal to a non-appealing co-accused, establishing the principle that where the prosecution's case is riddled with improbabilities and lacks credible evidence, the benefit of the doubt must be given to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can the benefit of an acquittal in a criminal appeal be extended to a non-appealing co-accused?
  • Does an inordinate, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR undermine the credibility of the prosecution's case?
  • Is the recovery of incriminating weapons several days after the arrest of the accused considered reliable evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mufti Ziaul Hasan Through His Legal Heir And 7 Others vs The Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab And Other1985 SCMR 1452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-24
  Lambardar appointmentAdditional Commissioner powersdistribution of workadministrative competencyPunjab Land Revenue Actwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition regarding the appointment of a Lambardar. The core legal question was whether the Additional Commissioner possessed the legal competency to create a second post of Lambardar in an estate, given the prevailing distribution of work between the Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner. The Commissioner and the Board of Revenue had previously held that such matters were reserved for the Commissioner, thereby invalidating the Additional Commissioner's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court examined the relevant distribution of work lists and Notification No. LR-31/15-60. The Court held that the creation of a Lambardar post falls under the functions delegated to the Additional Commissioner under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, and that Lambardari appeals were distinct from administrative matters like creating a post. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower orders, restoring the original order of the Additional Commissioner. The principle laid down is that administrative functions delegated to an Additional Commissioner under the Land Revenue Act, 1887, include the creation of Lambardar posts unless specifically excluded by the distribution of work.

  Questions settled

  • Does the creation of an additional post of Lambardar fall within the administrative functions of an Additional Commissioner under the Punjab Land Revenue Act 1887?
  • Are Lambardari appeals distinct from the administrative act of creating a Lambardar post for the purpose of work distribution between a Commissioner and an Additional Commissioner?
  • Is an order passed by an Additional Commissioner within his delegated powers liable to be set aside on the ground that it should have been handled by the Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarik Sarfraz vs The State1985 SCMR 609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-27
  murderculpable homicideocular testimonycriminal appealsentence reductionincised injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a murder conviction where the petitioner challenged the legal classification of his offence. The petitioner was convicted for the murder of his 13/14-year-old cousin, Mst. Saleem Bibi, who suffered 18 incised injuries from a dagger. The prosecution relied on ocular testimony, recovery of the weapon, and medical evidence. The petitioner contended that his actions constituted an offence under Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) rather than Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (murder), seeking a reduction in sentence. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the petitioner failed to demonstrate how the established facts supported a conviction under Section 304-I. Given the brutality of the attack, evidenced by the numerous incised wounds, the Court held that the conviction under Section 302 was appropriate. The petition was dismissed, affirming that the nature and number of injuries inflicted upon the victim warranted the higher sentence, thereby upholding the lower court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the infliction of multiple incised injuries on a victim justify a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than Section 304-I?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to a lesser sentence under Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if they cannot demonstrate that the facts of the case meet the legal requirements for culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarik Ali vs The State1985 SCMR 1907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-09
  criminal breach of trustembezzlementhandwriting proofexpert opinionpostal employee liabilityappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal by the Lahore High Court of the petitioner's appeal against his convictions and sentences for criminal breach of trust. The petitioner, a Sub-Postmaster, was convicted in two separate cases for embezzling funds received from customers for deposit into their accounts, having made entries in the passbooks but failing to record them in the official ledger and savings bank journal. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner's signatures on the passbooks could be legally proven without the testimony of a handwriting expert, and whether the petitioner, as a supervisor, could be held liable for the failure to make ledger entries despite the specific duties assigned to the Savings Bank clerk under the Pakistan Post Office Manual. The Supreme Court held that the convictions were sound, finding that the testimony of postal employees familiar with the petitioner's handwriting was sufficient proof, and that the direct evidence of the petitioner receiving the money established his liability. The petition was dismissed, affirming that expert opinion is not the sole method for proving handwriting when other competent evidence exists.

  Questions settled

  • Is the opinion of a handwriting expert strictly required to prove a signature in a criminal case?
  • Can a supervisor be held liable for embezzlement when direct evidence proves they personally received the funds, despite departmental rules assigning entry duties to subordinates?
  • Is the testimony of employees familiar with a person's handwriting sufficient to prove a signature?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarak Ali vs Tula Khan Alias Sadullah Khan1985 SCMR 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  specific performancebreach of contractagreement of saleregistration of sale deedreadiness and willingness
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a direct appeal arising from a civil suit for the specific performance of an agreement of sale regarding agricultural land. The core legal question centered on whether the plaintiff/appellant was guilty of committing a breach of contract by failing to appear before the Sub-Registrar on the stipulated date for the execution and registration of the sale-deed, thereby forfeiting his right to specific performance. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the High Court, which had reversed the trial court's decree in favor of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court concurred that the plaintiff failed to establish his presence before the Sub-Registrar, relied on interested testimony, and withheld himself from the witness box, thereby violating the essential terms of the agreement. The key principle laid down is that a party seeking specific performance must strictly prove compliance with their own obligations under the contract, and where a plaintiff commits a breach of an essential term—such as failing to attend for registration—specific performance will be refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff who fails to appear before the Sub-Registrar to execute a sale-deed is guilty of a breach of contract disentitling him to specific performance?
  • Does the failure of a plaintiff to enter the witness box to support his case adversely affect his claim for specific performance?
  • Whether a finding of fact regarding a party's presence before the Sub-Registrar recorded by the High Court can be interfered with by the Supreme Court when it is based on proper appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zuhran Khatoon And 8 Others vs The Member, Federal Land1985 SCMR 312 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-16
  Land Reforms Regulationalienation of landaggrieved personwrit jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals through leave of the Court are directed against the Lahore High Court judgments dismissing several writ petitions concerning the validity of alienations under paragraph 7 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (M.L.R. 115), which were declared void by a Member of the Federal Land Commission due to inadequate consideration and lack of proof of payment. The core legal question involves whether the alienations were valid and whether vendees qualify as aggrieved persons to challenge orders in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that appeals filed by certain vendees (alienees) fail as they are not 'persons aggrieved' when proceedings merely ascertain declarant holdings to resume excess land, but remanded four connected appeals to the High Court for fresh hearing and decision due to conflicting treatment of similar alienations, lack of opportunity on Transfer of Property and Registration Act issues, misreading of evidence, and the requirement to avoid technicalities in land reform cases. The key principle laid down is that vendees challenging land reform resumptions where transaction facts are undisputed generally lack aggrieved person status, and cases involving conflicting statutory treatment or procedural unfairness warrant a remand for fresh adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether vendees of land from declarants under the Land Reforms Regulation qualify as 'persons aggrieved' to challenge resumption proceedings in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a case be remanded to the High Court for fresh hearing when there is a conflict in judgments regarding the statutory validity of alienations in favor of female family members?
  • Whether the High Court's treatment of land reforms cases in writ jurisdiction should avoid being controlled by mere technicalities?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab B1bi and ANOTHERs vs Mushtaq and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-04
  murderocular testimonycorroborationrecovery of blood-stained clothesenhancement of sentencemitigating circumstancestender agecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court concerning a murder case. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of ocular testimony requiring independent corroboration in case of improvements, the evidentiary value of delayed recoveries of weapons, and the propriety of reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life on the grounds of tender age and a sudden, unpremeditated occurrence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in acquitting certain co-accused and maintaining the conviction of the petitioner while reducing his death sentence, but found the sentence of fine inadequate. The key principle laid down is that where eyewitnesses make improvements, their testimony requires independent corroboration as to each accused, and the recovery of blood-stained clothes soon after the arrest can provide such corroboration, whereas delayed recoveries of weapons may be discarded. Furthermore, tender age and lack of premeditation are valid mitigating circumstances for commuting a death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses who make improvements requires independent corroboration before a conviction can be sustained?
  • Does the recovery of blood-stained clothes soon after the arrest constitute sufficient corroboration against an accused?
  • Whether tender age and a sudden, unpremeditated occurrence serve as valid mitigating circumstances for reducing a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Willayat Jan And Another vs Muhammad Sharif And Another1985 SCMR 1131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-10
  giftHiba-bil-Ewazsubsistence holdingpresumptive heirsHanafi LawMartial Law Regulation No. 64retrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the validity of a gift of agricultural land and a house made in 1960 by a maternal grandfather to the appellants. The local Tehsildar refused to sanction the mutation of the land as the donor's holding was less than the subsistence holding, which was barred under paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 64. The respondents, nephews of the deceased donor, forcibly evicted the appellants. The trial court decreed the suit only for the house, holding that the land gift was void. The District Judge reversed this, treating the transaction as a 'Hiba-bil-Ewaz' (which amounts to a sale and was permitted under the proviso). The High Court restored the trial court's decision, holding that the gift was not a Hiba-bil-Ewaz and that a subsequent 1962 Land Commission Notification allowing gifts to presumptive heirs did not apply retrospectively. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that a Hiba-bil-Ewaz requires actual payment of consideration and a bona fide intention to divest property in praesenti. Furthermore, the appellants, being daughters of a predeceased daughter, did not qualify as 'presumptive heirs' under Hanafi Law, rendering the 1962 Notification inapplicable.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential conditions required to constitute a valid Hiba-bil-Ewaz under Islamic law as distinguished from a simple gift?
  • Can services rendered by a donee to a donor (such as care or service) be treated as valid consideration to convert a simple gift into a Hiba-bil-Ewaz?
  • Do the daughters of a predeceased daughter qualify as presumptive heirs under the Hanafi Law of Inheritance?
  • Does a notification issued by the Land Commission under paragraph 4(5) of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 have retrospective effect in the absence of express words to that effect?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Umri vs Muhammad Shafiq And Other1985 SCMR 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-21
  settlement caselocus standiconstitutional petitionproperty transferpossessionPermanent Transfer Deedfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition concerning a property settlement dispute. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who held a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) for a larger area of an Ihata, had the locus standi to challenge the transfer of a portion of that Ihata to the respondent, given that the petitioner was not in possession of that specific portion. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of fact made by the lower authorities, specifically that the petitioner’s successor-in-interest had previously admitted to the existence of other occupants in the Ihata, including one Mst. Fatima, whose portion was subsequently transferred to the respondent. The Court held that the petitioner could only claim the area actually in her possession and lacked the locus standi to challenge the transfer of other units within the Ihata not in her possession. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the mere issuance of a P.T.D. does not grant standing to challenge the transfer of property units outside the holder's actual possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the holder of a Permanent Transfer Deed have locus standi to challenge the transfer of property units within an Ihata that were not in their possession?
  • Can a petitioner challenge a finding of fact regarding possession affirmed by the High Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is a party entitled to claim the transfer of property units within an Ihata that were not in their actual possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ummatul Waheed And Others vs Mst. Nasira Kausar And Other1985 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-17
  specific performancecomparison of signatureshandwriting expertsecond appealagreement to sellappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed their regular second appeal arising from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell a government-allotted plot. The trial court had decreed the suit based on oral and documentary evidence, but the first appellate court reversed the decision after comparing the disputed signatures of the deceased vendor and finding them not genuine, a view affirmed by the High Court upon its own comparison of the signatures. The core legal question centered on whether a court is legally competent to compare handwriting and signatures itself without the assistance of a handwriting expert. The Supreme Court held that a court is fully entitled to compare handwriting and signatures by itself and is not bound to rely solely upon or require an expert opinion in every case. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the concurrent factual findings regarding the invalidity of the agreement were unassailable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court legally competent to compare disputed signatures and handwriting itself without the opinion of a handwriting expert?
  • Whether the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court regarding the genuineness of an agreement to sell can be interfered with in second appeal?
  • Does the testimony of an attesting witness who did not actually see the executant sign the document suffice to prove its execution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tijarat Bibi And Others vs Ghulam Rabbani And Other1985 SCMR 1004 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-08
  inheritance disputepaternitydeclaratory suitconcurrent findings of factmutationlimited ownerposthumous child
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a declaratory suit concerning the inheritance of property originally owned by one Dulla, who died in 1915. The dispute centered on the paternity of Ashram Khan, who claimed to be the son of Dulla born posthumously to his widow, Mst. Mirza Noor. While the property had historically devolved through limited owners without recognizing Ashram Khan's rights, the respondents, as heirs of Ashram Khan, challenged a mutation that excluded them from inheritance. The core legal question was whether the evidence presented, including birth and death certificates and oral testimony, sufficiently established Ashram Khan's paternity despite the absence of a specific issue framed on the matter and the long delay in asserting his rights. The courts below concurrently found that the documentary and oral evidence sufficiently proved Ashram Khan was the son of Dulla. The Supreme Court held that since the controversy was concluded by concurrent findings of fact based on evidence that the petitioners failed to effectively rebut, there was no scope for interference. The petition was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding paternity when the parties have led evidence on the issue despite the lack of a specific framed issue?
  • Does the failure of a party to challenge the genuineness of birth and death certificates by summoning original records preclude them from later challenging the evidentiary value of those documents?
  • Is the long-term failure of an heir to assert inheritance rights sufficient to displace positive documentary evidence of paternity?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Talat Nasira vs Mst. Munawar Sultana And 2 Other1985 SCMR 1367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-28
  guardianshipminor custodywelfare of minorremarriage of motherwishes of minorleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a guardianship dispute concerning a minor whose father died in the 1971 war. The paternal grandmother applied to be appointed as guardian of the person and property of the minor, contesting the mother's right to custody due to her remarriage to a stranger. The Guardian Judge appointed the paternal grandmother, and the lower appellate court and High Court dismissed the mother's subsequent appeal and revision. Upon the matter reaching the Supreme Court, the minor expressed a clear desire to remain with his mother. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the welfare of the minor coupled with his own intelligent preference, given his age of thirteen years, is a primary consideration, and that the effect of the mother's remarriage on the custody of a male child requires re-examination. The key principle laid down is that the wishes of a minor capable of making an intelligent preference, alongside their overall welfare, must be given due regard in guardianship matters, superseding rigid disqualifications based solely on a mother's remarriage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the welfare and wishes of a minor are primary considerations in determining guardianship matters?
  • Does the remarriage of a mother to a stranger automatically disqualify her from the custody of her male child?
  • Can a minor's expressed preference be disregarded by the court in custody proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tahira Bibi And Others vs Khair Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 1577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-12
  execution of decreelimitation periodstay of executionFrontier Crimes Regulationexclusion of timecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the execution of a decree originally passed on 8-12-1960 under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. Following the repeal of the Regulation, the parties consented to execute the decree through the civil court. The core legal question was whether the execution application filed on 19-8-1979 was barred by limitation under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, given the various stay orders obtained by the respondents throughout the preceding years. The Supreme Court held that the execution application was not time-barred. The Court reasoned that the period during which the execution was stayed by various court orders must be excluded from the computation of the limitation period pursuant to Section 15 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Court emphasized that the decree-holder was effectively prevented from filing the application due to these judicial interventions. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restored the orders of the lower courts, and allowed the appeal, affirming that the application was filed within the permissible statutory period when accounting for the excluded time.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period during which an execution is stayed by court orders count towards the limitation period for filing an execution application?
  • Can the time spent in litigation regarding the stay of execution be excluded under Section 15 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is an execution application filed after the repeal of the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 subject to the limitation period prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Surraya Begum vs Sh. Zafar Muhammad1985 SCMR 1606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-11
  review petitionerror apparent on the recordlimitationforma pauperiscourt-feespecific performancerestitution of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This common order disposes of two review petitions seeking review of the Supreme Court's consolidated judgment dated 10-4-1978. The litigation arose from an agreement of sale under which the petitioner was put in possession but later dispossessed. The petitioner's suit for specific performance was dismissed, and her subsequent second appeal before the High Court was dismissed as barred by limitation. Consequently, the High Court held that she had no right to remain in possession as against the owner. The primary ground urged for review was an error apparent on the face of the record, claiming the second appeal was filed within time on 10-2-1969 along with a pauper application, but erroneously taken as filed on 12-2-1969. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that a party cannot raise a factual point for the first time in review when it was available at the main hearing. Additionally, since the pauper application was found not made in good faith, filing without court-fee was not a proper presentation of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a factual argument for the first time in a review petition if it was available during the main appeal hearing?
  • Does the presentation of an appeal without paying court-fees constitute a proper presentation if the accompanying pauperism application was not made in good faith?
  • Whether an error in calculating limitation constitutes a ground for review when alternative findings independently sustain the dismissal of an appeal?
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• Mst. Sultana Begum And Another vs The Additional Deputy1985 SCMR 915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-04
  allotment of landwrit jurisdictionlocus standidiscretionary reliefstatus quomesne profitsconstructive possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the confirmation of land allotment and the subsequent exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction by the High Court. The core legal questions involve the effect of a previous Supreme Court judgment on the parties' respective claims, the validity of an allotment confirmation in the absence of proper notice, and whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in granting relief to the writ petitioners. Specifically, the Court examines whether an allotment, even if procedurally questionable, could be deemed void or illegal, and whether the writ petitioners possessed the necessary locus standi to seek relief. Furthermore, the Court addresses whether the petitioner, Mst. Sultana Begum, was entitled to similar relief based on constructive possession and the application of the prior Supreme Court precedent. The Court grants leave to appeal, imposing restrictions on the alienation or alteration of the property in dispute and requiring security for mesne profits, thereby preserving the status quo pending final adjudication of these complex questions of allotment validity and discretionary relief.

  Questions settled

  • What is the effect of a previous Supreme Court judgment on the respective pleas of contesting parties regarding land allotment?
  • Can an allotment confirmation be treated as void or illegal solely on the ground of lack of notice to an opposing party whose claim is based on a bogus allotment?
  • Does a party have the locus standi to file a Constitutional petition if their own claim is based on a bogus allotment?
  • Whether a party is entitled to relief based on constructive possession in light of a prior Supreme Court judgment?
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• Mst. Sitaran Bibi vs Sher Muhammad Khan And Other1985 SCMR 1052 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  inheritance mutationdocumentary evidence vs oral evidencepre-deceased soncustomary successioncivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from concurrent findings of lower courts dismissing the appellant's suit for declaration of ownership and possession of a share in agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in relying on documentary evidence, specifically inheritance mutations and execution warrants, over oral evidence to determine the pre-deceased status of the appellant's father relative to the original grantee. The Supreme Court held that documentary evidence such as mutation records and execution warrants establishing the exact dates of death and execution reliably proved that the appellant's father died prior to the original grantee, rendering oral evidence insignificant. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the appeal, laying down the principle that clear documentary evidence regarding dates of death and inheritance mutations prevails over contrary oral testimony unless shown to be incorrect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inheritance mutations and official documentary evidence can be preferred over oral testimony regarding the date of death of a predecessor?
  • Does a son who predeceased the original grantee inherit under custom?
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• Mst. Sharifan Begum And Others vs Abdul Hamid1985 SCMR 1060 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-31
  rent evictionpersonal needbona fide requirementconcurrent findingsleave to appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court, all of which ordered the eviction of the tenant from the back portion of a house on the grounds of the landlord's personal need and requirement. The petitioner challenged these orders, arguing that the landlord's wife resided in Karachi and the landlord was abroad, thereby negating the necessity for eviction. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting that the landlord's wife had testified that her residence in Karachi was temporary and that she lacked suitable accommodation in Lahore for herself and her sons. The Court observed that the wife had even been forced to rent a room in the same locality, further substantiating the genuineness of the landlord's requirement. Finding that the lower courts had correctly assessed the evidence without any misreading or omission, the Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact were well-supported. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as it failed to demonstrate any violation of legal principles warranting interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant challenge a concurrent finding of fact regarding a landlord's personal need for eviction in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the temporary residence of a landlord's family member in another city negate the landlord's claim for personal need of a property?
  • Is the necessity of renting alternative accommodation by a landlord's family relevant in determining the bona fide nature of a personal need claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shanbibi vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 1977 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-22
  settlement lawrepeal of statutefinality of ordersproperty transferauction proceedingscompetence of application
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Sind High Court, which had dismissed a Constitution Petition seeking to set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner. The petitioner had requested the cancellation of the transfer of a disputed property (C.H. No. 1368/1) to the respondents, claiming she had purchased a property (C.H. No. 1368/5) in a separate auction. The Settlement Commissioner had rejected this application on the grounds that the petitioner's previous transfer had been cancelled in 1972, her appeal against that cancellation was dismissed in 1973, and the order had attained finality. Crucially, the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court held that the petitioner's application filed in 1976 was incompetent because the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 had been repealed effective 1 July 1974, and no proceedings were pending at that time. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that once the relevant statute was repealed and the previous orders had become final, the authorities lacked jurisdiction to reopen the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can a settlement authority reopen a case after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 if no proceedings were pending at the time of repeal?
  • Does an order of an Additional Settlement Commissioner attain finality if it is not challenged by the aggrieved party?
  • Is an application for cancellation of a property transfer competent if filed after the repeal of the governing statute and the finality of previous adverse orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamshad Begum vs Lahore Development Authority1985 SCMR 1222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-19
  temporary injunctionperpetual injunctioninterlocutory matterjudicial discretioncivil revisionleave to appealconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Mst. Shamshad Begum against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed her civil revision regarding a dispute with the Lahore Development Authority. The petitioner had originally filed a suit for a perpetual injunction, seeking to restrain the respondent from demolishing her house, and concurrently filed an application for a temporary injunction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial court dismissed the application for a temporary injunction, and subsequent appeals to the District Judge and the High Court were also unsuccessful. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the refusal of interlocutory relief warranted interference by the apex court. The Supreme Court held that it would not interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion by the lower courts in an interlocutory matter. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that the Supreme Court generally declines to disturb concurrent findings of lower courts in discretionary interlocutory proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion by lower courts in interlocutory matters?
  • Can a petitioner obtain a temporary injunction to restrain the demolition of a property during the pendency of a suit for perpetual injunction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sarwar Begum And Another vs Khalida Kishwar And Other1985 SCMR 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-29
  pre-emptioncustom of pre-emptionpetition for leave to appealPunjab Pre-Emption Acturban pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises out of two petitions for leave to appeal directed against concurrent findings of lower courts in pre-emption suits concerning shares in a house situated within the city of Lahore. The core legal question was whether the custom of pre-emption existed in the vicinity of the suit property, involving the interpretation of Section 8 of the Punjab Pre-Emption Act and a notification dated 16-6-1941, alongside the sufficiency of oral evidence. The Supreme Court held that both the lower courts and the High Court correctly construed the notification—which established that the right of pre-emption existed within the city of Lahore lying within the Circular Road—and properly relied on oral and documentary evidence, including precedent. The petitions were accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of the custom of pre-emption, supported by statutory notifications and un-rebutted evidence, do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the custom of pre-emption existed in the vicinity of the suit property situated within the Circular Road of Lahore?
  • Whether the Notification No.149 I.R. dated 16-6-1941 issued under section 8 of the Punjab Pre-Emption Act was misconstrued by the courts below?
  • Whether oral evidence coupled with a statutory notification is sufficient to establish the existence of the custom of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saroobai And Another vs Mst. Rubab Bai1985 SCMR 916 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-11
  ejectmentdefault in rentconcurrent findings of factearnest moneyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment and order of the Sind High Court passed in Second Appeal No.188 of 1981, which allowed the appeal of the respondents against an ejectment order. The petitioner landladies had filed an ejectment application on the grounds of default in rent payment, subletting, and unauthorized construction. The respondents contested the default claim by asserting that an agreement of sale was entered into, wherein a cash sum of Rs.1,000 paid as earnest money was adjusted towards arrears of rent. The Rent Controller and District Judge ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered ejectment, but the High Court reversed this decision. The core legal question revolves around whether the High Court erred in holding that the alleged cash payment of Rs.1,000 could be adjusted towards arrears of rent and in disturbing concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts without sufficient evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contentions raised by the petitioners require re-examination and accordingly granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can disturb concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts regarding the payment of rent?
  • Can an earnest money amount paid under an unmaterialized agreement of sale be adjusted towards arrears of rent without sufficient evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sardaro and Others vs Mst. Nazran Begum and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-15
  customary lawlimited estatelast full ownercustomary successionMuslim Personal Lawproof of custominheritance dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose out of a dispute regarding inheritance and succession to a land holding of 1,706 kanals 9 marlas in District Mardan. Upon the original landholder's death in 1911, the property was mutated half to his son and half to his widow as a limited estate under custom. Following the subsequent deaths of the son, the widow, and the son's widow (who held the entire estate as a limited owner until 1967), the revenue authorities mutated the entire property to the Muslim Law heirs of the son as the last full owner, excluding the original landholder's daughters from his second wife. The daughters brought a declaratory suit. The appellate court and High Court held that succession regarding the widow's half share opened from the original landholder as the last full owner, dividing the estate among his Muslim Law heirs. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that custom must be specifically proved and cannot be extended by analogy. A widow succeeding to a limited estate under custom does so as a representative of her husband, and upon the termination of her life estate, succession is traced back to the original full owner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether custom can be extended by logical process or analogy, or must be established inductively by specific evidence?
  • Upon the termination of a limited life estate created under custom for a widow, is succession to the property traced back to her deceased husband as the last full owner?
  • Does a widow succeeding to an estate under custom hold as a representative of her deceased husband?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina Bi And Another vs The Additional District Judge And Other1985 SCMR 1027 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-16
  amendment of judgmentcorrection of decreelimited ownergift of landdeclaratory suitcivil procedureshariat act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a challenge to an order passed by the Additional District Judge, which accepted a revision petition and allowed the amendment of a trial court judgment and decree dated 16-5-1952 under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to incorporate an omitted mutation number. The petitioners challenged this amendment before the High Court via writ jurisdiction, contending that an amendment introduced via Section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1962 by Ordinance XIII of 1983 rendered the original declaratory decree ineffective, thereby depriving the Additional District Judge of jurisdiction to correct it. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the correction of a clerical or accidental omission in a decree through amendment does not alter its underlying legal efficacy; if the decree has indeed become inoperative by virtue of statutory amendments, a corrected decree stands on no higher footing than an uncorrected one. The Court affirmed that the question of the decree's efficacy remains distinct from the correction of the judgment, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court amend a judgment and decree under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to include a mutation number omitted from the text?
  • Does the correction of a clerical omission in a decree affect the substantive legal efficacy of that decree under subsequent statutory amendments?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeeda Ahsanullah Rahmani And Others vs Muhammad Iqbal Hussain1985 SCMR 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-29
  EjectmentLandlord-tenantPersonal requirementBona fide requirementLeave to appealFindings of factRent ControllerSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which had upheld an ejectment order issued by the Rent Controller. The original ejectment petition was filed by the respondent-landlord against the petitioners-tenants on the grounds of personal bona fide requirement, specifically for his son's marriage and his wife's health condition necessitating a ground-floor residence. The Rent Controller, after evaluating evidence, ordered the petitioners' ejectment, a decision subsequently affirmed by a Single Judge of the High Court. The petitioners' counsel argued that the lower courts erred in relying on a purported admission by a petitioner ignorant of English and in over-emphasizing certain depositions. The Supreme Court examined these points and held that the lower courts' findings regarding the landlord's bona fide personal requirement were questions of fact. The Court found no grounds for interference, concluding that the petition lacked merit, and consequently dismissed it.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is a landlord's personal bona fide requirement for premises a question of fact?
  • Are findings of fact by lower courts generally upheld by the Supreme Court in leave to appeal petitions?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sadiq Jan vs Muhammad Rashid And Other1985 SCMR 860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-04
  murderocular testimonybenefit of doubtacquittalreappraisal of evidencecommon intentioncriminal trespass
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a murder trial under sections 452 and 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The trial court had convicted Muhammad Rashid and Muhammad Nazir, while acquitting Din Muhammad. On appeal and revision, the High Court maintained Muhammad Rashid's conviction, acquitted Muhammad Nazir, and dismissed the complainant's revision seeking capital punishment and setting aside Din Muhammad's acquittal. The Supreme Court examined whether the acquittal of Muhammad Nazir was in consonance with the principles governing the safe administration of criminal justice. The Court held that the testimony of the eyewitnesses, including the wife and brother of the deceased, was natural, trustworthy, and sufficiently corroborated by motive, and that the High Court erred in discrediting the brother's testimony and acquitting Muhammad Nazir based on minor discrepancies, lack of recoveries, and the nature of injuries. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the complainant's appeal, restored Muhammad Nazir's conviction and sentence, and dismissed Muhammad Rashid's appeal. The key principle laid down is that the ocular testimony of natural witnesses, if found intrinsically reliable and consistent with medical evidence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of recoveries, and that minor discrepancies or speculative inferences should not be used to discard otherwise credible eyewitness accounts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an eyewitness can be discarded on the basis of speculative inferences regarding his presence at the scene of the crime?
  • Can the acquittal of a co-accused be set aside by the Supreme Court when the ocular testimony implicating him is found to be reliable and consistent?
  • Does the absence of weapon recoveries vitiate the prosecution case when direct and trustworthy ocular testimony is available?
  • Whether the nature and location of multiple stab wounds exclusively point to the involvement of a single assailant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ruqayya Begum vs Altaf Qutab And Other1985 SCMR 1223(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-22
  property demarcationleave to appealconcurrent findings of factsettlement authoritiesboundary disputeevidentiary review
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the demarcation of property boundaries between two bungalows transferred by Settlement authorities to the petitioner and the respondent, respectively. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in their factual determination that the disputed garage and servant quarters were situated within the respondent's property, specifically regarding the alleged failure of the courts below to consider certain evidentiary documents (Exhibits P.5 to P.7). Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had properly considered the evidence and that the findings were factually sound. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there was no justification for interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The petition was dismissed as having no force. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless a material misreading or non-reading of evidence is clearly demonstrated, which was not established in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding property boundaries?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when the lower courts have properly considered the evidence on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukiya Bai And Others vs Mst. Aqila Begum And Other1985 SCMR 977 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-07
  ejectmentrent controlex parte ordernatural justiceright to be heardremandadministrative transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a rent dispute wherein the landlords (appellants) obtained an ejectment order against tenants (respondents) due to unauthorized sub-letting. Following the dismissal of their first appeal, the tenants filed a Second Appeal in the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s ex parte disposal of the Second Appeal was legally sustainable, given that the case was abruptly transferred between judges for administrative reasons without notice to the appellants or their counsel. The Supreme Court held that the disposal of the appeal in the absence of the appellants, who were unaware of the transfer, resulted in a denial of the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for a fresh decision on its merits. The key principle laid down is that the principles of natural justice and fair play require that parties must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to represent their case, particularly when administrative transfers of proceedings occur, ensuring that no party is prejudiced by a lack of notice regarding the scheduling or forum of their litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte judgment passed by a High Court is sustainable when the case was transferred between judges without notice to the parties?
  • Is a party entitled to a rehearing when they were unable to represent their case due to an administrative transfer of the appeal file?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Resham Bibi vs Barkat Ali And Other1985 SCMR 2104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-22
  petition for leave to appealMuslim Personal Lawstatus quoregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  Mst. Resham Bibi filed a petition against the High Court judgment dated 8-4-1979 which dismissed her Regular Second Appeal No. 399 of 1970. The core legal question involves the application and interpretation of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act in light of conflicting views taken in prior judgments. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the matter, ordered security in the sum of Rs. 2,000, directed that the status quo granted to the petitioner shall continue, and permitted the case to be heard on the same record with liberty to file additional documents. The court established that leave is granted to resolve the legal divergence regarding the application of the relevant statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when conflicting views exist regarding the application of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act?
  • Does a status quo order continue upon the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehmat Bibi vs The State1985 SCMR 1050 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-08
  bail cancellationmurder by poisoningstatutory proviso for womenparity of bailcriminal conspiracyfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the cancellation of bail of the petitioner, Mst. Rehmat Bibi, who is facing trial for the murder of her husband by poisoning. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court and courts below were justified in cancelling the petitioner's bail while refusing to cancel the bail of a co-accused facing similar allegations. The Supreme Court held that since the allegations against the petitioner and the co-accused proceeded on similar evidence without any justifiable distinction, and given that the petitioner was a woman whose case fell under the statutory proviso for further inquiry, there was no sound basis to cancel her bail. The Court laid down the principle that parity in treatment regarding bail must be maintained among co-accused facing identical allegations unless distinguishing features exist, and that the statutory concession of bail for female accused should not be arbitrarily interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted to a female accused can be cancelled without distinguishing her case from co-accused facing similar allegations?
  • Does the case of a female accused charged with a non-bailable offence fall under the protective proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 requiring further inquiry?
  • Is parity in the treatment of co-accused a relevant consideration when deciding on the cancellation of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Sultan And Another vs Lt. Col. (Rtd.) M. M. Qureshi And Another1985 SCMR 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-09
  review petitionjurisdictionacquiescencewaiverejectmentcantonment rent restrictionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan which had earlier dismissed a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The underlying matter arose from ejectment proceedings initiated under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, where the Rent Controller's dismissal of the landlord's application was reversed on appeal by an Additional District Judge. The petitioners challenged this appellate decision through a writ petition before the Lahore High Court, which was dismissed, and subsequent leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was also refused on the ground that the petitioners had participated in the appellate proceedings without objecting to jurisdiction and were therefore barred by acquiescence from seeking discretionary relief. In the review petition, the petitioners contended that they were unaware of the lack of jurisdiction at the relevant time and that the Supreme Court's prior observation regarding the absence of such an averment in the writ petition was factually incorrect. The Supreme Court held, upon verifying the record, that no such ground regarding lack of awareness had been pleaded in the writ petition, and further found that no ground for review under the Supreme Court Rules, 1956 had been made out. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party who participates in appellate proceedings without objecting to the forum's jurisdiction can subsequently challenge the resulting judgment in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a review petition be entertained when no ground for review as mentioned in the Supreme Court Rules has been made out?
  • Whether lack of awareness of a tribunal's lack of jurisdiction constitutes a valid ground for review if it was never pleaded in the original writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Raz Khanum Bibi vs Nazir Ahmad And Other1985 SCMR 1725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-12
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionorder of successionagricultural landreversionerslegal fiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a pre-emption suit concerning agricultural land sold by the appellant's father. The appellant, the vendor's daughter, challenged the sale to the respondents, who claimed to be the vendor's reversioners. The core legal question was whether the respondents' right of pre-emption under Section 15(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, should be determined by their actual inheritance status upon the vendor's death or by a legal fiction regarding who would have been entitled to inherit had the vendor died on the date of the sale. The lower courts held that the right of pre-emption is to be adjudged based on the legal fiction of succession order at the time of the sale, rather than actual subsequent inheritance. The Supreme Court upheld this view, affirming that the phrase 'would be entitled, on the death of the vendor to inherit' refers to the order of succession under personal law, not the actual outcome of inheritance. The Court held that the right of pre-emption vests in persons based on their place in the order of succession, regardless of whether they were later excluded from actual inheritance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of pre-emption under Section 15(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, depend on the actual inheritance of the vendee upon the vendor's death?
  • How is the 'order of succession' determined for the purpose of establishing a right of pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Can a person who is ultimately excluded from inheritance still possess a superior right of pre-emption based on their potential status at the time of sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rasool Bibi And 3 Others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner And Another1985 SCMR 1261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-18
  settlement lawurban property transferclosed transactionleave to appealintra-court appealDeputy Settlement Commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' Intra-Court Appeal in an urban settlement dispute. The core legal question concerns the legality of a fresh transfer order issued by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner in 1975 regarding Unit No. 9-A, which had already been transferred to the respondent Asghar Ali in 1962, with related appellate and revisional proceedings concluding in 1965. The Supreme Court held that the matter of the property's transfer was a closed transaction, that the property was not available for re-transfer, and that the subsequent transfer order by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was void. The Court also noted that an Intra-Court Appeal was incompetent given the available remedies of appeal and revision. The key principle laid down is that properties conclusively transferred through final settlement proceedings cannot be reopened and re-transferred as available property by settlement authorities years later.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property conclusively transferred through settlement proceedings can be re-transferred as available property by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner years later?
  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal competent when statutory remedies of appeal and revision were available but not availed against the original transfer?
  • Does a settlement authority have the jurisdiction to reopen a closed matter regarding the transfer of an urban property without challenging the original transfer through proper appellate or revisional forums?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nemat Bibi vs Pathana And Another1985 SCMR 1581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-22
  Horse Breeding SchemeColonization of LandsRemand of caseSecond appealRejection of plaintMaintenance conditionBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute over land allotted under the Horse Breeding Scheme pursuant to the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. Following the original allottee's death, the Board of Revenue granted tenancy to the respondent on condition that he maintain the appellant, his step-mother. Upon the respondent's failure to pay maintenance, the land was resumed and allotted to the appellant. After protracted revenue and civil litigation, including the rejection of a second suit under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the Lahore High Court remanded the matter to the trial court. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court erred in remanding the case instead of deciding the pure question of law itself. Holding that the High Court ought to have finally decided the matter to save time, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's remand order and directed the High Court to decide the second appeal itself on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court should remand a case involving a pure question of law instead of deciding it finally?
  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction in matters falling to be decided under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912?
  • Can a condition of maintenance be lawfully incorporated into a tenancy allotment order by mutual consent before the Board of Revenue?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nawabzadi Sitara Begum And Others vs Province of N. W.F.P. And Other1985 SCMR 1713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-16
  res judicataallotment of landDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actlocus standiconstitutional petitionsettlement of claimsfinality of administrative orders
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, successors-in-interest of claimants for urban and rural agricultural land, sought leave to appeal against Peshawar High Court judgments. The core dispute involved the allotment of urban agricultural land to a respondent (Noor Muhammad) who held a verified claim for rural agricultural land, which the petitioners argued was legally impermissible. The High Court had previously upheld the respondent's allotment, ruling that the Chief Settlement Commissioner could not re-exercise powers to cancel an allotment already finalized by a delegate. The Supreme Court examined whether repeated inquiries into the same allotment were permissible. The Court held that the controversy had been settled by earlier administrative orders and a previous constitutional petition, which had attained finality. Applying the principle of res judicata, the Court affirmed that repeated inquiries under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act are not permissible. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the petitioners lacked locus standi to claim land that remained validly allotted to the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Are repeated inquiries into the same allotment permissible under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to the exercise of powers under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Can a Chief Settlement Commissioner re-exercise powers to cancel an allotment after a delegate has already finalized the matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nawab Bibi And Others vs Federal Government And Other1985 SCMR 1815 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-21
  evacuee trust propertyagricultural land leaselegal heirsconstitutional petitionunexpired period
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute over the lease of evacuee agricultural land vesting in the Evacuee Trust Property Board under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975. The original lessee having died during the subsistence of the lease, competing claims were made by the sub-lessee and the brother/legal heir of the deceased lessee. The Deputy Administrator initially granted a fresh lease to the legal heir, but the Administrator reversed this order in favor of the sub-lessee, a decision upheld by the Lahore High Court in a constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether the legal heir of a deceased lessee was entitled to a fresh lease of evacuee trust land or only to the devolution of leasehold rights for the unexpired period under the relevant scheme. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that paragraph 18 of the Scheme for the Lease of Evacuee Trust Agricultural Land, 1975, only allows devolution of leasehold rights for the unexpired period and does not confer a right to a fresh lease, and further noting that the lease period had expired by efflux of time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the legal heirs of a deceased lessee are entitled to a fresh lease of evacuee trust agricultural land upon the lessee's death?
  • Do leasehold rights under paragraph 18 of the Scheme for the Lease of Evacuee Trust Agricultural Land, 1975 devolve for a fresh term or only for the unexpired period of the lease?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent factual findings regarding cultivating possession in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Munti vs Muhammad Ayub And Other1985 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-11
  leave to appealwrit petitionrural propertytransfer of propertyfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition arising out of the disposal of a rural property consisting of a shop and a Chobara. The core legal question involved the challenge to concurrent findings of fact regarding the occupation and transfer application of the disputed property. The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact regarding the respondent's occupation and the lack of proof concerning the petitioner's occupation and pursuit of the transfer application suffered from no legal infirmity. The court established the principle that concurrent findings of fact regarding property occupation and non-prosecution of transfer claims by competent authorities will not be interfered with under writ jurisdiction unless shown to be against a principle of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the occupation of property be challenged in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact affirmed by the High Court when no principle of law has been violated?
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• Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi (Deceased) And Others vs Ata Muhammad And Another1985 SCMR 1506 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-10
  agreement of associationdisplaced personssettlement authoritiesjurisdiction of civil courtprovisional transfer order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the dismissal of a civil suit filed against the orders of the Settlement Department. A non-claimant displaced person had entered into an agreement of association with a claimant for the transfer of a house in his possession because he could not pay the transfer price and rent arrears. Later, he sought to withdraw the agreement, but the Settlement authorities refused and issued a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) and Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) to the associate. The civil courts dismissed the petitioner's suit, holding that section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 barred civil court jurisdiction. The core legal question is whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to interfere with orders passed by Settlement authorities when issuing transfer documents based on a premature agreement of association, and whether such agreement of association is permissible before the actual transfer of property. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that parties can enter into an agreement of association before the actual transfer of property. The principle laid down is that entering into an agreement of association prior to the actual transfer of property is not objectionable under settlement laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to interfere with orders passed by Settlement authorities?
  • Is an agreement of association entered into before the actual transfer of the property permissible under settlement laws?
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• Mst. Mazhar Khanum vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, Lahore And 71985 SCMR 1354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-05
  evacuee propertytreatment as evacuee propertyCustodian of Evacuee PropertySettlement Scheme No. VIIIrevenue recordconstitutional petitionovert act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arose from a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition against the Custodian of Evacuee Property's order. The dispute concerned whether a piece of land recorded in the revenue records in the name of a non-evacuee owner constituted evacuee property under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957. The appellant argued that the land was automatically treated as evacuee property by virtue of a general notification issued in 1947, bringing it under the exception provided in Section 3(2)(b) of the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Section 3(1) of the Act, property not treated as evacuee property prior to January 1, 1957, could not be so treated thereafter. The Court reaffirmed that mere statutory vesting or a general notification does not amount to 'treatment' of property as evacuee; competent authorities must have taken specific overt action regarding the particular property. Finding no evidence of prior overt action or concealment, the Court upheld the High Court's refusal to disturb the Custodian's factual findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general notification vesting evacuee property in the Custodian satisfy the requirement of treating a specific property as evacuee property under Section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957?
  • Can property recorded in revenue records under non-evacuee ownership prior to 1947 be declared evacuee property after January 1, 1957, without prior overt action by the relevant authorities?
  • Whether the High Court in its writ jurisdiction can re-evaluate disputed questions of fact determined by the Custodian of Evacuee Property based on revenue records?
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• Mst. Mariam Bai And Another vs Mst. Mehrunnisa Begum1985 SCMR 2064 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-19
  re-admission of appealdismissal for non-prosecutionsufficient causejudicial discretioncivil procedurenon-appearance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against orders of the Sind High Court, which dismissed applications under Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the re-admission of appeals previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to restore the appeals, given that the petitioners provided affidavits citing illness as the cause for non-appearance. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its decision. The Court determined that the absence of the petitioners was neither intentional nor negligent, particularly because they had engaged counsel to argue the case, and their personal presence was not strictly required for the hearing. The Court established that the expression 'sufficient cause' for non-appearance under Order XLI, Rule 19 must be interpreted based on the facts and circumstances of each case, emphasizing that discretion should be exercised on judicial principles to avoid a strict view when non-appearance is neither intentional nor negligent. Consequently, the appeals were restored.

  Questions settled

  • What constitutes 'sufficient cause' for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution under Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Should a court take a strict view of a party's absence when that absence is neither intentional nor negligent?
  • Is the personal presence of a party necessary on a date fixed for final arguments when they have engaged counsel?
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• Mst. Mamin And Others vs The Settlement Commissioner (Land) Multan1985 SCMR 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-18
  land allotmentsettlement commissionerpending unitsre-verificationfactual findingwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a land dispute concerning the allotment of approximately 36 Kanals of land in village Dunyapur, District Multan. The matter originated from a previous High Court order dated 6-6-1977, which remanded the case to the Settlement Commissioner to determine if respondent No. 2 held pending entitlement units. If such units existed, the land was to be allotted to the respondent; otherwise, the petitioners' existing allotment was to remain intact. Following a report from the Central Record Room, the Settlement Commissioner confirmed the respondent's entitlement to 423 units and allotted the disputed land accordingly. The petitioners challenged this decision, questioning the mode of re-verification used by the authorities. The High Court dismissed the challenge, finding that the factual determination of the respondent's entitlement to 423 units was established and not effectively rebutted. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, holding that where a factual finding regarding entitlement is supported by record and remains unchallenged by contrary evidence, the specific mode of verification does not invalidate the allotment. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a land allotment be challenged solely on the basis of the mode of verification when the underlying entitlement is factually established?
  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the authority to allot land based on a re-verification of pending units following a remand order?
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• Mst. Mahmooda Sultana vs Mst. Jamila Begum1985 SCMR 1926 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-23
  minor custodyguardian of propertycustody of minormother vs grandmothersupreme court petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a contest between the paternal grandmother and the mother of a minor girl, Mst. Faraz Wajid, regarding the appointment of the guardian of her property and the custody of her person. The lower courts concurrently found the mother to be the proper person to be entrusted with the custody and guardianship. The grandmother challenged these findings through a petition before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerned whether the lower courts erred in their evaluation of the welfare of the minor in preferring the mother over the grandmother. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any legal defect or infirmity in the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The key principle laid down is that concurrent factual determinations regarding minor custody and guardianship by lower courts will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court in the absence of any established legal defect or infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mother or the grandmother is a more suitable person for the custody of a minor girl and guardianship of her property?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding minor custody in the absence of a legal defect?
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• Mst. Mahmooda Begum And Others vs Taj Din1985 SCMR 882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-09
  ejectmentrent restrictionappellate authorityremand orderconstitutional jurisdictionsuperior court precedentslimited jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside an appellate authority's decision refusing the ejectment of tenants. The landlord had sought eviction based on default and the need for reconstruction, while the tenants contested these grounds and raised the issue of non-service of notices under statutory provisions. The appellate authority had initially ruled in favor of the tenants, finding no default or necessity for reconstruction. The High Court, exercising constitutional jurisdiction, remanded the case, criticizing the appellate authority for failing to discuss relevant superior court precedents in its judgment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court could interfere with the finality of an appellate authority's decision solely on the ground that it did not explicitly discuss superior court precedents, absent a specific jurisdictional or legal error. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing merit in the contention that tribunals of limited jurisdiction are not required to incorporate all superior court decisions in their orders to maintain lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate authority in a rent restriction case legally required to incorporate and discuss all relevant superior court decisions in its judgment?
  • Can a High Court set aside an appellate authority's decision solely on the ground that it failed to discuss superior court precedents?
  • Does the failure of a tribunal to discuss superior court precedents render its judgment as lacking lawful authority?
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• Mst. Mahmooda Begum And Others vs Major Malik Muhammad Ishaq And Other1985 SCMR 983 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-03-20
  condonation of delaytime-barred appealparda nasheen ladywrong legal advicepecuniary jurisdictionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the order of the High Court, which refused to condone the delay in filing an appeal and dismissed it as time-barred. The core legal question is whether the time spent pursuing an appeal before a forum lacking pecuniary jurisdiction, allegedly due to erroneous legal advice given to a Parda Nasheen lady, constitutes sufficient ground for condonation of delay under the law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention regarding the petitioner being a Parda Nasheen lady misled by wrong legal advice requires detailed consideration. The key principle laid down is that a litigant, particularly a Parda Nasheen lady, should not be made to suffer solely on account of the bona fide wrong advice of her counsel when assessing sufficient cause for the condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time spent pursuing an appeal before a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction can be excluded for the purpose of limitation?
  • Does wrong legal advice given to a Parda Nasheen lady constitute sufficient cause for the condonation of delay in filing an appeal?
  • Should a litigant suffer for the mistaken advice of their counsel regarding the forum of appeal?
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• Mst. Kulsoom Bai vs Mst. Nargis Bano1985 SCMR 1275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-04
  execution proceedingsobjections to executionseparate suit barredejectmentfraud and misrepresentationrent restrictioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an ejectment order and subsequent execution proceedings where the petitioner intervened claiming to be the lawful tenant and alleging that the ejectment order was obtained by fraud. The petitioner's objections under Order XXI, rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure were dismissed in default, and a subsequent separate civil suit filed by the petitioner challenging the ejectment order was rejected by the trial court under Order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure as barred by Order XXI, rule 103. The lower appellate court and the High Court affirmed this view. The core legal question was whether a separate civil suit is maintainable to challenge an order in execution proceedings regarding possession when such matters are barred by Order XXI, rule 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that all questions regarding title, right, interest, or possession arising under Order XXI must be adjudicated within the execution proceedings and no separate suit lies. The Court laid down that where a Rent Controller's order is executed by a Civil Court as a decree, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure fully apply to the execution stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a separate civil suit is barred under Order XXI, Rule 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure for determining questions relating to title, right, interest, or possession arising in execution proceedings?
  • Do the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to execution proceedings initiated in a Civil Court for the execution of an order passed under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does an order passed on objections under Order XXI, Rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure have the effect of a decree allowing an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
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• Mst. Khurshida Begum And Others vs Ayub Baig And Other1985 SCMR 1497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khurshid Begum and Others vs Ahmad Bakhsh and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-30
  pre-emptionexemption notificationColonization of Government Landspreliminary issueestoppelappellate jurisdictionrehabilitation laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether land, previously governed by the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, and exempted from the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, via a government notification, retains that exemption after the land is acquired under Rehabilitation and Settlement Laws and ceases to be governed by the 1912 Act. The Supreme Court addressed whether the exemption notification, which applied to areas where the 1912 Act 'has been or may hereafter be made applicable,' persists once the land vests in private transferees. The Court upheld the High Court's finding that the notification's language does not require the 1912 Act to be currently applicable for the exemption to persist; rather, the exemption attaches once the Act has been made applicable to that area. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that respondents were estopped from challenging a preliminary issue finding in a subsequent appeal, clarifying that an appeal against a final decree reopens all preceding interim orders and issues. The appeals and petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notification exempting land from the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 based on the applicability of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 continue to apply after the land is acquired under Rehabilitation and Settlement Laws?
  • Does an appeal against a final decree reopen all interim orders and preliminary issues decided during the course of the suit?
  • Can a party be estopped from challenging a preliminary issue finding in an appeal against the final judgment if they did not challenge the preliminary finding separately at the time it was made?
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• Mst. Khudija Begum vs Government of Pakistan And Other1985 SCMR 2061 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-03
  customs seizureconfiscation of goldpersonal searchnon-declarationre-exportconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed her constitutional petition challenging the seizure and outright confiscation of 46 Tolas of gold ornaments. Upon arriving at Lahore Airport from Dubai, the petitioner's baggage was cleared, but a subsequent personal search revealed heavy gold bangles and rings on her person, which she had failed to declare when asked. The Assistant Collector confiscated the gold, rejecting her request to re-export the items under Section 142 of the Customs Act 1969, on the grounds that she had concealed the gold and failed to make a clear declaration. The petitioner's departmental appeal and revision were dismissed, as was her constitutional petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that because the petitioner failed to declare the gold and it was only recovered upon a personal search, her bona fides were compromised. Consequently, the High Court's refusal to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction was justified, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a passenger claim the benefit of re-exporting restricted goods under Section 142 of the Customs Act 1969 if they failed to make a clear declaration of those goods upon arrival?
  • Does the failure to declare restricted gold ornaments found during a personal search justify outright confiscation under the Customs Act 1969?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to overturn a confiscation order where the passenger's bona fides are compromised by non-declaration of contraband.
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