Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Hafizuddin vs Muhammad Anwar1985 SCMR 1289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-10
  civil recoveryburden of proofhandwriting expertappellate reviewquestion of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court which set aside a trial court decree in favor of the petitioner for the recovery of money based on an alleged agreement and receipt. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner had successfully proved the execution of the disputed receipt and the payment of the advance amount, and whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence of fact regarding the signature and merits. The Supreme Court held that the burden of proving the disputed receipt lay on the petitioner, who failed to establish the payment, and that the High Court's findings of fact based on the evidence were unexceptionable. The Court laid down the principle that concurrent or appellate findings of fact based on an evaluation of the record do not warrant interference under leave to appeal when no substantial question of law arises, particularly where the plaintiff abandons expert evidence and fails to discharge the burden of proof.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the burden of proving a disputed receipt lies heavily on the plaintiff who alleges payment under a contract?
  • Can an appellate court's finding of fact based on the evaluation of evidence be interfered with when no substantial question of law arises?
  • Is a court bound to compare disputed signatures under Section 73 of the Evidence Act when contradictory statements exist on the record?
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• Hafiz Muhammad Khan vs Member (Colonies), Borad of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-11
  lambardartemporary lambardarresumption of landland grantprivate treatysupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition regarding the resumption of land granted to him as a temporary Lambardar. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who failed to be appointed as a permanent headman, had a legal right to retain the land allotted to him under a notification permitting permanent headmaids to purchase and retain land. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was correct in law as the petitioner had no strict legal right to retain the land upon failing to become a permanent headman. However, considering that the petitioner had been in possession for over 55 years and developed the land, the Court dismissed the appeal subject to the observation that the authorities should consider transferring the area to him through private negotiations by executing a private treaty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a temporary headman is entitled to retain land granted under notifications restricted to permanent headmen?
  • Can revenue authorities transfer land through private negotiations to a long-standing occupant who lacks a strict legal right to retain it?
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• Hafiz Aziz Ahmad Khan vs The State1985 SCMR 1943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-17
  anti-corruptionillegal gratificationtrap witnesscorroborationinterested witnesscriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of a Sub-Inspector of Police under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, for allegedly demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs. 100, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question is whether the solitary, uncorroborated testimony of an interested witness, who was hostile and played a central role in setting up the trap, is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction for bribery. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that the testimony of the sole direct witness lacked independent material corroboration, and critical discrepancies—such as the unexplained appearance of an envelope containing the marked currency notes—rendered the prosecution's case doubtful, establishing the principle that a conviction for corruption cannot rest solely on the uncorroborated evidence of an interested and hostile witness.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for accepting a bribe be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an interested and hostile witness?
  • Whether the evidence of witnesses who do not claim personal knowledge of the actual passing of bribe money can serve as valid corroboration?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained material discrepancy regarding the handling of marked currency notes in a corruption raid?
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• Hafiz Abdur Rehman vs Mst. Birjees Begum And Another1985 SCMR 1249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-25
  evacuee propertystatutory tenantcompromise agreementadmission by conductdiscretionary reliefleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed the respondent's constitutional petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee shop. The petitioner, who was in possession of the shop, had previously accepted the transfer of the property to the respondent in multiple eviction proceedings, thereby acknowledging his status as a statutory tenant and entering into compromises to obtain concessions. Instead of vacating the premises as agreed, the petitioner applied for and obtained a transfer order for the same shop under a different number. The High Court set aside this transfer. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's repeated admissions of the respondent's ownership in solemn court proceedings could not be ignored. The Court ruled that because the petitioner sought to take undue advantage of the time granted to him by the landlady, he was not entitled to the discretionary relief of leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant who has repeatedly admitted the landlord's title in solemn court proceedings subsequently challenge that title to obtain a transfer of the same property?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal to a party who has acted in bad faith by violating a court-approved compromise?
  • Does a party's admission of ownership in eviction proceedings estop them from seeking a fresh transfer of the same property under a different identification number?
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• Gulzar Hussain vs Abdur Rehman And Another1985 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-30
  pre-emptionvaluation of suitcourt-feesmode of proofwaiver of objectionrevisional jurisdictionstatement of net profits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court in revisional jurisdiction, whereby the High Court set aside the judgments of the courts below and remanded a pre-emption suit for a fresh decision on the issue of court-fee valuation. The core legal question was whether a court is under an absolute obligation to conduct a suo motu inquiry into the valuation of a suit under Section 9 of the Court-Fees Act, 1870, even in the absence of reasonable grounds or material suggesting under-valuation, and whether an objection to the formal mode of proof of a document can be raised for the first time in appeal or revision when not taken at the trial. The Supreme Court held that the High Court proceeded on an incorrect assumption that a court-fee inquiry is obligatory without initial reasonable grounds, and reaffirmed that objections to the formal mode of proof of a document cannot be raised for the first time at the appellate or revisional stage if not objected to when the document was exhibited. The appeal was allowed and the trial court decree was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court is under a mandatory obligation to conduct a suo motu inquiry into the valuation of a suit under Section 9 of the Court-Fees Act, 1870, without any reasonable ground to believe the valuation is incorrect?
  • Can a party raise an objection regarding the formal mode of proof of a document for the first time in appeal or revision when no such objection was taken at the trial when the document was exhibited?
  • Does the failure of a defendant to object to the admission of a document at the time of its exhibition render the document admissible in evidence for all subsequent stages of litigation?
  • What constitutes reasonable grounds for a court to initiate an inquiry under Section 9 of the Court-Fees Act, 1870?
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• Gul Muhammad And Others vs The Additional Settlement Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 491 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-09
  land allotmentcancellation of allotmentdouble allotmentconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionbona fide purchaserreview power
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the appellants' case regarding the cancellation of an original land allotment had received proper consideration in the High Court. The dispute arose from an allotment of land made to one Nek Muhammad in District Jhang using surplus units allegedly transferred from Sahiwal, where his claim had already been satisfied. Nek Muhammad subsequently sold the land to predecessors, who sold it to the appellants via registered deeds in 1964. Following a report, the Additional Settlement Commissioner permitted a review, leading to the cancellation of the allotment. The appellants' constitutional petition was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that discretionary constitutional jurisdiction cannot be issued in aid of injustice. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly refused relief because the transaction involved a double allotment and the complete satisfaction of the original claim in Sahiwal, establishing strong equities against the appellants and making any intervention an action in aid of injustice. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can refuse to exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction in aid of injustice?
  • Does a subsequent purchaser of a double allotment have a protected right as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice?
  • Whether the power of review was available for setting aside land allotments after Act XIII of 1964?
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• Gul Muhammad And Others vs Muhammad Ramzan1985 SCMR 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-27
  pre-emptionwaiver of rightmisreading of evidencepetition for leave to appealvendor and purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a vendees' petition arising from a pre-emption matter concerning the sale of land by one Allah Ditta to the petitioners. The respondent, who is the vendor's son, filed a suit for pre-emption, which was initially dismissed by the trial Court on the ground of waiver. However, the Additional District Judge accepted the pre-emptor's appeal and decreed the suit, and the High Court upheld this decision in revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower appellate court had misread the evidence regarding the respondent's knowledge and waiver of his right of pre-emption, and whether the High Court failed to examine the record. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions, holding that it was a fit case for leave as the High Court failed to examine the record in the face of allegations of misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the son of a vendor can be presumed to have knowledge of a proposed sale by his father for the purpose of establishing waiver of the right of pre-emption?
  • Does a failure by the High Court to call for and examine the record in revision when misreading of evidence is alleged warrant the grant of leave by the Supreme Court?
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• Gul Mehar Khan vs Syed Akram Ali1985 SCMR 1584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-26
  rent evictionlandlord and tenantbona fide requirementdefault in rentleave to appealfindings of factrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Sind High Court, which affirmed an eviction order issued by the Rent Controller against the petitioner. The Rent Controller had ordered the petitioner's eviction on the grounds of default in rent payment and the respondent-landlord's bona fide personal requirement of the premises for his family of fifteen members. The petitioner contested the eviction by denying the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, asserting instead that he held title to the property, and argued that the matter should have been adjudicated by a civil court. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the High Court, which had conducted a re-appraisal of the evidence and concluded that the landlord-tenant relationship was established and the requirement for the premises was bona fide. The Supreme Court held that since the findings of fact were firmly rooted in the evidence presented, there was no legal basis for interference by the appellate court. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact regarding the landlord-tenant relationship if they are based on evidence?
  • Is a dispute regarding the title of a property sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of a Rent Controller when the landlord-tenant relationship is established?
  • Does a landlord's bona fide requirement for premises constitute a valid ground for eviction under rent laws?
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• Government of the Punjab vs Ghulam Rasool Zahid1985 SCMR 1614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-28
  ad hoc appointmentleave vacancyservice tribunaltermination of serviceprobation periodautomatic confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Punjab Service Tribunal order that reinstated a government employee whose services were terminated. The respondent, initially appointed on an ad hoc basis to the Punjab Local Council Service, had his services terminated after the government clarified his position was against a leave vacancy. The Service Tribunal had ruled in favor of the respondent, finding he was entitled to confirmation after a probation period and that his terms of service could not be unilaterally varied. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the record, held that the initial appointment letter explicitly stated the employment was on an ad hoc basis, and the subsequent clarification regarding the leave vacancy was binding. The Court found that the Tribunal erred in concluding the respondent was regularly appointed and entitled to automatic confirmation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's order, affirming that an ad hoc appointment against a leave vacancy does not confer a right to permanent status or automatic confirmation, and the terms of the initial appointment letter govern the nature of the employment.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ad hoc appointment against a leave vacancy confer a right to automatic confirmation after a probation period?
  • Can the terms of an ad hoc appointment be clarified by a subsequent order regarding the nature of the vacancy?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the authority to deem an ad hoc employee as regularly appointed contrary to the terms of the appointment letter?
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• Government of the Punjab vs DR. Ijaz Hasan Qureshi1985 PLD Supreme Court 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-19
  newspaper declarationautomatic annulmentpreventive detentionstatutory obligationimpossibility of performanceprison rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a consolidated judgment of the Letters Patent Bench of the Lahore High Court, which had held that the declarations of certain periodicals did not automatically lapse during the period their printers and publishers were detained. The core legal question was whether the automatic annulment of a newspaper's declaration under Section 9(3) of the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance is suspended during the printer's or publisher's detention, and whether Section 9(5) requires personal appearance to satisfy the District Magistrate regarding reasons beyond their control. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory consequence of non-publication is mandatory and automatic unless the exception in Section 9(5) is invoked within the prescribed period. The Court ruled that 'showing' satisfaction to the District Magistrate does not require personal appearance and can be done in writing, which was entirely possible under prison rules. Consequently, the failure to notify the District Magistrate resulted in the automatic annulment of the declarations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the automatic annulment of a newspaper's declaration under Section 9(3) of the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance get suspended during the publisher's detention?
  • Does the expression 'shows to the satisfaction of the District Magistrate' in Section 9(5) of the Ordinance restrict the mode of representation to personal appearance only?
  • Can a detained person claim the benefit of the legal maxims 'lex non cogit ad impossibilia' and 'impotentia excusat legem' if they made no attempt to communicate with the authorities despite prison rules permitting it?
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• Government of the Punjab Government of the Punjab vs Muhammad1985 SCMR 1245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-22
  Service TribunalPay Revision RulesNational Pay ScaleCivil JudgesDistrict and Sessions JudgesLeave to appealPromotion quota
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from petitions filed by the Government of the Punjab against the decision of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding the method of granting higher national pay scales to Civil Judges and District and Sessions Judges under the Pay Revision Rules, 1973. The core legal question is whether the entry of 15 percent of Civil Judges into N.P.S.-18 and District and Sessions Judges into N.P.S.-20 is automatic based purely on seniority or requires due consideration of fitness and suitability of the incumbents. The Supreme Court held that the case involves a substantial question of law of public importance as entry into higher pay scales opens up further chances of promotion and requires consideration of suitability, suspending the Tribunal's judgment and granting leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that movement into a higher pay scale quota which affects promotional pathways cannot be treated as entirely automatic without considering the incumbent's record and suitability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the entry of Civil Judges and District and Sessions Judges into higher national pay scales based on a 15 percent quota is automatic on the basis of seniority?
  • Does the grant of a higher national pay scale that opens up further chances of promotion require consideration of the fitness and suitability of the incumbents?
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• Government of Punjab vs Munawar Sultana And Other1985 SCMR 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-10
  land acquisitioncompensation determinationcompulsory acquisitionvaluation of landreference to courtleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a land acquisition dispute involving the Government of Punjab and private landowners. The Government acquired 17 acres of land in Rawalpindi in 1961, with the Land Acquisition Collector determining compensation rates. Dissatisfied with the initial award, the landowners sought a reference under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, leading the Additional District Judge to enhance the compensation rates in 1965. The Government’s subsequent Regular First Appeal was dismissed by the High Court in 1977. Seventeen years after the initial acquisition, the Government petitioned the Supreme Court seeking a reduction in the compensation amount. The Supreme Court examined the petition and found that the petitioner’s counsel could not identify any legal flaw or error in the High Court’s judgment. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, observing that the Government should have exercised greater consideration for citizens whose land was compulsorily acquired, noting that the property value had appreciated significantly since the acquisition. The decision affirms the finality of the compensation determination made by the lower courts in the absence of legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Government seek a reduction in compensation for compulsorily acquired land after the High Court has dismissed its appeal against the enhancement of such compensation?
  • Does the failure to identify a legal flaw in the impugned judgment justify the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Government of Punjab And Others vs Saleem Hussain Gardezi1985 SCMR 443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-23
  service tribunal jurisdictionmartial law instructionprovisional constitution orderad hoc appointmentjudicial reviewdepartmental authorityreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had set aside a decision by the Martial Law Administrator regarding the reinstatement of a police officer. The core legal questions were whether the Service Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to hear an appeal against an order passed by a Martial Law authority, and whether such orders were immune from judicial challenge under the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal lacked the competence to adjudicate the matter. The Court ruled that an order passed by a Martial Law Administrator does not qualify as an order of a departmental authority under Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Article 15 of the Provisional Constitution Order 1981 provides a blanket immunity, barring any court or tribunal from questioning the validity of acts or orders executed under Martial Law authority. Consequently, the Tribunal’s decision to interfere with the Martial Law Administrator's order was set aside as legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against an order passed by a Martial Law Administrator?
  • Is an order passed by a Martial Law Administrator considered an order of a departmental authority under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974?
  • Does Article 15 of the Provisional Constitution Order 1981 bar courts and tribunals from questioning orders passed by Martial Law authorities?
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• Government of Pakistan vs Muhammad Sadiq1985 SCMR 699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-20
  service tribunal jurisdictionpromotion eligibilityseniority disputecivil servantsupgraded postsretrospective confirmationfitness and suitability
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Government of Pakistan and another challenges an order of the Service Tribunal which determined and declared respondent No.1 to be senior to the appellants in the Military Lands and Cantonments Department. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction under proviso (b) to subsection (1) of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 by interfering with the fitness and suitability of civil servants for promotion, and whether the appellants were legally eligible for promotion at the relevant time. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction because the question of eligibility involves a matter of law rather than fitness or suitability, and the appellants were fundamentally ineligible for promotion at the time their appointments were made prior to the framing of applicable rules in 1974. The key legal principle laid down is that the statutory bar regarding fitness and suitability under the Service Tribunals Act applies strictly among eligible candidates and does not extend to cases involving the initial legal ineligibility of candidates for promotion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar contained in proviso (b) to subsection (1) of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 prevent the Service Tribunal from examining the initial legal eligibility of a civil servant for promotion?
  • Can a promotion or appointment made in violation of existing recruitment rules be regularized retrospectively without explicit statutory backing?
  • Does the principle of constructive res judicata apply when a civil servant seeks limited relief in an earlier service appeal regarding a Departmental Promotion Committee meeting?
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• Government of Pakistan through Secretary vs Bashir Ahmad Khan1985 PLD Supreme Court 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-27
  service appeallimitationrepeated representationscompulsory retirementsenioritycondonation of delayService Tribunals Act 1973Civil Servants Act 1973
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal was filed by the Government of Pakistan against the judgment of the Central Service Tribunal, which had allowed an appeal filed by Bashir Ahmad Khan regarding his promotion and seniority in Grade-20 with effect from 1974. The primary issue before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the respondent's appeal before the Service Tribunal was barred by limitation due to his repeated departmental representations following the rejection of his initial review applications. The Supreme Court held that the relevant civil service framework allows only one statutory representation or review against an adverse departmental order. Subsequent or repeated representations do not extend the period of limitation for appealing to the Service Tribunal as a matter of right. Calculating limitation from the rejection of his original review and raising a presumption of knowledge regarding the decision sent to his department, the Court held that the appeal before the Service Tribunal was time-barred. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment on the ground of limitation alone.

  Questions settled

  • Does filing repeated departmental representations extend the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Can a civil servant make a second representation under Section 22(2) of the Civil Servants Act 1973 where a remedy of review already exists under the relevant rules?
  • Does sending reminders to departmental authorities exclude time as of right when calculating limitation under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
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• Government of Pakistan And Others vs Kh. Imtiaz Muhammad1985 SCMR 875 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-08
  compulsory retirementsuspension from serviceleave to appealservice tribunalpay and allowancesauthorised officer
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which, while upholding the compulsory retirement of the respondent, ordered the payment of full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. The Tribunal had reasoned that the initial suspension order issued by the Auditor-General was without lawful authority. The petitioner, the Government of Pakistan, contends that the Federal Service Tribunal erred in its factual assessment, asserting that the suspension order was issued by the Auditor-General acting as the 'Authorised Officer' with the express approval of the 'Authority,' identified as the President of Pakistan. The Supreme Court found that this submission raised a substantial question of law requiring further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine the validity of the Tribunal's finding regarding the suspension order's legality. Pending the final hearing of the appeal, the Court suspended the operation of the impugned portion of the Tribunal's order, subject to the condition that the respondent be paid one-half of the salary due to him during the interim period.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal order payment of full salary for a suspension period if the suspension order was allegedly approved by the competent authority?
  • Does an order of suspension issued by the Auditor-General with the approval of the President of Pakistan constitute a lawful exercise of authority?
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• Government of N. W.F.P. And Others vs Buner Khan And Other1985 SCMR 1158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-10
  service tribunalpromotion quotaseniority listdirect recruitspromoteesjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions directed against an order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal regarding the promotion and seniority of Grade-18 officers in the Provincial Education Department, where posts were allocated 75% by promotion and 25% by direct recruitment without proper rotation of vacancies. The core legal question concerned the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal to direct the Government to promote specific employees, given the bar under proviso (b)(i) to section 4 of the North-West Frontier Province Service Tribunals Act, 1974 regarding fitness for promotion, and the legality of maintaining separate seniority lists. The Supreme Court held that while the promotees had a legitimate grievance regarding the failure to fill vacancies according to the quota and rotation rules, the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to directly order the promotion of the respondents from a specific date. The Court laid down the principle that a service tribunal cannot substitute its own decision to promote an individual, but may direct the competent authority to properly consider candidates for promotion from the dates vacancies in their respective quota became available, followed by the issuance of a joint seniority list.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal has the jurisdiction to direct the Government to promote a particular person to a higher post or grade?
  • Are promotees entitled to be considered against vacancies occurring in their quota when proper rotation of vacancies is not maintained?
  • Whether separate seniority lists for directly recruited officers and promoted officers are proper under the service rules?
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• Government of Baluchistan Through Secretary Local Government And Rural Development Department vs Muhammad Nawaz Pashtun1985 SCMR 2089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-08
  civil servicedisciplinary proceedingssummary dismissalstatutory interpretationservice tribunalwillful absenceshow-cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Government of Baluchistan challenged a Service Tribunal order that set aside the dismissal of a civil servant. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of Rule 5(3)(c) of the Baluchistan Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1981, specifically whether it provided an independent ground for summary dismissal or required compliance with the preceding clauses (a) and (b). The Supreme Court held that clause (c) is not an independent provision but a "follow-up" mechanism that must be read in conjunction with clauses (a) and (b). Consequently, summary dismissal under clause (c) is only permissible after efforts to comply with the notice requirements of clauses (a) and (b) have been exhausted or frustrated by the accused's conduct. In the instant case, because the respondent’s unavailability at his last known address frustrated the initial procedural attempts, the resort to summary dismissal was upheld. The Court ultimately allowed the appeal but suggested the government consider accepting the respondent's resignation upon repayment of training expenses.

  Questions settled

  • Is Rule 5(3)(c) of the Baluchistan Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1981, an independent provision authorizing summary dismissal without following clauses (a) and (b)?
  • Must disciplinary rules be read as a cohesive whole rather than as isolated provisions?
  • Can a government department resort to summary dismissal under Rule 5(3)(c) when the civil servant's conduct has frustrated prior attempts at procedural compliance?
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• Gohar Rehman vs Thestate1985 SCMR 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-06
  murderacquittal set asideocular testimonydying declarationcriminal appealidentification of accusedimprovements in evidenceF.I.R. omissions
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a Peshawar High Court judgment that set aside the trial court's acquittal of the appellant in a murder case, convicting him under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned whether the conviction was sustainable despite alleged improvements in ocular testimony regarding the distribution of weapons, potential identification difficulties due to lighting conditions, and omissions in the First Information Report. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court reasoned that the dying declaration, corroborated by medical evidence and the presence of injuries on both sides, established the occurrence and the appellant's involvement. It held that minor improvements in testimony or omissions in the First Information Report do not automatically invalidate the prosecution's case when the foundational evidence remains consistent and credible. The Court affirmed that the timing and location of the incident precluded claims of identification failure, thereby upholding the High Court’s decision to convict based on individual acts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of specific details in the First Information Report necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are minor improvements in the ocular testimony regarding the sequence of events?
  • Is the presence of injuries on both the complainant and the accused sufficient to establish a sudden fight?
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• Ghuncha Gul And Another vs Nadir Khan And Another1985 SCMR 436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-27
  pre-emption suitdeficient court-feerejection of plaintlimitation periodreturn of plaintmandatory time grantinstitution of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a pre-emption suit instituted in February 1976 in the Malakand District, where the trial court had returned the insufficiently stamped plaint for correction without specifying a time limit, leading the plaintiffs to file a fresh properly stamped plaint on 1-10-1976. The core legal question was whether the second plaint constituted a fresh, time-barred suit or a continuation of the original suit filed within limitation, given the absence of a time-bound order under Order VII, Rule 11(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court, that a plaint cannot be lawfully rejected under Order VII, Rule 11(c) without first granting time to supply the deficient court-fee. The Court laid down that Order VII, Rule 11 is penal in nature and must be construed strictly, making it mandatory for the court to grant time to make up the deficiency, and where no such time-specified order of rejection is passed, the suit is deemed to have been instituted on the date the original plaint was lodged.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be lawfully rejected for insufficient court-fee without first granting time to the plaintiff to supply the deficiency?
  • Whether the return of a plaint without specifying a time for correction operates as a rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a subsequent filing of a properly stamped plaint relate back to the original date of institution when no proper order under Order VII Rule 11(c) was initially passed?
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• Ghulam Yasin vs Government of Pakistan And 2 Other1985 SCMR 549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-01
  suit for possessiondeclaration of titleauction purchaseburden of proofpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiff against the concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court dismissing his suit for possession. The petitioner had purchased a 3/5 share of land in an auction for Rs.900 against a reserved price of Rs.12,300, but discrepancies arose regarding the exact area auctioned and recorded in the mutation. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for possession simpliciter was maintainable without seeking a declaration of title, and whether the petitioner had discharged the burden of proof regarding the area actually auctioned. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that the respondents' denial of the petitioner's right operated as a clog on his title, rendering a suit for possession simpliciter not maintainable, and that the petitioner failed to prove the extent of the area auctioned in his favour. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a plaintiff must properly establish title and seek appropriate declaratory relief when title is disputed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for possession simpliciter maintainable when the defendant denies the plaintiff's title?
  • Does a discrepancy between the bid-sheet and the mutation regarding the auctioned area require a suit for declaration of title?
  • Who bears the burden of proof to establish the exact area purchased in a public auction?
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• Ghulam Yasin And Others vs Arshad A1.1 Shah And Another1985 SCMR 1904 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-28
  pre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plaintextension of timecivil procedurepetitions for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a pre-emption suit instituted by the respondents in April 1974, where the trial court directed them to make up a deficiency in the court-fee. The respondents repeatedly sought extensions of time to obtain the necessary statements from the revenue officials, but the trial court failed to pass orders on these applications for years, ultimately dismissing the application and rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The first appellate court reversed this order and remanded the case, finding no negligence or contumacious conduct by the respondents, which decision was affirmed in limine by the High Court. The core legal question concerned the propriety of rejecting a plaint for failure to supply court-fee deficiency where the delay was not attributable to the plaintiff's negligence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the High Court's view was in accordance with the established rule laid down in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaint can be rejected for non-payment of court-fee deficiency when the delay is caused by pending applications for extension and lack of official records without plaintiff's negligence?
  • Does the failure of a trial court to pass orders on an application for extension of time to make up court-fee prejudice the plaintiff's right to rectify the deficiency?
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• Ghulam Sikan Dar and Anotherc vs Mamaraz Khan and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-08
  appeal against acquittaldouble murderenhancement of sentencecorroborationinterested witnessinimical witnesspremeditationfalsus in uno falsus in omnibuscompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment in a double murder case, where two accused were acquitted and one, Mamaraz Khan, was convicted for offences under Sections 302 and 326, Pakistan Penal Code, with a lesser sentence. The core legal questions revolved around the principles for interfering with an acquittal, the necessity of strong corroboration for the testimony of an interested and inimical eyewitness, and the enhancement of sentence in cases found to be without premeditation. The Court upheld the acquittal of Khan Beg and Maqbool Elahi, finding no strong and independent corroboration against them, especially given the tainted nature of the sole eyewitness's testimony. It affirmed Mamaraz Khan's conviction but refused to enhance his sentence to death, concurring with the lower courts' finding of no premeditation. However, the Court significantly enhanced the fine awarded to Mamaraz Khan for compensation to the heirs of the deceased and the injured witness.

  Questions settled

  • What principles guide the Supreme Court when considering an appeal against acquittal?
  • When is strong and independent corroboration required for the testimony of an interested and inimical eyewitness?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal merely because a different conclusion is possible on re-appraisal of evidence?
  • Does the principle of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' apply in Pakistan's criminal justice system?
  • Under what circumstances can a sentence be enhanced in an appeal against acquittal, particularly regarding the finding of premeditation?
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• Ghulam Shah vs Noor Shah And Other1985 SCMR 935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-06
  concurrent findingsacquittalappreciation of evidenceeye-witness testimonycriminal appealmurderre-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, which acquitted the respondents of charges under Section 449/302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding the murder of Wazir Shah. The core legal question was whether the concurrent acquittal by the lower courts was based on a misappreciation of evidence or perverse reasoning. The Supreme Court held that the trial court and the High Court correctly evaluated the evidence, noting significant discrepancies in the prosecution's case, including the unreliability of eye-witness testimony, the lack of motive, and the physical impossibility of the witnesses observing the event as described. The Court affirmed that it would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless they were shown to be perverse, arbitrary, or conjectural. As the petitioner failed to demonstrate any such error in the lower courts' assessment of the evidence, the petition was dismissed, upholding the acquittal of the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a criminal acquittal?
  • Does the existence of blood-stained recoveries and eye-witnesses automatically necessitate a conviction if the testimony is found unreliable?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be sustained if the petitioner fails to demonstrate that the lower courts' findings were perverse or arbitrary?
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• Ghulam Rasul And Others vs The State And Other1985 SCMR 1450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-21
  murdercommon intentioncompromiseenhancement of sentencecriminal appealbenefit of section 382-B
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of multiple connected criminal appeals arising from a murder trial where four accused persons were convicted for murder and causing injuries under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerned the merits of the convictions and the potential enhancement or mitigation of sentences, particularly in light of a compromise reached between the parties and a request for the statutory benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court dismissed the complainant's appeal for enhancement as not pressed due to the compromise, and dismissed the convicts' appeals on merits while granting them the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The key principle laid down is that while convictions on merits may be upheld, appellate courts may extend the statutory benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the period spent in detention during trial under appropriate circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be granted to convicts whose appeals on merits are dismissed?
  • What is the effect of a compromise between parties on a criminal appeal filed for the enhancement of sentences?
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• Ghulam Rasul And Others vs Muhammad Khan And Other1985 SCMR 1329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-29
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionequal statuscivil petition for leave to appealsubsequent purchase
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves four civil petitions for special leave to appeal directed against a consolidated judgment of the High Court arising out of pre-emption suits. The petitioners had purchased four pieces of land from a vendor via a registered deed and three oral sales, prompting the respondents to file four separate pre-emption suits. The core legal question was whether a vendee, by acquiring multiple parcels of land, attains an equal status to a pre-emptor across all suits so long as any of the subsequent sales subsist when the initial suit is decreed. The Supreme Court held that since all four pre-emption suits had ultimately been decreed by the time the appeals were heard by the District Judge and the High Court, the petitioners' status as equal owners ceased to subsist, rendering any remand futile. The petitions were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a vendee who purchases multiple pieces of land acquire an equal status against pre-emption suits if all such purchases are ultimately successfully pre-empted?
  • Whether an appellate court should interfere with a pre-emption decree when subsequent sales relied upon for equal status have already been set aside by decrees in other suits?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs The State1985 SCMR 1990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-13
  criminal appealsentence mitigationbenefit of section 382-Brigorous imprisonmentSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through an appeal by leave of the Court against a criminal conviction and sentence. The core legal question revolves around the appellant's entitlement to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court held that given the stance taken by the appellant's counsel that the major part of the sentence of rigorous imprisonment had already expired and the appeal was not being pressed save for the aforementioned benefit, it was a fit case to extend the same. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeal as not being pressed while granting the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the appellant, establishing the principle that such sentence reduction relief can be granted when appropriately prayed for and conceded in the circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be granted when an appeal is not pressed otherwise?
  • Can a criminal appeal be dismissed as not being pressed while still granting relief regarding the computation of the sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool And 5 Others vs Allah Bachaya And 17 Other1985 SCMR 416 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-04
  inheritancecustomary lawmutationsecond appeallimitationabatementpre-deceased son's widow
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the inheritance of land left by Khuda Bakhsh, who died in 1922. A mutation of inheritance was attested in 1922, dividing the property equally between his son, Jin Wadda, and Mst. Talehan, the widow of his pre-deceased son. In 1961, Jin Wadda filed a suit for declaration claiming sole ownership, asserting that the parties were governed by Shariat and that Mst. Talehan was excluded. The trial court and the first appellate court (on remand) decreed the suit in the plaintiff's favor, finding no proof of a custom allowing a pre-deceased son's widow to inherit. However, the High Court reversed these findings in second appeal, holding that the 1922 mutation conformed to custom, as evidenced by the plaintiff's 38-year acquiescence and joint dealings. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that while the burden of proving a special custom lies on the party asserting it, long-term submission, joint property dealings, and contemporaneous revenue inquiries sufficiently establish the custom, justifying the High Court's interference in second appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party's continuous submission to a mutation of inheritance for nearly forty years and joint dealings with the property can establish the existence of a custom?
  • Can a second appeal be received under Section 4 of the Court Fees Act 1870 if the proper court-fee stamp was unavailable on the last day of limitation due to the absence of the stamp vendor?
  • Is the High Court justified in reversing concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal if the lower courts failed to raise necessary presumptions from revenue records and the prolonged conduct of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool And 2 Others vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, Central Settlement Cell And Other1985 SCMR 1832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-21
  impleadment of partiesnecessary partyproper partyconstitutional petitionsitting cultivatorsright of purchasecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of the High Court of Sind, which allowed an application under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, to implead respondents as parties in a pending Constitutional Petition. The petitioners, who purchased land from a transferee whose transfer was subsequently cancelled, sought to challenge that cancellation. The respondents, sitting cultivators of the land, sought to be impleaded, asserting a right of purchase under the relevant scheme framed under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975. The core legal question was whether these cultivators were necessary or proper parties to the Constitutional Petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court correctly impleaded the respondents. The Court reasoned that if the original transfer to the petitioners' predecessor was found invalid, the respondents would have a statutory right to purchase the land under the 1975 Act. Consequently, they were proper parties who must be heard before the matter is decided, ensuring their interests are protected in the adjudication of the land's title.

  Questions settled

  • Are sitting cultivators claiming a right of purchase under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975 necessary or proper parties in a constitutional petition challenging the cancellation of land transfer?
  • Can a party be impleaded in a constitutional petition if they have a potential statutory interest in the subject matter of the dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi vs Sardar Nazir Ahmad1985 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-12
  pre-emptionamendment of plaintpartial pre-emptionclerical errormisdescription of propertycode of civil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by right arises from a judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court, which allowed the respondent's regular first appeal and decreed his suit for possession through pre-emption after permitting an amendment of the plaint. The core legal question involved whether the High Court was justified in allowing the amendment of the plaint to correct misdescriptions and omissions of certain Khasra numbers at a late stage of the trial, and whether the suit was bad for partial pre-emption. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the errors in the description of the property were accidental or clerical and that the power to amend pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17 and Section 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be exercised at any stage, including at the appellate stage, to determine the real question in controversy. The key principle laid down is that accidental clerical errors or omissions in describing property in a pre-emption suit do not warrant dismissal for partial pre-emption when the intent was to pre-empt the entire sale and no prejudice or limitation bar arises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff can be allowed to amend the plaint to correct clerical errors and omissions in the description of property in a pre-emption suit?
  • Can the power to amend pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be exercised at the appellate stage?
  • Does an accidental omission of a Khasra number in a pre-emption plaint render the suit bad for partial pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi And 3 Others vs Settlement Commissioner And Another1985 SCMR 551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-14
  evacuee propertyallotmentsettlement schemenullityfinality of transferagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of evacuee property measuring 5 Kanals 5 Marlas in Mianwali Town. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, who obtained an allotment of the unconstructed portion of the property as agricultural land in 1971, held a valid title against the respondent, who had converted the entire property into a hospital and subsequently secured a transfer of the whole property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII in 1974. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal of the petitioners' writ petition. The Court held that the disputed area was neither agricultural land nor available for allotment in 1971, and that the petitioners' allotment was a nullity as it was made without notice to the respondent and lacked delivery of possession. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the respondent's 1974 transfer had acquired finality as it remained unchallenged by the petitioners. The key principle established is that an allotment made without notice to an existing occupant and without delivery of possession is a nullity, and a subsequent, unchallenged transfer of property acquires finality.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allotment of evacuee property be considered complete without delivery of possession?
  • Is an allotment of property made without notice to the existing occupant considered a nullity?
  • Does a transfer of property that remains unchallenged by the opposing party acquire finality?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad And Others vs The Punjab Road Transport Board1985 SCMR 1779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-29
  evacuee propertycompensation poolcentral government sanctiontransfer of propertylocus standiregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's suit for a declaration of ownership regarding certain evacuee land. The core legal question was whether the evacuee land, for which sanction for sale had been accorded by the Central Government to the Punjab Road Transport Board under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, formed part of the compensation pool and could be validly transferred to subsequent claimants. The Supreme Court held that the property did not form part of the compensation pool by virtue of a notification issued under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and therefore the subsequent allotment and transfers to the petitioner conveyed no valid title, rendering the petitioner without locus standi. The key principle laid down is that evacuee property exempted from the compensation pool through central sanction and notification is excluded from settlement operations, and subsequent purported transfers of such property are void ab initio.

  Questions settled

  • Does evacuee land sanctioned for sale by the Central Government form part of the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Whether a subsequent allottee acquires a valid title to evacuee property that was previously exempted from the compensation pool by central sanction?
  • Does a person claiming through a void subsequent transfer possess the locus standi to challenge a prior valid administrative sanction for the sale of evacuee property?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs Mst. Bakhan1985 SCMR 1917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-25
  guardianshipcustody of minorwelfare of minorcivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  Ghulam Hussain sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld the dismissal of his application for the custody of his minor daughter under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The petitioner had alleged that his divorced wife, Mst. Bakhan, was of bad character and suffered from Tuberculosis, but failed to produce any medical evidence to substantiate the illness claim. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the welfare of the minor did not lie with her mother. Furthermore, the petitioner had remarried whereas the respondent mother had not, which further favored the respondent. Holding that the welfare of the minor was paramount and best served with the mother, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the custody of a minor child of tender years should remain with the mother when the welfare of the minor is best served thereby?
  • Does the remarriage of the father weighed against his claim for custody compared to an unmarried mother?
  • Is an allegation of illness without medical evidence sufficient to displace the mother's right to custody?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs Akbar Ali1985 SCMR 1108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-22
  leave to appealpre-emptioncustom of pre-emptionold city of Multancivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a civil revision filed by the petitioner-vendee-defendant upholding a pre-emption decree in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned whether the custom of pre-emption could be presumed to prevail across the entirety of the old city of Multan upon proof of its existence in one Mohallah, given the conflicting judicial precedents and authorities cited by the parties. Upon hearing the counsel, the Supreme Court observed a clear conflict in the decided cases regarding the controversy and held that the issue required authoritative resolution. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further, while ordering security and directing the prior stay order to remain in force.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the custom of pre-emption presumed to prevail in one Mohallah of an old city applies to other parts thereof unless proved otherwise?
  • Does a conflict in decided cases regarding the custom of pre-emption warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain And Another vs Malik Shahbaz Khan And Another1985 SCMR 1925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-22
  writ jurisdictioncivil revisioncourt-fee deficiencyalternative remedypre-emption suitrejection of plaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil pre-emption suit where the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to rectify a deficiency in court-fee. The defendants successfully challenged this order in a civil revision before an Additional District Judge, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiffs' subsequent constitutional writ petition by the Lahore High Court. The High Court declined to interfere, noting that the revisional order did not result in the rejection of the plaint, thereby leaving the plaintiffs with an adequate alternative remedy of appeal should the plaint eventually be rejected. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to exercise its writ jurisdiction in light of the availability of an alternative remedy. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's refusal to interfere was justified. The Court affirmed that a revisional order regarding court-fee deficiency does not preclude the plaintiffs from challenging the matter through a regular appeal if the suit is ultimately dismissed or the plaint rejected, thus establishing that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked when other adequate legal remedies remain available.

  Questions settled

  • Does a revisional order regarding court-fee deficiency operate as a bar to raising the same issue in a regular appeal against the rejection of a plaint?
  • Is a constitutional writ petition maintainable against an order in a civil revision when an alternative remedy of appeal is available?
  • Does the High Court have justification to decline interference in a civil matter where the petitioner has not exhausted regular appellate remedies?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain And Another vs Ghulam Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 1906 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-24
  leave to appealcivil revisionfraudulent sale-deedconcurrent findings of factsuit for possession
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing their civil revision arising from a suit for possession of a house based on a sale-deed dated 5-8-1947. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in deciding issue No. 5 regarding whether the sale-deed was fictitious, fraudulent, and forged. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by all three courts below were based on a careful consideration of the evidence and did not warrant interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed as having no merit, affirming that concurrent findings of fact on questions of fraud and forgery do not justify interference under leave to appeal jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by three courts below regarding the validity of a sale-deed?
  • Does a petition for leave to appeal lie against a High Court judgment dismissing a civil revision on a question of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider vs The State1985 SCMR 884 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-27
  criminal appealsentence reductioncompensation to victimquantum of fineattempt to murder
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had reduced his sentence for a conviction under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner had been originally sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 for causing serious head injuries to the complainant. On appeal, the High Court reduced the imprisonment to the period already served, citing a compromise between the parties, but maintained the full fine of Rs. 10,000. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the sentence of fine imposed was excessive given the circumstances of the case. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the fine of Rs. 10,000 was indeed too severe. Consequently, the Court reduced the fine to Rs. 5,000, ordering that the entire amount be paid to the victim as compensation, while maintaining the default sentence of imprisonment in case of non-payment.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court reduce a sentence of fine imposed by the High Court if it is found to be excessive?
  • Is a sentence of fine subject to reduction upon appeal even if the term of imprisonment has already been served?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider vs Hafiz Allah Bakhsh1985 SCMR 1218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-17
  limitationinheritance mutationpredecessor-in-interestdeclaratory suitattestation of mutationknowledge of transfersecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal (R.S.A.). The petitioners had filed a declaratory suit in 1975 challenging a mutation of inheritance sanctioned in favour of their grandfather's widow in 1953, claiming entitlement to inherit a portion of the land. The core legal question was whether the suit was barred by limitation and from which date the period of limitation began to run against the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners' father and predecessor-in-interest was present during the attestation of the mutation in 1953 and had objected to it, he possessed immediate knowledge of the transaction. Consequently, time started running against the petitioners from the date of the mutation sanction on 10-01-1953. The court affirmed that the suit filed in 1975 was hopelessly time-barred and dismissed the petition, reiterating the principle that knowledge of a predecessor-in-interest regarding a property transfer binds the successor-in-interest for calculating the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Does the knowledge of a predecessor-in-interest regarding a mutation sanction cause time to start running for limitation against their heirs?
  • Whether a suit challenging a mutation of inheritance filed decades after its attestation is barred by limitation when the plaintiff's predecessor had knowledge of the transaction at the time of sanction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider And Others vs Abdul Karim And Other1985 SCMR 1468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-18
  pre-emptioncourt-feenet profitsvaluation of suitdismissal of plaintcontumacymala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a suit for possession through pre-emption filed by the respondents against the petitioners, who had purchased the disputed land. The trial court initially ordered the plaintiffs to deposit the Zare-panjum and make up the deficiency in court-fee based on net profits. Although the plaintiffs complied within the prescribed time, the trial court later dismissed the suit, finding it insufficiently stamped because the net profits statement submitted pertained to the wrong period. On appeal, the District Judge reversed this decision, finding that the plaintiffs had inadvertently used the wrong period but had, in fact, paid court-fee on a valuation higher than what was required for the correct period. The High Court dismissed the subsequent revision petition, relying on the precedent in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, refusing to reopen findings of fact regarding the quantum of net profits. The Court held that in the absence of evidence of mala fide or contumacy, a suit should not be dismissed for insufficient court-fee where the amount paid actually exceeds the required valuation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit be dismissed for insufficient court-fee if the amount paid actually exceeds the valuation required for the correct period?
  • Does the absence of mala fide or contumacy preclude the dismissal of a suit under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding the quantum of net profits open to challenge in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Asghar vs The State1985 SCMR 1946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-20
  bailmurder trialjudicial confessionself-defensemens reacriminal procedurepre-trial detention
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, facing trial for murder, sought bail after the High Court dismissed his application. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s judicial statement, which admitted to striking the deceased but claimed self-defense and a lack of intent to kill, constituted a confession sufficient to deny bail. The Supreme Court examined the statement and held that it did not amount to a confession. Relying on the principle established in Najib Raza Rehmani v. The State, the Court determined that because the petitioner expressly repudiated the intention to kill and pleaded the right of self-defense, the statement could not be treated as a confession. Furthermore, the recovery of the weapon used, a blood-stained lathi, was deemed to have little corroborative value regarding the critical issue of intent versus self-defense. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order, converted the petition into an appeal, and granted bail to the petitioner, finding that the circumstances did not warrant continued incarceration pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statement admitting to an act but claiming self-defense and denying intent constitute a judicial confession?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon sufficient to deny bail when the core issue is the intent of the accused?
  • Can a statement repudiating the intention to kill be treated as a confession for the purpose of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas And Another vs Faqir Hussain And Another1985 SCMR 1093 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-12
  urban rent controlsublettingdefault in payment of rentwrit jurisdictionexercise of discretionejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a writ petition arising from an urban rent control matter, setting aside the appellate court's order and restoring the Rent Controller's order directing the ejectment of the appellants on the grounds of default in rent payment and subletting. The core legal questions examined were whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the appellate court's exercise of discretion regarding default and subletting under writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court was not justified in interfering with the appellate court's exercise of discretion on the minor default in rent, the interference regarding subletting was fully justified as the lower appellate court had misread evidence and based its findings on non-consideration of vital material. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the ejectment order strictly on the ground of subletting. The key principle laid down is that a High Court may interfere in writ jurisdiction with a finding on subletting where the lower appellate court's exercise of discretion or evaluation of facts is vitiated by the omission of vital evidence and misreading of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the appellate court's exercise of discretion in rent matters under writ jurisdiction?
  • Does prolonged absence of a tenant and exclusive possession by another family member constitute subletting under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963?
  • Whether non-consideration of a vital piece of explanation by the appellate court justifies interference by the High Court in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghualm Muhammad vs The State1985 SCMR 1442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-17
  criminal appealpolice statementright of cross-examinationnon-supply of documentsremand of casefair trialprejudice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan wherein the appellant was convicted. During the proceedings, the Court discovered a police statement of the complainant recorded by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, Lahore, a copy of which had allegedly not been supplied to the appellant, and the trial court had mistakenly referenced it as the FIR during cross-examination. The core legal question concerns the effect of denying the accused access to a previous police statement of a witness for cross-examination. The Supreme Court held that the failure to supply the statement and denying the appellant the right to cross-examine the complainant with regard to his previous statement constitutes a gross violation of law, with prejudice necessarily presumed. The Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remanded the matter back for the appellant to be given an opportunity to cross-examine the complainant with respect to that statement, examine the DSP, record the accused statement, allow defense evidence, and decide the case afresh. The key principle laid down is that the denial of a previous police statement to an accused for cross-examination causes presumptive prejudice, necessitating a retrial or remand for proper procedural compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to supply a previous police statement of a witness to the accused constitute a violation of law?
  • Whether prejudice is presumed when an accused is denied the right to cross-examine a witness with regard to a previous statement?
  • What is the appropriate remedy when an appellate court finds that the accused was denied the right to cross-examine a witness based on a withheld police statement?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghiasuddin And Another vs Moinuddin1985 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-26
  civil suitinterlocutory ordertemporary injunctionreceiversale agreementleave to appealdeposit of consideration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court which dismissed the petitioners' High Court Appeal and upheld the trial court's order directing the petitioners to deposit a sum of money in court. The core legal question involves the propriety of an interlocutory order requiring a deposit to safeguard the plaintiff's interest in a suit for declaration, possession, partition, and permanent injunction where the execution of the sale agreement and the receipt of cash consideration were disputed. The Supreme Court held that the impugned orders passed by the lower courts were just and proper under the circumstances, as the execution of the agreement and payment receipt were contested and the petitioner's reply to the notice of demand was evasive. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, establishing that interlocutory conditions requiring the deposit of disputed sale consideration to protect a plaintiff's interest during pending proceedings are sustainable when receipt of payment is seriously contested.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with an interlocutory order requiring a party to deposit a disputed sum to safeguard the plaintiff's interest during the pendency of a civil suit?
  • Can a court direct the deposit of an alleged balance of sale consideration when the execution of the agreement and the cash payment are seriously disputed?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazi Khan vs The State1985 SCMR 1856 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-16
  leave to appealcapital punishmentocular evidencemedical evidencematerial contradictionsmotivecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts were sustainable in light of material discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the trial court and the High Court overlooked significant inconsistencies: the complainant's contradictory statements regarding the place of the petitioner's apprehension; the conflict between the eyewitnesses' testimony claiming a head injury and the medical evidence showing no such injury; and the ambiguity surrounding the alleged motive. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that these discrepancies and the uncertainty regarding the appropriate sentence required a deeper judicial review. The principle laid down is that where material contradictions exist between ocular testimony and medical evidence, and where the motive remains unproven or shrouded in mystery, a conviction and death sentence warrant further scrutiny by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between ocular testimony regarding a head injury and the medical report showing no such injury warrant a re-evaluation of the conviction?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution's evidence regarding the location of the accused's apprehension is inconsistent?
  • Is leave to appeal appropriate when the motive for the crime remains shrouded in mystery and the lower courts have overlooked material discrepancies?
  Read full judgment →
• Gharib Shah And Others vs Abdul Sattar1985 SCMR 2094 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-07
  revisional jurisdictioncriminal procedurereferencelaw reforms ordinancedispute concerning land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan which rejected a reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge for setting aside an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner and First Class Magistrate under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The core legal questions involved whether section 439-A of the Code applied to Pishin District and whether the Magistrate had violated earlier remand directions to record evidence. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure introduced via the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 were not extended to Pishin District and therefore the Additional Sessions Judge lacked revisional jurisdiction, but found on the merits that the Magistrate had complied with the remand directions by recording and cross-examining witnesses. The appeal was dismissed subject to the clarification on the geographical extent of section 439-A.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was applicable to Pishin District during the relevant period?
  • Was the Additional Sessions Judge competent to exercise revisional jurisdiction in respect of the Magistrate's order in Pishin District?
  • Did the First Class Magistrate pass the order in disregard of the High Court's earlier remand directions?
  Read full judgment →
• Gh1asuddin vs The State1985 SCMR 989 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-27
  special leave to appealinterlocutory orderrevision applicationproduction of documentsjoinder of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against an interlocutory order passed by a learned Single Judge on 15-2-1983, whereby the petitioner was directed to produce certain documents necessary for examining a plea raised in support of a revision application, and the complainant was ordered to be joined as a co-respondent. The core legal question concerns the propriety of interfering with an interlocutory order directing document production and joinder of parties in a revision proceeding. The Supreme Court held that since the High Court judge passed the order to satisfy himself regarding the petitioner's own plea, the petitioner could not validly challenge it, and further that interference by the Supreme Court was unwarranted given the interlocutory nature of the order. The petition was consequently dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an interlocutory order of the High Court directing the production of documents in a revision application?
  • Can a party challenge an interlocutory order passed by the High Court to examine a plea raised by that same party?
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• Ghulam Jafir And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 1938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-27
  mitigating circumstancecommutation of sentencecompromisefamily feuddeath sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three criminal petitions for special leave to appeal filed by various petitioners convicted of murder and related offences. The core legal question was whether a compromise between the parties, aimed at ending a long-standing family feud and fostering peace, constitutes a valid mitigating circumstance to justify the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the affidavits filed by the legal heirs of the deceased persons, accepted the compromise as a genuine effort to restore harmony. Consequently, the Court converted the petitions into appeals and held that the compromise serves as a significant mitigating factor. The Court reduced the death sentences of the appellants, Muhammad Akram and Muhammad Latif, to imprisonment for life under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while maintaining the fines imposed. The key principle laid down is that a compromise between the parties in a murder case, intended to resolve a family feud and promote future amity, may be considered a valid mitigating circumstance for the commutation of a death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise between the parties in a murder case be considered a mitigating circumstance for sentencing?
  • Does a compromise aimed at ending a family feud justify the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to sentences reduced due to a compromise?
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• General Manager, Peco Ltd. vs Shaukat Ali And Other1985 SCMR 2053 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-07-01
  industrial disputetermination of servicemala fideback benefitsindustrial relationsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the employer's Constitutional petition against the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision. The respondent workman, after recovering from a surgical operation and a recommended period of light duty, sought further accommodation and informed the employer of potential legal recourse. The employer promptly terminated the workman's services citing ill-health and lack of a light job. The Labour Court set aside the termination but denied back benefits, while the Labour Appellate Tribunal found the termination mala fide, granted back benefits, and dismissed the employer's appeal. The High Court dismissed the subsequent Constitutional petition in limine. The core legal question concerned the applicability of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the sustainability of concurrent factual findings regarding mala fides. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of mala fides were unexceptionable and that section 25-A was validly invoked against a mala fide termination. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance XXIII of 1969 are attracted when an employer's action is found to be mala fide?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding mala fides rendered by the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal?
  • Whether termination of a workman's service on the ground of ill-health is sustainable when the recommended period of light duty has already expired and no fresh medical examination has been conducted?
  Read full judgment →
• General Manager (Admn.) And Another vs Shafi Ahmad Khan1985 SCMR 1699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-22
  Service TribunalLeave to appealDepartmental punishmentBad faithCompulsory retirementJurisdiction of Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging a decision rendered by a Service Tribunal. The core legal questions concern the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction and the propriety of its findings. Specifically, the Court is tasked with determining whether the Service Tribunal acted within its legal authority when it made adverse observations regarding the conduct of a Deputy Director who was not a party to the proceedings and whose conduct was not under review. Furthermore, the Court must decide whether the Tribunal erred in concluding that a departmental punishment was imposed in bad faith, despite the absence of any allegations or proof of mala fides against the Enquiry Officer or the relevant departmental authorities. Finally, the Court will examine whether the proved charges against the respondent warranted the penalty of compulsory retirement. The judgment grants leave to appeal to address these significant questions of law, focusing on the limitations of the Tribunal's adjudicatory powers and the evidentiary requirements for establishing bad faith in departmental disciplinary proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal make adverse findings regarding the conduct of an individual who is not a party to the proceedings?
  • Is a finding of bad faith by a Service Tribunal sustainable when bad faith was neither alleged nor proved against the relevant authorities?
  • Does the proof of charges in a departmental inquiry justify the penalty of compulsory retirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Ganga R. Madhani vs Standard Bank Ltd. And Other1985 SCMR 1511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-19
  workman definitionindustrial relationsbank officermanagerial capacityStanding Orders Ordinancedismissal from servicepower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the employment status of a Grade-III Bank Officer dismissed for misconduct. The appellant sought relief under Martial Law Order No. 52, asserting he was a "workman" under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The core legal question was whether an employee holding a Power of Attorney and performing supervisory duties qualifies as a "workman" under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the appellant was not a "workman." The Court established that the definition of "workman" under the Ordinance is restricted to those performing manual or clerical work, excluding individuals in supervisory, administrative, or managerial capacities. The governing principle is that the status of an employee is determined by the nature of their primary and substantial duties rather than incidental tasks. Because the appellant’s Power of Attorney authorized him to exercise discretion, manage bank affairs, and make significant decisions, his role was managerial, thereby disqualifying him from the definition of a "workman."

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee holding a Power of Attorney to manage bank affairs qualify as a 'workman' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • What is the primary test for determining whether an employee is a 'workman' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Do incidental clerical duties performed by a managerial employee bring them within the definition of a 'workman' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  Read full judgment →
• Gajetan Pinto vs Dr. (Mrs.) Shirin1985 SCMR 1603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-21
  ejectment proceedingsimpleadmentlocus standitenantconcurrent findings of factlandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent against a third party, wherein the petitioner sought to be impleaded as a necessary party, claiming to be the actual tenant of the premises and asserting that he had been regularly paying rent to the respondent. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's application for impleadment, finding that he was not a tenant and lacked the necessary locus standi to participate in the proceedings. Subsequently, an ejectment order was passed against the original respondent. The petitioner challenged both the dismissal of his impleadment application and the ejectment order before the High Court, which dismissed his appeal due to a lack of cogent or satisfactory evidence establishing his tenancy. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the factual dispute over tenancy. The Court held that it would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact where no evidence supports the petitioner's claim, thereby upholding the dismissal of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a third party be impleaded in ejectment proceedings if they fail to provide satisfactory evidence of their tenancy?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts regarding tenancy status?
  Read full judgment →
• Fida Muhammad vs Pir Muhammad Khan (Deceased) through Legal Heirs and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-15
  Power of AttorneyLand AcquisitionFraudCollusionCourt FeeAgent's dutiesSale of propertyPrincipal-agent relationshipAppellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involved two appeals against a High Court judgment that dismissed the appellant's appeals concerning objections under the Land Acquisition Act. The core legal question was whether a power-of-attorney granted by Pir Muhammad Khan to Qalandar Khan authorized the sale of land, and whether the subsequent transaction between Qalandar Khan (as attorney) and his son Fida Muhammad (the appellant) was valid. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the power-of-attorney did not contain a clear authority to sell the land. The Court found the transactions between the father and son to be fraudulent and collusive, aimed at depriving the real owner of compensation. While addressing a court-fee deficiency, the appeals were ultimately dismissed on merits. The judgment emphasized that a general power-of-attorney does not inherently include the power to alienate property, requiring a clear, specific clause for such authority. It also highlighted an agent's duty to communicate with the principal in cases of doubt and to obtain informed consent when dealing with the principal's property for personal benefit.

  Questions settled

  • Does a 'general' Power-of-Attorney automatically include the power to alienate or dispose of the principal's property?
  • What are the essential obligations of an attorney when dealing with the principal's property, especially when the attorney deals on his own account?
  • Can a principal repudiate a transaction where an agent deals with the principal's property for his own benefit without full disclosure and consent?
  • Can an appellate court correct an error by the High Court regarding the application of Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, to appeals?
  • What standard of proof is required to establish an attorney's authority to sell land when the power-of-attorney is ambiguous?
  Read full judgment →
• Fida Hussain vs Messrs M.F.Elahi & Company Ltd.1985 SCMR 865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-01
  civil revisioninstitution of suitauthority of representativeboard resolutiondefault in renteviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The present petition arises out of a dispute concerning a commercial shop in Islamabad rented out by the respondent-company to the petitioner. The respondent-company instituted a suit for recovery of possession and arrears of rent through a representative. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, and the first appellate court partly modified the decree while upholding the eviction. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioner's civil revision in limine. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the suit was instituted without proper legal authority from the company, as the Board of Directors' resolution was not duly proved. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner cannot agitate the issue of the competency of the suit afresh since the relevant issue was not pressed before the trial court, and the resolution authorizing the representative to institute the suit was produced and accepted on record without objection. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings against the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party agitate the competency of a suit based on lack of authority when the corresponding issue was not pressed before the trial court?
  • Whether a resolution authorizing a representative to institute a suit on behalf of a company can be accepted on record if produced without objection during the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Feroze Din And Others vs Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-03
  temporary injunctionprima facie casepetition for leave to appealcivil revisioninterlocutory orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court dated 15-2-1977, which dismissed a revision petition challenging the District Judge's order dated 27-1-1977 refusing an interim injunction to the petitioners. The core legal question concerns whether the refusal of a temporary injunction by the lower courts, grounded on the failure to establish a prima facie case, warrants interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit as the petitioners failed to make out a prima facie case, and further noted that the underlying suit would likely have been decided by the passage of time, rendering the interim matter moot. Consequently, the court refused leave to appeal, affirming that appellate interference in interlocutory injunction matters is unwarranted where no prima facie case is established and the main proceedings have likely concluded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings refusing a temporary injunction where no prima facie case is established?
  • Does the likely conclusion of the main suit render a petition against an interlocutory injunction order unfit for interference?
  Read full judgment →
• Feroz vs Sher and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  co-sharerhissadari possessionjoint khatapartitionmutationsale of possessory rightstransfer by co-sharerdeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose out of a civil suit filed by a co-sharer challenging subsequent mutations of joint land by other co-sharers on the ground that the vendors had already exhausted their entitlement by selling their entire share in an earlier mutation. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the subsequent transfers were ineffective against his rights, or in the alternative, requested pre-emption. The trial court, first appellate court, and High Court all concurrently dismissed the suit, noting that the plaintiff failed to produce the record of the earlier mutation, making it unproven that the vendors had transferred proprietary rights rather than merely their possessory interest as co-sharers in exclusive hissadari possession. The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings, holding that a co-sharer in exclusive possession of joint property can lawfully transfer possessory rights or specific plots. The vendee steps into the shoes of the transferor and is entitled to retain possession until formal partition, subject to adjustment of shares upon partition.

  Questions settled

  • What rights are transferred to a vendee when a co-sharer in exclusive possession of joint land alienates that specific portion prior to partition?
  • Does the failure of a plaintiff to produce a crucial mutation record preclude a finding that co-sharers alienated proprietary rights in excess of their share?
  • Can a co-sharer lawfully transfer possessory rights in a joint holding subject to final adjustment at the time of partition?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan vs Muhammad Naqi Khan And Other1985 SCMR 2099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-07-01
  Service Tribunal jurisdictionsenioritycivil servantretrospective seniorityfitness for promotiondepartmental authorityService Tribunals Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a service matter appeal by the Federation of Pakistan against a Service Tribunal order granting seniority to a civil servant from an earlier date. The core legal questions were whether the Service Tribunal possessed jurisdiction to grant seniority for a period preceding July 1, 1969, and whether it could interfere with departmental decisions regarding fitness for promotion. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction. The Court determined that under the Service Tribunals Act, the Tribunal lacked authority to review departmental decisions made before July 1, 1969, or to adjudicate upon matters of fitness for promotion. Furthermore, the respondent had been considered and rejected for promotion, not inadvertently omitted, thus failing to qualify for retrospective seniority. The judgment affirms that Service Tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over departmental orders predating July 1, 1969, nor can they interfere with departmental determinations regarding a civil servant's fitness for promotion or appointment, as these matters fall outside their statutory mandate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon departmental orders or decisions made prior to July 1, 1969?
  • Can a Service Tribunal interfere with a departmental authority's decision regarding a civil servant's fitness for promotion or appointment?
  • Does a civil servant who was considered but rejected for promotion qualify for seniority from the date of the original batch under the General Principles of Seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan vs Azam Ali And Other1985 SCMR 386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-12
  service tribunalsenioritypromotees versus direct recruitspromotional quotaad hoc appointmentcivil servantdepartmental promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Federation of Pakistan and direct recruits challenged a decision of the Service Tribunal regarding the inter se seniority of departmental promotees versus direct recruits to the posts of Assistant Works Managers in the Pakistan Ordnance Factories. The core legal question concerned whether departmental promotees promoted in excess of their reserved quota can claim seniority from the actual date of their promotion or only from the date their promotion is adjusted against the promotion quota under the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Supreme Court held that departmental candidates are eligible for promotion only against the quota reserved under the rules, and promotions made in excess of that quota pending direct recruitment constitute ad hoc appointments. Consequently, such promotees cannot count their seniority from the date of actual promotion if it exceeds the prescribed quota. The Court laid down that the General Principles of Seniority circulated in 1970 are consistent with the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and continue to have statutory force under section 25(2) of the Act, governing the adjustment of seniority based on promotional quotas.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the interpretation put by the Service Tribunal on rule 7 of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 is correct?
  • Whether the definition of the word 'regular' in the General Principles of Seniority offends the provisions contained in subsection (2) of section 2 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Whether the principle regarding seniority contained in the General Principles of Seniority is repugnant to the provisions of section 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Whether the General Principles of Seniority are inconsistent with the provisions of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and cease to be applicable after its promulgation?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Establishment Division vs Muhammad Rafique1985 SCMR 1773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-10
  service mattermisconductreinstatementback benefitsleave to appealquestion of factService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federation of Pakistan sought leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the removal of the respondent, Muhammad Rafique, from his position as Secretary, Food Department, Government of Punjab. The respondent had been charged with misconduct regarding the illegal sanctioning of contracts and unauthorized expenditure, leading to his removal from service. Following a review petition rejection, he appealed to the Service Tribunal, which thoroughly examined the evidence and concluded that none of the charges were established, subsequently ordering his reinstatement with full back benefits. The Supreme Court reviewed the petition for leave to appeal. The Court held that the matter involved only questions of fact that had been comprehensively addressed and resolved by the Service Tribunal in a well-reasoned order. Finding no substantial question of law of public importance, the Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal's findings. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not grant leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution where the petition raises only factual disputes already settled by a competent tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal in service matters involving only questions of fact?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere with a well-reasoned order of the Service Tribunal that exonerates a civil servant of misconduct charges?
  • What is the threshold for granting leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan And Others vs Mubarik Ali1985 SCMR 901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-13
  service tribunalgovernment servantsefficiency and discipline rulesauthorised officerauthorityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions arising from a conflict of opinion within the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the interpretation of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973. The core legal question for consideration is whether, under the scheme of the said Rules, it is permissible to designate the same person as both the "Authority" and the "Authorised Officer" under sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 2. Noting a conflict of judicial opinion within the Tribunal on this question of considerable public importance, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to settle the matter, while ordering the continuation of interim stay orders during the pendency of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether it is permissible under the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973 to designate the same person as both the Authority and the Authorised Officer?
  • Does the designation of the same person as Authority and Authorised Officer violate the scheme of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Land Commission vs Sohrab Khan And Other1985 SCMR 1532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-05
  land reformsalienation of landFederal Land Commissionrevisional powersbona fide transactionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal filed by the Federal Land Commission against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had set aside the order of the Federal Land Commission declaring certain land alienations void under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was the legality and propriety of the High Court's judgment setting aside the Commission's order, which had invalidated three sale transactions made by the original landowner. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court rightly concluded that the alienations were valid and bona fide transactions supported by adequate consideration and actual transfer of possession. The Court laid down the principle that findings of the Federal Land Commission regarding the invalidity of land alienations cannot be sustained when they are based on mere presumptions rather than evidence on record, and transactions proven to be genuine with transferred possession and paid land revenue must be upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Whether findings of the Federal Land Commission regarding land alienations can be based on mere presumptions rather than evidence?
  • Are alienations of land made during the specified period under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 valid when supported by adequate consideration and transfer of possession?
  • Did the High Court correctly set aside the order of the Federal Land Commission under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Land Commission vs Mst. Aziz Begum And Other1985 SCMR 1533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-05
  Land Reforms Regulationsuo motu revisionwrit jurisdictionremandsurmises and conjecturesrevenue recordalienation of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which had set aside an order passed by the Federal Land Commission regarding the validity of certain land gifts. The respondent, Mst. Aziz Begum, had declared gifts of agricultural land made in 1968 under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. While the Land Commissioner initially validated some gifts, the Federal Land Commission, in suo motu revisional jurisdiction, subsequently declared all alienations invalid. The High Court, exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, found the Commission's order was based on surmises and conjectures rather than evidence from the revenue record, and remanded the matter for a fresh decision. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly interfered with the Commission's findings. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the Commission's conclusions were not supported by the record. The key principle laid down is that quasi-judicial authorities must base their findings on concrete evidence rather than conjecture, and appellate courts are justified in remanding cases where such findings are legally deficient.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a quasi-judicial authority can base its findings on surmises and conjectures rather than the revenue record?
  • Is it appropriate for the High Court to remand a case to the Federal Land Commission when the original order is found to be based on conjecture?
  • Does the Federal Land Commission have the authority to declare land alienations invalid without evidence from the revenue record?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Land Commission vs Mat. Ghulam Safia And 3 Other1985 SCMR 1099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-17
  leave to appealconstitutional petitiongiftland commissionacceptance of giftremand
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federal Land Commission sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that quashed a decision of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission, declaring a gift of land invalid under Martial Law Regulation No.115 due to the alleged minority of the donee and lack of proper acceptance. The core legal question concerned the validity of the gift's acceptance and whether the High Court erred in not remanding the matter for a fresh decision. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's view on the validity of the gift was unexceptionable, noting that minority alone was not decisive of acceptance and the Chairman relied on extraneous considerations while ignoring attending circumstances. Furthermore, given multiple prior inquiries, the High Court was justified in not remanding the case. The key principle laid down is that the question of minority of a donee is not solely decisive of the validity of a gift's acceptance, and courts exercising constitutional jurisdiction may refuse remand where further inquiry is unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the minority of a donee is solely decisive of the question of validity of acceptance of a gift?
  • When can a High Court in constitutional jurisdiction decline to remand a matter back to the authority for a fresh decision?
  • Whether a gift of land can be set aside under Martial Law Regulation No.115 on the ground of improper acceptance without considering the conduct and relationship of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazle Razaq vs Jan Sadiq And Other1985 SCMR 128 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-20
  evictionProvincially Administered Tribal AreasTribunalJirgaconstitutional jurisdictionappraisement of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court which dismissed his Constitutional petition against concurrent findings ordering his eviction from a property claimed by the respondents as ancestral property. The matter was initially adjudicated through a Jirga and Tribunal under the Provincially Administered Tribal Area Civil Procedure (Special Provision) Regulation, 1975, resulting in a majority verdict for the respondents, which was upheld in appeal and revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that evidence was not recorded in accordance with Article 8 of the Regulation, that a plaintiff failed to appear as a witness, and that admissions by certain brothers of a plaintiff were ignored. The Supreme Court held that questions of fact and appraisement of evidence, including procedural objections not raised before the lower forums, cannot be agitated or determined in Constitutional jurisdiction or in leave to appeal proceedings. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and refused leave to appeal, laying down the principle that factual disputes and evidentiary weight fall outside the scope of constitutional review.

  Questions settled

  • Can a question of fact or procedural irregularity regarding the recording of evidence, not raised before the lower forums, be raised for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether the appraisement of evidence by a tribunal or Jirga can be re-examined in proceedings arising out of constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the law require all plaintiffs to personally appear as witnesses in civil proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Shah And Others vs Ejaz Ahmad Usman And Other1985 SCMR 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-09
  pre-emptioncourt-feerejection of plaintleave to appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The first respondent filed a suit for pre-emption against the petitioners, which was initially dismissed on the ground that the suit-land was not pre-emptable. After successive appeals and a remand, the suit was ultimately decreed in favor of the plaintiff, with the lower appellate court and the Lahore High Court upholding the decision. In the present petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the trial Court was bound to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to the plaintiff's failure to pay the requisite court-fees. The Supreme Court examined the plea and held that the High Court had correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court regarding court-fees and the rejection of plaints. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings and the High Court's application of established jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaint must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for non-payment of the requisite court-fees?
  • Can a second appeal result in the remand of a case to the trial court for decision on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Rahim vs The Superintendent of Police, Mardan and Others s1985 PLD Supreme Court 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-01
  compulsory retirementdisciplinary proceedingspolice misconductshow-cause noticereasonable opportunityservice lawadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of a service appeal by the Service Tribunal regarding the compulsory retirement of a police officer. The appellant, an Additional S.H.O., was compulsorily retired after allegedly offering a bribe to his superior officer, the D.S.P. The core legal question was whether the competent authority violated the N.-W.F.P. Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, by failing to properly conduct disciplinary proceedings or provide a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court held that the authority possesses the discretion to determine whether to initiate summary or general police proceedings based on the circumstances, such as the nature of the allegation and the presence of superior officers. The Court found that the authority’s decision to follow general proceedings was justified given the appellant offered a bribe to his superior. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the requirement for a reasonable opportunity to show cause was satisfied by the issuance of a show-cause notice and the subsequent submission of a written explanation by the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the competent authority have the discretion to choose between summary and general police proceedings under the N.-W.F.P. Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975?
  • Is the issuance of a show-cause notice and the submission of a written explanation sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a reasonable opportunity to show cause in disciplinary proceedings?
  • What factors should guide the competent authority when deciding whether to conduct a formal inquiry or proceed via show-cause notice in police disciplinary matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Karim vs The State1985 SCMR 1506(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-06
  pre-arrest bailbail before arrestcriminal procedureextraordinary remedyabsconding accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Fazal Karim, who was accused alongside three others of causing injuries with hockey sticks to a prosecution witness. A criminal case was registered against the accused persons under sections 326, 325, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. While the petitioner's co-accused had been arrested, the petitioner remained at large and had previously been denied pre-arrest bail by the Lahore High Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the circumstances of the case did not warrant the grant of pre-arrest bail. The Court dismissed the petition, noting that the petitioner could seek bail after arrest if so advised. The judgment reinforces the principle that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy not to be granted as a matter of course, particularly where the petitioner has not yet submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to arrest.

  Questions settled

  • Is pre-arrest bail appropriate for an accused who has not yet been apprehended?
  • Can a petitioner be granted bail before arrest if the High Court has already refused the same relief?
  • Does the failure to surrender to arrest preclude the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Karim And Another vs Government of Pakistan And Other1985 SCMR 903 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-28
  limitationcondonation of delayincompetent appealLetters Patent Appealwrit jurisdictionsufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against an order of a High Court Single Judge dated 20-1-1975. The petition was filed with a delay of 437 days. The petitioners sought condonation of this delay, arguing that the time spent pursuing an incompetent Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court should be excluded. The core legal question was whether pursuing an incompetent legal remedy constitutes sufficient ground for condoning a significant delay in filing an appeal. The Supreme Court held that the time spent pursuing an incompetent remedy before a Letters Patent Bench does not constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay, as there was no ambiguity regarding the competency of the appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The principle laid down is that the pursuit of a clearly incompetent legal remedy does not justify the condonation of delay under the law of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time spent pursuing an incompetent Letters Patent Appeal constitute sufficient ground for condoning delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Can a delay of 437 days be condoned based solely on the erroneous legal advice of counsel?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Hussain vs Ghulam Hussain And Another1985 SCMR 1210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-19
  leave to appealpre-emptionclosure of evidencenatural justiceregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an unsuccessful defendant vendee, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 20 June 1979, which dismissed his regular second appeal arising from pre-emption suits filed over a sale of land that took place on 10 August 1972. The trial court had decreed the suits in equal shares in favour of the plaintiffs, and both the first and second appeals had failed. The core legal questions involved whether the denial of evidence amounted to a breach of natural justice, whether the plaints suffered from partial pre-emption, and whether the petitioner possessed a superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner's counsel had explicitly stated in the trial court that the present witnesses were not to be examined, no injustice or violation of natural justice occurred. Furthermore, the remaining grounds had been correctly dealt with by the lower courts. The Supreme Court concluded that no question of law requiring further examination arose, and accordingly refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the closure of evidence amount to a violation of natural justice when a party's counsel voluntarily states that the present witnesses are not to be examined?
  • Can a defendant vendee claim a superior right of pre-emption as a grandson of the vendor and owner of land in an adjoining village after concurrent findings against him?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the lower courts have concurrently dismissed a regular second appeal in pre-emption proceedings.
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Haq and ANOTHERs vs Muhammad Latif and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-23
  Section 145 CrPCbreach of peaceimmovable property disputepossession restorationmagisterial jurisdictionsummary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns the scope of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding disputes over immovable property. The petitioners sought proceedings under Section 145 after being allegedly dispossessed from a factory. The Magistrate initially attached the property but subsequently dismissed the application, finding no likelihood of a breach of the peace. An Additional Sessions Judge reversed this, ordering the restoration of possession. The High Court quashed the appellate order, restoring the Magistrate’s decision. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s ruling. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate retains jurisdiction to adjudicate possession under Section 145(4) after determining that no breach of the peace exists. The Court held that the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace is a fundamental pre-condition for invoking Section 145. If a Magistrate finds no such breach of the peace exists, they are mandated by Section 145(5) to cancel the preliminary order and stay all proceedings. The section is intended to maintain public peace, not to settle private title or possession rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Magistrate have jurisdiction to determine possession under Section 145(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if they find no likelihood of a breach of the peace?
  • What is the mandatory course of action for a Magistrate under Section 145(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when no breach of peace exists?
  • Is the summary procedure under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 intended to settle private rights of title or possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Hamid And Others vs Zarshad And Another1985 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-23
  bail cancellationcircumstantial evidencefurther inquiryjudicial discretionmurderappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had cancelled the bail previously granted to four accused persons charged with murder. The deceased, a business partner of the accused, was found dead in a premises belonging to one of the petitioners, Abdur Rashid. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Additional Sessions Judge, who had initially granted bail on the basis that the case rested on circumstantial evidence requiring further inquiry. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court's interference was unjustified regarding the other petitioners, it was correct concerning Abdur Rashid. The Court established the principle that where bail is granted by a lower court based on a reasonable assessment of circumstantial evidence, the High Court should not interfere unless there is obvious misdirection or error. However, the Court distinguished the case of Abdur Rashid, noting that the dead body was recovered from premises under his effective possession and control, thereby justifying the cancellation of his bail.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances should the High Court interfere with an order of bail granted by a lower court in a case based on circumstantial evidence?
  • Does the recovery of a dead body from premises under the effective possession and control of an accused justify the cancellation of bail?
  • Is it appropriate for the High Court to cancel bail simply because a different view of the evidence is possible?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Din And Another vs Ghulam Qadir And Other1985 SCMR 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-05
  abatement of appealjoint appellantsindivisible interestinconsistent decreeslegal representativesRegular Second Appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the abatement of a Regular Second Appeal following the death of one of two joint appellants. The petitioners, claiming ownership of property through a Will and an oral gift, filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, which was dismissed by the trial court and the first appellate court. During the pendency of the subsequent Regular Second Appeal in the High Court, one appellant died, and his legal representatives were not brought on record. The High Court held that the appeal abated in its entirety, reasoning that the appellants' interests were indivisible and that proceeding would risk inconsistent decrees. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the correctness of this finding. The core legal question is whether the death of one co-appellant, without substitution of legal heirs, necessitates the total abatement of an appeal involving a joint claim, or if the appeal can proceed on merits. The Court found the petitioners' contentions regarding the divisibility of the transaction and the absence of risk of inconsistent decrees sufficient to warrant further judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of one of two joint appellants, without bringing legal representatives on record, cause the entire appeal to abate?
  • Is a claim based on a joint gift and Will considered an indivisible interest for the purposes of appeal abatement?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal as having abated in toto if the interests of the appellants are separable?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Dad And Others vs Mst. Zainab Bibi And Other Through L.Rs.1985 SCMR 1196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-22
  civil court jurisdictionrevenue courtPunjab Tenancy Actplaint avermentsleave to appealdenial of title
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their Letters Patent Appeal. The respondents initially filed an eviction petition in the revenue court, which the petitioners resisted by claiming ownership. Consequently, the respondents withdrew the revenue proceedings and instituted a civil suit based on title and denial thereof by the petitioners. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, but the District Judge allowed the petitioners' appeal, holding that the civil court lacked jurisdiction under section 77(3) proviso 1 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. The High Court, in second appeal and subsequently in a Letters Patent Appeal, set aside the District Judge's order and remanded the matter for decision on merits. The Supreme Court held that the initial assumption of jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the plaint, and the antecedent conduct of the defendants justified the civil proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • What determines the initial assumption of jurisdiction in a suit?
  • Does a defendant's denial of title in prior revenue proceedings justify the institution of a civil suit?
  • Whether a civil court's jurisdiction is ousted solely by a plea taken in defence by the defendant?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Dad And Others vs Abdul Karim And Other1985 SCMR 1858 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-15
  pre-emptionco-sharerlimitation periodsuperior right of pre-emptioninstitution of suitleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision application by the Peshawar High Court regarding a suit for possession through pre-emption over agricultural land in District Abbottabad. The core legal question concerns the interpretation and application of section 17(1) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, specifically whether a subsequent transfer by a vendee to a person having an equal or superior right of pre-emption must occur within the limitation period for filing the pre-emption suit to bar the suit, or simply prior to the actual institution of the suit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misapplied precedent and incorrectly imported limitation considerations into section 17(1); the sole crucial factor under this provision is whether the transfer took place prior to the actual institution of the suit for pre-emption, irrespective of whether it occurred within the limitation period. The Court laid down the principle that the legal embargo under section 17(1) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act is attracted if the transfer to a person with equal or superior pre-emption rights is made before the date of the institution of the suit, and the limitation period for filing the suit is irrelevant to this specific inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transfer of property by a vendee to a person having an equal or superior right of pre-emption must be effected within the limitation period for a pre-emption suit to bar the suit under section 17(1) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act?
  • Does section 17(1) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act apply when the transfer in favor of a co-sharer takes place prior to the actual institution of the suit for pre-emption?
  • What is the relevance of the period of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit when determining the effect of a secondary transfer under section 17(1) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Begum And Others vs Sh. Ijaz Ahmad And Other1985 SCMR 1928 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-21
  interim injunctioncivil procedurestay orderpendente lite constructionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners' predecessors-in-interest filed a civil suit for declaration of joint ownership and permanent injunction regarding certain land against the respondents, alongside an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking an interim injunction against raising construction. The trial court dismissed the injunction application, but the Additional District Judge subsequently granted it on appeal. The High Court accepted a revision petition, setting aside the appellate order and vacating the stay. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan heard the matter and found no ground for interference with the High Court's order. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition while observing that any construction raised by the respondents on the disputed land during the pendency of the suit or subsequent proceedings would be strictly at their own risk and cost. The key principle laid down is that appellate interference with High Court orders in interlocutory injunction matters requires valid legal grounds, and pendency construction remains subject to the final outcome at the litigant's own risk.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order vacating an interim injunction where no legal ground is made out?
  • At whose risk and cost is construction raised during the pendency of a civil suit?
  • Can an appellate court's grant of interim injunction be successfully assailed in revision before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Ahmad vs Muhammad Javed And Other1985 SCMR 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-06
  leave to appealculpable homicidejudicial confessiongrave and sudden provocationacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment that acquitted two co-accused and altered the conviction of two others from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The complainant challenged the acquittal and the reduction of sentences, arguing that the same evidence used to convict the two respondents should have been applied to the acquitted co-accused, and that the original murder convictions should be restored. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence, particularly given the accused's judicial confession and the specific circumstances of the crime. The Court held that the High Court's decision was justified, noting that the two convicted respondents had a clear motive and admitted to the killing in their own home, while the large number of injuries indicated a crime committed in a fit of violent rage. The Court affirmed that the acquittal of the co-accused and the modification of the conviction to culpable homicide were appropriate, and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be altered from murder to culpable homicide when the accused admits to killing the deceased in a fit of rage upon finding them in a compromising position?
  • Is the acquittal of co-accused justified when the primary accused confess to the crime and exonerate the co-accused, despite the presence of blood-stained weapons recovered from all parties?
  • Does the presence of a large number of injuries on a deceased person support the plea of a crime committed in a fit of violent rage?
  Read full judgment →
• Fayyaz Butt And Another vs Mst. Aziz Begum1985 SCMR 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-11
  leave to appealejectmentdefault in payment of rentnotice of transferrelationship of landlord and tenantsecond appealconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which ordered the eviction of the tenant petitioners from a residential premises on the ground of default in payment of rent, reversing the concurrent findings of the lower fora. The core legal questions concern whether the institution of an ejectment application can serve as a substitute for the mandatory notice of transfer under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, the admissibility of photostat copies of notices and postal envelopes placed on record, the competency of the Rent Controller to inquire into the validity of a landlord's title upon which the tenancy is based, and the permissibility of interfering with concurrent findings of fact in second appeal without establishing misreading or omission of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the points raised by the petitioners are of a substantial nature requiring consideration and granted leave to appeal, while continuing the stay subject to conditions regarding the deposit of rent and furnishing security. The key principle laid down is that substantial questions regarding statutory notice requirements, evidentiary admissibility, and the scope of inquiry into title by a Rent Controller warrant a full hearing by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the institution of an ejectment application substitute for the notice of transfer required under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is a Rent Controller competent to inquire into the validity of the title of a landlord when the tenant disputes the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-existence of a landlord-tenant relationship be interfered with in second appeal without proof of misreading or omission of evidence?
  • Are photostat copies of notices and postal envelopes admissible in evidence to prove service of notice under rent restriction laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad vs Muhammad Shaft1985 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-19
  urban settlementproperty transferconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appealadministrative divisionproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a review application concerning an urban settlement dispute. The core legal question involved whether the High Court could interfere with the administrative division of a property that had been treated as a single building for transfer purposes, despite previous separate numbering of its component units. The petitioner, a transferee of a substantial portion of the building, challenged the division methodology, arguing for a different site plan interpretation. The Supreme Court examined the relevant documents and the site plan but found no legal error or contravention of established principles in the lower court's decision. The Court held that the division of the property by competent authorities did not warrant interference under the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that courts will not exercise constitutional jurisdiction to re-evaluate factual determinations or administrative divisions of property made by competent authorities absent a clear violation of law or legal principle.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with the administrative division of property under its constitutional jurisdiction in the absence of a violation of law?
  • Is a site plan's interpretation sufficient grounds for the Supreme Court to overturn a property division made by competent authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooque Ahmed vs Shah Nawaz1985 SCMR 1303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-28
  rent controlwilful defaultevictiondiscretionary powerlandlord-tenant disputespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had set aside an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller against a tenant. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in exercising its discretion to relieve the tenant from the consequences of non-payment of rent, given the landlord's alleged refusal to accept rent due to a prior dispute over amenities. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the tenant had not committed wilful default. The Court held that where a landlord deliberately refuses to accept rent due to ongoing disputes, the tenant's failure to pay is not necessarily wilful default. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the discretionary exercise of power by a High Court in rent matters unless it is demonstrated that such discretion was exercised capriciously or on non-judicial principles. Finding no such error, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's discretionary order in a rent matter if the discretion was not exercised capriciously?
  • Does a landlord's refusal to accept rent due to a dispute over amenities constitute wilful default by the tenant?
  • Is a tenant's application to deposit rent in court relevant in determining whether there was wilful default in payment of rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad (Represented By Legal Heirs) And Others vs Dr. A.1985 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-22
  urban settlementtransfer of propertyauction-purchasernon-claimant in possessionirrevocability of refusalsettlement lawsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of an urban shop under settlement laws. The respondent, a non-claimant in possession, initially declined the transfer but subsequently applied for it again before the property was auctioned. The auction-purchaser (petitioner) contended that the respondent's initial refusal was irrevocable and that the subsequent order by an Additional Settlement Commissioner to delete the property from the auction list was incompetent and not properly communicated. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the respondent's initial refusal was not irrevocable, particularly as it had not been acted upon before the respondent renewed the application for transfer. The Court affirmed that the respondent, as a non-claimant in possession, was entitled to the transfer of the shop. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the auction of the property, despite the respondent's pending application for transfer, was without lawful authority, and the failure to communicate the deletion order to the field authorities did not prejudice the respondent's rights.

  Questions settled

  • Is a refusal to accept the transfer of an urban property under settlement laws irrevocable?
  • Does an auction of property held despite a pending application for transfer by a non-claimant in possession constitute a valid transfer?
  • Does the failure to communicate an order for the deletion of property from an auction list to field authorities invalidate the rights of the party in whose favor the order was passed?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Hussain Shah And 2 Others vs Mian Bashir Ahmad And Another1985 SCMR 1377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-25
  agricultural land allotmentRehabilitation Settlement Schemerecord of rightsindefeasible entitlementbelated challengeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of 7 Marlas of agricultural land between the petitioners and the respondent. The core legal question was whether the respondent's allotment, which was incorporated into the record of rights and held to be valid by the High Court under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, could be challenged by the petitioners on the grounds of being unauthorized and collusive. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, refusing to grant leave to appeal. The Court held that the allotment of the small area in question was permissible as a marginal adjustment under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that given the long-standing nature of the entries in the record of rights and the respondent's indefeasible entitlement under Section 16 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, it was too late to re-examine the validity or alleged collusive nature of those entries. The principle established is that long-standing entries in the record of rights regarding land allotments, once incorporated, are generally immune to belated challenges regarding their initial procedural validity.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allotment of land made under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme be challenged on the grounds of collusion after it has been incorporated into the record of rights for a significant period?
  • Does a person have an indefeasible entitlement to land under Section 16 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 once the allotment is finalized in the record of rights?
  • Is a marginal adjustment of land permissible under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Falak Sher vs The State1985 SCMR 1604(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-31Read full judgment →
• Faiz Muhammad vs Muhammad Yusuf And Other1985 SCMR 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-20
  evacuee landmukhbari applicationallotmentwrit jurisdictionstatutory competenceequitable relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over evacuee agricultural land initially allotted to a displaced person. A Settlement Commissioner determined that while the allottee held excess land, no fraud or misrepresentation occurred, and suggested the land be sold to the allottee. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner prematurely allotted this excess land to an informant. Following protracted litigation, the Chief Settlement Commissioner eventually permitted the sale of the land to the original allottee's successors under the relevant laws. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, the Chief Settlement Commissioner lacked the statutory competence to authorize such a sale. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was precluded from raising this objection at such a late stage, as previous proceedings had proceeded on the accepted premise that the Chief Settlement Commissioner possessed the requisite statutory authority. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the order facilitating the sale, absent any fraud or misrepresentation by the allottee, was equitable and not subject to interference under writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the statutory competence of an authority after the issue has been litigated up to the Supreme Court on the accepted premise that the authority was competent?
  • Is an order directing the sale of excess land to an allottee, where no fraud or misrepresentation was found, considered an equitable order?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner retain the power to sell excess land to a previous allottee following the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz Ahmad vs Mst. Amiran Bibi And Other1985 SCMR 1370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-19
  specific performanceprior vendeesubsequent vendeemutation of landagreement to sellleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by an unsuccessful defendant claiming to be a prior vendee of a tenanted land against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding a decree for specific performance of contract in favor of subsequent vendees. The core legal question revolves around whether an oral sale reported to a Patwari prior in time, but whose attestation was delayed and initially repudiated by the vendor, takes precedence over a subsequent registered agreement to sell. The Supreme Court held that unless the sale itself is admitted by the vendor and completed before the Revenue Officer at the relevant time, incidental steps such as entries made by the Patwari or payment of District Council fees cannot substitute for a completed sale. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court that the subsequent registered agreement to sell prevails over an incomplete prior transaction, and accordingly refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an oral sale reported to a Patwari take precedence over a subsequent registered agreement to sell when the vendor initially repudiates the oral sale before the Revenue Officer?
  • Can the payment of District Council fees and Patwari entries act as a substitute for a completed sale when the vendor denies the transaction?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the completion date of a sale are unassailable when based on proper evidence.
  Read full judgment →
• Fahim Dad Khan And Others vs Mst. Zubeda Begum And Other1985 SCMR 1345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-14
  review petitionLetters Patent Appealabatement of appealLaw Reforms Ordinanceinherent lack of jurisdictionevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for review of this Court's order dismissing a civil petition for special leave to appeal, which arose from an evacuee property dispute concerning the division of a house in Sialkot. The core legal question was whether a Letters Patent Appeal that had abated by operation of law prior to the promulgation of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, and whose abatement was set aside in 1980, could be treated as a pending appeal saved under the said Ordinance, or whether the High Court suffered from an inherent lack of jurisdiction in deciding it on merits. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the contentions raised were substantially the same as those urged and repelled during the hearing of the original leave petition, and that no sufficient ground for review was made out. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be used to re-argue points already considered and rejected unless a glaring omission or valid ground is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Letters Patent Appeal that abated by operation of law and whose abatement was subsequently set aside can be deemed a pending appeal saved under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  • Does a review petition lie when the grounds urged in support thereof are substantially the same as those already considered and repelled by the court during the initial hearing?
  • Whether an order passed by a Division Bench setting aside an appeal's abatement and deciding it on merits suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction if the appeal was not pending upon the promulgation of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• Executive Engineer, Electricity, WAPDA, Shalamar, Lahore vs Muhammad Arshad1985 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-05
  service lawdepartmental remedyunauthorized absencereinstatementnatural justicegrievance noticeWAPDA employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Executive Engineer, WAPDA, against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal reinstating an Assistant Linesman who had been removed from service for alleged unauthorized absence. The core legal question was whether a grievance notice filed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, could be treated as equivalent to the departmental appeal required under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, to satisfy the condition of exhausting departmental remedies. The Supreme Court declined to adjudicate this specific legal question in the present case. The Court held that because the department failed to challenge the Tribunal's factual findings—specifically that the department had utterly failed to prove the alleged absence and that the removal order was arbitrary and irresponsible—the petition did not warrant interference. The decision emphasizes that where an order of removal is passed without evidence or inquiry, amounting to condemning an employee unheard, the Court will not interfere with reinstatement orders, regardless of procedural technicalities regarding departmental remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Can a grievance notice under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 be treated as equivalent to a departmental appeal under the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Is an order of removal from service sustainable when the employer fails to substantiate the charge of absence through evidence or inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore vs Riaz Ahmad And Another1985 SCMR 1376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-25
  service lawdismissal from servicejurisdiction of service tribunalstatutory interpretationpolitical appointmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which set aside the dismissal of the respondent ordered by the Evacuee Trust Property Board under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978. The Tribunal interfered with the dismissal on the basis that the Board failed to produce evidence proving the respondent's appointment was made on political considerations. The petitioner challenges this decision, arguing that the Tribunal erred by importing jurisdictional limitations not present in the governing statute. The core legal question is whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by interpreting the law to require evidence of political motivation when the statute itself did not provide for such a ground for action. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that this issue of statutory interpretation is a matter of public importance, particularly given its relevance to similar cases under section 12-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Court ordered the appeal to be heard alongside other matters raising similar questions of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal exceed its jurisdiction by requiring evidence of political considerations for a dismissal under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978, when the statute does not explicitly provide for such a ground?
  • Is the interpretation of statutory grounds for dismissal under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978, a question of public importance justifying leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Evacuee Trust Property Board vs Muhammad Sharif1985 SCMR 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-21
  Evacuee Trust PropertyJanj GharConcurrent findings of factAdditional evidenceSettlement CommissionerLeave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that affirmed concurrent findings of fact by a Settlement Commissioner regarding the status of a disputed property. The petitioner, the Evacuee Trust Property Board, contended that the property should be classified as Evacuee Trust Property because it was used as a 'Janj Ghar' and sought to introduce additional evidence at the appellate stage. The Supreme Court examined whether the use of a property as a 'Janj Ghar' inherently transforms it into Trust property and whether the denial of additional evidence was legally flawed. The Court held that concurrent findings of fact were free from legal defect and that the mere use of a property as a 'Janj Ghar' does not establish it as Trust property, distinguishing it from the term 'Dharam Sala'. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the petitioner had sufficient opportunity to present evidence, and the proposed additional evidence would not have altered the factual findings. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of a property as a 'Janj Ghar' automatically classify it as Evacuee Trust Property?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower forums be disturbed in the absence of a legal defect?
  • Is the refusal to admit additional evidence at the appellate stage justified when the party had sufficient opportunity to present it earlier?
  Read full judgment →
• Emmanual Masih vs The Punjab Local Councils Election Authority1985 SCMR 729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-21
  electoral rollnomination papersscrutinycandidate qualificationReturning OfficerElection Authoritylocal bodies election
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute concerning the rejection of the appellant's nomination paper for a non-Muslim seat in a municipal committee election on the ground that he was under twenty-five years of age, contrary to his age as recorded in the electoral roll. The core legal question was whether a Returning Officer or the Election Authority could go behind the entry of age in the electoral roll and conduct an independent inquiry to determine the correct age of a candidate during the scrutiny of nomination papers, given the prohibition contained in the proviso to rule 15(3) of the Punjab Local Councils (Election) Rules, 1979. The majority of the Court held that the Returning Officer is mandated not to inquire into the correctness or validity of any entry in the electoral roll regarding a candidate's age during scrutiny. The Court ruled that the Returning Officer and the Election Authority must accept the electoral roll entry as correct, thereby setting aside the contrary view and holding that pre-election challenges to candidate qualifications based on going behind electoral roll entries are impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Returning Officer can inquire into the correctness or validity of an entry relating to a candidate's age in the electoral roll during the scrutiny of nomination papers?
  • Does the Election Authority possess the power under section 17(1) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, to go behind an electoral roll entry regarding a candidate's age during the pre-election stage?
  • What is the extent of finality attached to entries in the electoral roll concerning the qualifications of a candidate for local council elections?
  Read full judgment →
• Ejaz Ahmad Alias Jaja And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 780 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-22
  murderattempted murdercompromisemitigation of sentencedeath sentence reduced to life imprisonmentdying declarationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a murder and attempted murder trial where the appellants, Ejaz Ahmad and Iftikhar Ahmad, were convicted under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving death and life imprisonment sentences respectively, which were upheld by the Lahore High Court. Upon leave being granted by the Supreme Court, the primary question considered was the effect of a compromise reached between the parties. The Supreme Court accepted the compromise submitted by the complainant party, including the deceased's father and widow, who forgave the appellants in the interest of peace and better family relations. Holding that the compromise serves as a mitigating circumstance warranting leniency, the Court maintained Ejaz Ahmad's conviction for murder but reduced his sentence from death to imprisonment for life, granting him the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, while dismissing the appeal of Iftikhar Ahmad as his life imprisonment sentence was already the lesser penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise between the parties serve as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a sentence of death to imprisonment for life in a murder case?
  • Whether the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be extended to a convict whose death sentence is commuted to imprisonment for life upon a compromise?
  • Is a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 maintainable when established by the account of eye-witnesses and a dying declaration?
  Read full judgment →
• Ehzar Ali Arhti vs Muhammad Yaqoob Khan And Other1985 SCMR 962 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-08
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantconstitutional jurisdictionfindings of factrent controllerleave to appealdispute of title
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order against a tenant regarding a shop in Khokha Bazar, Kallur Kot. The petitioner challenged the eviction order, disputing the respondent's title as landlord and denying the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The Rent Controller and the District Judge had previously affirmed the eviction, and the Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to re-examine the factual findings regarding property identity and the landlord-tenant relationship under its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller had the jurisdiction to determine these factual questions and that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the findings of fact. The Court ruled that the High Court correctly declined to interfere with these factual determinations. The principle laid down is that where a Rent Controller has properly appraised evidence to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant, such findings of fact are not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction, though the party may seek civil adjudication regarding title disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with findings of fact regarding the landlord-tenant relationship in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to determine the identity of property and the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Is a party permitted to seek civil adjudication of title rights after an adverse finding in rent proceedings?
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• Dr.P.N . Seth vs Government of Pakistan And Other1985 SCMR 914 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-28
  Enemy PropertyDefence of Pakistan RulesArbitrationLeave to AppealTransfer of PropertyStay Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the application of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1965, to Kaycee Industries Limited. The core legal questions involve determining whether the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1965, could be applied to the company without first establishing the nature of the enemy interest therein, and whether such application remained valid following a prior High Court decision dated 5-7-1972. Additionally, the Court is tasked with examining the legal effect of the petitioner's continued possession of the disputed property after a 'sale resolution' was passed by the company, specifically in relation to Section 55-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Finally, the Court must decide whether the Government was empowered to recall a reference to arbitration while a stay order from a pending writ petition was in effect. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address these significant questions of law and procedure, requiring the petitioner to furnish security for costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1965 be applied to a company without first determining the nature of the enemy interest in that company?
  • What is the legal effect of continued possession of property after a sale resolution is passed, under Section 55-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
  • Can the Government recall a reference to arbitration while a stay order from a writ petition is in effect?
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• Dr. Riazuddin Ahmad vs Mahboob Illahi1985 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-07
  ejectmentpersonal requirementgood faithlandlord and tenantcompromise of eviction applicationurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an ejectment proceeding initiated by the landlord-petitioner against the respondent-tenant for the eviction of a shop on the ground of personal good faith requirement for his younger son to run a chemist shop. The core legal question concerns whether the bona fides of a landlord's current personal requirement claim are adversely affected by the compromise or withdrawal of an earlier eviction application regarding a different property. The Supreme Court held that while the mere fact that a landlord was unsuccessful or compromised an earlier eviction application does not automatically negate good faith, the burden rests heavily on the landlord to satisfactorily explain the circumstances of such past withdrawal or compromise when it falls within their exclusive knowledge. The Court laid down the principle that the assessment of a landlord's good faith depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case, and a failure to provide a cogent explanation for the compromise of prior litigation leaves the concurrent findings of lower appellate courts undisturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the compromise or withdrawal of an earlier eviction application automatically negate the good faith of a landlord in a subsequent ejectment application?
  • Where a landlord files a personal requirement eviction application after previously compromising an earlier one, upon whom does the burden lie to explain the circumstances of the prior compromise?
  • Can a landlord seek possession of more than one shop for the use of multiple sons under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
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• Dr. Muhammad Yusuf vs Mst. Zakia Bibi And Other1985 SCMR 1390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-05
  maintenancereview jurisdictionlimitationleave to appealconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a husband against the dismissal of his review application by the Lahore High Court concerning an order of maintenance. The Chairman, Arbitration Council initially ordered maintenance payments against the petitioner. A revision filed before the Collector was dismissed as time-barred. A subsequent constitutional petition and a later review petition before the High Court were also dismissed in limine. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of the belated revision before the Collector and whether the High Court erred in refusing review jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the petition for leave to appeal was itself barred by seventy-six days without an application for condonation of delay, and that the petitioner failed to establish any error apparent on the record or grounds necessary for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the leave to appeal, affirming that review jurisdiction is not a substitute for appellate jurisdiction and that factual determinations regarding limitation cannot be raised for the first time without proper foundation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether review jurisdiction can be used as a substitute for appellate jurisdiction?
  • Can a question of limitation involving factual determination be raised for the first time without prior adjudication below?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when it is barred by time and lacks an application for condonation of delay?
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• Dr. B.M. Ankelsaria vs Azimuddin Najmi1985 SCMR 1901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-01Read full judgment →
• Diwan Kevalram vs Noor Muhammad And Another1985 SCMR 2042 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-02
  civil suitnon-evacuee propertypossessionsecond appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning property originally declared as non-evacuee property belonging to the petitioner, which was subsequently alleged to be encroached upon and transferred under rehabilitation laws. The petitioner filed a civil suit for possession and mesne profits against the trespasser and a subsequent allottee whose transfer documents were later cancelled. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed the suit in the petitioner's favour. However, the High Court partly allowed the second appeal filed by the defendants, holding that one of the respondents was in possession of a part of the property and the lower courts' decrees were not binding on her. The core legal question involves the scope of challenge available in a second appeal when certain issues were conceded in the first appellate court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the submissions raised on behalf of the petitioner regarding the limitations of challenging findings in second appeal merit consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether respondents who conceded issues before the first appellate court can challenge those findings in a second appeal?
  • Can a civil suit for possession and mesne profits be maintained against a person who claims through a cancelled transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
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• Diwan And Others vs Muhammad Yunis1985 SCMR 1280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-21
  land settlementsitting allotteesconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appealdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petitions concerning a land settlement dispute. The core legal question involved the competing entitlement of sitting allottees—specifically, big landlords versus small claim holders—to a small parcel of available land in a village. The Supreme Court held that where all competing parties are sitting allottees in the village, and the disputed land is of a small size only capable of satisfying small claims, the refusal of the High Court to interfere in its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction against a non-arbitrary order passed with jurisdiction does not warrant interference by the apex court. The key principle laid down is that discretionary constitutional jurisdiction will not be exercised to interfere with an order passed by a competent authority having jurisdiction, especially where the impugned decision is neither arbitrary nor in contravention of mandatory legal provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether erroneous decisions passed by an authority having jurisdiction are liable to challenge in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a sitting allottee with a large number of unsatisfied units have a preferential right over small claim holders for a small piece of disputed land?
  • Is the Supreme Court bound to interfere with the refusal of a High Court to grant relief in its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction under the circumstances?
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• Divisional Superrintendent, Pakistan Railways, Quetta And Another vs Syed Zafar Yar Ali And Another1985 SCMR 1982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-10
  traveling allowancerunning allowancerailway employeesindustrial relationsstatutory rulesforeign territory allowance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil appeals filed by the Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Quetta, challenging a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which upheld the orders of the Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal granting the respondent railway employees the difference in traveling allowance rates for performing duties in Iranian territory on the Mirjawa-Zahidan section between April 1965 and January 1968. The core legal question was whether the respondents, as running staff governed by rules 221 and 509 of the Pakistan Railways Establishment Code, Volume I, were entitled to higher traveling allowance rates under a Ministry of Finance Office Memorandum of 1959, and whether those administrative letters were inconsistent with the statutory rules. The Supreme Court held that there is no inconsistency between the statutory rules and the administrative instructions, as they address different situations, and therefore the rules do not bar the respondents from receiving the higher allowance. The appeals were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether railway running staff performing duties outside their normal beats in foreign territory are entitled to traveling allowance at higher rates prescribed for visiting that region?
  • Do rules 221 and 509 of the Pakistan Railways Establishment Code, Volume I, debar railway servants from claiming benefits admissible under the Ministry of Finance Office Memorandum of 1959?
  • Whether administrative instructions regarding traveling allowances are inconsistent with the statutory provisions of the Pakistan Railways Establishment Code?
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• Dilkusha Enterprises Ltd. vs Abdul Rashid And Other1985 SCMR 1882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  back benefitsreinstatementindustrial relationsgainful employmentburden of proofrecovery of moneylabour court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that upheld a Labour Court's order for the recovery of back benefits. The petitioner, a company, contested the Labour Court's jurisdiction under Section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance to compute and award salary for the period of non-reinstatement, and argued that the burden of proving the worker was not gainfully employed elsewhere rested on the worker. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court possesses the authority under Section 51(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance to compute the money value of the benefit of reinstatement, which includes the salary the worker would have earned. Furthermore, the Court established that the burden of proving a worker was gainfully employed elsewhere lies with the employer, as the worker cannot be expected to prove the negative fact of non-employment. The Court also clarified that Section 51 proceedings are not restricted to the Appellate Tribunal. The petition was dismissed, affirming the finality of the underlying orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving that a worker was gainfully employed elsewhere during the period of dismissal lie on the worker or the employer?
  • Can a Labour Court compute and order the recovery of salary as a money value for the benefit of reinstatement under Section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance?
  • Are proceedings under Section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance for the recovery of money due under a Labour Court decision exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal?
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• Dildar Hussain Nayyar vs Niaz Muhammad Dar And Another1985 SCMR 1769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-15
  personal needevictionlandlord and tenantremandrent controllerbona fide requirementappellate authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that remanded eviction proceedings to the appellate authority. The core legal question was whether a landlord is legally restricted from seeking the simultaneous eviction of tenants from multiple shops based on personal need, and whether a court can arbitrarily limit such a claim to a single shop. The Supreme Court held that there is no legal compulsion restricting a landlord's claim to a single shop; rather, the landlord's requirement must be determined objectively based on the nature of the business and the specific needs presented. The Court affirmed that while the landlord has the choice to seek multiple shops, the Rent Controller and appellate authority must pragmatically ascertain the bona fide nature and extent of that need through evidence. The Court refused leave to appeal, noting that the remand order allows the tenants to challenge the landlord's bona fides and the sufficiency of the claimed need before the appellate authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord simultaneously seek the eviction of tenants from multiple shops on the ground of personal need?
  • Is a Rent Controller or appellate authority legally compelled to restrict a landlord's claim for personal need to a single shop?
  • Does the law require a landlord to have prior business experience before seeking eviction for personal need?
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• Didar Shah vs Ch. Ghulam Haider (Deceased) Through Legal Heirs And Another1985 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-04
  ejectmentpersonal usereconstructionmutually destructive pleasrent restrictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court dated 4 October 1978, which allowed a second appeal and ordered the ejectment of the appellant and another from a disputed house in Quetta. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to consider whether the pleas of reconstruction and personal use are mutually destructive of each other in rent matters. The Supreme Court noted that this precise question had already been settled by previous binding precedents of the Court, specifically holding that the pleas of reconstruction and personal use are not mutually destructive of each other. Consequently, finding no merit in the contentions raised, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without any order as to costs, thereby affirming the settled legal position that a landlord may validly raise both grounds concurrently in ejectment proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the pleas of reconstruction and personal use are mutually destructive of each other in rent ejectment cases?
  • Can a landlord simultaneously seek eviction of a tenant on the grounds of personal use and reconstruction of the rented premises?
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