Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Ishaq Versus Falak Sher1988 SCMR 853 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  review petitioncivil appealsfactual error apparent on recordnew pleaSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves five review petitions directed against a common judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising from connected civil appeals. The core legal question addressed is whether grounds for review are established based on alleged factual errors and omitted documents in the impugned judgment. The Supreme Court held that the review petitions are without merit, observing that the alleged document relied upon by the petitioners was not traceable on the record nor tendered in evidence below, and that the petitioners were attempting to set up a new factual case not pleaded in the lower courts, which is impermissible in review. The key principle laid down is that review proceedings cannot be utilized to re-argue appeals afresh or to introduce new factual pleas and untraceable documents not previously part of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party introduce a new factual case or plea for the first time in review proceedings?
  • Whether review proceedings can be used to re-argue appeals afresh?
  • Is a review petition maintainable based on a document that is not traceable on the record and was not tendered in evidence before the trial court?
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• Shaukat Nawaz Versus Mansab Dad1988 SCMR 851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-10
  pre-emptionrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factco-sharerexchange of landcompromise deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which set aside concurrent findings of the lower courts in a pre-emption matter. The appellant had pre-empted a land transaction comprising an exchange (mutation No. 377) and a sale (mutation No. 396), alleging the exchange was a sham to defeat his pre-emption right, a stance supported by a compromise deed filed by the appellant and the vendor after evidence concluded. The trial and appellate courts decreed the suit, but the High Court accepted the vendee's revision and dismissed the suit, holding that the vendee had become a co-sharer. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact in revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court is justified in interfering under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the lower courts committed material irregularity or omitted evidence resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction is justified to interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below?
  • Can a compromise deed filed between the pre-emptor and the vendor after the close of evidence override clear documentary and oral evidence regarding an exchange of land?
  • Does a vendee who acquires a share through an exchange improve their status to become a co-sharer and defeat a pre-emption suit?
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• Gulzar Hussain Versus Muhammad Dilawar-1988 SCMR 847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-02Read full judgment →
• Alam Sher Versus State1988 SCMR 844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-09
  murderself-defenceocular evidencecriminal appealappreciation of evidencecommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment upholding the appellants' conviction and sentences under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The prosecution alleged that the appellants attacked the deceased, Ismail, due to prior enmity, with one appellant stabbing him and another acting in concert. The appellants denied the charges, with one appellant asserting a plea of self-defence, claiming he acted after the deceased fired at him. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, including ocular testimony and the recovery of a blood-stained knife. The Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, holding that the defence version was inconsistent with the medical evidence and the physical circumstances of the incident. Specifically, the Court found the self-defence plea implausible given the nature of the injuries and the mechanics of the attack. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the challenge to the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court regarding the appellants' guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of self-defence be sustained when it is contradicted by the medical evidence and the physical circumstances of the crime?
  • Is the appellate court justified in dismissing an appeal where the trial court and the High Court have concurrently appreciated the evidence and found no merit in the defence version?
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• Muhammad Afsar Versus Noor Muhammad1988 SCMR 840 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-10
  pre-emptionconsent decreecollusionTarbela Dam evicteeres judicatacivil revisionremandjudgment in personam
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the respondent claimed a superior right of pre-emption over land sold by the vendor. The appellants contended that the sale was actually in favor of a third party, a Tarbela Dam evictee exempt from pre-emption, relying on a consent decree obtained between the vendee and the third party. The trial and appellate courts decided the matter based on the existence of this decree without addressing the respondent's allegation that the decree was collusive and fraudulent. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred by failing to frame and try the essential factual issue regarding the true nature of the sale transaction. The Court emphasized that a consent decree in personam is not binding on a stranger to the proceedings who challenges its validity. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower judgments and remanded the case, directing the trial court to frame proper issues and determine whether the sale was in fact to the protected party or if the decree was a fraudulent device to defeat pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Is a consent decree obtained between a vendee and a third party binding on a pre-emptor who is not a party to the suit and challenges the decree as collusive?
  • Can a court decide a pre-emption suit based on a consent decree without adjudicating the underlying factual dispute regarding the true nature of the sale transaction?
  • Does a pre-emptor have the right to challenge the validity of a consent decree relied upon by a vendee to defeat a pre-emption claim?
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• Government of Punjab Versus Kissan Cooperative Credit Corporation Ltd.1988 SCMR 837 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad Versus Ajaib Sultan1988 SCMR 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-09
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionlandlord and tenantmortgagetenant's right of pre-emptionMartial Law Regulation No. 115
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises out of a pre-emption suit where the trial court, District Judge, and High Court concurrently decreed the respondent's suit based on a superior right of pre-emption as a collateral of the vendor. The core legal question was whether the appellant established a superior right to acquire the disputed land as a tenant under paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The Supreme Court held that after the creation of a subsequent oral mortgage between the parties, their erstwhile relationship of landlord and tenant was voluntarily terminated and replaced by a mortgagee-mortgagor relationship with different incidents. Consequently, at the time of the impugned sale, the appellant held the land as a mortgagee and not as a tenant, rendering paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 inapplicable. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the creation of a mortgage between a landlord and tenant extinguishes the tenancy relationship, precluding the tenant from later claiming a tenant's right of pre-emption based on the former tenancy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the creation of a mortgage between a landlord and tenant terminate the tenancy relationship?
  • Can a person holding land as a mortgagee invoke paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 to claim a right of pre-emption as a tenant?
  • Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsists after the execution of a mortgage between the same parties?
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• Aziz Khatoon Versus Zubaida Khanum1988 SCMR 832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-31Read full judgment →
• Khizar Hayat Versus State1988 SCMR 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-31
  post-arrest bailmurderfurther inquirycriminal appealvicarious liabilitypre-trial detention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail in a criminal case involving charges of murder. The petitioners, along with a co-accused named Zawar Hussain, were charged with the murder of Mst. Manzooran. The prosecution alleged that while Zawar Hussain performed the actual firing, one petitioner raised a lalkara, and the other was present while armed with a gun. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail pending trial given the nature of their alleged participation. The Supreme Court observed that the encounter appeared unplanned and that the pre-existing enmity was specifically between the co-accused Zawar Hussain and the deceased. Consequently, the Court held that the implication of the petitioners in the crime required further inquiry to determine their actual guilt. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the appeal, and admitted the petitioners to bail, establishing the principle that where the specific role and culpability of an accused in a murder case require further investigation, bail should be granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of an accused at the scene of a crime while armed, without evidence of a planned encounter, constitute sufficient grounds to deny bail?
  • Is a case fit for further inquiry when the specific role of the accused in a murder charge is contested and the enmity is primarily between the deceased and a co-accused?
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• S.A. Mukarim Versus Government of Sind1988 SCMR 826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service tribunaldepartmental appealmodification of penaltycompulsory retirementinfructuous appealamendment of memo of appealcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a judgment of the Sind Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's service appeal as infructuous and not maintainable. The appellant, an Excise and Taxation Inspector, was dismissed from service following departmental proceedings under the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. While his departmental appeal before the Chief Secretary and his appeal before the Service Tribunal under section 4 of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973 were pending, the departmental appellate authority partly allowed his appeal by substituting the penalty of dismissal with compulsory retirement. The Service Tribunal subsequently held that the appellant's pending appeal had become infructuous and that he should have filed a fresh appeal against the appellate order within limitation. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal's view was untenable, ruling that a subsequent modification or reduction of penalty in a departmental appeal does not render a pending appeal against the original order infructuous or destroy the appellant's vested right to have the original order determined on its merits. The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and remanded the case for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the modification of a penalty by a departmental appellate authority renders a pending service appeal against the original order infructuous?
  • Does an aggrieved civil servant lose the right to pursue a pending appeal against an original departmental order if a fresh appeal against the subsequent appellate order is not filed within limitation?
  • What is the effect of section 4 of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973, when an appeal is filed against an original order before the decision of a departmental appeal?
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• Nazeer Ahmad Versus Ghulam Mehdi1988 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-10
  evacuee propertycivil court jurisdictionouster of jurisdictionplaint rejectionGeneral Clauses Actcustodian of evacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the dismissal of a suit regarding the status of property claimed as non-evacuee land. The appellants sought a declaration that the suit property was not evacuee property, challenging previous orders passed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The core legal question was whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the status of property as evacuee or non-evacuee, particularly after the repeal of the relevant evacuee laws. The Supreme Court held that the civil court correctly rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court affirmed that Section 41 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 explicitly barred civil court jurisdiction in such matters. Furthermore, the Court established that the repeal of the 1957 Act did not remove this jurisdictional bar for decisions rendered while the law was in force, as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 preserved the validity and finality of those prior determinations. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, as the suit was barred by law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeal of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 remove the bar on civil court jurisdiction regarding evacuee property status?
  • Can a civil court entertain a suit challenging the status of property as evacuee or non-evacuee?
  • Does Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 preserve the finality of decisions made under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 after its repeal?
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• United Bank Limited Versus Yousuf Haji Noor Muhammaddhadhi1988 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-25Read full judgment →
• Qamruddin Versus Hakim Mahmood Khan1988 SCMR 819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-17
  ejectment applicationbona fide personal requirementlandlord and tenantabatement of appealvested rightlegal representativesrented premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an ejectment application filed by a landlord against a tenant, seeking possession of a shop for personal bona fide use. The core legal questions were whether the landlord's failure to disclose other rented-out properties in the pleadings disentitled him to eviction, and whether the landlord's death during the pendency of the appeal caused the claim for personal requirement to abate. The Supreme Court held that a landlord is not legally required to disclose all other properties rented out to third parties in an ejectment application. The court affirmed that the landlord has the right to choose which property is suitable for their personal use, provided they are not in possession of other equally suitable premises in the same locality. Furthermore, the court held that once a personal action for ejectment matures into a decree, the right to possession becomes a vested property right that passes to the legal heirs, thus surviving the death of the original landlord. The appeal was allowed, restoring the Rent Controller's order for eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a landlord legally required to disclose all other properties rented out to third parties in an ejectment application for personal use?
  • Does a claim for personal requirement for a shop abate upon the death of the landlord during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Does a personal action for ejectment that has matured into a decree become part of the estate of the deceased landlord?
  • Can a landlord's choice of a specific property for personal use be challenged on the ground that they own other rented-out properties?
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• Trustees of Port of Karachi Versus Zaffar Zaid Ahmah1988 SCMR 810 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-11Read full judgment →
• Sardar Khatoon Versus Dost Muhammad1988 SCMR 806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-27
  benami transactionburden of proofrevenue recordbeneficial interestletters patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a long-standing property dispute concerning land purchased in 1936 by Hussain Bakhsh in the name of his minor grandson, Dost Muhammad. Years later, Hussain Bakhsh filed a suit for declaration and possession, claiming the transaction was Benami and that he was the real owner. The trial court decreed the suit, but the District Judge reversed it, finding the property was purchased for the grandson's benefit. A Single Judge of the High Court restored the trial court's decree, which was subsequently set aside by a Letters Patent Bench of the High Court, restoring the District Judge's judgment. The Supreme Court considered whether the transaction was Benami and whether the plaintiff discharged the burden of proof. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish the Benami character of the transaction, as evidence showed the purchase was intended for the beneficial interest of the respondent. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the burden of proving a Benami transaction rests heavily on the plaintiff, who must succeed on the strength of his own case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the burden of proving a transaction to be Benami lies on the person asserting it?
  • Can a plaintiff succeed in establishing a Benami transaction merely on the weakness of the defendant's case?
  • Whether a concurrent finding of fact by the lower appellate court can be interfered with in second appeal when material evidence was ignored?
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• Muhammad Sharif Versus Nadeem Shahid1988 SCMR 804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-02
  pre-emptionguardian ad litemminor defendantsprocedural irregularitytechnical defectrepresentation of minors
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal arising from a pre-emption suit involving agricultural land purchased by minors. The core legal question was whether the failure of the trial court to formally appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor defendants rendered the entire proceedings illegal, despite the minors being represented by their paternal grandfather throughout the litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the absence of a formal appointment order was a mere technicality rather than a fatal defect. The Court observed that the grandfather had acted as the minors' representative during the purchase and had vigorously defended the suit at all stages, including appeals, with no evidence of adverse interest or negligence. The key principle laid down is that where a minor is effectively represented by a natural guardian who actively defends the suit without any conflict of interest, the procedural omission to pass a formal order appointing a guardian ad litem does not vitiate the proceedings or invalidate the decree, as such a failure is considered a technical irregularity rather than a jurisdictional error.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to formally appoint a guardian ad litem for minor defendants render the entire proceedings illegal?
  • Can a procedural omission to formally appoint a guardian ad litem be cured if the minors were effectively represented by a natural guardian throughout the litigation?
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• Abdul Ghafoor Versus Deputy Inspector-General of Police1988 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-28Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani Versus Muhammad Akhtar1988 SCMR 801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-02
  evictionpersonal needconcurrent findings of factsecond appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside the concurrent eviction orders passed against the respondent by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge. The appellant-landlord had sought eviction of the respondent tenant from the ground floor of a building on grounds including default in rent and personal need. The Rent Controller and first appellate court found in favor of the landlord regarding his bona fide personal need. The High Court, however, reversed this finding. The core legal question was whether the High Court could legally interfere with concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held that no second appeal lay to the High Court against concurrent findings of fact based on good and sound evidence establishing the landlord's bona fide personal need. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the High Court's judgment set aside, and the Rent Controller's eviction order restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Does a second appeal lie against concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide personal need of a landlord?
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• Bilquis Rehman Versus Anjum Hameed1988 SCMR 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif Versus Khushi Muhammad1988 SCMR 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-26Read full judgment →
• Fazal Karim & Sons Versus Fayyaz Akbar1988 SCMR 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  rent restrictioncantonment areademolition and reconstructionevictiongood faithreasonablenesslandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that ordered the eviction of tenants from shops in a cantonment area to facilitate the landlord's plan for demolition and reconstruction. The core legal question was whether the requirements of 'good faith' and 'reasonableness' must be read into Section 17(2)(vi) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963, even though the statute does not explicitly mention them, and whether the High Court failed to record a finding on these aspects. The Supreme Court held that even if such requirements were implied, the High Court had already made a sufficient finding of fact that the landlord's requirement was 'genuine,' which effectively satisfied the tests of reasonableness and good faith. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the eviction order. The key principle laid down is that where a landlord seeks to demolish and reconstruct a building for the purpose of substantially developing or improving the property, the requirement is generally considered bona fide and reasonable, and findings of fact regarding such genuineness by the High Court are not to be lightly interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Must the requirements of good faith and reasonableness be read into Section 17(2)(vi) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963?
  • Does a landlord seeking eviction for reconstruction under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963 need to prove the requirement is reasonable and in good faith?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's finding of fact regarding the genuineness of a landlord's intent to reconstruct?
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• Rab Nawaz Khan Versus Administrator, Thal1988 SCMR 797 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-29Read full judgment →
• Asian Associated Agencies Versus Pakistan1988 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-01
  arbitration awardsale of goodsrejection of goodsjurisdiction of arbitratorserror of law on the face of the awardplace of delivery
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, registered bulk suppliers of chemicals, contracted with the respondents to supply 400 tons of BHC 12%. Disputes arose regarding the acceptability and specification of the goods, non-payment, and shipment procedures, leading to a reference to arbitration. The arbitrators rendered an award in favour of the appellants, which was subsequently made a rule of the court. Upon a Letters Patent Appeal, the High Court division bench set aside a part of the award, holding that the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction regarding the return of goods to Rotterdam. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction and whether the matter of the return of goods was referable to arbitration under the pleadings and issues. The Supreme Court held that the pleadings and issues properly encompassed the questions of conformity to specifications, rejection, and place of delivery, and that the consequential direction by the arbitrators was an appropriate exercise of relief based on the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court can look beyond an arbitration award to the pleadings and issues to determine the scope of matters referred to arbitration?
  • Whether the arbitrators exceed their jurisdiction by issuing a consequential direction regarding the return of rejected goods to the place of delivery?
  • Whether a buyer who takes delivery of goods at a foreign port and ships them to Pakistan can reject them without returning them to the place of delivery?
  • Whether an arbitration award suffers from an error of law on the face of the record when terms of the contract are not incorporated into the award?
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• Kassim Versus Deputy Commissioner, Sanghar1988 SCMR 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-02
  Rehabilitation Settlement Schemenatural justiceexcess land allotmentright of hearingadministrative lawresumption of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside a Settlement Commissioner's order regarding the resumption of excess land allotted under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The core legal question concerns whether excess land allotted under the Minimum Four Acres Allotment Scheme can be resumed from a claimant without notice or an opportunity to explain their failure to exercise the purchase option, and whether such resumption automatically invalidates subsequent re-allotments. The Supreme Court held that while the principles of natural justice require that a claimant be heard before excess land is resumed, the High Court erred in automatically restoring the original allottees' rights. The Court ruled that the matter must be remanded to the relevant authority to determine if the original allottees had a satisfactory explanation for their delay in payment. The key principle laid down is that administrative actions affecting property rights require strict adherence to natural justice, specifically providing notice and an opportunity to be heard before resuming land; however, such procedural violations do not automatically entitle the defaulting party to retain the land if their delay lacks a valid justification.

  Questions settled

  • Does the resumption of excess land under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme require prior notice to the allottee?
  • Can a court automatically restore an allotment after finding a procedural violation in the resumption process?
  • Is an allottee entitled to retain excess land if they failed to exercise the purchase option within the prescribed time?
  • Must administrative authorities provide an opportunity to explain delays before resuming land allotted under the Minimum Four Acres Allotment Scheme?
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• Halima Versus Muhammad Ramzan1988 SCMR 784 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-14Read full judgment →
• Jan Muhammad Versus Settlement Commissioner1988 SCMR 781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  restoration of revision applicationdismissal in defaultmisreading of recordsettlement commissionerconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These two connected appeals arose out of a dispute regarding the disposal of a building in Hyderabad, which was transferred to the appellant, Jan Muhammad, while respondents Nos. 2 and 3 sought its transfer as locals. The matter went through various proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner, resulting in the dismissal of revision applications in default and the subsequent refusal to restore them. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 challenged the refusal to restore their revision applications through constitutional petitions before the High Court, which accepted the petitions on the ground that the Settlement Commissioner failed to apply his mind to the facts of the restoration applications. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court on the premise that the High Court's decision was based on a misreading of the record concerning the identities of the applicants. Upon closer examination of the record, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had not misread the record, as the Settlement Commissioner indeed failed to advert to the actual grounds urged by the respondents for restoration. Consequently, the Court recalled the leave granting order and dismissed the appeals with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's finding regarding the non-application of mind by the Settlement Commissioner to a restoration application was vitiated by a misreading of the record?
  • Can an order of the Settlement Commissioner refusing to restore a revision application be sustained when it fails to advert to the grounds urged by the applicants?
  • What is the effect of the disappearance of the sole ground on which leave to appeal was granted?
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• University of Sind Versus Ahmed Bashir1988 SCMR 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-12
  compulsory retirementmartial law regulationjurisdictionfresh pleagazette notificationuniversity employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Sindh High Court which had allowed a constitutional petition filed by the respondent, a University professor, declaring his retirement under Martial Law Regulation No. 114 to be without lawful authority. The High Court had proceeded on the assumption that no retirement order had been issued by the President of Pakistan, as the relevant Gazette notification was not produced by the parties, leaving only the University Registrar's circular on record. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan noted that the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, dated 30-03-1972, containing the President's order under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 3 of Martial Law Regulation No. 114, was indeed produced and admitted by both parties. The Court held that since the President had validly exercised his powers, the High Court's factual assumption was incorrect. The Court further declined to entertain a fresh legal plea raised by the respondent's counsel for the first time regarding whether the University of Sindh constituted a 'corporation' under the Regulation, as this was not raised below. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and upheld the retirement order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a completely new legal plea for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not raised before the High Court?
  • Whether an order of retirement issued by the President under Martial Law Regulation No. 114 is valid if the corresponding Gazette notification is subsequently produced and admitted by the parties?
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• Suleman Versus M.A. Mallick1988 SCMR 775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-10Read full judgment →
• Ismail Versus Sher Bano1988 SCMR 772 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-28
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentpersonal bona fide needSind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979appellate jurisdictioncross-appealcross-objectionsmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from rent proceedings wherein the Rent Controller ordered the tenant's ejectment on the ground of personal bona fide need, while holding that default in payment of rent was not established. In the tenant's appeal before the High Court of Sindh, the learned Single Judge rejected the ground of personal need but reversed the Rent Controller's finding on default, concluding that the tenant was indeed a defaulter, and consequently dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court was competent to reverse the finding regarding default in the absence of a cross-appeal or cross-objections by the landlady. The Supreme Court held that since the eviction petition had already succeeded before the Rent Controller, the landlady was not required to file any cross-appeal or cross-objections. Under Section 21(3) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, the appellate court possesses full authority to scrutinize the record, correct erroneous findings based on misreading of evidence, and uphold an eviction order on an alternative ground. The tenant's appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court under Section 21(3) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 reverse an adverse finding against a successful landlord in the absence of a cross-appeal or cross-objections?
  • Is a landlord required to file a cross-appeal or cross-objections to support an eviction order on a ground decided against them by the Rent Controller?
  • Does the High Court possess the power in a rent appeal to uphold an eviction order by reversing an erroneous finding on rent default based on misreading of evidence?
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• Abdul Haq Afghan Versus Chief Secretary1988 SCMR 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-26
  service appealdepartmental representationmaintainabilityMartial LawSind Service Tribunalexhaustion of remediesprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the maintainability of a service appeal before the Sind Service Tribunal. The appellant challenged his service notification by filing a representation with the Chief Secretary. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as incompetent, ruling that the appellant failed to exhaust departmental remedies by not addressing his appeal to the Martial Law Administrator, who exercised the powers of the abolished Chief Minister. The Supreme Court addressed whether such a representation was legally sufficient in the absence of specific rules designating the competent authority at the relevant time. The Court held that where the office of the Chief Minister was abolished during Martial Law and no specific rule designated a successor authority for service appeals, a representation addressed to the Chief Secretary was valid. Consequently, the Tribunal erred in dismissing the appeal as incompetent. The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the case for a decision on the merits, establishing that procedural requirements for departmental appeals must be interpreted reasonably when specific designations are absent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before a Service Tribunal is incompetent if the departmental representation was addressed to the Chief Secretary instead of the Martial Law Administrator during the Martial Law period?
  • Does the absence of a specific rule designating an appellate authority during the Martial Law period render a representation addressed to the Chief Secretary legally invalid?
  • Is a Service Tribunal justified in dismissing an appeal as incompetent solely on the ground that the departmental representation was not addressed to the Martial Law Administrator?
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• Employees' Old Age Benefit Institution Versus National Industrial Relations Commission1988 SCMR 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-23
  trade union registrationindustrial relationsadministration of the statedefinition of industrysocial security institutionexclusion clauses
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the appellant institution's constitutional petition, which had challenged the National Industrial Relations Commission's order upholding the registration of respondent No. 3 as a trade union under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The core legal questions concerned whether the Employees' Old Age Benefit Institution fell outside the purview of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, either as being engaged in the 'administration of the State' or as an establishment maintained for the treatment or care of sick, infirm, destitute, or mentally unfit persons under section 1(3), or because its functions did not constitute 'industry' under section 2(xiv) of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the institution's employees are not excluded by clauses (b) or (f) of section 1(3) and that its functions constitute a 'service' falling within the definition of 'industry'. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs, establishing that statutory bodies providing old-age and social security benefits to workers are subject to labour laws under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of the Employees' Old Age Benefit Institution fall within the exclusion clause for persons employed in the administration of the State under Section 1(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does an institution established to provide old-age benefits to employees qualify as an establishment maintained for the treatment or care of sick, infirm, destitute or mentally unfit persons under Section 1(3)(f) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Do the functions performed by the Employees' Old Age Benefit Institution constitute 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
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• Allahdin Versus Alamuddin1988 SCMR 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-27
  benamidarrevision petitionfraudulent withdrawalintervenerindependent proceedingsproperty ownership dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the ownership of property originally purchased by respondent No. 1 in the names of others, who were alleged to be benamidars. Following a decree in favor of respondent No. 1, and subsequent appellate and revisional proceedings, the appellants intervened, claiming ownership through a gift from respondent No. 1 and alleging that respondent No. 1's withdrawal of his ownership claim in the revision proceedings was fraudulent. The High Court allowed the revision petition but directed that the appellants' claim be adjudicated in separate proceedings. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in declining to adjudicate the appellants' claim of fraudulent withdrawal within the existing revision proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court correctly refrained from recording elaborate evidence required to determine the validity of the alleged gift and the alleged fraud. The Court affirmed that the High Court's order did not prejudice the appellants' rights, as they remained free to ventilate their grievances in an independent, competent proceeding.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court in revision proceedings is obligated to adjudicate a claim of fraud raised by an intervener when such a claim requires the recording of extensive evidence?
  • Can an appellate or revisional court direct parties to resolve a disputed claim of ownership in separate proceedings rather than deciding it within the pending revision?
  • Does an order in revision proceedings that leaves open the possibility of an independent suit for an intervener prejudice their legal rights?
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• Government of Punjab Versus Jiwan1988 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-07
  land acquisitionThal Development Actsubsequent purchasersstatutory exemptionsretrospective effectwrit petitiondevelopment scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  These seven appeals, preferred by the Thal Development Authority and the Government of the Punjab, challenge a decision of the Lahore High Court which declared certain orders passed under section 21(2) of the Thal Development Act, 1949 to be illegal. The core legal question concerns whether purchasers of land from originally recorded owners subsequent to the issuance of acquisition notifications can claim the benefit of exemptions introduced into the statute by subsequent amendments. The Supreme Court held that since the initial acquisitions were without legal sanction and were validated only upon the promulgation of the Thal Development (Amendment) Act XX of 1955, the acquisitions and the statutory amendments came into effect at the same time, thereby negating any issue of retrospective application. The Court affirmed that subsequent purchasers are entitled to the statutory benefits and dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Can purchasers of land subsequent to an acquisition notification claim the benefit of exemptions introduced into the statute by subsequent amendments?
  • Do statutory amendments validating prior illegal land acquisitions take effect simultaneously with the validated acquisitions?
  • Whether the limitations and conditions contained in subsection (2) of section 21 apply to localities notified under section 36 of the Thal Development Act, 1949?
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• Ata Muhammad Versus Abdul Aziz1988 SCMR 759 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-25
  court fee deficiencyappellate procedurerent restrictionconstitutional jurisdictiondismissal of appealfiscal provisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a rent dispute where a tenant challenged an eviction order. The core legal question was whether an appellate authority, under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, could summarily dismiss an appeal for deficient court fees without first determining the exact amount due and granting the appellant a reasonable opportunity to rectify the deficiency. The Additional District Judge had dismissed the appeal as incompetent due to non-payment of court fees, a decision upheld by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court set aside these judgments, holding that the appellate authority erred by failing to follow the established procedure regarding court fees. The Court ruled that provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, are not intended to be used as penal measures to thwart adjudication. Instead, the presiding officer must determine the exact court fee payable, inform the appellant, and allow a reasonable time for compliance before dismissing the appeal. The case was remanded to the District Judge for proper determination and collection of the court fees.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate authority summarily dismiss an appeal for deficient court fees without first determining the exact amount payable and granting time for rectification?
  • Are the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, applicable to proceedings before an appellate authority under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, regarding the making up of court fee deficiencies?
  • Is the dismissal of an appeal for non-payment of court fees without providing an opportunity to rectify the deficiency a valid exercise of judicial discretion?
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• Abdul Rahim Versus Maqbool Ahmad1988 SCMR 758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-08Read full judgment →
• Zohra Begum Versus Pakistan Burmah Shell1988 SCMR 756 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Amir Hamza Versus State1988 SCMR 755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-17Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Hussain Zaidi Versus Muhammad Yaqinuddin1988 SCMR 753 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ejectmentpersonal uselandlord and tenantage proofNational Identity CardSind Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Sind High Court which had set aside the Rent Controller's order for the ejectment of the respondent. The appellant-landlord had sought eviction of the respondent from a commercial shop under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, on the grounds of attaining 60 years of age and personal requirement. The core legal question was whether the appellant had conclusively proved his age as 60 years at the time of filing the ejectment application to bring his case within the purview of section 14. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's National Identity Card, issued under the National Registration Act, 1973, is a public document carrying presumptive truth and corroborative probative value, which was not rebutted by any contrary evidence from the respondent. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Rent Controller's ejectment order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a National Identity Card issued under the National Registration Act of 1973 carries a presumption of truth as a public document to prove age in ejectment proceedings?
  • Can a party raise a new point before the Supreme Court that was never raised before the High Court?
  • Is the oral assertion of a tenant sufficient to rebut the documentary evidence of a landlord's age in a case under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim Versus Noor Bai1988 SCMR 751 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-19Read full judgment →
• Matloob Ali Khan Versus Additional District Judg,East Karachi.1988 SCMR 747 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ex parte decreefamily courtreasonable timelimitation periodultra viressubordinate legislationmaintenance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the setting aside of an ex parte maintenance decree passed by a Family Court. The appellant, a military officer, sought to set aside the decree, but lower courts dismissed his application as time-barred, applying the thirty-day limitation period prescribed by Rule 13 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965. The core legal question was whether this rule, which imposes a fixed limitation period, is consistent with Section 9(6) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, which permits such applications to be filed within a "reasonable time." The Supreme Court held that the rule-making authority cannot frame rules inconsistent with the parent statute. Since the Act expressly provides for a "reasonable time" standard, the subordinate rule imposing a fixed thirty-day limit is ultra vires the Act. The Court established the principle that subordinate legislation cannot override the express provisions of a statute, and the determination of "reasonable time" must depend on the facts of each case rather than a fixed rule of thumb. The matter was remanded for fresh adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Is Rule 13 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, ultra vires the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
  • Can subordinate legislation impose a fixed limitation period when the parent statute provides for a 'reasonable time'?
  • Does the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, prescribe a fixed period of limitation for setting aside an ex parte decree?
  Read full judgment →
• M . Murtaza Hussain Versus Muhammad Mustafa1988 SCMR 741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-14
  ejectment applicationappellate inquirysubsequent eventsadditional evidencerented premisesdiscretionary powercommercial premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment upholding an eviction order against the appellant. The core legal question was whether an appellate authority, acting under Section 21(3) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, is precluded from conducting a further inquiry into evidence that emerged after the Rent Controller's decision. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in ruling that such evidence is categorically inadmissible. The Court clarified that Section 21(3) vests discretionary power in the appellate authority to hold further inquiries when necessary for the ends of justice, and this power is not strictly limited by the technical constraints of Order XLI, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court may consider subsequent events or altered circumstances if they are relevant to the controversy and necessary to ensure a just adjudication. However, because the proposed evidence in this specific case was irrelevant to the disputed premises, the Court ultimately dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate authority under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 consider evidence that came into existence after the Rent Controller's decision?
  • Are the restrictions on producing additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to inquiries under Section 21(3) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Is an appellate court empowered to mould relief based on changed circumstances or subsequent events?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashfaq Khalid Versus Muhammad Hanif1988 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-18Read full judgment →
• Star Textile Mills Ltd. Versus Government of Sind1988 SCMR 732 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-26
  capital gains taxactual costdeductionsvacant possessiontenants compensationadditions or alterationsWest Pakistan Finance Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition regarding capital gains tax. The core legal question was whether compensation paid by the purchaser-assessee to tenants to secure vacant possession of a purchased property constitutes 'actual cost to the assessee' or 'expenditure of a capital nature incurred in making any additions or alterations' under Section 16(2)(b) of the West Pakistan Finance Act, 1963, and is thus deductible in computing capital gains. The Supreme Court held that payments made to tenants to induce them to vacate premises protected under tenancy laws do not qualify as actual cost or permissible capital expenditure for additions or alterations, noting that price escalation was due to general real estate market trends rather than structural alterations. The Court laid down the principle that only genuine purchase prices and legitimate, lawful expenditures directly forming part of the asset's acquisition, preservation, or authorized alteration can be factored into 'actual cost,' and payments made to circumvent tenancy protections or pressure tenants to vacate are neither legitimate nor deductible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether compensation paid to tenants to secure vacant possession of a property constitutes actual cost under Section 16(2)(b) of the West Pakistan Finance Act, 1963?
  • Can payments made to tenants to eject them from protected premises be classified as capital expenditure incurred in making additions or alterations to the property?
  • Whether general market price escalation of real estate can be attributed to structural alterations made by the assessee for the purpose of capital gains tax deductions?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Engineer, Building Department Versus Pakistan National Construction1988 SCMR 723 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-17
  arbitrationsole arbitratorjurisdictionwaiverestoppelacquiescenceextension of timegovernment contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute where the respondent company appointed a sole arbitrator after the appellant department failed to nominate theirs. The appellant initially participated in the proceedings, raised a misconceived jurisdictional objection, and later consented to a court-ordered extension of time under Section 28 of the Arbitration Act. The appellant subsequently challenged the award, asserting that the sole arbitrator lacked the qualifications specified in the arbitration clause. The Supreme Court held that while an inherent want of jurisdiction cannot be cured, an irregular assumption of jurisdiction or a defect in the nomination of an arbitrator (such as failing to meet subsidiary qualification criteria) is a curable irregularity. By participating in the proceedings and consenting to the extension of time without further protest, the appellant waived the right to object. The Court affirmed that such conduct binds the government on the principles of acquiescence, waiver, and estoppel.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a defect in the nomination of an arbitrator regarding subsidiary qualification clauses constitutes an inherent lack of jurisdiction or a curable irregularity?
  • Can a party challenge the jurisdiction of an arbitrator after consenting to a court extension of time for making the award?
  • Does the participation of a government official in arbitration proceedings bind the government under the principles of waiver and estoppel?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Muhammad Versus Habibullah Khan1988 SCMR 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-27Read full judgment →
• Chief Land Commissioner, Sind Versus Ghulam Hyder Shah1988 SCMR 715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-17
  land reformsretrospective legislationpast and closed transactionsvested rightssuo motu reviewbona fide transactiongift to non-heirs
  Summary & questions settled

  These two appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a common question of law regarding whether the Land Reforms Regulation (Sind Amendment) Ordinance 1972, which was made retrospective to 11th March 1972, could nullify land alienations previously declared valid under the unamended Land Reforms Regulation 1972 (M.L.R. 115). In both cases, the Land Commissioner had initially validated gifts made to non-heirs under paragraph 7(1)(b) of the unamended Regulation. Following the amendment, which barred the Commission from holding gifts to non-heirs as bona fide, the Land Commissioner reviewed and declared the gifts void. The High Court of Sind set aside these review orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that while the amending Ordinance was retrospective, it lacked express provisions or necessary intendment to reopen past and closed transactions. The Court laid down the principle that rights determined by judicial or quasi-judicial adjudication under existing law are vested and cannot be disturbed by subsequent legislative amendments unless such an intention is clearly expressed or arises by necessary implication.

  Questions settled

  • Does a retrospective amendment to a land reform regulation automatically reopen and nullify transactions that were already validated and closed under the unamended law?
  • Can a statutory authority use its review powers to apply a newly enacted legislative prohibition retrospectively to transactions it had already finalized?
  • Whether rights that have been determined by judicial or quasi-judicial adjudication can be disturbed by a subsequent change in law without express statutory language or necessary implication?
  Read full judgment →
• Saira Bai Versus Ants-Ur-Rehman1988 SCMR 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim Versus Jamil Ahmad1988 SCMR 708 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali Versus Hameeda Begum1988 SCMR 705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-27
  ejectmentrented premiseswidow's right to evictionpersonal uselandlord definitionstatutory interpretationinheritance rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, which was upheld by the High Court. The respondent, a widow and landlord, sought possession of the premises for personal use. The appellant challenged the eviction, contending that the special provision under Section 14(1) of the Ordinance, which permits a widow to seek eviction for personal use, was inapplicable because the respondent was not the sole heir of the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the provision is designed to mitigate hardship faced by widows and should not be construed narrowly to exclude widows who are not sole owners. The Court clarified that the term "landlord" includes persons authorized to receive rent, and an application by a widow for personal use does not prejudice the rights of other heirs in the property. The principle established is that a widow, even if not the sole heir, is entitled to invoke the special summary procedure for eviction under the Ordinance provided she is authorized to manage the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Can a widow who is not the sole heir of the deceased landlord invoke the special provision for eviction under Section 14(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the term 'landlord' under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, require the person to be the sole owner of the premises?
  • Does an application for eviction by a widow for personal use prejudice the property rights of other legal heirs?
  Read full judgment →
• M.A. Rahman Versus Federation of Pakistan1988 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-10
  quasi-judicial functionsdisciplinary proceedingsmisconductinefficiencycustoms adjudicationservice lawjudicial independence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that converted the appellant's dismissal from service into compulsory retirement. The appellant, a Collector of Customs, had been disciplined for allegedly failing to conduct further inquiries or remand a case while exercising quasi-judicial appellate powers under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether an erroneous decision, absent dishonesty, subjects a quasi-judicial functionary to disciplinary proceedings for misconduct or inefficiency. The Supreme Court held that disciplinary action cannot be used to penalize honest errors in quasi-judicial functions, as such functions must remain independent. The Court emphasized that the statutory mechanism for correcting judicial errors is through appeal or revision, not disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a single instance of error does not establish inefficiency under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, which requires a finding of lasting incapacity. Consequently, the Court set aside the penalty, establishing that quasi-judicial officers are immune from disciplinary action for bona fide errors in judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a quasi-judicial officer be subjected to disciplinary proceedings for an erroneous decision made in good faith?
  • Does a single instance of error or lapse in judgment constitute inefficiency under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  • Does the Board of Revenue have the authority to interfere with the quasi-judicial discretion of Customs officers under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Is it permissible for a Service Tribunal to convict a civil servant of a charge for which they were not originally charged?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Hussain Versus Hajra Begum1988 SCMR 690 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-17
  leave to appealstriking off defenceejectment orderdefault in rentrent controllerwilful defaulter
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Sind High Court, which upheld the striking off of the petitioner-tenant's defence and the subsequent ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller. The core legal question involves whether the tenant's failure to deposit monthly rent pursuant to the Rent Controller's order was justified by illness, and whether the courts below erred in rejecting the plea of default. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain the delay in depositing the rent, noting contradictory evidence regarding his illness and his ability to move and appear before the court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that unsubstantiated and contradictory pleas regarding illness do not constitute a valid defense against a finding of willful default in rent deposit matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictory evidence regarding a tenant's illness can justify a failure to deposit rent as ordered by the Rent Controller?
  • Can a Rent Controller strike off the defense of a tenant for non-compliance with a rent deposit order?
  • Whether the High Court's upholding of an ejectment order based on a finding of willful default warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Hussain Versus State Noor Ahmad1988 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-25Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad Versus Ahmad Nasir Khan1988 SCMR 689 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-07Read full judgment →
• Zaka Ullah Khan Versus Muhammad Aslam1988 SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-20Read full judgment →
• Government of Sind Versus Nazir Ahmad Siddiqui1988 SCMR 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-14
  service tribunalmedical reimbursementmedical treatment abroadgovernment servantsrules relaxationdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court challenged the judgment of the Sind Service Tribunal, which had allowed the respondent government servant's claim for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred abroad. The core legal question was whether a government servant could claim reimbursement of medical expenses incurred abroad as a matter of right under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1959, and whether rule 14 permitted such a claim through relaxation. The Supreme Court held that the grant or refusal of medical expenses for treatment abroad by way of relaxation of the rules under rule 14 is entirely discretionary with the government and cannot be claimed as of right by a government servant, nor was prior sanction obtained in this case. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the Tribunal's judgment set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant claim reimbursement of medical expenses incurred abroad as a matter of right under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1959?
  • Is the relaxation of the West Pakistan Government Servants (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1959 for medical treatment abroad a discretionary power of the government?
  • Must a government servant apply for sanction in relaxation of the rules before proceeding abroad for medical treatment?
  Read full judgment →
• Hajra Bai Versus Azmatullah1988 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi Versus Pakistan International Airlines Corporation1988 SCMR 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-26
  evictiondefault in rentletter of attornmentintimation of transferrented premisesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging an impugned judgment of the High Court which allowed an appeal against an eviction order passed in favor of the petitioner. The core legal questions relate to whether valid intimation of the transfer of rented premises was given to the corporate tenant under section 18 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, and whether the tenant committed default in the payment of rent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions regarding the proper perspective of default and the sufficiency of notice to the occupant on behalf of the tenant require detailed examination. The key principle laid down is that the service of a letter of attornment upon an officer occupying the premises requires judicial examination to determine whether it constitutes a valid intimation of transfer under the relevant rent laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether service of a letter of attornment on the Chief Medical Officer of a corporate tenant constitutes a valid intimation of transfer of premises under section 18 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Did the tenant commit a default in the payment of rent warranting eviction under section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Bakar Versus Khatoon Hajin Kala Alias Kala Begum1988 SCMR 677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-31
  ejectmentrent controllerpersonal needconcurrent findings of factlandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the High Court of Sindh, which affirmed an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller against the petitioner. The respondent, as the widow of the deceased owner, sought the eviction of the petitioner from two shops on the grounds of personal need, asserting that she did not own or possess any other commercial property. Both the Rent Controller and the High Court concurrently found that the respondent was indeed a widow and that she did not own any other shops, thereby justifying the eviction order. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the respondent's status and her personal requirement for the premises were legally sustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any error of law or misappraisal of evidence. The Court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts, which suffer from no legal infirmity, are not subject to interference in leave to appeal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by a Rent Controller and the High Court be challenged in a petition for leave to appeal without demonstrating an error of law?
  • Is a widow entitled to seek the ejectment of a tenant from commercial premises based on personal need if she owns no other similar property?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Ahma Versus Ishrat Ali Siddiqi1988 SCMR 676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-08Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Glass Industries Labour Welfare Union, Hyderabad Versus Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.VI, Hyderabad1988 SCMR 674 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif Siddiqi Versus Government of Pakistan1988 SCMR 673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-27
  service tribunalgovernment servantsefficiency and disciplineinquiry procedureleave to grantnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 16-9-1984. The core legal question raised before the court was whether the proper procedure mandated under rule 6 of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973 was duly followed, specifically regarding the conduct of a proper inquiry and the provision of an adequate opportunity of hearing, as opposed to an inquisitorial procedure involving a questionnaire and cross-examination. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contentions raised require detailed examination and accordingly granted leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary proceedings against government servants must strictly adhere to the prescribed inquiry procedures and afford a proper opportunity of hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the procedure laid down in rule 6 of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973 was followed when an Inquiry Officer proceeds by issuing a questionnaire instead of holding a proper inquiry?
  • Does the use of an inquisitorial questionnaire and cross-examination on it satisfy the requirement of a proper opportunity of hearing for a government servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Ahsan Versus Government of Sind1988 SCMR 671 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-26
  aggrieved personlocus standiconstitutional petitionland allotmentGrow More Food Schemeburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition filed by the petitioner seeking the permanent grant of land allegedly leased to him under the Grow More Food Scheme. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had established his status as an 'aggrieved person' entitled to challenge the administrative decisions regarding the land in question. The High Court had found that the petitioner failed to provide documentary evidence linking him to the land, noting that the relevant notices and records referred to a different individual, Haji Mahmoodul Hassan, rather than the petitioner. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the inferences drawn by the lower court regarding the lack of entitlement were sound and based on the documents provided. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of proof of identity or entitlement to the disputed property, the petitioner lacked the necessary locus standi to maintain the constitutional petition. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that a petitioner must clearly establish their legal interest in the subject matter to qualify as an aggrieved party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner maintain a constitutional petition without establishing their identity as the person to whom land was originally allotted?
  • Does a mere oral assertion of identity suffice to establish locus standi when official records name a different individual?
  • Is a finding of fact by the High Court regarding a petitioner's identity subject to interference by the Supreme Court if based on sound inferences?
  Read full judgment →
• Shirin Begum Versus Habib Bhai1988 SCMR 670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-07Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad Versus Muhammad Tahir1988 SCMR 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-03
  leave to appealacquittalmurderocular testimonyrecovery evidencenighttime occurrencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court acquitting respondents Muhammad Tahir, Muhammad Suleman, Muhammad Shafique, and Muhammad Siddique of charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, after they had been convicted by the trial court. The core legal question concerns the appreciation of ocular testimony, motive, and recovery evidence in a criminal trial involving a nighttime murder where torches were not mentioned in the First Information Report. The Supreme Court held that the High Court properly evaluated the evidence, noting that the recovery evidence and ocular testimony could not be safely relied upon due to the dark night occurrence and the introduction of torches as an afterthought. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that concurrent findings of an appellate court regarding the unreliability of ocular and recovery evidence in nighttime offences will not be interfered with absent substantial legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal judgment of the High Court based on the appreciation of ocular and recovery evidence?
  • Can ocular testimony be relied upon in a nighttime occurrence when the use of a source of light like a torch is omitted from the First Information Report?
  • Does the presence of a motive alone suffice to maintain a conviction when the direct evidence has been disbelieved by the appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Ahmed Silk Mills Ltd. Versus Director, Sind Employees' Social Security Institution1988 SCMR 668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-26
  social security contributionarrears of land revenuecoercive recoverystatutory appealdisputed claimleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment regarding the recovery of social security contributions. The petitioners, a private limited company, were assessed for contributions under the Sind Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965. Following a surprise inspection, the respondent assessed contributions for the period 1982 to 1986 and initiated recovery proceedings as arrears of land revenue under the Land Revenue Act 1967. The petitioners challenged the recovery process, arguing that the authorities could not initiate coercive recovery measures for a disputed claim without first allowing the statutory period for complaints or appeals under the Ordinance to expire or obtaining a final order under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the respondents were legally obligated to await the exhaustion of statutory remedies under sections 57 and 67 of the Sind Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 before invoking coercive land revenue recovery procedures for disputed contribution claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can coercive recovery proceedings for social security contributions be initiated as arrears of land revenue while a claim is still disputed?
  • Are authorities under the Sind Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 required to wait for the exhaustion of statutory appeal periods before initiating coercive recovery?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ahmad Versus State1988 SCMR 666 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-29
  smugglingcustoms Actquashment of proceedingscriminal proceduredefinition of smuggled goodsspecial judge customs
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether a motor vehicle not specifically notified or specified under sub-clause (a) of clause (s) of section 2 of the Customs Act, 1969, can be considered 'smuggled' and lead to prosecution under section 156(1), clauses (77) and (89) read with section 178 of the same Act. The appellant sought the quashment of proceedings pending before the Special Judge Customs under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 read with section 185-F of the Customs Act, contending that the car was not covered by any notification. The Supreme Court held that sub-clause (b) of section 2(s) of the Customs Act operates independently to cover goods brought into Pakistan by routes other than those declared under sections 9 or 10 or from places other than a customs-station, and failure to notify under sub-clause (a) does not render sub-clause (b) redundant. The Court affirmed that prosecution evidence regarding the clandestine entry of the vehicle must be tested at trial and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether goods not notified or specified under sub-clause (a) of clause (s) of section 2 of the Customs Act, 1969 can be considered smuggled under sub-clause (b) of the same section?
  • Can criminal proceedings under the Customs Act, 1969 be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when factual questions regarding the illegal importation of goods remain to be determined at trial?
  • Does sub-clause (b) of section 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969 become redundant if goods are not notified under sub-clause (a)?
  Read full judgment →
• Asad Brothers Versus Ibadat Yar Khan1988 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-03
  evictiondefault in rentwater chargesBetterment Taxstriking off defenceSind Rented Premises Ordinanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of an eviction application filed by the respondent-landlord against the petitioner-tenant on the ground of default in payment of water, conservancy charges, and Betterment Tax. The Rent Controller directed the petitioner to deposit arrears and future monthly payments of water charges and Betterment Tax under section 16(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Upon a minor delay and partial non-compliance, the Rent Controller struck off the petitioner's defence and ordered eviction, a decision affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that substantial legal questions were raised regarding the legality and justification of the Rent Controller's order under section 16(1), the propriety of ordering future monthly deposits without prayer, and whether the defence could be struck off without affording an opportunity to show that non-compliance was not wilful or that the underlying order was unsustainable. The appeal was admitted for regular hearing with a stay of eviction conditional upon continued deposits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order made by a Rent Controller under section 16(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance for the deposit of water charges and Betterment Tax, including future monthly deposits, is in accordance with the law when such charges are otherwise payable annually?
  • Whether the Rent Controller was justified in ordering future monthly deposits of water charges and Betterment Tax when no such prayer was made by the landlord in his application?
  • Whether it was open to the Rent Controller to strike off the tenant's defence without giving an opportunity to establish that the deposit order was illegal and unjustified or that the failure to comply was not wilful?
  • Whether the High Court erred in holding that a tenant cannot urge that a deposit order under section 16(1) was on merits unjustified until the final adjudication of the rent application?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan Versus State1988 SCMR 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-26Read full judgment →
• Farzand Ali Versus State1988 SCMR 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-25Read full judgment →
• Khushi Muhammad Versus Muhammad Jamil1988 SCMR 659 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-20
  leave to appealmurdersudden fightculpable homicide not amounting to murderattempt to murdermisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant side and the State against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which partly allowed the respondents' appeal by setting aside their convictions under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and instead convicting them under sections 304-I and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 with reduced sentences, based on the applicability of Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court committed serious errors resulting in a miscarriage of justice by applying Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in the absence of a "fight," whether there was misreading of evidence, and whether the benefit of Exception 4 could be partially applied. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions, holding that arguable points of law regarding the correct application of Exception 4 and appreciation of evidence warranted a full hearing, while issuing orders regarding the custody and bailable warrants of the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of a "fight" precludes the application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the High Court committed misreading and non-consideration of evidence resulting in a miscarriage of justice?
  • Whether an accused can be granted the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when only some of its conditions are satisfied?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Razzaq Mania Versus State1988 SCMR 653 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-28Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ahmed Versus Asghar Ali1988 SCMR 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-21Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghaffar Versus Sakhi Sultan1988 SCMR 649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-05Read full judgment →
• Fazal Rabi Versus State1988 SCMR 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-24
  criminal appealmurderattempted murderbenefit of the doubtmedical evidenceocular testimonyidentification in lightre-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave from the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, whereby the appellant's conviction and sentence under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and attempted murder were upheld. The core legal questions involved whether the medical evidence conflicted with the ocular account and site plan, and whether the identification of the assailants under the alleged electric bulb light was credible. The Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted the appeal and acquitted the appellant on the ground that the medical evidence regarding skin-deep injuries was inconsistent with firing from a close range as shown in the site plan, and that the evidence concerning the electric bulb used for identification was a fabricated and cooked-up piece of evidence. The key principle laid down is that where material contradictions exist between the ocular version, medical evidence, and site plan, and the source of identification of the accused is doubtful, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused leading to an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether medical evidence showing superficial skin-deep injuries is consistent with close-range firearm firing?
  • Can an accused's conviction be sustained when the sole source of identification is found to be a fabricated and planted piece of evidence?
  • Does a contradiction between the site plan and the medical testimony render the prosecution's case doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Alamgir Versus State1988 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-22
  sudden fightculpable homicidepremeditationself-defencecriminal appealsentence reductionproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that upheld the appellants' convictions for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question concerns whether the incident constituted premeditated murder or a sudden fight, given that both the appellants and the victims sustained injuries during the altercation over a property dispute. The Supreme Court found that the incident arose from a sudden, unpremeditated fight between closely related parties at the spur of the moment, rather than a planned attack. Consequently, the Court held that the conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was inappropriate. The Court modified the conviction of one appellant to Section 304-I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the other to Section 308, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, setting aside the convictions under Section 324/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principle laid down is that where a fatal incident occurs during a sudden, unpremeditated fight in which both parties sustain injuries, the offense is more appropriately classified as culpable homicide not amounting to murder rather than premeditated murder.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sudden, unpremeditated fight between parties resulting in injuries to both sides negate the charge of premeditated murder?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be converted to Section 304-I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the incident is found to be a sudden fight?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a sentence of imprisonment for a sudden fight?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam Masood Versus State1988 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-04
  bail refusalnarcotics smugglingCustoms Actleave to appealcriminal liabilitycarrier of contraband
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which refused to grant bail to the petitioner. The petitioner was charged under the Customs Act 1969 for allegedly attempting to smuggle 27.89 kilograms of heroin concealed within water coolers. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner, who contended he was merely a carrier of the contraband, was entitled to the grant of bail in the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court, after hearing the arguments presented by the petitioner's counsel, held that the case did not warrant interference with the High Court's order refusing bail. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The judgment reinforces the principle that the role of a 'mere carrier' in large-scale narcotics smuggling does not automatically entitle an accused to bail, and appellate courts will not interfere with lower court bail refusals unless a compelling case for such intervention is established.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person charged with smuggling a large quantity of heroin entitled to bail merely on the ground that they acted as a carrier?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order refusing bail in a narcotics smuggling case where the petitioner is a carrier?
  Read full judgment →
• Naeem Sabir Moghal Versus Nizam Alias Nizamuddin1988 SCMR 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-30
  leave to appealplea of alibire-appraisal of evidenceocular testimonyacquittalmurdercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the acquittal of seven respondents by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sind in a murder case. The petitioner, whose brother was killed, alleges that the High Court erroneously accepted the respondents' pleas of alibi despite evidence suggesting that hospital records were interpolated and court proceedings manipulated to fabricate these defenses. The petitioner contends that the High Court failed to properly weigh the ocular testimony of two injured witnesses who consistently supported the prosecution's case. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency of evidence required to sustain a plea of alibi and the extent to which appellate courts should re-appraise evidence when trial courts rely on potentially fabricated alibi defenses. The Supreme Court, finding that the petitioner made a prima facie case regarding the validity of the alibi claims and the weight of the ocular evidence, granted leave to appeal. The Court held that a re-appraisal of the evidence and a re-examination of the established case law regarding the plea of alibi are necessary to ensure justice.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances should an appellate court re-appraise evidence in a criminal acquittal?
  • What is the evidentiary standard required to substantiate a plea of alibi in a criminal trial?
  • Does the failure to produce the treating doctor in support of a medical alibi render the plea unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazidino Versus State1988 SCMR 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-13
  illegal gratificationbenefit of doubtcorruptioncriminal appealappreciation of evidencehostile witnesstainted money
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for allegedly demanding illegal gratification. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently established the demand and acceptance of the bribe, particularly given that the tainted money was recovered from a co-accused and the complainant’s testimony was inconsistent. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The Court observed that the complainant provided contradictory statements during examination-in-chief and cross-examination, and a key prosecution witness was declared hostile. The Court emphasized the cardinal principle of criminal justice that the benefit of every statement favoring the accused must be extended to them. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, ruling that the mere recovery of documents and the filing of an F.I.R. were insufficient to sustain a conviction without reliable, corroborative evidence of the alleged demand and acceptance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a bribe-giver is sufficient to sustain a conviction for illegal gratification?
  • Does the benefit of doubt apply when a complainant provides contradictory statements during trial?
  • Is the recovery of documents from an accused sufficient to establish guilt for demanding a bribe in the absence of proof of demand and acceptance?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Sattar Shah Versus Ali Ahmad1988 SCMR 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-19
  rented premisesex parte evictionstriking off defenceremand orderreasonable excusenatural justiceservice of notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Sind High Court dismissing an appeal against an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller was justified in striking off the appellant's defence and passing an ex parte eviction order due to the appellant's failure to appear and file a written statement on a specific date, despite the appellant not receiving the required notice of that date. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller's decision was based on a factual misconception, as the Deputy Registrar had failed to issue the mandatory notice to the parties as directed by the High Court in its remand order. Consequently, the appellant's absence was not willful or contumacious. The Court established the principle that punitive provisions, such as those in Section 19(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, cannot be invoked to strike off a defence where a party has a reasonable excuse for non-appearance, particularly when the failure to appear stems from a lack of notice required by the court's own directions. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller strike off a tenant's defence for non-appearance when the tenant did not receive the mandatory notice of the hearing date?
  • Does the failure to file a written statement on a specific date constitute a willful default if the party was not notified of that date?
  • Are the punitive provisions of Section 19(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 applicable when a party has a reasonable excuse for non-appearance?
  Read full judgment →
• State Versus Zamarrud Begum1988 SCMR 632 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-12
  leave to appealconstructive liabilitycommon intentionacquittalappreciation of evidencepre-concert
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against a judgment of the High Court, which had acquitted the respondents of charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondents had been initially convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge for their alleged role in holding the deceased while a co-accused inflicted a fatal knife injury. The core legal question was whether the High Court's acquittal, based on an appreciation of evidence regarding the lack of pre-concert or common intention, warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's decision was based on a sound appreciation of evidence. The Court affirmed that where the prosecution fails to establish common intention or pre-concert, and the incident appears to have occurred suddenly without prior enmity, convictions based on constructive liability cannot be sustained. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with a High Court's factual findings when no substantial question of law is presented.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court judgment based solely on the appreciation of evidence where no question of law arises?
  • Can a conviction based on constructive liability be sustained when the prosecution fails to establish common intention or pre-concert between the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan Versus Furqan Ahmad Qureshi1988 SCMR 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-26
  overseas employment promoter's licenceemigrationcancellation of licencefresh applicationrenewal of licenceconstitutional petitionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court challenged a judgment of the High Court of Sind which had declared an order rejecting an Overseas Employment Promoter's licence to be without lawful authority and directed the issuance of the licence. The core legal question concerned whether an application by a formerly licensed entity whose licence was previously cancelled should be treated as a fresh application for a grant of licence under Section 12 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979 or as a renewal, and whether the High Court could substitute its own discretion for that of the statutory authority. The Supreme Court held that the respondent had elected to apply for a fresh licence on prescribed forms rather than seeking a renewal, and therefore the authorities were required to evaluate the application as a fresh grant rather than treating it as a restoration of the old licence. However, because the authorities themselves appeared influenced by the historical facts of the cancelled licence and mischaracterized the application as misconceived, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter to the Director-General for a fresh decision in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for an Overseas Employment Promoter's licence following the cancellation of a previous licence is to be treated as an application for a fresh grant or as an application for renewal?
  • Can the High Court substitute its own discretion in place of the statutory authority and order the issuance of a licence directly?
  • Whether the statutory authority can refuse a fresh licence application on grounds pertaining to the historical facts of a previously cancelled licence when the applicant has abandoned a claim for renewal?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Sind Versus Shafiullah Qureshi1988 SCMR 620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-11Read full judgment →
• Niamat Ali Versus Muhammad Yaqub1988 SCMR 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-04
  grave and sudden provocationculpable homicidecriminal revisionenhancement of sentenceappellate interferenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a criminal revision petition seeking the enhancement of sentences awarded to the respondent. The respondent had been tried for murder and attempted murder but was convicted by the trial court under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, based on a finding of grave and sudden provocation. The core legal question was whether the trial court's decision to convict under Section 304 rather than Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 warranted interference or a retrial. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly juxtaposed the prosecution and defense versions, concluding that the respondent acted under grave and sudden provocation upon discovering his wife in an immoral act. Finding no inconsistency in the lower courts' reasoning, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the trial court's assessment of evidence regarding provocation and loss of self-control did not merit appellate interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court's finding of grave and sudden provocation be interfered with if the reasoning is consistent with the circumstances of the case?
  • Is a retrial appropriate when a complainant previously sought only the enhancement of a sentence in a criminal revision petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Versus State1988 SCMR 619 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-26
  kidnappingrapeminor victimconsent of minorcorroboration of evidenceappreciation of evidencesentence reductioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal conviction for kidnapping and rape. The petitioner was convicted by the trial court under Sections 363 and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with sentences of three and seven years respectively. The High Court maintained the convictions but reduced the sentence for the rape charge to three years, citing the prolonged litigation period, and granted the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that the prosecutrix's testimony was unreliable due to medical evidence suggesting prior sexual experience and that the delay in proceedings warranted further sentence reduction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the prosecutrix's testimony was corroborated by forensic chemical analysis and that the victim's minority rendered her consent immaterial. The Court affirmed that the appreciation of evidence by lower courts was sound and that the petitioner failed to substantiate claims regarding trial delay. The judgment reinforces that the consent of a minor is legally irrelevant in cases of kidnapping and rape, and that appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on reliable evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is the consent of a minor victim legally relevant in a prosecution for kidnapping and rape?
  • Can a conviction for rape be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix when corroborated by forensic evidence?
  • Does the mere passage of time during litigation automatically entitle a convict to a reduction of sentence to the period already undergone?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Versus State1988 SCMR 617 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-17
  acquittalbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidenceleave to appealinjured witnesscorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner-complainant against the judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondent of a charge under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, after the trial court had initially convicted him while acquitting his co-accused. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's appreciation of evidence and the grant of the benefit of the doubt to the respondent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court's judgment was well-discussed and based on a proper appreciation of evidence, noting that the testimony of the sole injured witness required strong corroboration given the acquittal of co-accused and failure to examine material eye-witnesses, which corroboration was lacking. The petition raised no substantial question of law and was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a sole injured witness requires strong corroboration when co-accused are acquitted and material eye-witnesses are not examined?
  • Does the High Court's appreciation of evidence warrant interference by the Supreme Court when based on sound reasoning and benefit of the doubt?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when no substantial question of law is raised from the acquittal judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Versus Azhar Mahmood1988 SCMR 615 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-29
  grave and sudden provocationculpable homicidemurderself-controlcriminal appealobjective test
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court decision granting the respondent the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, thereby reducing a murder conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The core legal question was whether the respondent’s act of killing the deceased, following a verbal altercation and a physical fight, constituted grave and sudden provocation sufficient to deprive a reasonable person of self-control. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its application of the law. The Court determined that the provocation—being called a 'Chamcha'—was not of such gravity as to deprive an ordinary person of self-control. Furthermore, the Court observed that the incident occurred in two distinct stages: an initial fight and a subsequent, deliberate act of firing after the deceased had retreated. The Court established that the test for grave and sudden provocation is objective, requiring that the provocation would upset a person of ordinary sense and calmness, rather than a hyper-sensitive individual. Consequently, the conviction was altered to Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the sentence was modified to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'Chamcha' constitute grave and sudden provocation sufficient to reduce murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  • What is the objective test for determining if provocation is grave and sudden enough to deprive an offender of self-control?
  • Can an act of killing be considered a result of grave and sudden provocation if it occurs after the initial altercation has ceased and the victim has retreated?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf Khan Versus Chairman, Federal Land Commissioner1988 SCMR 611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-20
  Land Reforms Regulationdower deedalienation of landrevenue recordconstitutional jurisdictionremandright to be heard
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from proceedings under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (No.115), where the appellant challenged the rejection of his claims to exclude certain land alienations from his declared land holdings. The Land Commission authorities had refused to recognize these alienations—transfers of land in lieu of dower—solely because the underlying deeds were unregistered and not reflected in the revenue records. The High Court upheld this refusal, declining to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, however, held that the Land Commission erred by relying exclusively on the absence of registration and revenue entries to invalidate the alienations, without considering other evidence or the rights of the alienees. The Court emphasized that the alienees were necessary parties who should have been heard. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the matter to the Federal Land Commission. The Commission was directed to re-examine the claims, specifically considering the civil court declaratory decrees and ensuring the alienees are afforded an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can the validity of a dower deed be denied by the Land Commission solely due to the absence of registration or entry in revenue records?
  • Are alienees of land whose rights are in jeopardy necessary parties who must be heard in land reform proceedings?
  • Is the Land Commission obligated to consider civil court declaratory decrees when determining the validity of land alienations?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdus Salam Versus Additional District Judge, Jhang1988 SCMR 608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-07Read full judgment →
• Ali Nawaz Alias Aliya Versus State1988 SCMR 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-21
  abductioncommon objectcommon intentiongrievous hurtalteration of convictioncriminal appealbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Punjab Special Court for Speedy Trial, convicting six appellants for rioting, abduction, and causing grievous and simple injuries. The core legal questions involved whether the short distance of movement constituted abduction under section 365, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the co-accused shared a common object or intention for the principal offender's specific brutal act of gouging the victim's eyes. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, holding that the short distance from the initial encounter to the Dera did not constitute abduction, thereby acquitting all appellants of that charge. Furthermore, the Court held that the co-accused did not share the common intention or knowledge regarding the principal accused's independent act of gouging the victim's eyes with a piece of brick found at the scene, setting aside their convictions for those grievous injuries. The principal accused's conviction was altered from section 326 to section 325, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and convictions for simple hurt were maintained where active participation was established. The key principle laid down is that participation in a general scuffle does not automatically impute shared common intent or object for distinct, unforeseen brutal acts independently committed by a co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does moving a victim over a very short distance following a sudden encounter constitute the offence of abduction under section 365 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can co-accused be held vicariously liable under section 149 or section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for an unforeseen and independent brutal act committed by the principal offender?
  • Whether the offence of causing grievous injury with a piece of brick already lying at the spot falls under section 326 or section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Karim Versus State1988 SCMR 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-25Read full judgment →
• Settlement Commissioner (Land), Punjab Versus Muhammad Amjad Parvaiz1988 SCMR 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-29
  settlement of claimsagricultural land allotmentevacuee propertyunauthorized transferadministrative negligenceconstitutional petitioncompromise order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that directed the Settlement Department to implement a compromise agreement regarding the allotment of agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the respondents were entitled to the confirmation of land allotments under a previous agreed order of the High Court, which required their claim to be pending in the specific estate at the time of the writ petition's institution. The Settlement Commissioner argued that the claim was not pending in the estate, thereby disqualifying the respondents. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were entitled to the land. The Court reasoned that the claim had been verified and was within the district's Settlement Department's jurisdiction, but was subject to an unauthorized transfer to Lahore. The Court established the principle that the Settlement Department cannot rely on the failure or negligence of its own functionaries to defeat a claimant's entitlement when all other conditions for allotment are satisfied. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Settlement Department deny a claimant's entitlement based on the failure of its own functionaries to process a claim?
  • Does an unauthorized transfer of a claim to another district defeat the claimant's entitlement to land in the original estate?
  • Is a claimant entitled to land allotment when their claim was verified and present in the district but mishandled by the department?
  Read full judgment →
• Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan Versus Muhammad Sharif1988 SCMR 597 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-21
  service terminationdisciplinary proceedingsmaster and servantstatutory interpretationcompetent authoritymisconductcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, an employee of the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, had his services terminated under Staff Services Regulation No. 13(1), which allows for termination without assigning reasons upon payment of salary in lieu of notice. The respondent challenged this termination in a civil suit, arguing that because the Bank internally considered him corrupt, it was legally obligated to proceed under Staff Services Regulation No. 95, which governs disciplinary proceedings for misconduct. The lower courts ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that the Bank could not bypass the disciplinary procedure of Regulation 95 when the underlying reason for termination was alleged corruption. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the Bank had the discretion to choose between the two regulations. The Court held that the Bank possesses two distinct powers under its regulations, and in the absence of a specific legal bar, the competent authority may elect to terminate services under Regulation 13 rather than initiating disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 95, provided the action is not mala fide. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower court decisions and dismissed the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer choose to terminate an employee's services under a general termination clause instead of initiating disciplinary proceedings for misconduct?
  • Does the existence of an internal allegation of corruption legally compel an employer to proceed under disciplinary regulations rather than a general termination clause?
  • Is an employer's decision to terminate service under a general termination clause invalid if the employer previously considered disciplinary action?
  • Under what circumstances can an employer's choice between two available modes of termination be challenged?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed Ahmad Versus State1988 SCMR 594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-21
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidenceoutraging modestygrievous hurtattempted murderspeedy trial court
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Court convicting five appellants for rioting, house trespass, attempted murder, and outraging the modesty of a woman. The core legal question involves the appreciation of ocular and medical evidence to determine the guilt of the appellants and the correct penal provision applicable to the assault. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the guilt of four appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on consistent eyewitness and medical testimony, while granting the benefit of doubt to the fifth appellant who was empty-handed. Furthermore, the Court held that the charge of attempted murder was not made out as the intention was to beat and disgrace rather than kill, substituting the conviction under section 307 with section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The key principle laid down is that the specific intent requisite for attempted murder must be clearly established from the facts, and where the evidence points to an intention to cause grievous hurt and humiliation rather than death, the conviction must be altered accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the charge of attempted murder is sustainable when the evidence establishes an intention to beat and disgrace rather than to kill?
  • Can a conviction under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code be altered to section 325 upon re-evaluation of the medical and ocular evidence?
  • Should an accused be granted the benefit of doubt when the First Information Report does not attribute any specific overt act or weapon to her?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Ahmad Versus State1988 SCMR 591 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-09
  death penaltymitigation of sentencesudden provocationcriminal appealmurderfirearm injury
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the appellant challenged the imposition of the death penalty. The core legal question was whether the death sentence was appropriate given that the prosecution's motive was based on remote, seven-to-eight-year-old litigation and the occurrence was preceded by an exchange of abuses, potentially suggesting sudden provocation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the death sentence was proper and well-deserved. The Court reasoned that the appellant was armed with a firearm, which he deployed at close range, causing fatal injuries to the deceased's chest, lungs, and liver. The Court emphasized that the presence of a lethal weapon and the deliberate act of firing at close range negated the argument for mitigation based on the exchange of abuses. The principle established is that the mere exchange of verbal abuse does not mitigate a sentence of death when the accused is armed with a lethal weapon and acts with clear intent to cause fatal injury at close range.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exchange of verbal abuses between parties immediately preceding a fatal shooting constitute sufficient grounds to mitigate a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is the death penalty appropriate for a murder conviction where the accused was armed with a firearm and fired at close range, despite a remote motive?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan Versus Ghulam1988 SCMR 590 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Niaz Ahmad, Manager, Wood Working A.A. Factory P.O.F. Board, Wah Cantt. Versus Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Regulation Wing, Islamabad1988 SCMR 587 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-09
  service tribunalpremature incrementsnational pay scaleengineering graduaterecruitment rulescivil servantsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, arising from a decision of the Service Tribunal dated 23rd October 1983, examined whether the appellant, employed as a Manager in the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board and holding an AMIE qualification recognized as equivalent to a B.Sc. Engineering degree, was entitled to five premature increments under a Finance Division Office Memorandum granting such benefits to NPS-17 posts of engineers where the prescribed minimum qualification is graduation in engineering. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit because the recruitment rules and conditions applicable to holders of the AMIE qualification required undergoing a two-year training as a trainee before induction, distinguishing them from direct recruits possessing a basic minimum B.Sc. Engineering degree. The court laid down the principle that eligibility for beneficial dispensations regarding pay scales depends strictly on the recruitment rules and the specific category and minimum qualifications prescribed for the post held by the civil servant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee holding an AMIE qualification equivalent to a B.Sc. Engineering degree is entitled to premature increments under the Office Memorandum for NPS-17 engineering posts?
  • Does the requirement of completing a training period as a trainee before final appointment affect eligibility for premature increments under the Office Memorandum?
  • What determines the minimum qualification for a post for the purpose of claiming beneficial pay scale dispensations under service law?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Rahman & Sons Ltd. Versus Muhammad Afzal1988 SCMR 585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-21
  leave to appealtransfer of servicesindustrial disputelabour courttermination of employmentsolvent extraction plant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute where the Federal Government, after taking over the management of a vegetable ghee mill under the Hydrogenated Vegetable Oil Industry (Control and Development) Act, 1973, sold its solvent extraction plant to a private entity. The registered sale-deed transferred the services of 140 workers, including the contesting respondents, who were employed at the plant, to the vendee on the same terms and conditions. The respondents challenged this transfer under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, arguing it amounted to termination and placed them at a disadvantage. While the Labour Court dismissed the petitions, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal directed that the workers be given options to choose their employer, a decision upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to examine whether the Appellate Tribunal could legally interfere with the transfer of services of workers who were factually employed at the sold plant at the relevant date, and suspended the operation of the Tribunal's order in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the services of workers employed in a specific section of an industrial undertaking can be legally transferred to a vendee upon the sale of that section?
  • Can the Labour Appellate Tribunal direct an employer to offer options of transfer to workers when they are factually on the strength of the sold plant at the time of sale?
  • Does the transfer of services of employees to a vendee on the same terms and conditions of service amount to an illegal termination of employment?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani Versus State1988 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-28Read full judgment →
• Nawab Khan Alias Nabi Versus State1988 SCMR 579 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-28Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad Versus Settlement Commissioner1988 SCMR 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-28
  settlement schemedemand noticeautomatic resumptioncancellation of allotmentestoppel against statuteauction of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, by leave, arose from the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the appellant's writ petition in limine. The appellant had been transferred an open plot under Settlement Scheme No. VI, but failed to pay the full transfer price within the one-month period specified in an order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, the property was auctioned to the respondents. The appellant subsequently deposited the remaining price and sought restoration. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the High Court held that no demand notice was necessary and that resumption was automatic. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, penal consequences such as resumption and cancellation cannot ensue without the mandatory service of a demand notice. The Court ruled that there is no automatic resumption of property for non-payment of dues, and there can be no estoppel against a statute, thereby rendering the subsequent auction invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Can a transferred property be legally resumed and auctioned for non-payment of dues without the prior service of a mandatory demand notice?
  • Is the resumption and cancellation of an allotment automatic upon a transferee's default in paying the transfer price?
  • Can the principle of estoppel be applied against a statutory requirement to issue a demand notice before taking penal action?
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