Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muharram Ali vs Government of Punjab and Another1984 SCMR 289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-01
  civil servantservice tribunaldeputationstatutory guaranteescadre abolitionjurisdictioneducational and training institutions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's service appeal in limine on the preliminary ground that he was not a civil servant and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellant remained a Government servant entitled to protections despite the abolition of his college cadre and subsequent drawing of pension, and the legal effect of a later government notification restoring the cadre and declaring employees to be on deputation. The Supreme Court held that the initial notification abolishing the cadre contravened statutory provisions under the governing ordinance, and the subsequent cancellation of that paragraph restored the employees' continuous status as Government servants by operation of law without requiring individual applications. The Court laid down the principle that statutory guarantees protecting the status and terms of service of government employees transferred to educational institution boards cannot be overridden by administrative notifications, and restoration of a cadre automatically revives the government service status of affected personnel.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee transferred to a Board of Governors under the West Pakistan Government Educational and Training Institutions Ordinance, 1960 ceases to be a Government servant upon the abolition of his college cadre?
  • Does the cancellation of a notification that purported to abolish a college cadre automatically restore the affected employees' status as Government servants without requiring them to individually apply for restoration?
  • Whether the receipt of pension and gratuity following the purported abolition of a cadre strips a person of their statutory status as a Government servant once the cadre is legally restored?
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• Muhammad, Saeed Qureshi and Others vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan1984 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-10
  Service Tribunalmaintainabilitytime-barred appealpay scalesleave to appeal recalled
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon leave to appeal being granted to consider whether the Department was justified in denying back and future benefits to the petitioners after designating them as Upper Division Clerks in 1972, and whether the Service Tribunal was justified in dismissing the petitioners' appeal as not maintainable on the ground that the impugned order was passed prior to 1969. Upon reviewing the record, the Court found that the grievance pertained to the denial of pay under scales revised by rules framed in 1949. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal rightly dismissed the appeal as not maintainable because the decision was made before 1969 and the appeal was also time-barred. Consequently, the order granting leave to appeal was recalled and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal was justified in dismissing an appeal as not maintainable when the impugned order was passed before the year 1969?
  • Can an appeal regarding service pay revision dating back to rules framed in 1949 be maintained before the Service Tribunal?
  • Whether leave to appeal granted by the Supreme Court can be recalled upon discovering the appeal before the Service Tribunal was time-barred?
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• Muhammad Zaman vs Abdul Ghaffar and others1984 SCMR 1352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-21
  ejectmentpersonal uselandlord and tenantamicable settlementvacant possessionsupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from concurrent orders of ejectment passed against the appellant tenant on the ground of bona fide personal use of the shop by the landlord. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, the counsel for the appellant stated that the appellant was willing to surrender vacant possession of the premises and not press the appeal, provided reasonable time was granted to vacate. Counsel for the respondents agreed to grant time until the 1st of May, 1984, for the appellant to make alternative arrangements. The appellant personally undertook to vacate the premises voluntarily by the stipulated date, without necessitating execution proceedings, and agreed to continue paying monthly rent during the interim period. The Supreme Court found the amicable settlement acceptable. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as not pressed, while allowing the appellant to retain possession until the agreed date subject to the strict observance of the terms of the settlement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against an ejectment order can be dismissed as not pressed upon an amicable settlement between the landlord and tenant?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant extended time to a tenant for vacating commercial premises based on a voluntary undertaking?
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• Muhammad Zahoor vs Musarraf Iqbal and others1984 SCMR 1473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-09
  evacuee propertystatutory landlord-tenant relationshipres judicataejectment proceedingswithdrawal of petitiontransfer of propertysuccessors-in-interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court order directing the petitioner to vacate a shop. The core legal question was whether the withdrawal of an earlier ejectment petition, which involved a dispute over the landlord-tenant relationship, operated as res judicata against subsequent ejectment proceedings initiated by the successors-in-interest of the original transferee. The Supreme Court held that the transfer of the evacuee property to the original owner created a statutory relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee and the occupant. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's finding that the previous ejectment petition, which was withdrawn following a compromise, did not result in a determination of the relationship issue; thus, the principle of res judicata did not apply. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, confirming that the statutory relationship persisted after the property's sale to the respondents. The key principle laid down is that the withdrawal of an ejectment petition pursuant to a compromise, without a judicial determination of the contested issues, does not bar subsequent litigation on those same issues under the doctrine of res judicata.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of an ejectment petition pursuant to a compromise operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings?
  • Does the transfer of evacuee property create a statutory relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee and the occupant?
  • Can a successor-in-interest initiate ejectment proceedings if the original transferee's previous petition was withdrawn?
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• Muhammad Zahoor and another vs Lal Muhammad and 2 others1984 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-16
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitioncivil revisionamendment of pleadingscourts of general jurisdictionsection 115 CPCstatutory barleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment that entertained a constitutional petition against an order passed by an Additional District Judge in a civil revision under Section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial court had permitted the amendment of a reply to an application regarding an issue of unsoundness of mind. The Additional District Judge set aside that amendment on the basis that Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applied only to pleadings. The High Court, exercising constitutional jurisdiction, declared the Additional District Judge's revisional order illegal. The petitioners contended that Section 115(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 specifically bars further revision proceedings in the High Court against revisional orders of the District Court, and that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent legislative intent or review orders of ordinary civil courts of general jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether judgments and orders of courts of general jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be challenged through constitutional petitions in the High Court where further appeal or revision is statutorily barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by a District Court under Section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be challenged in the High Court through a constitutional petition despite the bar in Section 115(4)?
  • Can the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court be exercised to review orders of ordinary civil courts of general jurisdiction when further remedies of appeal or revision are statutorily barred?
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• Muhammad Yusuf vs The State1984 SCMR 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-18
  leave to appealappreciation of evidenceZinabenefit of doubtcredible witnessconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Yusuf against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which dismissed his appeal and upheld his conviction and sentence under Section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence and whether the testimony of the prosecutrix and panchayat witnesses could form the basis of a conviction when co-accused were acquitted. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the credibility of the prosecutrix and the involvement of the petitioner were unexceptionable, and that the acquittal of co-accused on the basis of benefit of doubt does not vitiate the conviction of the petitioner where the evidence against him is severable and reliable. The key principle laid down is that reappraisal of evidence will not be undertaken by the Supreme Court unless a provision or principle of law has been violated or ignored by the courts below.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused persons necessitates the acquittal of the remaining accused whose role is proven?
  • Can a conviction for Zina be sustained solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix if her statement is found credible by the courts below?
  • Does the Supreme Court undertake a reappraisal of evidence in petitions for leave to appeal where no principle of law has been violated?
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• Muhammad Yousuf and Others vs The State1584 SCMR 1967 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-06
  criminal appealculpable homicidebenefit of doubtmurder convictionmedical evidenceappreciation of evidencecommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for murder and related offenses. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence regarding individual participation in a group assault and the correct determination of the nature of the offense where multiple injuries contributed to the fatal result. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the participation of one appellant, Nazir Ahmad, was established by consistent ocular testimony and corroborative injuries, the medical evidence did not support an intention to cause death or the specific fatal injuries attributed to him, reducing his conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The second appellant, Muhammad Yousaf, was granted the benefit of the doubt and acquitted. The key principle laid down is that where multiple blows contribute to a fatal result and individual attribution for the fatal injuries is uncertain, the legal intention cannot be elevated to murder under Section 302 without clear proof of common intention or specific fatal acts, warranting a conviction under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be sustained when multiple injuries contribute to a skull fracture and the specific fatal blow cannot be definitively attributed to the accused?
  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused whose role in an assault is not conclusively established by the prosecution, warranting his acquittal?
  • Whether the intention to cause death can be inferred from a single blow with a blunt weapon when the overall circumstances and nature of the injuries negative a preconcerted plan to commit murder?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs The State1984 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-04
  illegal gratificationanticorruption raidaccomplice liabilitysubordinate liabilitymitigation of sentencerecovery of tainted money
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a criminal appeal by a former foot-constable against his conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, for assisting a police sub-inspector in accepting illegal gratification. The core legal question was whether sufficient evidence existed to establish that the appellant had the requisite knowledge of the illicit nature of the transaction and was a privy to the crime, or whether he was merely an innocent subordinate acting under orders. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts establishing the appellant's complicity, based on his presence during incriminating conversations and the recovery of tainted currency notes from his possession, were legally sound and supported by creditworthy evidence. The conviction was upheld, but the Supreme Court laid down the principle that the absence of personal gain and the role of a subordinate acting at the behest of a superior officer are relevant mitigating circumstances warranting a reduction in sentence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with a modification to the sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subordinate police official who picks up tainted bribe money at the behest of a superior officer can be convicted under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 without proof of personal gain?
  • Does the absence of personal financial gain in a corruption transaction operate as a mitigating circumstance in determining the quantum of sentence for an accomplice?
  • Can concurrent factual findings regarding a public servant's knowledge of an illegal gratification transaction be interfered with by the Supreme Court in the absence of a legal error?
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• Muhammad Yousaf and Others vs Settlement Organization and Others1984 SCMR 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-14
  land settlementJammu and Kashmir refugeerehabilitation schemesubsequent allotmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises out of a land settlement case concerning land allotted to a Jammu and Kashmir refugee under a Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme. The core legal question is whether the subsequent allotment of the disputed land to the petitioners during the original allottee's incarceration was valid, and whether the challenge by the original allottee was barred by delay. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent allotment made without notice to the original allottee was rightly set aside by the Settlement Authorities, and the delay in challenging the same by the respondent during his imprisonment was sufficiently explained and repelled on facts. The Court also affirmed that the reservation of rights for Jammu and Kashmir refugees under the Scheme holds. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allotment of land made to a third party during the original allottee's incarceration is valid without notice to him?
  • Whether a challenge to a land allotment made by an incarcerated person is barred by delay under the circumstances?
  • Does the reservation of Jammu and Kashmir refugees' rights regarding land under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme carry validity?
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• Muhammad Yar and Others vs Additional Land Commissioner and Others1984 SCMR 1098 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-11
  land reformsorchard retentionconstitutional petitionremand proceedingsres judicataconsent order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court is directed against the Lahore High Court's dismissal in limine of a constitutional petition arising from a land reform case. The core legal question concerned whether a landowner, having initially failed to claim an orchard in his declaration forms and having failed in his initial challenges before the land authorities, could re-open the matter of retaining land as an orchard after the disputed land had been sold to the cultivating tenants. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the retention of the orchard had already been finally settled and permitted by the High Court in an earlier round of litigation pursuant to a consent order upon remand, precluding the appellants from challenging it again. The key principle laid down is that a matter conclusively adjudicated and consented to in earlier remand proceedings between the same parties cannot be re-litigated in subsequent proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landowner can re-open the question of retaining an orchard after failing to indicate its existence in initial declaration forms and after the land has been sold to tenants?
  • Can matters finally settled and consented to in earlier remand proceedings by the High Court be re-litigated in subsequent rounds of litigation?
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• Muhammad Yaqub vs Muhammad Nasrullah Khan and others1984 SCMR 1553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-22
  specific performancetime is of the essenceimmovable propertycontractual obligationsre-transfer agreementlimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought specific performance of an agreement dated 12th May 1960, under which the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents agreed to re-transfer a shop within five years upon payment of the price paid to the Settlement Department. The petitioner initially disputed the amount payable, arguing for a lower sum based on claim valuations, but later offered to pay the full amount. Both the trial court and the first appellate court rejected the suit. The High Court dismissed the second appeal, holding that the suit was filed on 13th May 1965, one day after the five-year period expired, and that time was of the essence of the contract. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that in contracts for immovable property, time is not normally of the essence, relying on precedent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court correctly determined that time was of the essence in this specific agreement and whether the suit was time-barred despite the petitioner's subsequent offer to pay the full amount.

  Questions settled

  • Is time considered the essence of a contract for the sale of immovable property by default?
  • Does the expiration of a stipulated period in a re-transfer agreement bar a suit for specific performance if filed immediately thereafter?
  • Can a party to a specific performance suit cure a defect in the offered payment amount by offering the full amount during appellate proceedings?
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• Muhammad Yaqub Ali and Muhammad Gul, M. S. Khan vs Ch. Muhammad1984 SCMR 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob Khan vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab and Others1984 SCMR 940 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-09
  lachesconstitutional petitionbig mansionsettlement schemeauction of propertyacquiescence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a High Court judgment dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition in limine on the sole ground of laches. The case concerned the declaration and subsequent auction disposal of a commercial and residential property as a 'big mansion' under settlement laws. Although the appellant initially challenged the property's declaration in a 1971 constitutional petition, he failed to appeal its dismissal, unlike his co-petitioners who eventually secured a compromise before the Supreme Court in 1981. Following that compromise, the appellant filed a fresh constitutional petition seeking transfer of the shop in his possession. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition for laches despite the appellant being an impleaded party in intermediate litigation. Dismissing the appeal, the Court held that laches signifies not merely delay, but delay working to another's disadvantage. By reconciling himself to the 1972 dismissal and remaining a passive respondent in subsequent proceedings without seeking affirmative relief against auction purchasers, the appellant created laches barring his belated petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to challenge the dismissal of an earlier constitutional petition constitute laches barring a subsequent petition on the same cause of action?
  • Whether delay amounts to laches when a party's inaction works to the disadvantage of another party who concluded compromises in interim litigation?
  • Can a litigant who participated merely as a respondent without seeking affirmative relief preserve his rights to challenge a transaction after related proceedings conclude?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob alias Qoobi vs The State1984 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-14
  post-arrest baildelay in trialmurder trialstatutory delaybail refusalcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from an order of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's application for post-arrest bail on the ground of delay in the completion of his murder trial under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail as a matter of right due to statutory delay under Section 497(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the petitioner was himself responsible for a considerable portion of the delay in the trial due to his own absence and transfer applications, thereby justifying the refusal of bail. The Court laid down the principle that an accused person who contributes to or causes delays in trial proceedings cannot claim the statutory right to bail based on such delay, and further emphasized that trial courts must ensure expeditious conclusion of murder trials while utilizing available powers against deliberate absences or non-production by jail authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right under Section 497(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the delay in trial is partly attributable to the accused?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the refusal of bail by the High Court when considerable delay in a murder trial is caused by the absence of the accused.
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• Muhammad Umar vs The State1984 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-03
  approver testimonyaccomplice evidencecorroborationconfessional statementidentification parademurderrobberycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the conviction and sentencing of the appellant, Muhammad Umar, and others under sections 302/34 and 394/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder and robbery of Sufi Muhammad Yusuf. The core legal questions involve evaluating the evidentiary value of an eye-witness account, the validity and force of an accomplice's testimony who turned approver after initially confessing, and the extent of corroboration required for such testimony. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the approver, corroborated in material particulars by ocular evidence, the confessional statement of a co-accused, and successful weapon recoveries, was reliable and sufficient to sustain the conviction. The key principle laid down is that an accomplice's testimony, when supported by independent corroborative evidence connecting the accused to the crime, forms a valid basis for conviction in capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • What amount of corroboration is required in the case of testimony given by an accomplice or approver?
  • Can the confessional statement of a co-accused be taken into consideration against other co-accused?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an eye-witness account corroborated by weapon recoveries and identification parades?
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• Muhammad Umar vs M/s. Parveen Hilaluddin and Another1984 SCMR 272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-01
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentconcurrent findingsleave to appeallandlord and tenantrepairs adjustment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the lower appellate court and the High Court, which ordered the ejectment of the petitioner from residential premises on the ground of default in the payment of rent. The original ejectment application was filed by the initial landlord, who subsequently sold the premises to respondent No. 1, who was joined as an applicant. The petitioner contested the default, claiming he paid the rent and adjusted expenses incurred for necessary repairs authorized by the landlord. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, but the Additional District Judge reversed this finding, concluding that default was established and the repair plea was unproven. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's second appeal in limine. The core legal question was whether the concurrent factual findings regarding default and unauthorized repairs were sustainable, and whether a new factual plea regarding the sale-deed could be raised. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings were well-supported by evidence and declined to entertain a new factual question not raised before the High Court. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent factual findings regarding default in rent can be interfered with when supported by evidence?
  • Is a tenant entitled to adjust repair expenses against rent without the landlord's consent and proper proof?
  • Can a new question of fact regarding the effect of a sale-deed be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
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• Muhammad Tasneem vs Controller, Secondary Board of Education1984 SCMR 1049 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-13
  restoration of appealdismissal for non-prosecutionsufficient causenegligence of counselcivil miscellaneous petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil miscellaneous petition seeks the restoration of a civil appeal that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question revolves around whether sufficient ground was shown for the restoration of the appeal based on a claim of late intimation of the hearing date. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since both the Advocate-on-Record and the counsel received intimation prior to the date of hearing, their failure to appear or inform the court constituted clear negligence. Consequently, the court established the principle that receipt of hearing notice by counsel or Advocate-on-Record prior to the hearing date precludes a claim of late intimation constituting sufficient ground for restoration when neither appears nor seeks an adjournment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether late intimation of a hearing date constitutes sufficient ground for the restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution when counsel received notice prior to the hearing?
  • Does failure of the Advocate-on-Record or counsel to appear or seek an adjournment after receiving prior notice of hearing amount to negligence?
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• Muhammad Ta Sneem vs Controller, B. I. S. E., Sargodha1984 SCMR 1046 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-10
  review petitiondismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appealreduction of punishmenthardship
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition is directed against an order dismissing an application for restoration of a civil appeal which was earlier dismissed for non-prosecution. Learned counsel for the petitioner conceded that no legal grounds were made out for review of the court's order under the applicable rules, but highlighted the special facts and circumstances of the case and pointed to rules permitting the respondent Board to reduce punishments in cases of hardship even after original penalty orders have attained finality. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that despite the dismissal of the appeal and the restoration application, the respondent Board is not barred by the court's orders from exercising its independent power or discretion to reduce the punishment if such power legally exists under its rules. The court observed that the petitioner may approach the Board for this purpose, and the petition was disposed of accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a civil appeal for non-prosecution bar a statutory board from exercising its independent power to reduce a punishment under its rules?
  • Can an order of the Supreme Court dismissing an appeal and a restoration application act as a legal bar to the exercise of discretionary power vested in a board regarding hardship cases?
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• Muhammad Sultan Mir and Others vs M. Yousuf Hussain Dada and Others1984 SCMR 533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-10
  Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958Settlement Scheme No. IVevacuee propertylocus standitransfer of propertySeraiJammu and Kashmir refugees
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns the legality of transferring "Serai Hardit Singh," a property containing multiple residential units, as a single unit to respondents, thereby displacing refugees from occupied Jammu & Kashmir. The core legal questions were whether the deletion of Section 30(5) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 validated prior illegal transfers, and whether a Serai could be transferred as a single entity under the Act. The Supreme Court held that the transfer of the entire Serai as one unit was void, as a Serai comprises multiple distinct residential and commercial units that must be disposed of separately. The Court further held that the deletion of Section 30(5) did not retroactively validate the initial illegal transfer, nor did the appellants' failure to file settlement forms earlier—due to a prior statutory bar—preclude them from challenging the transfer. The key principle established is that property consisting of multiple units, such as a Serai, cannot be transferred as a single house or shop, and administrative instructions regarding such disposal are mandatory.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Serai consisting of multiple rooms be transferred as a single house or shop under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the deletion of Section 30(5) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 retroactively validate a prior illegal transfer of property?
  • Are the instructions contained in the Chief Settlement Commissioner's memorandum regarding the disposal of Serais mandatory or merely permissive?
  • Does a failure to file a settlement form due to a statutory bar preclude a party from later challenging an illegal transfer of property?
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• Muhammad Siddique vs Officerincharge, Central Record Office, Lahore and Others1984 SCMR 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-10
  Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958land allotmentProduce Index UnitsChief Settlement Commissioneradministrative correctionwrit jurisdictioncalculation error
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that set aside an order by an Additional Settlement Commissioner, which had reduced the respondents' land allotment based on an erroneous calculation of Produce Index (P.I.) Units. The appellant, acting as an informant, had successfully challenged the respondents' allotment, arguing that the calculation should have been based on kanals rather than bighas. The High Court had invalidated the reduction on grounds of improper service and lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court examined whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner could reduce an allotment due to calculation errors absent fraud. The Court held that while Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 might not apply to simple calculation errors, Section 11 of the same Act empowers the Chief Settlement Commissioner to amend or vary the terms of an allotment. Consequently, the Court ruled that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the administrative order, as the authority possessed the legal power to correct such errors. The appeal was allowed, and the original order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chief Settlement Commissioner reduce an allotment of land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Does Section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 empower the Chief Settlement Commissioner to amend or vary the terms of an allotment due to calculation errors?
  • Is an order passed by a delegatee of the Chief Settlement Commissioner liable to be set aside solely on the ground of improper service if the underlying entitlement calculation is correct?
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• Muhammad Siddique vs Mst. Kalsoom Bibi and Others1984 SCMR 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-04
  Khuladissolution of marriagematrimonial disputeleave to appealdiscretionary jurisdictionFamily Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment in a matrimonial dispute. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction in setting aside the decisions of the Family Court and the District Judge, which had dismissed a wife's suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula. The High Court had concluded that the unhappy relations between the parties, evidenced by ongoing litigation, left no hope for them to live together within the limits prescribed by God Almighty, and that the wife was entitled to Khula upon relinquishing her dowry claim. The Supreme Court, upon hearing the parties, found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's decision. The Court held that the High Court's assessment of the matrimonial breakdown was sound and that the petition did not present a fit case for the exercise of the Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court set aside a Family Court's dismissal of a suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula?
  • Is the existence of irreconcilable differences and ongoing litigation sufficient grounds for a wife to claim Khula?
  • Does the Supreme Court of Pakistan grant leave to appeal in matrimonial cases where the High Court has correctly assessed the breakdown of the marital relationship?
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• Muhammad Siddique Cheema and Another vs Government of the Punjab and 3 Others1984 SCMR 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-05
  Martial Law Orderstermination of servicequantum of punishmentappellate authorityconstitutional protectionmala fideeducational institutionretrospective legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals against a High Court judgment dismissing writ petitions filed by college staff whose services were terminated by an Administrator appointed under Martial Law Orders. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the retrospective application of Martial Law Orders 234 and 255, the legality of terminating services without a hearing, and whether the action was mala fide. The Supreme Court held that the Martial Law Orders were protected by Article 281 of the Interim Constitution and Article 269 of the 1973 Constitution, rendering them immune from judicial challenge. The Court rejected the allegation of mala fide, citing the deteriorated disciplinary situation at the college. However, the Court held that the Appellate Authority failed to fulfill its duty to review the severity of the punishment. Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the Appellate Authority solely to determine the quantum of punishment, establishing that appellate bodies must exercise their duty to ensure justice regarding the proportionality of penalties, regardless of whether the point was explicitly agitated by the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can the validity of Martial Law Orders be questioned in a court of law given the protection of Article 281 of the Interim Constitution and Article 269 of the 1973 Constitution?
  • Does an appellate authority have a duty to examine the quantum of punishment even if the issue is not explicitly raised by the parties?
  • Can disciplinary action taken against college staff be challenged on the ground of mala fide when the institution is in a state of disorder?
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• Muhammad Siddiq vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner1984SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-02
  settlement departmentfunctus officiopermanent transfer deedauction-purchaserdelay and lacheswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their writ petitions by the High Court, which had upheld the auction of houses in favour of the respondents and the subsequent issuance of Permanent Transfer Deeds (P.T.D.). The petitioners claimed they had filed N.C.H. Forms for the transfer of the houses in 1960, but their applications were ignored, and the properties were auctioned in 1961. The core legal question concerned the validity of challenging an auction and transfer after a lapse of sixteen years and the competence of the Settlement Department after the issuance of a P.T.D. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly dismissed the writ petitions on the grounds that the petitioners failed to produce valid proof of filing N.C.H. Forms, were guilty of gross negligence and indolence for remaining inactive for sixteen years, and that the Settlement Department had become functus officio after the issuance of the P.T.D. The key principle laid down is that unexplained, inordinate delay and gross negligence disentitle a party to equitable relief under constitutional jurisdiction, and the issuance of a P.T.D. finalizes the settlement process rendering the department functus officio.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a property auction after a delay of sixteen years?
  • Does the Settlement Department become functus officio after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • What is the effect of failing to produce verifiable proof of filing transfer forms?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Settlement Commissioner (Administration), Punjab and Others1984 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-28
  condonation of delaylimitationpetition for leave to appealsufficient causeSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal which is barred by 106 days. The core legal question concerns whether sufficient cause has been shown for the condonation of the substantial delay in filing the petition. The petitioner sought to exclude the time consumed in obtaining a copy of a previous judgment from the High Court. The Court held that since it was neither obligatory nor necessary to file a copy of the said High Court judgment for the entertainment of the petition for leave to appeal, the time spent in obtaining it could not be excluded for the purpose of limitation. Consequently, the Court ruled that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay had been established. The key principle laid down is that time spent obtaining unnecessary documents cannot be excluded to condone a delay in filing a petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time taken to obtain an unnecessary copy of a High Court judgment can be excluded for condonation of delay?
  • What constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Province of Punjab and another1984 SCMR 1308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-19
  Grow More Food Schemeproprietary rightsresumption of landcivil suit barjurisdiction of revenue authoritiesallotment of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil suit challenging the resumption of land by Revenue authorities. The petitioner, an allottee under the 'Grow More Food Scheme', sought proprietary rights to land in Tehsil Vehari. Following conflicting orders from the Collector and the Additional Commissioner, the Collector ultimately resumed the land, citing the petitioner's ineligibility due to the expiry of the allotment period and violation of cultivation conditions. The petitioner filed a civil suit for a declaration against this resumption, which was dismissed by the trial court and upheld in subsequent appeals on the basis that the suit was barred under Section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, finding that the Collector acted within his authority to scrutinize eligibility based on Board of Revenue instructions. The Court affirmed that the civil suit was barred by statute and that the High Court correctly refused to grant relief based on subsequent government notifications that the petitioner had failed to pursue through appropriate administrative channels.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit challenging a land resumption order by a Collector barred under Section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912?
  • Does a Collector have the jurisdiction to re-examine the eligibility of an allottee for proprietary rights pursuant to new instructions from the Board of Revenue?
  • Can a High Court in second appeal grant relief based on a subsequent government notification that the petitioner failed to pursue before the relevant administrative authorities?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Mst. Sughra Bano and Others1984 SCMR 1139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-16
  specific performanceagreement to sellsubsequent purchaserregistered sale-deedbona fide purchasernotice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts decreeing a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell an evacuee house filed by the first respondent against the original owner and the appellant. The core legal question was whether a suit for specific performance of a prior agreement to sell is maintainable without seeking the cancellation of a subsequent registered sale-deed executed in favour of a third party, and whether the appellant was a bona fide purchaser without notice under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court held that the suit is maintainable and that prior case law suggesting the mandatory cancellation of a registered sale-deed has been undermined by subsequent jurisprudence of this Court. Furthermore, the concurrent factual findings confirming the appellant had notice of the prior agreement were upheld, disqualifying him as a bona fide transferee without notice. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for specific performance of a prior agreement to sell maintainable without seeking the cancellation of a subsequent registered sale-deed in favour of another?
  • Can a subsequent purchaser claim the benefit of being a transferee without notice when evidence establishes knowledge of a prior agreement to sell?
  • Does the existence of an outstanding registered sale-deed bar the grant of a decree for specific performance of an earlier contract?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Maqsood Ali and Others1984 SCMR 590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-01
  court-feedeficiency in court-feepre-emption suitlimitation periodsecond appealdiscretion of courtspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a second appeal and remanded a pre-emption case for decision on merits. The core legal question concerned whether the appellate court was justified in allowing the defendants to make good a deficiency in court-fee after the period of limitation had expired, where the initial deficiency arose due to an enhancement of court-fee rates and an erroneous office endorsement confirming proper stamping. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly exercised its discretion in condoning the deficiency and remanding the case, as the defendants were misled by the court-fee affixed on the original plaint and the registry's endorsement rather than acting merely out of inexcusable ignorance of the law. The key principle laid down is that where a party is led into a bona fide mistake regarding court-fee due to institutional endorsements and reliance on the plaintiff's valuation, appellate courts possess the discretion to allow the deficiency to be made good even after the expiry of the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ignorance of an enhanced court-fee law precludes a court from granting time to make good a deficiency in court-fee after the expiry of limitation?
  • Can an appellate court's discretion in allowing time to make good a deficiency in court-fee be interfered with when the party was misled by an office endorsement and the plaintiff's valuation?
  • Whether an appellate court can dismiss an appeal on limitation grounds after having previously granted time to make good a deficiency in court-fee.
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• Muhammad Sharif and others vs Bashir Ahmad and others1984 SCMR 1547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-21
  consolidation of holdingsrevenue authoritiesland blocksconsolidation proceedingssupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition challenging the orders of Consolidation Authorities regarding the consolidation of land holdings. The core legal question is whether the final consolidation proceedings resulted in an increase in the number of blocks held by the petitioners, thereby violating the provisions of section 2(f) of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960. The Supreme Court holds that the petition lacks merit, finding through explanations and charts provided by the law officer that the petitioners' land was originally scattered into 13 blocks before consolidation and was ultimately reduced to 9 blocks through various appellate and revisional proceedings, rather than being increased from an intermediate 5-block arrangement erroneously relied upon by the petitioners. Consequently, no violation of the Ordinance occurred. The key principle laid down is that the evaluation of whether consolidation has reduced holdings must be measured against the landowners' pre-consolidation status rather than interim or superseded orders of inferior authorities. The petition is accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the consolidation of land into nine blocks from an original thirteen blocks violates section 2(f) of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960?
  • Can a party rely on an interim order of an inferior consolidation authority to claim an increase in land blocks when the ultimate appellate proceedings show an overall reduction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and Another vs Khurshid Ahmad1984 SCMR 602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-28
  pre-emptionpreferential rightburden of proofno evidencestay of executionmesne profitsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a pre-emption dispute where the lower courts upheld the respondent's preferential right of pre-emption. The core legal question addressed is whether a finding of fact regarding a preferential right of pre-emption can be sustained when it relies solely on an averment in the plaint that was explicitly controverted in the written statement, without the respondent or any witness appearing in the witness-box to support the claim or prove the supporting documentary evidence (a school leaving certificate). The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the lower courts' findings appeared to be based on no evidence. Additionally, the Court addressed the petitioners' request for a stay of the decree, noting that the previous condition requiring payment of Rs. 6,000 as annual compensation for use and occupation was potentially onerous given the land's actual profitability. Consequently, the Court directed the local Tehsildar to conduct an inquiry and submit a report to determine the appropriate amount of compensation for use and occupation during the pendency of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of a preferential right of pre-emption be sustained if it is based solely on an averment in the plaint that was controverted in the written statement?
  • Is a school leaving certificate sufficient to establish a relationship for pre-emption purposes if it is tendered by counsel without any witness appearing to support the claim?
  • What is the appropriate procedure for determining the quantum of compensation for use and occupation when a stay of execution is granted pending appeal?
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• Muhammad Shari N vs Shamso Qamar1984 SCMR 775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-13
  Pre-emptionShamilatContiguityGhair Mumkin KhataCo-sharershipRight of Pre-emptionLand Ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought to pre-empt the sale of land comprising two distinct blocks, asserting a superior right based on co-sharership, contiguity, and easement. The trial court decreed the suit for one block but dismissed it for the other, finding that the defendant held an equal right due to shared ownership in the contiguous shamilat land. The appellate and revisional courts upheld this decision, noting that the contiguous shamilat was recorded as ghair mumkin khata with maqbuza malikana status, implying ownership in possession. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that co-ownership in ghair mumkin khata should not constitute contiguity. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where shamilat is recorded as maqbuza malikana without restriction, it is capable of exclusive possession by proprietors. Consequently, a defendant possessing such rights can successfully defeat a pre-emptor's claim based on contiguity. The Court distinguished this from cases involving ghair mumkin rasta, where no exclusive ownership exists, thereby affirming that ownership in ghair mumkin khata can effectively negate a pre-emption claim.

  Questions settled

  • Can ownership in shamilat recorded as ghair mumkin khata be considered ownership of contiguous property for pre-emption purposes?
  • Does the status of maqbuza malikana in shamilat land imply that co-sharers are owners in possession?
  • Can a defendant's co-ownership in shamilat land defeat a plaintiff's superior right of pre-emption based on contiguity?
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• Muhammad Shakil vs The Quaidiazam University and Sthers1984 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-13
  natural justiceunfair meansexamination malpracticedisciplinary proceedingsstudent disciplineadministrative lawuniversity autonomy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a medical student, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his Intra-Court Appeal, which had upheld the cancellation of his examination results and subsequent disciplinary action by Quaid-i-Azam University for using unfair means. The core legal question was whether the university’s disciplinary proceedings violated the principles of natural justice by failing to conduct a formal trial-like inquiry. The Supreme Court held that the university authorities acted in good faith and that the petitioner had been sufficiently informed of the allegations and granted a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The Court affirmed that educational institutions, when dealing with disciplinary matters, are not required to adhere to the strict rules of evidence or trial procedures, such as the formal cross-examination of witnesses. Instead, the essential requirement of natural justice is satisfied if the charged individual is provided a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any relevant material prejudicial to their case. Consequently, the Court found no legal defect in the university's decision and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a university disciplinary committee required to follow strict rules of evidence and cross-examination when adjudicating cases of examination malpractice?
  • Does the failure to hold a formal trial-like hearing in student disciplinary proceedings constitute a violation of natural justice?
  • What is the standard of fairness required for university authorities when penalizing a student for using unfair means in an examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi vs Sardar Noor Ahmad and another1984 SCMR 1560 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-11
  settlement lawdisplaced personrefugee statusleave to appealJammu and Kashmirelectoral rollproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a property dispute between a petitioner and a respondent over the status of the petitioner as a 'refugee' versus a 'local' under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the petitioner qualified as a displaced person (refugee) from Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, which would entitle him to compete for the property against the respondent, a non-claimant displaced person. While the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and Additional Settlement Commissioner initially found the petitioner to be a refugee based on electoral records and participation in Azad Jammu and Kashmir State Council elections, the Settlement Commissioner reversed this finding, alleging the petitioner had falsified his place of origin. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner failed to adequately consider official notifications and the statutory definition of 'refugee' under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Presidential Election Act, 1960. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the evidence of the petitioner's status as a refugee required further judicial consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person's inclusion in electoral rolls as a refugee constitute evidence of their status as a displaced person under settlement laws?
  • Can a Settlement Commissioner reverse concurrent findings of lower authorities without considering statutory definitions of 'refugee'?
  • Is a notification in the Government Gazette regarding election results relevant to determining a party's status as a refugee from Indian-occupied territory?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi vs Maulvi Abdul Aziz and another1984 SCMR 1208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-27
  mortgagee rightsland allotmentconstitutional petitionleave to appealsettlement dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court. The land in dispute, measuring 181 Kanals in District Sargodha, was originally confirmed in the petitioner's favour in lieu of mortgagee rights, subsequently cancelled, restored by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, and finally upset by the Settlement Commissioner on the ground that the allotment stood withdrawn before the crucial date of 11-4-1962 under Press Note dated 28-12-1959. The core legal question involves the correct application of the relevant law and administrative instructions governing the allotment of land in lieu of mortgagee rights, particularly regarding the effect of the restoration order and subsequent extension of time by a memorandum. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the law was correctly applied, holding that arguable questions were raised, and continued the interim stay order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cancellation of land allotment prior to the crucial date affects eligibility under the relevant Press Note?
  • Whether the restoration of an allotment by the Additional Settlement Commissioner revives the rights for the purpose of confirmation?
  • Whether the subsequent Memorandum extending time supersedes the earlier Press Note regarding mortgagee rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi and Another vs Ataullah and Others1984 SCMR 1124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-18
  writ petitionmaintainabilitydefinition of personfrivolous litigationcostsres judicataleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two petitions seeking leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' writ petition in limine. The petitioners had previously litigated the same dispute up to the Supreme Court, failing in their civil petition and subsequent review petitions. They then initiated a civil suit and, upon its dismissal, filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking to reverse the order passed in the earlier settlement revision. The core legal question was whether a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is maintainable against an order passed by the High Court itself, and whether subsequent litigation on concluded matters is permissible. The Supreme Court held that the High Court is not a 'person' under Article 199(5) of the Constitution, making a writ petition against its own order incompetent. Furthermore, the Court ruled that civil litigation on questions already concluded in a previous round is barred. The petitions were dismissed with exemplary costs awarded to the respondents for frivolous and vexatious litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be issued against an order passed by the High Court itself?
  • Is the High Court considered a 'person' within the meaning of Article 199(5) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a party initiate fresh civil litigation on questions that have already been concluded in a previous round of litigation up to the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sarwar vs Qutab Din and Others1984 SCMR 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-09
  settlement proceedingsapprobate and reprobateestoppelpermanent transfer deedjurisdiction of settlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the transfer of property under settlement laws where the petitioner initially claimed his shop was part of House No. 3822 and contested its sub-division. After failing in his appeals and revisions up to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the petitioner shifted his stance, asserting that the house measured only two marlas and seeking transfer of his shop as part of an adjoining plot. Although a Settlement Commissioner accepted his revision, the High Court accepted the respondents' writ petition, holding that the petitioner was estopped by his earlier pleadings and that the settlement authorities lacked jurisdiction to re-open the matter after the issuance of Permanent Transfer Deeds. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's view, holding that a party cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate by changing its factual stance after final conclusion of proceedings, and accordingly dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can change its factual stance in subsequent proceedings after its initial claim regarding property transfer has been finally dismissed?
  • Do settlement authorities have jurisdiction to re-open a concluded property transfer matter after the issuance of Permanent Transfer Deeds?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Salim and Others vs Collector, Land Acquisition No, 4 and Others1984 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-21
  land acquisitioncompensationland classificationclerical erroraccidental slipreference courtcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding compensation for land acquired for the Tarbela Dam project under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The core legal question was whether the Reference Court's decree incorrectly omitted certain Khasra numbers from the classification of land, and whether the High Court erred in dismissing the appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Reference Court's judgment was clear and unambiguous regarding the classification of the acquired land. The Court affirmed that where a judgment or decree contains clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions, the appropriate legal remedy is to seek correction under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, rather than pursuing an appeal on the basis of such alleged omissions. The principle laid down is that appellate courts will not interfere with a decree where the lower court has adequately addressed the evidence and provided a clear, reasoned determination on the classification of the acquired property.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal the appropriate remedy for correcting clerical or arithmetical mistakes in a judgment and decree?
  • Can a court correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in a judgment or decree under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a Reference Court's failure to incorporate specific Khasra numbers in a decree constitute a ground for appeal if the judgment itself is clear and unambiguous?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Salahuddin Khan vs Muhammad Nazir Siddiqi and Others1984 SCMR 583 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-10
  talaqeffective divorcenotice to chairmanMuslim Family Laws Ordinancesuccession certificaterevocation of talaqleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which held that a pronouncement of talaq became effective after ninety days even if notice under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 was not served upon the Chairman. The core legal question was whether a divorce (talaq) becomes effective without sending a notice to the Chairman of the Union Committee pursuant to section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's view was erroneous, reiterating its prior settled jurisprudence that a talaq only becomes effective after notice is given to the Chairman and the prescribed reconciliation period expires, and failure to notify implies revocation. However, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal given the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The key principle laid down is that under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, failure to give notice of talaq to the Chairman renders the divorce ineffective and implies revocation by the husband.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pronouncement of talaq become effective without sending a notice to the Chairman under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • What is the legal effect of a husband's failure to give notice of talaq to the Chairman under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • Does the absence of notice of divorce to the Chairman imply the revocation of talaq by the husband?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Safdar vs Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court, Lahore1984 SCMR 1508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-10
  limitationcondonation of delaytime-barred appealSupreme Court Rulesdismissal of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The core legal question addressed was whether an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation could be entertained in the absence of a formal application for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was barred by limitation by a period of six days. Given that the petitioner failed to file any application seeking condonation of this delay, the Court determined that it could not exercise its discretion to extend the time. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, with no order as to costs. The principle laid down is that the Court cannot condone a delay in filing an appeal where the appellant has failed to formally move an application for such condonation, thereby rendering the appeal liable to dismissal on the grounds of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be entertained by the Supreme Court if it is filed beyond the limitation period without an application for condonation of delay?
  • Is a formal application for condonation of delay required when an appeal is filed after the expiry of the limitation period?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed vs Mst. Samina Latif1984 SCMR 1394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-11
  guardianshipcustody of minorsvisitation rightsminor sonswelfare of minorleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court in a guardianship dispute concerning the custody of two minor sons. The core legal question revolves around the custody of minor children under the age of seven and the visitation rights of the father. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the welfare of minor boys under seven years presumptively lies with their mother, the visitation rights granted to the father—permitting him to meet his sons for only two hours once a month—were grossly inadequate and required modification to prevent the estrangement of the children. The key principle laid down is that visitation rights for a non-custodial parent must be meaningful and sufficient, allowing adequate time for interaction, meals, and outings, provided it serves the welfare of the minors and is balanced with the custodial parent's rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the welfare of minor boys under seven years of age lies with their mother?
  • Can visitation rights granted to a non-custodial father be modified by the Supreme Court if found to be inadequate?
  • What is the extent of visitation rights that should reasonably be granted to a non-custodial parent in guardianship matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed Khan and Others vs Abdul Rehman and Others1984 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-25
  regular second appealjudgment of variancequestion of factejectment orderrent controllercollusive decreepermanent injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which partly allowed a regular second appeal concerning an ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller. The respondents had filed a suit for a declaration that the eviction order was collusive and void, and that they were owners in possession of the suit property. The trial court decreed the suit, but the district judge reversed the findings and dismissed it on first appeal. In the second appeal, the High Court modified the decree, granting a permanent injunction restraining the petitioners from executing the ejectment order against respondents Nos. 1 and 2, finding as a matter of fact that the said respondents were in actual possession rather than the tenant against whom eviction was ordered. The Supreme Court heard the petition and held that the High Court's decision rested on a pure finding of fact regarding possession, which raised no question of law and did not violate any established principles regarding second appeals against judgments of variance. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with findings of fact in a regular second appeal against a judgment of variance?
  • Does an ejectment order passed against a tenant operate against third parties found to be in actual possession of the property?
  • Can a second appeal be maintained on questions of fact where no substantial question of law is raised?
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• Muhammad Saeed and Another vs The State1984 SCMR 33(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-21
  transfer of caseSpecial Magistratebias allegationcriminal petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging an order of the High Court dated 13th April 1983, which refused to transfer a criminal case pending before a Special Magistrate, WAPDA, Lahore. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in declining to transfer the case despite personal allegations leveled against the Special Magistrate by the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked substance and dismissed it, reasoning that it was entirely open to the High Court to accept the explanation provided by the Special Magistrate regarding the personal allegations, particularly when the High Court itself remained unconvinced as to the genuineness of the petitioners' allegations. The key principle laid down is that a superior court's evaluation of the genuineness of allegations against a trial judge and the acceptance of the judge's explanation are valid grounds for refusing the transfer of a case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to transfer a case when it is not convinced about the genuineness of personal allegations leveled against the trial magistrate?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in accepting a Special Magistrate's explanation regarding allegations of bias?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed and 6 Others vs The State and Another1984 PLD Supreme Court 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-21
  quashment of proceedingsprivate complaintabuse of processZina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinanceterritorial jurisdictioncriminal proceduremalicious prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a quashment application regarding criminal proceedings initiated via a private complaint under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal questions involved whether the Additional Sessions Judge had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and whether the proceedings constituted an abuse of the court's process given the prior police cancellation of the case. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, accepted it, and quashed the criminal proceedings. The Court held that where a private complaint is filed with significant inconsistencies compared to previous statements recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and where the circumstances indicate the litigation is motivated by malice or bad blood rather than a genuine grievance, the court must exercise its inherent powers to prevent the abuse of the process of law and protect the accused from unnecessary harassment.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Additional Sessions Judge have jurisdiction to entertain a private complaint if the alleged offence occurred in a different district?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed if they are found to be an abuse of the process of the court?
  • Is a private complaint maintainable after the police have cancelled the case based on the same facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Pir Dad1984 SCMR 1413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-24
  pronoterecovery suitsale considerationmutationmisreading of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld a decree for the recovery of Rs. 20,000 based on a pronote. The petitioner (defendant) contended that the pronote did not represent a loan but was instead security for the sale consideration of 20 Kanals of land transferred to the respondent (plaintiff) via mutation. The petitioner argued that the High Court misread the evidence by ignoring material proving the pronote was satisfied upon the transfer of land. The Supreme Court examined the record and found no evidence supporting the petitioner's claim that the pronote was executed in lieu of the land transfer. The Court held that if the pronote had been executed for the land's consideration, it would logically have been satisfied or returned at the time of the mutation. Finding no merit in the contention that the lower courts misread the evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the judgment below.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pronote executed for consideration remain valid if the underlying transaction is claimed to be a land sale?
  • Can a court infer that a pronote was satisfied if the defendant fails to produce evidence of its cancellation upon a subsequent land transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Ministry of Religious Affairs and others1984 SCMR 1255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-01
  evacuee trust propertycancellation of allotmentaudi alteram partemwrit petitionmala fidesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the High Court order dismissing his writ petition regarding the cancellation of the allotment of an evacuee trust property. The allotment of the shop in dispute was cancelled by the Assistant Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property Board, due to a violation of allotment terms, and the property was ordered to be auctioned. The petitioner's departmental appeal and subsequent revision before the Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs, were both dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the cancellation orders were mala fide and that he was condemned unheard. The Court held that allegations of mala fide are questions of fact requiring evidence which cannot be entertained in writ jurisdiction, and noted that the record established the petitioner was indeed afforded an opportunity of hearing, thereby satisfying the rule of audi alteram partem. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings and dismissed the petition, ruling that the Secretary provided cogent reasons for rejecting the revision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether allegations of mala fide can be resolved as a question of fact in writ jurisdiction without considering evidence?
  • Whether the rule of audi alteram partem is satisfied when an opportunity of hearing is provided during departmental revision proceedings?
  • Whether an allotment of evacuee trust property can be cancelled for violation of allotment terms?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Manzoor Hussain1984 SCMR 1347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-11
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantdenial of titlerent controllertransfer of propertysettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from concurrent orders of ejectment passed against the petitioner-tenant by the Rent Controller and upheld by the Sind High Court. The petitioner resisted the ejectment application on the grounds of default in rent and personal need by denying the landlord's title and the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant, asserting instead that he might be a trespasser. The core legal question was whether a tenant who admits the landlord's transfer of property from Settlement authorities can challenge the landlord's title based on pending civil litigation without revocation of the transfer, and thereby deny the tenancy. The Supreme Court held that since the transfer in favour of the respondent remained valid and unrevoked, the petitioner could not deny the landlord's title, nor could the rent forums go behind the transfer document. The Court affirmed that an occupant of the premises at the time of transfer is liable to pay rent and cannot evade ejectment proceedings by raising a belated plea of trespasser status.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant deny the title of a landlord who is a transferee from the Settlement authorities on the basis of pending civil litigation without proving revocation of the transfer?
  • Whether an occupant of premises at the time of transfer by Settlement authorities can avoid ejectment proceedings by claiming the status of a trespasser?
  • Can rent forums go behind a transfer document issued by the Settlement authorities during ejectment proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq and Others vs The State1984 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-23
  ocular testimonyhostile witnessappreciation of evidencecriminal appealmurder convictionFirst Information Reportcorroborative evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from the conviction of the appellants for the murder of Muhammad Siddiq and the attempted murder of Naseer Ahmad. The core legal question concerns the reliability of ocular testimony, specifically whether the evidence of a witness who makes concessions in favour of certain accused should be discarded entirely, and whether the First Information Report (F.I.R.) was recorded after preliminary investigation at the crime scene. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, holding that the testimony of an injured witness who turns hostile or makes concessions need not be discarded in its entirety; rather, it should be evaluated alongside other evidence. The Court found that the ocular testimony of the deceased's widow, corroborated by other witnesses and physical evidence, was sufficient to establish guilt despite the concessions made by the injured witness. The Court affirmed that the presence of natural witnesses and corroborative evidence, such as the recovery of blood-stained weapons and clothing, sustains the conviction, and technical arguments regarding the timing of the F.I.R. registration do not invalidate the prosecution's case when the evidence is otherwise credible.

  Questions settled

  • Should the entire testimony of a witness be discarded if they make concessions in favour of some accused?
  • Does the registration of an F.I.R. after a preliminary police visit to the scene automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of a natural witness when other witnesses have turned hostile or made concessions?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq and Others vs Muhammad Nawaz and Others1984 SCMR 1080 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-05
  criminal lawmurder convictionculpable homicidesentencingreview petitionPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for review of a judgment in a criminal case involving a conviction for murder. The core legal question presented by the petitioner's counsel concerned the appropriate sentencing classification under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, specifically whether an accused, having been granted the benefit of Exception 2 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, should be convicted under the first part or the second part of Section 304. During the proceedings, the petitioner's counsel, after reviewing relevant precedents of the Supreme Court, abandoned the argument regarding the legal classification of the conviction and instead restricted the petition to a plea for the reduction of the sentence. Upon consideration of the arguments and the circumstances of the case, the Court found no valid justification for reviewing the judgment on any of the grounds raised. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, thereby maintaining the original conviction and sentence as determined in the earlier proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the benefit of Exception 2 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 mandate a conviction under the second part of Section 304 rather than the first part?
  • Are there sufficient grounds for a review petition when the petitioner abandons the legal argument regarding conviction classification and seeks only a reduction in sentence?
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• Muhammad Sadiq and others vs Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others1984 SCMR 1513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-13
  pre-emptionleave to appealcompensation for improvementsfruit gardencivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court which dismissed a civil revision petition arising out of a pre-emption suit. The suit for pre-emption of land was decreed in favour of the respondents and upheld through successive appeals before the appellate court and the High Court. The core legal question raised before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners, as vendee-defendants, were entitled to compensation for a fruit garden planted on the disputed land. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that there was a concurrent finding of fact that the garden in existence was prior to the sale, rendering any claim of compensation based on planting it as tenants futile and without basis. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding pre-emption and improvements made on the land, unsupported by evidentiary basis, do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether compensation can be claimed for a fruit garden allegedly planted by a vendee prior to a pre-emption sale?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding improvements made on pre-empted land?
  • Can a vendee claim tenant status for planting a garden when no factual basis exists on the record?
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• Muhammad Riaz vs Muhammad Maqsood Ahmad and others1984 SCMR 1273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-10
  rent matterejectmentdefault in payment of rentpersonal requirementconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a rent matter where the petitioner tenant challenged the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the High Court. The respondent landlord had sought eviction of the petitioner from a shop on the grounds of default in payment of rent and personal requirement. The Rent Controller ordered eviction on the ground of default, which decision was upheld by the appellate court and subsequently by the High Court in limine. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether any question of law warranted interference with the concurrent findings of the lower forums. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to raise any substantial question of law or point out any flaw in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as without merit, while granting the tenant two months to vacate the premises upon the undertaking to hand over vacant possession and clear all outstanding rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of lower rent forums on the question of default warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can a tenant be granted time to vacate premises upon a voluntary undertaking given to the court?
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• Muhammad Riaz vs Muhammad Akhtar and others1984 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-28
  acquittalocular testimonyappraisal of evidenceleave to appealcriminal liabilityF.I.R. delaymedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the acquittal of respondents in a murder case involving the deaths of two individuals and injuries to others. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appraisal of evidence, specifically regarding the reliability of ocular testimony and the prosecution's version of events. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The courts below found significant discrepancies in the prosecution's narrative, including the timing of the incident, the presence of witnesses, and the medical evidence regarding the victims' injuries and stomach contents. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony is found to be unreliable and contradicted by material circumstances—such as the timing of the F.I.R., the medical evidence, and the absence of corroborating physical evidence—an acquittal is justified. The Supreme Court emphasized that the mere occurrence of an incident in daylight does not substitute for credible evidence of guilt, and appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on a sound appraisal of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal where the ocular testimony is found to be unreliable and contradicted by medical evidence?
  • Does the mere fact that an incident occurred in daylight establish the guilt of the accused if the prosecution's version of events is otherwise improbable?
  • Is the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries sustained by the deceased a ground for doubting the prosecution's version of the occurrence?
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• Muhammad Raza vs Khan Muhammad and Others1984 SCMR 1588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-18
  ocular testimonyinterested witnessmitigating circumstancesdeath sentence reductioncriminal appealacquittalmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two criminal appeals arising from a single judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a murder case. The primary legal question was whether the ocular testimony of two witnesses, who were related to the deceased, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder, and whether the mitigating circumstances justified a reduction in the death sentence. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the related witnesses was reliable and sufficient to sustain the conviction, as they lacked direct hostility toward the appellant that would motivate them to falsely implicate him. The Court affirmed the conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but found that prior disputes regarding property at a brick-kiln constituted a mitigating circumstance. Consequently, the Court reduced the appellant's sentence from death to imprisonment for life. Regarding the complainant's appeal against the acquittal of co-accused, the Court found no cogent grounds to interfere with the High Court's acquittal, thereby upholding the lower court's decision. The principle established is that ocular testimony from related witnesses is admissible and sufficient for conviction if credible and free from direct enmity.

  Questions settled

  • Can the ocular testimony of witnesses related to the deceased be sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the existence of a prior property dispute between the parties constitute a mitigating circumstance for sentencing in a murder case?
  • Is it appropriate for an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal where no cogent reasons are provided by the appellant?
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• Muhammad Rais Khan and Others vs Sher Ilyas1984 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-20
  pre-emptiontenancyKhasra GirdawariJamabandico-sharernew plea
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated petitions for special leave to appeal were filed to challenge the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' revision applications and upheld the District Judge's dismissal of their pre-emption suit. The petitioners claimed a preferential right of pre-emption under MLR-115 on the ground that they were tenants of the disputed land. The trial court decreed the suit based on Khasra Girdawari entries, but the District Judge reversed this, finding that the Jamabandi record showed the land in possession of the owners and that the Khasra Girdawari entries had been corrected as incorrect. The Supreme Court held that the question of tenancy is a question of fact, and since no presumption of truth attaches to Khasra Girdawari entries, the finding of the lower appellate court based on the superior Jamabandi record was correct. The Court also declined to entertain a new plea regarding the respondent's co-sharer status that was not raised before the courts below. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a presumption of truth attaches to entries made in the Khasra Girdawari as opposed to the Jamabandi record?
  • Can a new plea of fact or law regarding a party's status as a co-sharer be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not raised in the courts below?
  • Whether a tenant's right of pre-emption under MLR-115 can be sustained when the Jamabandi record contradicts the claim of tenancy?
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• Muhammad Rafiq Bhatti vs Province of Punjab through Secretary1984 SCMR 33(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-25
  service tribunalmisconductdepartmental inquiryremoval from servicenatural justiceefficiency and discipline rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which upheld the removal from service of the petitioner, a Sub-Engineer in the Lahore Municipal Corporation, on charges of misconduct and corruption relating to excessive and fictitious measurements. The core legal question concerned whether the departmental inquiry and subsequent removal order violated the principles of natural justice and rule 6(A) of the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960, by allegedly denying the petitioner copies of documents and opportunity to inspect the record. The Supreme Court held that all formalities of the departmental inquiry were duly fulfilled, the petitioner was given full opportunity to defend himself, and the rules were not violated, as the excess measurements were recorded in the Measurement Book and not seriously controverted. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that advance running bills do not cure the creation of false records for potential over-payments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to supply copies of documents prior to replying to allegations vitiates a departmental inquiry under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960?
  • Does the issuance of running bills in advance absolve a government servant from recording excessive measurements in the Measurement Book?
  • Whether the principles of natural justice are violated when a delinquent official is allowed full opportunity to defend himself and examine witnesses during a departmental inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq and Another vs Muhammad Sharif and Another1984 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-02
  specific performanceagreement to sellbona fide purchaserforgery of documentcancellation of sale-deedconsequential reliefpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell in favor of respondent No. 1. The petitioners challenged the concurrent findings of fact that their prior alleged agreement of purchase was a forgery and that their subsequent sale-deed was executed with notice of the earlier agreement. They also contended that the suit for specific performance simpliciter was defective for not seeking the cancellation of the registered sale-deed in their favor or possession as a consequential relief. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact regarding forgery will not normally be interfered with. The Court further held that a plaintiff who is not a party to a subsequent sale-deed is not obliged to seek its cancellation, and that a prayer for possession in a suit for specific performance sufficiently covers the relief claimed. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the forgery of an agreement to sell?
  • Is a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance obliged to seek the cancellation of a subsequent sale-deed to which they were not a party?
  • Does a suit for specific performance requiring possession as part of the claim fail for not seeking possession as a separate consequential relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Raees vs The State1984 SCMR 223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-22
  attempted murderappreciation of evidenceacquittal of co-accusedbenefit of doubtcriminal liabilityidentification of assailant
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner for attempted murder. The petitioner, along with several co-accused, was charged with attacking the complainant party following a property dispute. While the trial court acquitted the co-accused due to a lack of evidence regarding specific overt acts, it convicted the petitioner under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, finding him responsible for firing the shot that injured the victim. The conviction was subsequently upheld by the Sessions Judge and the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that his case was indistinguishable from the acquitted co-accused, suggesting he was singled out without corroboration. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the petitioner was specifically identified in the F.I.R. and trial testimony as the individual who fired the effective shot and issued threats. The Court clarified that the acquittal of co-accused based on the absence of active roles does not invalidate the conviction of a principal assailant. Finding no misappreciation of evidence or violation of legal principles, the Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused for lack of specific overt acts necessarily invalidate the conviction of a principal assailant identified by witnesses?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the petitioner is specifically named in the F.I.R. and trial evidence as the person who fired the effective shot?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to reappraise evidence in a criminal appeal where the lower courts have not violated established principles of evidence appraisal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Noor vs Allied Bank of Pakistan and others1984 SCMR 1237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-09
  Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans)decretal amountbank guaranteeinterim orderappellate discretionadmission of appealsecurity deposit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an interim order passed by the Peshawar High Court in a Regular First Appeal arising from a suit filed under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The High Court had directed the petitioner to furnish a bank guarantee equivalent to the decretal amount of Rs. 1,69,415 as a condition for the admission of the appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's exercise of discretion in requiring a bank guarantee rather than a cash deposit, or specifically the quantum of security, warranted interference by the appellate court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court acted within its statutory discretion. The Court affirmed that under Section 12(5) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, the normal condition for admitting an appeal is the deposit of the decretal amount in cash, though the Court retains discretion to accept other forms of security. The Supreme Court established that it will not normally interfere with the High Court's exercise of such discretion regarding the nature of security required for the admission of an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the discretion to accept security other than a cash deposit for the admission of an appeal under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion regarding the nature of security required for the admission of an appeal?
  • Is a bank guarantee a valid form of security for the admission of an appeal under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nazir vs The State1984 SCMR 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-06
  post-arrest bailmurderrule of consistencyfatal injuriesSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail after being charged alongside co-accused for the murder of the deceased. His previous bail applications were dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge and the Lahore High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds of lack of attribution of fatal blows and the rule of consistency, given that a co-accused assigned similar or more active roles had been admitted to bail. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail considering the circumstances and the role attributed to him. The Court accordingly admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail, establishing that parity in treatment with co-accused and non-attribution of fatal injuries are relevant considerations for granting bail in murder cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused not attributed with fatal blows to the deceased is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does the grant of bail to a co-accused form a valid ground for granting bail to another accused on the rule of consistency?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Muslim vs The State and another1984 SCMR 1243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-17
  criminal revisionsummoning of accusedcolumn No. 2acquittalSessions Court powerspolice challan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal revision judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had directed the Sessions Court to proceed against the petitioner, Muhammad Muslim. The petitioner had been placed in column No. 2 of the police challan (found innocent by police) but was subsequently summoned by a Magistrate. The Sessions Court initially declined to proceed against him, but following a High Court revision order, it summoned him to face trial. The petitioner challenged this summoning order, arguing that the initial refusal by the Sessions Court amounted to an acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the earlier refusal did not constitute an acquittal under Section 265-K. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the power of the Sessions Court to summon an accused person placed in column No. 2 of the challan, noting that the petitioner had previously conceded this point and failed to challenge the earlier remand order. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order by a Sessions Court refusing to proceed against an accused person placed in column No. 2 of the challan amount to an acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a Sessions Court have the legal authority to summon an accused person who was placed in column No. 2 of the police challan?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mumtazul Hasan vs Ata Ullah Mehar and others1984 SCMR 1499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-18
  service lawstatutory interpretationeducational qualificationsPublic Service Commissionrecruitment rulesPhysiotherapist appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a service dispute regarding the appointment of a Physiotherapist (Grade 18) under the Punjab Health Department. The appellant was selected by the Public Service Commission despite lacking a B.Sc. degree in Physiotherapy, relying on a Diploma and ten years of experience. The core legal question was whether the relevant service rules permitted ten years of experience after a diploma as a substitute for the mandatory B.Sc. degree, or if that experience was merely an alternative to the five-year experience requirement for degree holders. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that the academic qualification of a B.Sc. degree is a mandatory prerequisite for the post. The Court ruled that the experience provisions—five years after a degree or ten years after a diploma—are alternative experience criteria and cannot be interpreted to waive the essential academic degree requirement. The Court emphasized the principle of statutory interpretation that all parts of a rule must be read together, and any construction rendering a portion of the statute redundant must be rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement of ten years' experience after a diploma in physiotherapy acts as a substitute for the mandatory B.Sc. degree qualification for the post of Physiotherapist (Grade 18)?
  • Does the principle of statutory interpretation require that all parts of a rule be construed together to avoid rendering any portion redundant?
  • Are the experience requirements for the post of Physiotherapist (Grade 18) under the Punjab Health Department (General, Specialists and Miscellaneous Post) Service Rules, 1981, intended to be alternative to the academic degree requirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Masood Khan vs Noor Muhammad Khan and Others1984 SCMR 936 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-07
  concurrent findings of factdeclaratory decreerevenue recordleave to appealownership rightssuit for declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit wherein the plaintiff sought a declaration of exclusive ownership and possession of specific agricultural land, challenging the validity of registered gift deeds executed in favor of the petitioner. The plaintiff asserted that the land had been purchased by his father in 1892 and subsequently devolved upon him through private partition. The trial court, after examining the evidence, determined that the plaintiff was the exclusive owner of the suit land, excluding a small portion belonging to his brother, and granted a declaratory decree. This finding was upheld by the appellate and revisional courts. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the plaintiff's ownership, based on long-standing revenue records, warranted interference by the apex court. The Supreme Court held that the findings were based on a proper examination of material evidence, including historical revenue records dating back to 1892. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact supported by documentary evidence are generally not subject to interference in appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts regarding land ownership?
  • Can a declaratory decree be granted based on historical revenue records dating back to 1892?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Masood Khan Bhatti vs Mst. Ghulam Fatima1984 SCMR 1385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-24
  preferential rightwaiverleave to appealstatus quoland transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, addressing the question of whether the respondent had waived her preferential right to acquire land based on her conduct and statements of witnesses establishing refusal to take the land despite knowledge of the transfer. The Supreme Court held that the case requires further consideration, particularly regarding whether the plea of waiver was rejected on academic considerations rather than the true realities of the situation. Accordingly, leave to appeal was granted, security was ordered, and the interim order of status quo as to possession was directed to continue pending the final hearing. The key principle laid down is that a party's conduct, including explicit refusal to accept property despite knowledge of its transfer, may constitute waiver of a preferential right and warrants a thorough judicial examination rather than dismissal on academic grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the refusal to take land despite knowledge of its transfer constitute a waiver of a preferential right?
  • Can a plea of waiver be rejected on academic considerations rather than the realities of the situation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Malik and another vs Ahmad Din and others1984 SCMR 1203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-04
  pre-emptionco-sharerconcurrent findingssecond appealdismissal in liminequestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a suit for pre-emption of a sale of land, wherein the petitioners claimed a superior right based on their status as co-sharers in the khata and as tenants. The trial court dismissed the suit after rejecting both grounds. On appeal, the petitioners abandoned the tenancy claim and focused solely on the co-sharer status, which the appellate court also rejected. A subsequent second appeal to the Lahore High Court was dismissed in limine. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that their documentary evidence established their co-sharer status. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners failed to provide the necessary documents or the trial court's judgment for review. Furthermore, the Court noted that the first appellate court had already duly considered the relevant evidence, specifically the extract from the register Haqdaran. Finding that the petitioners' plea involved a question of fact already settled by concurrent findings of the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that there was no justification for interference and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts regarding a claim of being a co-sharer in a pre-emption suit?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal liable to be dismissed if the petitioner fails to provide the necessary documents and judgments of the lower courts for review?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif and Another vs The State1984 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-02
  sudden fightcommon intentionalteration of convictionfatal blowgrievous hurtbenefit of doubtSection 302/34 PPCSection 326/34 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a decision of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and life imprisonment sentences of the appellants under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the death of Liaqat Ali during a sudden dispute over a plot of vacant land. Both parties sustained stick injuries during the clash, with the appellants inflicting sota blows to the head of the deceased, one of which proved fatal. The core legal question was whether the appellants acted with a common intention to commit murder under Section 302/34, or whether the occurrence was a sudden fight in which individual acts and shared common intention were limited to causing grievous hurt. The Supreme Court observed that there was no pre-conceived plan to commit murder and it was uncertain which appellant delivered the fatal blow. Consequently, the Supreme Court altered the conviction from Section 302/34 to Section 326/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing each appellant to seven years' rigorous imprisonment, while maintaining their other convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under Section 302/34 PPC can be sustained when a death occurs during a sudden fight without a pre-conceived plan to commit murder?
  • What offence is committed under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when participants in a sudden fight cause fatal injuries with blunt weapons but the author of the fatal blow cannot be determined?
  • Can shared common intention under Section 34 PPC be restricted to causing grievous hurt rather than murder in an un-premeditated clash?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan and Another vs Sultan and 5 Others1984 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-29
  murderdying declarationocular testimonyballistic evidencecriminal appealdeath sentencecorroborationappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that maintained the death sentence of one accused while acquitting four others in a murder case. The core legal questions were whether the High Court erred in acquitting the co-accused despite the existence of a dying declaration and ocular testimony, and whether the conviction of the primary accused was sustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions. Regarding the acquittal, the Court held that the ocular testimony required corroboration, which was lacking, and that the medical evidence—showing fewer injuries than would be expected from multiple simultaneous shooters—contradicted the prosecution's narrative. Regarding the primary accused, the Court upheld the conviction, finding the dying declaration credible despite the severity of the victim's brain injuries, and noting that ballistic evidence successfully linked the recovered weapon to the crime scene. The judgment reaffirms that while dying declarations are potent evidence, they must be evaluated alongside medical findings, and that ocular testimony, even from natural witnesses, may require independent corroboration if the witnesses are not entirely reliable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dying declaration be relied upon if the victim suffered severe brain injuries?
  • Does medical evidence regarding the number of injuries provide a basis to doubt the prosecution's version of multiple assailants?
  • Is corroboration required for ocular testimony when witnesses are deemed not entirely truthful?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ballistic evidence matching a recovered weapon to a crime scene empty?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Javaid vs The State1984 SCMR 1463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-19
  leave to appealmurderappreciation of evidenceocular testimonyabscondenceballistic matchcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased and the sentence of imprisonment for life. The core legal question involved the proper appreciation of ocular evidence, delayed lodging of the first information report, interested witnesses, non-production of certain eyewitnesses, and corroborative pieces of evidence including motive, ballistic matching of a crime empty with a recovered weapon, and abscondence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence by the courts below were unexceptionable. The key principle laid down is that minor discrepancies and relationship of witnesses do not impair their credibility when corroborated by independent medical and forensic evidence, and that unexplained prolonged abscondence strongly supports the inference of guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts on the appreciation of ocular evidence warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the relationship of eyewitnesses to the deceased inherently render their testimony unreliable without independent corroboration?
  • Whether prolonged abscondence of an accused person serves as a valid corroborative circumstance of guilt in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail vs Liaqat and Others1984 SCMR 1053 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-18
  criminal appealmurderacquittalright of private defenceappreciations of evidenceeyewitness testimonyreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a petition for leave to appeal against the acquittal of two respondents, addressed whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the eyewitness account and acquitting the accused of murder. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, including rival versions of a sudden flare-up and physical altercation at a mosque over a management dispute involving injuries sustained by both sides. The core legal question concerned the appreciation of ocular testimony, the right of private defence, and whether the acquittal resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court held that the existence of two conflicting versions, corroborated by medical evidence of injuries on the defense side, created reasonable doubt regarding the specific attribution of the fatal shot and the role of the accused. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, establishing that where mutual injuries and a sudden altercation give rise to competing versions and a plausible plea of private defence, an acquittal based on reasonable doubt will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an eyewitness account corroborated by medical evidence must be accepted when a plausible competing version of a sudden fight exists?
  • Does a sudden flare-up and exchange of brickbats between parties give rise to the right of private defence?
  • When does the presence of injuries on the accused party create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution version in a murder case?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail and Another vs Sh. Muhammad Munawar1984 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-12
  rent matterremand orderpiecemeal adjudicationres judicatapreliminary issuesejectment applicationlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which declined to interfere with an appellate court's decision to remand a rent case for a fresh determination of all issues. The respondent, claiming to be the purchaser of the property, initiated ejectment proceedings, leading to the framing of four preliminary issues, including jurisdiction, competency, service of notices, and the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The Rent Controller initially decided only the issue regarding the landlord-tenant relationship, dismissing the application, but the appellate court set aside this order, directing a comprehensive decision on all issues to avoid piecemeal adjudication. The High Court affirmed this approach, emphasizing that trial courts should decide all issues in appealable cases to prevent unnecessary remands. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, rejecting the petitioners' argument of res judicata regarding an earlier dismissed appeal, noting that the contention was not raised before the High Court and the prior dismissal was based on non-maintainability. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate for a Rent Controller to decide only a single preliminary issue in an ejectment application rather than deciding all issues?
  • Does a dismissal of an appeal on the grounds of non-maintainability create a res judicata bar against subsequent proceedings?
  • Should trial courts decide all issues in appealable cases to avoid the necessity of a remand?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaque vs Fazal Muhammad and another1984 SCMR 1204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-05
  Ejected Tenants Schemeproprietary rightslocus standilandlord and tenantlacheswrit petitionallotment of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed a writ petition challenging the grant of proprietary rights to allottees of land under the Ejected Tenants Scheme. The petitioner, who had been inducted as a tenant by the allottees, sought to challenge the allotment of proprietary rights to them. The core legal questions addressed were whether the petitioner had the locus standi to challenge the title of his landlords, whether the challenge was barred by laches, and whether the petitioner could assail the title of the allottees under whom he entered possession. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the petitioner lacked locus standi and was estopped from challenging the title of the landlords under whom he held the land as a tenant. Furthermore, the Court agreed that the challenge to the Board of Revenue's order was barred by laches. The decision reinforces the principle that a tenant cannot challenge the title of the landlord under whom they were inducted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant inducted by an allottee have the locus standi to challenge the grant of proprietary rights to that allottee?
  • Is a tenant estopped from challenging the title of the landlord under whom they were inducted?
  • Can a writ petition be dismissed on the grounds of laches when challenging a long-standing order of the Board of Revenue?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State1984 SCMR 810 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-01
  criminal appealacquittalconvictionappellate courtprosecution caseself-defenseburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a High Court judgment that reversed an acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether an appellate court is justified in convicting an accused based on a theory of a 'scuffle' or 'self-defense' that was neither pleaded by the prosecution nor supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and acquitting the appellant. The Court held that the High Court erred by constructing a new hypothesis of a scuffle to explain injuries on the accused, which was not the prosecution's case. The key principle laid down is that a court cannot convict an accused based on a theory of the incident that contradicts the prosecution's evidence or introduces a narrative not supported by the record. Furthermore, when the prosecution fails to explain injuries on the accused, the court cannot unilaterally invent a justification for those injuries to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court convict an accused based on a theory of the case that was not presented by the prosecution?
  • Is a court permitted to construct a theory of a 'scuffle' or 'self-defense' in the absence of evidence supporting such a narrative?
  • What is the legal consequence when a court rejects the prosecution's evidence on the main incident but attempts to convict based on a new, unproven theory?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Mst. Shakila Khatoon and another1984 SCMR 1477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-18
  dissolution of marriagedowerKhulahfamily courtsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court which restored a two-fold decree for dissolution of marriage and dower amount in favour of the respondent wife. The core legal question concerns the competence of the District Court in appeal to modify a decree for dissolution of marriage by converting it into one based on Khulah when such decree was passed on grounds of non-maintenance and cruelty, thereby affecting the dower amount in light of statutory bars. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court could not modify the decree for dissolution of marriage in a collateral manner so as to add the ground of Khulah in violation of the bar contained in section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964. The key principle laid down is that the statutory bar against appeals in family matters concerning dissolution of marriage cannot be circumvented collaterally through an appeal relating to the dower decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a District Court modify a decree for dissolution of marriage on grounds of non-maintenance and cruelty to one of Khulah in an appeal arising from a dower decree?
  • Does section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 bar the collateral modification of a dissolution of marriage decree?
  • Whether an appeal against a dower decree permits the appellate court to alter the underlying grounds for the dissolution of marriage?
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• Muhammad Iqbal vs Mst. Irshad Begum and 2 crHEas1984 SCMR 1034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-09
  guardian and wardscustody of minorterritorial jurisdictionwelfare of minorwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the judgments of the lower courts which granted the custody of a minor child, Memoona Iqbal, to her mother, Mst. Irshad Begum. The core legal questions involved the territorial jurisdiction of the Guardian Judge under Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act and the determination of the welfare of the minor. The Supreme Court held that the ordinary place of residence of the child was correctly determined by the courts below and that the welfare of the minor would be best served in the custody of her mother, especially since her other children were already living with her. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that concurrent findings of fact regarding residence and welfare based on proper appreciation of evidence do not warrant interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Guardian Judge has territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the custody of a minor based on the ordinary place of residence?
  • Is the mother entitled to the custody of her minor child when her welfare is best served with her?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the residence and welfare of a minor can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and Others vs The State and Others1984 SCMR 1019(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-10
  quashment of criminal proceedingsprivate complaintpending appealsection 561-A CrPCmurder trialpolice challan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the dismissal of an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the Lahore High Court for the quashment of criminal proceedings. The core legal question was whether a private complaint against a new set of accused could proceed while an appeal and murder reference regarding the same incident were pending before the High Court, and whether such a complaint amounted to a review or an abuse of process. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that there is no bar to the trial of the accused appellants on a private complaint merely because the police had not challaned them or because an appeal concerning connected proceedings is pending in the High Court. The key principle laid down is that a private complaint is a valid recourse when the police choose not to send up an accused for trial, and contentions regarding the merits or quashment of proceedings should be raised before the trial court at the appropriate stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a private complaint can be maintained against an accused who was not challaned by the police during investigation?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 while an appeal regarding the same incident is pending before the High Court?
  • Does the trial of a second set of accused on a private complaint amount to a review of an already announced judgment in a connected case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and others vs Khurshid Ahmad1984 SCMR 1324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-04
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantexecution proceedingsobjection petitionrelationship of landlord and tenantdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent orders of the lower courts and the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' objections in execution proceedings regarding the ejectment of their mother from a residential property. The core legal question is whether an ejectment order passed against a mother living under the same roof is binding on her adult children who were omitted from the subsequent ejectment proceedings, and whether their late application for impleadment and subsequent objections are maintainable. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners lived with the judgment-debtor under the same roof, shared identical interests without any conflict, and had all available defenses represented, the ejectment order was fully effective against them as well. The Court laid down the principle that an objection petition filed by family members residing together with the judgment-debtor under similar interests is in substance an objection on behalf of the judgment-debtor and does not impede the execution of an ejectment order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ejectment order passed against a mother is binding on her children living with her in the same property?
  • Can family members residing under the same roof file independent objections in execution proceedings when their interests are identical to the judgment-debtor?
  • Whether the omission of certain family members from an ejectment application invalidates the ejectment order against the occupant mother?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and Another vs The State1984 SCMR 1184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-16
  solitary eye-witnessmurdermitigating circumstancesreduction of sentencemotivecriminal appealmedical evidencerecovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentences of the appellants for murder and related offenses. The core legal questions involved the sustainability of a conviction based on the testimony of a single, related eye-witness and the sufficiency of motive for the imposition of the death penalty. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of a solitary, related eye-witness, if credible, consistent, and corroborated by medical and recovery evidence, is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction. However, on the question of sentence, the Court ruled that where the prosecution fails to establish a clear and plausible motive and leaves the genesis of the crime shrouded in mystery, a mitigating circumstance is made out. Consequently, the Court upheld the appellants' convictions under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but altered their death sentences to imprisonment for life, while enhancing the fine and extending the benefit of section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that while a related solitary eye-witness's unblemished testimony can form the basis of a conviction as a matter of law, an unproven or obscure motive can serve as a mitigating factor warranting the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of a single, related eye-witness?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to establish a plausible motive warrant the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Is corroboration required as a matter of law for the testimony of a related eye-witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim Khan vs Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Others1984 SCMR 1014 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-26
  Service Tribunalspeaking orderseniority disputecivil servantjudicial reviewadministrative lawremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a Service Tribunal decision concerning the seniority of a civil servant, which was altered following an order by the President under Section 12-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The appellant challenged the Tribunal’s decision, contending it failed to address the legal and factual controversies and lacked sufficient reasoning. The Supreme Court examined whether the Tribunal’s order constituted a "speaking order" capable of appellate review. The Court held that the Tribunal’s decision was legally deficient as it failed to specify the nature of the "wrong advice" tendered to the President or the legal basis for its conclusions, offering only vague assertions of injustice. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the matter for a fresh decision. The key principle established is that all judicial and quasi-judicial orders must be "speaking orders," explicitly manifesting that the adjudicating authority has applied its mind to the specific issues of fact and law, thereby enabling appellate courts to understand the rationale behind the determination.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential requirements for a judicial or quasi-judicial order to qualify as a 'speaking order'?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have an obligation to decide all questions of law and fact raised in an appeal?
  • Can an appellate court review a decision of a Service Tribunal if the decision fails to articulate the reasoning and the specific controversies involved?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Sadiq Muhammad1984 SCMR 1353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-30
  concurrent findingsfraud and misrepresentationmutation of landcivil prisonland revenuepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the dismissal of a regular first appeal by the High Court, which had affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's suit. The core legal question was whether the mutation of land executed while the petitioner was in civil prison was the product of fraud and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that in view of the concurrent findings of fact by all three courts below establishing that fraud was not proved, the Court was not inclined to interfere with the same. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower forums unless a compelling ground is made out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact on the question of fraud and misrepresentation?
  • Can a party challenge a land mutation executed while confined in civil prison on the ground of fraud?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Muhammad Yar and Anothr1984 SCMR 1067 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-09
  Shamlat landdeclaratory suitlimitationsecond appealownership dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for special leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the High Court which dismissed two regular second appeals concerning a dispute over ownership of Shamlat land measuring 7,650 kanals and 4 marlas situated in Village Choni Shimali Dagar, Tehsil and District Bhakkar. The petitioner had brought a suit for declaration claiming exclusive ownership of the Shamlat land on the ground that his ancestor founded the village. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court accepted the appeals of the defendants and dismissed the suit. The High Court upheld the dismissal, concluding inter alia that the suit was barred by limitation. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's declaratory suit was within time and whether interference was warranted against the concurrent findings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to show any error in the High Court's finding that the suit was time-barred, which went to the root of the case. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a declaratory suit regarding ownership of Shamlat land liable to be dismissed if it is found to be time-barred?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court regarding limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Zafrullah Khan1984 SCMR 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-22
  leave to appealmurderacquittaldelay in FIRidentification in darkappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 26-5-1981, whereby the respondent Zafrullah Khan was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The respondent along with his father was accused of committing the murder of Haji Zar Gul by firing at him at night. The trial court had convicted the respondent and sentenced him to death, but the High Court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction, and rejected the Murder Reference. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in appreciating the evidence, specifically regarding the inordinate delay in lodging the first information report, the lack of sufficient light for identification at night, and the improbability of the prosecution's narrative concerning pre-planning. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in its findings regarding the delayed FIR and the impossibility of identification in the dark, and consequently declined to interfere with the acquittal. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court when the appreciation of evidence regarding identification and delayed FIR is plausible?
  • Does a solitary eye-witness statement require corroboration when the occurrence takes place in the dark of night without reliable sources of identification?
  • What is the evidentiary effect of an inordinate delay in lodging the first information report when the police station is located within a short distance from the scene of the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat and others vs The State1984 SCMR 1465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-20
  criminal appealsentence reductioncompromisemitigating circumstancesriotingwater dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a criminal revision filed by the petitioners, who were convicted by the trial court for offences involving rioting and causing injuries. The incident arose from a water supply dispute, resulting in injuries to several prosecution witnesses. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether, given that the parties had reached a compromise to ensure future peaceful coexistence, the sentences imposed on the appellants could be mitigated. The Supreme Court, having converted the petition into an appeal, noted the compromise between the parties, which was supported by the State counsel and the complainants present in court. Consequently, the Court maintained the convictions but exercised its discretion to reduce the sentences of the appellants to the period already undergone. The judgment affirms the principle that while a compromise may not necessarily negate the underlying criminal conviction, it serves as a valid mitigating factor for the appellate court to consider when determining the appropriate quantum of sentence in cases involving private disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise between parties in a criminal case be considered as a ground for reducing the sentence?
  • Does a compromise between the parties negate a criminal conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the appellate court empowered to reduce a sentence to the period already undergone based on a post-conviction compromise?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Muhammad Jahangir and Others1984 SCMR 531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-17
  leave to appealejectmentlandlord and tenantconstitutional petitionrelationship of landlord and tenanttransfer orderfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a tenant, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed concurrent orders of ejectment passed against him. The core legal question concerned whether a subsequent transfer order specifying the exact portion of the property removed the bar of a previous failed ejectment application and established the relationship of landlord and tenant. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact regarding the validity and effect of the subsequent transfer order, as determined by the lower forums and affirmed by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction, was supportable from the record and suffered from no legal error. The Court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact by tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant, supported by evidence and equity, will not be interfered with in constitutional or appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent transfer order specifying the exact property remove the bar of a previous failed ejectment application?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether a tenant can resist ejectment while failing to pay rent to the transferee landlord?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hameed vs Khushi Muhammad and Another1984 SCMR 804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-22
  quashment of proceedingsSection 145 CrPCpre-emption suitpossession of landbreach of peaceattachment of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which sought the quashment of proceedings initiated under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner argued that because a civil suit for possession through pre-emption was pending regarding the disputed land, the criminal proceedings under Section 145 were incompetent. The petitioner further contended that the criminal court's attachment order was legally unjustified given the prior civil litigation and the nature of Section 145 proceedings, which are intended to maintain peace. The Supreme Court examined the circumstances, noting that the criminal proceedings were initiated to address potential breaches of peace. Finding no infirmity in the High Court's order and no legal basis to declare the Section 145 proceedings incompetent merely due to the existence of a civil suit, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The holding affirms that the pendency of a civil suit does not automatically render Section 145 proceedings incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a civil suit for pre-emption render proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 incompetent?
  • Can a criminal court initiate proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 while civil litigation regarding the same property is ongoing?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Gulab and An0thbr vs Haji Fazal Mahmood alias Khawar1984 SCMR 967 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-21
  ejectmenttenantlandlordurban arealeave to appealconstitutional jurisdictionfixed-term lease
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petitions challenging their ejectment from commercial shops in Batkhela, Malakand Agency. The landlord filed ejectment applications on grounds including default, personal need, and reconstruction, and the Rent Controller ordered ejectment based on reconstruction, subject to providing subsequent accommodation. The petitioners raised two primary contentions before the High Court: that Batkhela was not an urban area rendering the Rent Restriction Ordinance inapplicable, and that a twenty-year fixed-term lease protected them from eviction. The Supreme Court held that the factual question of whether Batkhela was an urban area could not be raised for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction without proper foundational pleadings and disclosure of facts. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the finding that the disputed document merely stipulated a rent freeze for twenty years rather than creating a fixed-term lease. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the concurrent ejectment orders.

  Questions settled

  • Can a question of fact regarding the urban classification of an area be raised for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction without proper pleadings?
  • Does a contractual stipulation preventing rent increases for a specified duration constitute a fixed-term lease protecting against ejectment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fayyaz alias Shakoh vs The State1984 PLD Supreme Court 445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-23
  circumstantial evidencemurderfingerprint evidencerecovery of stolen propertyappellate reviewcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under sections 332, 449, 436, and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code, based entirely on circumstantial evidence following the murder of five family members and the burning of their house. The core legal question involves determining whether the circumstantial evidence presented—including motive arising from a frustrated love affair, fingerprint impressions on objects at the crime scene, and subsequent recoveries of stolen property at the appellant's instance—forms an unbroken, complete chain incompatible with the innocence of the accused. The Supreme Court held that despite the exclusion of an extra-judicial confession and a knife recovery, the remaining well-authenticated circumstances, particularly the matching fingerprints on the kerosene hearth and tin along with the recovery of stolen items, conclusively proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that where a case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, the proven facts must form a complete chain that is wholly incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of any other reasonable hypothesis except guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence be sustained if the proven facts form a complete and unbroken chain pointing solely to the guilt of the accused?
  • Whether fingerprint impressions found on objects at the scene of the crime constitute a strong and reliable piece of circumstantial evidence against an accused?
  • Does the absence of the accused's name in the initial first information report vitiate a conviction when subsequent reliable circumstantial evidence connects him to the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farid Khan vs Water and Power Development Authority1984 SCMR 603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-04
  service tribunallimitationcondonation of delayreview applicationremand
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the dismissal of his service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal on the ground of limitation, without his application for condonation of delay being considered during the hearing which was confined to the merits. His subsequent review application was dismissed by the Tribunal on the ground that it lacked the power to review its orders. Granting leave, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the dismissal was justified without examining the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant had filed an application for condonation of delay, he was entitled to a proper consideration of that application before his appeal could be dismissed on the ground of limitation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision on the question of limitation after hearing the parties, establishing the principle that a litigant is entitled to a hearing and consideration of a delay condonation application before limitation is invoked against them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellant is entitled to a consideration of an application for condonation of delay before an appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the power to review its earlier decisions under the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974?
  • What is the proper course of action when a tribunal dismisses an appeal on limitation without hearing the appellant on that question or considering a delay condonation application?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Faraz and Others vs Abdul Rashid Khan and Others1984 SCMR 724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-13
  record-of-rightssettlement operationswrit jurisdictionalternative remedyBoard of Revenuerevisional powersfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a dispute regarding the entry of ownership of forest land in the record-of-rights during initial settlement operations. The core legal questions involved whether an adequate alternative remedy under section 53 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 precluded writ jurisdiction, and whether the High Court erred in substituting its own finding of fact for that of the Board of Revenue in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the revisional order of the Board of Revenue, as the Board had properly found that entries were made without a final order of a competent authority while the dispute was still under enquiry. The Court ruled that while an alternative remedy before a civil court under section 53 exists, parties are not barred from exhausting remedies within the revenue hierarchy, and the Board of Revenue possesses wide revisional powers under section 164. Furthermore, the High Court cannot interfere with factual findings of inferior tribunals in constitutional jurisdiction merely because it considers the decision wrong. The appeal was allowed and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an adequate alternative remedy being available under section 53 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 bars recourse to writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether the High Court can substitute its own finding of fact for that of the Board of Revenue in the exercise of its constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • What is the scope of the revisional powers of the Board of Revenue under section 164 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967?
  • Can the High Court interfere with the decision of a tribunal merely because it considers the decision to be wrong?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bux vs Muhammad Ali1984 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-27
  civil revisionrevisional jurisdictionpower of attorneyfraudestoppeljurisdictional error
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit filed by the successors-in-interest of a deceased refugee, challenging the transfer of land executed by a lambardar under an alleged power-of-attorney. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the transaction was fraudulent and hit by the Transfer of Property Act, which was subsequently upheld by both the appellate court and the High Court in revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the plaintiffs were estopped from challenging the power-of-attorney under the principle of estoppel, and that the courts below committed an illegality under Section 115(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that fraud vitiates the most solemn transactions and the principle of estoppel cannot override this rule. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies strictly to jurisdictional errors, and a mere error of law or fact unrelated to jurisdiction does not warrant revisional interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can the principle of estoppel be invoked to protect a transaction that is vitiated by fraud?
  • Does a wrong decision on a point of law or fact by a subordinate court, unrelated to its jurisdiction, satisfy the requirements for revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether the commission of an illegality or material irregularity under Section 115(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 must be strictly relatable to the exercise of jurisdiction by a subordinate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota and Another vs The State and Another1984 SCMR 560 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-20
  capital convictioncircumstantial evidencerecovery evidencehostile witnessbenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of Muhammad Boota for the murder of Rana Muhammad Yaqub under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court convicted the appellant based on ocular testimony and the recovery of a revolver and bayonet. The High Court upheld this conviction, relying heavily on the recovery evidence. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the circumstantial evidence, specifically the recovery of weapons, was sufficient to sustain a capital conviction in the absence of forensic corroboration or matching ballistic reports. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was unsafe. The Court reasoned that the recovered revolver could not be linked to the crime as no empty shells were recovered from the scene to match it. Furthermore, the recovery of a blood-stained bayonet was unreliable because the accused had no prior connection to it, and the location was accessible to others. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that circumstantial evidence must be cogent and directly linked to the accused to support a conviction in a capital case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the recovery of a weapon when no forensic evidence links that weapon to the crime?
  • Does the declaration of a prosecution witness as hostile automatically invalidate their entire testimony?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon from a location accessible to others sufficient to establish the guilt of an accused?
  • Does Section 154 of the Evidence Act 1872 restrict the court's discretion to allow cross-examination of a party's own witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner and Another1984 SCMR 1164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-25
  settlement disputeindependent unittransfer of propertywrit petitionquestion of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the concurrent factual findings of the Settlement authorities. The core legal question was whether the disputed chaubara could be treated as an independent unit and transferred separately to its occupant. The Supreme Court held that the question involved was essentially one of fact, upon which the highest authority in the settlement organization had already recorded a finding that the chaubara constituted an independent and separate unit. Consequently, the High Court was legally justified in refusing to interfere with that finding, and the Supreme Court affirmed the same, holding that the impugned order warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that superior courts exercising constitutional or appellate jurisdiction will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact rendered by specialized settlement authorities unless such findings are shown to be perverse or without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a finding of fact determined by the settlement authorities regarding the nature of a property?
  • Can a disputed chaubara be treated as an independent unit for separate transfer under settlement laws?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against concurrent factual findings of lower forums and settlement authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh vs The State1984 SCMR 1310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-19
  murderdeath sentencemitigating circumstancesforgivenessdying declarationhatchet recoveryleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner against the dismissal of his appeal by the High Court, which had confirmed his conviction and death sentence for the murder of his real niece. The prosecution case was supported by the testimony of the deceased's father and sisters, two independent witnesses, the dying declaration of the deceased, and the recovery of a blood-stained hatchet from the petitioner. The core legal question was whether an affidavit filed by the deceased's father (the petitioner's brother) forgiving the petitioner constituted a mitigating circumstance sufficient to reduce the death sentence. The Supreme Court held that forgiveness by the petitioner's brother under the circumstances of this case did not constitute a mitigating circumstance entitling the petitioner to a lesser penalty. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that familial forgiveness does not automatically warrant a reduction of sentence in a murder conviction under the prevailing law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the forgiveness of an offender by the deceased's father constitute a mitigating circumstance sufficient to reduce a death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained primarily on the corroborated testimony of close relatives and a dying declaration of the deceased?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh alias Muhammadi vs The State1984 SCMR 1474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-11
  solitary eye-witnessleave to appealcriminal appealconvictionsentence computationSection 382-B Cr.P.C.murder
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Bakhsh, was convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge for murder and theft under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving life imprisonment and one year of rigorous imprisonment, respectively, to run concurrently. The Lahore High Court maintained these convictions and sentences on appeal. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging the reliance on a solitary eye-witness testimony. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, including the testimony of the eye-witness, corroborating medical evidence, and the established motive of land dispute enmity. The Court held that the testimony of a solitary eye-witness is sufficient for conviction when there is no evidence of enmity or motive to falsely implicate the accused. Finding no grounds to interfere with the convictions, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. However, the Court exercised its discretion to grant the petitioner the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the computation of his sentence, modifying the order accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the testimony of a solitary eye-witness?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a convict seeking leave to appeal?
  • Does the absence of enmity between an eye-witness and the accused support the reliability of the witness's testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azram vs Nawab and Others1984 SCMR 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-12
  sudden quarrelculpable homicidevicarious liabilityappraisal of evidencecriminal appealpremeditationheat of passion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a criminal incident involving a fatal stabbing and injuries following a Kabaddi match. The core legal question was whether the lower courts correctly appraised the evidence regarding premeditation and vicarious liability, and whether the conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was sustainable given the circumstances. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings that the incident was not a premeditated attack but a sudden quarrel arising from provocation, thereby negating common object and vicarious liability. However, the Court modified the conviction of the primary appellant, Nawab, from murder under Section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court held that while the accused acted with knowledge that his blow was likely to cause death, the absence of premeditation and the heat of the moment precluded the requisite intention for murder. The principle established is that in sudden, unpremeditated altercations, the specific intent required for murder may be absent, necessitating a reclassification of the offense to culpable homicide.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained when the evidence proves a sudden quarrel without premeditation?
  • Does the absence of premeditation and the presence of a sudden quarrel negate the application of vicarious liability in a criminal assault?
  • When should an act causing death be classified as culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azam vs Shabbir Ali and others1984 SCMR 1505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-26
  bail pending appealappeal against acquittaldelay in disposal of appealcriminal procedurepost-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the acquittal of the accused, who were initially convicted under sections 302, 323, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Following the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court, the accused were arrested pursuant to non-bailable warrants. The core legal question addressed is whether the accused, having been arrested pending the hearing of the appeal against their acquittal, are entitled to bail due to the passage of time. The Supreme Court held that the delay of two years in the disposal of the appeal against acquittal constitutes sufficient grounds for the grant of bail. Consequently, the Court admitted the accused to bail, subject to the furnishing of surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner, Khushab. The principle laid down is that prolonged delay in the adjudication of an appeal against acquittal, during which the accused remains incarcerated, serves as a valid basis for the exercise of judicial discretion to grant bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a two-year delay in the disposal of an appeal against acquittal entitle the accused to the grant of bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant bail to an accused person pending the hearing of an appeal against their acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azam and Another vs The State1984 SCMR 1166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-25
  suspension of sentenceappellate delaybail pending appealcriminal procedurelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' application for the suspension of their sentences pending appeal. The petitioners, convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment, sought relief under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the suspension of sentence was warranted given the significant delay in the appellate process. The Supreme Court observed that more than two years had elapsed since the filing of the appeal, and the record remained unprinted, with further delays anticipated. Holding that the prolonged delay in the hearing of the appeal without fault of the petitioners constituted a valid ground for relief, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and ordered the suspension of the petitioners' sentences. The judgment reinforces the principle that where an appellate court is unable to hear an appeal within a reasonable timeframe due to administrative delays, the suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence be suspended under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 due to the non-printing of the appellate record?
  • Does a significant delay in the hearing of an appeal justify the suspension of a life sentence?
  • Is the suspension of a sentence permissible when the appellate court is unlikely to fix the appeal for hearing in the near future?
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• Muhammad Ayub vs Sadik Ali Khan and another1984 SCMR 1402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-09
  property transferprovisional transfer orderrevisional jurisdictionresumption of propertyauction salefindings of factsettlement law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the disputed transfer of a property in Rohri, District Sukkur, originally transferred to the appellant via a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) in 1959. The property was subsequently resumed and auctioned to the respondent following an alleged default in payment. The Settlement Commissioner, in revision, set aside the resumption, finding no evidence that the appellant was served notice regarding the default. The High Court, however, interfered with this finding based on presumptions of service and held that the Settlement Commissioner lacked revisional jurisdiction once a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) was issued. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court erred in interfering with the Settlement Commissioner's findings of fact based on mere surmises rather than the record. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that the Settlement Commissioner retains revisional jurisdiction even after the issuance of a P.T.D., consistent with established precedent. The Court concluded that the initial transfer to the appellant was never legally cancelled, rendering the subsequent auction invalid, and restored the Settlement Commissioner's order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with findings of fact recorded by a Settlement Commissioner based on mere presumptions?
  • Does a Settlement Commissioner retain the power of revision after a Permanent Transfer Deed has been issued to an auction purchaser?
  • Is an auction sale of property valid if the original transfer order was not legally cancelled due to lack of notice to the original transferee?
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• Muhammad Ayub Khan vs Rai Abdul Qayyum and others1984 SCMR 1231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-13
  rent ejectmentdefault in rentconstitutional jurisdictionservice of noticeconcurrent findings of factlandlord-tenant relationshipstriking off defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a rent ejectment matter where the petitioner, a tenant, challenged an eviction order affirmed by the District Judge and upheld by the Lahore High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. The core legal questions concerned whether the tenant was in default of rent payment and whether the service of notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, was validly effected. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts, noting that the notice was properly addressed and deemed served, and that the tenant had failed to comply with the rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the Ordinance, leading to the striking off of his defence. The Court held that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to re-examine findings of fact established by competent authorities. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, though the Court granted the tenant a three-month grace period to surrender possession based on his undertaking to vacate and pay outstanding rent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with concurrent findings of fact recorded by rent tribunals?
  • Does the refusal to accept a properly addressed registered notice constitute valid service of notice under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is a tenant who fails to comply with a rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 liable for eviction due to default?
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• Muhammad Ayaz vs Mazeed Khan and Another1984 SCMR 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-30
  bailjudicial discretionmurder caseleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the order of the Peshawar High Court, which had granted bail to the respondent in a criminal case involving charges of murder and causing injuries. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had exercised its judicial discretion properly in granting bail, particularly in light of the circumstances surrounding the incident. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that the High Court had observed that a person from the accused's side was also found dead at the crime scene with a weapon nearby, yet the prosecution had failed to provide any explanation regarding the circumstances of that individual's death. Finding no infirmity or error in the exercise of discretion by the High Court in granting bail, the Supreme Court held that the impugned order was not exceptionable. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that the appellate court will not interfere with the discretionary grant of bail by a lower court unless it is shown to be arbitrary or based on a misreading of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail in a murder case warrant interference by the Supreme Court if no infirmity is found?
  • Is the presence of an unexplained death on the accused's side at the crime scene a relevant factor for the court to consider when deciding a bail application?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs Yaqoob and Another1984 SCMR 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-17
  suspension of sentencecriminal petition for leave to appealtentative assessmentvicarious liabilityappellate discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal challenging the orders of the High Court suspending the sentences of Fazal Ellahi and Yaqoob under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Both respondents were convicted under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving sentences of life imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment with fines. The High Court suspended their sentences upon forming a tentative view from the judgment that the specific part attributed to one respondent was not established and that the question of vicarious liability required consideration, placing both respondents on par. The core legal question was whether the High Court acted injudiciously in suspending the sentences based on a tentative opinion formed from the trial judgment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its discretion in forming a tentative opinion on the face of the judgment, and the suspension orders were not injudicious. The petitions were accordingly dismissed, establishing that an appellate court may exercise its discretion to suspend a sentence under section 426 Cr.P.C. by forming a tentative assessment of the merits of the case from the trial judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court suspend a sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 based on a tentative opinion formed from the trial judgment?
  • Whether the High Court's exercise of discretion in suspending a sentence can be interfered with when it is based on a tentative assessment of the merits?
  • Does parity in the case of co-accused justify the suspension of sentence for one based on the reasoning applied to another?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs Sher Ahmed and Others1984 SCMR 4i9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-13
  acquittalcriminal petitionconcurrent findingsreappraisal of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of the acquittal of the respondents for the murder of Ashraf by the trial court, which was upheld by the High Court in revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether interference with concurrent findings of fact regarding acquittal was warranted upon a reappraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's counsel raised no question of law and failed to provide any compelling reason for the court to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily reappraise evidence to interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal in the absence of a substantial question of law or serious legal error by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence to interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal?
  • Does the dismissal of a petition against acquitted co-accused affect the case of an absconding co-accused?
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• Muhammad Aslam and Others vs Sherdil Khan and Others1984 SCMR 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-21
  remand orderwithdrawal of suitcivil procedurecause of actionpreliminary issueappellate jurisdictionservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a remand order passed by the Additional District Judge, Peshawar. The respondent, a diploma-holder, filed a suit challenging his non-promotion and the validity of a government notification regarding transfers and postings, while inadvertently failing to challenge the primary notification regarding the promotion of others. During the suit's pendency, the respondent filed an application under Order XXIII, Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking withdrawal of the suit with permission to file a fresh one. The trial court dismissed the suit on a preliminary issue regarding a statutory bar under the Specific Relief Act 1877 without deciding the withdrawal application. The appellate court set aside this dismissal and remanded the case, directing the trial court to first decide the withdrawal application. The Supreme Court upheld the remand order, holding that the appellate court correctly identified that the trial court could not determine the suit's competency or jurisdiction without first addressing the pending application for withdrawal, as the respondent's cause of action depended on the proper identification of the challenged notification.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court dismiss a suit on a preliminary issue without first deciding a pending application for withdrawal of the suit with permission to file a fresh one?
  • Is a remand order legally infirm if the appellate court directs the trial court to first dispose of a pending application for withdrawal of the suit?
  • Does an appellate court have the discretion to remand a case for fresh decision when the trial court failed to address a procedural application that could impact the cause of action?
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• Muhammad Aslam and Another vs Mir Afzal alias Mir Afsar and Another1984 SCMR 1050 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-11
  leave to appealsupreme court practicebinding precedentpetition dismissed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Aslam and another against Mir Afzal alias Mir Afsar and another. The core legal question sought to be agitated in the petition stood already adjudicated by the apex court in a prior precedent, which ran counter to the petitioners' primary plea on the merits. Upon reviewing the settled legal position, the court held that no useful purpose would be served by proceeding further with the matter as it did not constitute a fit case for the grant of leave to appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that matters conclusively settled by binding precedent cannot be reopened.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the core question sought to be agitated stands already decided by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a petition serve any useful purpose if the main plea on merits goes against settled precedent?
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