Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Aslam alias Accha and Others vs The State1984 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-01
  sudden fightculpable homicideprivate defencecourt witnessessummoning of witnessescriminal trialappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for murder and simple hurt. The core legal questions involved whether the incident was a sudden fight attracting Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the trial court was bound under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to examine injured defence witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the occurrence took place without premeditation during a sudden quarrel where both sides suffered injuries, bringing the principal offender's case under Exception 4 to Section 300, and further held that the trial court erred in failing to exercise its mandatory powers under the second part of Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to examine material witnesses essential for a just decision. The court laid down the principle that the second part of Section 540 imposes a mandatory duty on the court to summon witnesses whose evidence is essential for the just decision of the case, and altered the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sudden quarrel without premeditation during a fight attracts Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is it mandatory for a trial court under the second part of Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon and examine a witness if their evidence appears essential for the just decision of the case?
  • Whether individual liability can be fastened on accused persons when an incident arises out of a sudden flare-up without a common object or premeditation?
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• Muhammad Ashraf vs Dost Muhammad and another1984 SCMR 1505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-11
  pre-emptionleave to appealabandonment of issuessuperior right of pre-emptioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions arise out of concurrent findings of the lower courts decreeing a suit for possession by way of pre-emption, which was upheld by the District Judge and subsequently by the Lahore High Court in revision. The core legal questions involved whether the District Judge failed to exercise jurisdiction by not deciding all relevant issues, whether un-rebutted evidence must be accepted, and whether the pre-emptor waived their right or failed to comply with court-fee orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the leave to appeal, holding that the contentions were without merit because the petitioners' counsel had not pressed the remaining issues before the District Judge, amounting to an abandonment of those pleas, and that the pre-emptors had successfully proved their superior right of pre-emption. The key principle laid down is that points not pressed before the lower appellate court cannot be agitated as a ground of failure to exercise jurisdiction in higher forums, and the concurrent findings based on proper appreciation of evidence regarding superior pre-emptive rights will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of an appellate court to decide issues that were not pressed by counsel amounts to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction?
  • Can a party agitate issues in a higher forum that were explicitly abandoned or not pressed before the lower appellate court?
  • Whether the absence of later Jamabandis not completed at the time of the institution of the suit affects the proof of a superior right of pre-emption?
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• Muhammad Ashfaq vs The State1984 SCMR 1229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-25
  death sentencequantum of sentencemitigation of sentencejuvenile offenderbrutality of crimecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the appellant challenged the death sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the appellant, being 16 years and 6 months old at the time of the incident, was entitled to a lesser sentence than death due to his age. The Supreme Court reviewed the circumstances of the crime, noting that the appellant had previously been dismissed from employment by the deceased following a dispute with another labourer, for which he had threatened revenge. The Court observed that the appellant subsequently attacked the deceased in his home, inflicting thirteen dagger wounds in a cruel and merciless manner. The Court held that despite the appellant's young age, the brutality and premeditated nature of the attack demonstrated that he was a desperate individual undeserving of leniency. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the death sentence was maintained, establishing that age alone does not mitigate the sentence in cases of extreme brutality.

  Questions settled

  • Does the age of a sixteen-year-old offender automatically entitle them to a lesser sentence than death in a murder case?
  • Can the brutality of a crime outweigh the mitigating factor of a young age when determining the quantum of sentence?
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• Muhammad Asghar vs Mst. 1Nayat Begum and another1984 SCMR 1266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-07
  property resumptionsettlement schemeconstitutional jurisdictiontransfer of propertyauction purchasecompensation book
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute concerning the transfer of a shop in Moti Bazar, Rawalpindi, originally purchased in an open auction by respondent Mst. Inayat Begum in May 1962. Due to an administrative failure to record the adjustment of a compensation book towards the transfer price, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner resumed the shop in December 1975 and subsequently transferred it to the petitioner under Scheme No. VIII. The respondent challenged the resumption via a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court, which set aside the resumption and transfer orders, holding that since more than twenty-five percent of the price had been paid, the proviso to paragraph 2 of the re-constituted Scheme No. VIII barred resumption. An Intra-Court appeal having failed, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authority had the power to resume the property given the statutory protection against resumption. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the resumption was illegal and without jurisdiction because the respondent was protected by the statutory provision prohibiting resumption when over twenty-five percent of the transfer price was paid.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Authority has the power to initiate resumption proceedings when more than twenty-five percent of the transfer price has already been paid?
  • Can discretionary relief in constitutional jurisdiction be denied on the ground of laches where the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction?
  • What is the appropriate recourse for the Department in case of default in payment of the transfer price under Scheme No. VIII?
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• Muhammad Asghar vs District Judge, Sialkot and 3 others1984 SCMR 1225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-09
  pre-emptionadditional evidencerevisional jurisdictionconstitutional petitioncase decidedleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a vendee in a pre-emption suit against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his constitutional petition challenging the revisional order of the District Judge refusing him permission to lead additional evidence. The core legal question concerns whether an order allowing or refusing additional evidence amounts to a 'case decided' so as to be amenable to revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether revisional jurisdiction in such circumstances should be controlled by discretionary constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that an authoritative pronouncement on the question is required, suspended the decision of the District Judge ad interim, and allowed the trial court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously while granting leave.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order granting or refusing permission to produce additional evidence amount to a case decided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is an interlocutory order allowing additional evidence amenable to revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • How should the revisional jurisdiction of a court in interlocutory matters be controlled by the discretionary constitutional jurisdiction possessed by superior courts?
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• Muhammad Anwar and Others, vs Muhammad Ashraf and Others1984 SCMR 592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-24
  pre-emption suitadmission of appealscope of appealreview petitionjudicial proprietystay orderappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the appellants, as vendees, challenged a trial court decree. In the High Court, the appellants filed a regular appeal raising multiple issues; however, the High Court admitted the appeal only to consider the specific question of entitlement to compensation for improvements, effectively excluding other grounds without providing reasons. The appellants sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, contending that this limited admission order amounted to an unreasoned dismissal of their other pleas. During the pendency of the Supreme Court proceedings, it was revealed that the appellants had also filed a review petition in the High Court regarding the same admission order. The Supreme Court held that since the core issue regarding the scope of the High Court's admission order was concurrently pending before the High Court in a review petition, it would be inappropriate to pre-empt the High Court's decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, noting that the High Court retained the authority to consider the excluded pleas during the final disposal of the main appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate court's order admitting an appeal on a limited question amount to a dismissal of other grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal?
  • Can the Supreme Court entertain an appeal when the subject matter is concurrently pending before the High Court in a review petition?
  • Is an appellate court required to assign reasons when admitting an appeal on limited grounds while excluding others?
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• Muhammad Anwar and others vs Muhammad Ashraf and others1984 SCMR 1248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-05
  leave to appealpre-emption suitadmission of appealinterim reliefcompensation for improvements
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, vendees and heirs of vendees, filed a Regular First Appeal in the High Court against a trial court decree in a pre-emption suit. Although the appeal challenged findings on multiple issues, the High Court admitted the appeal only to consider the question of the appellants' entitlement to compensation for alleged improvements and denied interim relief regarding possession. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the restrictive admitting order amounted to an unreasoned dismissal of their remaining pleas, citing supporting authorities. The Supreme Court held that the point raised required consideration and accordingly granted leave to appeal, while continuing the stay already granted and setting a date for the hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the admission of an appeal on a limited ground amount to the dismissal of other pleas raised in the memorandum of appeal?
  • Is the High Court required to assign reasons when restricting the admission of a regular first appeal to specific issues?
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• Muhammad and Others vs Sultan and Others1984 SCMR 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-19
  consolidation matterconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionBoard of Revenuequestion of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition challenging the revisional order passed by a Member, Board of Revenue in a consolidation matter. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court rightly declined to entertain arguments concerning factual inquiries and matters not raised before the revenue tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact regarding the opportunity of hearing suffered from no legal infirmity and that the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to entertain an argument regarding land allocation that was not pressed before the Board of Revenue. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that factual arguments not raised before the subordinate tribunal cannot ordinarily be entertained for the first time in writ jurisdiction, and bare statements of counsel cannot outweigh the recorded contents of judicial and quasi-judicial orders.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a factual argument in writ jurisdiction that was not pressed before the lower tribunal?
  • Whether the High Court's refusal to entertain unpressed factual contentions in consolidation matters is unexceptionable?
  • Can the bare statement of counsel regarding the raising of points be preferred over the contents of relevant tribunal orders?
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• Muhammad Amir alias Meera vs The State1984 SCMR 1523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-25
  murder convictiondeath sentenceright to counsellegal representationprovocationcriminal appealjail petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a jail petition filed by Muhammad Amir against a High Court judgment that upheld his conviction and death sentence for the murder of Khan Muhammad. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner stabbed the deceased following a dispute over a small monetary loan, resulting in fatal chest injuries. The petitioner challenged the conviction on two grounds: first, that he was not properly represented by counsel during the trial; and second, that the sentence should be reduced because the act occurred during a heated exchange of abuses, suggesting a fit of anger. The Supreme Court rejected both contentions. Regarding representation, the Court found that the petitioner was adequately defended by both state-appointed and privately engaged counsel throughout the proceedings. Regarding the sentencing, the Court held that the argument of provocation was fallacious, noting that the petitioner inflicted multiple stab wounds over a trivial matter, constituting a gruesome murder. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the major penalty of death was rightly awarded for such an act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that an accused was represented by both state-appointed and private counsel satisfy the requirement of proper legal representation?
  • Can a murder committed during a verbal altercation over a trivial matter be mitigated to a lesser sentence based on a claim of sudden anger?
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• Muhammad Amin vs Senior Member, Board of Revenue, Sind, Hyderabad1984 SCMR 495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-28
  allotment cancellationgovernment landpeasant tenurebreach of conditionsnatural justiceconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the Sind High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of his government land allotment measuring 64 acres. The land was granted to the petitioner on peasant tenure in 1961 under the rules framed under the Sind Revenue Code, 1879. Authorities cancelled the allotment in 1981 after finding that the allotment papers were untraceable, the petitioner was not in possession, had failed to satisfy any conditions of the grant, and was in serious default. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was entitled to statutory protection and an opportunity to rectify breaches under section 24 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, and whether principles of natural justice were violated. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not claim statutory protection without fulfilling requirements such as obtaining an ijazatnama or proving lawful possession under section 10 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, or section 60 of the Sind Revenue Code, 1879. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to explain his default over twenty years, justifying the cancellation without separate notice. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a grantee of government land can claim statutory protection under section 24 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 without proving lawful possession or compliance with section 10 of the said Act?
  • Does the failure of a grantee to discharge obligations over a long period disentitle them from claiming a separate opportunity to show cause based on principles of natural justice?
  • Can the Supreme Court conduct a roving inquiry into allegations of discrimination regarding the treatment of other allottees' land grants?
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• Muhammad Amin and Others vs Muhammad Suleman1984 SCMR 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-22
  ejectmentrent restrictionlimitationmixed question of fact and lawsecond appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged a Peshawar High Court order that restored a Rent Controller's decision directing their ejectment from a property. The landlord had sought ejectment based on default in rent payment and the need for property reconstruction. While the first appellate court had reversed the Rent Controller's findings, the High Court reinstated them, finding no merit in the appellate court's reasoning regarding the nature of rent payments or the applicability of section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the High Court failed to address a limitation issue regarding the Second Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the question of limitation, involving the timing of copy applications and appeal filing, constituted a mixed question of fact and law that could not be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. Furthermore, citing precedent, the Court affirmed that a plea of limitation not pressed before the High Court cannot be re-opened at the appellate stage. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of limitation be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court if it involves a mixed question of fact and law?
  • Does the failure to press a plea of limitation before the High Court preclude a party from re-opening it before the Supreme Court?
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• Muhammad Ali and Others vs Government of N.W. F. P. through Commissioner, Peshawar and Others1984 SCMR 31 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-22
  auction of leasehold rightsjurisdiction of civil courtAdministrator of AuqafWaqf Ordinancetenancy rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges an order dated 16th September, 1971, issued by the Administrator of Auqaf, N.-W. F. P., directing the auction of disputed plots where the petitioners were tenants. The core legal question concerns whether there is any legal bar against the auction of leasehold rights and whether the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred in such matters. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to point out any legal bar against the auction of leasehold rights, and furthermore, the jurisdiction of civil courts is completely ousted by virtue of section 17 of the Waqf Ordinance, 1961, and subsequent repealing and re-enacting enactments. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the ouster of civil court jurisdiction and the legality of the auction of leasehold rights under the relevant legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Is there any legal bar against the auction of leasehold rights by the Administrator of Auqaf?
  • Does section 17 of the Waqf Ordinance, 1961 oust the jurisdiction of the civil court to question the auction of leasehold plots?
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• Muhammad Akram vs Secretary to Government of Punjab, Forestry, Wildlife, Fisheries Department1984 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-01
  service tribunalrepatriationtemporary absorptionretrenchmentforest departmentwildlife departmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioner, initially appointed as a forester in the Forest Department in 1963-64, was temporarily transferred and absorbed as a Game Inspector in the Parks and Wildlife Department following the retrenchment of posts caused by the transfer of canal-side plantations to the Irrigation Department. Subsequently, the petitioner was repatriated to his parent Forest Department. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's absorption in the Games Department was permanent and final, barring his repatriation to the parent department. The Supreme Court held that the absorption was made purely on a temporary basis subject to repatriation upon the availability of duly qualified staff after the lifting of the recruitment ban, and therefore the repatriation order was lawful. The court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that temporary absorption subject to specified conditions does not confer permanent tenure and allows for repatriation to the parent department upon fulfillment of those conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee temporarily absorbed in a department on specific conditions can be repatriated to their parent department?
  • Does temporary absorption of surplus staff confer a permanent right to retain the absorbed post?
  • Can a service tribunal's judgment upholding the repatriation of a temporarily absorbed employee be interfered with when the terms of absorption permit repatriation?
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• Muhammad Akbar vs The State1984 SCMR 1512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-14
  leave to appealplea of guiltycustoms offencesupply of statementstrial vitiationproperty valuation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of his appeal by the Peshawar High Court, having been convicted and sentenced on his own plea of guilty under section 156(i)(89) of the Customs Act for possessing smuggled foreign-made electric irons. The core legal questions involved whether the non-supply of witness statements under section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiated the trial, and whether the conviction was unsupportable without explicit proof of property valuation. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 265-C are directory, and non-compliance does not vitiate proceedings unless prejudice is shown, which cannot be claimed when an accused pleads guilty. Furthermore, the framing of the charge itself indicated the requisite valuation, which the petitioner failed to dispute before pleading guilty. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-supply of copies of statements and documents under section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate a trial where the accused has pleaded guilty?
  • Whether the provisions of section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Can an accused who pleaded guilty to a charge under the Customs Act subsequently challenge the valuation of the property in the absence of any dispute raised during the trial?
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• Muhammad Akbar Cheema vs The Province of West Pakistan and Another1984 SCMR 1047 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-27
  arrears of land revenueascertained duescoercive processadjudication of duesWest Pakistan Land Revenue Actdeposit under protestremand for trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a decision of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the appellant's suit for declaration and injunction against coercive recovery proceedings initiated by the respondents. The appellant, who was awarded a lease of agricultural land at an auction but was never given possession nor notified of approval, challenged the recovery of lease instalments initiated as arrears of land revenue. The primary legal issue was whether an unadjudicated claim could be recovered as arrears of land revenue without prior determination of liability and whether the suit was barred under Section 91 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967 due to non-deposit of the disputed amount. The Supreme Court held that statutory machinery for recovering government dues as arrears of land revenue can only be invoked after the claim has ripened into 'ascertained dues' following proper determination and opportunity of hearing. Reaffirming established precedent, the Court ruled that unestablished claims cannot be forcibly recovered as arrears of land revenue. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the suit was remanded for trial on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government claim be recovered as arrears of land revenue before it is adjudicated and established as an ascertained due?
  • Must a plaintiff deposit disputed recovery amounts under protest before filing a civil suit if the underlying liability has not been legally determined?
  • Does a statutory notification authorizing the recovery of 'ascertained dues' apply to disputed lease instalments where possession of the leased property was never delivered?
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• Muhammad Akbar and Others vs Nasar Jama Shah and Others1984 SCMR 1022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-01
  pre-emptionrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factleave to appealfictitious salecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a pre-emption suit filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants regarding the sale of land, which was initially decreed. Subsequently, the heirs of the alleged vendor filed a separate suit for a declaration that the sale was fictitious, fraudulent, and without consideration, which was decreed by the trial court and upheld by the District Judge. The pre-emptor's revision petition was dismissed by the High Court, which held that concurrent findings of fact regarding the invalidity of the sale were not open to interference under revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to re-examine these concurrent findings of fact. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court determined that the case was not a fit or proper matter for the grant of leave to appeal. Consequently, the Court rescinded the order granting leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, thereby affirming the finality of the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts?
  • Is a concurrent finding of fact regarding the validity of a sale open to challenge in revisional jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Afzal vs Nazir Ahmad and Others1984 SCMR 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-10
  bailinvestigation reportocular testimonyfurther inquirypolice opinioncriminal proceduremurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to two accused persons charged under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant challenged the bail grant, arguing that the High Court erred in relying on police investigation reports that favored the accused's innocence, despite the existence of ocular testimony implicating them in the murder. The core legal question was whether the opinion of an investigating agency, which contradicts the FIR and ocular evidence, constitutes valid grounds for granting bail. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion. The Court affirmed that while police opinions are not binding on courts, they are relevant in bail matters if based on sound material, such as statements from credible witnesses regarding an alibi. The key principle laid down is that the relevancy of an investigating officer's opinion in bail proceedings depends on the soundness of the factual material supporting that opinion, which may provide reasonable grounds for believing an accused is not guilty.

  Questions settled

  • Is the opinion of an investigating agency regarding an accused's innocence binding upon a court in bail proceedings?
  • Under what circumstances is the opinion of an investigating officer relevant to the determination of bail?
  • Can a court grant bail based on an investigation report that contradicts the FIR and ocular testimony?
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• Muhammad Afzal vs Muhammad Yusuf and Others1984 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-12
  public auctionresumption of propertydemand noticeSettlement Scheme No. VIIIdisplaced personsmandatory compliancewaiver
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the resumption and subsequent transfer of a commercial property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The first respondent was the highest bidder in a public auction, and a Provisional Transfer Order was issued in his favour. Due to issues with adjusting the price through an agreement of association and a non-genuine compensation book, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner resumed the property and transferred it to the appellant under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The High Court set aside the resumption, holding that the Settlement authorities failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of a demand notice under Paragraph 2 of Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that because the property was treated as available and disposed of under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, the mandatory requirements of Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Scheme—specifically, sending a demand notice by registered post with acknowledgment due—had to be strictly complied with before penal consequences of resumption could flow.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Settlement Scheme No. VIII apply to the resumption of a property that was originally auctioned before the promulgation of the Scheme but subsequently treated as available property under the Scheme?
  • Is the requirement of sending a demand notice by registered post acknowledgment due under Paragraph 2 of Settlement Scheme No. VIII mandatory before penal consequences of resumption can flow?
  • Does the confirmation of an auction bid by Settlement authorities despite the non-deposit of the required one-fourth amount at the fall of the hammer constitute a waiver of that requirement?
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• Muhammad Afzal vs Faqir and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 375 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-21
  dying declarationappeal against acquittalmedical evidenceeye-witness testimonytribal affiliationretrialuninjured witnessabsconding accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the dismissal by the High Court of a revision petition upholding the trial court's acquittal of four respondents accused of a daylight ambush resulting in four deaths and injuries to two others. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan for reappraisal of the evidence. The primary legal questions concerned the evidentiary value and credibility of a brief dying declaration certified by medical officers, whether tribal affiliation warrants an inference of medical fabrication, and the reliability of an uninjured solitary eye-witness. The Supreme Court held that the brevity of a dying declaration does not detract from its truthfulness and can alone form a sufficient basis for conviction without independent corroboration. It rejected the presumption that public servants fabricate evidence based solely on tribal ties. The Court further held that escaping injury does not discredit an eye-witness lacking direct hostility with the assailants. Consequently, the acquittal of the respondents named in the dying declaration was set aside with an order for retrial, while the acquittal of the unnamed co-accused was maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be based solely on a truthful dying declaration without independent corroboration?
  • Does the brevity of a dying declaration undermine its veracity or credibility?
  • Can a court infer fabrication of a dying declaration by medical officers merely because one doctor shares the tribal background of the deceased?
  • Does the mere fact that an eye-witness escaped unhurt during an armed attack justify disbelieving their testimony?
  • Can an appellate court set aside the acquittal of an absconding accused who has not yet been arrested?
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• Muhammad Abbas and Another vs The State1984 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-14
  dying declarationexclusive jurisdictionFederal Shariat CourtOffence of Zinaframing of chargejoint trialsection 173 CrPC reportconfirmation of death sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from criminal petitions for leave to appeal filed by two petitioners against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which confirmed their convictions and sentences under Sections 449 and 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as well as under Section 18 read with the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners trespassed into a house to commit rape and murder, inflicting fatal knife injuries on the victim upon resistance. The Supreme Court addressed whether a Court of Session can frame charges under the Offence of Zina Ordinance 1979 based on facts in a police report even if the investigating officer omitted the provision, whether the Federal Shariat Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction and authority to confirm death sentences in such joint trials, and whether a statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can serve as a valid dying declaration. Dismissing the petitions, the Court held that courts are not bound by police conclusions in a police report, joint trials of offenses under the Penal Code and Hudood laws are valid, appellate and confirmation jurisdiction lies with the Federal Shariat Court, and a police statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. constitutes a valid dying declaration if the maker subsequently dies.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court bound by the conclusions or statutory provisions mentioned by an investigating officer in a report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals and confirm death sentences in cases involving offenses under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 tried jointly with offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a statement recorded by an investigating officer under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be treated as a valid dying declaration if the declarant subsequently dies?
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• Muhammad a Y U B vs Meh Boob Elahi1984 SCMR 1550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-13
  Limitation ActCondonation of delayEx parte decreeService of summonsRevisional jurisdictionAppellate procedureCivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed a revision application regarding the condonation of delay in filing an appeal. The core legal question was whether an appellate court acts properly by summarily condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 based on a finding that service of summons was "doubtful," when that finding effectively pre-determines the central issue of the main appeal. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court erred by disposing of the limitation application in a cursory manner without a positive finding on the legality of service. The Court ruled that where the grounds for condonation of delay are identical to the merits of the appeal, the appellate court must not decide the limitation application in isolation. Instead, the proper procedure is to defer the decision on the application for condonation of delay and dispose of it concurrently with the main appeal to ensure a fair hearing. The impugned order was set aside and the case remanded for fresh adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court decide an application for condonation of delay by making a finding on a core issue that is also the subject of the main appeal?
  • Is it proper for an appellate court to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 based solely on a vague conclusion that service of summons was doubtful?
  • Should an appellate court defer the decision on a limitation application if the grounds for condonation are identical to the grounds of the main appeal?
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• Muham Ma D Aslam vs Nazir alias Naji and 4 Others1984 SCMR 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-01
  criminal appealleave to appealmisreading of evidencemedical evidenceocular testimonyself-defencechance encounteracquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal case where the respondents were initially convicted for the murder of Faiz Ahmad but subsequently acquitted by the Lahore High Court. The prosecution alleged that the respondents ambushed the deceased while he was traveling to court. The petitioner contended that the High Court misread the medical evidence regarding the deceased's ability to fire in self-defence and the nature of the weapon injuries. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting that the deceased sustained multiple severe gunshot wounds, making it improbable he could have fired back as claimed. Furthermore, the Court observed that one of the accused, Muhammad Sharif, died during the encounter, and the circumstances suggested a chance encounter rather than a premeditated ambush. The Court held that the High Court's appraisal of the evidence was sound, particularly regarding the physical impossibility of the deceased's actions as described by the prosecution. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of severe gunshot wounds on a deceased person render the prosecution's claim of the deceased firing in self-defence implausible?
  • Can a finding of a chance encounter be sustained when the prosecution alleges a premeditated ambush?
  • Is a High Court's acquittal based on a proper appraisal of medical and ocular evidence liable to be set aside in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Muhabbat Ali vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Bahawalpur Division, Bahawalpur and others1984 SCMR 1388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-12
  land settlementmukhbari applicationallotment disputewrit petitionalternative remediesres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the legality of a land allotment made in favour of the respondent, initially pursuing remedies through appeal and revision before the Settlement authorities, where he claimed a preferential right. After failing in those proceedings, the petitioner filed a Mukhbari application under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, raising a different ground of challenge, which was also dismissed. A subsequent writ petition filed before the High Court met the same fate. The core legal question addressed was whether a party, having failed to challenge an allotment through normal remedies of appeal and revision, can subsequently re-agitate the same matter by invoking a different provision of law and altering the ground of attack. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a litigant cannot be permitted to repeatedly challenge an adverse order through alternative legal avenues by changing grounds after failing in the primary hierarchy of remedies. The principle laid down is that the doctrine of finality and the bar against repetitive, collateral challenges prevent a party from re-agitating settled matters by shifting legal stands.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a land allotment through a Mukhbari application after failing to set it aside in appeal and revision?
  • Whether a litigant is permitted to re-agitate an adverse allotment by changing the ground of attack under a different provision of law?
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• Muhabat Hussain and Another vs The State1984 SCMR 386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-28
  abductionrapeconsentage determinationburden of proofcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for the abduction and rape of the complainant's daughter. The core legal questions were whether the victim was a consenting party and whether the prosecution successfully established that she was under the age of sixteen at the time of the incident. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the victim's age through conclusive evidence, such as birth records or ossification tests, relying instead on mere estimates. Furthermore, the Court observed that the victim's conduct—specifically her failure to seek assistance during her travel and her subsequent stay at the appellants' residence—was inconsistent with the claim of forcible abduction and supported the defense's plea of consent. Consequently, the Court found the prosecution's case doubtful, set aside the convictions, and acquitted the appellants. The key principle laid down is that where age is a critical factor for determining the criminality of an act, the burden of proof lies on the prosecution to provide unshakable and conclusive evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is the conduct of an alleged abductee relevant in determining whether the act was consensual?
  • Does the prosecution bear the burden of proving the age of the victim when age is a crucial factor for determining criminality?
  • Is a conviction for abduction and rape sustainable where the prosecution fails to provide conclusive evidence of the victim's age?
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• Mst.Bilquis Begum, vs Taj Muhammad and others1984 SCMR 1242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-13
  limitation periodsecond appealcondonation of delayoccupancy tenantrevenue mutationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' second appeal as time-barred by 129 days. The underlying dispute involved the status of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest as an occupancy tenant and their subsequent entitlement to ownership rights under the Punjab Tenancy Act (Act VII of 1952). Following a remand by the High Court for separate judgments, the District Judge dismissed the petitioners' appeal. When the petitioners filed a second appeal, the High Court sustained an objection regarding limitation, finding the appeal filed 129 days late without explanation or a condonation application. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued they were taken by surprise by the limitation objection and were not afforded an opportunity to explain the delay. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate the critical date of copy preparation or delivery, which determines the start of the limitation period. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition, affirming that in the absence of material justifying the delay, the dismissal on limitation grounds was proper. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for filing an appeal start from the date of the preparation of the copy of the judgment?
  • Is a party required to provide evidence or explanation for delay when an appeal is filed beyond the statutory limitation period?
  • Can a court dismiss an appeal as time-barred if the appellant fails to justify the delay in filing?
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• Mst. Zulekha Bai and others vs The Masjidemirajun Nabi Trust and others1984 SCMR 1295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-21
  leave to appealrented landejectmentpersonal requirementconstruction of mosqueWest Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959trust property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an eviction order passed against the petitioners regarding a rented plot of land used for manufacturing bus bodies. The application for ejectment was filed by trustees of a trust on the ground that the rented land was reasonably and in good faith required for the construction of a mosque, backed by an approved building plan. The core legal questions were whether the requirement to construct a mosque on rented land fell within the scope of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, and whether the petitioners would be deprived of statutory protections upon such construction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings that the subject matter was 'rented land' under Section 2(g) of the Ordinance and the eviction ground was fully covered under Section 13(2)(vi). Relying on established precedent, the Court found no merit in the contentions and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement to construct a mosque on rented land is covered under Section 13(2)(vi) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does a plot of land let out for commercial purposes constitute 'rented land' under Section 2(g) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 for the purpose of eviction?
  • Whether the construction of a public or religious facility like a mosque affects the applicability of statutory eviction provisions under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
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• Mst. Zarina Begum vs Munsif Khan and Another1984 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-19
  pre-emptionequity of redemptiondower-debtsham transactionconcession of counselpleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a pre-emption dispute concerning the sale of equity of redemption in land. The core legal questions were whether a suit for pre-emption could be decreed when the plaintiff's counsel conceded that the specific transaction was not intended to be pre-empted, and whether the appellant improved her status as a co-sharer upon the dismissal of a competing pre-emptor's appeal. The trial court had dismissed the suits, finding the initial transfer was in lieu of dower-debt and thus not pre-emptible. However, the appellate courts granted a decree to the pre-emptor, Munsif Khan. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in granting a decree when the pre-emptor himself pleaded that the transaction was a sham and his counsel expressly conceded that the second transaction was not intended to be pre-empted. The Court established the principle that a court cannot grant a decree for pre-emption on a transaction that the plaintiff explicitly disavows as a genuine sale, particularly when counsel makes a binding concession on the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a decree for pre-emption when the plaintiff's pleadings and counsel's concession indicate the transaction was not intended to be pre-empted?
  • Does a suit for pre-emption fail when the plaintiff characterizes the transaction as a sham and the court finds the underlying transfer was not a sale?
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• Mst. Zahida Khatoon vs The State1984 SCMR 687 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-14
  bailleave to appealOffence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinancesurety bondconditions of bailjactitation of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court, which modified a condition of bail granted to the petitioner in a case involving offences under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner was accused of committing Zina, with conflicting claims of a lawful marriage and an elopement presented by the parties. The Sessions Judge had granted bail subject to the condition that the petitioner furnish a bail-bond through her father, who was also the complainant. The High Court modified this condition, requiring a surety bond from a person related within the prohibited degree. The Supreme Court examined the legal contentions regarding the imposition of onerous bail conditions and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. However, the Court declined to grant leave to appeal, holding that the discretionary relief was unwarranted due to the conduct of the petitioner in refusing acceptable sureties and failing to institute a suit for jactitation of marriage to establish the validity of the alleged union. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the imposition of restrictive conditions on the grant of bail amounts to a refusal of bail?
  • Can leave to appeal be refused on the basis of the conduct of the accused and failure to file a suit for jactitation of marriage?
  • Whether a surety bond executed by a person related within the prohibited degree can be validly required as a condition for bail?
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• Mst. Waz1ran. vs Ranjha1984 SCMR 1579 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-25
  adverse possessionlimitationsecond appealagricultural custommutationappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had reversed the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding a land dispute. The dispute originated from a suit for declaration of ownership and perpetual injunction filed by the respondent, claiming inheritance rights over land previously mutated in the name of the petitioner, Mst. Waziran. The trial court dismissed the suit as time-barred, and the District Judge upheld this dismissal, additionally finding that the petitioner had perfected her title through adverse possession. The High Court, in second appeal, reversed the findings on limitation and custom but failed to address the District Judge's finding regarding adverse possession. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the High Court's failure to adjudicate upon the issue of adverse possession—a finding that remained undisturbed by the High Court—rendered the acceptance of the respondent's appeal legally flawed. The key principle established is that an appellate court must address all material findings of the lower appellate court, particularly those that independently support the judgment, before reversing the decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court allow an appeal without addressing all material findings of the lower appellate court?
  • Does a finding of adverse possession by a lower appellate court require specific adjudication by the High Court in second appeal?
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• Mst. Sughra Begum and Others vs Mst. Shah Sultan and Others1984 SCMR 1011 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-01
  ejectment petitionlandlord and tenantreconstructionsite planevictionCantonment Board
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from an ejectment dispute where the High Court set aside the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the District Judge, which had dismissed the landlady's eviction petition. The core legal question was whether the landlady was entitled to evict the tenants on the ground of reconstruction when she had produced an approved site plan from the Cantonment Board. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the lower authorities erred in law by denying eviction. The Court established that where a landlord produces an approved site plan for reconstruction and there is no evidence indicating that the application is a mere contrivance to dislodge the tenants, the ground for eviction on the basis of reconstruction is legally established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord is entitled to evict tenants on the ground of reconstruction upon producing an approved site plan from the competent authority?
  • Can an eviction petition for reconstruction be dismissed in the absence of evidence showing the claim is a mere contrivance to dislodge the tenants?
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• Mst. Shahida Begum and Others vs Ghulam Rasul1984SCMR 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-25
  court-feeremandregular second appealundervaluationconsolidated judgmentprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which remanded a case to the Additional District Judge, Attock, for a decision on merits. The petitioner argued that the High Court erred by not dismissing the Regular Second Appeal (R.S.A.) due to an alleged deficiency in court-fee, asserting that the fee paid was based on an undervaluation of the subject matter. The Supreme Court observed that the Additional District Judge had previously dismissed numerous appeals, including the one in question, based on a specific interpretation regarding the applicability of a Punjab Government Notification dated 4-2-1980, without addressing other issues like court-fee. The High Court had already set aside the Additional District Judge's consolidated judgment in a related matter (Abdul Ghafoor v. Muhammad Rafagat). Consequently, the High Court remanded the present appeal to be decided on merits, including the determination of the appropriate court-fee. The Supreme Court found the High Court's order of remand to be legally sound and unexceptionable, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court remand an appeal for a decision on merits when the lower appellate court dismissed it solely on a preliminary legal point without addressing other issues like court-fee?
  • Is a consolidated judgment by an appellate court that fails to address individual intrinsic objections, such as court-fee, liable to be set aside and remanded?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sarfrazi Begum and Another vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner1984 SCMR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-14
  settlement operationurban property transfercondonation of delayconcurrent findings of factwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal in limine of a writ petition by the High Court concerning the transfer of urban property during settlement operations. The petitioners challenged the finding of fact that they had voluntarily withdrawn from the contest regarding the property transfer, noting that the beneficiaries of the transfer were their close first-degree relatives. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of a 27-day delay in filing the petition, finding sufficient cause to condone the delay. Regarding the merits, the Court examined the concurrent findings of fact made by the lower authorities and affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that it would not interfere with findings of fact where the petitioners had effectively abandoned their claim to the property. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that the Supreme Court will not disturb concurrent findings of fact in the absence of a compelling justification or legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a party's withdrawal from a property contest?
  • Is a 27-day delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal sufficient to warrant dismissal if valid grounds for condonation are provided?
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• Mst. Sardar Begum and Others vs Muhammad Saleem alias Seema and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-06
  rent restrictionrevisional jurisdictionremand orderexecution proceedingssummary disposalpersonal requirementlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court order remanding an execution proceeding in an urban tenancy matter to the District Judge for a fresh decision. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, should have adjudicated the outstanding legal controversies itself rather than remanding the case, particularly given the necessity for summary disposal in rent restriction litigation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by remanding the matter. The Court emphasized that rent restriction cases require expeditious resolution to prevent protracted litigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the remand order and directed the High Court to finally decide the specific legal questions raised, including the impact of the landlord's death on the execution of an eviction order, the classification of the disputed property, and the effect of ownership changes. The key principle laid down is that the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction under rent laws, should resolve legal disputes finally to ensure summary disposal, avoiding unnecessary remands that delay the finality of proceedings for litigants.

  Questions settled

  • Should the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, decide legal questions in rent restriction cases itself rather than remanding the matter to the lower appellate court?
  • Is the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to execution proceedings of an order of ejectment passed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Does the principle of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872 apply to a tenant challenging the title of the landlord in execution proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina Bibi vs Crescent Textile Mills Ltd. and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-10
  workmen's compensationsocial securitystatutory interpretationimplied repeallabour lawinconsistency of lawsoverlapping benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of Section 81 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965, specifically whether it bars a workman from claiming compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 if they are also eligible for benefits under the Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the two parts of Section 81 operate independently, effectively barring all claims under the 1923 Act, or whether they must be read together, meaning the bar only applies if the benefits are inconsistent or incompatible. The Supreme Court held that the two parts of Section 81 must be read together. The Court ruled that the 1923 Act is only superseded where the benefits are inconsistent or incompatible with those provided under the Ordinance. Mere duplication or overlapping of benefits does not constitute inconsistency. Consequently, the Court restored the Tribunal's finding that the appellant was entitled to compensation under the 1923 Act, as the benefits were not incompatible with those under the Ordinance. The principle established is that Section 81 requires a case-by-case determination of incompatibility before displacing existing statutory compensation rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 81 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 completely repeal the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923?
  • Is a workman entitled to receive benefits under both the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 and the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 simultaneously?
  • What is the test for determining whether a benefit under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 is inconsistent with the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965?
  • Does Section 73 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 operate independently of Section 81?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina and Others vs Muhammad Yamin Khan and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 3 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-14
  Permanent Transfer DeedSettlement Authoritiesclerical error correctioncompensation poolwrit jurisdictionmisdescription of propertyevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside orders of Settlement Authorities, which had corrected the description of property in a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) issued to the appellants' predecessor, Genda. The core legal question was whether Settlement Authorities retain jurisdiction to rectify clerical errors or misdescriptions in a P.T.D. after its issuance, particularly when the property involved was either non-evacuee or had been misidentified in the original transfer documents. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Authorities possess the power to correct such errors, especially where the property in question was never legally part of the compensation pool or was not in the possession of the party claiming it. The Court distinguished the present case from precedents barring corrections after P.T.D. issuance, noting that the respondent had not been transferred the disputed shop and that the writ jurisdiction should not be exercised to perpetuate injustice. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restoring the orders of the Settlement Authorities, and affirmed that misdescription of property does not confer ownership rights over categories of property (house vs. shop) not actually transferred.

  Questions settled

  • Do Settlement Authorities have the jurisdiction to correct clerical errors in a Permanent Transfer Deed after its issuance?
  • Can a transferee claim a category of property (such as a shop) not actually transferred to them based solely on an error in the property description?
  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed for a specific property preclude the correction of transfer documents if the property was not part of the compensation pool?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeera Bib1 vs Ghulam Muham Mad1984 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-05
  leave to appealejectmentdefault in rentpersonal uselandlord and tenantmoney order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the landlord against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the tenant's ejectment order by reversing findings on the issues of default and personal bona fide use. The core legal questions involve the determination of default in rent payment through money orders remitted for specific periods and the consistency between the landlord's pleadings and the testimony of her attorney husband regarding personal use. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the alleged default for specific months and the interpretation of the personal use requirement require deeper consideration. The key principle laid down is that arguable questions concerning the appreciation of evidence on default and personal use in rent matters warrant the grant of leave to appeal for a comprehensive examination of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the remittance of rent through money orders constitutes a valid payment to avoid default?
  • Whether a variance between the pleadings in an ejectment application and the deposition of an attorney regarding personal use vitiates the claim?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when arguable points of fact and law are raised against the reversal of an ejectment order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. S. M. Hussain vs Mst. Nasra1984 SCMR 628 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-08
  leave to appealejectmentbona fide personal requirementconcurrent findings of factlandlord and tenantrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed her first rent appeal and upheld her eviction from the disputed premises ordered by the Rent Controller. The core legal question concerned whether the respondent landlady established a bona fide personal requirement for ejectment under the relevant rent restriction law, and whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower forums were sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide requirement of the premises were unexceptionable and did not raise any question of law, noting that the respondent's evidence stood unchallenged on material aspects while the petitioner's mala fide claims lacked support. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, granting the petitioner four months to vacate the premises on condition of regular rent payment. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts on the issue of personal bona fide requirement in rent matters will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court unless a substantial question of law arises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding personal bona fide requirement can be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does an ejectment application under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 require proof of bona fide requirement when challenged on grounds of mala fides for rent enhancement?
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• Mst. Riaz Begum vs Muhammad Shafi1984 SCMR 1171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-08
  limitationexclusion of timesetting aside decreeleave to appealbona fide prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court. The core legal question is whether the time spent in erroneously prosecuting an incompetent application for setting aside a decree can be excluded by applying section 14 of the Limitation Act. The High Court had held, relying on precedent, that the time spent bona fide could be excluded, whereas the Supreme Court noted that its own previous judgment in Shah Muhammad v. Ghulam appeared to have expressed a contrary view. Recognizing the question as one of law and of general public importance, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, directed security, dispensed with the preparation of a new paper book, and ordered a stay of proceedings before the lower appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the time spent in erroneously prosecuting an incompetent application for setting aside a decree be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act?
  • Whether time spent bona fide in proceedings that were legally incompetent qualifies for exclusion of limitation period?
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• Mst. Rehmat Bibi vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab and Others1984 SCMR 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-14
  urban settlementtime-barredlimitationremand orderreview petitionlocus standiappellate rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions arising from an urban settlement dispute regarding property rights. The petitioner, Mst. Rehmat Bibi, challenged an order of the High Court that remanded her case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, as well as the dismissal of her subsequent review petition as time-barred. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner's review application was maintainable despite being filed late, whether the original writ petition was time-barred, and whether the petitioner could defend her interests in a related pending appeal. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the review petition as time-barred was unexceptionable, and the original writ petition was also significantly time-barred, even after accounting for time spent in review proceedings. Consequently, the Court dismissed both petitions. However, the Court established the principle that a party, even if unsuccessful in their own petition, is entitled to defend a High Court judgment in a related pending appeal on all available legal grounds, including those not explicitly mentioned in the impugned judgment, as supported by the principles underlying the Supreme Court Rules, 1980.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party defend a High Court judgment in a pending appeal on grounds not explicitly mentioned in that judgment?
  • Does the exclusion of time spent in a review petition under the Limitation Act 1908 cure a petition that remains otherwise time-barred?
  • Is a review petition filed against a remand order maintainable if it is filed significantly after the limitation period has expired?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naznin Fatima and Others vs Syed Hussain Ahmed Shah and Others1984 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-03
  urban settlementtransfer of propertydivisibility of housesettlement commissionerletters patent appealspecial leave appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal arising out of an urban settlement case. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether the High Court and the Settlement Commissioner correctly assumed and effected the transfer of the disputed house to both contesting parties on the basis of its division according to their respective possessions. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner possessed the power to divide the property and had consciously applied his mind to relevant factors, including the separate occupation of the ground floor and first floor by the claimants and the impossibility of determining a prior allottee. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the division and transfer of the property in accordance with possession was lawful and not arbitrary. The key principle laid down is that a Settlement Commissioner may lawfully divide and transfer a disputed property to multiple occupants based on their separate possession where the relevant factors have been consciously considered.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Settlement Commissioner has the power to divide a house even if lower settlement authorities have declared it indivisible?
  • Did the Settlement Commissioner consciously apply his mind to the question of divisibility of the property based on separate possession?
  • Is the transfer of a disputed house to its occupants according to their respective possessions lawful under urban settlement laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nawab Bibi vs Settlement Commissioner, Faisalabad and others1984 SCMR 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-28
  settlement lawtransfer of propertyleave to appealpending applicationpossessiondue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of a shop under settlement laws. The petitioner, who was in possession of the property, had filed a transfer application on Form RS. VIII/House. However, the property was subsequently transferred to third-party respondents. The High Court had upheld this transfer, reasoning that the petitioner's form had been returned to her and, having not been resubmitted, was not pending before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted an entry indicating the form was to be returned to the applicant; however, it found no evidence proving the actual dispatch or receipt of the form by the petitioner. Consequently, the Court held that the contention that the property could not be transferred to a third party while the petitioner's application remained undisposed of carried significant legal force. Leave to appeal was granted, and the interim stay order was maintained pending the final disposal of the appeal, emphasizing the necessity of proof regarding the disposal of pending transfer applications.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property be transferred to a third party while a transfer application from a current occupant remains undisposed of?
  • Does an entry in a record indicating the return of a transfer form constitute sufficient proof of its actual dispatch and receipt by the applicant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Musharofa Begum vs Syed Nayyar Hussain and Others1984 SCMR 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-02
  Urban SettlementPermanent Transfer DeedWrit JurisdictionProperty ValuationSettlement CommissionerFactual FindingsEvacuee Property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an Urban Settlement case challenging a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition regarding an alleged illegal increase in the price of transferred property. The core legal question was whether the price of property transferred to the petitioner could be increased after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.). The Supreme Court examined whether the Settlement Commissioner's findings of fact regarding the rental value and property size were subject to interference in writ jurisdiction. The Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's factual determination—based on site inspection and municipal records—that the petitioner's property had a higher rental value than initially assessed was sound. Consequently, the High Court correctly exercised its discretion to dismiss the writ petition, as interference would have perpetuated an injustice. The Court established that where findings of fact regarding property valuation are supported by evidence, they are not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction, particularly when such interference would result in injustice rather than the furtherance of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings regarding property valuation in its writ jurisdiction when such interference would result in injustice?
  • Is a property price increase permissible after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed if the initial valuation was subject to contemporaneous correction?
  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the authority to re-evaluate property rental value based on site inspection and municipal records?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Meraj Begum and others vs Mst. Sultan Zenab and others1984 SCMR 1348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-09
  urban settlementdisplaced personstransfer of propertyagreed settlementvertical divisionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court affirming the dismissal of the appellants' writ petition regarding the transfer of an urban property under the Displaced Persons (Rehabilitation and Settlement) Act 1958. The core legal dispute involved the rival claims for the transfer of the entire house or, alternatively, the maintenance of its initial division between claimant and non-claimant parties. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, the contesting parties and their respective counsel reached an amicable agreement to resolve the matter by dividing the disputed house vertically between them, as delineated on a site-plan made part of the record. Acting upon the joint request of the parties, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeal in accordance with the agreed settlement. The holding establishes that urban settlement disputes under the relevant rehabilitation legislation can be resolved and disposed of on the basis of a lawful, mutually agreed vertical division of the property between contesting claimants.

  Questions settled

  • Can an urban property dispute under the Displaced Persons (Rehabilitation and Settlement) Act 1958 be resolved on the basis of a mutually agreed vertical division between contesting parties?
  • Whether an appeal concerning the transfer of a displaced person's house can be disposed of in terms of a compromise reached by the parties before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehr Taja vs Mst. Babo Jan and Others1984 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-20
  dismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appealcounsel withdrawalprocedural rulesservice of noticeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which refused to restore a regular Second Appeal that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioner challenged the dismissal, arguing that she had not received notice of the hearing date and that the court was wrongly influenced by a history of adjournments. The core legal question was whether sufficient grounds existed for the readmission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution when the appellant claimed lack of notice. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner was represented by counsel stationed at the seat of the court, the plea regarding lack of notice was untenable. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the case papers were removed to engage new counsel, noting that the original counsel had not withdrawn with the court's permission as required by procedural rules. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, finding no justifiable ground for restoration, and dismissed the petition, emphasizing that procedural rules regarding counsel withdrawal must be strictly followed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellant seek restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution on the grounds of lack of notice when represented by counsel?
  • Is an application for restoration of an appeal maintainable if the appellant's counsel did not withdraw from the case with the court's permission?
  • Does the history of previous adjournments influence a court's decision on an application for restoration of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khaista Jan and Others vs Hafizurrehman and Others1984 SCMR 709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-20
  substitution of plaintiffspendente lite purchasernecessary partiespre-emption suitrevisional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a revisional order of the Peshawar High Court dated 1-11-1983, which restored the trial court's order substituting the respondents as plaintiffs in a pending suit. The core legal question is whether purchasers of suit property during the pendency of a suit can be impleaded as plaintiffs under Order XXII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, notwithstanding a rival pre-emption suit filed by tenants based on the same sale. The Supreme Court held that the order of the trial court allowing the substitution of the purchasers as plaintiffs was just, fair, and in accordance with the principles governing the impleading of necessary parties, thereby upholding the High Court's decision. The key principle laid down is that pendente lite purchasers may be permitted to be joined as parties to protect their acquired interest when the original plaintiffs' and defendants' competing claims involve issues affecting the underlying title and tenancy rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can a purchaser of suit property during the pendency of a suit be impleaded as a plaintiff under Order XXII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether pendente lite purchasers are entitled to be joined as necessary parties when their purchased interest is subject to the outcome of the ongoing litigation?
  • Does a rival pre-emption suit filed by tenants bar the impleading of a purchaser who acquired the property during the pendency of the original suit?
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• Mst. Karim Khatoon vs The State1984 PLD Supreme Court 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-11
  perjurySection 193 PPCSection 164 CrPCSection 476 CrPChostile witnessfalse evidencereduction of sentenceleniency in perjury
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by Mst. Karim Khatoon against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court, which reduced her sentence for perjury to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner had initially made a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 alleging abduction and rape against her husband and three others, but resiled from it during the trial, claiming police pressure. Consequently, the trial court convicted her under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner sought a reduction of sentence to the period already undergone, pleading police coercion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing to show leniency. The Court held that perjury is a heinous social and moral offense, condemned in Islamic injunctions (Surah An-Nisa: 135), which undermines the judicial system. It emphasized that courts must firmly curb perjury by awarding stiffer sentences rather than taking a lenient approach.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leniency in sentence should be granted to a witness convicted of perjury under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 on the ground of police pressure?
  • Can a witness who resiles from a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be summarily proceeded against and convicted under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the duty of courts regarding the sentencing of offenders who commit perjury during judicial proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Karim Bibi and Others vs Hussain Bakhsh and Another1984 PLD Supreme Court 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-04
  Letters Patent AppealLaw Reforms OrdinanceDisplaced Persons Actoriginal orderconstitutional petitionrevisional jurisdictionsettlement proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the appellants' Letters Patent Appeal as incompetent pursuant to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The property in dispute involved shops transferred under settlement laws, leading to conflicting transfer orders and subsequent revisional proceedings. The core legal question was whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order of a Single Judge in constitutional jurisdiction is barred under the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, when the original order in the proceedings was appealable under the law applicable at the time it was passed, notwithstanding the subsequent abolition of the right of appeal. The Supreme Court held that the competency of a Letters Patent Appeal depends on whether the original order commencing the proceedings was subject to appeal under the law applicable at the time of such original order, rather than the law in force when the constitutional petition or appeal was filed. The Court laid down that 'proceedings' embrace the entire course of action from inception to execution, and the appealability of the 'original order' must be determined with reference to the date of its passage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Letters Patent Appeal is barred under section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, if the original order in the proceedings was appealable when passed?
  • Does the relevent date for determining the appealability of the 'original order' under the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, refer to the date of the original order or the date of filing the constitutional petition?
  • What constitutes the 'original order' and 'proceedings' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 for the purpose of barring an Intra-Court Appeal?
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• Mst. Kaniz Begum and others vs Mst. Akbar Jan and another1984 SCMR 1493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-01
  waqfMarzul Mautmosque beneficiaryevacuee propertyMutawallicontingent waqfconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiffs examines the validity of a waqf created by the predecessor-in-interest of the parties in favour of a mosque via a registered deed shortly before his death. The appellants challenged the waqf on the grounds that it was contingent, executed during Marzul Maut (deathbed illness), and that the beneficiary mosque lacked legal status because it was located on the site of a former Hindu temple. The trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court concurrently dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, holding the waqf to be valid, immediate, and free from the taint of Marzul Maut, while confirming the factual existence and legal capacity of the mosque. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the declaration of waqf was immediate and absolute, that asthma and dysentery did not constitute Marzul Maut under the circumstances, and that a functional mosque established on the site of a former temple can legally be the beneficiary of a valid Muslim waqf.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a waqf deed reserving the right of residence for the appropriator and a designated Mutawalli during their lifetimes renders the waqf contingent or invalid?
  • Does the illness of asthma and dysentery, where the maker actively attends to routine duties and personally gets the deed registered, constitute Marzul Maut?
  • Can a mosque established on a site where a Hindu temple previously existed legally serve as a valid beneficiary of a Muslim waqf?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jhando and Another vs Settlement Commissioner1984 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-17
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertypermanent transfer ordersettlement schemewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examines whether a disputed property formed part of evacuee House No. 9 previously transferred to the appellants' predecessor-in-interest, Mst. Eido, or remained undisposed of property subject to subsequent transfer. The dispute arose over overlapping claims and conflicting reports regarding portions of houses in D.G. Khan, where a portion occupied by a licensee was later treated as a separate unallotted property. The High Court had dismissed the appellants' constitutional petition on the ground that the determination of property units by settlement authorities was a question of fact not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court examined the survey and taxation records, finding that Mst. Eido held a Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) for the entire House No. 9 and that admissions made by the opposing party confirmed her possession. The Supreme Court held that the settlement authorities acted against the record and surmises in treating the disputed portion as a separate property. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order and affirming Mst. Eido's status as the lawful transferee of the entire house inclusive of the disputed portion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a finding of fact by settlement authorities regarding whether a property constitutes a single unit or separate properties?
  • Does a Permanent Transfer Order for a house include an adjacent disputed portion shown to be part of the same property in survey and taxation records?
  • Whether admissions made by a party in pleadings and judicial proceedings regarding the ownership and status of evacuee property are binding?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jamila Khatoon and Another vs Mst. Tajunnisa and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-27
  limitationcertified copytime requisitesecond appealrent restrictioncopying feesdefault
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had dismissed the appellant's Second Appeal as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the period of thirty-seven days spent by the appellant in supplying the requisite stamp for a certified copy of the judgment should be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act in computing the period of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was required under the Sind Civil Court Rules to deposit the requisite stamp within seven days of the communication of the copying fee, and that the failure to do so without sufficient cause meant the intervening delay could not be treated as 'time requisite' for obtaining copies. The Court affirmed that while section 12 confers a substantive right to exclude time properly required, the appellant must act with reasonable promptitude and diligence, and cannot claim exclusion for delays attributable to their own default.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period spent in supplying the stamp for a certified copy can be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act when the appellant fails to deposit it within the prescribed time under the rules?
  • Does section 12 of the Limitation Act confer an absolute right to exclude time regardless of the appellant's diligence or default?
  • What is the legal meaning of the term 'time requisite' under section 12 of the Limitation Act in relation to obtaining certified copies?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Humna Bibi and Others vs Niaz Gul and Others1984 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-12
  civil revisionrevisional jurisdictionjoint khatarevenue settlementinheritance disputere-appreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a property dispute concerning land originally held by Adam Khan, whose four sons were recorded as joint owners in the 1901-1902 Jamabandi. In a subsequent revenue settlement, the name of one son, Allah Khan, was omitted, prompting his heirs to file a civil suit for a declaration of ownership in 1976. The trial court decreed the suit, and the lower appellate court dismissed the petitioners' appeal, holding that the land devolved upon all four sons and no alienation by Allah Khan was proven. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent revision petition in limine, declining to re-appreciate the evidence. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the background of the case and held that the High Court's refusal to interfere with concurrent factual findings in revisional jurisdiction was justified. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that revisional courts will not undertake a re-appreciation of evidence where no misreading of evidence is established, and consequently dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can re-appreciate evidence in revisional jurisdiction when no misreading of evidence is pointed out?
  • Does the omission of a co-owner's name in a subsequent revenue settlement extinguish his inheritance rights without proof of alienation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hashmat Bibi vs Muhammad Rafiq and Others1984 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-31
  out-of-court awardcompromise of suitadjustment of suitleave to appealarbitration out of court
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions raise the common legal question of whether an out-of-court award made during the pendency of litigation can be treated as an agreement or compromise for the adjustment of a suit under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, even in the absence of the consent of all parties. The Supreme Court noted conflicting judicial precedents on the matter from various High Courts, as well as its prior observation in Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Akram regarding awards from arbitrations out of court. Considering that the specific provision of Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, had not been directly considered previously in that context, the Court deemed it necessary to examine the controversy to provide an authoritative pronouncement. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Can an award made out of court during the pendency of litigation be considered as an agreement or compromise for the adjustment of a suit under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the absence of consent of all the parties?
  • Whether parties are entitled to sue or defend on the basis of an out-of-court award that has neither been filed nor made a rule of Court if it has been accepted and acted upon by mutual consent?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hafeez Bibi and Others vs The Settlement Commissioner (Land) and Others1984 SCMR 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-06
  petition for leave to appealtime-barredcondonation of delayreview applicationlimitation periodsettlement land allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their review application by the High Court, which had earlier dismissed their writ petition challenging a land allotment decision by the Settlement Commissioner. The petition for leave to appeal was barred by 28 days, with the explanation for delay deemed unsatisfactory, particularly regarding the period after copies of documents were obtained. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the petitioners were essentially attempting to challenge the original order of the High Court, which had become final by efflux of time, as a refusal to review does not provide a fresh period of limitation. The Court held that a party cannot bypass the finality of a basic order by framing the petition as an appeal against the dismissal of a review application. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred and unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a review application provide a fresh period of limitation to challenge the original order?
  • Can a petitioner bypass the limitation period for challenging a primary order by filing an appeal against the order refusing review?
  • Is a delay in filing a petition adequately explained when the period between obtaining necessary copies and filing the petition remains unaccounted for?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fazal Bibi vs Muhammad Raf1q and another1984 SCMR 1373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-22
  leave to appealgrave and sudden provocationmurdermitigating circumstancessentence reductioncriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court setting aside the respondent's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his wife and infant son, substituting it with a conviction under Section 304, Part I of the same Code, and reducing the sentence to life imprisonment on the ground of grave and sudden provocation. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in applying Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based on conjecture regarding sudden provocation arising from suspected immorality. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning regarding grave and sudden provocation was indeed conjectural and untenable on the record. However, the Supreme Court declined to grant leave, reasoning that even if the conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were restored, the death sentence might not be warranted given the circumstances involving family honour and suspected immorality, rendering an alteration of conviction without sentence interference an exercise in futility. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can rely on conjecture to find grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal solely to alter a conviction back to Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the sentence of death is still unlikely to be imposed?
  • Does the murder of an infant during an act directed at the spouse form part of the same transaction influenced by family honour?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fazal Bibi and Others vs Mst. Aziz Begum and Others1984 SCMR 1155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-23
  settlement lawremand proceedingsauction validityscope of remandfinality of ordersproperty transferwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer and subsequent auction of a property (chaubara) in Faisalabad, originally transferred to Abdul Karim by the Settlement Department. Following Karim's death, his heirs failed to pay the transfer price, leading to the property's resumption and auction to Haji Din Muhammad. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, upon remand of the case, possessed the jurisdiction to restore the auction in favor of the purchaser, despite an earlier, final order by the Additional Settlement Commissioner that had set aside the auction and remanded the case solely for the purpose of identifying legal heirs and determining the transfer price. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner acted beyond the scope of the remand order. The principle established is that an authority acting on remand is strictly bound by the terms of the remand order; it cannot reopen or alter issues that have already been conclusively decided and have attained finality, particularly when the original order setting aside an auction remains unchallenged.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subordinate authority, acting on a remand order, reopen issues that have already been conclusively decided by a superior authority?
  • Does an authority acting on remand have the jurisdiction to restore an auction that was previously set aside by a final, unappealed order?
  • Is a remand order binding on the authority to which the case is remanded?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farah Naz and Another vs The State and Twits1984 SCMR 646 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murderculpable homicideprivate defencesudden provocationsentence enhancementlife imprisonmentmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan: one by the convict challenging her conviction and life imprisonment sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and another by the deceased's brother seeking the enhancement of her sentence to death. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot and killed her fiance at Shakar Parian Hills after their families' relations soured. The appellant claimed an unidentified person shot the deceased. One learned judge of the Supreme Court proposed reducing the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, finding that the circumstances (including a torn shirt and missing cassettes) pointed to a sudden fight or provocation. However, the majority of the bench disagreed, holding that the eye-witness testimony was natural and credible, the motive's obscurity did not undermine direct evidence, and there was no basis to apply any exceptions to murder. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, maintaining the conviction and the lesser sentence of life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the obscurity or failure of the prosecution to prove a motive undermine direct and reliable eye-witness evidence in a murder trial?
  • Can a plea of sudden provocation or self-defence be sustained in the absence of any explanation or evidence from the accused regarding the events immediately preceding the offense?
  • Whether a lesser penalty of life imprisonment instead of death is appropriate under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 where the offender is of tender age and the motive remains obscure?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Batool Begum vs Muhammad Younus Khan1984 SCMR 1188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-26
  ex parte decreespecific performancelimitationdate of knowledgemisreading of recordremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte decree for specific performance of a sale. The core legal question concerned the determination of limitation and the date of knowledge for setting aside an ex parte decree, specifically whether the courts below correctly computed time based on a disputed entry of presence before a revenue official. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts misread the record regarding the appellant's presence and knowledge on 30 October 1974, as the entry relied upon was defective and unreliable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned judgments and decrees were set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a fresh trial with an opportunity of hearing for both parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application to set aside an ex parte decree is barred by limitation when based on a disputed date of knowledge derived from a misread revenue record?
  • Can a court rely on a defective and unverified noting regarding a party's presence before a revenue officer to determine the starting point of limitation?
  • Whether the High Court and District Judge erred in failing to properly scrutinize the material relied upon to establish the date of knowledge of the ex parte decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Baqreedan vs Muhammad Shafi and 7 owns1984 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertysettlement lawrevisional jurisdictionprovisional transfer orderearmarking schemestatutory right of appealDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment concerning the transfer of evacuee residential property in Lahore under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions were whether the appellant's second revision petition remained competent despite the promulgation of Ordinance II of 1962, whether the issuance of a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) barred further appellate or revisional scrutiny, and whether participation in an 'earmarking' scheme precluded the appellant from seeking transfer under Scheme No. 1. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner had validly assumed jurisdiction before the Ordinance's promulgation, rendering the revision competent. It further held that the issuance of a P.T.O. does not extinguish statutory rights to appeal or revision, as such rights are inherent until the transfer is finalized. Finally, the Court ruled that participation in an earmarking scheme does not per se bar a claimant from seeking transfer under other schemes unless a vested right has already been perfected by an earlier transferee. The appeal was allowed, restoring the Settlement Commissioner's order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) deprive an aggrieved party of their statutory right to appeal or revision?
  • Does participation in an earmarking scheme under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, automatically disqualify a claimant from seeking transfer under other schemes?
  • Can a revision petition be considered validly pending if the authority assumed jurisdiction before the promulgation of an ordinance that removed such revisional powers?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bakhtina vs Haji Saltnat and 2 Others1984SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-18
  leave to appealHudood Ordinancejurisdiction of High CourtFederal Shariat Courttender of pardonprivate complaintcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court which set aside a Sessions Judge's order arraying two private respondents as accused and converting the petitioner from an accused into a prosecution witness. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a revision against the Sessions Judge's order in a case involving offences under the Hudood Ordinance, given the revisional jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203-DD of the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Federal Shariat Court rather than the High Court, and whether the High Court's order improperly stifled the petitioner's separate private complaint. The Court held that the arguable questions regarding jurisdictional competence warrant a full hearing and accordingly granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition against an order passed by a Sessions Judge in a criminal case relating to the enforcement of Hudood?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court possess exclusive revisional jurisdiction under Article 203-DD of the Constitution over orders passed by criminal courts under laws relating to Hudood?
  • Can a Sessions Judge lawfully permit an accused person to be converted into a prosecution witness upon the request of a Public Prosecutor?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amina vs Abdul Qadir and Others1984 SCMR 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-12
  permanent transfer deeddemand noticesubstituted servicesettlement schemeproperty resumptionconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the appellant, Mst. Amina, had been properly served before the cancellation of the Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) issued in her favour regarding a disputed house in Quetta. The appellant's transfer price was paid through compensation books later found to be bogus, prompting a demand notice sent by registered post which was returned unserved. The property was subsequently resumed and auctioned to the respondent without effective substituted service or notice of cancellation. After multiple remands, the Member, Board of Revenue, set aside the cancellation upon finding that service was defective and allowed the appellant to deposit the transfer price. The High Court, however, restored the cancellation via a constitutional petition, holding that service was valid under section 27 of the General Clauses Act. The Supreme Court held that since the registered notice returned unserved, substituted service under Settlement Scheme No. VIII and the Code of Civil Procedure was mandatory, and section 27 of the General Clauses Act was inapplicable. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the order of the Member, Board of Revenue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a demand notice returned unserved constitutes valid service under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  • Does section 27 of the General Clauses Act apply when a notice sent by registered post is returned unserved?
  • Whether penal consequences for non-payment can follow without strict compliance with the demand notice requirements?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ajaib and others vs Fazal Dad Janjua1984 SCMR 1222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-30
  pre-emptioncivil revisionconcurrent findingslocal commissionercantonment limitsmaterial irregularityremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment and order of the Lahore High Court passed in civil revision, which set aside concurrent findings of the lower courts and remanded the matter for the appointment of a Survey Department expert as a Local Commissioner to determine whether the suit land was situate within Cantonment limits. The core legal question concerned the legality of the High Court's interference with concurrent findings of fact and the remand for expert local commission in a pre-emption suit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was unexceptionable, ruling that the failure to properly determine the territorial limits through expert evidence constituted a material irregularity under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, justifying interference and remand. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact can be interfered with in civil revision on the ground of material irregularity?
  • Can the High Court remand a case for the appointment of a Survey Department expert as a Local Commissioner to determine territorial jurisdiction?
  • Does failure to appoint an expert local commissioner to resolve location disputes amount to a material irregularity under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aisha Bibi vs Syed Saghirul Hassan and others1984 SCMR 1320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-18
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyallotmentrehabilitation authorityleave to appealsettlement law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee property. The petitioner, Mst. Aisha Bibi, sought the transfer of House No. G/462, claiming entitlement based on her husband's prior possession of a different property, House No. E/97, which had been exchanged with the approval of the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner in May 1959. The Settlement authorities and the High Court rejected her claim, ruling that because she occupied the disputed house after the crucial date of 20-12-1958, she was ineligible for transfer. The petitioner challenged this, relying on the precedent in Mst. Madina Begum v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1968 Lah. 945), which suggests that where an exchange of houses is approved by competent authorities, the original allotment date should be considered the date of allotment for the new property. The Supreme Court identified this as a significant legal question not previously settled by the Court and granted leave to appeal to determine whether the date of initial allotment applies in cases of authorized exchanges of evacuee property.

  Questions settled

  • Does the date of initial allotment of a property apply to a new property acquired through an exchange approved by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner?
  • Is a person who occupies an evacuee property after the crucial date of 20-12-1958 entitled to its transfer if they held a prior allotment for a different property?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. Zehra Begum vs Messrs Pakistan Burmahshell Ltd_1984 PLD Supreme Court 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-25
  personal needbona fide requirementejectment applicationlease agreementcontractual tenancypremature applicationSind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979waiver of rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an eviction application filed by a landlady against her tenant under Section 15(2)(viii) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 on the ground of personal bona fide requirement. The premises, originally containing a bungalow, had been demolished and leased out under a long-term registered lease deed for thirty years to set up a petrol pump and service station. The core legal question was whether the statutory ground of personal need under Section 15(2)(viii) overrides the express terms and duration of a valid, subsisting contractual lease agreement. The Supreme Court held that the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 protects and recognizes valid contractual tenancies. Where a landlord voluntarily barters away or waives the right to seek eviction for a fixed period under a valid lease contract for consideration, the statutory provisions do not override the covenant. Consequently, an eviction application on grounds of personal requirement during the currency of a binding lease is premature and unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ground of personal need under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 override the terms of a valid and subsisting long-term registered lease deed?
  • Can a landlord seek ejectment on the ground of personal requirement during the currency of a fixed-term lease where the landlord waived such right under covenants?
  • Can a respondent support the ultimate decree or order of a Rent Controller in appeal on grounds decided against them without filing cross-objections under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. S. J, Usmani vs Government of Punjab through Secy., Education1984 SCMR 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-05
  service lawseniority listselection graderes judicataservice tribunallimitationdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding a dispute over seniority and the grant of a Selection Grade in the Education Department. The petitioner, a teacher, challenged the grant of Selection Grade to respondents based on a 1974 seniority list, while simultaneously challenging a subsequent 1980 seniority list that placed her junior to those same respondents. The Service Tribunal dismissed her appeal against the 1980 seniority list as time-barred, a decision that became final. Consequently, when the petitioner's appeal regarding the Selection Grade came for hearing, the Tribunal dismissed it, reasoning that the seniority issue was already settled by the finality of the earlier decision and that the Tribunal could not review its own previous order. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that the grant of Selection Grade involved discretion based on seniority-cum-fitness. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it justified as the seniority issue was res judicata and the grant of Selection Grade fell within the discretionary authority of the department. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal reopen an issue of seniority that has been decided in a previous, final order?
  • Is the grant of a Selection Grade based on seniority-cum-fitness a matter of administrative discretion?
  • Does the failure to challenge a Service Tribunal's decision on seniority render that issue final and binding in subsequent related appeals?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. Munawar Sanni vs Director, Army Education1984 SCMR 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-24
  reinstatementarrears of salarytermination of serviceconstitutional petitionmoney claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a constitutional petition filed by the appellant, a permanent Assistant School Mistress whose services were previously terminated by the Cantonment Board, an order declared illegal and without lawful authority by the High Court. Following her reinstatement, the Director, Federal Government Educational Institutions ordered payment of arrears of pay, which was subsequently modified and prohibited by the Director of Army Education following an opinion from the Law Division. The High Court dismissed her subsequent writ petition on the ground that the claim was a money claim suited for a civil court or service tribunal. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court noted that authorities are under a bounden obligation to satisfy lawful salary claims of a reinstated employee without driving them to litigation. With the Deputy Attorney-General conceding that the appellant was indeed entitled to the arrears of pay in question, the appellant's counsel did not press the appeal further. The Supreme Court accordingly disposed of the appeal based on the statements made.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee reinstated after an unlawful termination is entitled to receive arrears of salary for the period kept out of service?
  • Whether a constitutional petition under writ jurisdiction is an appropriate remedy to claim arrears of salary following reinstatement?
  • Whether departmental authorities are bound to satisfy the salary claims of a reinstated employee without driving them to civil court or service tribunal litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. Mahmooda K. Soze vs Director of Army Education and Another1984 SCMR 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-06
  service tribunalpay scalefederal government servantcantonment boardcantonment teaching staffpromotionservice terms and conditions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Service Tribunal denying relief to the appellant, a former school principal under the Cantonment Board whose services were later taken over by the Federal Government. The core legal question was whether the appellant, a Federal Government employee, was entitled as of right to the fixation of her pay in Grade-19 based on policy decisions and notifications issued by the Provincial Government, particularly when similar benefits were granted by the province to its own employees and certain counterparts. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that since the appellant was a Federal Government servant governed by the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and the Provincial Government notifications were not adopted by the Federal Government nor applicable to her as a matter of right, she could not claim Grade-19 pay scale merely because it was granted as a personal benefit to provincial employees or junior staff. The key principle laid down is that federal employees cannot claim the benefit of provincial government administrative concessions or notifications unless expressly adopted and extended by the Federal Government.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Federal Government servant can claim the benefit of a Provincial Government pay notification as a matter of right when it has not been adopted by the Federal Government?
  • Does the placement of a junior employee in a higher pay scale by a provincial notification create an enforceable vested right for a federal employee?
  • Can a prayer for the fixation of pay in a higher grade be claimed as a matter of right when the post's designated category does not fall within that grade?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. Hazarbai Merchant and Another vs Muhammad Ismail1984 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-07
  statutory tenantejectmentdefault in payment of rentdisplaced personstender of rentpermanent transfer order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Sind High Court directing the eviction of the petitioners, who were statutory tenants of a property in Karachi transferred to the respondent under the Settlement Scheme. Following protracted litigation culminating in a Supreme Court judgment restoring the respondent's Permanent Transfer Order, the respondent served a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, demanding arrears of rent. The petitioners failed to pay the full demanded amount within the statutory period, instead depositing a lesser sum with the Rent Controller after deducting certain taxes and placing conditions on its withdrawal. The Rent Controller and High Court found the petitioners to be wilful defaulters. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that tenants are not entitled to unilaterally deduct disputed tax payments from the rent due under a Section 30 notice, and that failing to deposit the full rent due constitutes a valid ground for ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant receiving a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 is entitled to deduct claimed tax payments from the arrears of rent due?
  • Does the conditional deposit of a reduced sum of rent before the Rent Controller constitute a valid tender of rent to avoid ejectment?
  • Whether the reversal of adverse settlement orders by the Supreme Court entitles the transferee landlord to claim arrears of rent from the date of the original transfer?
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• MRS. Haliman Hanif Moonno O vs Mst. Ismat Kamal and Others1984 SCMR 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-31
  ex parte decreeservice of noticesubstituted servicerehearing of appealnatural justiceremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court dismissing civil miscellaneous applications for rehearing an appeal and condonation of delay. The core legal question concerns whether an ex parte appellate judgment passed without proper service of notice and due notice of the actual hearing date violates principles of natural justice and procedural law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court erred in accelerating the hearing date without proper notice or personal service to the petitioner, rendering the ex parte order unsustainable. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court, and remanded the matter for a fresh decision on the regular second appeal after giving due notice to all parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte appellate order passed without proper notice of the actual hearing date to a party is sustainable?
  • Can a case be remanded for fresh decision when the appellate court accelerates a hearing date without notice?
  • Whether a party is entitled to rehearing of an appeal when not duly served with the notice of hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• MRs. Alima Ahmad vs Amir Ali1984 PLD Supreme Court 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-22
  default in payment of rentejectment of tenantcommercial tenancywilful defaultlandlord and tenantrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the landlord examines whether a tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of a written tenancy agreement is strictly bound by its terms regarding timely rent payment, and whether the Rent Controller's refusal to order ejectment was justified. The appellant-landlord sought eviction of the respondent-tenant alleging non-payment of rent. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, holding there was no wilful default due to the landlord's practice of accepting accumulated rent. The first appellate court reversed this finding, determining that the tenant had admittedly committed default. The High Court in second appeal restored the Rent Controller's order, ruling that the first appellate court improperly interfered with the Controller's discretion and that a landlord must serve notice before enforcing strict statutory timelines if past conduct induced a belief that delayed payments were acceptable. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the tenant was clearly in default for multiple months without plausible explanation, and that the alleged practice of accepting accumulated rent could not excuse defaults occurring after explicit notice to pay promptly. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and ordered the tenant's ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of a written tenancy agreement is strictly bound by the terms regarding the payment of rent by a particular date?
  • Does a landlord's past practice of accepting accumulated rent waive the statutory requirement of timely monthly rent payments after notice has been served requiring prompt payment?
  • Whether the first appellate court is justified in reversing a Rent Controller's finding of fact regarding default in rent payment?
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• Mistri Abdul Hamid vs Malik Amir Khan and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-29
  pre-emption suitnotificationabatement of appealrescission of notificationsuperior right of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions involved the effect of a notification issued under section 7(2) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, which removed the right of pre-emption within municipal limits of Peshawar, and the subsequent rescission of that notification during the pendency of the appeal. The Supreme Court held that a notification withdrawing the right of pre-emption does not ipso facto cause pending suits or appeals to abate unless expressly provided by law or unless a formal order of dismissal is obtained from the court while the notification remains in force. Because the initial notification was rescinded before any such order of dismissal was obtained or the appeal abated, the pre-emptor's right of pre-emption was revived, and the High Court validly decided the appeal in favor of the pre-emptor. The key principle laid down is that executive notifications barring pre-emption rights do not automatically abate pending proceedings unless specific statutory language mandates abatement or the party obtains an explicit order of dismissal while the bar is active.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a notification under section 7(2) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, taking away the right of pre-emption, causes pending suits and appeals to abate ipso facto?
  • What is the effect of the subsequent rescission of a pre-emption exclusion notification on pending appeals where no order of dismissal was obtained while the exclusion was in force?
  • Whether an executive notification barring pre-emption rights requires a formal order of the court to terminate pending proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Misri Khan vs Mst. Sakina Begum and Another1984 SCMR 1019(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-12
  pre-emptionexchange vs saleconcurrent findingsleave to appealquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from concurrent findings of lower courts in a pre-emption matter. The petitioner, a pre-emptor, challenged the nature of a transaction, contending that it constituted a sale rather than an exchange. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the transaction in question was legally classified as an exchange or a sale, a determination which would dictate the applicability of pre-emption rights. Upon review of the record and hearing arguments from counsel, the Supreme Court observed that all lower courts had concurrently determined the transaction to be an exchange. The Court held that the petition raised no substantial question of law and that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of the transaction were not open to interference in the current proceedings. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of a significant legal question.

  Questions settled

  • Does a transaction classified as an exchange rather than a sale attract the right of pre-emption?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Misal Khan vs The State1984 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-13
  acquittalcriminal appealocular testimonyinterested witnessbenefit of doubtindependent corroborationmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the trial court and convicted him for murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the trial court's finding that the prosecution witnesses were interested and inimical, and that the ocular testimony lacked independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal. The Supreme Court observed that the trial court's reasons for disbelieving the witnesses—including the failure to explain the exact time of the occurrence, the doubtful circumstances of the police arrival, and the lack of independent corroboration for interested witnesses—were cogent and legally sound. Furthermore, the High Court had inconsistently accepted the alibi of co-accused while relying on the same testimony to convict the appellant. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that where ocular testimony is interested and inimical, it cannot be accepted against an accused without independent corroboration. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court convict an accused based on ocular testimony that the trial court found to be interested and inimical without independent corroboration?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to establish the specific time of an occurrence in the FIR cast doubt on the reliability of the prosecution case?
  • Is the abscondence of an accused sufficient to prove guilt if the prosecution fails to establish the fact of abscondence on the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Yousuf Mustafa Baig vs Mst. Razia Begum1984 SCMR 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-25
  ejectmentbona fide requirementlandlord and tenantrent controlpersonal useleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind High Court, which affirmed an ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller against a tenant. The core legal question was whether the landlady’s claim of personal bona fide requirement for the residential premises was sufficiently established, particularly in light of the tenant's contention that the landlady failed to prove she was residing in rented accommodation. The Supreme Court held that the ejectment order was valid, noting that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the landlady's bona fide requirement were supported by sufficient evidence. The Court rejected the tenant's argument as irrelevant, emphasizing that the absence of proof regarding the landlady's current rented status did not negate her established need for the premises, especially given the lack of evidence that she owned alternative accommodation. The key principle laid down is that a landlord's bona fide requirement for personal use is not defeated solely by a failure to prove current residence in rented property, provided the requirement is otherwise substantiated by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is a landlord required to prove they are currently residing in rented accommodation to establish a bona fide requirement for their own property?
  • Can an ejectment order be sustained based on concurrent findings of fact regarding personal bona fide requirement?
  • Does the failure to produce evidence of alternative ownership by the landlord support a tenant's defense against eviction for personal use?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Khan vs The State1984 SCMR 1006 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-11
  murder convictionocular evidencemitigation of sentencedeath sentence commutationforensic evidencemotive in criminal casescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, a Guard Commander in the Rangers, for the murder of a colleague and attempted murder of two others. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular testimony, the consistency of medical evidence with the prosecution's narrative, and the impact of a failed motive on the sentencing. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the ocular evidence of the eyewitnesses credible and rejecting arguments regarding forensic delays and site plan discrepancies. However, the Court held that while the prosecution is not strictly required to prove motive, the introduction of a falsified or doubtful motive during trial warrants a reduction in sentence. Consequently, the Court maintained the conviction under Sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The judgment affirms the principle that while a failure to prove motive does not invalidate reliable ocular evidence, a falsified motive may serve as a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove a motive for a crime necessitate the rejection of otherwise reliable ocular evidence?
  • Can a falsified or doubtful motive introduced by the prosecution serve as a mitigating factor for sentencing?
  • Does the delay in sending crime empties to a forensic laboratory automatically render the recovery evidence doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Miran Bakhsh and Others vs Din Muhammad and Others1984 SCMR 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-06
  regular first appealframing of issuesappellate jurisdictionprocedural discretionrecording of evidencereal controversy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a regular first appeal before the High Court, which determined that the existing issues did not adequately address the real controversy between the parties. Consequently, the High Court exercised its discretion to frame a new, specific issue and directed the trial court to record evidence on this issue and transmit its findings back to the High Court. The petitioners challenged this procedural order before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court acted correctly in directing the framing of a new issue and the recording of additional evidence to resolve the true controversy in a pending appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order, finding it to be just, fair, and properly aimed at clarifying the dispute between the parties. The Court held that appellate courts possess the authority to direct the framing of necessary issues and the recording of additional evidence when such steps are essential to determine the real controversy, and it declined to interfere with the High Court's exercise of this procedural discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court direct the framing of a new issue during the pendency of a regular first appeal?
  • Is an appellate court empowered to order the trial court to record additional evidence on a newly framed issue?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's procedural order aimed at clarifying the real controversy between parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Miran Bakhsh and Another vs The State and Others1984 SCMR 1086 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-26
  double murdercriminal petitionleave to appealmedical evidenceocular versionballistic matchbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of a jail petition filed by Miran Bakhsh against his conviction for double murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and a criminal petition filed by the complainant against the acquittal of a co-accused, Muhammad Iqbal. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, medical evidence contradictions, and corroboration through recoveries. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that minor discrepancies or speculative arguments regarding the time of occurrence and medical direction do not warrant interference with concurrent findings of fact when independent eye-witnesses and forensic evidence corroborate the guilt of the petitioner. Furthermore, an acquittal based on medical evidence contradicting alleged sharp weapon injuries is well-founded. The Court laid down that concurrent findings based on credible independent eye-witness accounts supported by ballistic and medical evidence will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court, and benefit of doubt is rightly extended where medical evidence directly contradicts the weapon attribution of a co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence in a criminal petition against conviction when independent eye-witnesses and forensic corroboration exist?
  • Does a contradiction between medical evidence and the ocular version regarding the direction of a firearm injury warrant setting aside a conviction?
  • Is an acquittal justified when the medical examination reveals no injuries corresponding to the specific weapon attributed to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Zaman vs Khuda Dad and others1984 SCMR 1298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-28
  writ petitionextraordinary jurisdictionFederally Administered Tribunal AreaJirgaleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition by the Peshawar High Court, which had held on a preliminary objection that it lacked jurisdiction to issue process to the Federally Administered Tribunal Area under its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. The underlying matter involved a challenge to a Jirga verdict for the recovery of money, which had been approved by the Political Agent and affirmed in appeal by the Commissioner. The Supreme Court examined the facts, noting that the Jirga was constituted pursuant to a written agreement signed by the petitioner, who had nominated members, undertaken to abide by the decision, admitted receipt of the amount, and signed the unanimous recommendation of the Jirga. The Court held that notwithstanding any pending constitutional question regarding territorial jurisdiction in another matter, the instant case was not a fit one for the grant of leave to appeal. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Peshawar High Court has jurisdiction to issue process to the Federally Administered Tribunal Area under its extraordinary jurisdiction?
  • Is a petition challenging a Jirga verdict a fit case for grant of leave when the petitioner participated in the agreement and signed the recommendation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Muhammad Murtaza vs Federation of Pakistan and Another1984 SCMR 748 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-24
  restoration of writ petitiondismissal in defaultnon-prosecutiondue diligencesupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which dismissed an application for the restoration of a writ petition previously dismissed in default for non-prosecution. The core legal question concerns whether sufficient cause was shown for the restoration of the writ petition, taking into account the non-appearance of the petitioner's counsel due to professional engagements elsewhere and the alleged lack of service of notice. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner and his counsel failed to exercise due diligence and did not take proper interest in prosecuting the petition, noting prior instances of default and adjournments. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the refusal by the High Court to restore the writ petition was justified given the conduct of the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether non-service of notice to a party constitutes sufficient ground for the restoration of a writ petition dismissed in default?
  • Does the absence of counsel due to professional engagement elsewhere justify the restoration of a matter dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretion in refusing to restore a writ petition marked by a history of lack of due diligence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Aijaz Ali and 2 Others vs Mir Hmi and 11 Others1984 SCMR 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-27
  dismissal for non-prosecutionadjournmentSupreme Court of Pakistannon-appearance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. When the case was called out for hearing, no one appeared on behalf of the petitioners, whereas the learned counsel for the respondent was present and noted that the petitioners' counsel had prior knowledge of the hearing date. The record showed that an earlier application for adjournment and for hearing at Karachi had been rejected by the Chief Justice. Furthermore, the petition had previously been adjourned on four occasions at the request of the petitioners' counsel. Finding no justification for a further adjournment in the continued absence of the petitioners or their counsel, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for non-prosecution. Additionally, the Court noted that a separate reference lodged in the Court did not require a separate order, as the questions raised therein were governed by an earlier final judgment of the Court. Finally, a belated adjournment application received by post after the announcement of the dismissal order was held to be of no avail.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition be dismissed for non-prosecution when the petitioners and their counsel fail to appear at the hearing?
  • Whether an adjournment application received by post after the announcement of an order dismissing a case is maintainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Aijaz Ali and 2 Others vs Mir Haji and 11 Others1984 SCMR 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-27
  non-prosecutiondismissal of petitionadjournmentabsence of counselprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan following a series of adjournment requests by the petitioners. Despite previous adjournments granted on four separate occasions, the petitioners failed to appear for the scheduled hearing. The court noted that the petitioners were fully aware of the hearing date, as evidenced by their prior unsuccessful attempt to have the matter adjourned or transferred to Karachi, a request which had been explicitly rejected by the Chief Justice. Given the petitioners' absence and the history of repeated delays, the court found no justification for further postponement. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for non-prosecution. The court further observed that a belated application for adjournment, received by post after the order of dismissal had already been announced, was of no legal effect. The court also noted that no separate order was required regarding a reference pending before it, as the issues therein were governed by a previous final judgment of the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition be dismissed for non-prosecution when the petitioners fail to appear after multiple previous adjournments?
  • Is a belated application for adjournment received after the announcement of a dismissal order legally effective?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Inam Karim and others vs Mirza Israrulqadir and others1984 SCMR 1427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-10
  Wakf Alal AuladPrivate TrustMutawalliSale of Wakf PropertyKaziChange of InvestmentWakifJudicial Discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a High Court order permitting the sale of immovable properties constituting a Wakf Alal Aulad. The core legal question was whether a Court possesses the authority to sanction the sale of Wakf property and the reinvestment of proceeds when the Wakif (founder) did not expressly reserve such a power, particularly when the properties had become dilapidated. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it. The Court affirmed that while it must strive to give effect to the founder's express wishes, the Court, acting in the capacity of the Kazi, retains the judicial discretion to authorize the sale and change of investment of Wakf property if it is deemed conducive to the proper maintenance and benefit of the Wakf. The key principle laid down is that the absence of an express power of sale in the Wakf deed does not preclude the Court from permitting a sale and reinvestment, provided the Court is satisfied that such action is necessary and beneficial for the preservation and maintenance of the trust.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Court authorize the sale of immovable property constituting a Wakf Alal Aulad if the Wakif did not expressly reserve the power of sale?
  • Does the Court have the authority to permit a change of investment of Wakf property for the benefit of the trust?
  • Is the Court, in its capacity as the Kazi, empowered to vary the management of a Wakf to ensure its proper maintenance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Bashir Haider vs MRS. Nur Jehan Kirmani1984 SCMR 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-11
  ejectmentpersonal requirementmaintainability of eviction applicationMartial Law Order 20consent orderremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an ejectment order passed against the tenant in respect of a residential-cum-commercial building in Karachi. The proceedings were initially instituted under Martial Law Order No. 20 by the husband of the respondent-landlady and subsequently validated under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal questions involved were whether eviction proceedings initiated by the husband of the landlady instead of the landlady herself were maintainable, and whether the landlord's claim for personal bona fide requirement was established. The Supreme Court held that the initial defect, if any, stood cured by subsequent proceedings, the remand of the case by consent, and the active participation of the respondent-landlady. The Court further held that the landlord has a preferential right to occupy his own premises and that isolated statements regarding enhanced rent do not negate a substantiated claim of personal requirement. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether eviction proceedings initiated by the husband of a landlady under Martial Law Order No. 20 are null and void?
  • Does a consent order remanding a case to the Rent Controller preclude a party from challenging the initial maintainability of the proceedings?
  • Whether a landlord has a preferential right to occupy his own premises even if residing in government accommodation?
  • Does an offer by a landlord regarding enhanced rent during continued occupation destroy a bona fide personal requirement claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs United Woollen Mills Ltd. vs Workers' Union and Another1984 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-10
  cost of living allowanceindustrial settlementset-offeffective date of settlementlabour lawinterpretation of statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment regarding the applicability of a set-off provision under the Employees Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973. The core legal question was whether a settlement agreement signed on 16-6-1980, which covered two distinct periods (1979-80 and 1980-81), could be treated as effective from 1-7-1980 for the latter period, thereby allowing the employer to set off the statutory cost of living allowance against emoluments payable for that year under proviso (a) to subsection (4) of section 3 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the settlement contained two distinct agreements. While one part was effective from 1-7-1979, the part governing the 1980-81 period was effective from 1-7-1980. The Court established the principle that when interpreting the 'effective date' of a settlement or agreement, the intention of the parties regarding the date of effectiveness must be determined first, rather than relying solely on the date of signing. Consequently, the employer was entitled to set off the allowance against the emoluments for the 1980-81 period, but not for the 1979-80 period.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer set off a statutory cost of living allowance against emoluments payable under a settlement agreement?
  • How is the effective date of a settlement determined under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can a single settlement document contain multiple agreements with different effective dates?
  • Does the date of signing a settlement automatically dictate its effective date if the parties have otherwise agreed on a specific commencement date?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Rafique Industries Ltd. vs Messrs Conforce Ltd.1984 SCMR 807 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-02
  compromise decreespecific performanceamendment of decreerestitutioninherent powersdefault of commitment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment and order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision concerning the amendment of a compromise decree in a suit for specific performance. The petitioners filed a suit which was resolved via a compromise agreement requiring certain payments by specified dates, failing which the agreement would terminate and possession of the property would revert to the respondents. The petitioners defaulted on the payments, leading to the dismissal of the suit and a decree reflecting the compromise terms. Subsequent challenges via application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, revision petitions, and a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court were all dismissed. The petitioners also sought amendment of the decree under sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to delete the relief of possession, which was rejected by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners could not take advantage of their own failure to honour their commitment, that the restoration of possession is a necessary consequence of the default, and that the jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court and should be exercised whenever justice demands. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the restoration of possession is a necessary consequence of a default in a compromise decree for specific performance?
  • Does every court possess the inherent jurisdiction to make restitution whenever justice demands?
  • Can a party who fails to honour the terms of a compromise agreement seek to amend the resulting decree to avoid adverse consequences?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Rafiq Industries Ltd. vs Messrs Conforce Limited1984 SCMR 1452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-27
  compromise decreebreach of agreementcivil procedurenon-compliancejudicial discretiondismissal of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which upheld the dismissal of a civil suit following the petitioner's failure to comply with a court-recorded compromise agreement. The core legal question was whether the compromise, as recorded in the statements of the parties before the Senior Civil Judge, was binding and whether the subsequent dismissal of the suit for non-compliance with the payment terms was legally justified. The Supreme Court held that the compromise was unambiguous and binding, noting that the petitioner had repeatedly failed to honor the payment schedule despite multiple opportunities granted by both the trial court and the High Court. The Court refused to interfere with the lower courts' orders, emphasizing that a party cannot be permitted to take undue advantage of its own breach of a solemn commitment made before the court. The key principle laid down is that where parties enter into a compromise in the presence of the court, they are bound by its terms, and failure to comply with such terms justifies the dismissal of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Is a compromise agreement recorded in the statements of parties before a court binding on the parties?
  • Can a court dismiss a suit where a party fails to comply with the payment terms of a recorded compromise?
  • Does a party have the right to challenge a dismissal order when they have repeatedly failed to honor a court-sanctioned undertaking?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Manzoor Textile Works and another vs The Chief Settlement1984 SCMR 1546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-25
  leave to appealauction of propertyPermanent Transfer Deedsettlement authoritiesproperty disputestatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, which had reversed the decision of a learned Single Judge and dismissed the petitioner's writ petition regarding a property dispute. The core legal question concerns whether a specific portion of the property, known as Piara Singh Workshop, was lawfully included in the auction and subsequent Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) issued to respondent M.M. Khalil, or whether it constituted a separate property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contention regarding the inclusion of the workshop in the auction requires detailed consideration by the court. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal, ordered security to be furnished, and directed that the status quo shall continue to be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Piara Singh Workshop portion was included in the property subject-matter of the auction held in favour of the respondent?
  • Can separate allotments made by rehabilitation and settlement authorities be treated as distinct properties despite subsequent transfer deeds covering a larger area?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs J.V. Kocks KG/Rist vs Government of Pakistan and another1984 SCMR 1543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-27
  arbitration proceedingsumpireadditional evidenceprocedural agreementextension of timearbitration award
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition, which was subsequently converted into an appeal. The dispute concerned arbitration proceedings involving Messrs J.V. KOCKS KG/Rist and the Government of Pakistan. The parties, their legal representatives, and the appointed umpire reached a consensus regarding the procedural conduct of the arbitration. The Court, acting upon this agreement, ordered that additional evidence, as specified in the Government's application, be admitted before the umpire, subject to the right of rebuttal. The Government was tasked with producing the necessary evidence and witnesses, excluding the expert witness to be appointed by the umpire. Furthermore, the Court extended the deadline for the issuance of the arbitration award by two months, effective from the date of the parties' appearance before the umpire. The Government also undertook to withdraw its pending application for the removal of the umpire, while retaining its right to challenge the arbitration proceedings and the final award in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can parties to an arbitration agreement mutually agree to the admission of additional evidence before the umpire?
  • Is the court empowered to extend the time for the issuance of an arbitration award based on the consent of the parties?
  • May a party withdraw an application for the removal of an umpire while reserving the right to challenge the arbitration proceedings later?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ghulam Muhammad Dossul & Co. vs Messrs Vulcan Co. Ltd and Another1984 SCMR 1024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-14
  trade marktemporary injunctionprima facie caseprior userexclusive selling rightscustoms authoritiesinfringement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a suit for permanent injunction and an application for temporary injunction concerning the trade mark "ARMINIUS" registered in favour of the petitioner for arms and ammunition. The petitioner challenged the import of revolvers bearing the same trade mark by respondent No. 1. The trial court and the High Court both dismissed the petitioner's application for a temporary injunction, holding that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case, noting evidence that goods bearing the mark were imported prior to the petitioner's registration, and applying the principle that prior users have preference under section 25 of the Trade Marks Act 1940. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting that the documents on record did not sufficiently establish that the original foreign owner had abandoned its rights or transferred full proprietary and manufacturing rights to the petitioner, and that the goods in question had already been released and partly sold. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing to interfere with the High Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the holder of a registered trade mark is entitled to a temporary injunction against the import of goods bearing the same mark by a third party when prior user by others is established?
  • Does a grant of exclusive selling rights by a foreign manufacturer confer proprietary rights in a trade mark sufficient to restrain third-party imports?
  • Can a appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts refusing a temporary injunction in a trade mark matter without clear error?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Galaxy Constructions Ltd. vs The Province of Sind and Others1984 SCMR 1572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-26
  bank guaranteetemporary injunctioncivil suitwithdrawal of suitinterim reliefencashment of bank guarantee
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court order refusing to grant a temporary injunction to restrain the respondents from encashing a bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner in a civil suit. The petitioner had previously filed a suit which was withdrawn with permission to file a fresh suit, where the current application for injunction was made. The High Court, relying on previous litigation between the parties regarding the same bank guarantee, refused the injunction. However, the High Court also directed that a portion of the bank guarantee amount be paid to the respondent, while ordering the remaining balance to be invested in Khas Deposit Certificates, despite no claim having been made by the respondent for that specific balance. The Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the injunction but set aside the High Court's order regarding the investment of the balance sum. The Court held that in the absence of any claim by the respondent for the specific amount, there was no justification for withholding it from the petitioner, and ordered its release.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court order the retention of a portion of a bank guarantee amount when no claim has been made by the respondent for that specific sum?
  • Does the refusal of a temporary injunction in a subsequent suit remain valid when based on the adjudication of the same issue in prior litigation between the same parties?
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• Messrs Dada Ltd. vs Messrs Abdul Sattar & Co.1984 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-28
  frustration of contractSection 144 CrPCcollateral challengevoidable orderforward contractsimpossibility of performanceadministrative order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the frustration of forward contracts for the supply of rapeseed, following a District Magistrate's order under Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, prohibiting the movement of oilseeds out of the district. The core legal question was whether the contracts were frustrated by this order and whether the validity of such an order could be challenged collaterally in a civil suit. The Supreme Court held that the District Magistrate acted within his jurisdiction, rendering the order voidable rather than void ab initio. Consequently, the order could not be challenged collaterally in a civil suit without joining the issuing authority as a party. The Court affirmed that the contracts were frustrated immediately upon the imposition of the ban, as the stipulated mode of performance—rail transport from the district—became impossible. The Court rejected the argument that the sellers were obligated to procure goods from alternative sources, as this was not contemplated by the parties. The appeal was dismissed, establishing that frustration of contract is automatic when performance becomes legally impossible.

  Questions settled

  • Can the validity of an order passed under Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be challenged collaterally in a civil suit?
  • Does the frustration of a contract occur automatically upon the imposition of a legal ban rendering performance impossible?
  • Is a party to a forward contract obligated to procure goods from alternative sources when the specific mode of delivery stipulated in the contract becomes legally impossible?
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• Messrs Colony Textile Mills, Ltd. vs Reh Ma Tullah1984 SCMR 1390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-09-07
  ejectmentpersonal requirementconcurrent findingslandlord and tenantspecial leave to appealbona fide need
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind upholding the concurrent orders of ejectment of the petitioner-company from the disputed premises on the ground of the respondent-landlord's personal requirement. The core legal question concerned the bona fides of the landlord's claim for personal use and whether the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts suffered from misreading of evidence regarding family size and available accommodation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the submissions raised pure questions of fact concluded by concurrent findings, and that a family of nine or twelve members cannot conveniently reside in a two-bed room house. The Court laid down that concurrent factual findings regarding personal requirement in ejectment matters, supported by evidence of family size and inadequacy of present accommodation, will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding personal requirement for ejectment can be interfered with under special leave to appeal?
  • Is a two-bedroom house considered sufficient for a family consisting of nine to twelve members including married couples and children?
  • Whether an ejectment application based on personal requirement is vitiated without proof of malafides or alternative accommodation?
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• Messrs Brothers Weaving Factory and another vs Messrs Habib Silk1984 SCMR 1565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-11
  rent controlinterim orderfinal orderleave to appealevictionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal regarding the nature of an order passed by a Rent Controller under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question presented to the Supreme Court is whether an order issued under Section 16(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, constitutes a final order or an interim order. This inquiry necessitates a comparative analysis of the legislative language used in Section 16(1) of the 1979 Ordinance against the provisions of Section 13(6) and (8) of the repealed West Pakistan Urban Rent Restrictions Ordinance, 1959. Recognizing that this issue involves a substantial question of law with significant implications for numerous pending cases, the Court granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative interpretation. The Court declined to grant interim relief against eviction, noting the petitioners' failure to comply with a previous conditional order requiring the deposit of rent. The Court further clarified that its refusal of interim relief did not preclude the High Court from exercising its discretion to grant appropriate relief in the interest of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed by a Rent Controller under Section 16(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, considered a final order or an interim order?
  • Does the language of Section 16(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, differ in legal effect from Section 13(6) and (8) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restrictions Ordinance, 1959?
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• Messrs Ally Brothers & Co.Limited vs The Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and others1984 SCMR 1212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-04
  ejectmentpersonal uselandlord and tenantabatement of proceedingsfinality of judgmentvesting of rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had refused to set aside an eviction order following the death of the landlord. The respondent landlord had successfully obtained an eviction order against the petitioner for personal use, which was upheld on appeal and subsequently challenged in a writ petition that was dismissed. After the landlord's death, the petitioner sought review, arguing that the personal need for the premises had extinguished with her demise. The High Court dismissed the review, holding that the eviction proceedings had concluded during the landlord's lifetime, thereby vesting the right to possession in her heirs. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, ruling that once eviction proceedings have reached a final conclusion during the lifetime of the landlord, the right to repossess the property vests in the landlord and subsequently passes to their heirs. Consequently, the petitioner's plea that the cause of action abated upon the landlord's death was rejected as the legal proceedings had already attained finality.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's right to evict a tenant for personal use abate if the landlord dies after the eviction order has attained finality?
  • Can an eviction order based on personal need be challenged on the ground of the landlord's death after the proceedings have concluded?
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• Messers Spinzar Snacks vs Mrs. Anjum A. Rab and another1984 SCMR 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-15
  ejectmenttenantcompromiseundertakingleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the dismissal of a constitutional petition that had upheld an order of ejectment passed by the District Judge, Karachi. The core legal question concerned the tenant's continued occupation and eviction from the disputed premises. During the hearing, the parties reached an amicable settlement. The Supreme Court disposed of the petition as not pressed in terms of the compromise, allowing the tenant to retain possession for a specified period until September 16, 1984, subject to the condition that the tenant pays the agreed rent in a lump sum by February 1, 1984, and furnishes an undertaking to voluntarily and peacefully hand over vacant possession to the landlord upon the expiry of the stipulated period. The key principle laid down is that the court may dispose of ejectment matters on the basis of a lawful compromise and undertakings given by the parties regarding peaceful surrender of possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal in an ejectment matter be disposed of on the basis of a compromise between the landlord and tenant?
  • What is the effect of an undertaking given by a tenant to voluntarily vacate premises within a stipulated period?
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• Mehraj Begum and Others vs Mst. Nuzhat Majeed1984 SCMR 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-24
  leave to appeallandlord and tenantevictionrelationship of landlord and tenantappreciation of evidencejudgment of variance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the appellate court's judgment and restored the Rent Controller's eviction order. The core legal question concerned the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and whether the tenancy vested in an individual partner or a firm. The Supreme Court held that the arguments raised by the petitioners related purely to the appreciation of evidence and that the High Court's judgment did not violate established principles regarding interference with a judgment of variance in second appeal. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with a two-month extension granted for voluntary surrender of possession upon an undertaking to pay due rent. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent factual findings regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant unless the lower court's appreciation of evidence suffers from a legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Does a denial of tenancy by the tenant result in forfeiture of the tenancy?
  • Can a tenancy be created through oral agreement or the conduct of the parties?
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• Mehar Hussain vs Allah Wasaya and others1984 SCMR 1386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-11
  murderacquittalleave to appealocular testimonymedical evidencegunshot injuryrecurrent appreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court acquitting three respondents who were initially tried and convicted by the trial court for the murder of Abdur Rahman under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case was based on ocular testimony, medical evidence, recoveries, and a previous motive relating to a prior murder. The High Court acquitted the respondents, leading to the current petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in disbelieving natural eye-witnesses, ignoring certain witness testimonies entirely, and misinterpreting medical evidence regarding injuries sustained by an injured witness as self-suffered. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioner required detailed consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal against the acquittal and ordered non-bailable warrants to issue against the respondents. The key principle laid down is that where a High Court fails to consider material witness testimonies and draws unsound conclusions regarding medical and ocular evidence in an acquittal appeal, the Supreme Court may grant leave to examine the correctness of the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can disbelieve natural witnesses without properly discussing their testimony?
  • Can an appellate court classify an injury as self-suffered against the unequivocal opinion of the medical officer?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an acquittal judgment rendered by the High Court?
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• Mehar Hussain vs Allah Wasaya and 2 Others1984 SCMR 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-29
  bail pending appealacquittal appealsuspension of sentencemedical grounds for bailcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the suspension of sentence and grant of bail filed by three respondents who were initially convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, subsequently acquitted by the High Court, and then arrested following the Supreme Court's grant of leave to appeal against their acquittal. The core legal question was whether the respondents were entitled to bail pending the final adjudication of the appeal against their acquittal. The Supreme Court held that no case for bail was established for two of the respondents, Allah Wasaya and Khadim Hussain, and consequently rejected their applications. However, regarding the third respondent, Ghulam Muhammad, the Court granted bail based on medical grounds, specifically a fractured leg that remained untreated despite efforts within the jail, a fact which the complainant's counsel did not refute. The key principle laid down is that while bail pending appeal against acquittal is not automatic, the court may exercise its discretion to grant bail where specific, substantiated medical exigencies exist that cannot be addressed within the prison system.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted to an accused pending an appeal against their acquittal?
  • Does a substantiated, untreated medical condition constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of bail to a respondent in an appeal against acquittal?
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• Maulvi Muhammad Aslam and Others vs Government of N.W. F. P. and Others1984 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-21
  land acquisitioncompensationmarket valueseverance of landdamagescivil court reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, wherein the petitioners' land measuring 41 kanals and 19 marlas was acquired. Dissatisfied with the Collector's compensation award, the petitioners sought a reference to the civil court. The Additional District Judge enhanced the market value, which was further challenged through an appeal and cross-objections before the Peshawar High Court. The High Court maintained the compensation rates and dismissed the cross-objections. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the provisions of section 23(1) thirdly and section 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 were overlooked, specifically regarding severance and the acquisition of the remaining block of land. The Supreme Court examined the record and held that the lower courts had properly evaluated the evidence on issues of severance and damages, noting the lack of evidence quantifying the actual loss sustained. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Whether compensation for severance of land under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 requires specific evidence showing the quantum of damages suffered?
  • Whether the High Court's determination of market value for acquired land warrants interference when based on proper appraisal of evidence?
  • Whether a landowner can compel the acquisition of an entire block of land under section 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 without proving adverse effects in terms of money?
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• Master Muhammad Ibrahim vs Mst. Amina Bib and Others1984 SCMR 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-07
  constitutional jurisdictiondisputed questions of factpublic auctionSettlement DepartmentPermanent Transfer Deedproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a house property in Lahore claimed by both the petitioner, who allegedly purchased it in an unrestricted public auction held by the Settlement Department, and the first respondent, who claimed ownership based on an agreement of association and a Permanent Transfer Deed. The core legal question involved the genuineness of the competing transfer documents and whether disputed questions of fact could be resolved in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined to resolve disputed questions of fact in its constitutional jurisdiction and correctly remanded the matter to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for a proper enquiry in the presence of the parties. The key principle laid down is that disputed questions of fact regarding transfer documents in settlement matters ought to be resolved through factual inquiry by the competent administrative authority rather than through constitutional petitions in the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can disputed questions of fact regarding property transfer documents be resolved in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in remanding a matter involving disputed settlement documents to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for enquiry?
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• Masood Ahmad vs The State1984 SCMR 1389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-29
  post-conviction bailcriminal appealsentence of whippingrigorous imprisonmentbail pending appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for post-arrest bail pending the final decision of a criminal appeal (Crl.A.6(S)/82). The convict-appellant, having already served nine months of rigorous imprisonment in addition to the one-year sentence awarded in appeal, sought bail primarily on the basis that the remaining sentence of whipping should be set aside due to the duration of imprisonment already undergone. The Supreme Court, noting that the question regarding the potential setting aside of the whipping sentence required further determination, granted the bail application. The Court held that the applicant is entitled to release pending the final adjudication of the appeal, subject to the provision of bail and surety bonds. The key principle established is that where a convict has served a substantial portion of their sentence and raises a valid legal question regarding the appropriateness of the remaining sentence (such as whipping), the court may exercise its discretion to grant bail pending the final disposal of the appeal, provided the applicant remains available to receive any sentence upheld or modified by the final judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a convict-appellant be granted bail pending the final decision of an appeal if they have already served a significant portion of their sentence?
  • Is a sentence of whipping subject to judicial review or potential setting aside when a convict has served additional imprisonment beyond the awarded term?
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