Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Behram Shah and 9 Others vs M. Younas and 6 Others1984 SCMR 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-17
  Jirgashrine managementleave to appealunanimous verdictconfirming authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment and order of the Peshawar High Court regarding a dispute over the succession and management of the shrine of saint Diwana Baba situated in Tehsil Daggar, District Swat. The core legal questions involve whether the initial suit was barred by time, whether the appointment and proceedings of the Jirga under Regulation II of 1975 complied with the mandatory legal requirements, and whether the confirming authority properly applied its mind to the Jirga verdict. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the Jirga members failed to reach a unanimous decision on vital issues, that the proceedings violated Regulation II of 1975, and that the confirming authority committed a material irregularity by failing to apply its mind properly to the verdict. The key principle laid down is that a Jirga's verdict must be unanimous and follow proper statutory procedure, and the confirming authority must independently and properly apply its mind thereto.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Jirga's verdict is legally sustainable when its members fail to reach a unanimous decision on vital issues?
  • Does the failure of a confirming authority to properly apply its mind to a Jirga verdict constitute a material irregularity?
  • Whether the appointment of non-local members to a Jirga without fulfilling required conditions vitiates the proceedings?
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• Begum Sarwar Khatoon vs Land Commission, Punjab and Others1984 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-17
  land reformstube-wellproduce index unitsconstitutional petitionsubordinate legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition concerning Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 115). The core legal question is whether a tube-well owned by a declarant exclusively or jointly, but not installed on their own land, makes the owner eligible for additional Produce Index Units under paragraph 8(2)(ii) of the Regulation read with subsequent notifications. The Supreme Court held that a notification issued under paragraph 4(8) of the Regulation operates as a subordinate, explanatory measure and cannot substitute or repeal the substantive provisions requiring the tube-well to be installed on the declarant's own land. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, establishing that the main condition requiring the tube-well to be situated on the declarant's land must be satisfied to claim additional land units.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tube-well owned by a declarant but not installed on their own land makes them eligible for additional Produce Index Units under paragraph 8(2)(ii) of Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 115)?
  • Does a notification issued under paragraph 4(8) of Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 115) override the substantive condition that a tube-well must be installed on the declarant's land?
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• Bati vs The State1984 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-04
  murdergrave and sudden provocationflagrante delictocircumstantial evidencecriminal appealmarital infidelity
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted and sentenced under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his wife. The appellant challenged his conviction, arguing that the murder occurred under sudden and grave provocation due to his wife's infidelity, citing evidence of semen found on swabs taken from the deceased as proof of her illicit relationship. The Supreme Court examined whether the presence of semen on the deceased's person, in the context of a marital relationship, constituted evidence of infidelity sufficient to invoke the plea of grave and sudden provocation. The Court held that the mere presence of semen on a married woman does not conclusively prove illicit sexual intercourse with a third party, as it could be attributed to relations with her husband. Furthermore, the Court determined that the appellant failed to establish a case of flagrante delicto. Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction, ruling that mere suspicion of infidelity does not mitigate a charge of murder to a lesser offense under Exception 1 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of semen on a deceased married woman constitute conclusive proof of infidelity?
  • Can mere suspicion of a spouse's infidelity satisfy the requirements for the defense of grave and sudden provocation under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the doctrine of flagrante delicto apply when there is no direct evidence of the deceased being caught in the act of adultery?
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• Bashir Hussain vs Mst. Fatima Bi1984 SCMR 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-31
  pre-emptiondeposit of pre-emption moneyextension of timenegligence of counselconcurrent findings of factremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against an order of remand passed by the lower appellate court. The respondent had filed a pre-emption suit and was ordered to deposit one-fifth of the pre-emption money by a specific date. Although she handed the amount to her counsel in time, the counsel failed to deposit it into court within the stipulated period, leading the trial court to reject the plaint. The District Judge remanded the matter for a decision on merits, holding that the litigant should not suffer for her counsel's default, a view endorsed by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure grants courts wide discretion to extend time for doing acts even after the expiry of the originally fixed period, provided the discretion is exercised judiciously. The Court affirmed that a litigant should not be penalized for the non-intentional or non-wilful default of her counsel when she has fulfilled her duty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff can be made to suffer for the default or negligence of her counsel in depositing pre-emption money in time?
  • Does Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure empower the court to extend time for doing an act even after the original period has expired?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the payment of money to counsel?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Zaheerud Din and another1984 SCMR 1418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-16
  urban settlementauction purchasedelayed challengediscretionary jurisdictionleave to appeallaches
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an urban settlement case concerning the auction of a unit in a composite property. The petitioner's initial auction in 1965 was cancelled after he failed to pay the full earnest money. Subsequently, the respondent succeeded in a 1973 auction, which the petitioner challenged before settlement authorities after a delay of nearly eight years. Although the petitioner initially succeeded before the settlement authority, the High Court restored the respondent's auction purchase, citing the petitioner's negligence, belated challenge, and the respondent's status as a bona fide purchaser. The core legal question involves whether discretionary relief under constitutional jurisdiction ought to be granted to a party guilty of prolonged silence and laches. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that leave to appeal must be refused because the petitioner remained silent for eight years, declining to exercise discretionary jurisdiction in such circumstances. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in favor of a party who has remained silent and delayed challenging an adverse administrative action for an unreasonable period.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in favor of a petitioner who remained silent for eight years before challenging an administrative auction?
  • Does an unexplained delay of nearly eight years in challenging an auction purchase bar a party from obtaining relief in constitutional and discretionary jurisdictions?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs The State1984 SCMR 1056 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-16
  murderdeath sentenceocular evidenceinjured witnesscriminal investigationidentificationmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a criminal appeal against a death sentence confirmed by the Lahore High Court for murder and house trespass. The petitioner challenged his conviction, arguing lack of motive, impossibility of identification due to darkness and confusion, and discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular testimony regarding the time of death. The Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution successfully established the petitioner's identity and guilt despite alleged investigative flaws. The Court held that the ocular testimony of the injured witnesses, who were present at the scene and suffered injuries during the incident, was natural and credible. The Court rejected the defense's arguments regarding the time of death and identification, noting the presence of moonlight and the witnesses' familiarity with the accused. While the Court deprecated the perfunctory and slipshod investigation by the police, it ruled that such procedural deficiencies did not undermine the reliability of the direct evidence. Consequently, the conviction was upheld, and the petition was dismissed, affirming that consistent ocular evidence corroborated by medical findings is sufficient for conviction in capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an investigating officer to collect material evidence like blood-stained items automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can the testimony of injured witnesses be relied upon even if the police investigation is found to be perfunctory or slipshod?
  • Does a discrepancy in the estimated time of death based on stomach contents override direct ocular testimony of the occurrence?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Abdul Hameed and Another1984 SCMR 689 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-07
  tenant evictionadverse possessionrejection of plaintmisuse of processcontempt of courtres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine a civil revision filed by the petitioner tenant. The petitioner had instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration that eviction orders passed against him by the Rent Controller and confirmed up to the Supreme Court were illegal and void, alleging fraud and that respondents were not the owners. The trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and the lower appellate court upheld the decision. The core legal question was whether a tenant, whose eviction order had been finalized by the Supreme Court and who unsuccessfully claimed adverse possession, could subsequently challenge those final judicial determinations through a fresh civil suit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the attempt to reopen settled issues regarding tenancy and ownership constituted a classic misuse of legal process. The Court reaffirmed that such suits are barred by law and initiated contempt proceedings against the petitioner, alongside issuing show-cause notices to the drafting lawyers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can challenge a final eviction order confirmed by the Supreme Court by filing a subsequent civil suit for declaration?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when it attempts to relitigate issues already closed by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether repeatedly agitating settled questions of tenancy and adverse possession amounts to an abuse of the process of the court?
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• Bashir Ahmad Khan vs Hakim Ali and 6 others1984 SCMR 1392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-10
  leave to appealrehabilitation schemeland allotmentdouble allotmentproposal confirmationsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court concerning competing land proposals and allotments under the rehabilitation scheme. The facts involve land proposed in the petitioner's favour in April 1959, subsequently proposed and confirmed in the name of another respondent without notice to the petitioner, and later sold to third-party purchasers whose title became subject to litigation after the second respondent's allotment was cancelled for double allotment. The core legal question involves the true scope and intendment of paragraph 68 of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme (Part II), specifically whether a land proposal is automatically confirmed after the expiry of fifteen days if no objections are filed. The Supreme Court held that the case raises a question of general public importance regarding the interpretation of paragraph 68 that arises frequently. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine the correct legal position, while directing that status quo regarding possession be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • What is the true scope and intendment of paragraph 68 of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme Part II regarding the confirmation of land proposals?
  • Does a land proposal under the rehabilitation scheme stand automatically confirmed after the expiry of fifteen days if no objections are filed?
  • What are the mandatory conditions and procedure required for the confirmation of proposals under paragraph 68 of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
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• Bashir Ahmad and another vs Irshad Muhammad Khan and others1984 SCMR 1531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-27
  court-feepre-emption suitmemorandum of appealrevisional jurisdictionlimitation perioddeficiency in court-fee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the payment of court-fee on a memorandum of appeal in a pre-emption suit. The petitioners filed an appeal against the dismissal of their suit, affixing court-fee based on the law applicable at the time of the original plaint. However, the office objected, noting that the Finance Act, 1973, which came into force before the appeal was filed, required a higher court-fee based on net profits. The District Judge allowed the petitioners to make up the deficiency, but the High Court, in revision, held that the court-fee must be determined by the law prevailing at the time of filing the appeal and that the appeal should have been dismissed as time-barred. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the District Judge's order allowing the deficiency to be made up was legally sustainable and whether the High Court, upon finding the order contrary to law, should have decided the matter itself rather than remanding it.

  Questions settled

  • Is the court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal determined by the law in force at the time of the original plaint or the law in force at the time the appeal is presented?
  • Can a court allow a party to make up a deficiency in court-fee after the expiry of the limitation period without an application for extension of time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • When a High Court finds a lower court's order regarding court-fee deficiency to be contrary to law in a revision petition, is it required to decide the matter itself or remand it back to the lower court?
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• Basharat Khan vs The State1984 SCMR 1033(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-10
  review petitionreappraisal of evidencecriminal appealmurder casefrivolous petitionfactual findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 25-5-1983 in a murder case. The core legal question addressed by the Court was whether the grounds presented in the review petition justified a re-examination of the previous judgment. Upon hearing the petitioner's counsel at length, the Court determined that the petition was frivolous. The Court held that the petitioner's arguments essentially sought a reappraisal of evidence and a re-evaluation of factual findings to achieve a different conclusion, which is not a permissible ground for review. The Court reaffirmed that the impugned judgment had already been carefully considered in light of the contentions raised during the original hearing and that the case did not warrant a reappraisal of evidence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the review petition, establishing the principle that a review jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely to re-argue questions of fact or to seek a reappraisal of evidence already adjudicated upon by the Court in its final judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be maintained solely to seek a reappraisal of evidence?
  • Is a request to reach a different conclusion on questions of fact a valid ground for review?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to re-examine factual findings in a review petition?
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• Basharat Ali and Another vs Allah Wasaya and Others1984 SCMR 739 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-16
  land reformslandless tenantsbona fidesminor applicantscultivating tenantsland grant priority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition arising from a Land Reforms dispute. The petitioners, who were minors at the material time, sought the grant of land under the Land Reforms Act, 1977, claiming entitlement as cultivating tenants. Upon failing to establish their status as recorded tenants, they alternatively argued for the grant of land on a second-priority basis as landless tenants, asserting preference over the respondents who were landowners. The Supreme Court examined the proceedings and noted that the petitioners' claim was factually doubtful, particularly given their status as minors with a living father who was himself a landowner. The Court observed that the father appeared to be attempting to acquire land by utilizing his minor sons' names. Finding no merit in the petitioners' bona fides, the Court dismissed the petition. The judgment reaffirms that claims for land grants under land reform legislation require genuine status as tillers of the soil and that courts will scrutinize the bona fides of applicants to prevent the circumvention of land reform objectives.

  Questions settled

  • Can minor children claim land grants as cultivating tenants when their father is a landowner?
  • Does the failure to establish status as a recorded tenant preclude a claim for land grant on a second-priority basis?
  • Are courts required to examine the bona fides of applicants in land reform grant proceedings?
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• Bahadur Khan vs Muhammad Anwar and 2 Others1984SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-22
  leave to appealculpable homicidemedical evidencegrievous hurtacquittalcriminal revisionappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a Peshawar High Court judgment concerning the murder of Muhammad Ayub and injuries to his father, Bahadur Khan. The petitioner challenged the acquittal of Muhammad Anwar and Feroz Din, and sought the enhancement of the sentence of Mir Zaman, who was convicted of causing grievous hurt rather than murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appraisal of medical evidence regarding the lethality of the abdominal injury inflicted by Mir Zaman, and whether such injury constituted culpable homicide under Section 299 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence, specifically regarding whether the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Court affirmed that a person is deemed to have caused death by bodily injury even if medical intervention might have prevented it. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal against Mir Zaman’s acquittal for murder but refused leave regarding the other respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court determine if an injury is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature even if the medical expert does not explicitly state so?
  • Does a person who inflicts a fatal bodily injury remain liable for causing death even if proper medical treatment might have prevented the fatality?
  • What constitutes culpable homicide under Section 299 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding the causation of death by bodily injury?
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• Bag Ga vs Lal Hussain1984 SCMR 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-21
  revisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factsale-deed validitypayment of considerationtransfer of titledeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which reversed concurrent findings of the trial court and the District Judge regarding the validity of a registered sale-deed. The respondent had filed a suit for declaration, alleging the sale-deed was fictitious and that no consideration was paid. The lower courts dismissed the suit, finding the deed genuine. The High Court, however, set aside these findings, holding that failure to prove the payment of consideration rendered the transaction ineffective, and reassessed the evidence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying two core legal questions: first, whether the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, could interfere with concurrent findings of fact without identifying jurisdictional defects or material irregularities; and second, whether the mere failure to prove the actual payment of sale consideration at the time of conveyance vitiates a sale transaction where title was intended to pass. The Court noted the established principle that non-payment of price does not necessarily prevent title from passing if the parties intended the transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in revisional jurisdiction interfere with concurrent findings of fact absent jurisdictional defect or material irregularity?
  • Does the failure to prove the actual payment of sale consideration at the time of conveyance vitiate a sale transaction where title was intended to pass?
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• Badri Zaman vs Muhammad Ashraf and Others1984 SCMR 1013 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-11
  leave to appealcivil revisionregistered sale-deedfraudulent salerevenue recordprimary evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a civil revision in limine. The petitioner had instituted a suit for declaration and possession, challenging a registered sale-deed dated 20th February 1954 as collusive, fraudulent, and without consideration, which was dismissed concurrently by the lower courts. The core legal question concerned the admissibility and validity of a certified copy of a registered sale-deed and the presumption of its fictitious nature when the original was allegedly not produced by the defendants. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings and the registered status of the sale-deed stood, noting that the petitioner failed to summon the identifying witnesses or the relevant Sub-Registrar's clerk, and omitted to challenge the corresponding revenue entries or seek cancellation of the sale-deed in a timely manner. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a certified copy of a registered sale-deed is inadmissible when the primary document is allegedly withheld?
  • Does a failure to challenge revenue record entries or seek cancellation of a registered sale-deed preclude a later claim of fraud?
  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the validity of a sale-deed warrant interference in civil revision or leave to appeal?
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• Avais Mazhar Hussain vs Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Another1984 SCMR 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-06
  disciplinary proceedingsgovernment servantright to explanationinquiry reportremoval from serviceprocedural fairnessEfficiency and Discipline Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a member of the Police Service of Pakistan, challenged his removal from service following disciplinary proceedings. Initially dismissed in 1975, he was reinstated but subsequently suspended and subjected to a fresh inquiry under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. Although the Inquiry Officer exonerated him, the Authorized Officer disagreed, leading to the petitioner's removal from service. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by the failure to provide the petitioner an opportunity to respond to the Authorized Officer's proposed action after the inquiry report was finalized. Relying on the principle established in Syed Mir Muhammad v. N.-W. F. P. Government, the Court noted that under rules 5 and 6 of the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1973, it is a statutory requirement to furnish the accused officer with a copy of the inquiry report and allow them to offer an explanation against the proposed action before recommendations are sent to the Authority. Finding that this procedure was not followed, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is it a statutory requirement to provide an accused government servant with a copy of the inquiry report before the Authorized Officer makes a recommendation to the Authority?
  • Must an accused officer be given an opportunity to offer an explanation against the proposed action by the Authorized Officer after a formal inquiry has been conducted?
  • Does the failure to provide an accused officer an opportunity to respond to the findings of an inquiry officer before the Authorized Officer makes a recommendation vitiate the disciplinary proceedings?
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• Aurangzeb Khan vs Abdur Rehman1984 SCMR 1294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-03
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionShamilat Dehcontiguous ownervendeecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision and denied a decree for possession based on a right of pre-emption. The petitioner, a contiguous owner, sought to pre-empt a land sale, while the respondent-vendee resisted the claim by asserting their status as a recorded owner in the Shamilat Deh Ghair Mumkin Kassi. The trial court and the High Court held that this ownership share placed the vendee on par with the pre-emptor, thereby defeating the claim. The core legal question was whether ownership of a share in such common land (Kassi) entitles a vendee to successfully resist a pre-emption claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, holding that co-sharership in Kassi or Lakhti does entitle a party to successfully resist a pre-emption claim. The Court relied on established precedents confirming that such ownership status is sufficient to defeat a claim of superior pre-emption rights based on contiguity. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does ownership of a share in Shamilat Deh Ghair Mumkin Kassi entitle a vendee to resist a claim of pre-emption?
  • Can a contiguous owner successfully pre-empt a sale against a vendee who holds a share in Shamilat Kassi?
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• Attaullah Jan vs Abdullah Jan1984 PLD Supreme Court 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-20
  second appealmixed question of fact and lawjurisdiction of Rent Controllerrented landeviction petitionremand of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a leave to appeal granted to examine whether the High Court was justified in entertaining a plea raised for the first time in second appeal—specifically, whether the disputed property qualified as 'rented land' under the relevant rent restriction law, thereby ousting the Rent Controller's jurisdiction. The appellant-landlord had filed an eviction petition against the respondent-tenant, which succeeded before the Rent Controller and the first appellate court. However, the High Court entertained the new legal-factual ground regarding the nature of the rented land and dismissed the eviction order without providing an opportunity for evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where a mixed question of fact and law regarding jurisdiction is raised for the first time in second appeal, the court cannot decide it solely on existing uncontested material without affording parties an opportunity to lead evidence. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the proceedings to the Rent Controller to frame an appropriate issue, record evidence, and decide the matter afresh.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new ground involving a mixed question of fact and law regarding jurisdiction be raised for the first time in second appeal?
  • What is the proper course for an appellate court when a party raises a new factual controversy regarding jurisdiction in second appeal?
  • Whether an appellate court can decide a mixed question of fact and law without allowing parties an opportunity to lead evidence.
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• Atta Muhammad vs Not1984 SCMR 1109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land reformsgift to heirsrevisional jurisdictionmutationtamleekLand Reforms Regulation 1972suo motu powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the validity of a gift of land made by a donor in 1969 to his heirs, which was subsequently challenged under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (M.L.R. 115). The core legal question was whether the gift was genuine and validly executed before the promulgation of the Regulation, and whether the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission had the authority to set aside the Chief Land Commissioner's validation of said gift. The Supreme Court held that the gift was validly made in favour of the donor's heirs, and the Chief Land Commissioner correctly validated the transaction. The Court ruled that the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission, in exercising revisional jurisdiction, had misread the evidence and exceeded the scope of his powers by failing to recognize the validity of the gift under the relevant provisions of the Regulation. The Court affirmed that once a gift to heirs is established, it is protected under the Regulation. The impugned order of the Federal Land Commission was declared to be of no legal effect, and the order of the Chief Land Commissioner was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Land Commission have the authority to scrutinize and invalidate a gift made to heirs under the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 if the gift was made prior to the Regulation's promulgation?
  • Is a gift of land to minors valid without formal delivery of possession when the donor is the legal guardian of the property?
  • Can the revisional powers under paragraph 29 of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 be exercised to re-examine factual findings that are supported by evidence?
  • Does the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 apply to transfers of land made by a person in favour of their heirs?
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• Atlas Battery Ltd. vs Superintendent, Central Excise & Land Customs, Circle 'C', Karachi and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-19
  excise dutyretail pricead valorem assessmentdeductionsCentral Excises and Salt Act 1944contract pricestorage batteries
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned the proper basis for determining the value of goods for excise duty assessment under Section 4(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944 read with Item No. 53(1) of its First Schedule. The appellant, a battery manufacturer, supplied storage batteries under special purchase contracts to specific institutions at higher contract prices while printing a lower figure on the batteries as the supposed retail price after deducting non-excisable charges such as transport, warranty, and special packaging. The Department demanded differential excise duty based on the contract prices, which the High Court upheld. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that under Section 4(2), the retail price fixed by a manufacturer must be inclusive of all charges and taxes and represent the price at which the goods are offered to the general body of consumers. Where multiple retail prices exist or unauthorized deductions are made from contract prices, the assessing officer retains statutory jurisdiction to verify whether the printed price truly constitutes the legal 'retail price'.

  Questions settled

  • Does a manufacturer have absolute discretion to fix a printed retail price for excise duty purposes without inclusion of all taxes and charges under Section 4(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944?
  • Can a manufacturer deduct transportation, warranty, and packaging costs from the contract price when determining the printed retail price for excise duty assessment under Section 4(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944?
  • Whether the excise assessing officer has jurisdiction to question a printed retail price on goods if it does not conform to the statutory definition of retail price in Section 4(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944?
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• Atlas Battery Limited Karachi vs Superintendent Central Excise and LandPTCL 1984 (CL) 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  excise dutyretail pricestatutory interpretationad valorem dutymanufacturing costsCentral Excises and Salt Acttax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  The dispute concerns the determination of 'retail price' for excise duty on storage batteries under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The appellants, manufacturers of batteries, challenged excise assessments, arguing they were entitled to deduct special contract costs—such as packing, warranty, and transport—from the contract price to arrive at a 'retail price' for duty purposes. The core legal question was whether such a price, which excluded these costs, satisfied the statutory definition of 'retail price' under Section 4(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' printed price failed to meet the statutory requirements because Section 4(2) mandates that the retail price must be inclusive of all charges and taxes and represent the price offered to the general body of consumers. Consequently, the Court affirmed that a manufacturer cannot arbitrarily deduct costs to lower the excise base. Where a printed price does not conform to the statutory definition, the goods are assessable on an ad valorem basis under Section 4(1) of the Act, rather than the concessional retail price rate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'retail price' under Section 4(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, permit a manufacturer to deduct special contract costs such as packing and warranty from the price?
  • Is a manufacturer's printed price on goods automatically binding for excise duty assessment if it does not reflect the price offered to the general body of consumers?
  • What is the consequence under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, if a printed retail price fails to meet the statutory definition of retail price?
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• Atiqurrehman and others vs Muhammad Ibrahim and another1984 SCMR 1469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-05
  pre-emptionguardian ad litemex parte decreeminor defendantsrevival of suitres judicatacivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where an ex parte decree was passed against minor defendants without a guardian ad litem. The High Court declared the decree a nullity, leading the trial court to revive the suit and appoint a guardian. The petitioners challenged this revival through a writ petition, which was dismissed on the merits by the High Court. After their subsequent appeals and a petition to the Supreme Court were dismissed, the petitioners filed a civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to challenge the same revival order. The High Court dismissed the revision petition on the ground of res judicata. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, holding that once a matter has been fully adjudicated and disposed of by the High Court under its writ jurisdiction, the same issue cannot be re-opened through a revision petition, as it is barred by the general principles of res judicata.

  Questions settled

  • Does the declaration of an ex parte decree against an unrepresented minor as a nullity wipe out the entire suit, or does it merely relegate the parties to the position they occupied when the illegality occurred?
  • Can a party file a civil revision petition to challenge an order that has already been adjudicated and upheld on the merits in previous writ proceedings?
  • Do the general principles of res judicata bar the re-opening of an issue in civil revision that was previously decided under writ jurisdiction?
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• Ata Muhammad vs Munawar Hussain and Others1984 SCMR 715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-01
  leave to appealcompetency of appealcriminal appealrevisional jurisdictionacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, father of the prosecutrix, sought leave to appeal against the Federal Shariat Court's order dismissing his criminal appeal as incompetent against the acquittal of the respondent under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the Federal Shariat Court was bound to treat an incompetent appeal as a revision petition under the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that since no such request was made before the Federal Shariat Court during the proceedings, the petitioner should formally move that court in accordance with the law relating to revisional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that a party seeking to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court by treating an incompetent appeal as a revision must first make a formal request before that court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an incompetent criminal appeal against acquittal can be treated as a revision by the Federal Shariat Court without a formal request?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court possess revisional jurisdiction under Article 203-DD of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Ark Navigation Company of Pakistan Ltd. and anothers vs Messrs Esso1984 SCMR 1535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-01
  limitationcondonation of delayforma pauperistemporary injunctionexpeditious disposalcivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two distinct matters. In the first matter, the Court dismissed an appeal as time-barred, holding that the appellant failed to provide an adequate explanation for a 41-day delay in filing beyond the limitation period. The Court declined to grant leave to sue in forma pauperis at that stage, directing the petitioner to pursue such relief before the trial court under the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. In the second matter, the Court considered a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding a temporary injunction in a suit for permanent injunction. The Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's refusal to grant the injunction but expressed concern over the delay in the trial court proceedings. Consequently, the Court directed the trial court to dispose of the suit within three months, requiring a report to the High Court and the Supreme Court if the deadline is not met.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be entertained when the application for a copy of the impugned judgment is made after the expiry of the limitation period without adequate explanation for the delay?
  • Is a request to sue in forma pauperis maintainable before the Supreme Court after the appeal has been dismissed as time-barred?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's order regarding a temporary injunction?
  • Can the Supreme Court issue specific directions to a trial court for the expeditious disposal of a pending suit?
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• Ark Navigation Company of Pakistan Ltd. and another vs Messrs Esso1984 SCMR 1518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-31
  forma pauperispauper suitcourt feesspecial leave to appealindigent personcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' appeal regarding an application to sue in forma pauperis. The petitioners sought permission to initiate a lawsuit for the recovery of Rs. 29,92,000, representing the cost of a vessel or insurance proceeds, claiming they lacked the means to pay the requisite court fees following the events of 1971 in East Pakistan. Although the Deputy Collector had verified the petitioners' financial inability, the High Court rejected the application based on the perceived merits of the underlying claim. The Supreme Court noted that the petitioners had subsequently been granted permission to sue as paupers in separate proceedings involving different parties. Finding that the petitioners' pauper status had been recognized elsewhere, the Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal to examine the High Court's dismissal. The Court also condoned the delay in filing the petition, subject to future exceptions, and directed that the appeal be prepared on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application to sue in forma pauperis be rejected based on the merits of the underlying claim?
  • Does a previous declaration of pauper status in separate proceedings impact an application to sue as a pauper in a new suit?
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• Arif and OTHERSs vs The State1984 SCMR 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-10
  criminal appealmurderocular testimonycorroborationmotiveeye-witness credibilityrecovery of weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted in this criminal matter to reappraise the uncorroborated evidence and examine discrepancies regarding the motive in a murder case. The incident involved the fatal attack on the deceased by multiple armed appellants resulting in numerous injuries. The trial court convicted the appellants under sections 148 and 302 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to imprisonment, which the High Court subsequently upheld along with a compensation order under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court evaluated the credibility of the natural and non-partisan eye-witnesses, the medical evidence, and the recoveries of incriminating weapons. The court held that where ocular testimony is of unimpeachable and high credibility, it does not require corroboration as a matter of law, and the absence of a proven motive does not weaken otherwise reliable eye-witness accounts. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the convictions and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Does unimpeachable ocular testimony require corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Can the absence of a proven motive cloud or weaken otherwise credible eye-witness testimony?
  • Whether the testimony of a witness related to both parties can be relied upon without independent corroboration?
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• Arif and Others vs The State1984 SCMR 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-10
  ocular testimonycorroborationmotivecriminal appealmurderreappraisal of evidencerelated witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to reappraise the evidence in a criminal matter where the appellants were convicted under sections 148 and 302 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Sharif. The core legal question involved the reliability of uncorroborated ocular testimony and whether discrepancies and a rejected motive warranted setting aside the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the testimony of the eye-witnesses was natural, credible, and unimpeachable, thereby ruling out the necessity of corroboration. The Court laid down the principle that high-quality, trustworthy ocular testimony from non-partisan or related witnesses who have no animosity toward the accused is sufficient to establish guilt without requiring independent corroboration, even if the prosecution's alleged motive is found to be far-fetched or weak.

  Questions settled

  • Is corroboration mandatory for ocular testimony that is found to be of a credible and unimpeachable character?
  • Does the absence or rejection of a motive affect the culpability of the accused when strong ocular testimony is present?
  • Can the testimony of a witness related to both the complainant and the accused be relied upon without independent corroboration?
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• Anwar Hussain vs Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-13
  master and servantstatutory corporationwrongful terminationspecific reliefcontract of servicereinstatementdeclaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns whether an employee of the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, a statutory corporation, could maintain a civil suit for declaration and injunction against the termination of his service. The core legal question was whether the relationship between the employee and the statutory corporation was governed by the principle of master and servant, thereby precluding a suit for reinstatement. The Supreme Court held that the petition was meritless and dismissed it. The Court affirmed that the principle of master and servant applies unless specific statutory safeguards intervene to restrict the employer's freedom. Since the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance 1961 left the regulation of service conditions entirely to the Bank’s discretion, the relationship was purely contractual. Consequently, the employee lacked a legal character to seek a declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, and his remedy for wrongful termination was limited to a suit for damages rather than reinstatement. This judgment reinforces that employees of statutory corporations without specific statutory protections are governed by common law master-servant principles.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of master and servant apply to employees of a statutory corporation where the governing statute leaves service conditions to the discretion of the corporation?
  • Is a suit for declaration and injunction under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 maintainable for an employee of a statutory corporation governed by the principle of master and servant?
  • Can an employee of a statutory corporation claim reinstatement if the corporation has not violated any statutory provision or rule regarding service conditions?
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• Anwar Gill vs Muhammad Jehangir and another1984 SCMR 1528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-14
  leave to appealacquittalmurdereye-witness testimonyrecovery of weaponcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the acquittal of the respondent by the Lahore High Court for the murder of a young Christian girl under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court had initially convicted the respondent based on the testimony of an eye-witness and the recovery of a blood-stained knife, sentencing him to imprisonment for life. However, the High Court accepted the respondent's appeal and acquitted him after disbelieving the eye-witness testimony and the recovery evidence. Upon hearing the petitioner's counsel and reviewing the record, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court had rightly discarded the compromised eye-witness testimony and the recovery, leaving no sustainable evidence to maintain the conviction. The Court found no misreading or non-appreciation of evidence by the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the acquittal. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court's judgment acquitting an accused will not be interfered with when the primary evidence and eye-witness accounts are found unreliable and no misreading of evidence is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal when the High Court has rightly disbelieved the eye-witness testimony and recovery?
  • Can a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be maintained solely on discredited eye-witnesses and unverified weapon recoveries?
  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal against acquittal is maintainable when the High Court has not misread or ignored any material portion of the prosecution evidence?
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• Amir Bux and others vs Ghayasuddin and others1984 SCMR 1400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-25
  transfer of propertysettlement commissionerlocus standiconstitutional petitiongeneral attorneyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The dispute in this matter concerns the transfer of an available property under settlement laws, which was initially ordered to be transferred through negotiations to a general attorney acting for the respondents. Upon failure to pay the reserve price in cash within the stipulated time, the transfer was cancelled and the property was transferred to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, who was the occupant. The respondents challenged this cancellation in revision, which was rejected by the Settlement Commissioner. Subsequently, the respondents successfully invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court on the ground that an extension of time had been granted to them to make the payment. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to examine whether the respondents had the locus standi to challenge the transfer. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the original application and departmental records clearly established that the general attorney acted on behalf of the respondents, making their application for extension competent, and precluded the appellants from raising new factual pleas regarding forgery which were outside the scope of leave granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a principal has the locus standi to challenge the cancellation of a property transfer where the initial application was made by their general attorney?
  • Can an appellant raise a new factual plea regarding a forged document when leave to appeal was granted on a specific limited question?
  • Does an application for extension of time for payment made by the actual principals through their recognized attorney render the proceedings competent?
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• Amir Ali and Others vs The State1984 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-07
  criminal bailmurderbenefit of doubtinvestigation reportsupreme court of pakistanleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Amir Ali, Mokha, and Mohabat against the refusal of pre-trial bail by the High Court. The petitioners were accused under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Jamat Ali. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail when the investigating officer, an Assistant Superintendent of Police, concluded after examining numerous witnesses that the petitioners were not present at the scene of the occurrence. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the finding of the investigating officer was based on sufficient material, thereby creating a reasonable doubt regarding the participation of the petitioners that warranted the grant of bail at this stage. The Court laid down the principle that the benefit of an investigating officer's reasoned opinion regarding the non-participation or absence of an accused at the crime scene can be extended to grant bail to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail when the investigating officer's report concludes that the accused was not present at the scene of the occurrence?
  • Can the benefit of doubt arising from an investigating officer's report be extended to an accused at the bail stage?
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• Amin Khan vs Janab Gul and Others1984 SCMR 937 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-28
  criminal appealmurderacquittalocular evidencemedical evidencebeneficial doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 30th April, 1977, whereby the respondents were acquitted of the murder charge of the appellant's brother. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's acquittal based on discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence, and doubts regarding the presence of the complainant at the crime scene. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court's reappraisal of the evidence was sound, given that the direct motive was against the complainant himself, making his unhurt survival implausible, and that the medical evidence contradicted the eye-witness testimony. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony is in material conflict with medical evidence and improbable regarding the presence of interested witnesses, the resulting benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, and an appellate court will not interfere with a well-reasoned acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court should interfere with an acquittal when ocular evidence is in conflict with medical evidence?
  • Does the absence of injury to a complainant who was allegedly the primary target cast doubt on his presence at the scene?
  • Is an acquittal sustainable when the High Court's appreciation of evidence is found to be free from material flaws?
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• Aman Ullah Shah vs Muhammad Sharif Shah and others1984 SCMR 1292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-01
  second appealconcurrent findings of factwill executionappreciation of evidenceancestral propertycustomary lawMarzul Maut
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a second appeal on the grounds that the matter was concluded by concurrent findings of fact and that questions regarding the appreciation of evidence were outside the scope of second appellate review. The dispute concerned the validity of a will allegedly executed by the deceased in favor of the appellant, which the respondent challenged as forged and fictitious, further pleading that the deceased was suffering from Marzul Maut and lacked a disposing mind, and that the property was ancestral, governed by custom restricting alienation. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently held that the execution of the will was not proved. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that since the execution of the will was not established, the subsidiary issues regarding the nature of the property and the testator's mental capacity became irrelevant. The Court reaffirmed the principle that concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-execution of a document cannot be reopened in a second appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can questions regarding the appreciation of evidence be examined in a second appeal?
  • Does a finding that a will was not executed render subsidiary issues regarding the nature of the property and the testator's mental capacity irrelevant?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the first appellate court binding in a second appeal?
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• Allahdino vs The State1984 SCMR 420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-05
  murdercapital punishmentcommutation of sentencegrave and sudden provocationocular testimonyinjured witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Sessions Judge, Tharparkar, convicting the appellant under section 302 and section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of his wife and for causing grievous hurt to his mother-in-law, and sentencing him to death and rigorous imprisonment respectively. The core legal questions involved the assessment of ocular testimony, the scope of leave to appeal granted specifically to consider the quantum of sentence, and whether mitigating circumstances existed to alter the death sentence. The Court held that the prosecution successfully established its case through natural and injured ocular witnesses whose presence at the scene was unquestionable. However, considering the sudden provocation and background circumstances, the Supreme Court partly accepted the appeal by commuting the death sentence to imprisonment for life, while maintaining the conviction, adjusting fine and compensation orders, and extending the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the appellant. The key principle laid down is that while concurrent findings regarding eyewitness accounts from natural witnesses inside a home will be upheld, a sentence of death may be commuted to life imprisonment where the attack was preceded by sudden provocation arising from domestic disputes and complaints regarding character.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal granted solely to consider the quantum of sentence permits the reopening of the case on merits for seeking acquittal?
  • Does the testimony of an injured eyewitness present inside the house carry high probative value in a murder trial?
  • Whether sudden provocation arising from a deceased wife's refusal to accompany her husband and complaints regarding his character constitutes a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
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• Allah Yar and Others vs Additional District Judge, and Others1984 SCMR 741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-17
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentrelationship of landlord and tenantagreement to sellspecific performancetransfer of propertyconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition filed by tenants against concurrent orders of their ejectment. The core legal question concerned whether tenants, upon setting up an agreement to sell executed by the previous owner's husband and filing a suit for specific performance, could withhold rent and deny the relationship of landlord and tenant after receiving notice of the property's sale via a registered deed to the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the tenants could not lawfully deny the relationship of landlord and tenant or withhold rent for a prolonged period based merely on an unproven receipt lacking authorization, and that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 afforded no protection in these circumstances. The key principle laid down is that pending a specific performance suit, tenants who fail to pay rent after receiving valid notice of transfer are rightly adjudged defaulters, and interim relief or stay of eviction cannot be granted to protect possession against a landlord duly established through a registered deed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant deny the relationship of landlord and tenant and withhold rent upon setting up an agreement to sell?
  • Does Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 protect a tenant from eviction for default in rent when a suit for specific performance is pending?
  • Can a Civil Court grant interim relief to stay eviction proceedings after a tenant has been legally adjudged a defaulter under rent restriction laws?
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• Allah Wasaya and Another vs Abdul Majid and Others1984 SCMR 1582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-21
  part performanceunregistered sale deedadverse possessiontransfer of propertysuit for declarationright of actionshield vs sword
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over land ownership where the petitioners claimed title based on an unregistered and unstamped sale deed executed in 1939, while the respondents claimed inheritance rights following the death of the original owner. The petitioners, who remained in possession of the land, filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction after the respondents asserted their rights based on inheritance mutations. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding the sale deed inadmissible. The District Judge reversed this decision, but the Lahore High Court, relying on the Privy Council's ruling in Prabodh Kumar Das v. Dantmara Tea Co. Ltd., held that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 does not confer a right of action on a transferee in possession but acts only as a shield for a defendant. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the restrictive interpretation of Section 53-A, which limits its application to a defendant, remains valid in light of subsequent jurisprudence from the High Court of West Pakistan that suggests a broader application.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 confer a right of action on a transferee in possession under an unregistered contract of sale?
  • Can a transferee in possession rely on Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 as a plaintiff to assert title, or is it limited to a defense?
  • Is the principle that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 acts only as a shield for a defendant still applicable in post-independence Pakistani jurisprudence?
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• Allah Rakha alias Rakha vs The State1984 SCMR 491 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-17
  murdergrave and sudden provocationeyewitness testimonycriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted by the trial court for the murder of a 14/15-year-old girl by inflicting multiple knife blows, receiving a sentence of death, which was confirmed by the High Court. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to examine the sentence, the reliability of the eyewitnesses, and the plea of grave and sudden provocation based on an alleged engagement and an assertion of seeing the deceased compromising with a witness. The core legal question revolved around the credibility of the eyewitness testimony and whether the appellant's plea of grave and sudden provocation was established. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the plea of grave and sudden provocation and engagement rested on unverified hearsay and improbable assertions, while the eyewitnesses, including an independent and natural witness, conclusively established the prosecution's case. The key principle laid down is that uncorroborated hearsay regarding a motive or engagement cannot substantiate a plea of grave and sudden provocation in the face of direct, reliable eyewitness testimony establishing premeditated brutality.

  Questions settled

  • Whether uncorroborated hearsay regarding an engagement can substantiate a plea of grave and sudden provocation in a murder trial?
  • Does the testimony of an independent eyewitness possessing land near the scene of the crime qualify as reliable and natural evidence?
  • Whether brutality displayed in committing a murder precludes interference with a confirmed death sentence?
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• Allah Ditta and Another vs Mst. Khurshid Begum and Another1984 SCMR 598 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-05
  habeas corpusleave to appealdetenucriminal proceedingscustody
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the High Court dated 13-11-1982, whereby a habeas corpus petition filed by respondent No. 1 was accepted and the detenu was ordered to be released. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's order in habeas corpus proceedings granting freedom to the detenu bars the husband or father from taking legal or criminal proceedings against the detenu or her alleged paramour for any alleged criminal offenses. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the apprehension of the petitioners is misconceived and that the order of the High Court does not stand in the way of proceedings being taken against any party who may be committing a criminal offense. The key principle laid down is that habeas corpus orders releasing a detenu do not grant immunity from future or independent criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a habeas corpus order releasing a detenu bar criminal proceedings against the detenu or other parties?
  • Can a husband initiate legal proceedings against his wife or her alleged paramour despite a High Court habeas corpus order releasing her?
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• Allah Din vs Settlement Commissioner (Urban)1984 SCMR 1538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-10
  property transfersettlement lawactual possessionfactual findingsremand orderwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of property No. S-60-R-31, Mozang Road, Lahore, which had been the subject of prolonged litigation. Following a previous remand order from the High Court, the Settlement Commissioner was directed to conduct a fresh measurement of the premises in the presence of the parties and perform a personal inspection to determine the transfer of the property. The Settlement Commissioner subsequently determined that the petitioner, Allah Din, was in actual possession of a specific area measuring 3 Marlas and 123 square feet, and ordered the transfer of this area to him. The petitioner challenged this order in the High Court, arguing he was entitled to additional area, but the petition was dismissed on the grounds that the findings were factual and no objections were raised during the inspection. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not claim the transfer of any area beyond what was found to be in his actual possession. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claimant seek the transfer of property area that is not in their actual possession?
  • Does a finding of fact made by a Settlement Commissioner after personal inspection warrant interference in writ jurisdiction?
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• Allah Bakhsh vs Assistant Commissioner and another1984 SCMR 1357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-06
  evacuee propertyagricultural landallotmentrehabilitation commissionerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning evacuee agricultural land originally temporarily allotted to the petitioner in 1947, which allotment was cancelled and confirmed in favor of the respondent's father in 1952 without challenge from the petitioner. The core legal question is whether the petitioner could claim fresh allotment of the land based on subsequent litigation and a declaration that he was unaffected by an earlier writ petition, despite his original rights having been extinguished in 1952. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner's temporary allotment was cancelled and the land was confirmed to the respondent's predecessor in 1952 without any challenge, his rights had attained finality, rendering subsequent litigation irrelevant and incapable of reviving any claim. The key principle laid down is that an unchalleged cancellation and confirmation of land creates a finality of rights, and a party whose rights stood terminated prior to general resumption orders cannot revive or claim entitlement through collateral or subsequent proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unchallenged cancellation of a temporary allotment and confirmation in favor of another party attains finality precluding subsequent claims?
  • Can a party whose rights stood terminated by an earlier administrative order revive entitlement through collateral litigation?
  • Does a declaration that a party is not affected by a specific judgment operate to create new property rights where none previously existed?
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• Allah Bakhsh and Another vs Muhammad Ishaque and Another1984 PLD Supreme Court 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-07
  displaced personssettlement schemeavailable propertytransfer of propertyhorizontal divisionconstitutional petitionlocus standivested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal examines whether the jurisdictional requirements of the second proviso to subsection (12) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 were satisfied in transferring a composite property comprising residential and commercial units to a claimant displaced person, and whether a local occupant could claim the property as available property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The appellants, local occupants of a shop, challenged the transfer of the shop combined with a chaubara to the respondent, arguing that the horizontal division principle was violated and the order constituted a nullity. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner acted within his competent jurisdiction in dividing and transferring the property to a primary claimant beneficiary for proper rehabilitation, and that a final order of transfer, even prior to the issuance of provisional transfer documents, takes the property out of the category of available property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs, affirming that past and closed transactions of validly transferred properties cannot be reopened by subsequent policy changes.

  Questions settled

  • Does a final order determining the entitlement of a party to a property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 take the property out of the category of available property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII even if provisional transfer documents have not been issued?
  • Whether local occupants can challenge a past transfer order as a nullity and claim the property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII when the original transfer was made by a competent authority acting within its jurisdiction?
  • Does the combination of a residential unit with a non-adjoining shop by a Settlement Authority during the horizontal division of a composite property render the transfer order a nullity?
  • Does a change in the mode of transfer or the subsequent conferment of rights on local occupants permit the reopening of past and closed transactions?
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• Allah Ba KHSH and Others vs Khuda Bakhsh and Others1984 SCMR 729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-10
  pre-emptionlimitationinstitution of suitpresentation of plaintauthorized officer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a pre-emption suit where a sale effected on 30-11-1973 was pre-empted through a plaint presented to a Tehsildar on 27-11-1974 during the absence of the Civil Judge, and later placed before the Civil Judge on 2-12-1974. The core legal question is whether the suit can be regarded as instituted within limitation when the plaint was filed before a Tehsildar authorized by the District Judge to receive the same. The High Court had held that the suit was validly instituted within time before an authorized officer. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended that the term 'officer' competent to receive plaints means an officer of the court ordinarily competent, and that a Tehsildar does not qualify, relying on precedent. The Supreme Court found that the question raised requires consideration, granted leave, ordered security, and directed the interim stay order to continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit can be regarded as within limitation when the plaint is filed before a Tehsildar authorized by the District Judge during the absence of the Civil Judge?
  • Does the term 'officer' competent to receive plaints mean an officer of the court ordinarily competent to receive plaints?
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• Ali Umar and Another vs Muhammad Anwar1984 SCMR 809 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-18
  child marriageinheritance mutationvalidity of nikahminorityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a civil dispute over the inheritance of the late Mst. Kaniz Akhtar, whose property mutation in favour of her husband, Muhammad Anwar, was challenged by her mother and brother on the ground that her marriage was invalid due to minority, subsequent repudiation upon puberty, and divorce. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs, but the appellate court and subsequently the Peshawar High Court in revision set aside the decree, holding that the marriage was not invalid under the Child Marriage Restraint Act even if she was under 16, and that she was likely above 18 based on a prior property sale. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court overlooked material circumstances and conflicting evidence regarding the deceased's exact age at the time of her marriage and death. The Court held that leave to appeal should be granted to thoroughly examine the factual inferences regarding the deceased's age, the legal validity of a marriage contracted below certain ages without a wali in light of Islamic jurisprudence, and the applicability of prior precedents from the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Is the inference as to the age of the deceased drawn by the High Court correct based on the evidence on record?
  • What was the age of the deceased at the time of the nikah and what is its effect on the validity thereof?
  • Could a marriage be validly performed without a wali for nikah under the relevant legal and Islamic principles?
  • What is the effect of the observations in Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmad in the light of further observations in Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal?
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• Ali Shan vs The State1984 SCMR 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-25
  criminal appealmurdersole eyewitnessappreciation of evidenceleave to appealcredibility of witness
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction for the murder of his first cousin, which arose from a trivial dispute regarding plants sown near a wall. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained solely on the testimony of a single eyewitness, Mst. Sufaidan, when other witnesses were disbelieved or abandoned. The Supreme Court held that the petition had no merit and dismissed it, ruling that the testimony of the sole eyewitness was credible and that the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts suffered from no legal infirmity or violation of appraisal principles. The key principle laid down is that a criminal conviction can lawfully rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness if found credible and reliable by the courts of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on the testimony of a single eyewitness?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the concurrent appreciation of evidence by lower courts in the absence of a violation of appraisal principles?
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• Ali Nawaz Rajput vs Muhammad Ali and another1984 SCMR 1213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-03
  pre-emption suitwithdrawal of suitspecial attorneypower of attorneyauthority of counselcompromiseleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's Regular Second Appeal in a pre-emption suit. The petitioner had instituted a civil suit for possession through pre-emption regarding agricultural land, which was later dismissed as withdrawn by the trial court upon a statement made by his advocate. The petitioner challenged the withdrawal, claiming it was unauthorized. The District Judge and the High Court affirmed the dismissal, finding that the counsel had withdrawn the suit on the instructions of the petitioner's special attorney, who was empowered under a valid power-of-attorney to compromise the matter. The Supreme Court reviewed the record, including the testimony of the advocate, and concluded that the evidence fully supported the lower courts' concurrent findings. Finding no misreading of evidence or defect in the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that it was not a fit case for interference. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an advocate can withdraw a suit based on instructions conveyed through a plaintiff's special attorney possessing a valid power of attorney?
  • Can concurrent factual findings by lower courts regarding the authority to withdraw a suit be challenged in the absence of evidence misreading?
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• Ali Muhammad and Others vs Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner and Others1984 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-03
  evacuee propertyproprietary rightstransfer of propertyejected tenants schemeregistered sale deedallotment cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellants' writ petition against the cancellation of their land allotment. The core legal question was whether land purchased in open auction by a non-Muslim evacuee who paid the entire price and stamp duty prior to partition, but without a registered sale-deed executed before evacuating to India, assumed the status of 'evacuee property' or remained State land capable of allotment under the Ejected Tenants Scheme. The Supreme Court held that proprietary rights pass to the purchaser once the transfer is authorized and the proper dues and price are paid in full, rendering formal execution or registration of a conveyance deed unnecessary for title to mature against third parties. Consequently, the disputed land was correctly treated as evacuee property, and the subsequent allotment to the appellants under the Ejected Tenants Scheme was illegal and void. The key principle laid down is that full payment of the purchase price and compliance with conditions complete the sale transaction for establishing proprietary rights against third parties, irrespective of the lack of a registered sale-deed under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proprietary rights in land pass to a purchaser upon full payment of the price and authorized transfer, notwithstanding the absence of a registered sale-deed?
  • Does land where the purchase price was fully paid by a non-Muslim evacuee before partition assume the status of evacuee property?
  • Can land validly declared as evacuee property revert to the Provincial Government without an order or decree of a court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Khan vs The State1984SCMR 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-09
  culpable homicide not amounting to murdersudden quarrelheat of passionfree fightsuppression of injuriespolice station murderappellate criminal jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind which set aside the appellant's acquittal under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and convicted him of murder, sentencing him to imprisonment for life. The incident occurred inside a police station where both rival parties—one carrying an injured relative and the other arriving regarding a prior assault—confronted each other in a highly charged emotional state, culminating in the appellant inflicting a fatal knife injury on the deceased. The core legal question was whether the conviction for murder under section 302 was sustainable or whether the circumstances brought the case within the exceptions for sudden and unpremeditated combat. The Supreme Court held that the evidence demonstrated a sudden quarrel and lack of premeditation in the heat of passion, aggravated by mutual provocation and a verbal altercation, thereby attracting Exception IV to section 300. Consequently, the Court partially allowed the appeal, altering the conviction from murder under section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code, and reduced the sentence accordingly, laying down principles regarding the application of sudden quarrel exceptions where injuries on the accused side are suppressed by prosecution witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code can be altered to section 304, Part I when a fatal injury is inflicted during a sudden quarrel without premeditation?
  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused and his witnesses by police eye-witnesses falsify the prosecution version of a unilateral attack?
  • Whether an incident occurring within the precincts of a police station during a confrontation between rival groups amounts to a sudden fight in the heat of passion under Exception IV of section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Khan and others vs Ali Zaman and others1984 SCMR 1343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-17
  mortgagee rightsmutationacquiescencerevenue recordprescriptive titleequity of redemptionadverse possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a suit for declaration filed by the respondents, claiming ownership of disputed land based on their status as mortgagees in possession for over sixty years, thereby extinguishing the mortgagors' rights. The core legal question was whether the transfer of mortgagee rights via Mutation No. 88 in 1911—attested by the son of the original mortgagee on his father's behalf—was valid, and whether the respondents had acquired title through prescription. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, finding the mutation invalid due to the son's lack of authority to attest during the father's lifetime. However, the appellate court and the High Court reversed this, finding that the original mortgagee had fully acquiesced to the transfer, as evidenced by long-standing revenue records and the absence of any challenge by the original mortgagee or his successors. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, holding that the acquiescence of the original mortgagee validated the transaction. The key principle laid down is that where a transfer of rights is recorded in revenue documents and remains unchallenged by the original title holder or their successors for decades, such acquiescence validates the transaction despite initial procedural irregularities in the attestation of mutation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mutation of mortgagee rights be considered valid if attested by the son of the mortgagee on behalf of his father, provided there is subsequent acquiescence?
  • Does the long-standing absence of a challenge to a mutation in revenue records constitute evidence of acquiescence by the original title holder?
  • Is it permissible for the Supreme Court to consider new documents not presented as evidence before the trial or appellate courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Hassan Shah vs D. G. Agriculture and Others1984 SCMR 611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-31
  suspension periodback benefitshonourable acquittalbenefit of doubtcivil servantsubsistence allowanceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order of the Punjab Services Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's appeal concerning the denial of full pay during the period of his suspension. The core legal question is whether a civil servant, upon acquittal from a criminal charge by way of benefit of doubt, is automatically entitled to the balance of his pay for the suspension period under the applicable rules. The Supreme Court held that the competent authority is legally empowered to withhold the balance of pay and allowances if a civil servant is not acquitted honourably, but rather on the basis of a benefit of doubt. The key principle laid down is that acquittal by giving the benefit of doubt does not constitute an honourable acquittal for the purpose of claiming full back benefits and emoluments during suspension.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant acquitted on the basis of a benefit of doubt is entitled to full pay for the period of suspension?
  • Does an acquittal giving the benefit of doubt amount to an honourable acquittal for claiming emoluments during suspension?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam Sher and another vs The State1984 SCMR 1520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-21Read full judgment →
• Alam Khan and Others vs The State1984 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-21
  ocular evidenceinterested witnessescorroborationabscondencebenefit of doubtcriminal appealsafe dispensation of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of four appellants for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony of interested witnesses, which was partially disbelieved by the lower courts leading to the acquittal of co-accused, could sustain the conviction of the appellants without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that while the prosecution's ocular account was generally credible, the partial rejection of this testimony regarding other co-accused necessitated independent corroboration to safely convict the remaining appellants. The Court established the principle that where ocular evidence is not accepted in its entirety and some accused are acquitted based on discrepancies, it becomes unsafe to convict the remaining accused solely on that same testimony without additional corroborating evidence. In this case, the Court found that prolonged, unexplained abscondence served as sufficient corroboration for three appellants, but in the absence of such evidence or any opportunity for the accused to explain his non-availability during trial, the conviction of the fourth appellant, Masood Khan, was set aside, and he was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can the conviction of an accused be sustained on ocular testimony alone when that same testimony has been rejected by the court regarding other co-accused?
  • Is prolonged abscondence of an accused sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction when the ocular evidence is not accepted in its entirety?
  • Does a failure to put the circumstance of abscondence to an accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate the use of that abscondence as corroborative evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Akram vs Mst. Sakina Begum and Another1984 PLD Supreme Court 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-17
  pre-emptionright of substitutionsubsisting rightlimitation periodco-sharercontiguitysuperior right of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court allowing a civil revision in a pre-emption matter. The core legal questions involved whether a pre-emptor can rely on the principle of substitution to antedate their status as a co-sharer from the date of a prior sale decree to defeat a subsequent sale, and whether a transfer within the period of limitation to a person with an equal or superior right of pre-emption defeats the plaintiff's suit under the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950. The Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption must subsist at the time of the sale and the date of the decree, and the doctrine of substitution cannot be applied artificially to antedate the acquisition of ownership status prior to the actual execution and completion of the pre-emption decree. Furthermore, a transfer made within the period of limitation to a person having an equal or superior right effectively bars the pre-emption suit. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of substitution allow a pre-emptor to be deemed an owner from the date of the original sale rather than from the date of the execution of the pre-emption decree?
  • Must a pre-emptor possess a subsisting right of pre-emption contemporaneously at the time of the sale and up to the date of the decree?
  • Does a transfer of property made within the period of limitation to a person with an equal or superior right of pre-emption defeat the plaintiff's pre-emption suit?
  • Can an improvement in the status of a vendee-defendant or their transferee after the institution of the pre-emption suit affect the plaintiff's rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Akram and Amother vs Member, Board of Revenue and Others1984 SCMR 1000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-03
  constitutional petitiondiscretionary writ jurisdictionunclean handsenhancement of rentrevenue court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These two appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the constitutional petitions filed by the appellants. The core legal questions examined were whether the High Court should have declined to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction on the ground of non-payment of rent, and whether the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to enhance the rent fixed prior to 1976. The Supreme Court held that the finding of the High Court that the appellants approached the court with unclean hands due to non-payment of rent was incorrect, as the undisputed position revealed that rent had continuously been paid at the rate of Rs. 80 per annum per Jareeb during the disputed period, while the landlords sought an enhancement. The Court ruled that the writ petitions could not be dismissed on the ground of unclean hands and that the High Court failed to adequately address the merits and jurisdictional questions. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the matter was remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court should have declined to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction on the ground of non-payment of rent when rent was paid at the established rate?
  • Whether a constitutional petition can be dismissed on the principle of unclean hands when the petitioner has continuously paid the undisputed historical rate of rent pending enhancement proceedings?
  • Whether the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to enhance the rent fixed prior to 1976?
  Read full judgment →
• Aijaz Amin vs United Bank Ltd.1984 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-07
  ejectmenttentative rent orderstriking off defencesecond appealrepeal and savingsvested right of appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment application filed by the landlord against the tenant under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Rent Controller passed a tentative rent order directing the tenant to deposit arrears and future rent. Upon the tenant's failure to deposit, the Rent Controller struck off the defence, which order was upheld by the first appellate court. However, the High Court in a second appeal set aside the orders and remanded the case, holding that the second appeal was competent. The petitioner landlord sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging both the maintainability of the second appeal before the High Court in light of the repeal of the 1959 Ordinance by the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, and the merits of remanding the case. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised concerning the competency of a second appeal under the repealing legislation involve substantial questions of public importance. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted for an early hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second appeal is competent against an appellate order passed after the repeal of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 by the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the right to file a second appeal constitute a vested right accrued to a party upon the institution of original proceedings under the repealed rent law?
  • How do the savings and repeal provisions under Section 27 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 affect pending appeals filed under the repealed Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Din and Another vs The State1984 SCMR 823 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-08
  murderculpable homicidesudden fightland disputesuperdarileave to appealsentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to two convicts, Ahmed Din convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death, and Hakim Ali convicted under section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment, to examine whether the conviction of the former should have also been under section 304, Part I and whether the latter was entitled to a reduced sentence. The dispute arose over land rights, tenancy, and the removal of harvested wheat produce from a threshing floor, resulting in a violent clash between rival parties leading to injuries and the deaths of two persons. The Supreme Court examined the evidence regarding the sudden fight, the nature of the injuries inflicted by the appellants, and the background of revenue disputes concerning superdari of the produce. Ultimately, the court evaluated the applicability of lesser penal provisions in light of the sudden altercation and mutual dispute over the agricultural produce.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 should be altered to section 304, Part I in cases of sudden fights arising from property disputes?
  • Are co-accused entitled to a reduced sentence when the main accused's conviction is converted from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  • How does a pre-existing revenue dispute and superdari order regarding agricultural produce affect the determination of common object or intent in a sudden criminal occurrence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Saeed and Others vs The Member Board of Revenue and Others1984 SCMR 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-07
  leave to appealcondonation of delayPunjab Tenancy Actstatutory interpretationcivil petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal filed against a common judgment delivered by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court. The primary legal question presented in these petitions pertains to the correct interpretation of the provisions of Section 114, as introduced by the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act 1952. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the issue of a three-day delay in filing one of the petitions, ultimately condoning the delay subject to all just exceptions. Regarding the merits, the Court observed that leave to appeal had already been granted in a connected matter, Ghulam Fatima and others v. Rahim Bakhsh and others, which involved the same legal question regarding the interpretation of the aforementioned statutory provision. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in the present petitions as well, directing that they be heard alongside the connected case. The Court further ordered the provision of security in the amount of Rs. 1,000 for each case and permitted the parties to supplement the existing record with additional documents as necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Can a delay in filing a civil petition for special leave to appeal be condoned if the reasons provided are sufficient?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the central legal question is already pending in a connected matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Khan and another vs Baz Khan and 5 others1984 SCMR 1214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-06
  Shamilat Dehco-sharerjoint possessionsham transactionalienation of propertyproprietary body
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that affirmed the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts regarding a disputed land transaction. The core legal question concerned whether a co-sharer could unilaterally sell land recorded as 'Shamilat Deh' (joint village property) to a family member, thereby excluding other co-sharers. The petitioners argued that the sale was valid as the vendor was a co-sharer in possession and that the transaction remained unchallenged for five years. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the lower courts' findings that the land was joint property of the village proprietary body and that the sale was a fictitious and sham transaction intended to deprive other co-sharers of their rights. The Court affirmed that while a co-sharer may possess land in excess of their share pending partition, they cannot alienate joint property to the detriment of other co-sharers through collusive transactions. The judgment reinforces the principle that sham transactions involving joint property are legally voidable and cannot be used to misappropriate common land for exclusive benefit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer unilaterally sell land that is part of the Shamilat Deh to a family member?
  • Does a co-sharer's possession of land in excess of their share entitle them to alienate that land to the detriment of other co-sharers?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the nature of land as Shamilat Deh subject to interference in civil revision?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Din vs Federal Service Tribunal and Another1984 SCMR 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-31
  civil servant statusService Tribunal jurisdictionremandstatutory interpretationemployee transferadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal as incompetent on the grounds that he was not a civil servant. The petitioner, formerly an employee of the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council, had been removed from service, and his subsequent departmental appeal resulted in the conversion of his removal into an accepted resignation. The core legal question was whether the petitioner held the status of a civil servant at the time of his removal, thereby entitling him to invoke the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred by failing to determine the petitioner's status at the relevant time of his removal, particularly given that the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council Ordinance, 1981, came into force after the impugned administrative order. The Court established the principle that the status of an employee must be determined based on their position at the time of the impugned action, rather than relying on subsequent legislative changes that might not retrospectively alter that status.

  Questions settled

  • Does the establishment of a corporate body under the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council Ordinance 1981 automatically divest an employee of their status as a civil servant?
  • Is the Federal Service Tribunal required to determine an appellant's status as a civil servant at the time of the impugned administrative order rather than at the time of the appeal?
  • Can an employee be deemed an employee of a newly established corporate body if they were removed from service prior to the commencement of the relevant ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Rafique Ahmad vs Government of Sind and Others1984 SCMR 751 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-14
  surplus employeeabsorption in servicecivil servantservice tribunalinterpretation of rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Sind Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's challenge regarding his absorption in government service after being declared surplus as an Assistant Traffic Manager. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of clause (ii) of rule 9-A of the Sind Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, specifically whether a surplus employee not given a post of equivalent or comparable grade could be appointed to a post of any lower grade however low. The Supreme Court held that the phrase "to a post of lower grade" does not mean a post of any grade howsoever low, but refers to the next lower grade when an equivalent or comparable post is unavailable. The Court ruled that giving unfettered power to appoint surplus staff to the lowest grade would defeat the protective purpose of the rule and the implementing circulars. Consequently, the Court set aside the Service Tribunal's order and directed the immediate implementation of the government's initial absorption order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the phrase 'to a post of lower grade' under rule 9-A of the Sind Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974 permits appointment to a post of any grade howsoever low?
  • Can a surplus government employee be absorbed in a post far below their equivalent grade when higher posts are available?
  • Whether an order passed by the Chief Secretary for the absorption of a surplus employee under rule 9-A must be implemented in letter and spirit?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Jan and Another vs Kundal Khan1984 SCMR 1042 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-29
  pre-emption suittemporary injunctionCode of Civil Procedurenon-partyland mutationrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment, which had affirmed an appellate court's decision to grant an injunction in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a court could issue an injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, to restrain individuals who were not parties to the pending suit from proceeding with land mutation attestations. The Supreme Court held that the injunction was improperly granted, setting aside the orders of the High Court and the District Judge, and restoring the trial court’s initial refusal to grant the injunction. The Court clarified that the discretionary power to grant an injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1(a), Code of Civil Procedure, is strictly limited to restraining a "party to the suit." Consequently, an injunction cannot be legally issued against non-parties, regardless of the underlying circumstances of the transaction or the statutory obligations of public officials like the Tehsildar regarding land mutations.

  Questions settled

  • Can an injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure be issued against persons who are not parties to the suit?
  • Does the discretionary power of a court under Order XXXIX, Rule 1(a), Code of Civil Procedure extend to restraining non-parties from performing acts like land mutation attestation?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Hussain Naqvi vs Director of Labour Welfare and others1984 SCMR 1275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-13
  civil servicecompulsory retirementservice tribunallimitation perioddepartmental appealjurisdictionreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former civil servant, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal challenging his compulsory retirement from service. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner's appeal before the Service Tribunal was competent and whether his subsequent representations in 1981 could revive a cause of action arising from his retirement in 1964 and the alleged disposal of his departmental appeal in 1966. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal correctly determined that the departmental appeal had been disposed of in 1966, a finding supported by the departmental record. Consequently, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, as the Service Tribunals Act precluded appeals against departmental orders issued before 1st July 1969. The Court affirmed that a civil servant cannot revive a stale claim for reinstatement by filing fresh representations decades after the initial retirement, as such actions do not enlarge the period of limitation or confer a fresh cause of action. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant revive a stale claim for reinstatement by filing fresh representations decades after retirement?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against a departmental order passed before 1st July 1969?
  • Does a subsequent representation to a departmental authority enlarge the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Aqeel Nasir vs Inspectorgeneral Police, Quetta1984 SCMR 788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-18
  pardonreinstatementpublic officemilitary court convictionpolice serviceservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's service appeal by the Baluchistan Service Tribunal, which upheld the refusal of the Inspector-General of Police to reinstate the petitioner as an Inspector of Police following his conviction by a Military Court and subsequent grant of pardon. The core legal question is whether the grant of pardon under section 143 of the Pakistan Army Act entitled the petitioner to automatic reinstatement in service and barred departmental action. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a free or granted pardon does not restore a convicted person to a public office forfeited in consequence of a conviction, though it may remove the disability for a fresh appointment. The Court affirmed that directions to consider reinstatement 'as per service rules' do not mandate automatic restoration to service, reinforcing the principle that executive pardon does not wipe out the forfeiture of public office resulting from a valid criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether upon the grant of pardon under section 143 of the Pakistan Army Act a convicted person is entitled to reinstatement in service?
  • Does a free pardon restore a convicted person to a public office forfeited by or in consequence of a conviction?
  • Does rule 16.3 of the Police Rules 1934 bar departmental action when an officer has been convicted rather than acquitted?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Abdur Rahman vs The State1984 SCMR 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-19
  corruptionextortionextra-judicial confessionillegal gratificationcriminal appealsentence modification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police challenging the High Court judgment that dismissed his appeal against conviction and sentence under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, and section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as recorded by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption. The core question involved whether the concurrent findings of guilt based on extortion, extra-judicial confession, and causing hurt were sustainable, and whether the sentence warranted interference. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the conviction was fully merited and supported by trustworthy evidence, finding no ground to interfere with it. However, considering that the conviction entailed departmental consequences, the Court partially allowed the appeal only to the extent of modifying the substantive sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently rather than consecutively. The key principle laid down is that while concurrent findings of fact on criminal conviction based on reliable ocular and medical evidence will not be disturbed by the apex court, the manner of serving sentences of imprisonment can be adjusted in appropriate circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act are sustainable when supported by ocular and medical evidence?
  • Can sentences of imprisonment for distinct offences under the Pakistan Penal Code be ordered to run concurrently by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether an extra-judicial confession corroborated by prosecution witnesses and medical evidence is sufficient to uphold a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Afzal Ali Gill vs Thal Development Authority1984 SCMR 1278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-10
  leave to appealresumption of landshow-cause noticeservice of noticeconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an unsuccessful plaintiff, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his civil revision petition. The petitioner was a grantee of land under the Tube-well Sinking Scheme administered by the Thal Development Authority, whose land was resumed in 1958 for non-fulfilment of conditions. In 1979, the petitioner instituted a civil suit challenging the resumption, alleging a lack of notice and hearing. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court reversed the decision, finding that due notice had been served. The High Court dismissed the subsequent civil revision petition. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was afforded a show-cause notice prior to the resumption of the grant. The Supreme Court held that concurrent factual findings by the lower courts established that proper notice had indeed been issued and served, and the petitioner failed to repudiate such evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, laying down that concurrent factual findings regarding service of notice, supported by record evidence, will not be interfered with in leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent factual findings regarding the service of notice can be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is resumption of land valid when supported by evidence of proper notice and service to the grantee?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdurrehman vs The State1984 SCMR 1502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-18
  murderjail petitionocular testimonyeyewitness evidencecriminal leave to appealcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal in a murder case. The petitioner was accused of murdering the deceased on December 5, 1979, at District Mansehra. The First Information Report was lodged by the widow of the deceased, who was informed by eyewitnesses at the scene. At the trial, the prosecution relied upon ocular testimony of eyewitnesses, medical evidence, and a motive arising from previous litigation. The trial court and the High Court believed the testimony of the independent eyewitnesses, which was duly corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of a firearm from the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses, even without further corroboration, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Consequently, the court found no fit case for the grant of leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is the ocular testimony of independent eyewitnesses sufficient by itself to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Whether medical evidence and weapon recovery serve as sufficient corroboration in a murder trial?
  • When will the Supreme Court refuse to grant leave to appeal in a criminal matter concurrent on facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman vs The Secretary, C & W Department1984 SCMR 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-06
  service tribunaldepartmental allocationsenioritypromotionvested rightoption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's service appeal concerning seniority and promotion. The appellant, a junior clerk who joined service in the erstwhile B & R Department, challenged his permanent allocation to the Buildings Department rather than the Highways Department and sought promotion as an Accounts Clerk from the date a junior was promoted. The core legal question was whether the appellant had a vested legal right to be allocated to the department of his choice based on options invited by the Government, and whether the cancellation of a prior notification restored a joint cadre and joint seniority. The Supreme Court held that inviting options merely ascertains the wishes of staff to accommodate them where possible and creates no vested right to an allocation according to choice, as public interest and organizational changes remain paramount. The Court concluded that the appellant failed to establish any entitlement, and consequently dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an invitation of options by the Government create a vested legal right for a civil servant to be allocated to the department of their choice?
  • Whether the cancellation of an allocation notification automatically restores a joint cadre and joint seniority position for ministerial staff?
  • Can a recommendation report of an Anomally Committee be made the basis for asserting or claiming a legal right in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman Represented by his Legal Heirs vs Mst. Bibi Fatima1984 SCMR 1444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-22
  inheritanceadverse possessionousterjoint possessionPardahnashin ladysecond appealfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a land inheritance dispute involving the estate of Ferozedin, who died in 1937, leaving behind a son (appellant) and a daughter (respondent). The respondent filed a suit for joint possession of her share of the land, which the trial court decreed. The District Judge reversed this, but the High Court restored the trial court's decree. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the respondent had been ousted from the property for more than ten years, thereby barring her claim through adverse possession. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the respondent's receipt of produce from her brother corroborated her claim of entitlement and negated the plea of ouster. The Court emphasized that when evaluating claims of ouster between siblings, particularly involving an illiterate Pardahnashin lady, evidence must be viewed in the context of their relationship. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly applied the principles regarding the setting aside of findings of fact in second appeals as established in precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claim of ouster be established against a female heir when she has been receiving a share of the produce from the property?
  • Does the receipt of produce from a brother by a sister corroborate her claim to joint possession of inherited land?
  • Under what circumstances can a finding of fact regarding ouster be reviewed in a second appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rahim vs Abdul Khaliq Qureshi and Others1984 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-21
  ejectmentpersonal needlandlord and tenantwrit petitionleave to appealvacant possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging an ejectment order. The Rent Controller, whose decision was upheld by the Additional District Judge, had ordered the petitioner's eviction from the premises on the ground of the respondent-landlord's personal need. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's judgment suffered from any legal error or error of principle warranting interference. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court found no such error in the High Court's decision. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. However, acknowledging that the petitioner was conducting business on the premises, the Court granted the petitioner two months to vacate and deliver peaceful possession to the respondent, based on an undertaking provided by the petitioner in open court to avoid execution proceedings. The principle affirmed is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding ejectment for personal need absent a legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in rent matters absent a legal error?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant a grace period for vacating premises upon an undertaking by the tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Khan vs Mst. Bilquis Begum1984 SCMR 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-13
  ejectmenttentative rent orderstriking off defencedefault in payment of rentrent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions challenging a common judgment of the High Court of Sind which dismissed the petitioner's first rent appeals against the orders of the Rent Controller directing his ejectment. The core legal question concerns the justification for striking off the tenant's defence under rent restriction laws due to non-compliance with a tentative rent order. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the High Court—rejecting the petitioner's explanation for failing to comply with the tentative rent order and finding a lack of diligence in pursuing the case—were unexceptionable and warranted no interference. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that tenants must remain diligent regarding the progress of pending proceedings and cannot evade statutory compliance obligations based on counsel's illness without showing sufficient diligence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant's defence can be struck off for non-compliance with a tentative rent order?
  • Does the illness of a counsel absolve a tenant from the duty to remain diligent regarding the progress of a rent case?
  • Are concurrent findings of lower tribunals regarding non-compliance with rent orders open to interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Jan vs The State1984 SCMR 734 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-08
  murderocular testimonyabscondancemedical evidencecriminal appealdeath sentenceeye-witness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which confirmed the death sentence imposed on the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The appellant contended that the prosecution's ocular evidence conflicted with medical findings, specifically regarding the trajectory of the gunshot wounds and the deceased's stomach contents, suggesting a different time of death. The appellant further argued that the prosecution failed to prove the motive and that the absence of a notice to produce the weapon undermined the case. The Supreme Court examined the testimony of two eye-witnesses, finding their accounts consistent and credible, and noted that the medical evidence did not contradict the prosecution's version of events. The Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, supported by the eye-witness testimony and the appellant's prolonged abscondance. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence, affirming that the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the appellant's culpability for the murder.

  Questions settled

  • Does a conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can the prolonged abscondance of an accused be considered as corroborative evidence of guilt?
  • Is the testimony of an eye-witness who is a friend of the deceased inherently unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Bhai vs Adam Ali Jiwajee Charitable Trust1984 SCMR 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-15
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentconcurrent findingssecond appealtenant eviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against a judgment of the High Court of Sind at Karachi which dismissed the tenant's second appeal and maintained the concurrent findings of the two lower courts ordering his ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings regarding default in rent warranted interference in second appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner failed to point out any error of law in the impugned judgment, thereby upholding the concurrent findings and dismissing the petition for leave to appeal. However, considering the circumstances, the Court granted the petitioner a period of four months to vacate the premises and make alternate arrangements, subject to the continued payment of monthly rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts on default in payment of rent can be interfered with in second appeal without showing an error of law?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant a grace period to a tenant for vacating premises subject to the payment of monthly rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah and Others vs Abdul Majeed1984 SCMR 258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-14
  leave to appeallandlord and tenantpermanent transfer deedrent controller jurisdictioneviction petitionfraudulent allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Karachi High Court dated 20-5-1982, which reversed the findings of the Rent Controller and remanded the ejectment case. The respondent, holding a permanent transfer deed (P.T.D.), sought the eviction of the petitioners as tenant and sub-tenants. The petitioners contested the relationship of landlord and tenant by alleging that the respondent's P.T.D. was fraudulent and void. The Rent Controller ruled in favor of the petitioners, but the High Court reversed this, holding that the Rent Controller, possessing limited jurisdiction, could not sit in judgment over the P.T.D. The core legal question is whether a Rent Controller can adjudicate upon the validity or fraudulent nature of a permanent transfer deed. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller's jurisdiction is limited and cannot extend to challenging title documents like a P.T.D., but clarified that this conclusiveness is restricted to rent proceedings and does not bar the petitioners from agitating the matter of fraud before an appropriate forum. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Rent Controller has the jurisdiction to examine the validity or fraudulent nature of a permanent transfer deed?
  • Does the conclusiveness of a permanent transfer deed in rent proceedings foreclose a tenant's right to challenge its validity in another appropriate forum?
  • Can a Rent Controller sit in judgment over title documents issued under the settlement hierarchy?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Waheed Khan vs Mst.Azra Khanum and other1984 SCMR 1283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-12
  evictionlandlord and tenantconcurrent findings of factrent controlspecial leave to appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from eviction proceedings initiated by the respondents/landlords against the petitioner/tenant. The Rent Controller ordered the petitioner's eviction, a decision subsequently upheld by both the Additional District Judge in appeal and the High Court in second appeal. The petitioner challenged these orders before the Supreme Court, primarily contending that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that all lower courts had reached a concurrent finding of fact against the petitioner, which was supported by cogent reasons and evidence. The Court held that since the petitioner failed to demonstrate any omission or misreading of evidence by the lower courts, there was no justification to reopen the matter, as it was concluded by a finding of fact. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, though the Court granted the petitioner two months to vacate the premises, conditional upon the payment of rent and voluntary surrender of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts in rent eviction proceedings?
  • Is a petition for special leave to appeal maintainable when the petitioner fails to point out any omission or misreading of evidence by the courts below?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Shakoor vs Syed Wahid Hussain1984 SCMR 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-23
  leave to appealex parte ejectmentservice of noticerent proceedingstenant evictionpowers of Reader
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against whom an ex parte decree of ejectment was passed, along with the refusal of the lower forums to set it aside. The core legal questions involve examining whether a note recorded by a Reader, rather than the Presiding Officer, regarding the service of notice is sufficient to authorize proceeding ex parte on a subsequent date without notice to the tenant, and whether the practice of recording orders or diaries by the Reader in rent cases accords with applicable law and practice. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions, requiring the record of the proceedings before the Rent Controller to be made available at the hearing, while directing that the ejectment order not be executed in the meanwhile upon furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a note recorded by the Reader and not the Presiding Officer is sufficient to effectuate service of notice on a tenant to proceed ex parte?
  • Whether the practice of recording orders and diaries by the Reader in rent cases is in accordance with the law and practice applicable to the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Samad and Others vs Shahzada Ghulam Jilani and Others1984 SCMR 1036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-16
  land disputeqalangtenancy rightsChitral Stateland revenueconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional challenge regarding land ownership rights in the former State of Chitral. The petitioners claimed ownership of certain lands and pastures (charagahs), arguing that the payment of 'qalang' (a form of tax or revenue) did not constitute rent, but rather a tax paid to the State, and that their payment of 'Ushr' further evidenced their status as owners rather than tenants. The Dir, Swat and Chitral Land Disputes Enquiry Commission had previously recommended treating the petitioners as tenants liable to pay rent, a finding upheld by the administrative authorities and the High Court. The core legal question is whether the payment of 'qalang' inherently signifies a tenancy relationship or whether it constitutes a tax payment consistent with ownership. The Supreme Court, finding that the points raised regarding the nature of 'qalang' and the status of the landholders required in-depth examination, granted leave to appeal to determine the legal character of these payments and the resulting land rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the payment of 'qalang' in the former State of Chitral constitute rent indicative of a tenancy or a tax indicative of ownership?
  • Can long-standing possession of land, in the absence of other evidence, establish a claim of ownership against a finding of tenancy by a Land Disputes Enquiry Commission?
  • Is the payment of 'Ushr' by a landholder sufficient legal proof of ownership status in the context of historical land disputes in Chitral?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman and Others vs Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and Others1984 SCMR 205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-20
  writ petitionsecond revisionabandonment of remedyleave to appealconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' second writ petition. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of a subsequent constitutional petition challenging an order that was the subject of an earlier writ petition, which the petitioners' counsel had previously got converted into a civil revision, subsequently dismissed on the ground that a second revision was not maintainable. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners, having themselves abandoned their earlier writ petition by converting it into a revision, cannot justify filing a subsequent writ petition to challenge the same impugned order. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, reinforcing the principle that parties cannot bypass procedural bars by initiating successive overlapping challenges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent writ petition is maintainable after an earlier writ petition challenging the same order was converted into a revision at the instance of the petitioner?
  • Does a second revision lie against an order passed in revision by a District Court?
  • Can a party justify filing a fresh writ petition after abandoning their prior constitutional remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Razzak and Others vs The State1984 SCMR 431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-10
  criminal appealmurdercommon intentionchance witnessocular testimonymedical discrepancysupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a direct appeal filed under Article 185(2)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court convicting the appellants for murder under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentencing them to imprisonment for life. The prosecution case was that the appellants, along with an absconding co-accused, attacked and killed the deceased on a public road in Quetta city. The trial and High Court both relied on ocular testimony from independent witnesses and corroborative recoveries. The Supreme Court considered whether the eye-witnesses were chance witnesses and whether discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence warranted interference. The Court held that the witnesses were independent, present in the ordinary course of their business, and that minor discrepancies regarding the number of blows did not undermine the credible prosecution case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether eye-witnesses who happen to be present at the scene of a crime in the pursuit of their trade can be discredited solely on the basis of being chance witnesses?
  • Does a minor discrepancy between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding the number of weapon injuries vitiate an otherwise reliable murder conviction?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence in a criminal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid Mughal vs Muhammad Shabbir Abbasi1984 SCMR 1172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-03
  quo warrantomoral turpitudeelection disqualificationadmissibility of evidenceSummary Military Courtburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a writ of quo warranto filed against the appellant, who had been elected as a Councilor for the Municipal Committee, Murree. The respondent challenged the appellant's eligibility, alleging disqualification under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, due to a prior conviction by a Summary Military Court for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had accepted the respondent's petition, relying solely on the contents of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) to conclude that the appellant's conviction involved moral turpitude. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the conviction indeed involved moral turpitude and if the High Court's reliance on the F.I.R. was legally sound. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by treating the F.I.R. and a jail certificate as sufficient evidence to establish moral turpitude, noting that these documents were inadmissible for proving the specific findings of the Military Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, establishing that a conviction cannot be presumed to involve moral turpitude based on mere allegations in an F.I.R. without legal evidence of the specific findings of the convicting court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court determine that a conviction involves moral turpitude based solely on the contents of an F.I.R.?
  • Is an F.I.R. admissible as legal evidence to prove the specific findings or grounds of a conviction by a Summary Military Court?
  • Does a conviction by a Summary Military Court automatically constitute an offence involving moral turpitude for the purposes of election disqualification?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid and Others vs Muhammad Riaz and Others1984 SCMR 450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-15
  concurrent findings of factcivil revisioninheritance disputegift deedleave to appealreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil suit filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, seeking a declaration of sole heirship regarding the estate of Mst. Fazal Jan and a perpetual injunction to restrain the respondents from collecting rent from the disputed property. The respondents contested the suit, asserting that the deceased had gifted the property to them via a registered gift deed. The trial court framed issues regarding the plaintiff's status as the sole heir and the validity of the alleged gift. Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled against the plaintiff, finding in favor of the defendants. The petitioners subsequently filed a civil revision before the High Court, which was dismissed. Upon petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the core issues involved questions of fact upon which the three lower courts had reached concurrent findings. The Court held that it would not reappraise evidence to reverse concurrent findings of fact in such circumstances. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by three lower courts in a civil matter?
  • Is the reappraisal of evidence permissible in a petition for leave to appeal where lower courts have reached concurrent findings of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid and Another vs The State1984 SCMR 1105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-28
  criminal appealmurdersolitary witnesscorroborationFirst Information Reportrejection of capital sentenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction of the appellants under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while altering the death sentence of one appellant to imprisonment for life. The core legal question was whether the conviction of the appellants could be sustained safely on the solitary, uncorroborated testimony of an interested eye-witness who was the brother of the deceased and whose evidence was partially rejected regarding a co-accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that the testimony of an eye-witness, even if related to the deceased, can form the basis of a conviction if found natural, reliable, corroborated by a prompt First Information Report, and supported by medical evidence. The key principle laid down is that minor discrepancies or the acquittal of a co-accused do not discredit an otherwise truthful and natural witness whose presence at the scene is unquestionable, provided the testimony inspires full confidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a related and interested eye-witness?
  • Whether the acquittal of one co-accused based on identity doubts necessitates the acquittal of other co-accused tried together?
  • Is a prompt First Information Report considered sufficient corroboration for the testimony of an eye-witness?
  • Does the presence of a witness at a shop opposite the place of occurrence render them a natural witness under criminal law?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rahim vs Mst. Shahida Khan1984 PLD Supreme Court 329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-01
  khuladissolution of marriagefixed aversionfamily lawwrit jurisdictionirretrievable breakdown
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenges a common judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside orders of the Family Judge and Additional District Judge dismissing a wife's suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula. The core legal question was whether a wife seeking dissolution of marriage through khula is legally required to prove specific acts of cruelty or provide a rational basis for her aversion towards her husband. The Supreme Court held that where a wife exhibits a fixed aversion and extreme incompatibility of temperament, making it impossible for the spouses to live together within the limits prescribed by Allah, a case for khula is made out without needing to prove specific fault on the part of the husband. The Court laid down the principle that Islam does not force spouses into a hateful union, and if the marriage has irretrievably broken down, the court must satisfy its conscience regarding the impossibility of harmonious cohabitation and grant dissolution accordingly, upholding the High Court's remand for proper re-decision of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a wife seeking dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula is required to prove specific acts of cruelty or maltreatment by the husband?
  • Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with concurrent findings of Family Courts regarding khula?
  • Does fixed aversion and extreme incompatibility of temperament constitute sufficient ground for the dissolution of marriage through khula?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum and another vs The State1984 SCMR 1511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-14
  bail cancellationZina (Enforcement of Hudood)abductionrapediscretionary powerreasonable groundscriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court cancelling the bail previously granted to the petitioners by the Sessions Court in a criminal case involving charges under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioners were accused of abducting and raping a minor girl, Mst. Majida. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in cancelling the bail based on the material available on the record, specifically the complainant's statement and medical evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that reasonable grounds existed to implicate the petitioners in the alleged offences. The Court held that the High Court's re-examination of the facts and its subsequent cancellation of bail was unexceptionable and did not warrant interference. The key principle affirmed is that an appellate court will not interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in bail cancellation matters when the lower court has properly evaluated the incriminating material, such as witness statements and medical reports, to establish reasonable grounds for the accused's involvement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the authority to cancel bail granted by a Sessions Court if reasonable grounds exist for the accused's implication?
  • Is the presence of abrasions on a victim's body considered supporting material for allegations of rape in bail proceedings?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in a bail cancellation matter if the decision is found to be unexceptionable?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum and Another vs Mst. Khurshid Jahan and Others1984 SCMR 710 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-09
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantreconstructionbona fide requirementsubstantial alterationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order passed against the petitioner-tenants by the Rent Controller, which was upheld by the District Judge and the Lahore High Court. The respondent-landlady sought eviction of five tenants occupying five shops to reconstruct the building into a restaurant for her sons, having obtained the necessary municipal sanction. The core legal question was whether 'reconstruction' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 requires the complete demolition of an existing building and the construction of a totally new one, or if substantial structural alterations suffice. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that 'reconstruction' does not necessitate complete demolition. The Court ruled that where a change of a substantial character is being effected—such as removing walls and raising new ones to convert five shops into a single large hall with a kitchen and pantry on the same foundations—it falls within the purview of reconstruction under the law, thereby justifying the eviction of the tenants.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'reconstruction' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 require the complete demolition of an existing building?
  • Can substantial structural alterations, such as converting multiple shops into a single hall on the same foundations, constitute 'reconstruction' for the purposes of tenant eviction?
  • What degree of structural change is necessary to satisfy the ground of reconstruction under rent restriction laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qadir and Another vs The Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner and 3 Others1984 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-03
  urban settlementcomposite propertyrevisional jurisdictionmisreading of evidenceconcurrent findingsdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court whereby a constitutional petition arising out of an urban settlement case was allowed and a revisional order of the Settlement Commissioner was set aside. The dispute related to the precise identity of a shop versus a balakhana forming part of a composite building. The core legal questions involved the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the Settlement Commissioner to examine findings of fact and whether the revisional order suffered from misreading of evidence or surmises. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Settlement Commissioner's revisional jurisdiction extended to examining the legality, correctness, and propriety of subordinate orders, and he was fully competent to correct errors in findings of fact, even if concurrent. The Court further held that the Settlement Commissioner's conclusions were based on a proper perusal of the record and did not amount to misreading or surmises. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Settlement Commissioner's order was restored, laying down the principle that a revisional authority under the relevant settlement laws may reappraise evidence and correct concurrent factual findings when legally justified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Settlement Commissioner in revisional jurisdiction can interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by subordinate authorities?
  • What is the extent and scope of the revisional jurisdiction of a Settlement Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the inclusion of a disputed room as part of a transferred shop based on pre-1958 possession and user constitute a misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid vs Ghulam Muhammad and Others1984 SCMR 1584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-25
  ejectmentpersonal requirementgood faithlandlord and tenantconstitutional petitionleave to appealconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition against the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, directing the eviction of the petitioner-tenant on the ground of personal bona fide requirement under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the landlord established his requirement in good faith, particularly given allegations that other shops were vacated and re-rented or acquired for another son. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's good faith, based on the record, were unexceptionable and that no interference was warranted in constitutional jurisdiction over questions of fact. The court laid down the principle that concurrent factual findings on personal bona fide requirement in rent matters will not be disturbed where the tenant fails to substantiate claims of mala fides with proper evidence and merely attempts to fill gaps in the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent factual findings regarding personal bona fide requirement of a landlord can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the vacation of another shop for the use of a landlord's son disprove the good faith of a separate ejectment application?
  • Can a party be permitted to lead additional evidence at the appellate stage merely to fill a lacuna in the trial evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Karim vs Hashmat Ali and Others1984 SCMR 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-06
  constitutional jurisdictionremand ordersettlement commissionerevacuee propertydisplaced personsLetters Patent Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed two constitutional petitions regarding a settlement dispute involving displaced persons and evacuee property. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner, in passing an order on 20-5-1970, had adhered to the specific conditions and directions stipulated by the High Court in a previous order of remand issued by a Letters Patent Bench in L.P.A. No. 950 of 1966. The Supreme Court examined the proceedings and concurred with the High Court's finding that the Settlement Commissioner had failed to comply with the mandatory conditions set forth in the remand order. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction to set aside the Settlement Commissioner's order. The Court affirmed that administrative or quasi-judicial authorities are bound to strictly follow the directions issued by a superior court in a remand order, and failure to do so renders the subsequent decision liable to be set aside through constitutional review.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Settlement Commissioner bound to strictly comply with the conditions laid down by a High Court in an order of remand?
  • Can a High Court set aside an order of a Settlement Commissioner in its constitutional jurisdiction if the Commissioner fails to follow a remand order?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Karim Jaffarani vs United Bank Ltd and 2 Others1984 SCMR 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-31
  summary suitleave to defendpromissory noteconditional leavenegotiable instrumentslimitationtime-barred debt
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a summary suit filed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by the respondent bank for the recovery of outstanding dues based on a promissory note. The High Court of Sind had granted the petitioner conditional leave to defend the suit, subject to furnishing security equal to the entire claim amount. The petitioner challenged the imposition of this condition, arguing that the promissory note was an inchoate instrument filled in with an inflated amount after a great lapse of time, and that the underlying debts were time-barred. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that while the trial court has discretion to impose conditions under Order XXXVII Rule 3, such discretion must be exercised on judicial principles. The Court held that when a defendant raises a plausible, triable defence that is not illusory, imposing a condition of security for the entire claim may render the leave to defend illusory. The Court modified the condition, reducing the security to the amount of transactions occurring within the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • What are the judicial principles governing the exercise of discretion to grant conditional versus unconditional leave to defend in a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the admission of a signature on a blank document amount to an admission of 'execution' of a promissory note under the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881?
  • Can a court impose a condition of full security for leave to defend when the plaintiff relies on a promissory note to enforce a time-barred debt under Section 25 of the Contract Act 1872?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Jabbar Khan vs The Director, P.C.S.I.R. Laboratories, Peshawar1984SCMR 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-21
  service lawpromotionvested rightdiscriminationconstitutional petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition seeking parity in promotion with respondents Nos. 4 to 12. The petitioner and the said respondents, employees of P.C.S.I.R. Laboratories, Peshawar, were promoted to Grade 17, but the respondents received additional benefits based on a policy decision granting Class I status and advance increments to officers holding a second-division M.Sc. degree. The petitioner, who possessed a third-division M.Sc. degree, was promoted separately as a special case based on experience and publications, and subsequently claimed discrimination. The core legal questions concerned whether the petitioner had a vested right to promotion and whether a case of discrimination was established. The Supreme Court held that promotion is a matter within the exclusive discretion of the competent authority without any vested right, and that the petitioner, having different qualifications and being promoted on a separate basis, failed to establish any discrimination. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government employee have a vested right to promotion?
  • Whether promotion falls within the exclusive discretion and judgment of the competent authority?
  • Does differential treatment based on qualification policy constitute unlawful discrimination?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hayee vs Sardar Muhammad and Others1984 SCMR 1149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-14
  contempt of courtprofessional misconductunqualified apologyconcealment of material factsleave to appealstay applicationSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from contempt and show-cause notices issued to a petitioner, Abdul Hayee, and his counsel, Mr. Samad Mahmood, Advocate, for attempting to conceal a previous determinative judgment of the Supreme Court dated 21-2-1979 while seeking a stay order in a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner and his counsel were liable for contempt of court, prosecution, and professional misconduct for withholding vital judicial records from the Court. The Supreme Court held that while the concealment was a grave default and serious misdemeanour, both respondents having submitted written unqualified apologies, throwing themselves at the mercy of the Court, and expressing sincere remorse, the notices should be discharged and the suspension of the advocate withdrawn. The key principle laid down is that while deliberate concealment of material judicial proceedings from the court constitutes a grave contempt and professional default, an unqualified apology coupled with genuine remorse may be accepted by the court to take a lenient view and discharge contempt and professional misconduct proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concealment of a previous determinative judgment of the court in a petition and stay application amounts to contempt of court?
  • Can an unqualified apology and expression of remorse purge a charge of contempt and professional misconduct?
  • Whether an advocate can be suspended from practice as a temporary measure pending contempt proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haque vs Masood Jan and another1984 SCMR 1391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-10
  condonation of delaylimitationsufficient causepetition for special leave to appealillness of counsel
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Sind High Court and is barred by 8 days. The petitioner filed an application for condonation of delay on the ground of the counsel's illness. The core legal question is whether sufficient cause was shown to condone the delay in filing the petition. The Supreme Court held that the grounds urged for condonation were vague and insufficient, noting that the nature of the illness was not properly disclosed, no medical advice for complete rest was shown, and no explanation was provided as to why alternative counsel or the advocate-on-record could not prepare the petition. The ratio decidendi is that valuable rights accrue to a successful party upon the expiry of the period of limitation, and delay can only be condoned when each day's delay is satisfactorily explained with sufficient grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether illness of counsel constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • Is each day's delay required to be satisfactorily explained when seeking condonation of limitation?
  • Does failure to disclose the specific nature of illness and medical advice preclude the condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani vs Noor Muhammad and Others1984 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-15
  double allotmentbuilding siteagricultural landpermanent transfer deedsettlement schemedelegation of powersdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a dispute over the transfer of a urban plot in Pakpattan Town originally transferred to the appellant as a building site under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and subsequently allotted to the respondents' predecessor as agricultural land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal question concerned the validity of the subsequent allotment and whether a re-enquiry into the nature of the property was warranted when a permanent transfer deed subsisted in favour of the first transferee and the competent authority had already determined its character as a building site pursuant to delegated powers. The Supreme Court held that once the property was validly transferred as a building site and the permanent transfer deed remained uncancelled, and where the Additional Settlement Commissioner had properly exercised delegated powers to determine the character of the land, no further inquiry or remand by the High Court was justified. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land transferred as a building site under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 can be re-allotted as agricultural land without cancellation of the subsisting permanent transfer deed?
  • Whether an Additional Settlement Commissioner is competent to determine the character of a disputed plot as a building site under delegated powers?
  • Is a remand by the High Court necessary when the competent settlement authorities have already lawfully determined the nature of the property and resolved conflicting allotments?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani and 4 Others vs Mst. Saida Naim Hussain1984 SCMR 597 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-25
  compromiselandlord and tenantrent disputelease deedSupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court regarding an ejectment matter where the relationship of landlord and tenant was held not to be established. During the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the parties reached a formal compromise. The core legal question involved the resolution of the tenancy dispute between the appellants and the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the compromise entered into by the parties constitutes a just and fair disposal of the dispute. Consequently, the Court disposed of and allowed the appeal in terms of the agreed compromise, wherein a third party was accepted as the tenant on specified terms, and directed the execution of a regular lease-deed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal can be disposed of in terms of a compromise reached between the parties before the Supreme Court?
  • Can parties mutually agree to substitute a new tenant and execute a regular lease-deed to resolve a pending tenancy dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs The State1984 SCMR 439 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-01
  suspension of sentencecriminal appealmurderdiscretionary orderbail pending appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Abdul Ghafoor against the order of the High Court dismissing his application for suspension of sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner had been convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to imprisonment for life with a fine. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in refusing to suspend the petitioner's sentence pending his regular appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court provided cogent reasons for dismissing the bail application and appropriately granted liberty to the petitioner to renew his application after the summer vacation if his appeal remained pending. The petition was accordingly dismissed based on these observations, upholding the discretionary order of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's refusal to suspend a sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a convicted person file a subsequent application for suspension of sentence after the expiration of a specified period if the appeal is not fixed for hearing?
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• Abdul Ghaffar vs Muhammad Sharif and Another1984 SCMR 1165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-19
  Colony Manualunauthorized possessiontenant classification15 years Lease SchemeBoard of Revenueleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to a decision by the Member, Board of Revenue, which classified a respondent in unauthorized possession of land as a "tenant" by invoking paragraph 480 of the Colony Manual, thereby rendering him eligible for the 15-year Lease Scheme. The petitioner challenged this classification, arguing that the provisions of paragraph 480 of the Colony Manual were inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, as they were intended to address an entirely different situation. Upon review, the Supreme Court found prima facie merit in the petitioner's contention that the legal provision was misapplied. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the unauthorized occupant could legally be treated as a tenant under the cited regulatory framework. The appeal was ordered to be prepared on the existing record, with liberty granted to the parties to submit further documentation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person in unauthorized possession of land be classified as a tenant under paragraph 480 of the Colony Manual?
  • Does paragraph 480 of the Colony Manual apply to individuals in unauthorized possession of land for the purpose of eligibility under the 15-year Lease Scheme?
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• Abdul Ghaffar Khan vs Major Rtd. Mahmood Khan Tukhi and others1984 SCMR 1252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-20
  residual propertysettlement schemetransfer of propertyconstitutional petitionleave to appealfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his constitutional petition challenging the order of the Administrator Residual Property setting aside the transfer of a plot of land in his favour. The petitioner claimed the plot under Settlement Scheme No. VI, alleging continuous possession and a subsequent transfer order by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. However, respondents sought revision, asserting the plot was part of a big mansion previously transferred to them. The Administrator Residual Property found that the disputed land formed part of Khasra No. 1961, which had indeed been transferred to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest. The High Court dismissed the constitutional petition, holding the factual finding to be supported by record. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner's inquiry suffered from defects regarding property identification and lack of coordination with neighbouring properties, whereas the Administrator properly examined site plans and records. Finding no question of law arising, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing a constitutional petition where concurrent findings of fact regarding the transfer of residual property were supported by departmental records?
  • Can a transfer of residual property be set aside if the inquiry reveals that the disputed land was already transferred as part of another property?
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• Abdul Basit vs Muhammad Idrees and Others1984 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-17
  co-operative societiesarbitration awardmisconduct of arbitratorsdiscovery of fresh evidenceset aside awardRegistrar's powershousing society plot dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which had set aside an order of the Secretary, Co-operation Department, and restored an order of the Deputy Registrar remitting an arbitration award for fresh decision. The core legal dispute involved a plot in a co-operative housing society claimed by multiple parties, culminating in an arbitration award in favour of the appellant. Subsequently, the Deputy Registrar set aside the award under section 54-A of the Sind Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, based on newly discovered registers, which order was reversed by the Secretary on revision. The High Court upheld the Deputy Registrar's view, holding the arbitrators guilty of misconduct for failing to examine certain records. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitrators had not committed any misconduct or refused to summon available records, as the registers in question were genuinely believed to be lost at the time. The Court laid down the principle that an arbitration award under the Act cannot be set aside or remitted for reconsideration on the sole ground of subsequent discovery of new evidence when no such ground is enumerated in section 54-A of the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Can an arbitration award under the Sind Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 be set aside or remitted on the ground of the subsequent discovery of new evidence?
  • Does the failure of arbitrators to examine records that were believed to be lost at the time constitute misconduct vitiating the award?
  • Whether the Registrar has the power under section 54-A of the Sind Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 to order fresh arbitration merely because fresh evidence has come to light after the delivery of the award?
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• Abdul Bari Khan, Advocate vs The Collector, Land Acquisition and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-28
  procedural defaultappeal recordSupreme Court Rulesleave to appealappellate procedureRegistrar duties
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns procedural defaults in the preparation of the record for an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The appellant failed to supply necessary addresses for respondents despite multiple reminders and show-cause notices issued by the Registry. The core legal question addressed is the proper procedure to be followed by the Registry and the Court when an appellant fails to diligently prepare the record for appeal. The Court held that the Registry must strictly adhere to the procedure outlined in the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. Specifically, upon a default, the Registrar should notify the appellant to explain the default; if the explanation is unsatisfactory or absent, the Registrar must issue a summons requiring the appellant to show cause before the Court why the leave to appeal should not be rescinded. The Court emphasized that excessive, repetitive reminders are unnecessary and that the Registrar should promptly escalate defaults to the Court for final direction once the prescribed show-cause process is exhausted.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct procedure for the Registrar to follow when an appellant fails to prepare the record for an appeal?
  • Under what circumstances may the Supreme Court rescind the grant of leave to appeal due to a default in record preparation?
  • Is it necessary for the Registry to issue multiple reminders before issuing a formal show-cause notice for default in appeal preparation?
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• Abdul Aziz vs Pakistan International Airlines and Others1984 SCMR 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-10
  dismissal from serviceunauthorized absenceindustrial relationsgrievance petitionlabour courtleave extensiondue inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner from service by the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA). The petitioner, a former Traffic Assistant, was dismissed for unauthorized absence from duty. The core legal question was whether the dismissal was illegal due to the alleged absence of a charge sheet and the failure of the authorities to consider medical leave applications. The petitioner contended that the inquiry was conducted ex parte and that his leave applications were improperly rejected. The Supreme Court, upon review, found that the petitioner had deliberately absented himself from duty after his sanctioned leave expired on 26-4-1977. The Court observed that the petitioner failed to provide necessary medical certificates to support his requests for leave extension, despite the issuance of a charge sheet and the conduct of a due inquiry prior to his dismissal. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there were no grounds to interfere with the lower courts' findings, affirming the dismissal and dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can challenge a dismissal order under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 when the dismissal is based on unauthorized absence?
  • Does the failure to provide medical certificates for leave extension justify an employer's decision to dismiss an employee for absence from duty?
  • Is a dismissal order valid if it follows the issuance of a charge sheet and the conduct of a due inquiry?
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• Abdul Aziz vs Mahmoodul Hasan and others1984 SCMR 1349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-21
  settlement scheme no viiitransfer of propertyresumption of propertytransfer ordersupreme court of pakistanleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court addresses whether the rejection of an initial L.S. Form for the transfer of a shop under Settlement Scheme No. VIII operates as a perpetual bar to a subsequent application filed after the property was resumed by the settlement authorities. The appellant had originally applied for the transfer of a shop, which was rejected as unavailable due to a prior auction. Upon the property's subsequent resumption for non-payment, the appellant applied anew, received a transfer order, and deposited the balance price and taxes, but settlement authorities and the High Court dismissed his claims treating the earlier rejection as an insurmountable hurdle. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of an earlier form does not bar the transfer of a property once it becomes available following resumption, and that valuable rights accrued to the appellant upon complying with transfer orders and making valid deposits. The Court accordingly accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned decisions, and remanded the matter to the Notified Officer for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rejection of an earlier form for the transfer of property operate as a bar to a subsequent application filed after the property is resumed?
  • Whether an applicant acquires a valuable right upon depositing the price of a property and settlement fees pursuant to a transfer order issued by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner?
  • Did the Settlement Commissioner err in treating the prior rejection of an L.S. Form as a hurdle against a second form when the property subsequently became available for transfer?
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• Abdul Aziz vs Mah Moodulhass an and Others1984 SCMR 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-05
  transfer of propertysettlement lawleave to appealauctionresumption of property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition regarding the transfer of a shop in Mandi Bahauddin. The petitioner initially filed a transfer form in 1966, which was rejected because the property had been auctioned in 1960. Following the resumption of the property in 1969 due to non-payment, the petitioner applied again and claimed a transfer order was issued in his favour. However, the property was subsequently auctioned to the respondent. The Settlement Commissioner held the second transfer order illegal, reasoning that the finality of the rejection of the first form precluded the second application. The High Court upheld this decision, doubting the existence of the second transfer order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying the core legal question as whether the finality of a rejected transfer form legally bars a subsequent application for the same property after it has been resumed by the authorities. The Court found that this issue requires deeper consideration, thereby granting leave to appeal to determine if the Settlement Commissioner erred in law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the final rejection of an initial transfer form legally bar a subsequent application for the same property after it has been resumed by the authorities?
  • Can a Settlement Commissioner declare a transfer order illegal solely on the basis that an earlier application for the same property was rejected?
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• Abdul Aziz vs Additional Settlement Commissioner and others1984 SCMR 1562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-12
  condonation of delayconstitutional petitionreview petitionbona fide pursuitlimine dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against an order of the High Court dismissing a constitutional petition which was barred by 309 days. The petitioner sought condonation of delay on the ground of prosecuting a review petition in good faith in the High Court. The Supreme Court considered whether the time spent in pursuing the review petition could be condoned. The Court held that since the grounds urged in the review could not have been properly maintained in such proceedings, the pursuit of the review was not bona fide but a negligent act, and consequently the delay could not be condoned. The petition was dismissed in limine. The key principle laid down is that time spent in pursuing another remedy cannot be condoned unless the pursuit of that remedy is shown to have been bona fide.

  Questions settled

  • Can delay in filing a petition be condoned on the ground of pursuing a review petition when the grounds urged in the review were not maintainable?
  • Whether time spent in prosecuting a remedy that is not pursued in good faith can be excluded for the purpose of limitation?
  • Does the dismissal of a main constitutional petition as time-barred preclude the granting of leave to appeal against the refusal of a review order?
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