Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Abdul Aziz Khan Babar vs Salahuddin Khan Alizai and Others1984 SCMR 820 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-18
  territorial jurisdictionreturn of plaintadministration suitpleadingspetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts returning the plaint in an administration suit for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the petitioner properly invoked the territorial jurisdiction of the courts at Lahore by including a specific property located in Lahore within the estate of the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner artificially and falsely included the property in question in the estate solely to manufacture territorial jurisdiction at Lahore, as evidenced by admissions in previous pleadings by the petitioner and his wife. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with costs, reaffirming that litigants who knowingly adopt false stances to manipulate territorial jurisdiction will not be countenanced.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff can include a property in an administration suit solely to create territorial jurisdiction in a particular court?
  • Can the courts return a plaint if it is established that territorial jurisdiction was artificially invoked?
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• Abdul Aziz and Others vs Sheikh Abdur Rahim and Others1984 PLD Supreme Court 164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-02
  conversion of revision into appeallimitationsecond appealpre-emption suitprocedural technicalityrelation back doctrinecourt-fee deficiency
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the appellants' Regular Second Appeal as time-barred in a pre-emption suit. The appellants had initially filed a civil revision petition within ninety days of the first appellate decree. Later, realizing that a second appeal was legally competent due to the jurisdictional value exceeding Rs. 2,000, they applied to convert the revision into a second appeal. The High Court permitted the conversion but computed limitation from the date the conversion application was filed, thereby dismissing the second appeal as barred by time. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that where an incompetent revision is filed within the period prescribed for an appeal and there is no deficiency in court-fee or other unfulfilled statutory condition, the converted second appeal relates back to the date the revision petition was originally instituted. The Court emphasized that procedural technicalities should yield to substantial justice, remanding the matter to the High Court for adjudication on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • From what date is a second appeal deemed to be instituted when an incompetent revision petition is converted into a second appeal without any deficiency in court-fee?
  • Does an incompetent revision petition filed within the limitation period for an appeal protect against the bar of limitation upon conversion to a regular second appeal?
  • Can the High Court treat a revision petition as a second appeal where there is no requirement to make up a deficiency in court-fee or seek condonation of delay?
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• Abdul Aziz and Others vs Malik Naz1r Ahmad1984 SCMR 1083 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-29
  compromise decreefraudforgeryabuse of processlitigation strategysignature verificationSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an application filed by the respondent, Nazir Ahmad, seeking the recall of a compromise order passed by the Supreme Court on 18-5-1983. The respondent alleged that the compromise deed, which led to the disposal of the petition, was obtained through fraud and that his signatures thereon were forged. The core legal question was whether the compromise order was vitiated by fraud and forgery as claimed by the respondent. Upon examining the respondent's specimen signatures against various documents filed throughout the litigation, the Court observed that the respondent had engaged in a pattern of inconsistent signing, intentionally using different signatures to create grounds for later denying the validity of his own compromises. The Court held that the compromise order was valid and effective, dismissing the application. The judgment establishes the principle that litigants cannot abuse the judicial process by creating fraudulent discrepancies in their signatures to facilitate subsequent claims of forgery, and that courts may direct the prosecution of parties found engaging in such deceptive practices to discourage the abuse of the legal system.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court recall a compromise order based on allegations of forgery if the evidence suggests the party intentionally created inconsistent signatures?
  • Does a litigant's history of denying previous compromises based on alleged fraud affect the court's assessment of a subsequent claim of forgery?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct the prosecution of a litigant for abuse of process and forgery discovered during proceedings?
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• Abbas Khan and Others vs The State1984 SCMR 312 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealidentification paradeeye-witness testimonymuffled facesmotivemurderabduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the court arises from the dismissal by the Lahore High Court of the appellants' appeal against their conviction and sentences under sections 302/149, 364/34, 148, and 373/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder, abduction, and rioting. The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses solely by voice or stature, amidst allegations of muffled faces and concessions made in cross-examination, rendered their identification unsafe without an identification parade. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that where witnesses were already familiar with the accused, named them promptly in the First Information Report, and gave consistent testimony, the absence of an identification parade and minor contradictions or concessions did not create a reasonable doubt. The court reaffirmed that motive, often being a matter of speculation known best to the accused, is not strictly required to be proved if direct eye-witness testimony is otherwise reliable and trustworthy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an identification parade is necessary when accused persons are already known to the prosecution witnesses?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove motive adversely affect otherwise reliable eye-witness testimony?
  • Can concessions made by witnesses during a lengthy cross-examination years after the occurrence invalidate their prior identification?
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• A. S. Tasneem and Another vs Member, Board of Revenue (Colonies)1984 SCMR 1030 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-18
  Tube-well Sinking Schemeproprietary rightsland allotmentadministrative directiveresumption of landminor son of government servantconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a Constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which challenged the resumption of land allotted under a Tube-well (Sinking) Scheme. The appellants, allottees since 1953, had their land resumed by the Collector in 1970 on the grounds that the original allottee was a minor son of a government servant, a disqualification introduced in the 1959 Scheme. The core legal question was whether the 1959 Scheme conditions, specifically the disqualification, applied to allotments made in 1952-53. The Supreme Court held that while the original 1952 conditions were silent on this disqualification, a 1960 directive explicitly required allottees seeking proprietary rights to satisfy the 1959 conditions. The Court reasoned that interpreting the directive to exclude these conditions would create an unworkable legal vacuum. Consequently, the Court upheld the Board of Revenue's decision that the allotment was void due to the disqualification. The principle established is that administrative directives conditioning the grant of proprietary rights upon compliance with subsequent regulatory schemes are enforceable, and must be interpreted to ensure a coherent, functional legal framework.

  Questions settled

  • Does a 1960 directive requiring compliance with 1959 conditions for the grant of proprietary rights apply to land allotted under a 1952 scheme?
  • Can an administrative directive be interpreted to incorporate conditions from a subsequent scheme to avoid a legal vacuum in the administration of land allotments?
  • Is the allotment of land to a minor son of a government servant void under the conditions of the 1959 Tube-well Sinking Scheme?
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• A. Q. K. Afghan vs Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division1984 SCMR 1159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-23
  civil serviceremoval from serviceservice tribunalin limine dismissalmala fidesservice recordstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a civil servant's appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal regarding his removal from service. The appellant, a former government official, was removed under Section 12-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The core legal questions were whether the Service Tribunal was legally obligated to summon the appellant's service record before dismissing the appeal in limine, and whether the removal order was valid under the cited statutory provision. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal is not required to summon service records in every case, particularly where no disputed questions of fact are raised or where the appellant fails to specify facts necessitating such review. Furthermore, the Court rejected the appellant's contentions regarding the inapplicability of Section 12-A, noting the appellant's own admission of continuous service within the relevant statutory period. The Court affirmed that allegations of mala fides must be specifically pleaded and proved, and that new legal pleas not raised before the Tribunal cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Federal Service Tribunal required to summon a civil servant's service record in every appeal before dismissing it in limine?
  • Can a party raise a new legal plea before the Supreme Court that was not raised before the Service Tribunal?
  • Must allegations of mala fides be specifically pleaded and proved to warrant judicial intervention?
  • Does the failure to explicitly state 'public interest' in a removal order under Section 12-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, automatically invalidate the order?
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• A FZ Al Mir Z a vs Ahmad Saeed Khan and others1984 SCMR 1383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-02
  leave to appealdisplaced personstransfer of propertypossessionejectment ordersstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question presented is whether the respondent, Ahmad Saeed Khan, is entitled to the benefit of ejectment orders previously passed against occupants of the disputed property, thereby enabling him to claim the transfer of said property. Specifically, the Court seeks to examine this issue in light of the extended definition of 'possession' as contemplated under the relevant Act and the various notifications issued thereunder. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to resolve this controversy. Pending the final adjudication of the appeals, the Court ordered the maintenance of the status quo and directed that the appeals be prepared on the existing record, with liberty for the parties to file additional documents. A departmental representative was ordered to produce the relevant case records at the subsequent hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim the benefit of ejectment orders passed against occupants of a property to secure its transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • How does the extended definition of 'possession' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, affect the eligibility for property transfer?
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• A BD Ur R a Shid vs Mirza Kafait Baig1984 SCMR 1461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-16
  forged documentconcurrent findings of factsecond appealpossession suittransfer orderleave to appealdismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil suit for possession and recovery of mesne profits. The petitioner claimed ownership of a property based on a transfer order (P.T.O.) issued to his predecessor-in-interest, Khadim Hussain, and a subsequent sale deed. The respondent contested this claim, asserting ownership through a different transferee. The trial court, after evaluating the evidence, found the petitioner's P.T.O. to be a forged document, citing unexplained discrepancies in the issuance dates, inconsistencies between the property records and the transfer documents, and the failure to produce the original transferee as a witness. The suit was dismissed, and subsequent appeals were rejected. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court erred in dismissing the second appeal in limine. The Court held that the dismissal was justified as no valid grounds under the relevant procedural law were established. Furthermore, the Court declined to interfere with concurrent findings of fact, emphasizing that the case's outcome rested on factual determinations regarding the authenticity of the transfer documents.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts?
  • Is a High Court justified in dismissing a second appeal in limine if no valid grounds under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are established?
  • Does the failure to produce a key witness to prove the genuineness of a disputed transfer document justify the dismissal of a suit for possession?
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• Zoab and 5 Others vs Akbar Ali1983 SCMR 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-19
  tenant reinstatementreconstruction of buildingejectmentrent restrictioncommercial tenancyleased premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal arising from a dispute over the right of an evicted tenant to be reinstated in a reconstructed building under section 13(5-B) of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether a tenant, upon reconstruction of the building after eviction for reconstruction, is entitled to be put in possession of the exact same spot where the old shop was situated. The Supreme Court held that while a landlord is generally free to determine the nature and type of reconstruction and is not bound to keep the tenant's exact needs in mind, the landlord must respect the rights conferred on the tenant under section 13(5-B) and cannot arbitrarily maneuver construction to deprive the tenant of a reasonable reinstatement on the original site without compelling circumstances. The appeal filed by the landlords was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment in favour of the tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant evicted for reconstruction is entitled under section 13(5-B) of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 to be put in possession on the exact same spot where the old shop was situated?
  • Does the landlord have unrestricted discretion to offer any premises in the newly-constructed building to the evicted tenant regardless of the original location?
  • Can a landlord change the nature and character of a building upon reconstruction under section 13(2)(vi) of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
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• Zaman vs The State1983 PLD Supreme Court 191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-15
  vegetable gheeillegal possessionhoardingfoodstuffs controldistribution ordercriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the appellant's criminal revision against his conviction for possessing large quantities of vegetable ghee and sugar in contravention of provincial foodstuffs control laws. The core legal question was whether a merchant storing a large quantity of vegetable ghee in his godown without a distribution system in force constituted illegal hoarding or violated the relevant distribution orders. The Supreme Court held that the mere possession of a large stock of vegetable ghee by a merchant, without proof that he refused to sell to customers or withheld goods from the market, does not constitute hoarding or an offence under the law. The Court laid down the principle that to establish hoarding by a merchant, it must be proved either that the merchant was not offering the goods for sale or that he refused to sell to a customer on the plea of no stock.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere possession of a large quantity of vegetable ghee by a merchant constitute hoarding under the West Pakistan Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958?
  • What must be proved to establish that a merchant or shopkeeper is hoarding a controlled foodstuff?
  • Does storing goods in a godown to replenish shop supplies amount to an infraction of the N.-W. F. P. Vegetable Ghee (Distribution) Order, 1971 when no formal distribution system is in force?
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• Zaibtun Textile Mills Ltd. vs Central Board of Revenue and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-28
  delegated legislationexcessive delegationproduction capacity taxexcise dutynatural justiceconstitutional interpretationfiscal statuteseparation of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals by textile mill owners challenging the levy of excise duty on production capacity under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The core legal question was whether the legislature, by empowering the Central Board of Revenue to determine production capacity and levy duty, had unconstitutionally abdicated its essential legislative functions or engaged in excessive delegation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the legislation was valid. The Court affirmed that while essential legislative functions cannot be delegated, the legislature may delegate regulatory and administrative tasks to expert bodies, especially when technical details are involved. The Court rejected the argument that the legislature had effaced itself, noting that the legislature retained ultimate control. Furthermore, the Court held that the rules of natural justice were not violated, as the statutory review mechanism provided an adequate opportunity for affected parties to be heard. The judgment reinforces the principle that the doctrine of separation of powers in Pakistan is functional rather than rigid, allowing for necessary delegation to administrative agencies to implement legislative policy effectively.

  Questions settled

  • Does the delegation of power to a subordinate authority to determine production capacity for tax purposes constitute an unconstitutional abdication of legislative function?
  • Can a lack of hearing at the initial stage of an administrative tax determination be cured by a subsequent hearing before a review board?
  • Is the doctrine of separation of powers in the Pakistani constitutional system so rigid as to prohibit all delegation of legislative power to the executive?
  • Does the simultaneous notification of guiding principles and production capacity violate the requirements of the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944?
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• Zaheer Ahmad and Another vs Abdul Aziz and Othsrss1983 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-09
  specific performanceagreement to selltime of the essencedefaulting partypleadings and evidencesupreme court petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, defendants in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell a house, challenged the dismissal of their Regular First Appeal by the High Court. The trial and appellate courts concurrently found that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, whereas the defendants defaulted by refusing communications. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that time was of the essence of the contract and that a scored-out clause in a subsequent agreement indicated an intention to bar specific performance. The Supreme Court held that a party who prevents the completion of a transaction cannot plead that time is of the essence. Furthermore, the Court held that the legal effect of a scored-out portion of a document must be specifically pleaded and supported by evidence, and cannot be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court without being raised in the courts below. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who prevents the completion of a transaction plead that time was of the essence of the contract?
  • Whether the legal effect of a scored-out portion of an agreement can be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court without being pleaded in the written statement?
  • Does the right to get a sale-deed registered survive for a reasonable time beyond the period specified in the agreement when time is not strictly of the essence?
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• Zaffar Abbas vs The State1983 SCMR 780 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-02-04
  criminal appealbailmurderballistic reportstatutory delay
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a criminal petition seeking leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the High Court in a case registered under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner is entitled to bail in a murder case when the ballistic evidence contradicts the prosecution's allegation of firing the fatal shot and the accused has remained incarcerated for a significant period. The Supreme Court converted the petition into a criminal appeal and held that the appellant was entitled to the concession of bail in view of the forensic discrepancy regarding the crime empty and the duration of custody. The key principle laid down is that where ballistic evidence fails to corroborate the firearm recovery attributed to the specific accused facing a murder charge, and the accused has suffered prolonged pre-trial detention, a case for further inquiry is made out under criminal jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail when the crime empty recovered from the spot does not match the gun recovered from him?
  • Does prolonged incarceration for sixteen months constitute a ground for granting bail in a capital charge?
  • Can a criminal petition for leave to appeal be converted into a criminal appeal by the Supreme Court?
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• Yousuf Raza and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 1220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-16
  jail appealprivate defencemurdermurderous assaultballistic expertcriminal appealSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail appeal arises from the conviction and sentence of the appellants, Yousaf Raza and Asif Raza, for murder and murderous assault. The prosecution case alleged that during a altercation involving the appellants' family, Yousaf Raza fired a double-barrel gun and Asif Raza fired a pistol, resulting in the death of Abdur Rashid and injuries to Rehmatullah. The trial court convicted the appellants under sections 304 Part-II, 307, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which conviction and modified sentences were largely maintained by the High Court of Sind. Upon leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the appellants acted in the right of private defence while attempting to rescue a family member from a mob attack. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution's upgraded version regarding the use of stones was an afterthought and that the injuries sustained by the family member were extremely minor. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction. The key principle laid down is that minor injuries and improved allegations regarding a mob attack cannot substantiate a plea of private defence against a deadly assault.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor injuries sustained by an accused can justify a plea of right of private defence against a deadly assault?
  • Can an improved version regarding the nature of a mob attack introduced later during the trial be accepted to alter the foundation of the prosecution case?
  • Whether the conviction under section 304 Part-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is sustainable when the evidence disproves the existence of a grave and sudden provocation or valid private defence?
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• Yasin and Others vs Mst. Hussain Bibi (Represented by Legal Heirs) and Other1983 SCMR 1250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-10Read full judgment →
• Yar Muhammad Khan vs Federal Land Commission1983 SCMR 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-26
  land reformsrevisional powersexchange of landproduce index unitsbona fide transactionsuo motu proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition challenging an order of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission, which declared certain land transactions of the appellant void under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The core legal questions involved the competence of the Chairman sitting singly to exercise revisional powers and the legality of declaring long-settled land transactions void without properly examining statutory criteria of bona fides. The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, holding that declaring an exchange transaction fictitious merely on the grounds of unequal produce index units was insufficient without considering the statutory factors outlined in Explanation III to paragraph 7 of the Regulation. The Court set aside the impugned orders to the extent of the exchange transaction and remanded the matter to the Federal Land Commission for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission sitting singly is competent to exercise revisional powers under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
  • Can an exchange of land under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 be declared void solely on the ground that the produce index units of the exchanged lands are unequal?
  • What factors must be considered by the Land Commission while determining the bona fides of a land transaction under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
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• Yaqub Shah vs Chief Settlement Commissioner (Punjab) and Other1983 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-22
  leave to appeallachescivil suitpublic auctiontransfer of propertydismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a civil revision petition challenging the dismissal of a suit regarding the transfer of a property. The petitioner claimed to have filed a KNCH form in 1959 for the transfer of a house in Rawalpindi but took no action for fourteen years until the property was disposed of via public auction in 1973. Subsequent challenges, including an appeal and a constitutional petition, were unsuccessful. The petitioner argued that because the prior constitutional petition was dismissed in limine solely on the grounds of laches, a subsequent civil suit was not barred. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's conduct, specifically the inordinate delay in pursuing his claim, disentitled him to any equitable relief. Consequently, the Court found the case unfit for the grant of leave to appeal and dismissed the petition. The judgment reinforces the principle that a litigant's conduct, particularly unreasonable delay and inaction, serves as a valid ground for denying judicial relief, regardless of the procedural history of prior litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a constitutional petition on the ground of laches bar a subsequent civil suit regarding the same subject matter?
  • Can a petitioner who delays action for fourteen years regarding a property transfer claim relief against a public auction?
  • Does the conduct of a petitioner, specifically inordinate delay, disentitle them to relief in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Yahya Bakhtiar vs The State1983 SCMR 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-09
  electoral misconductriggingcriminal appealacquittalburden of proofrepresentative offices
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a conviction for electoral misconduct. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution successfully established that the appellant was responsible for large-scale rigging in the constituency in question, either directly or through agents, as required under the relevant legal framework. The Supreme Court held that while the evidence demonstrated that rigging had indeed occurred on a large scale within the constituency, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant was personally responsible for such acts, either directly or through any other person, within the meaning of the applicable law. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgment of the Special Court dated 31-3-1981 and acquitted the appellant, discharging his bail bonds. The key principle laid down is that a conviction for electoral misconduct under the Holders of Representative Offices (Punishment for Misconduct) Order, 1977, requires specific proof of the accused's direct or vicarious involvement in the alleged rigging, and mere proof of rigging in a constituency is insufficient to sustain a conviction against a specific candidate without connecting them to the act.

  Questions settled

  • Does proof of large-scale rigging in a constituency automatically establish the criminal liability of a candidate under the Holders of Representative Offices (Punishment for Misconduct) Order, 1977?
  • What is the standard of proof required to connect a candidate to electoral rigging under the Holders of Representative Offices (Punishment for Misconduct) Order, 1977?
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• Wazir Khan vs The State1983 SCMR 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-10
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayco-accused abscondencemurdermilitary custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the Lahore High Court's dismissal of a bail application filed by the petitioner, who was accused of offences under Sections 302, 307, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner had been detained for over two years and nine months without the trial commencing, primarily because his co-accused brother, a military officer, had not been apprehended due to the military authorities' refusal to surrender custody. The High Court had denied bail under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, attributing the delay to the abscondence of the petitioner's brother as a person acting on his behalf. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the delay was neither attributable to the petitioner nor to anyone acting on his behalf, as the non-apprehension was due to the military's refusal to surrender custody. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can the abscondence of a co-accused brother be deemed an act of a person acting on behalf of the accused to deny statutory bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether an accused is entitled to statutory bail when the delay in trial is caused by the state's inability to apprehend a co-accused due to jurisdictional or administrative hurdles?
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• Waseem Hassan vs The State1983 SCMR 901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-28
  Zina-bil-jabrleave to appealmedical evidencecorroborationappreciation of evidenceHudood Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner under Section 7 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 for committing Zina-bil-jabr. The trial court convicted the petitioner and his co-accused, while acquitting another co-accused. On appeal, the Federal Shariat Court acquitted the co-accused due to his age and lack of maturity, but upheld the conviction of the petitioner based on the consistent testimony of the prosecutrix and corroborating medical evidence. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appreciation of evidence by the Federal Shariat Court regarding the petitioner's guilt warranted interference. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established its case beyond doubt through reliable ocular and medical evidence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a prosecutrix in a Zina-bil-jabr case requires corroboration when supported by medical evidence?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts when the guilt is established beyond doubt?
  • Whether a juvenile co-accused lacking sexual maturity can be acquitted while maintaining the conviction of another minor accused found physically fit?
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• Wali Muhammad and Another vs Mst. Hamida Bai1983 SCMR 191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-07
  summary evictionrented premisesstatutory notice periodtechnical objectionwaiver of objectionwidow's right to eviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment upholding the eviction of tenants from residential premises. The landlord initially filed ejectment applications under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, but passed away during proceedings. His widow subsequently issued notices under Section 14(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, seeking summary eviction. The tenants challenged the validity of these notices, arguing they failed to meet the prescribed two-month notice period. The Supreme Court addressed whether the failure to comply with the statutory notice period rendered the eviction order invalid. The Court held that while the notice period is a statutory requirement for the tenant's benefit, the tenants' failure to raise this technical objection before the Rent Controller, coupled with the significant passage of time before the eviction order, precluded them from challenging the notice's validity. The Court affirmed that such technical objections cannot be raised to defeat the spirit of summary relief provisions when no prejudice is demonstrated, upholding the High Court's decision to dismiss the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant challenge the validity of a notice under Section 14(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 for the first time in appeal?
  • Does the failure to comply with the statutory notice period under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 automatically invalidate an eviction order if no prejudice is shown?
  • Is a technical objection regarding the notice period sustainable when the tenant has allowed the proceedings to continue for a significant duration without raising the issue?
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• United Textile Mills Ltd., Faisalabad vs The Pakistan Industrial Credit1983 SCMR 397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-17
  winding upsecured creditorleave to appealnew pleaappellate stageIntra-Court Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from proceedings initiated by the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation against the petitioner-Company for its winding up due to the company's inability to meet its financial liabilities. The High Court, through a Single Judge and subsequently a Division Bench in an Intra-Court Appeal, ordered the winding up and the appointment of a liquidator. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that a secured creditor could not initiate winding-up proceedings without first surrendering its security. The Supreme Court examined the record and the impugned judgment to determine whether this legal point had been raised before the High Court. The Court held that the petitioner had failed to raise this specific contention before the Division Bench of the High Court. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petitioner could not be permitted to introduce a new legal argument at the appellate stage that was not presented in the lower court. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed on the basis that the issue was not agitated below.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a legal contention in the Supreme Court that was not argued before the High Court?
  • Is a secured creditor required to surrender its security before initiating winding-up proceedings under the Companies Act?
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• Umra and 8 Others vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1983 SCMR 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-02
  re-allotmentverified claimexcess landinformerproduce index unitssubsequent accretionrehabilitation scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether an allottee could claim re-allotment of land resumed from him as excess and allotted to an informer, on the basis of subsequent accretion to his verified claim. The appellant had received land allotment which was later reduced upon an informer's complaint, and the excess land was resumed and allotted to the informer. Years later, the appellant sought re-allotment of this resumed land based on subsequent enhancements and inheritance of units. The Settlement Commissioner and High Court repelled the claim, holding that the accretions occurred after the valid resumption and allotment to the informer, and that the appellant had earlier acquiesced to the resumption. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that subsequent accretions to an allottee's claim cannot justify the retrospective reopening of a valid prior allotment made to an informer based on information supplied, where the excess land was resumed with the appellant's acquiescence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allottee can claim re-allotment of land previously resumed as excess on the basis of subsequent accretion to his verified claim?
  • Can subsequent accretions to a claimant's entitlement justify the retrospective reopening of an allotment lawfully made to an informer?
  • Does an allottee who acquiesces to the resumption of excess land retain a right to reclaim it upon a later increase in his claim units?
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• Umar Hayat vs The State1983 SCMR 877 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-28
  murder convictionattempted murderocular evidencesentence reductionmotive discrepancycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the Peshawar High Court's judgment affirming the petitioner's conviction and sentences under Section 302 and Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Haji Sarwar and the attempted murder of two prosecution witnesses. The petitioner sought to challenge the conviction on the basis of enmity and alleged discrepancies in the prosecution's case, specifically regarding the motive and the sequence of the firing. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, including the ocular testimony of three eyewitnesses and the recovery of the crime weapon, finding no merit in the challenge to the conviction. Regarding the sentence, the Court rejected the argument that the motive was unclear or that the circumstances warranted a reduction in the death sentence. The Court also noted that while the petitioner claimed a potential compromise had been reached between the parties, no such formal settlement was presented. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction and sentences imposed by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy in the motive stated in the F.I.R. versus the trial testimony automatically invalidate a conviction?
  • Can a sentence of death be reduced solely on the basis of a claimed, but unverified, compromise between the parties?
  • Is ocular testimony from closely related witnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction when corroborated by recovery of the crime weapon?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Din vs M. Hussain and Another1983 SCMR 1299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-02
  pre-emptionabatement of appeallegal representativesnecessary partyLaw Reforms Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the order of the Lahore High Court consigning the appellant's Regular Second Appeal to the record as having abated due to the failure to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased vendor, Mst. Sharfan. The core legal question is whether the death of the vendor in a pre-emption appeal results in its abatement under the governing procedural law and whether the vendor is a necessary party to such proceedings. The Supreme Court held that in view of the amendment introduced by the Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972) prior to the expiry of the limitation period, the appeal could not abate, and further that a vendor is not a necessary party in a pre-emption suit or appeal. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the matter to the High Court for disposal on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death of a vendor in a pre-emption appeal results in its abatement?
  • Is a vendor a necessary party in a pre-emption suit or appeal whose absence proves fatal?
  • Does an amendment to the law of limitation and procedure operating before the expiry of the limitation period save an appeal from abatement?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Din vs Additional District Judge, Gujran Wala and Other1983 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-07
  evictionpersonal needmisreading of evidencerent controlgood faith requirementappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an appellate order reversing an eviction decree. The petitioner sought the eviction of respondents from disputed premises based on personal need. The Rent Controller initially ordered eviction, but the Additional District Judge reversed this, finding the petitioner had previously failed in an earlier eviction attempt for the same premises. The petitioner argued before the Supreme Court that the lower courts misread the evidence and that this misreading was material to the outcome. The Supreme Court examined the record and the High Court's reasoning. It held that even if the alleged misreading of evidence by the Additional District Judge were disregarded, the remaining evidence on record sufficiently established that the petitioner did not require the premises in good faith. Consequently, the Court found the petition lacked substance and dismissed it, affirming that appellate findings on factual matters, when supported by independent evidence, do not warrant interference under the Court's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a misreading of evidence by an appellate court warrant interference if the remaining evidence supports the conclusion?
  • Can a landlord seek eviction based on personal need after failing in a previous eviction attempt for the same premises?
  • Is the requirement of good faith in personal need eviction cases a question of fact that precludes Supreme Court interference?
  Read full judgment →
• Tufail Muhammad Khan (Represented by Muhammad Saleem Khan) and Others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner and Other1983 SCMR 1031 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-11
  settlement propertytransfer of propertyactual possessionwrit petitionleave to appealLahore High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal challenging the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the orders of settlement authorities regarding the transfer of property No. S.86-R-74, Ferozepur Road, Lahore. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the petitioners to a larger share of the property, specifically including a lawn and open land exceeding the physical possession held by their predecessor-in-interest. The Supreme Court held that occupants are entitled to the specific independent portions proven to be in their actual possession and consented to during settlement proceedings, and cannot claim additional areas never possessed or claimed before the original forum. The ratio decidendi is that a party cannot successfully claim property in writ or appellate proceedings that was neither in their possession nor claimed during the foundational settlement proceedings, especially when they consented to the transfer of their actual possession. The key principle laid down is that transfer of settlement properties is strictly tethered to actual physical possession and the specific boundaries accepted by the parties before the primary tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an occupant in settlement proceedings can claim additional land that was never in their actual possession?
  • Is a party bound by their lack of objection to the transfer of specific portions in their actual possession before the settlement authority?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in dismissing a writ petition seeking property outside the actual possession of the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Trustees of the Port of Karachi vs Abdul Ghani1983 SCMR 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-08-25
  Karachi Port TrustIndustrial Relations Ordinancedismissal from servicemisconductspecial enactment versus general lawLabour Court jurisdictionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind dismissing a constitutional petition. Leave was granted to examine whether the provisions of section 23 of the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886, prevail over section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, thereby barring a Karachi Port Trust employee from invoking the general law for relief against dismissal. The respondent, a permanent employee of the Karachi Port Trust, was dismissed after an inquiry where he was found guilty of misconduct based on an uncharged incident. He challenged his dismissal before a Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which ruled in his favor and ordered reinstatement. The High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition filed by the employer. The Supreme Court observed that the specific legal questions regarding the interplay and bar between the special enactment and the general labour laws were either not properly raised or preserved in the lower forums, and noted subsequent developments including the respondent's reinstatement and fresh proceedings. Consequently, the appeal did not require a definitive ruling on the academic questions of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 23 of the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886 prevail over section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can an employee invoke section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for seeking relief against dismissal when a special enactment provides a remedy?
  • Does a Labour Court have jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 from an employee governed by specific statutory service rules?
  • Whether a delinquent employee can be found guilty of a charge or incident not mentioned in the statement of allegations?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through Advocate General, N.W. F. P. vs Ahad Sher1983 PLD Supreme Court 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-16
  explosive substancesburden of proofconscious possessionunlawful purposecriminal appealacquittalproclaimed offender
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the State challenged the acquittal of the respondent, Ahad Sher, by the Peshawar High Court regarding a charge under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The respondent was found in possession of a hand-grenade while being a proclaimed offender. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of Section 5, specifically whether the prosecution must prove the absence of a lawful purpose or if the burden shifts to the accused once reasonable suspicion is established. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution must establish two ingredients: conscious possession of the explosive substance and circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the possession was for an unlawful purpose. Once the prosecution establishes these facts, the burden of proof shifts to the accused to demonstrate a lawful purpose. The Court found that the respondent's status as a proclaimed offender and the nature of the weapon—a military-grade hand-grenade—sufficiently raised a reasonable suspicion of unlawful purpose, which the respondent failed to rebut. Consequently, the acquittal was set aside and the conviction restored.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish an offence under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act 1908?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused to prove a lawful purpose under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act 1908 once the prosecution establishes reasonable suspicion?
  • What factors are relevant in determining whether the possession of an explosive substance gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of an unlawful purpose?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary to Government of Punjab and Another vs Noor1983 SCMR 1104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-14
  civil servantcompulsory retirementpublic interestqualifying servicepension rulesservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which set aside the retirement of the respondent from government service. The core legal question concerns the interpretation of Section 12(ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, specifically whether the requirement of completing 25 years of service for retirement in the public interest entails continuous service in one department or aggregate service under the government, and how periods of deputation and service counting towards pension are to be computed under the Pension Rules, 1963. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the findings of the Service Tribunal regarding the calculation of qualifying service and the interpretation of the statutory provision, while suspending the operation of the impugned order pending final disposal. The key principle noted is that statutory provisions regarding retirement after 25 years of service require close examination of qualifying service periods, including deputation and inter-departmental service under the relevant pension and civil service laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 12(ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 require continuous service in one department for the completion of 25 years of service?
  • How is the period of service spent on deputation with the Central Government to be counted for retirement purposes under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Can a civil servant be retired in the public interest after completing 25 years of service when part of their tenure includes service under the Central Government?
  Read full judgment →
• The Province of the Punjab and Another vs Kamaluddin and 301983 PLD Supreme Court 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-08
  service tribunal jurisdictionpolicy decisionnew plea on appealpay scale anomalycivil servantterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had directed the upgrading of the pay scale of Readers to the Judges of the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the Government's decision regarding pay scales constituted a non-justiciable policy decision beyond the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, and whether the appellant could raise this jurisdictional objection for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, having failed to raise the jurisdictional objection regarding the nature of the policy decision before the Service Tribunal despite having the opportunity to file written objections, could not agitate this point for the first time in appeal. Furthermore, the Court found the Tribunal's decision to be just and equitable, noting the anomaly of placing High Court Readers in a lower pay scale than their counterparts in the Board of Revenue. The principle laid down is that a party cannot raise a new legal plea before the Supreme Court that was not urged before the subordinate forum, particularly when that forum provided full opportunity to file written pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a jurisdictional objection for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not raised before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have the authority to interfere with a government decision regarding pay scales?
  • Are the appellant and respondent placed on equal footing regarding the submission of pleas before the Punjab Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• The Province of the Punjab and 2 Others vs Malik Muhammad Afzal1983 SCMR 564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-18
  nationalization of schoolsmartial law regulation 118landlord and tenantejectment petitionpersonal useleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which upheld the eviction of the Provincial Government from a privately managed school building taken over under Martial Law Regulation No. 118. The core legal question examined was whether a building owned by a private party and rented for a nationalized school could be treated as property attached to the school vesting in the Provincial Government under Paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation 118, and whether the Rent Controller had jurisdiction when the relationship of landlord and tenant was admitted. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit, affirming the lower courts' concurrent findings. The Court emphasized that since the relationship of landlord and tenant was not denied and personal bona fide need was established, the ejectment order was lawfully passed, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a privately owned building rented for a nationalized school vests in the Provincial Government under Martial Law Regulation No. 118?
  • Can a tenant challenge ejectment proceedings on ownership grounds after admitting the relationship of landlord and tenant before the Rent Controller?
  • Does a leave granting order by the Supreme Court constitute a binding precedent or dicta?
  Read full judgment →
• The Province of Punjab Ahd Others vs Mian Noor Uz Zaman Qureshi1983 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-11
  service tribunalpremature retirementwithdrawal of retirementcivil serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Province of Punjab against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which allowed the respondent's appeal and declared the notification regarding his premature retirement void ab initio. The respondent, a Jail Superintendent, had requested premature retirement with pension benefits, which was approved by the Governor by relaxing the rules. However, before the notification was published, the respondent attempted to retract his request for retirement, which the government refused to accept. The core legal question concerns the effect of a retraction of a retirement request after its acceptance by the competent authority but before its publication. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the point regarding whether a subsequent withdrawal of a retirement request is of consequence after its acceptance requires detailed consideration, and directed that the order of the Tribunal shall remain suspended.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant withdraw a request for premature retirement after it has been accepted by the competent authority?
  • Does the Governor have the jurisdiction to relax rules for premature retirement?
  • Whether the publication of a retirement notification is necessary for the finality of the acceptance of retirement?
  Read full judgment →
• The Inspector General of Police and Othfrs vs Muhammad Farid1983 SCMR 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-21
  service tribunalquantum of punishmentpolice disciplinedismissal from serviceleave to appealcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, departmental superiors, sought leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which had substituted the respondent Head Constable's punishment of dismissal from service with censure and stoppage of three annual increments for misconduct involving insubordination and use of abusive language. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal has the authority to interfere with the quantum of punishment awarded to a civil servant in disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal possesses wide powers under section 5 of the Administrative Tribunals Act to confirm, set aside, vary, or modify the impugned departmental order. The key principle laid down is that the Service Tribunal is legally competent to interfere with punishments imposed by departmental authorities in appropriate cases, and the exercise of such power does not raise a question of law of public importance warranting interference under Article 212 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal has the power to interfere with the punishment imposed by departmental authorities in disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the exercise of power by the Service Tribunal to modify a departmental punishment raise a question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• The Evacuee Trust Property Board and Another vs Muhammad Nawaz1983 SCMR 1275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-23
  master and servantservice lawdeclaratory decreestatutory ruleswrongful dismissalEvacuee Trust Property Boarddisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding a decree that declared the respondent's removal from service as an Inspector with the Evacuee Trust Property Board illegal. The core legal question was whether the respondent, whose employment was terminated without a show-cause notice or adherence to disciplinary procedures, could seek a declaratory decree, or if the relationship was strictly governed by the 'master and servant' doctrine, limiting the remedy to damages. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was illegal because the Board had adopted statutory Efficiency and Discipline Rules, which regulated the service conditions of its employees. Consequently, the 'master and servant' doctrine was inapplicable to the extent that statutory rules governed the employment. The Court affirmed that where service conditions are controlled by statutory rules, the employer's pleasure is surrendered, and any dismissal in violation of such rules is actionable through a declaratory suit. The petition was dismissed as the lower courts correctly applied the law regarding the binding nature of statutory service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee of a statutory body seek a declaratory decree for wrongful dismissal if the service conditions are governed by statutory rules?
  • Does the 'master and servant' doctrine apply to employees whose service conditions are regulated by statutory rules?
  • Is a dismissal of an employee illegal if it violates the Efficiency and Discipline Rules adopted by the Evacuee Trust Property Board?
  Read full judgment →
• The Deputy Inspector Generl of Police, Punjab Lahore vs Muhammad1983SCMR 665 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-05
  service tribunalleave to appealefficiency and discipline rulesillegal gratificationdepartmental inquirycorruption charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had set aside the departmental dismissal of the respondent traffic constable for corruption. The core legal question was whether a regular inquiry through an Inquiry Officer under rule 6(4) of the Punjab Police Efficiency and Discipline Rules is mandatory in every case involving a charge of corruption, precluding the summary procedure under rule 6(3). The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the Tribunal's decision raises a question of public importance as it would render rule 6(3) redundant in all corruption cases. Consequently, the Court suspended the impugned order of the Service Tribunal and directed an early hearing. The key principle laid down is that summary inquiry procedures under disciplinary rules should not be automatically barred in corruption cases solely on the nature of the charge without considering the scope of applicable statutory rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a regular inquiry is mandatory under rule 6(4) of the Punjab Police Efficiency and Discipline Rules whenever a charge of corruption is made?
  • Can the summary procedure prescribed in rule 6(3) of the Efficiency and Discipline Rules be adopted in cases involving allegations of corruption?
  • Does an interpretation rendering a disciplinary rule redundant raise a question of law of public importance warranting leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range vs Ants Ur1983 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-31
  departmental proceedingscriminal acquittalservice lawmisconductdisciplinary actionPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, challenging the decision of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The respondents, an Inspector and an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, were dismissed from service for grave misconduct. The Tribunal accepted their appeals, reasoning that because the respondents had been acquitted of the same charges by a Criminal Court, the departmental authorities lacked a basis for dismissal and should have awaited the criminal verdict before initiating disciplinary action. The petitioner contends that acquittal in criminal proceedings does not bar departmental proceedings and that the Tribunal's view incorrectly restricts departmental action solely to cases where a government servant is convicted by a Criminal Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the case raises a substantial question of law of public importance regarding the relationship between criminal acquittal and departmental disciplinary proceedings. The Court ordered the appeals to be prepared for hearing, while maintaining the interim stay order previously in place.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acquittal by a Criminal Court automatically bar departmental proceedings against a government servant on the same charges?
  • Are departmental authorities legally required to await the outcome of criminal proceedings before initiating disciplinary action for misconduct?
  • Is departmental action against a government servant restricted only to instances where the servant has been convicted by a Criminal Court?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Hyderabad and 2 Others vs Mst.1983 SCMR 1158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-07
  evacuee propertysurrendered landoption to repurchaseinstallment paymentsMartial Law Regulationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two civil appeals arising from a common question of law regarding the recovery of purchase price for excess land surrendered by evacuee displaced persons under Martial Law Regulation 89 and Martial Law Regulation 91. The respondents, who had secured land allotments in District Tharparkar, were required to surrender excess portions but were given the option to repurchase them under various successive administrative schemes and amendments concerning installment payments. The core legal question was whether a purchaser, in seeking exemption from a subsequent restrictive amendment (correction slip of 1965), could selectively claim the benefit of an intervening beneficial concession (memorandum of 1963) promulgated after they had already exercised their option to repurchase. The Supreme Court held that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by claiming the benefit of a subsequent beneficial amendment while rejecting its associated obligations or later modifications; they must be governed by the Scheme as it stood when they exercised their option. The appeals were accordingly allowed and the High Court judgments set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a purchaser of surrendered evacuee land can claim the benefit of an intervening concession introduced after the exercise of the option to repurchase while rejecting subsequent restrictive amendments?
  • Are purchasers of excess land governed by the scheme as it stood at the time of exercising their option to repurchase?
  Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain vs Pehlwan Khan and Other1983 SCMR 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-05
  criminal revisionwithdrawal of complaintacquittaljurisdictionframing of chargelocus standirevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a criminal revision petition filed by an eyewitness against an order of acquittal. The core legal questions concerned the jurisdiction of a Sessions Court to allow the withdrawal of a criminal complaint after cognizance had been taken, and whether an eyewitness, not being the original complainant, was barred from filing a revision petition under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner argued that the trial court acted without jurisdiction by acquitting the accused without framing charges as required by law, and that the High Court failed to exercise its revisional powers to correct this illegality. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the procedural irregularities regarding the withdrawal of the complaint and the failure to frame charges, declined to interfere. The Court held that ordering the proceedings to start afresh would be futile because the available evidence was insufficient to substantiate any charge against the respondents. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, emphasizing that the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction to revive proceedings where the underlying evidence is lacking.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Court of Session have the jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of a criminal complaint after cognizance has been taken?
  • Is an eyewitness who is not the original complainant barred from filing a revision petition under Section 439(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court exercise its revisional jurisdiction to recall an illegal order passed by a subordinate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Taj Din vs Muhammad Ismail1983 SCMR 1051 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-20Read full judgment →
• Taj Din vs Bashir Ahmad and Other1983 SCMR 844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-03-08
  transfer of propertysettlement authoritiesindivisible unitconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionsenior allotteefindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a dispute over the transfer of a composite property comprising a ground-floor shop and a first-floor residential accommodation in Lahore under settlement laws. The petitioner and respondent, both non-claimant allottees, sought transfer of the property. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred the entire property as a single indivisible unit to the respondent as the senior allottee, which decision underwent various rounds of appeals, remands, and constitutional petitions before the High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the settlement authorities correctly treated the property as an indivisible unit and whether findings of fact regarding divisibility and seniority of allottees could be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the finding of the settlement authorities regarding the indivisibility of the property was a finding of fact reached upon a conscious application of mind, and was thus not amenable to reversal or review by superior courts under writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, concurrent findings regarding the respondent's seniority as an allottee were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the finding of settlement authorities regarding the divisibility of a property is open to review in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can superior courts interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by settlement authorities upon a conscious application of mind?
  • Whether a residential accommodation on top of a shop in a commercial locality must necessarily be disposed of separately under settlement laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Wazir Ali Shah vs Ghulam Rabbani and Other1983 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-12
  ejectmentrent restrictiondefault in rent paymentstriking off defenceimplied condonationabatement of proceedingslegal representatives
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld an order of ejectment against a tenant for failure to comply with a rent deposit order. The core legal questions were whether the landlord had impliedly condoned the tenant's default by delaying the ejectment application for over two years, and whether the proceedings had abated due to the failure to bring legal representatives of deceased co-landlords on record. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the tenant failed to prove compliance with the rent deposit order despite being granted an opportunity to produce receipts. The Court found no merit in the argument of implied condonation, as the tenant had falsely claimed compliance before the Rent Controller. Furthermore, the Court rejected the abatement plea, noting it was not raised in lower forums and that the existing applicants were already legal representatives of the deceased. The judgment affirms that a tenant's failure to deposit rent as directed under the relevant rent restriction law justifies striking off the defence and ordering ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay by a landlord in filing an ejectment application after a tenant's default constitute implied condonation of that default?
  • Can a plea of abatement due to the death of a party be raised for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is a tenant's defence liable to be struck off for failure to comply with a court order to deposit rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Wahajul Hasnain Rizvi vs DR. Zahid Hussain1983SCMR774 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-13
  tenancy agreementefflux of timesecurity depositrent defaultevictionconflicting precedentslandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a landlord's petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which had allowed a tenant's appeal against an eviction order. The central dispute involved whether the non-payment of rent for three months could be adjusted against a security deposit held by the landlord under a tenancy agreement that had expired by efflux of time in 1972. The High Court, identifying conflicting precedents from the Supreme Court regarding whether the terms of an expired tenancy agreement continue to govern the relationship or whether the statutory provisions of the Rent Ordinance prevail, chose to follow the later decision, thereby allowing the adjustment and dismissing the eviction petition. However, the Supreme Court noted that this conflict in its own prior decisions had been previously identified in another case, which had directed that such matters be referred to a larger bench for authoritative settlement. Consequently, the Supreme Court recognized the necessity of resolving this recurring legal conflict regarding the applicability of expired tenancy terms versus statutory rent laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement of tenancy that has expired by efflux of time continue to govern the relationship between landlord and tenant?
  • Can rent arrears be adjusted against a security deposit held under an expired tenancy agreement?
  • Are the terms of an expired tenancy agreement superseded by the statutory provisions of the Rent Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Sarfraz Hussain Bokhari vs District Magistrate, Kasur and Oteiers1983 PLD Supreme Court 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-09
  religious processionlicensing powerPolice Actbreach of peaceconstitutional petitionregulatory conditionsfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional appeal concerns the refusal by the District Magistrate to grant a license for a religious procession, citing potential breach of peace due to local opposition. The core legal question was whether the District Magistrate, under Section 30 of the Police Act, is empowered to permanently refuse a license for a religious procession. The Supreme Court held that the refusal was without lawful authority and set aside the order. The Court determined that the right to conduct religious processions on public streets is an inherent legal right, subject only to reasonable regulation. The licensing power conferred by the Police Act is intended for the regulation of such processions—specifically regarding routes, timings, and conduct—to prevent public disorder, rather than for their total prohibition. The likelihood of a breach of peace justifies the imposition of regulatory conditions, not the outright denial of the right to assemble. Consequently, the licensing mechanism cannot be utilized to impose a perpetual ban on religious observances.

  Questions settled

  • Can the licensing authority under the Police Act permanently refuse a license for a religious procession?
  • Is the right to conduct a religious procession on public streets an inherent legal right?
  • Does the likelihood of a breach of peace justify the total prohibition of a religious procession?
  • What is the scope of the power to regulate religious processions under the Police Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Niamat Ali and 4 Others vs Dewan Ja1ram Dass and Another1983 PLD Supreme Court 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-24
  counter-claimlegal set-offequitable set-offabatement of suitcontinuing wrongpossessioncross-suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arose from a High Court judgment that allowed a defendant's counter-claim for possession of agricultural land. The appellants had entered into possession under sale and development agreements with the original owner, who later sued for possession but died during the pendency of the suit. That suit abated under Order XXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to the late impleadment of his legal representatives. Subsequently, the appellants filed a separate suit, in which the deceased's legal representatives filed a counter-claim for possession. The Supreme Court examined whether a counter-claim for possession is maintainable under Order VIII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or as an equitable set-off. The Court held that a counter-claim is distinct from a set-off, which is restricted to money claims. While a court may treat a counter-claim as a plaint in a cross-suit, it cannot do so if such a suit is otherwise barred. Because the original owner's suit for possession had abated, and dispossession is a complete injury rather than a continuing wrong under Section 23 of the Limitation Act 1908, a fresh suit was barred under Order XXII Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant plead a counter-claim for possession of land as a legal or equitable set-off under Order VIII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Under what circumstances can a court treat a defendant's counter-claim as a plaint in a cross-suit?
  • Does the abatement of a suit for possession of land bar a subsequent counter-claim or cross-suit for the same relief under Order XXII Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does forcible dispossession or ouster constitute a continuing wrong under Section 23 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Khurshid Abbas Gardezi and Others vs Multan1983 PLD Supreme Court 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-17
  land acquisitionhousing schemestatutory interpretationpublic authoritycompensationPunjab Development of Cities Actultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing an Intra-Court Appeal regarding land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Multan Development Authority. The petitioners contended that the acquisition was illegal because the Government failed to issue a specific notification under Section 1(3) of the Punjab Development of Cities Act, 1976, applying the Act to the City of Multan before declaring it a city or establishing an authority under Sections 3 and 4. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that a notification under Section 3(1) declaring an area a city inherently manifests the Government's intention to extend the Act to that area, as the Act cannot be applied to a city that has not yet been legally constituted. The Court emphasized that when reviewing actions by public authorities, courts must explore every possible avenue for validity before striking down an order. While acknowledging the petitioners' grievance regarding the harsh compensation limits under the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973, the Court found no legal error in the proceedings and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notification declaring an area a city under Section 3(1) of the Punjab Development of Cities Act, 1976, satisfy the requirement of applying the Act to that city?
  • Is it a duty of the courts to explore every possible avenue for the validity of an order passed by a public authority before striking it down?
  • Can land acquisition proceedings be challenged on the ground that a separate notification applying the Act to the city was not issued under Section 1(3) of the Punjab Development of Cities Act, 1976?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mowahed Hussain vs Syed Karam Ali Shah1983 SCMR 1015 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-09
  Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) ActSettlement Scheme Vtransfer of propertyallotment of houseC.H. Formleave to appealSettlement Authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's Letters Patent Appeal regarding the transfer of a disputed property. The petitioner, an Assistant Land Reclamation Officer, occupied House No. 62 in Khanewal and sought its transfer by filing a C.H. Form in April 1960. The property, however, was categorized as 'C' and disposed of through a lottery system to the respondent. The petitioner challenged this disposal, arguing that he was in possession and had applied for transfer prior to the lottery, and that the Settlement Authorities failed to follow mandatory procedures under Settlement Scheme V, specifically regarding the publication of lists and the opportunity to file objections. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner raised substantial questions of law concerning the interpretation of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and the procedural compliance of the Settlement Department. Finding that these issues required deeper examination, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the disposal of the property violated the statutory scheme and the rights of the claimant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property categorized for disposal through lots can be transferred to a claimant who filed a C.H. Form prior to the lottery?
  • Are Settlement Authorities required to publish lists of properties under Settlement Scheme V and provide a mandatory period for filing objections?
  • Does the disposal of a property under paragraph 4 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, require compliance with preceding paragraphs?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Masood Hussain Zahidi vs Aziz Ahmad1983 SCMR 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-16Read full judgment →
• Syed Manzoor Hussain Shah vs Syed Agha Hussain Naqvi and Another1983SCMR775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Syed Jaffar Hussain vs Government of Punjab1983 SCMR 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-17
  service appealretirementpolice servicelimitationcondonation of delayPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal concerning his retirement from police service as an Assistant Sub-Inspector. The core legal question involved the lawfulness of the retirement order passed under Section 12(ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, upon the recommendation of an Advisory Committee, alongside contentions of being condemned unheard. The Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by time by twenty-one days, with no sufficient cause shown for the condonation of delay, and noted that the petitioner had improperly pursued a writ petition in the High Court instead of diligently prosecuting his remedy before the Service Tribunal. The key principle laid down is that petitions filed with unexplained delay and a lack of diligent prosecution before the appropriate forums are liable to be dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court can be dismissed when it is barred by time without sufficient explanation for the delay?
  • Does an order of retirement passed under Section 12(ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 warrant interference when the aggrieved party fails to prosecute the matter diligently before the appropriate service tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Asghar Ali Imam vs Muhammad Ali1983 SCMR 723 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-30
  landlord and tenantejectmentdefault in rentsecurity depositstatutory tenancyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by a landlord against an order of the Sind High Court, which had set aside an ejectment order previously granted by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the first Appellate Court. The core dispute concerns whether a tenancy agreement, which stipulated a six-month term, ceased to govern the relationship after the initial period expired, thereby rendering the tenancy statutory, and whether a security deposit held by the landlord could be adjusted against unpaid rent to negate a claim of default. The High Court had ruled in favor of the tenant, determining that the agreement had terminated, the tenancy had become statutory, and the security deposit was adjustable, thus precluding a finding of default. The Supreme Court, noting that similar legal questions were pending in other litigation, granted leave to appeal to resolve whether the contractual terms regarding the tenancy duration remained binding after the initial period and whether the security deposit was legally adjustable against future rent arrears.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenancy agreement cease to govern the relationship after the expiry of the initial term stipulated in the contract?
  • Can a security deposit held by a landlord be adjusted towards future rent to prevent a finding of default?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Wasi Jan vs Sultan Saeed Jan and Other1983 SCMR 1265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-19
  gift of landdelivery of possessionminor doneesjudicial admissionconclusive admissionpower of attorneymutation of gift
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a suit for declaration challenging the validity of a gift of land made by the petitioner's late father in favour of his children from a second marriage. The donor had executed a power-of-attorney, leading to a mutation of gift in 1928. The core legal question was whether the gift was validly executed, particularly regarding the delivery of possession and the binding nature of an admission made by the donor during court proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which dismissed the suit. The Court held that the gift was valid because, where the donees are minor children of the donor, actual delivery of possession is not required, and mutation recitals suffice. Furthermore, the Court established that an admission of fact made by a party under Order X, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is on the same footing as pleadings and is conclusive for the purpose of the suit, distinguishing it from evidentiary admissions made outside of court proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is actual delivery of possession necessary for a valid gift when the donees are minor children of the donor?
  • Are admissions of fact made by a party under Order X, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 conclusive for the purpose of the suit?
  • Can a court pronounce judgment based on admissions made under Order X, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Muhammad Khan and Another vs Federal Land Commission and 4 Other1983 SCMR 797 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-05
  Land Reforms Regulationbona fide transferdoweralienation of landland holding exemptionrevenue recordburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from proceedings under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (Martial Law Regulation No. 115). The petitioner challenged the rejection of his claim to exempt 55 acres of agricultural land, which he alleged was transferred to his wife as dower, from his total land holding. The Land Commissioner had previously rejected this claim, noting the absence of formal alienation, mutation, or revenue record entries demonstrating the wife's ownership. The core legal question was whether the alleged transfer of land as dower constituted a bona fide transaction under the Regulation. The Supreme Court upheld the rejection, finding that the petitioner failed to satisfy the criteria set out in Explanation (XII) of paragraph 7 of the Regulation. Specifically, the petitioner could not demonstrate that the wife exercised management over the land, paid land revenue, or received rent or batai shares. The Court affirmed that in determining the bona fide nature of such transfers, the Commission must consider factors like management, payment of revenue, and receipt of income, which were absent in this case.

  Questions settled

  • What factors must be considered by the Land Commission to determine if a land transfer is bona fide under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
  • Does a mere mention of land transfer as dower in a Nikah Nama suffice to prove alienation of land under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
  • Can a party raise a new legal point before the Supreme Court that was neither raised in the writ petition nor argued before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Alias Sulla Saleh Muhammad vs The State Muhammad Husain1983 SCMR 1155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ali vs Khushi Muhammad1983 PLD Supreme Court 243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-09
  redemption of mortgageres judicataright of redemptionTransfer of Property ActCode of Civil Procedurepreliminary decreefinal decreefunctus officio
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the maintainability of a second suit for redemption of a mortgage. The appellant, a mortgagor, previously failed to comply with a decree requiring payment of the mortgage debt by a specific date, leading to an order in 1945 that purported to debar him from redeeming the property. The core legal question was whether this 1945 order, passed in the absence of a preliminary decree strictly conforming to Order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, extinguished the right of redemption and barred the subsequent suit on the principle of res judicata. The Supreme Court held that the 1945 order was a nullity and without jurisdiction. The Court established that the right of redemption, conferred by Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, is a substantive right that can only be extinguished by a decree passed in strict compliance with the prescribed procedural forms. As the previous decree did not adhere to these requirements, the right of redemption subsisted, and the subsequent suit was not barred by res judicata.

  Questions settled

  • Does a decree that fails to comply with the procedural requirements of Order XXXIV, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, effectively extinguish the mortgagor's right of redemption?
  • Can a court pass an order debarring a mortgagor from redemption if the previous decree was not a preliminary decree in the form prescribed by law?
  • Does the principle of res judicata bar a second suit for redemption if the previous order debarring redemption was passed without jurisdiction?
  • Is a court considered functus officio after passing a final decree that does not contemplate further proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Suleman Ghazi vs Ghulam Haider and Another1983 SCMR 1058 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-14
  ejectmentpersonal bona fide requirementtenantrent restrictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal against an order of ejectment. The respondents originally sought the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from the disputed bungalow under section 13 of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (West Pakistan Ordinance VI) of 1959 for non-payment of rent, and subsequently filed another petition under section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 on the ground of personal bona fide requirement. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, holding that the premises were required in good faith, and the High Court dismissed the tenant's appeal. The core legal question was whether a landlord can maintain a subsequent rent application on the ground of personal requirement during the pendency of an earlier rent case. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly evaluated the evidence demonstrating the landlords' bona fide personal requirement, finding the respondents lived in their father's house and lacked suitable alternative accommodation. The petition was dismissed with a four-month extension for execution subject to regular rent payment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord can file a second rent case on the ground of personal requirement during the pendency of an earlier ejectment petition?
  • Does a landlord residing in their father's house satisfy the requirement of not being in possession of a suitable building in the same urban area?
  Read full judgment →
• Suleman and Others vs Assistant Commissioner, Dera Murad Jamali and Other1983 SCMR 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-22
  Martial Law Regulation No. 117land resumptionejectment noticecultivating possessionconstitutional petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing their constitutional petition, which challenged ejectment notices issued against them following the resumption of disputed land under Martial Law Regulation No. 117. The petitioners claimed rights based on an agreement of sale and alleged cultivating possession. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had a legal right to retain possession or challenge the ejectment notices despite failing to apply as owners under the regulation and failing to establish cultivating possession. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded the petitioners had no legal right or locus standi to remain in possession, as their ownership claim stood foreclosed for failing to apply under paragraph 7 and their tenancy claim was rejected in favor of the contesting respondents. The Court laid down that the power to eject unauthorized occupants is necessarily implied in the regulation to enable grantees to fulfill the terms of their grant, applying the principle of necessary intendment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who fails to apply for land under paragraph 7 of Martial Law Regulation No. 117 can claim legal rights based on an agreement of sale?
  • Does an authority under Martial Law Regulation No. 117 have the implied power to eject unauthorized occupants of resumed land?
  • Whether a constitutional petition against ejectment proceedings is premature if alternative remedies within the revenue hierarchy were not availed?
  Read full judgment →
• Subhanuddin vs The State1983 SCMR 635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-28
  murdercircumstantial evidencelast seen togetherrecovery of dead bodycriminal appealconfessional statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the conviction of the appellant under sections 302 and 404 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of the deceased and sentence of death and rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question involved the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, including the last-seen theory, pointing out of the dead body, extra-judicial/judicial confessions, and incriminating recoveries of blood-stained weapons and currency notes. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prosecution successfully established a watertight chain of circumstantial evidence proving the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, as the testimony of the prosecution witnesses remained unshaken, the recoveries were duly corroborated by medical and chemical evidence, and the appellant failed to offer any plausible explanation for the disappearance of the deceased. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the judgment of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence including the last-seen theory and pointing out of the dead body?
  • Does the failure of an accused to provide an explanation for the disappearance of a person last seen in their company form a strong circumstance against them?
  • Whether minor discrepancies or the use of a single attesting witness for multiple recoveries vitiates recovery memos under criminal law?
  Read full judgment →
• State vs Salim Ali, Chairman, Ally Brother & Co., Lahore1983 SCMR 1302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-26
  smugglingimport policy ordercustoms actjoblot and stocklotburden of proofquashing of proceedingscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment that quashed proceedings pending before a Special Judge, Customs, against respondents accused of smuggling ammunition. The core legal question was whether the imported ammunition constituted "joblot/stocklot" quality, which is prohibited under the Import Policy Order, 1974, thereby justifying charges under the Customs Act, 1969. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to provide any evidence to substantiate the allegation that the imported goods were of the prohibited "joblot/stocklot" quality. Conversely, evidence indicated the ammunition was new and consistent with import documentation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, holding that without proof that the goods fell within the prohibited category, the charge of smuggling could not be sustained. The Court affirmed that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the factual basis of the alleged violation, and failing this, proceedings cannot continue. This ruling emphasizes that criminal liability for smuggling cannot be established on mere allegations unsupported by evidence regarding the nature of the imported goods.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove that imported goods fall within the prohibited category of 'joblot/stocklot' quality invalidate a charge of smuggling?
  • Can proceedings under the Customs Act, 1969 be sustained when the prosecution fails to establish that the imported goods were in contravention of the Import Policy Order, 1974?
  • Is the definition of 'joblot' and 'stocklot' quality established in law absent a specific notification defining these terms?
  Read full judgment →
• State vs Habibur Rahman and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-25
  murderacquittal appealpolice statementscontradictionsretrialmiscarriage of justiceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by the State and the complainant challenged the acquittal of the respondents in a double murder case, which had been upheld by the High Court based on alleged contradictions between trial depositions and police statements recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerned the legality and procedural propriety of using conflicting, unauthenticated police statements, improper confrontations of witnesses, and material misreadings of the record during the trial and appellate stages. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that serious procedural irregularities, the use of disputed police statements without proper verification, and misreading of evidence resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice and prejudice to both parties. The Court laid down that under section 3 of the Evidence Act 1872, courts are not bound by 'evidence' alone but must consider all matters before them to determine high probabilities, that courts must supervise proceedings actively rather than act as mere spectators, and that statutory provisions regarding witness confrontations under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and section 145 of the Evidence Act 1872 must be strictly followed. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments of the courts below and remanded the case for a fresh trial before a different judge.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court rely on unauthenticated or disputed copies of police statements recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without holding an inquiry or determining their genuineness?
  • Whether the definition of 'proved' under section 3 of the Evidence Act 1872 permits courts to look beyond strict narrow definitions of evidence to consider wider matters and high probabilities?
  • What is the proper procedure for confronting witnesses with their previous statements under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and section 145 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Does a trial judge bear an active duty to supervise the correct reading and putting of record to witnesses during a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation vs Mst. Begum Jan1983 PLD Supreme Court 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-18
  insurance policyfraud of agentmisrepresentation of agevoid contractrefund of premiumimputation of knowledgeinsurance claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a civil appeal concerning the scope and effect of condition number 9 of an insurance policy, which allowed the insurer to treat the policy as void if the insured's age was misrepresented. The assured obtained an insurance policy through a sales officer of the appellant corporation, understating his true age to qualify for a more advantageous scheme. Following the assured's death, his nominee filed a claim, which the insurer rejected on the grounds of fraud and concealment. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court and the Lahore High Court concurrently held that the fraud was committed solely by the insurer's agent, rendering the policy enforceable. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that an insurance contract is vitiated by the fraud of an agent acting against the principal, and that the knowledge of the agent cannot be imputed to the principal under such circumstances. The Court further held that the insurer validly invoked its right to dispute the policy within the statutory period of two years under section 45 of the Insurance Act. The judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the claim was modified to a mere refund of the premiums paid.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the fraud of an insurance agent in filling out a proposal form vitiates the contract of insurance and prevents the agent's knowledge from being imputed to the principal?
  • Can an insurance company treat a policy as void when the true age of the insured exceeds the maximum entry age permissible under the specific scheme?
  • Whether the limitations contained in section 45 of the Insurance Act apply when the insurer disputes the veracity of the proposal form within two years of the policy's issuance?
  • What is the extent of relief available to a nominee under an insurance contract that has been declared void due to fraudulent misrepresentation regarding age?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Messrs Pakistan1983 PLD Supreme Court 280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-16
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit of mandamusstatutory dutygroup insurancecontractual disputequestion of factinsurance claimStanding Order 10-B
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment directing the State Life Insurance Corporation to pay insurance claims for natural disabilities of employees of a private company. The core legal questions were whether the Corporation had a statutory duty under the Life Insurance (Nationalization) Order, 1972, to provide insurance coverage for all contingencies specified in Standing Order 10-B of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and whether the High Court could resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the existence and scope of an insurance contract through constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Corporation’s general duty to conduct business does not impose a specific, peremptory statutory obligation to provide insurance policies matching every requirement of the Standing Orders. Furthermore, the Court ruled that disputed questions of fact regarding the terms of an insurance contract are not amenable to adjudication under constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the High Court’s decision was set aside, and the petitions were dismissed, establishing that statutory duties must be express and unequivocal, and contractual disputes require plenary proceedings rather than writ petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Life Insurance (Nationalization) Order, 1972, impose a specific statutory duty on the State Life Insurance Corporation to provide insurance coverage for all contingencies listed in Standing Order 10-B of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can disputed questions of fact regarding the terms and scope of an insurance contract be adjudicated within the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Is a writ of mandamus appropriate to compel an insurance corporation to make payment of claims when the existence of the contractual obligation to cover specific risks is contested?
  Read full judgment →
• Sitam Khan vs The State1983 SCMR 896 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-03
  misreading of evidencecriminal appealattempt to murderfirearm injuryeyewitness testimonyappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a judgment of the High Court of Peshawar, examines whether the conviction of the appellant Sitam Khan under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code was founded on a clear misreading of evidence. The prosecution case involved an altercation arising from a dispute over a gold ring, during which firearm injuries were allegedly sustained by eyewitnesses Aziz Khan and Ghazi Khan. While the trial court convicted multiple accused persons under Sections 382 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, the High Court acquitted some accused, converted the co-accused Mumtaz Khan's conviction to a lesser offense, and maintained the appellant's conviction under Section 307 on the assumption that the appellant had fired the effective shot hitting the injured witness. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the High Court committed a clear misreading of the ocular testimony, as the evidence established that the co-accused Mumtaz, and not the appellant, had fired the effective shot, while the appellant's alleged ineffective firing was not positively established by the lower courts. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 307, and ordered the appellant's immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code can be sustained when the High Court's judgment is based on a clear misreading of ocular evidence regarding the identity of the assailant who fired the effective shot?
  • Does the misattribution of an effective firearm shot from one co-accused to another vitiate the conviction for an attempt to commit murder?
  • Can an appellant be held guilty of ineffective firing when neither the trial court nor the High Court recorded a positive finding proving such act?
  Read full judgment →
• Sirajuddin (Represented by Legal Hiers) vs Fakhruzzaman and Another)S1983 SCMR 525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-12
  civil jurisdictionrevenue courtestoppel by pleadingtitle disputetenancy rightsforfeiture of tenancyagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over agricultural land where the respondent-landlord sought the petitioner-tenant's eviction. The core legal question was whether the civil court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit, given the petitioner's claim of ownership and the contention that the matter fell exclusively within the revenue court's competence under the North-West Frontier Province Tenancy Act, 1950. The Supreme Court held that the civil court correctly exercised jurisdiction. The ratio is that when a tenant sets up a title of ownership in themselves, thereby completely ousting the landlord's title, the dispute transcends the scope of a simple tenancy matter and becomes a title dispute, which is triable only by a civil court. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a party is estopped by their own pleadings and conduct from denying the jurisdiction of a forum they previously challenged or from raising new factual pleas, such as claims for compensation for improvements or lack of notice, that were not properly pleaded or framed as issues during the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's claim of ownership in a revenue court proceeding allow the landlord to initiate a title suit in a civil court?
  • Can a party raise new factual pleas regarding improvements and notice of forfeiture for the first time at the final appellate stage?
  • Does the principle of estoppel by conduct and pleading apply when a defendant denies the jurisdiction of a court based on their own self-serving averments?
  Read full judgment →
• Sirajud Din Banjmin (through His Legal Heirs) and Another vs Haji1983 SCMR 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-19
  constitutional petitioncompromise decreesettlement of propertyextension of timelocus standicontractual obligationsdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition after the appellants failed to comply with the terms of a court-sanctioned compromise. The appellants, who were in possession of disputed property, had entered into a compromise agreement with the respondents, agreeing to pay a specific sum and vacate part of the property by a set date, failing which their petition would stand dismissed. Upon failing to meet the deadline, the appellants sought an extension, which the High Court refused, leading to the dismissal of their petition. The Supreme Court examined whether the compromise was binding and whether the High Court erred in refusing the extension. The Court held that the appellants, having voluntarily invoked the High Court's jurisdiction to record the compromise, could not subsequently challenge its legality or validity. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that when time is fixed by mutual agreement between parties, it cannot be unilaterally altered by the Court without the consent of all parties. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the sanctity of the compromise and the finality of the settlement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who invokes the court's jurisdiction to record a compromise subsequently challenge the legality of that compromise?
  • When a time limit for performance is fixed by mutual agreement between parties in a court-sanctioned compromise, can the court unilaterally alter that time without the consent of all parties?
  • Does the failure to incorporate a penalty clause into a formal court order preclude the enforcement of that penalty if it was part of the underlying compromise agreement recorded by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sibghatullah vs Utma and Other1983 SCMR 747 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-13
  Local GovernmentElection LawMinority RepresentationMandatory ProcedureChairman ElectionVacancy in MembershipStatutory Interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the election of the petitioner as Chairman of a Local Council due to the failure to hold elections for a minority seat. The core legal question was whether the election of a Chairman and Vice-Chairman of a Local Council is valid if the election for a minority seat in that council was not held, and whether the vacancy created by such failure allows the council to function under the power to act notwithstanding vacancies. The Supreme Court held that the election of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman was invalid because it violated the mandatory procedural requirements prescribed by statute. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the specific provisions governing the sequence of elections for Local Councils must be strictly followed. The key principle laid down is that the election of office-bearers in a Local Council is contingent upon the prior completion of elections for all reserved seats, including minority seats, and that general provisions regarding vacancies do not override these mandatory procedural prerequisites.

  Questions settled

  • Can the election of a Chairman and Vice-Chairman of a Local Council be held before the election for a minority seat is completed?
  • Does the power of a local council to act notwithstanding a vacancy in its membership override the mandatory requirements for holding elections for reserved seats?
  • Is the election of a Chairman and Vice-Chairman void if the statutory sequence of elections for reserved seats is not followed?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Zaman and Others vs Government of N. W. F. P. and Other1983 SCMR 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-22
  shops and establishmentsbarbers and hair-dressersclosed daystatutory exemptionnotificationconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the Peshawar High Court judgment regarding notifications issued under the West Pakistan Shops & Establishments Ordinance, 1969, which directed that barbers' and hair-dressers' shops, hammams, and saqqawas remain closed on Mondays and not be exempt from certain provisions. The core legal question was whether the Ordinance applied to barbers' and hair-dressers' shops in the North-West Frontier Province and whether the government had the authority to issue notifications regulating their closure and withdrawing exemptions. The Supreme Court held that the Ordinance, validated by the Validation of Laws Act, 1975, applied to the municipal and cantonment limits of the province, and that the government possessed the statutory power under section 5 of the Ordinance to withdraw exemptions and mandate closed days for such establishments. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that the executive retains statutory authority to regulate operating hours and closed days for specific categories of establishments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the West Pakistan Shops & Establishments Ordinance, 1969, applies to barbers' and hair-dressers' shops in the North-West Frontier Province?
  • Does the government have the power under the West Pakistan Shops & Establishments Ordinance, 1969, to withdraw exemptions previously granted to certain establishments?
  • Can the government direct specific classes of shops to observe a closed day under the West Pakistan Shops & Establishments Ordinance, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and Other1983 SCMR 1049 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-01
  displaced personwrit jurisdictionauction of propertysettlement schemeequitable considerationsdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that declined to interfere with the auction of an open plot. The petitioner, a transferee of the plot, failed to deposit the full price within the time period agreed upon with the Additional Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, the authorities auctioned the plot. The petitioner argued that the auction was procedurally flawed due to the lack of mandatory notices required under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The High Court rejected this contention, primarily citing the petitioner's own conduct in failing to meet payment obligations, thereby disentitling him to discretionary writ jurisdiction. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the High Court failed to consider equitable factors, such as his status as a displaced person, his long-term physical possession, and the existence of a permanent structure on the plot. The Supreme Court, without deciding the merits, converted the petition into an appeal to further examine the legal implications of the auction process in light of the cited precedent regarding procedural requirements for such auctions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a transferee of an open plot challenge an auction sale if they failed to deposit the price within the agreed timeframe?
  • Does the failure to pay the price of a plot within the agreed period disentitle a petitioner from seeking discretionary writ jurisdiction?
  • Is the issuance of specific notices under Settlement Scheme No. VIII a mandatory prerequisite before auctioning a plot?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad Khan and Others vs Ilam Din and Other1983 SCMR 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-26
  specific performanceagreement to sellproprietary rightsAbadkari Schemeleave to appealcolonization of government lands
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a regular second appeal, concerning a dispute over land originally allotted under the Abadkari Scheme. The core legal question revolves around whether an agreement to sell land executed before the acquisition of proprietary rights is void under section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The Supreme Court considered the arguments presented, particularly relying on precedent regarding the statutory bar on transfers, and granted leave to appeal to examine whether the agreement in question violated the relevant statutory provisions. The Court held that an arguable case was made out regarding the interpretation and application of section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, laying down that transactions affecting government-allotted land prior to obtaining proprietary rights require detailed scrutiny against statutory restrictions.

  Questions settled

  • Is an agreement to sell government-allotted land executed before obtaining proprietary rights void under section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  • Whether a suit for specific performance is maintainable on the basis of an agreement executed contrary to the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad and Another vs Jamadar Ghulam Ghaus (Represented1983 SCMR 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-09-12
  order of remandcivil appealappellate powerssufficiency of evidenceremand under Order XLI Rule 23-Afinal determination of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether, in a first appeal against an order of remand made under Rule 23-A of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court could examine the merits of the case and finally decide it by restoring the trial court's findings. The plaintiff had filed a suit for eviction and possession of agricultural land, claiming the defendants were trespassers, which the defendants contested by asserting ownership through a partition and purchase. The trial court decreed the suit, but the District Judge remanded the matter for framing fresh issues. The High Court set aside the remand order and restored the trial court's decree, which was subsequently upheld in a Letters Patent Appeal. The Supreme Court held that when an appellate court hears an appeal against a remand order under Rule 23-A, it possesses the power under sections 107 and 103 and Order XLI Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure to finally determine the suit if the evidence on record is sufficient, untrammelled by the grounds of the remand order. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can go into the merits of the case and finally decide it when hearing an appeal against an order of remand under Rule 23-A of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • What are the powers of an appellate court when examining an appeal against an order of remand?
  • Does the appellate court have the power to finally determine a suit under Rule 24 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure if the evidence on record is sufficient?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Daraz Khan vs The State1983 SCMR 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-24
  murdersentence reductionlife imprisonmentocular testimonymedical evidenceabscondencespur of the momentinterested witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased by gunshots. The trial court's death sentence was previously confirmed by the Peshawar High Court. Leave to appeal was granted to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence, alleged delay in lodging the report, unexplained long abscondence, and asserted discrepancies between the ocular testimony and medical evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the presence of related eye-witnesses in the village Chowk natural and trustworthy, while rejecting the appellant's implausible explanation for absconding for seven years. However, upon reviewing the evidence concerning motive, the Court observed that the occurrence appeared to have erupted on the spur of the moment rather than with premeditation. Consequently, the Supreme Court altered the sentence from death to life imprisonment with enhanced fine and compensation, while extending benefit under Section 382, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related eye-witnesses sitting at a village common place (Chowk) during evening time can be relied upon to sustain a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether prolonged, unexplained abscondence of an accused corroborates ocular testimony in a murder trial?
  • Can a sentence of death under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to life imprisonment where the crime appears to have occurred on the spur of the moment without established premeditated motive?
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• Sher Baz Khan vs Darvesh and Another1983 PLD Supreme Court 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-12
  acquittalinterested witnesscorroborationchance witnessblood feudcriminal appealidentity of assailants
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against the acquittal of the respondent by the Peshawar High Court in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent despite the testimony of the complainant, who was the father of the deceased. The Supreme Court examined the prosecution's evidence, specifically the testimony of the complainant and two alleged eyewitnesses. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, agreeing that the two eyewitnesses were 'chance witnesses' who had not actually seen the occurrence. Regarding the complainant, while acknowledging his presence at the scene, the Court held that due to the existing blood feud and enmity between the parties, his testimony required independent corroboration to establish the identity of the assailants. As no such corroboratory evidence was present on the record, the Court affirmed the acquittal. The key principle laid down is that in cases involving deep-seated enmity, the uncorroborated testimony of an interested witness is insufficient to sustain a conviction, necessitating independent evidence to confirm the identity of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can the uncorroborated testimony of an interested witness be sufficient to sustain a conviction in a murder case involving blood feud?
  • Are witnesses who are not naturally present at the scene of an occurrence considered 'chance witnesses' whose testimony requires scrutiny?
  • Is the High Court justified in acquitting an accused when the prosecution evidence lacks independent corroboration regarding the identity of the assailants?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Mansoor Ahmad vs Faizul Hassan and 8 Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-22
  ejectment applicationpersonal needresidential buildinglandlord and tenantpleadingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a rent dispute where the landlady sought the eviction of the tenant on multiple grounds, including personal need for her children's use and conversion of the premises. The Rent Controller ordered eviction on these two grounds, which was subsequently upheld by both the Additional District Judge and the Lahore High Court in a writ petition. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner-tenant raised a technical objection, arguing that the landlady's ejectment application used the word 'use' instead of 'occupation' when describing her children's need for the residential building, which allegedly conformed to the statutory language for non-residential rather than residential premises. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the technical distinction between 'use' and 'occupation' in the pleadings did not defeat the landlady's claim. The Court ruled that when the application and evidence are read as a whole, it is abundantly clear that the landlady intended to get the house vacated for her children's residence, and the choice of words made no substantial difference.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of the word 'use' instead of 'occupation' in an ejectment application for a residential building defeat a landlord's claim for personal need?
  • Should technical errors in the wording of a landlord's pleadings under rent laws override the clear intent established by the evidence as a whole?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Ghulam Qadir vs Malik Abid Hussain and Other1983 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-16
  Supplementary Settlement Scheme No. IIurban land allotmenttemporary allotteerural claimantarea rationing systemceiling on allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a leave to appeal granted to examine whether the appellant's entitlement to the allotment of urban land, previously temporarily allotted to him as a rural claimant, should be governed by a ceiling of 30 kanals or 4 kanals fixed under paragraph 8 of Supplementary Settlement Scheme No. II. The core legal question concerns the correct interpretation and application of the circular letters and area rationing schemes issued by the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner regarding the maximum scale of allotment permissible to rural claimants holding temporary urban land. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's entitlement was subject to the lesser ceiling fixed under the scheme and the subsequent area rationing system, as adopted by the Central Government's final decision, which intended to maintain parity rather than create an incongruous higher ceiling for rural claimants over urban claimants. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs, affirming the lower court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the entitlement of a rural claimant holding temporary urban land is governed by the 30-kanal ceiling or the reduced ceiling fixed under paragraph 8 of Supplementary Settlement Scheme No. II?
  • Does the area rationing system and its reduced ceiling apply to old temporary allottees whose entitlements were later protected by the second proviso to paragraph 24 of Supplementary Settlement Scheme No. II?
  • Can a rural claimant holding temporary urban land claim a higher ceiling of allotment than that applicable to urban claimants under the settlement scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Ataullah vs Muhammad Naseem Yar Khan1983 SCMR 1062 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-01
  personal requirementejectmentmisreading of evidencelandlord and tenantleave to appealrented premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a landlord's petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had reversed an order for the ejectment of a tenant from a shop in Sialkot. The Additional District Judge had initially accepted the landlord's plea of personal requirement for the shop. However, the High Court overturned this decision, reasoning that the landlord's admission of having conducted his business for several years prior to renting out the shop undermined his claim of personal need. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court's conclusion was based on a misreading of the evidence, as the record suggested the factual position was the reverse of what the High Court had assumed. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the case required further examination due to the apparent misreading of evidence. Leave to appeal was granted to determine the validity of the High Court's findings regarding the landlord's personal requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does a misreading of evidence by the High Court regarding a landlord's personal requirement constitute valid grounds for granting leave to appeal?
  • Can a landlord's claim for personal requirement be defeated solely by the fact that he was already conducting business when the premises were rented out?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Ahmad vs Messrs Unilever Ltd. and Another1983 SCMR 1043 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-15
  trade mark registrationsettlement agreementintellectual propertycompromise decreepharmaceutical productshomoeopathic medicines
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had upheld the rejection of the petitioner's trade mark application by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the petitioner and the respondent reached a settlement agreement to resolve their dispute. The core question before the Court was whether it could record and give effect to this compromise agreement regarding the registration of the trade mark. The Supreme Court accepted the settlement, which permitted the petitioner to register the trade mark subject to specific limitations on the goods for which it could be used—specifically restricting it to medicines used in Homoeopathy, excluding Allopathic pharmaceutical products and glycerine-based goods. Consequently, the Court set aside the previous orders of the Registrar of Trade Marks and the High Court, allowed the appeal, and directed the Registrar to register the trade mark in accordance with the agreed terms. The principle established is that the Court may dispose of a trade mark dispute by recording and enforcing a voluntary settlement reached between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court give effect to a settlement agreement reached between parties during the pendency of a trade mark dispute?
  • Is a court empowered to set aside previous orders of a Registrar of Trade Marks and a High Court to implement a compromise reached between the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Abdul Aziz vs The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Another1983 SCMR 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Sharif Hussain and Others vs Hav. Pir Bakhsh and Other1983 SCMR 857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-04
  rent controlejectmentlandlord-tenant relationshipstatutory tribunaljurisdictionpreliminary issueremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order remanding a rent dispute to the District Judge. The core dispute involved an ejectment application where the petitioners contested the Rent Controller's jurisdiction, arguing that a title dispute existed between the parties regarding the transfer of the property. The Rent Controller had initially ordered eviction, but the District Judge reversed this, ruling that the Rent Controller lacked competence to determine title. The High Court subsequently remanded the matter, holding that the Rent Controller possesses the jurisdiction to determine the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship as a foundational fact for exercising its authority. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that a statutory tribunal of limited jurisdiction is inherently empowered to decide the preliminary facts necessary to establish its own jurisdiction. The Court held that such findings are subject to appellate review, and since the case was remanded for a fresh decision on merits, the petitioners would have full opportunity to present their case before the District Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to determine the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Can a statutory tribunal of limited jurisdiction decide the foundational facts required to exercise its own jurisdiction?
  • Is a Rent Controller competent to determine title disputes in the context of an ejectment application?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamsuddin vs Mst. Naziran and 2 Other1983 SCMR 1118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-09
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantconstitutional jurisdictiondefault in rentdisplaced persons actleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of the High Court to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with an ejectment order passed against the petitioner by the Rent Controller and upheld by the appellate authority. The core legal questions involve the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant, the requirement of statutory notices under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and section 13-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, and the effect of non-payment of rent. The Supreme Court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant was duly established, and although the absence of notice under section 13-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance initially excused the tenant regarding default, his continued failure to tender or deposit rent after the appellate authority's decision constituted a forfeiture of his right of tenancy. The Court laid down the principle that a tenant who withholds rent despite an adverse finding on the relationship of landlord and tenant forfeits equitable relief and discretionary constitutional remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant forfeit the right of tenancy by failing to tender or deposit rent after an appellate authority affirms the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Whether the High Court can properly refuse discretionary constitutional relief to a tenant who withholds rent despite adverse findings?
  • Does an offer to deposit arrears of rent before the Supreme Court cure a prior default established during lower proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamroz and Another vs Assistant Collector and Other1983 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-18
  ejectment of tenantsdefault in paymentlease moneytenancy rightscondonation of defaultrevenue courts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed a writ petition challenging the ejectment of tenants. The petitioners, who were tenants, were ejected by the Assistant Collector for non-payment of lease money regarding Rabi and Kharif crops for the year 1979. After exhausting their remedies through appeals to the Collector, the Additional Commissioner (Revenue), and the Member, Board of Revenue, the petitioners sought relief in the High Court, which was denied. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that they had attempted to pay the lease money to the respondent prior to the ejectment proceedings and had subsequently deposited the amount with the trial court. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the lower courts, which consistently held that the petitioners had defaulted on their payment obligations. The Court affirmed that a subsequent deposit of the lease money does not condone the initial default. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as being without merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the subsequent deposit of lease money with a trial court condone a prior default in payment by a tenant?
  • Can a tenant avoid ejectment proceedings by depositing arrears after the default has already occurred?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakoor Muhammad and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-10
  Supreme Court jurisdictionNorthern AreasJudicial CommissionerHigh CourtConstitutional petitionLeave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner for Northern Areas at Gilgit, which convicted them under section 325/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner for Northern Areas, Gilgit, constitutes a judgment passed by a High Court so as to attract the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 185 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the appellate jurisdiction under Article 185 pertains exclusively to judgments of a High Court of a Province of Pakistan as envisaged under Article 175 of the Constitution. Since the Court of the Judicial Commissioner is not a High Court for a Province, the appeal is not maintainable. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under Article 185 does not extend to decisions rendered by courts in the Northern Areas that do not qualify as a High Court of a Province.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Northern Areas is a High Court within the meaning of Article 175 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 extend to judgments passed by the Judicial Commissioner for Northern Areas?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against a judgment delivered by a court in the Northern Areas that is not a Provincial High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Hussain vs The State1983 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-19
  murder convictionsentence reductioninterested witnessbenefit of doubtsudden flare-upappreciation of evidencedeath penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder. The core legal question concerned the reliability of the prosecution's evidence, specifically whether the testimony of an allegedly interested witness could be relied upon to sustain a conviction after the co-accused was acquitted due to the benefit of the doubt. The Supreme Court re-evaluated the evidence and affirmed the appellant's guilt, finding no infirmity in the testimony of the complainant, who had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant in a daylight occurrence. However, regarding the sentence, the Court observed that the incident lacked pre-planning and arose from a sudden flare-up. While the appellant did not satisfy all conditions for the exception of sudden provocation, the Court held that the circumstances warranted a reduction in the penalty. The principle laid down is that where a murder occurs in a sudden, unplanned confrontation, even if the strict requirements of the exception for sudden provocation are not fully met, the court may exercise discretion to impose the lesser sentence of life imprisonment rather than the death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of an interested witness if the co-accused has been acquitted?
  • Does the absence of pre-planning in a murder case justify the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is the benefit of the doubt extended to a co-accused sufficient to invalidate the entire prosecution case against the main accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Muhammad vs The State And 5 Other1983 SCMR 1173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-06
  criminal procedurepossession disputecivil court jurisdictioninjunctionstatus quolease agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave of the Court against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court dated 27th April 1977, which had directed the restoration of possession of a piece of land to the respondents under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question involved was whether a Magistrate or the High Court in proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 retains jurisdiction to order restoration of possession when a civil court is already seized of the matter and has passed interim orders regulating possession. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. The Court held that where a civil court is actively seized of a property dispute and has passed orders regulating possession, proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are ousted, and criminal authorities lack jurisdiction to interfere with or restore possession contrary to the civil court's determinations. The key principle laid down is that the domain of civil courts regarding possession must prevail, and criminal forums cannot adjudicate upon or alter possession rights already regulated by competent civil judicial orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Magistrate retain jurisdiction under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a civil court is already seized of the subject-matter and has issued orders regulating possession?
  • Can the High Court in revision under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 disregard subsequent civil court orders regulating possession in favor of an earlier interlocutory order?
  • Whether proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are liable to be quashed when civil litigation regarding the same property is pending and active?
  Read full judgment →
• Shafaat Ahmad Qureshi and Others vs Government of Punjab and Other1983 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-10
  service lawlocus poenitentiaeseniority disputeservice tribunal jurisdictionestoppelabsorption of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal's decision regarding the service conditions and seniority of a respondent, formerly a Divisional Engineer in the defunct Thal Development Authority. The respondent, having been absorbed into the Irrigation and Power Department, had explicitly requested appointment as an officiating Executive Engineer on specific terms, which the government implemented. Subsequently, the respondent challenged his seniority and terms of absorption, seeking retrospective benefits and a different date of absorption. The Service Tribunal accepted his appeal, disregarding his earlier written request on the premise that it was not made of his own volition, and ordered his absorption from an earlier date. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, primarily to consider whether the respondent, having induced the government to act upon his specific written request, possessed a locus poenitentiae to retract it without formal withdrawal. Furthermore, the Court seeks to determine whether the Service Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by effectively ordering the government to make a specific appointment, a matter falling within the executive domain of the state.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government servant have a locus poenitentiae to retract a written request for appointment after the government has acted upon that request?
  • Can a Service Tribunal order the government to appoint a civil servant to a specific post, or does such authority lie exclusively with the executive?
  • Is a civil servant bound by the terms of their own written request regarding their appointment and seniority once the government has implemented those terms?
  Read full judgment →
• SH. Manzoorul Haq vs Begum Tasleem Riaz Hamdani and Other1983 SCMR 1022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-08
  specific performancerejection of plainttriable cause of actioninnocent purchaserscivil revisionres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order dismissing a civil revision petition in limine. The petitioner sought specific performance of a contract of sale, having previously filed and withdrawn a suit, followed by a second suit where the plaint was rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. After subsequent litigation, the petitioner filed a fresh suit, which was again rejected. The core legal question was whether a plaint can be rejected on the ground of an earlier suit's failure when the new suit involves different defendants and claims. The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly rejected the plaint because it failed to disclose a triable cause of action against the newly added defendants, who were innocent vendees for consideration. The Court affirmed that allegations of fraud and misrepresentation against original vendors, while potentially actionable in a suit for damages, could not serve as a basis for specific performance against subsequent innocent purchasers. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, as the trial court's finding regarding the lack of a triable cause of action remained irrefutable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be rejected for failure to disclose a triable cause of action against newly added defendants who are innocent vendees?
  • Does the rejection of a previous suit under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 preclude a subsequent suit if the cause of action against new defendants is distinct?
  • Can allegations of fraud and misrepresentation against original vendors be used to sustain a claim for specific performance against subsequent innocent purchasers?
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• Sh. Farzand Ali vs Government of Punjab and Other1983 SCMR 833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-02
  land lease renewalwrit jurisdictionestoppeladministrative policygrant conditionsacquiescence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition against a government order reducing the area of a leased land grant upon renewal. The core legal question was whether the government acted lawfully in reducing the leased area from 120 acres to approximately 58 acres when renewing the petitioner's lease, and whether the petitioner had a vested right to renewal on the original terms. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory notice requirements for renewal stipulated in the grant's conditions. Furthermore, the Court held that because the petitioner had voluntarily opted for and accepted the reduced area without protest after the lease had expired, he was estopped from challenging the government's decision in constitutional jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that a party who acquiesces to a modified administrative decision and acts upon it cannot subsequently challenge the outcome in writ jurisdiction, particularly when the underlying contractual conditions for renewal were not strictly satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Can a lessee challenge the reduction of a leased area in writ jurisdiction after having voluntarily accepted the reduced terms?
  • Does a failure to provide the mandatory notice for lease renewal under the grant conditions preclude a claim for renewal on original terms?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to constitutional relief when they have acquiesced to an administrative decision without protest?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to the Government of N. W. F. P. and Others vs Abdul Rahman1983 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-21
  limitationcondonation of delaygovernment litigationexecution of decreecivil procedureconsent decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the execution of a consent decree against the Government of N.W.F.P. The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their appeal by the District Judge, who had refused to condone the delay in filing the appeal against an order passed by the Civil Judge. The core legal questions were whether the Government is entitled to preferential treatment regarding the law of limitation and whether the procedural requirements of Section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 extend the limitation period for filing an appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Government is not exempt from the law of limitation and must be treated like any ordinary litigant. The Court affirmed that the Government's internal bureaucratic processes do not constitute sufficient grounds for condoning delay. Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of Section 82, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which regulate the execution of decrees against the Government, do not extend or alter the statutory period of limitation for filing an appeal against an order.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Government entitled to preferential treatment or special consideration regarding the law of limitation compared to an ordinary litigant?
  • Does the requirement under Section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to specify a time for satisfaction of a decree against the Government extend the limitation period for filing an appeal?
  • Can internal bureaucratic delays in consulting government functionaries constitute sufficient ground for the condonation of delay in filing an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of the Punjab and Others vs Bashir Ahmad1983 SCMR 1035 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-08
  leave to appealseniorityreinstatementcivil serviceMartial Law Orderretrospective promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two petitions seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The core legal question was whether, in light of the proviso to paragraph 5 of Martial Law Order No. 23 dated 22-10-1977, the Tribunal was legally justified in granting back-dated seniority to respondents who had been retired under Martial Law Regulation No. 114 on 18-3-1972 but were subsequently reinstated and promoted to Extra Assistant Commissioners. The respondents had been granted seniority over their compeers who were promoted during the period the respondents were out of service. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to resolve this conflict, declining to stay the Tribunal's order but directing that the cases be heard together with related appeals. The key principle under consideration is the determination of retrospective seniority for reinstated civil servants under Martial Law Order No. 23.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Punjab Service Tribunal is justified in conferring back-dated seniority to reinstated civil servants over their compeers who were promoted during the period of the former's retirement under Martial Law Regulation No. 114?
  • What is the legal effect of the proviso to paragraph 5 of Martial Law Order No. 23 of 1977 on the seniority of reinstated officers?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of N. W. F. P. Agriculture Department and Another vs Abdul Rehman, Forest Contractor and Other1983 SCMR 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-02
  condonation of delaylimitationconsent decreeexecution of decreeforest contractstatutory interpretationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order that dismissed a revision petition on the grounds of limitation. The dispute arose from a consent decree obtained by a forest contractor against the N.W.F.P. government. Following the decree, the government enacted Ordinance No. VII of 1980 and Regulation No. 1 of 1980, which terminated such contracts notwithstanding any court orders. The government sought to challenge the execution of the decree, but lower courts dismissed the challenge due to time-bar. The Supreme Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal. The Court held that when a matter involves an important legal question regarding the interpretation of new legislation that potentially impacts the executability of a decree, it is in the interest of justice to condone delay to decide the issue on merits. This approach prevents potential legal anomalies and ensures consistency, even where the government’s explanation for the delay is not entirely convincing, as the substantive legal question requires authoritative examination by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court condone delay in filing an appeal to resolve an important legal question regarding the interpretation of new legislation?
  • Does the government require greater latitude in respect of limitation than an ordinary litigant?
  • Is it appropriate to condone delay in filing an appeal to prevent potential legal anomalies in the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Sakhawat Ud Din and Others. vs Muhammad Iqbal and Other1983 SCMR 1269(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-23
  leave to appealwritten statementdefault in filing pleadingsdecree without evidencecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the passing of a decree in the absence of supporting evidence upon the failure of the defendants to file additional written statements. The core legal question for consideration is whether a court is competent to pass a decree under the provisions of Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without recording evidence in support of the plaintiff's case. Granting leave to appeal, the Court held that the question requires further consideration and ordered the appeal to be made ready on the present record for an early hearing, requiring security. The key principle relates to the procedural prerequisites for rendering a judgment and decree upon a party's default in filing pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree be passed under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 despite the absence of any evidence in support of the plaintiff's case?
  • Does the failure of defendants to file additional written statements automatically warrant the passing of a decree without further proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Noor Hussain vs Chief Settlement Commissioner Em1983 PLD Supreme Court 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-22
  Letters Patent Appealabatementsubstitution of legal representativeslimitation periodwrit jurisdictionconstitutional petitionCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses whether the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and Article 177 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to a Letters Patent Appeal arising from writ jurisdiction regarding the substitution of a deceased party and the resulting abatement. The core legal question was whether writ proceedings and Letters Patent Appeals emanating therefrom are governed by the procedural rules and limitation periods prescribed for civil suits and appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, or by residuary limitation provisions. The Supreme Court held that the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Limitation Act 1908 fully apply to constitutional petitions, writ proceedings, and Letters Patent Appeals arising therefrom, meaning that an application for impleading legal representatives must be filed within the prescribed period of ninety days, failing which the appeal abates. The key principle laid down is that procedural laws and penal consequences, such as abatement for failure to substitute legal heirs in time, apply uniformly to civil proceedings, constitutional petitions, and intra-court Letters Patent Appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Do the provisions of Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to a Letters Patent Appeal arising from writ jurisdiction?
  • Does Article 177 of the Limitation Act 1908 govern applications for impleading legal representatives of a deceased party in a Letters Patent Appeal?
  • Does the omission of abatement provisions by the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 have retrospective effect on an appeal that had already abated prior to its enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Muhammad Khan Alvi vs Bashir Ahmad and 15 Other1983 SCMR 1007 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-11
  displaced persontemporary allotmentsettlement authoritiesconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appealsitting allottee
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a displaced person and temporary allottee of land in 1947, challenged the allotment of land to the respondents who claimed as heirs of a previous allottee. Following protracted litigation involving multiple rounds before rehabilitation authorities, the High Court, and the Supreme Court, the Settlement authorities eventually decided the matter in favor of the petitioner, holding that the respondents' predecessor was not a sitting allottee and could not compete with the petitioner. A subsequent writ petition by the respondents before the Lahore High Court reversed this finding. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found substance in the petitioner's contentions that the Settlement authorities were competent to reach their conclusions on evidence and that disputed questions of fact do not form a proper subject for constitutional jurisdiction when a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction has properly appreciated the evidence. The Supreme Court accordingly granted leave to appeal to consider the questions raised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether disputed questions of fact form a proper subject for the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction when a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction has based its findings on evidence?
  • Whether settlement authorities are precluded from reaching their own conclusions on issues raised in an order of remand?
  • Whether heirs of a deceased claimant can claim the status of sitting allottees when the deceased did not take advantage of temporary allotment in the disputed estate?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanaullah and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-23
  cancellation of bailpre-arrest bailpost-arrest bailabductionzinahabeas corpusleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had cancelled the bail previously granted to the petitioners, Sana Ullah and Nazir, in a criminal case involving allegations of abduction and zina. The petitioners had initially been granted pre-arrest and post-arrest bail by the Additional Sessions Judge, Faisalabad, but the High Court subsequently cancelled these orders upon the complainant's application. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners sought to challenge this cancellation. While the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's impugned order at this stage, it acknowledged new developments brought to its attention, specifically the statement of the alleged victim, Mst. Ghafooran, made before a Civil Judge in a separate suit for conjugal rights, and the persistent failure of the victim's father to produce her in court despite habeas corpus proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal but granted the petitioners liberty to file a fresh bail application before the High Court, grounded upon these newly emerged facts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner file a fresh bail application in the High Court based on new facts after a previous bail cancellation order?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order cancelling bail when new, relevant facts have emerged?
  • Is the failure of a complainant to produce an alleged victim in habeas corpus proceedings a relevant ground for a fresh bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanaullah and 3 Others vs The State1983 SCMR 15 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-24
  criminal petitionleave to appealbail applicationinjured witnessaffidavit retractionmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for leave to appeal filed by Sanaullah and three others, challenging the High Court's order dated 3-3-1982, which dismissed their post-arrest bail application in a criminal case involving offences under sections 148, 302, 307, 324, 365, 451, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the retraction of an eye-witness by way of an affidavit constitutes sufficient ground for granting bail when another injured eye-witness, the complainant himself, supports the prosecution case. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit because the injured complainant, who sustained ten injuries, remains an available eye-witness to support the prosecution. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the principle that an affidavit by a single witness cannot override the direct testimony and existence of an injured complainant implicating the accused in a heinous crime.

  Questions settled

  • Does the retraction of an eye-witness by affidavit warrant the grant of bail when an injured complainant supports the prosecution case?
  • Whether bail should be refused to accused persons facing trial under charges including murder and attempted murder when direct incriminating evidence exists?
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• Sami Ahmad Jafri vs Third Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi and Other1983 SCMR 1082 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-10
  evictionterritorial jurisdictionconstitutional petitionrent restrictiondiscretionary relieflandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by a tenant challenging an order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, which was upheld through successive appellate and execution proceedings. The petitioner subsequently sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller on the ground that the premises fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the Cantonment Board, an objection raised for the first time after nearly twelve years of litigation. The High Court dismissed the constitutional petition, holding that the question of territorial jurisdiction was a disputed question of fact and that discretionary writ jurisdiction should not be exercised to allow a party to reopen a finally disposed of case on a plea not raised at the appropriate stage. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that a party who participated in proceedings on merits without raising the objection of territorial jurisdiction cannot invoke discretionary constitutional relief at a belated stage. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise the question of territorial jurisdiction for the first time in execution proceedings after participating in the trial and appellate stages without objection?
  • Whether the High Court can decline to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction when a party attempts to reopen a finally disposed of case after a prolonged delay?
  • Is the question of territorial jurisdiction of a Rent Controller considered a disputed question of fact not fit for investigation in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Salim Akhtar and 6 Others vs DR. Naeem Rathore and Other1983 SCMR 304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-21
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyundisputed possessionsettlement authoritieswrit jurisdictioncollusive transferpagri
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a shop, which was auctioned to the respondents, but challenged by the petitioners' predecessor, Hafiz-ud-Din, on the basis of his alleged prior possession. The central legal question was whether Hafiz-ud-Din held "undisputed possession" in his own right, thereby entitling him to the property's transfer under the relevant settlement laws. The High Court had previously determined that the claimant’s possession was derivative, acting merely as an agent or salesman for the original allottee, and that the underlying agreement was collusive. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, finding that the claimant’s own contradictory statements and the original allottee’s continued assertion of possession negated the claim of independent ownership. The Court affirmed that possession for the purpose of transfer must be held in one's own right, not on behalf of another. Furthermore, it held that collusive arrangements or payments of "pagri" to allottees to transfer possession are invalid, do not confer legal rights, and cannot serve as a basis for claiming the transfer of evacuee property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether possession for the purpose of transfer of evacuee property must be held in one's own right?
  • Does a payment of 'pagri' to an allottee for the transfer of possession confer a legal right to the transfer of the property?
  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact by a Settlement Authority if that finding is perverse to the material on record?
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• Saleh Muhammad vs The State1983 SCMR 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-20
  murderappellant convictioninjured eye-witnessabscondenceacquitted co-accusedcorroborationcriminal appealfatal shot
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a murder case where the appellant, Saleh Muhammad, was convicted under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death for firing the fatal shot, while his four co-accused were previously acquitted by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the testimony of eye-witnesses, partially disbelieved regarding the acquitted co-accused, could be relied upon to sustain the appellant's conviction, and whether abscondence served as sufficient corroboration. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the testimony of the injured complainant specifically attributing the fatal shot to the appellant, coupled with strong motive and prolonged abscondence, sufficiently distinguished his case from the co-accused and warranted his conviction. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of an injured eye-witness, when corroborated by a direct specific role and subsequent abscondence, can sustain a conviction even if co-accused have been acquitted on general or weaker evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of an eye-witness be relied upon against a non-acquitted appellant when it was disbelieved regarding his co-accused?
  • Whether abscondence can be used as corroborative evidence of ocular testimony in a murder trial?
  • Is the testimony of an injured complainant alone sufficient to sustain a murder conviction without independent corroborative ocular evidence?
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• Saleh Muhammad vs The State and Another1983 SCMR 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-09-05
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaymurder trialbail cancellationdiscretionary powerprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order of the High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondent, who was facing trial for murder, on the ground of delay in concluding the trial. Leave was granted to consider whether bail could be granted on the ground of delay before the expiry of the statutory two-year period specified in the third proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and whether expected or apprehended future delay could be factored into the decision. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted without jurisdiction by granting bail before the expiration of the mandatory two-year detention period, as future apprehended delay does not satisfy the statutory requirement. The Court ruled that the amendment introducing specific time periods made the grant of bail upon such delay a matter of strict right rather than general judicial discretion, thereby superseding previous discretionary practices. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and cancelled the bail granted to the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted to an accused charged with an offence punishable with death on the ground of delay when the statutory period of two years has not yet expired?
  • Is it open to a court to grant bail on the ground of delay by taking into account future apprehended delay?
  • Does the third proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 make the grant of bail upon the expiry of the specified period a matter of right rather than discretion?
  • Can a court entertain a repeated bail application on merits when a previous application has already been dismissed and no fresh grounds exist?
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• Salamuddin vs Ejaz Ahmad and Another1983 SCMR 1251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-12
  property transferSettlement Scheme No. VIIoccupationdispossessionsupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the question of whether the petitioner could be deemed to be in occupation of a house so as to be eligible for its transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VII. The High Court had ruled against the petitioner based on previous judicial precedents regarding occupation. Upon hearing the petitioner's counsel, who argued that those precedents were not apposite and that the case was similar to another cited precedent, the Supreme Court found prima facie force in the submission. The Court consequently granted interim protection against dispossession, ordered security, and directed that the appeal be made ready on the present record. The key principle revolves around evaluating the factual nature of occupation and eligibility for property transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VII based on applicable precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner can be deemed in occupation of a house to be eligible for its transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • Do prior decisions on property occupation apply universally or depend on the specific factual matrix of each case?
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• Salabat Etc. Khalid Mahmood vs The State Salabatetc.S1983 SCMR 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-14Read full judgment →