Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Bashir Ahmad and Others vs Additional Commissioner with Powers Of Settlement Commissioner (L) and Other1983 SCMR 1199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-12
  settlement lawbona fide purchaserallotment cancellationTransfer of Property ActDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actland grant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, purchasers of land from original allottees, challenged a High Court decision declaring their purchase invalid due to the underlying allotment being in excess of entitlement. The core legal question was whether purchasers of land allotted under settlement laws can invoke the principle of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 to protect their title as bona fide purchasers for value when the original allotment is subsequently cancelled. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the principle of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is not available in settlement matters. The Court reasoned that because allotments are subject to cancellation under Sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958, every purchaser is deemed to have knowledge of this potential incidence. Consequently, a purchaser cannot claim protection against the Department and must instead seek remedies against their vendor. The Court affirmed that such transactions are inherently subject to the statutory conditions of the settlement grant, excluding the applicability of the Transfer of Property Act 1882.

  Questions settled

  • Can a purchaser of land allotted under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 invoke Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 to protect their title?
  • Does the cancellation of an original allotment due to excess entitlement invalidate subsequent sales to third-party purchasers?
  • Is a purchaser of settlement land deemed to have notice of the potential for cancellation under Sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
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• Basham Khan and Others vs Syed Shafi Shah and Other1983 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-13
  review jurisdictionerror apparent on the face of the recordcondonation of delayopportunity of hearingrevisional powerland reforms
  Summary & questions settled

  This review application arises from a Supreme Court judgment dated 22-12-1976, which had set aside a High Court order and restored an order of the Chief Land Commissioner dated 19-12-1968. The applicants sought review, arguing that the Supreme Court's previous decision was based on a factual error regarding the nature of the defect in the proceedings. The High Court had originally quashed an earlier order dated 19-11-1960, passed in revision by Mr. Ahsan-ud-Din, on the grounds that it was a nullity due to a failure to provide an opportunity of hearing, violating the West Pakistan Land Reforms Rules, 1969. The Supreme Court, in its 1976 judgment, erroneously believed this defect of non-hearing applied to the later order of 19-12-1968. The Court held that an error apparent on the face of the record existed because the defect of non-hearing related specifically to the 1960 order, not the 1968 order. Consequently, the Court allowed the review, condoned the delay in filing, set aside its previous judgment, and restored the original Civil Petition for fresh consideration by a Petition Bench.

  Questions settled

  • Does an error regarding the specific order to which a procedural defect relates constitute an error apparent on the face of the record sufficient for review?
  • Can a court condone a delay in filing a review application where the applicant demonstrates a lack of knowledge of the impugned order?
  • Is an order passed in revision without providing an opportunity of hearing to affected parties a nullity under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Rules, 1969?
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• Barkat Ali vs The State1983 SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-04Read full judgment →
• Banna (Represented by Heirs) and 11 Others vs Mst. Hussain Bibi1983 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-09
  abatementlegal heirspower of attorneywithdrawal of appealcondonation of delaylocus standirestoration of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of applications for the re-hearing of a regular second appeal and the condonation of delay. The appeal had been withdrawn in 1973 by the appellants' attorney and counsel. Six years later, the legal heirs of one of the deceased appellants, Banna, sought to restore the appeal, arguing that Banna had died prior to the withdrawal, which terminated his attorney's authority, and that the delay should be condoned. The High Court refused to condone the delay and dismissed the restoration application as time-barred. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, holding that because the legal heirs of the deceased appellant were not impleaded within the prescribed statutory period, the appeal had abated in respect of the deceased. Consequently, the heirs lacked locus standi to seek restoration of the abated appeal. Furthermore, the attorney's authority remained valid for the surviving appellants, and the withdrawal was lawfully executed by their counsel.

  Questions settled

  • Do the legal heirs of a deceased appellant have locus standi to seek the restoration of an appeal if they failed to implead themselves within the statutory period and the appeal consequently abated?
  • Does the death of one appellant invalidate the authority of a common attorney to act on behalf of the remaining surviving appellants?
  • Can an appeal be restored on the application of heirs after a delay of six years without sufficient grounds for condonation of delay?
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• Bakhtiar and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-14
  multiple murderocular evidenceidentification under fire lightbenefit of doubtcorroborationrecovery of firearmscriminal conspiracyjail appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court concerning a gruesome multiple murder case where ten persons were killed during a night attack on a house in District Sanghar, and several others were injured. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony, the possibility of identification in the light of a raging fire, the application of the rule of corroboration in respect of interested witnesses, and the credibility of incriminating recoveries including firearms. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts convicting the appellants were well-founded, as the eye-witnesses were present at the scene and identified the culprits under the illumination of the fire, and their testimony stood sufficiently corroborated by ballistic evidence and weapon recoveries. The court laid down the principle that the acquittal of co-accused on the basis of benefit of doubt does not automatically vitiate the case against remaining convicts where independent and corroborated ocular and circumstantial evidence exists against them, and that previous enmity or litigation does not preclude co-accused from acting in concert when shared motives and subsequent compromises are established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether identification of culprits by eye-witnesses in the light of a burning house is reliable?
  • Does the acquittal of some co-accused on the benefit of doubt automatically entitle other convicts to an acquittal?
  • Whether the testimony of interested eye-witnesses can form the basis of a conviction when supported by strong corroborative evidence?
  • Can previous animosity or litigation between co-accused preclude them from joining together in the commission of a subsequent crime?
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• Bagh Ali vs Muhammad Anwar and Another1983 SCMR 1292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-09-11
  ocular testimonyretracted confessionmedical evidencecapital chargeacquittalinterested witnessappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Sind High Court, which had set aside the conviction and death sentence of the respondent for murder. The core legal question concerned the reliability of the sole ocular witness and the validity of a retracted judicial confession in a capital case. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s acquittal, finding that the prosecution’s case was fundamentally flawed. The Court held that where ocular testimony is inconsistent with medical evidence—specifically regarding the number of injuries sustained—and where the prosecution fails to clarify such contradictions, the testimony is unreliable. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a retracted confession is inadmissible if it lacks procedural safeguards, such as proper warnings, and contains material inconsistencies with the prosecution's own narrative. The key principle laid down is that the intrinsic worth of a witness's testimony must be evaluated first; if the Court finds the witness untruthful due to inconsistencies with material facts, the question of whether corroboration is required becomes irrelevant, and the evidence must be discarded.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the number of injuries render a witness's testimony unreliable?
  • Is a retracted judicial confession admissible if it lacks proper procedural warnings and contains inconsistencies with the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the basis of recoveries when the ocular testimony and confession are rejected?
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• Babu Khan vs Barkat Bibi and Other1983 SCMR 1098 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-29
  ejectment proceedingspersonal requirementspecific performancelandlord and tenantrent restrictionrecovery of damages
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from ejectment proceedings initiated by the heirs of a deceased landlord against a tenant. The tenant, having advanced a significant sum for the reconstruction of the property under an agreement that allegedly restricted the landlord's right to evict, challenged the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, the appellate court, and the High Court, which all ordered his eviction. The core legal question was whether an agreement between a landlord and tenant, which restricts the landlord's right to evict, can legally bar an ejectment order based on personal need, or if it merely provides a basis for a claim for damages. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the agreement did not affect the validity of the ejectment order. The Court affirmed that such an agreement does not grant a right to specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, but rather leaves the tenant with the remedy of a civil suit for the recovery of the advanced amount and damages. The principle established is that an agreement restricting eviction does not override statutory ejectment grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Can an agreement between a landlord and tenant restricting the right of eviction bar an ejectment order based on personal need?
  • Is an agreement for the advancement of funds for property reconstruction specifically enforceable to prevent eviction under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does a tenant have a remedy for the recovery of funds advanced to a landlord if the tenant is subsequently evicted?
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• Azimullah and Others vs Khawaja Inayatullah and Other1983 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-12Read full judgment →
• Azam Baig vs Chief Settlement Commissioner and Other1983 SCMR 1244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-12
  informant rightsland resumptionexcess land allotmentconstitutional jurisdictionsettlement authorities discretionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, successor-in-interest of an informant, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that declined to interfere with an order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, as an informant, possessed a statutory right to be allotted land resumed from respondents due to excess entitlement, or whether the authorities could permit the original allottees to purchase said excess land. The Supreme Court held that the settlement authorities acted within their discretion in allowing the original allottees to purchase the resumed land, noting that the excess resulted from administrative errors by revenue staff rather than fraud or collusion by the allottees. The Court affirmed that where the nature of the irregularity stems from official miscalculation rather than claimant misconduct, the authorities have the discretion to determine the method of disposal of resumed property. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, finding no justification to interfere with the High Court's refusal to exercise constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an informant have an absolute statutory right to be allotted land resumed from another party due to excess entitlement?
  • Can settlement authorities permit original allottees to purchase land resumed from them due to administrative miscalculation?
  • Is the High Court's refusal to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction against a discretionary order of the Board of Revenue sustainable when the order is based on administrative error rather than fraud?
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• Attu vs Ghulam Ali1983 SCMR 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-10
  ejectmentcondonation of delaysufficient causeex parte orderlimitationrented premisespetition for special leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Sind High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's appeal against an ejectment order as time-barred. The petitioner, who had been ejected via an ex parte order, sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, citing his detention in India and subsequent return to Pakistan. The High Court had dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of the condonation application, holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was inapplicable to appeals filed under Section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court observed that even if the High Court's legal interpretation regarding the applicability of Section 5 was erroneous, a remand would be futile because the petitioner failed to establish 'sufficient cause' on the merits of his case. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to resolve the legal question regarding the applicability of the Limitation Act to the Ordinance and dismissed the petition in limine, finding no justification for condoning the delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to establish sufficient cause for delay on the merits justify dismissing a petition for leave to appeal without deciding the underlying legal question of the applicability of the Limitation Act?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an application for condonation of delay without considering the merits of the reasons provided?
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• Atiqurrehman and Others vs Muha Mmad Ibrahim and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-13
  constitutional jurisdictionadequate alternative remedyex parte decreeminor without guardianrevival of suitIntra-Court AppealLaw Reforms Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a pre-emption suit where an ex parte decree against minor petitioners—sued without a guardian ad litem—was declared to be without lawful authority in an earlier constitutional petition. The respondents subsequently obtained revival of the suit before the trial court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners challenged the revival proceedings through a fresh writ petition and a subsequent Intra-Court Appeal, both of which were dismissed by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the constitutional petition was incompetent because an adequate alternative remedy was available under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court reiterated that invoking extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction to resolve interlocutory controversies in a civil suit, bypassing ordinary remedies provided by law, frustrates the constitutional scheme and must be avoided. The Intra-Court Appeal was also held barred under Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972. Consequently, the leave petition was converted into an appeal and dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge interlocutory proceedings in a civil suit when an adequate remedy is available under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the declaration of an ex parte decree as a nullity operate to wipe out the underlying suit proceedings entirely?
  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal maintainable when it arises from an incompetent constitutional petition and violates Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972?
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• Aswar Muhammad and Others vs Sharif Din and Other1983 SCMR 626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-23
  leave to appealinheritance disputeco-sharer possessionrevenue mutationssuit for declarationlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who were defendants in a property dispute, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court that had accepted the plaintiffs' second appeal, set aside concurrent findings of the lower courts, and decreed the plaintiffs' suit for declaration regarding inheritance. The core legal question concerned whether a suit for declaration and correction of revenue records was competent and barred by time where mutations had been attested in 1907 and 1908 reflecting only cultivating possession of certain co-sharers. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly decided that revenue mutations are fiscal arrangements for land revenue realization and do not confer substantive property rights or determine inheritance. The possession of one co-sharer is deemed to be for the benefit of all, meaning joint land possession prevents the suit from being time-barred. The key principle laid down is that administrative practices or revenue record entries regarding cultivating possession cannot override the rules of inheritance under custom or Shariat, and mutations do not impart sanctity or confer title to property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mutation entries in the revenue record can determine the devolution of the estate of a deceased person?
  • Does the possession of one co-sharer constitute possession for all other co-sharers in joint land?
  • Whether revenue mutations attested decades prior confer substantive rights in property?
  • Is a suit for declaration regarding joint land barred by time merely because the plaintiff is not recorded in cultivating possession?
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• Aslam Industries Ltd., Khanpur vs Pakistan Edible Corporation and Other1983 SCMR 316 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-15
  court-feeleave to appealstatutory interpretationPunjab Finance Actinterim stay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the demand for an additional court-fee. The core legal question is whether section 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 is subject to the proviso to Article 1 of Schedule I of the said Act, as substituted by section 8 of the Punjab Finance Act, 1973, rendering the demand for an additional court-fee of Rs. 15,000 unwarranted when that amount had already been paid on the suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contention requires further consideration and accordingly granted leave to appeal, while directing security to be furnished and staying the payment of the additional court-fee in the interim. The key principle laid down is that substantial legal contentions regarding statutory interpretation of court-fee provisions warrant a full hearing upon the grant of leave.

  Questions settled

  • Is section 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 subject to the provisions of the proviso to Article 1 of Schedule I of the said Act as substituted by the Punjab Finance Act, 1973?
  • Whether the demand for an additional court-fee is warranted when the requisite court-fee has already been paid on the suit?
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• Asim Khan vs Muhammad Fazil Khan1983 PLD Supreme Court 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-25
  ex parte decreelimitation periodknowledge of decreesetting aside decreecivil procedureservice of summons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an ex parte money decree passed against the appellant, Asim Khan. The appellant sought to set aside the decree under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, claiming he had not been duly served and only learned of the decree on May 8, 1969. While the trial court set aside the decree, the High Court restored it, finding the application time-barred based on the appellant's cross-examination admission that he knew of the decree by late March 1969. The core legal question was whether the limitation period under Article 164 of the Limitation Act 1908 begins upon mere knowledge of the decree's existence or requires knowledge of specific particulars. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had sufficient knowledge of the essential particulars of the decree by late March 1969. Consequently, the Court found no factual basis to intervene, concluding that the appellant was aware of the decree's nature and details, thereby rendering the application for setting aside the decree time-barred under the relevant limitation provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period under Article 164 of the Limitation Act 1908 begin upon the mere knowledge of the existence of an ex parte decree?
  • Is an application to set aside an ex parte decree time-barred if the applicant admits to having knowledge of the decree's existence and nature beyond the statutory limitation period?
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• Asif Jah Siddiqi vs Government of Sind and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-08-30
  res judicatacivil suit maintainabilityservice terminationwrit jurisdictionfinality of judgmentsCode of Civil ProcedureSpecific Relief Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a civil revision filed by the petitioner, who sought to challenge his dismissal from service and subsequent eviction from official accommodation. The core legal question was whether a civil suit is maintainable to challenge service termination and departmental orders when the underlying issues have already been adjudicated in prior constitutional petitions. The Supreme Court held that the suit was barred by the principles of res judicata and the statutory framework governing the finality of judgments. The Court affirmed that a party cannot circumvent the binding nature of superior court decisions by initiating fresh civil litigation. The key principle laid down is that challenges to the validity of a judgment, decree, or order—whether based on fraud, misrepresentation, or want of jurisdiction—must be pursued by making an application to the court that passed the final order, rather than through a separate civil suit. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the lower courts' findings that the suit was legally incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a judgment on the grounds of fraud or lack of jurisdiction through a separate civil suit?
  • Does a decision in a constitutional petition operate as res judicata in a subsequent civil suit involving the same cause of action?
  • Is a civil suit maintainable to challenge an order of dismissal when the issue has already been decided by a superior court?
  • What is the proper forum for challenging a judgment on the plea of fraud or misrepresentation under the Code of Civil Procedure?
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• Ashaq vs The State1983 SCMR 1020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-29
  criminal revisionacquittal of co-accusedreliability of eye-witnessesmedical evidenceconvictionappellate court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner for causing injuries to a complainant. The petitioner was initially convicted under Section 307/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but the appellate court reduced the conviction to Section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 while maintaining the sentence. The petitioner challenged his conviction before the High Court, arguing that because six co-accused were acquitted on the basis that the eye-witnesses were not supported by medical evidence, the petitioner should also be acquitted as the witnesses were unreliable. The Supreme Court examined the record and rejected this contention. The Court held that the acquittal of the co-accused by the appellate court was not justified, and therefore, the petitioner could not rely on that acquittal to invalidate his own conviction. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, affirming that the acquittal of co-accused does not automatically entitle a petitioner to acquittal where the underlying reasoning for the co-accused's acquittal is itself flawed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on the ground of unreliable eye-witness testimony automatically entitle a remaining accused to acquittal?
  • Can an appellate court's unjustified acquittal of co-accused be used as a ground for the acquittal of the remaining accused?
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• Arif Hussain and Another vs Abid Hussain and Other1983 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-25
  murderbenefit of doubttrail of bloodinterested witnessesrecovery of weaponscriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentences of three accused-appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a co-villager. The prosecution alleged that the accused attacked the deceased with sharp-edged weapons in a dried-up pond, carried his body to their haveli, and fled. The High Court had confirmed the death sentences. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan evaluated the ocular evidence and physical circumstances. The Court observed a critical discrepancy: despite the deceased sustaining multiple stab wounds, there was no trail of blood between the alleged site of attack (the pond) and the haveli where the body was found. Furthermore, the eye-witnesses were highly interested and inimical, and the recoveries of the weapons and blood-stained clothes were highly doubtful and delayed. Applying the principle of benefit of doubt, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, allowed the appeal of the convicts, and acquitted them.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted of murder when there is a complete absence of a trail of blood between the alleged site of attack and the place where the body was found?
  • Whether the delayed recovery of blood-stained weapons and clothes in unlocked or easily accessible rooms is sufficient to corroborate inimical ocular testimony?
  • Does the failure of close relatives of the deceased to intervene or attempt to rescue him, despite being present at the scene, cast doubt on their presence as eye-witnesses?
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• Anwar Masih vs MRS. Vinnis Oliver Kokhar and Other1983 SCMR 1056 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-12
  petition for leave to appealquestion of factquestion of lawintra-court appealsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 30-6-1976 and a subsequent judgment of a learned Division Bench dated 18-1-1977 dismissing the Intra-Court Appeal. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner has raised any substantial question of law warranting interference by the court, as opposed to merely seeking an inquiry into questions of fact. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since no question of law was raised and the petitioner only sought an inquiry into questions of fact, the petition is devoid of merit. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings or factual inquiries where no valid question of law is presented.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent judgments when only questions of fact are raised?
  • Is a petition barred by time with respect to the Single Judge's judgment maintainable when directed against an Intra-Court Appeal?
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• Anwar Hussain and 5 Others vs The State1983 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-09Read full judgment →
• And Others vs Liaquat Hayat Khan and Other1983 SCMR 215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-26
  Produce Index UnitsLand Reforms Regulationrevenue recordsspecial class town landconstitutional jurisdictionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals, by special leave of the Supreme Court, challenge a judgment of the Lahore High Court that set aside orders passed by the Land Commission Authorities in constitutional jurisdiction. The core legal question revolves around the interpretation and application of paragraphs 2(10) and 12 of the Land Reforms Regulation (Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972) regarding the calculation of Produce Index Units for land falling within municipal limits, where terminology in revenue records (such as 'Nehri Awal') differed from the entries in the relevant Produce Index Units booklet (such as 'Special Class Town Land'). The Supreme Court held that neither the High Court nor the Land Authorities could strictly and literally apply conflicting classifications without properly correlating the rationale between the revenue records and the settlement booklet entries. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the Chief Land Commissioner for a fresh decision. The key principle laid down is that where a direct textual mismatch exists between soil classification in revenue records and Produce Index Unit tables, authorities must logically correlate the entries or invoke statutory powers to determine appropriate measures rather than rely purely on literal interpretations.

  Questions settled

  • How are Produce Index Units to be calculated under Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972 when descriptions in revenue records differ from entries in the settlement booklet?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the orders of the Land Commission Authorities regarding soil classification?
  • What is the proper course of action for authorities when statutory soil classification and Produce Index Unit entries cannot be directly correlated?
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• Amir Khan vs Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation1983 PLD Supreme Court 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-31
  industrial relationsstanding orderscompulsory group insurancestatutory service ruleslimitation periodworkmen's compensationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former employee of the Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation, sought payment under a Compulsory Group Insurance Scheme following his termination due to blindness. His application under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was initially dismissed by the Labour Court as time-barred, but the Labour Appellate Tribunal remanded the matter. The Baluchistan High Court subsequently ruled against the petitioner, holding that the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, did not apply to the respondent organization because it was carried on under the authority of the Federal Government and governed by statutory service rules. The High Court further affirmed the application was time-barred. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying two primary legal questions: whether the proviso to Section 1(4) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, excludes the respondent from its scope given the management structure under the Provincial Industrial Development Corporation (West Pakistan) Ordinance, 1962, and whether the claim for group insurance is governed by the limitation period prescribed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

  Questions settled

  • Does the proviso to Section 1(4) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, exclude an establishment from its scope if its management is vested in a Board?
  • Is the limitation period for a claim under the Compulsory Group Insurance Scheme governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923?
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• Alm Syeda Saeeda Fat Ima and Another vs Abdul Hamid and 4 Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-22
  personal requirementejectmentbona fide needurban areacantonment boardburden of proofexcess rent adjustmentrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose out of ejectment proceedings initiated by the appellant-landlords seeking eviction of the respondent-tenants on grounds of bona fide personal requirement under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. While the Rent Controller ordered eviction, the District Judge reversed the decision, holding that the landlords could not seek possession because excess rent had been deposited by the tenants and required prior adjustment, and because one of the appellants occupied another bungalow in Peshawar Cantonment. The High Court dismissed the landlords' second appeal in limine, placing the burden on the landlord to disprove ownership of the Cantonment property. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the burden to prove the landlord's ownership of alternative accommodation lay on the party alleging it. Furthermore, accommodation occupied by courtesy without ownership does not disentitle a landlord, and a Cantonment area does not constitute the same 'urban area' under the Ordinance. The eviction order of the Rent Controller was accordingly restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving that a landlord owns alternative residential accommodation rest on the tenant who alleges that fact?
  • Does accommodation occupied merely by courtesy of relatives without proprietary interest qualify as 'another residential building suitable for his needs' under Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b) of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does an area administered by a Cantonment Board fall within the definition of an 'urban area' under Section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can a landlord be disentitled from seeking eviction on grounds of personal requirement merely because the tenant deposited rent in excess of what was due?
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• Allah Ditta Khaliq Dad, Etc. vs The State the State1983 SCMR 779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-08-16Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta and Muhammad Ashiq vs The State the State (a) Penal Code1983 SCMR 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-10Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta and Another vs Mst. Jamila Begum and Other1983 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-01
  ejectmentstriking off defencedefault in rent depositco-ownerleave to appealrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the District Judge, which ordered the eviction of the petitioners after striking off their defence for non-compliance with a rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioners committed a default in depositing the rent pursuant to the court order, whether the landlord waived or condoned any such default through delay, and whether a single co-owner is competent to institute ejectment proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings regarding default were justified, that no waiver or condonation could be inferred since the landlord raised the objection promptly upon discovering the deposit details, and that a co-owner is fully competent to maintain ejectment proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a single co-owner is competent to bring ejectment proceedings under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Does a delay in applying for striking off the defence for non-deposit of rent amount to a waiver or condonation of default by the landlord?
  • Are concurrent findings of lower courts regarding default in rent deposit liable to interference in a petition for special leave to appeal?
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• Ali Sher vs Member, Board of Revenue and Other1983 SCMR 655 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-04
  leave to appealcolonization of government landstransfer of grantboard of revenue circularnatural justiceopportunity of hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's judgment dismissing his constitutional petition, which had challenged the reversal of permission granted to him under section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act. The core legal question concerned whether the Board of Revenue could lawfully treat a sanction granted under section 19 as void solely based on an internal administrative circular prohibiting such transfers, without examining allegations of fraud or affording an opportunity of hearing to the affected party. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's contentions—including the lack of opportunity of hearing, the interpretation of the circular regarding ejected tenants, and the interdependent nature of the transfer transactions—raised substantial grounds requiring in-depth examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that administrative circulars cannot override statutory discretions without proper scrutiny of facts, and affected parties must be granted a fair hearing before administrative interference with settled property rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Board of Revenue can declare a transfer sanction under section 19 void solely on the basis of a general administrative circular without examining allegations of fraud?
  • Is an affected grantee entitled to an opportunity of being heard before the cancellation or reversal of a sanctioned land transfer?
  • Whether general instructions issued by the Board of Revenue can override statutory permissions granted under the Colonization of Government Lands Act?
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• Ali Muhammad and Another vs Fazal Hussain and Other1983 SCMR 1239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-06
  limitationcondonation of delayspecial lawurban rent restrictionstatutory interpretationappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions challenging the dismissal of applications for condonation of delay in filing appeals under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, could be invoked to condone delays in appeals filed under the special limitation period prescribed by the Ordinance, which differs from the period provided in the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court held that because the special law (the Ordinance) provides a specific limitation period of 30 days for appeals to the High Court, which conflicts with the general period of 90 days under the Limitation Act, 1908, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is excluded by operation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908. Consequently, the Court affirmed that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 cannot be applied to extend the time for filing such appeals, and the High Court correctly dismissed the applications for condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 apply to appeals filed under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 when a special law prescribes a different period of limitation?
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• Ali Muhammad and Another vs Abdul Ghani1983 SCMR 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-08
  right of easementlight and airmandatory injunctionmaterial discomfortspecial leave petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which accepted the respondent's revision and set aside the appellate decree granted in favor of the petitioners. The core legal question involved whether the closure of a 'Magh' constituted an actionable infringement of the right of easement of light and air, causing material discomfort to the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the High Court established that the petitioners failed to prove any material discomfort, damage, or nuisance, and that partial impairment of air and light does not amount to an actionable infringement of an easement. The petition was accordingly dismissed on the basis that the High Court's factual findings based on evidence warranted no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Does the partial impairment of air and light constitute an actionable infringement of the right of easement?
  • Can a second appellate or revisional court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding material discomfort?
  • What must a plaintiff prove to succeed in a suit for mandatory injunction regarding the closure of a 'Magh'?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Hussain vs Late Ali Ahmed Khan Warsi through His Legal1983 SCMR 1178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-18
  dissolution of partnershipamendment of plaintlimitationlegal representativesspecific performanceres judicataIqrarnama
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court upholding a decree in favor of the respondents, who are the legal representatives of the deceased original plaintiff, A.I Ahmed Khan Warsi. The petitioner and the deceased had entered into a partnership which was dissolved by a deed of dissolution, subsequently modified by an instrument called 'Iqrarnama' concerning the transfer of a disputed plot and monetary payments. Upon the petitioner's failure to abide by the terms and subsequent agreement to sell the plot to a third party, the deceased filed a suit for declaration and recovery of money, which was later amended by his legal representatives to include the relief of possession. The core legal questions involved whether the suit was barred by limitation, whether the trial court erred in allowing the amendment of the plaint to include the relief of possession, whether legal representatives can seek such amendments, and whether the document in question constituted a bond rather than an enforceable agreement. The Supreme Court held that the suit was within limitation, that the amendment of the plaint did not alter the character of the suit and was properly granted under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the legal representatives were competent to seek such amendments. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for possession added through an amendment of the plaint after the limitation period is barred by time when the original suit for declaration and recovery of money was filed within limitation?
  • Whether legal representatives substituted in place of a deceased plaintiff can seek an amendment of the plaint to incorporate an additional relief of possession arising from the same cause of action?
  • Does a judgment in a separate suit between co-defendants operate as res judicata when no active contest or issue was framed and decided between them in that earlier proceeding?
  • Whether an 'Iqrarnama' modifying the terms of a dissolved partnership agreement constitutes an enforceable contract or a bond barred by law?
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• Ali Hussain and Another vs Mukhtar and 2 Other1983 SCMR 806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-14
  murderdying declarationcommon intentionmitigation of sentenceobscure motivecapital punishmentreduction of sentenceeye-witness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals before the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of Mumtaz Ahmad under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965, while maintaining the acquittal of co-accused Mukhtar and Sabir Ali under Section 302/34 of the PPC. The prosecution alleged that the co-accused held the deceased while the principal accused inflicted fatal knife wounds following a dispute regarding visits to a local political leader. The Supreme Court evaluated the credibility of the dying declaration recorded by the police in the doctor's presence, the testimonies of eye-witnesses, the common intention of the co-accused, and the quantum of sentence. The Court held the dying declaration and eye-witness evidence to be credible and untutored. The acquittal of the co-accused was maintained as they lacked knowledge that the principal accused carried a knife or would cause fatal injuries. However, finding that the true motive remained obscure, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment while upholding the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration recorded by a police officer admissible and reliable when certified by a doctor confirming the deceased's consciousness and absence of prompting?
  • Does the mere presence of co-accused who hold the victim establish common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if they had no knowledge that the principal accused possessed a knife or intended to inflict fatal injuries?
  • Can an obscure or unproven motive serve as a valid mitigating circumstance to commute a sentence of death to life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Gul Khan vs Lahore High Court, Lahore and Other1983 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-18Read full judgment →
• Ali Akbar vs Muhammad Anwar1983 SCMR 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-25
  pre-emptionpartial pre-emptionexempt propertyindivisible transactionleave to appealagricultural landvillage immovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which partly accepted a second appeal and decreed a suit for pre-emption to the extent of 10 marlas out of the disputed land. The core legal question involved whether partial pre-emption is permissible when a portion of the sold land is exempt from pre-emption due to the presence of constructed shops, and whether the transaction constituted an indivisible unit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly decreed the suit for the unexempted portion of 10 marlas since the land was clearly bifurcated and the doctrine of partial pre-emption only applies when a pre-emptor fails to seek substitution for the whole subject-matter of the sale to which their right extends. The key principle laid down is that statutory exemptions from pre-emption apply strictly to the specific portion of land covered by the exempt structures, and bifurcated parcels do not bar a pre-emption decree for the non-exempt portion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a boundary wall around land automatically qualify it for exemption from pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  • Can a pre-emption decree be passed in respect of only a portion of the disputed land when another portion is exempt from pre-emption?
  • When does the doctrine of partial pre-emption come into play in a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Ahmad vs Ghulam Qadir and Other1983 SCMR 1307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-16
  state land grantrevenue authoritiesdiscretionary powercivil court interferenceHariland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit filed by the petitioner, claiming entitlement to the grant of state land as a landless Hari, challenging the administrative decision of the Colonization Officer and the Board of Revenue to grant the land to the respondent. The core legal question was whether the civil courts should interfere with the discretion exercised by revenue authorities in selecting between competing applicants for state land grants. The Supreme Court held that the selection of grantees for state land falls within the discretionary domain of the revenue authorities, provided the exercise of such discretion does not violate any specific rule or law. The Court found that both the petitioner and the respondent had claims as Haris, and the revenue authorities acted within their jurisdiction to prefer one over the other based on factors such as prior landholdings. Consequently, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, establishing the principle that civil courts will not interfere with the administrative discretion of revenue authorities in land grant matters absent a violation of law.

  Questions settled

  • Do civil courts have the jurisdiction to interfere with the discretionary grant of state land by revenue authorities?
  • Can a claimant demand the grant of state land as a matter of right based on their status as a Hari?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam Khan and Others vs The State1983 SCMR 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-21
  criminal appealreappraisal of evidenceeyewitness testimonycorroborationabscondencebenefit of doubtmurderattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court concerning charges of murder and attempt to commit murder stemming from a family feud and elopement. The core legal question involved the reappraisal of evidence, the reliability of related and injured eyewitnesses, the necessity of corroboration where eyewitness testimony was partly disbelieved regarding some co-accused, and the legal effect of prolonged abscondence as corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies and honest mistakes in ocular testimony do not discredit natural eyewitnesses whose injuries are established, and that prolonged and unexplained abscondence serves as sufficient corroboration to sustain convictions where testimony is partially discounted. The Court laid down the principle that the partial rejection of ocular testimony regarding certain accused does not inherently falsify the entire prosecution case against other accused whose active participation and specific attribution are consistently proven and corroborated by independent factors such as abscondence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether partial rejection of ocular testimony against certain co-accused necessitates independent corroboration to sustain the conviction of remaining accused?
  • Does prolonged and unexplained abscondence of an accused serve as valid corroborative evidence to support a conviction when eyewitness accounts require corroboration?
  • Whether minor discrepancies and honest mistakes by eyewitnesses are sufficient to discard the prosecution case in a criminal trial?
  • Is failure to put a circumstance like abscondence to an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 fatal to its use against him?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Khan vs Mst. Shamozai1983 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-14
  inheritancecustomary lawShariat Actadverse possessionco-sharerappellate reviewN.W.F.P. Courts Regulationgratuitous admission
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the inheritance of property originally held under customary law. The core legal question concerned the scope of appellate review under the N.W.F.P. Courts Regulation 1931 compared to the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the marriage of the defendant, Mst. Amazai, occurred before or after the enforcement of the N.W.F.P. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act 1935, which determined the devolution of the estate. The Supreme Court held that the N.W.F.P. Courts Regulation permitted a wider scope of review, allowing for the re-appraisal of concurrent findings of fact. Upon re-examining the evidence, the Court affirmed that the marriage occurred after the Shariat Act’s enforcement, entitling the plaintiffs to their shares under Muslim Personal Law. Furthermore, the Court established that a party may withdraw gratuitous admissions made by an attorney if proven incorrect, and that the possession of a co-sharer does not constitute adverse possession absent clear evidence of hostility. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the lower courts' decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does the N.W.F.P. Courts Regulation 1931 allow for a broader scope of review of facts in a further appeal compared to a second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party withdraw a gratuitous admission made in a written statement filed by an attorney if it is proven to be mistaken or untrue?
  • Is the possession of a co-sharer considered adverse against other co-sharers in the absence of evidence of hostility?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Alias Akku vs The State1983 SCMR 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-02
  murderlurking house-trespassnight trespassright of private defenceidentification of culpritcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Akbar alias Akku, for the murder of Abdul Latif. The prosecution case established that the petitioner and his co-accused, Saifullah, were caught trespassing at night. When the deceased apprehended Saifullah, the petitioner, who was on a rooftop, descended and fired shots to secure his brother's release, killing the deceased and injuring another witness. The petitioner contended that the occurrence, happening at night, made identification doubtful and alleged that the co-accused was beaten by the complainant. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, finding the prosecution's case established beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the deceased acted within his rights to challenge the intruders who were committing lurking house-trespass by night. The petition was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence for the murder committed during the criminal transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of a gunshot injury on a witness corroborate their presence at the scene of a crime?
  • Can a person be held liable for murder if they kill someone while attempting to rescue a co-accused from lawful apprehension?
  • Is the testimony of eye-witnesses sufficient to establish identity in a night-time occurrence if their presence is corroborated by physical injuries?
  Read full judgment →
• Ajaib Khan vs The State1983 SCMR 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-05
  Federal Shariat CourtAdministrative CourtConstitutional jurisdictionAppellate jurisdictionCompetency of petitionHudood OrdinanceService tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged an order of the Federal Shariat Court by invoking Article 212(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which provides for appeals to the Supreme Court from Administrative Courts or Tribunals. The core legal question was whether the Federal Shariat Court falls within the definition of an Administrative Court or Tribunal under Article 212, thereby allowing for such an appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition was incompetent. The Court reasoned that Administrative Courts and Tribunals are strictly limited to matters concerning the terms and conditions of service, government claims, and enemy property, whereas the Federal Shariat Court was established by constitutional amendment to adjudicate matters of Islamic repugnancy. Consequently, the Federal Shariat Court does not qualify as an Administrative Court or Tribunal under Article 212. The Court further noted that, at the relevant time, orders passed by the Federal Shariat Court in its appellate jurisdiction regarding offences under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, were final and not subject to appeal under Article 212(3).

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Shariat Court qualify as an Administrative Court or Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can an appeal be filed in the Supreme Court against an order of the Federal Shariat Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
  • What are the specific matters for which an Administrative Court or Tribunal can be established under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Hayat and Others vs The State1983 SCMR 350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-02
  interested witnessescriminal appealindependent corroborationocular evidencemedical evidencerecovery evidencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentences of death and life imprisonment imposed on the appellants for murder. The core legal question was whether the testimony of interested and inimical prosecution witnesses, which formed the basis of the conviction, was supported by sufficient independent corroboration to satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution’s ocular evidence contained significant discrepancies, specifically regarding the role of one appellant who was alleged to have fired fatal shots at a deceased who, according to medical evidence, sustained no bullet injuries. Furthermore, the Court found the recovery evidence—a knife recovered from a dung heap and revolver empties—to be highly suspect and unreliable. Holding that the prosecution failed to provide the necessary quality of corroborative evidence required when dealing with interested witnesses, the Court set aside the convictions and sentences. The judgment reaffirms the principle that in criminal cases involving inimical witnesses, independent corroboration must be clear, consistent, and logically sound to sustain a conviction, and that discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence undermine the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses require independent corroboration to sustain a criminal conviction?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there is a significant discrepancy between the ocular evidence and the medical evidence regarding the nature of injuries?
  • Is recovery evidence considered reliable when the circumstances of the recovery, such as the location and timing, are highly suspect?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Khan and Others vs Dosa and Other1983 SCMR 756 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-08
  pre-emption suitrejection of plaintcourt-fee deficiencyvaluation of suitprocedural irregularitysummary adjudication
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment, which upheld a District Judge's order setting aside the trial court's rejection of a plaint in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a trial court, having framed an issue regarding the valuation of the suit for court-fee purposes, could summarily reject the plaint without allowing the parties to lead evidence on that specific issue. The Supreme Court held that once an issue regarding valuation is framed, the court must allow the parties to adduce evidence or decide the matter based on clear, unconditional admissions. The trial court's hasty, summary rejection of the plaint, without ascertaining the exact deficiency or hearing the plaintiffs regarding the valuation, was deemed procedurally irregular and arbitrary. The Court affirmed that the question of granting indulgence or extension of time for making up court-fee deficiencies only arises after evidence has been led and the plaintiff is found to have acted negligently without a plausible explanation. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court summarily reject a plaint for insufficient court-fee after framing an issue regarding valuation without allowing parties to lead evidence?
  • Is it procedurally proper for a court to reject a plaint based on a valuation statement prepared by the opposing party without hearing the plaintiff?
  • At what stage should a court determine whether a plaintiff has been negligent in paying court-fee deficiencies?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Hussain vs The Officer on Special Duty Etc.S1983 SCMR 827 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-16
  M.L.R. 115M.L.R. 89M.L.R. 91land reformsgovernment servant land allotmentcancellation of allotmentretrospective operationrepurchase of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from proceedings before the land authorities under Martial Law Regulation (M.L.R.) 115 of 1972. The petitioner, a government servant, had initially been allotted 117.32 acres of land prior to 1-1-1959, but under M.L.R. Nos. 89 and 91, his entitlement was reduced, resulting in him surrendering 86.39 acres and later repurchasing it. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could claim exemption under Paragraph 10 of M.L.R. 115 for the entire 117.32 acres on the basis that it was allotted to him prior to 1-1-1959. The Supreme Court held that under Paragraph 7 of M.L.R. 89, previous allotments stood cancelled retrospectively, thereby laying a fresh basis for entitlement. Surrendered surplus land vested in the Government, making its repurchase a separate transaction. Consequently, the original allotment did not remain intact as of 1-1-1959, and exemption was properly restricted to the 31.33 acres continuously retained. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • What is the effect of Paragraph 7 of M.L.R. No. 89 on land allotments made prior to 1-1-1959?
  • Does repurchasing land surrendered under M.L.R. No. 89 restore the original allotment for the purposes of exemption under Paragraph 10 of M.L.R. No. 115?
  • Can a government servant claim exemption under M.L.R. No. 115 for land that was surrendered and subsequently repurchased under M.L.R. No. 89?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Muhammad Kazim vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab and Other1983 SCMR 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-10
  proprietary rightsactual tillerTender Schemesub-tenancyBoard of Revenue circularleave to appealstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Constitutional Petition by the High Court, which had upheld the decisions of the Board of Revenue denying the petitioner proprietary rights over certain agricultural land. The petitioner, an Advocate, had been cultivating the land as a sub-tenant of his brother, the original lessee under a Tender Scheme. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, despite being a practicing Advocate, qualified as an "actual tiller" of the soil entitled to retain the land or acquire proprietary rights under the prevailing government policy. The Board of Revenue had denied his claim based on a circular dated 7th February 1978, which disqualified practicing lawyers from being considered actual tillers. The Supreme Court, noting the undisputed fact that the petitioner was indeed cultivating the land as a sub-tenant, granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the denial of proprietary rights. The Court ordered the maintenance of the status quo regarding possession pending the final hearing of the appeal, allowing the parties to supplement the existing record.

  Questions settled

  • Does a practicing lawyer qualify as an actual tiller of the soil for the purpose of acquiring proprietary rights under the Tender Scheme?
  • Can a sub-tenant of a government lessee claim proprietary rights if the original lessee is found ineligible?
  • Is a circular issued by the Board of Revenue sufficient to disqualify a class of persons from being considered actual tillers?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Hussain vs Mst. Rashem Bibi and Other1983 SCMR 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-16
  evacuee trust landallotment cancellationBorder Area Committeeproprietary rightsJammu and Kashmir refugeepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute over evacuee trust land measuring 27 kanals 8 marlas in village Ghaziwal, Tehsil Narowal, District Sialkot, initially allotted to Mst. Rahim Bibi in 1962, who later acquired proprietary rights. The Border Area Committee subsequently cancelled her allotment and allotted the land to Agha Hussain, leading to prolonged litigation. Following a remand by the High Court, the Committee restored Mst. Rahim Bibi's allotment, holding her to be a Jammu and Kashmir displaced person, and cancelled Agha Hussain's allotment. Agha Hussain's subsequent writ petition was dismissed in limine by the High Court. The core legal questions concerned whether the Border Area Committee could re-open its earlier finding regarding the status of the allottee and whether an allotment made by way of maintenance reverts upon death after proprietary rights have been acquired. The Supreme Court held that the Committee's view was justified by material on record and that proprietary rights conferred prior to death preclude the land from being treated as a mere temporary maintenance allotment. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Border Area Committee can re-open the question of an allottee's status after previously adjudging her to be a local?
  • Does an allotment made in favour of an allottee survive after her death once proprietary rights have been duly conferred?
  • Whether an order of the Border Area Committee restoring an allotment and cancelling a rival allotment warrants interference under writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Afsar Khan and Others vs Mst. Khanum Jan and Other1983 SCMR 273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-09
  joint propertyco-shareralteration of landagricultural landpermanent injunctionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which modified a first appellate court decree concerning joint property. The petitioners filed a suit for a declaration and permanent injunction to prevent the respondents, who are co-sharers, from altering the character of jointly owned agricultural land by erecting a building without consent. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court decreed it, holding that a co-sharer cannot convert agricultural land into other uses. The High Court modified the decree, allowing the construction subject to the condition that if the land does not fall into the respondents' share upon partition, they must remove the construction without claiming compensation. The core legal question is whether a co-sharer can alter the nature of joint property without consent. The Supreme Court held that while ordinarily a co-sharer cannot alter the nature of joint property, the High Court's protective stipulations and the enhancement of the property's value caused no prejudice to the petitioners. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer alter the character of joint agricultural land by erecting a building without the consent of other co-sharers?
  • Whether a co-sharer raising construction on joint property is entitled to compensation if the land does not fall to their share upon partition?
  Read full judgment →
• Administrator, Thai Development vs Mehboob Ali Khan1983 SCMR 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-21
  leave to appealdeclaratory decreewrit petitionarrears of salaryIntra-Court Appealservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court involving questions regarding the execution of a declaratory decree through a writ petition, the entitlement to arrears of salary under such a decree, and the competency of an Intra-Court Appeal under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The core legal questions pertain to the permissible scope of relief in constitutional petitions relating to declaratory decrees and service matters, as well as the interpretation of appellate remedies. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contentions raised by the petitioner require detailed examination. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted to consider the propositions of law canvassed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a declaratory decree be enforced and implemented through the agency of a writ petition?
  • Whether a respondent is entitled to the relief regarding payment of arrears of salary following a declaratory decree passed by the High Court?
  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal competent against the order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, keeping in view the nature of the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Additional Chief Land Commissioner (Punjab), Lahore vs Mst. Ghulam1983 SCMR 1052 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-01
  land reformmutationgift transactioninterconnected transactionsmisreading of recordwrit jurisdictionadministrative authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to the decision of the Additional Chief Land Commissioner (Punjab) regarding the validity of land gift transactions. The respondent, Mst. Ghulam Zohra, had gifted land to her husband and son, which was recorded via mutation. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Additional Chief Land Commissioner erred in law by treating these two distinct gift transactions as separate, independent events rather than interconnected transactions. The High Court had previously accepted a writ petition filed by the respondent, concluding that the transactions were indeed interconnected and that the Commissioner had misread the record in separating them. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision. The Court found that the Additional Chief Land Commissioner acted without lawful authority by failing to recognize the interconnected nature of the transactions, thereby misreading the evidentiary record. The judgment affirms that administrative authorities must correctly interpret the factual nexus of transactions when exercising their jurisdiction, and failure to do so constitutes an error of law amenable to judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative authority separate interconnected land transactions without misreading the record?
  • Does the misreading of a record by a land commissioner constitute an act without lawful authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman vs Hail Mir Ahmad Khan and Another1983 PLD Supreme Court 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-04
  constitutional jurisdictionrent restrictionalternative remedypiecemeal litigationinterlocutory orderswrit petitionlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a rent dispute where the petitioner, a tenant, challenged eviction proceedings before a Rent Controller, disputing the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and the applicability of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 to a hotel. After the Rent Controller overruled these objections, the petitioner filed a constitutional petition in the High Court, which was dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, affirming that the petitioner's attempt to invoke constitutional jurisdiction was improper. The Court held that the petitioner had an adequate alternative remedy through the statutory appeal process, which should be exhausted before seeking higher intervention. The judgment emphasizes that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is not intended to bypass the hierarchy of forums established by special rent laws. Furthermore, the Court strongly deprecated the practice of piecemeal litigation, noting that challenging interlocutory orders through writ petitions causes unnecessary delay and defeats the legislative intent of providing summary, speedy disposal of rent cases. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that writ jurisdiction is unavailable where an efficacious alternative remedy exists.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained against an interlocutory order of a Rent Controller when a statutory right of appeal exists?
  • Does the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 apply retrospectively to pending eviction proceedings initiated under the W. P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction permissible to bypass the hierarchy of forums established by special rent laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman vs Ali Bakhsh and Another1983 SCMR 146 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-25
  functus officioPermanent Transfer Deedauction purchaserleave to appealsettlement proceedingsdelaysubstantial justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court order that had dismissed his challenge regarding the transfer of a shop. The property in question was auctioned in 1961 to a successful bidder, who later associated with the respondent. Following the bidder's failure to pay the balance, the respondent applied for the transfer of the property, supported by the bidder's affidavit of no objection. The property was subsequently transferred to the respondent, and a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) was issued. Thirteen years later, the petitioner challenged this transfer, alleging fraud. The Settlement Commissioner initially cancelled the P.T.D., but the High Court reversed this, holding that the Settlement Department had become functus officio once the P.T.D. was issued. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had remained silent for thirteen years and failed to object to the initial transfer. Finding that substantial justice had been served, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, thereby upholding the High Court's decision that the Department lacked jurisdiction to reopen the matter after the issuance of the P.T.D.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Settlement Department become functus officio once a Permanent Transfer Deed is issued?
  • Can a party challenge a property transfer after a delay of thirteen years?
  • Is the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed a bar to the subsequent reopening of settlement proceedings by the Department?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Razzaq vs Ilam Din1983 SCMR 146 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-25
  interlocutory matterperpetual injunctioninterim injunctioncivil revisionleave to appealdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's civil revision in an interlocutory matter. The underlying dispute involved a suit for a perpetual injunction filed by the petitioner to restrain the respondent from increasing the height of a shop wall, which allegedly deprived the petitioner of the use of the shop's roof. An application for an interim injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was initially dismissed by the trial court, and a subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Additional District Judge. The High Court also dismissed the petitioner's revision petition against these concurrent findings. Upon hearing the counsel for the petitioner, the Supreme Court found that no valid grounds existed to warrant interference with the impugned order in an interlocutory matter. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' decisions regarding the interim injunction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts in interlocutory matters where no valid grounds are shown?
  • Is a revision petition maintainable against an order dismissing an application for interim injunction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Razzaq and OthersABDUR Razzaq and Others vs The Statethe1983 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-22
  suspension of sentencecriminal appealdelay in hearingimprisonment for lifebail pending appealSupreme Court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application filed by convicts undergoing sentences of imprisonment for life seeking suspension of their sentences and release on bail pending their criminal appeal before the Supreme Court, based on the ground of delay in the hearing of the appeal. The core legal question is whether the provisions of section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding mandatory or discretionary release on bail due to appellate delay apply to appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court held that section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies strictly to appellate courts established under that Code and does not control proceedings before the Supreme Court. However, inordinate delay may be considered as a factor by the Supreme Court when assessing bail during a pending appeal, but it does not create an automatic right to bail. The court laid down the principle that statutory delay periods prescribed for High Courts or lower appellate courts under the Code of Criminal Procedure do not automatically entitle an appellant to bail in the Supreme Court, and each case must be evaluated on its own circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure control the question of bail in criminal appeals pending before the Supreme Court?
  • Does inordinate delay in the decision of an appeal before the Supreme Court create an automatic right to bail under the prevailing law?
  • Can the principles underlying section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be invoked as a matter of right for release on bail in the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid Chaudhary and Otrers vs Muhammad Umer and Other1983 SCMR 1272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-08
  ejectment petitionlandlord and tenantrent deedrelationship of landlord and tenantappellate reviewexecution of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had upheld the dismissal of an ejectment petition filed by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, specifically turning on the validity and execution of a rent deed. The Rent Controller had initially found in favor of the landlord, confirming the execution of the deed. However, the appellate court and the High Court discarded the rent deed based on perceived discrepancies regarding the place of execution and other minor evidentiary defects, without properly addressing the core issue of whether the respondent had indeed executed the document. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred by focusing on peripheral inconsistencies rather than the fundamental question of the deed's execution. Consequently, the Court determined that the matter required further consideration, as the alleged evidentiary defects were of little significance if the execution of the rent deed was established. Leave to appeal was granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy regarding the place of execution of a rent deed invalidate the document if the execution itself is otherwise established?
  • Is the determination of the relationship of landlord and tenant a fundamental issue that must be addressed before discarding a rent deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Khan vs Sarwar Khan and Other1983 SCMR 955 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-02-11
  acquittalspecial leave to appealmurderappreciation of evidencecriminal appealinherent improbabilities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted five respondents of charges under Sections 148 and 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relating to the murder of Hafeezullah. The petitioner, the complainant, challenged the acquittal, arguing that the trial court had correctly convicted the respondents based on eye-witness testimony and the respondents' subsequent abscondence. The core legal question was whether the High Court's acquittal was based on a proper assessment of evidence or if it suffered from legal infirmities. The Supreme Court found that the High Court correctly identified inherent improbabilities in the prosecution's case, including the lack of incriminating recoveries, the absence of crime empties despite multiple shots fired, and the implausible conduct of the accused. The Court held that the acquittal was based on a proper application of the principles of criminal justice administration. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt in light of the evidentiary gaps and inconsistencies.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of crime empties at a crime scene where multiple shots were allegedly fired weaken the prosecution's case?
  • Can an acquittal judgment be sustained when the prosecution case suffers from inherent improbabilities regarding the conduct of the accused?
  • Is the abscondence of accused persons sufficient, in the absence of other incriminating evidence, to sustain a conviction for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Andanother vs Taj Muhammad and Other1983 SCMR 1057 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-15
  civil revisionancestral propertyco-shareradverse possessionpossessionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and decree of the Baluchistan High Court, Quetta, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision concerning a claim for possession of a half share of land. The core legal question involves whether the suit land was ancestral joint property and whether the petitioners maintained a subsisting right to the property despite long-standing exclusive possession by the respondents based on a dower (Haqq a Mehar) claim and prior judicial findings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to establish any subsisting right in the property, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court. The key principle laid down is that concurrent factual findings regarding the lack of a subsisting right to property will defeat claims of joint ancestral ownership and co-sharer possession when unsupported by the evidentiary record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the possession of one co-sharer amounts to the possession of other co-sharers in the absence of a subsisting right?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained on merits when it is barred by time after examining the underlying contentions?
  • Whether concurrent factual findings by lower courts regarding ancestral property ownership can be successfully challenged without supporting evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wadud Khan vs Chief Land Commissioner and Another1983 PLD Supreme Court 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  natural justiceaudi alteram partemLand Reforms Regulationgift alienationright of hearingadministrative lawLand Reforms Authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against orders passed by Land Reforms Authorities, which declared certain gift alienations of agricultural land invalid under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The core legal question was whether the Land Reforms Authorities could lawfully invalidate these gift transactions without providing the donees—the recipients of the gifts—an opportunity to be heard, despite the donor/declarant having participated in the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the orders passed by the Land Reforms Authorities were without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The Court affirmed that the principles of natural justice, specifically audi alteram partem, must be read into the provisions of every enactment unless the contrary is expressly provided. Consequently, because the impugned orders adversely affected the rights and interests of the donees, they were entitled to notice and a fair hearing. The Court rejected the notion that the donor’s participation sufficiently represented the donees' interests. The appeals were allowed, the impugned orders were quashed, and the cases were remanded for fresh decisions following proper notice to all affected parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can Land Reforms Authorities invalidate a gift transaction without providing the donee an opportunity to be heard?
  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem apply to proceedings before Land Reforms Authorities?
  • Does the participation of a donor in land reform proceedings constitute sufficient representation of the donee's interests?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Sattar and Others vs The State1983 SCMR 1288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-12
  pre-arrest bailmedical evidenceFIR allegationscriminal liabilitybail rejection
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by several accused persons charged under sections 307, 325, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an alleged attack involving firearms and blunt weapons. The petitioners challenged the rejection of their bail applications by the Court of Sessions and subsequently by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the discrepancies between the First Information Report (FIR) allegations and the medical evidence. The Supreme Court observed that while the FIR alleged the use of firearms and sharp-edged weapons, the medical reports did not substantiate the presence of gunshot or sharp-edged weapon injuries on the victims. Consequently, the Court held that the case of two specific petitioners, Abdul Sattar and Muhammad Ajmal, warranted the grant of bail due to the lack of medical corroboration for the specific allegations against them. Conversely, the Court found no sufficient grounds to grant bail to the remaining petitioners, whose applications were rejected. The principle established is that medical evidence is a critical factor in assessing the veracity of allegations in bail matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of medical corroboration for alleged injuries entitle an accused to bail?
  • Can bail be granted to some co-accused while being denied to others based on the specific evidence against them?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Salam and Others vs Noor Nisa1983 SCMR 1012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-13
  leave to appealpre-emptionrevisional powersmisreading of evidenceconcurrent findingsexemption from pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, unsuccessful plaintiffs, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 19-10-1981, which had accepted a civil revision petition, set aside concurrent findings of fact by the two courts below, and dismissed the plaintiffs' pre-emption suit. The dispute arose over a small house purchased by the respondent, in respect of which the petitioners claimed a right of pre-emption as owners of contiguous property. The respondent claimed exemption under Section 5(d) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, asserting she was a resident of Haripur. The trial and appellate courts initially denied the exemption, holding she resided elsewhere, but the High Court reversed this finding upon discovering material misreading and ignoring of evidence regarding her twenty-five-year residence in Haripur. The Supreme Court examined the record and held that revisional interference is justified where there is a manifest misreading or total ignoring of material evidence by fact-finding courts. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can revisional powers be exercised by the High Court to set aside concurrent findings of fact based on a misreading of evidence?
  • Whether residence of the vendee for a significant duration in the town where the property is situated entitles her to exemption under Section 5(d) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman and Others vs The State1983 SCMR 958 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-03
  ocular testimonyinterested witnessfalse implicationindependent corroborationcriminal appealbenefit of doubtmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony of interested and inimical witnesses, who were found by the lower courts to have falsely implicated other co-accused, could safely form the basis of conviction for the remaining appellants without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that where prosecution witnesses are proven to have perjured themselves by falsely implicating certain individuals, their testimony becomes inherently unreliable and cannot be accepted against other accused persons without strong, independent corroboration. The Court observed that the lower courts erred by applying different standards of evidence and failing to recognize that the witnesses' established tendency to falsely implicate others undermined their entire credibility. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the inconsistencies regarding the time of the occurrence and the lack of credible evidence to support the prosecution's version of events.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of prosecution witnesses be relied upon for conviction if they are found to have falsely implicated other co-accused?
  • Is independent corroboration required when ocular testimony is provided by inimical and interested witnesses?
  • Does the false implication of some co-accused by prosecution witnesses render their entire testimony unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Razzaq vs The State1983 SCMR 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-12
  criminal appealcompoundable offencecompromiseacquittalpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had set aside the petitioner's acquittal and convicted him under section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine for injuring the complainant. The core legal question concerns the effect of a written compromise between the parties in respect of a compoundable offence. The Supreme Court held that since the offence under section 325 is compoundable and the parties confirmed the written compromise in open court, the petition should be converted into an appeal and accepted. The court established the principle that a genuine compromise between the parties in a compoundable criminal offence warrants the setting aside of conviction and the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal upon a compromise between the parties?
  • What is the effect of a compromise between parties in a compoundable offence under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid vs The State1983 SCMR 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-04
  ZinaHudood Ordinanceappreciation of evidenceleave to appealcorroboration of evidenceconsent in rape cases
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which maintained the petitioner's conviction under Section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The petitioner was originally convicted by the trial court under Section 10(3) of the same Ordinance for the abduction and rape of a minor. On appeal, the Federal Shariat Court, after examining additional court witnesses, altered the conviction to Section 10(2), finding the prosecutrix to be a consenting party, and reduced the sentence accordingly. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that the medical evidence lacked corroboration, the prosecutrix's testimony was unreliable, and the defense's counter-version regarding the prosecutrix's mental state and the payment of compensation was ignored. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Shariat Court had thoroughly analyzed the evidence, including the relationship between the parties and the lack of motive for false implication. Finding no violation of law or principle in the appreciation of evidence, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the lower court's factual findings were sound.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 when the prosecutrix is found to be a consenting party?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the appreciation of evidence by the Federal Shariat Court if no principle of law has been violated?
  • Is the testimony of a prosecutrix who is disbelieved on the issue of consent sufficient to support a conviction for Zina if corroborated by other evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid vs T1ie State1983 SCMR 934 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-26
  zina-bil-jabrincestleave to appealcriminal convictionHudood lawssentence enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence under Section 10(3) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for committing zina-bil-jabr upon his own daughter. The trial court had sentenced him to 25 years rigorous imprisonment and 30 stripes of whipping, which was upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The Supreme Court examined the record to determine if the findings of guilt regarding the incestuous act were correct. The Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting that the petitioner's act was abominable and fully justified the maximum punishment prescribed by law. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Is the maximum punishment under Section 10(3) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 appropriate for the offence of zina-bil-jabr committed against one's own daughter?
  • Does the Supreme Court have grounds to interfere with concurrent findings of guilt in a zina-bil-jabr case where the lower courts have properly evaluated the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1983 SCMR 1285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-13
  settlement lawproperty transferconstitutional petitionres judicataleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his constitutional petition, which challenged the deletion of a portion of a property transferred to him. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner could relitigate the ownership and transfer of a disputed portion of property that had already been conclusively settled by an earlier administrative order in 1962, which the petitioner failed to challenge. The Supreme Court held that the unchalleged order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner dated 14th April 1962 was binding on the parties, and the petitioner could not reopen a concluded controversy through collateral proceedings such as the apportionment of rent or revaluation. The key principle laid down is that final administrative orders regarding property transfers that are left unchallenged become binding, and parties cannot bypass them to re-agitate settled property rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unchallenged administrative order regarding property transfer binds the parties to subsequent proceedings?
  • Can a party reopen a concluded property dispute by raising incidental matters such as the apportionment of rent?
  • Does a person not party to an initial round of litigation retain the right to challenge a settled property apportionment if an intervening final order covers the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid vs Muhammad Javed1983 SCMR 685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-24
  pre-emptionestoppelwaiveracquiescenceregular second appealfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from pre-emption suits filed by the appellant, Abdul Rashid, seeking to pre-empt land purchased by the respondent, Muhammad Javed. The trial court dismissed the suits, holding that the plaintiff was estopped from suing due to his participation in the transaction and acquiescence. The District Judge allowed the plaintiff's appeals, reversing the trial court's findings. However, the Peshawar High Court in Regular Second Appeals restored the trial court's judgment and decrees. The core legal question examined by this Court was whether the High Court was justified in reversing the finding of fact of the District Judge and whether the plaintiff's conduct amounted to waiver or estoppel precluding his right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the High Court did not misread the evidence and that the plaintiff's positive acts—such as being present at the transaction and counting the sale money—amounted to acquiescence and waiver, thereby estopping him from enforcing his right of pre-emption. The key principle laid down is that active participation and positive conduct in a sale transaction by a pre-emptor constitutes waiver and estops him from subsequently bringing a pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does active participation and presence at a sale transaction estop a pre-emptor from filing a pre-emption suit?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with findings of fact when evidence is not appreciated in its correct perspective by the first appellate court?
  • Does counting the sale money and participating in negotiations amount to a waiver of the right of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rahim and Another vs Muhammad Ismail and Another1983 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-27
  life estategiftinheritanceShariat lawdeclaratory suitco-sharerslimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their Regular Second Appeal, which affirmed a decree declaring the respondents as rightful heirs to property previously held by Mst. Aisha. The dispute originated from a 1929 gift by one Boota, who granted Mst. Aisha a life interest in the property, conditional upon her lifetime or remarriage. Upon Mst. Aisha's death in 1970, the petitioners claimed absolute ownership, while the respondents, successors to Boota's sons, asserted their right to inherit under Shariat law. The core legal question was whether the 1929 gift created an absolute interest or a limited life estate, and whether the respondents' suit for declaration was maintainable and within limitation. The Supreme Court held that the gift was validly restricted to a life interest or until remarriage, as such conditions were not violative of the law then in force. Consequently, the property devolved according to Shariat upon the termination of the limited estate. The Court affirmed that co-sharers could seek declaratory relief and that the cause of action arose upon the death of the life tenant in 1970.

  Questions settled

  • Can a gift of property be validly restricted to a life interest or until remarriage under the law applicable in 1929?
  • Does the cause of action for a suit regarding property held under a life estate arise upon the death of the life tenant?
  • Are co-sharers entitled to seek a declaratory relief in respect of joint land held by a life tenant after the termination of that estate?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rab and Others vs The Additional Settlement Commissioner, A. D.1983 SCMR 1090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-14
  leave to appealmukhbari applicationland settlementnew pointswrit jurisdictiondead personimpleading legal representatives
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court in a land settlement matter. The petitioners had initially filed a mukhbari application against a deceased individual, Hassan A.I., who had died nearly 15 years prior. After the repeal of the relevant settlement law, they attempted to bring the legal representatives of the deceased onto the record. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners raised two new arguments: that a separate application had been filed against the sons of the deceased, and that impleading a specific person in a mukhbari application was unnecessary provided the challenged allotment was sufficiently identified. The Supreme Court observed that neither of these points had been pressed before the High Court. Holding that it was not a fit case to grant leave to appeal by allowing the petitioners to urge new points for the first time, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner urge new points before the Supreme Court for the grant of leave to appeal if those points were not pressed before the High Court?
  • Can a mukhbari application under land settlement laws proceed validly when filed against a deceased person?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid vs Mahmood Ahmad Qureshi and Other1983 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-26
  constitutional jurisdictionfindings of factreappraisal of evidencesettlement schemeleave to appealtransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed his constitutional petition regarding the transfer of a small plot of land. The petitioner claimed entitlement to the plot under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, alleging he had raised construction on the property. However, the Settlement authority rejected his claim, finding that at the time of transfer to the respondent, the petitioner was neither in possession of the property nor had he raised any construction. The High Court upheld this decision, declining to interfere with the Settlement authority's findings of fact. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner attempted to re-argue these factual findings by referencing subordinate reports and receipts. The Supreme Court held that it could not engage in the reappraisal of factual findings already determined by the competent tribunal, especially where the High Court had correctly declined to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court affirmed that it would not disturb findings of fact based on spot inspections and the historical record of the case. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact recorded by a settlement authority in a constitutional petition?
  • Is the High Court empowered to reappraise evidence regarding possession and construction in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the underlying dispute rests solely on factual findings made by a competent tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid vs Additional District Judge, Sahiwal and Other1983 SCMR 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-03
  ejectment petitionremand orderpersonal needlandlord and tenantappellate jurisdictionpreliminary issuesDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an ejectment petition filed against tenants on grounds of rent default and personal need. The core legal question was whether the appellate authority, upon remand, correctly adjudicated all issues, specifically the landlord's personal need, in compliance with the remand order. The Rent Controller had initially decided the personal need issue, but a subsequent appellate remand order explicitly directed a fresh decision on both preliminary issues and the merits regarding personal need. Upon the second appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the Rent Controller's finding on the notice issue but failed to re-adjudicate the personal need issue, relying instead on the original, pre-remand finding. The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court erred by failing to comply with the remand order's mandate to decide the merits afresh. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's dismissal and the Appellate Court's order, remanding the case for a fresh determination of the landlord's bona fide personal need, ensuring that all issues are properly adjudicated based on the evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is bound to decide all issues on merits when a remand order explicitly directs a fresh decision on those issues?
  • Can an appellate court rely on a pre-remand finding regarding personal need when the remand order mandated a fresh adjudication of that issue?
  • Does a failure to decide a material issue on merits as directed by a remand order vitiate the appellate judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-22
  murderself-defenceunexplained injuriesbenefit of doubtprivate defencecriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the court arises from the conviction of the appellants for murder under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in life imprisonment and compensation orders by the High Court. The core legal question concerned the effect of unexplained injuries on the accused persons and whether an unsuccessful plea of self-defence precludes the accused from receiving the benefit of reasonable doubts arising from prosecution omissions. The Supreme Court held that even if the defence fails to fully establish a plea of self-defence under section 105 of the Evidence Act 1872, the accused are entitled to the benefit of doubts and gaps in the prosecution case where prosecution witnesses failed to explain injuries sustained by the appellants during the occurrence. The ratio decidendi established is that where the prosecution suppresses the origin of injuries on the accused and reasonable possibilities of self-defence emerge from the record, the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, warranting an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person is entitled to the benefit of self-defence when the defence fails to fully establish the plea under section 105 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Can the prosecution secure a conviction when it fails to explain the fire-arm injuries sustained by the accused during the same occurrence?
  • Does a reasonable possibility of self-defence arising from the prosecution's own omissions react on the entire prosecution case to warrant an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majeed vs Province of the Punjab1983 SCMR 726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-08
  temporary injunctionleave to appealgovernment landboard of revenue instructionsdiscretionary powercivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, who is in cultivating possession of Government land, sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order refusing a temporary injunction pending his civil suit against the offer of the land on tender to the highest bidder. The petitioner claimed entitlement to allotment under instructions of the Board of Revenue. The lower courts and the High Court concurrenty found no prima facie case in his favour, noting he was ineligible as he already held over 106 kanals of land under another scheme, and that the instructions constituted an enabling discretionary power rather than a mandatory command. The Supreme Court held that questions of fact regarding land holdings cannot be tentatively determined by the Court against concurrent findings of three courts, and that the Board of Revenue instructions merely confer a discretionary power rather than an absolute right to allotment. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, establishing that discretionary administrative instructions do not create an enforceable right to allotment for sub-tenants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether instructions of the Board of Revenue create an enforceable right of allotment for sub-tenants?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding land eligibility for the purpose of granting interim relief?
  • Does an enabling provision in administrative instructions amount to a mandatory command for making allotments?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Latif vs Abdus Samad and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-06
  free fightculpable homicideappreciation of evidenceland disputecriminal liabilityacquittalself-defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the High Court's acquittal of three respondents in a murder case involving a long-standing land dispute. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence regarding the nature of the confrontation and the criminal liability of the respondents. The Supreme Court observed that both parties had actively armed themselves and prepared for conflict after an initial encounter, creating a 'free and planned fight.' The Court held that the High Court failed to correctly apply the law regarding free fights, where the court must draw inferences from the circumstances despite the parties' failure to provide a truthful account. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal of the primary respondent, Abdus Samad, convicting him under Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, while maintaining the acquittal of the other respondents due to insufficient corroborative evidence. The judgment reinforces the principle that in free fights, participants are liable for their specific acts regardless of who fired first.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of free fight apply when both parties arm themselves and engage in a conflict over disputed land?
  • Is a court permitted to draw inferences from evidence in a free fight case even when the parties suppress the truth?
  • Can an appellate court convict an accused for culpable homicide not amounting to murder based on evidence of a free fight despite a High Court acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Karim and Others vs Province of Punjab and Another1983 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-12
  State landproprietary rightsexcess areaBoard of Revenuewrit petitionunauthorized occupant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine the writ petition filed by the petitioners. The petitioners, tenants of State land occupying approximately 11 to 12 acres each, were granted proprietary rights up to 8 acres each by the Collector, while the remaining excess area was not allotted to them. Their subsequent application to the Board of Revenue for the sale of the excess area was rejected because the excess area exceeded 10% of the prescribed limit under government instructions. The High Court dismissed their writ petition, noting that the original order of the Collector had not been challenged before the revenue authorities and that they were unauthorized occupants of the excess land. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court found the order of the revenue authorities just and fair, as the petitioners had already received 8 acres of land and the excess land had been allotted to others. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal and refused to interfere, resulting in the dismissal of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition be maintained against an order of the Board of Revenue when the primary order of the Collector was never challenged before the revenue authorities?
  • Are tenants of State land entitled to purchase excess area exceeding ten percent of the prescribed limit at the average market price under government instructions?
  • Does unauthorized and illegal occupation of land confer any right to demand transfer of proprietary rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Jabbar and Others vs The State1983 SCMR 1191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-05
  bailcriminal procedureleave to appealimproper conductinordinate delaypending petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which refused bail to the petitioners in a criminal case registered under sections 307, 326, 324/149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners, charged with attacking the complainant and others with firearms and weapons, sought bail on the grounds of inordinate delay. The Supreme Court noted that the petitioners had improperly approached the High Court for bail while a petition for leave to appeal regarding the same matter was already pending before the Supreme Court. The Court held that such conduct was highly improper and that there was no compelling reason to justify the petitioners' actions. Furthermore, the Court found that the ground of delay was not applicable in the circumstances. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's refusal of bail, emphasizing that the petitioners' conduct and the prior dismissal of their earlier petition by the Supreme Court precluded the grant of relief. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is it permissible for a petitioner to approach the High Court for bail while a petition for leave to appeal regarding the same matter is pending before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the ground of inordinate delay justify the grant of bail when the petitioner's conduct in seeking relief is found to be improper?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hussain Baloch vs Principal, Chandka Medical College and Othfrss1983 SCMR 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-05
  land acquisitionadditional commissionerpublic purposewrit petitionstatutory interpretationurgency provisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had challenged the acquisition of land for the Chandka Medical College. The core legal question was whether an Additional Commissioner is competent to issue a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, and whether the invocation of urgency provisions under section 17 was valid. The Supreme Court held that under section 2(17) of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956, the term 'Commissioner' includes an Additional Commissioner, thereby validating the notification. Furthermore, the Court declined to examine the question of urgency as no factual foundation had been laid in the writ petition. The key principle laid down is that an Additional Commissioner can validly perform the functions of a Commissioner under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 by virtue of the extended definition provided in the General Clauses Act, unless excluded by context.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term Commissioner under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 include an Additional Commissioner?
  • Can an Additional Commissioner issue a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Is the invocation of urgency under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 open to challenge without proper factual foundation in the pleadings?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid vs Custodian and Other1983 SCMR 783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-04
  evacuee propertylacheswrit petitionrestoration of propertyleave to appealexecution proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a writ petition filed in the High Court challenging the Custodian's order regarding the status of an evacuee property located in Hyderabad. The petitioner had applied for transfer of the property on a CH form, claiming tenancy under an evacuee. After his review application was dismissed by the Custodian following an inquiry, the petitioner filed a constitutional writ petition after a delay of nearly six years. The High Court dismissed the petition on grounds of laches and lack of merit. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that an order under Section 22 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957 remains inoperative without an accompanying restoration order under Section 23 of the same Act. The Supreme Court held that the absence of a Section 23 order does not invalidate an order passed under Section 22. Upholding the High Court's dismissal, the Court affirmed that the writ petition was barred by laches and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of an order under Section 23 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957 invalidate an order made under Section 22?
  • Can a writ petition filed after an unexplained delay of six years be dismissed on the ground of laches?
  • Is an order declared under Section 22 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957 inoperative until restoration of possession is ordered under Section 23?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid and 3 Others vs Additional Commissioner and 2 Other1983SCMR760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-28
  leave to appealinheritance mutationlimited ownerdisplaced persons settlementrevisional jurisdictiontime-barred appealallotment of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the inheritance and allotment of agricultural land originally held by a limited owner. The petitioners claimed entitlement as collaterals, having secured an inheritance mutation and subsequent land allotments. The contesting respondents later challenged these proceedings through time-barred appeals before the revenue and settlement authorities. The core legal questions involve the jurisdiction of the Additional Settlement Commissioner to entertain revision petitions following statutory omissions, the effect of limitation on belated challenges to long-settled mutations, and the independent application of mind by settlement authorities upon remand. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that substantial questions of law regarding jurisdiction and limitation were involved, and permitted the parties to proceed on the present record with liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner retains revisional jurisdiction after the omission of Section 19(3) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement Act, 1958)?
  • Does a belated and time-barred appeal against a long-settled mutation remain maintainable before settlement authorities?
  • Whether an order passed by a settlement authority without independent application of mind upon remand is vitiated in law?
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• Abdul Hameed and Others vs Imam Din and Other1983SCMR611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-06
  contempt of courtmesne profitstemporary injunctionundertakingsupreme court rulesenforcement of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a contempt application filed under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Part V, Order XXVII, rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, alleging non-compliance with a Supreme Court order dated 4-1-1979. The core legal question concerned the enforcement and quantification of mesne profits that the respondents had undertaken to pay as a condition for a temporary injunction protecting their possession during the pendency of a civil petition for special leave to appeal, which was subsequently dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were bound by their consent and undertaking given to the court to pay mesne profits from the date of initial possession, and that the Assistant Commissioner/Collector erred in refusing jurisdiction. The Court directed the Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Chunian, to determine and award the mesne profits in accordance with the prior order within three months, establishing that parties obtaining interim relief on specific undertakings cannot subsequently evade their liability or contest the execution of such terms.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party who obtained an interim injunction on an undertaking to pay mesne profits can subsequently challenge the enforcement of that liability?
  • Does an Assistant Commissioner have jurisdiction to calculate and award mesne profits directed by the Supreme Court as a condition of a stay order?
  • Can a demand for mesne profits ordered by the Supreme Court be avoided on the ground that a separate suit for declaration is pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hafeez vs The State1983 SCMR 1143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-04
  kidnappinglawful guardianshipchild witnesscriminal appealsentencingstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the kidnapping of a minor girl. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the essential ingredients of Section 364-A, specifically whether the victim, who was under ten years old at the time of the offence, was kidnapped for the purpose of murder, grievous hurt, slavery, or lust. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while the appellant did kidnap the child from lawful guardianship, the evidence did not support the specific aggravating circumstances required for a conviction under Section 364-A. The Court noted the child was not subjected to the harms enumerated in that section and that her family members appeared complicit in her employment as a child artist. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 364-A, substituting it with a conviction under Section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and reduced the sentence to seven years of rigorous imprisonment, granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the kidnapping of a child under ten years old automatically constitute an offence under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What are the essential elements required to prove an offence under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 364-A be converted to one under Section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the specific intent to harm or exploit is not proven?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hafeez vs Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and Another1983 SCMR 566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-25
  writ jurisdictionsuppression of factsdiscretionary jurisdictionalternative remedydismissal in liminecompulsory retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction because the petitioner had suppressed the material fact that he had already filed a civil suit regarding the same subject matter—his compulsory retirement from the Board of Secondary Education. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly dismissed the writ petition in limine due to the petitioner's failure to disclose the pending civil litigation and his pursuit of an alternative remedy. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had indeed suppressed a material fact in his writ petition. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that such suppression disentitles a petitioner from invoking the High Court's special discretionary jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that a petitioner who fails to disclose the existence of parallel proceedings or the pursuit of alternative remedies in a writ petition is not entitled to relief under the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction, as such suppression constitutes a valid ground for dismissal in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of the fact that a civil suit has been filed regarding the same subject matter disentitle a petitioner from invoking the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction?
  • Is a writ petition liable to be dismissed in limine if the petitioner fails to disclose that they have already availed of an alternative remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Had alias Abdul Hadi Hasan and 2 OTHERSs vs Syed Ali Haider and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-15
  ejectmentreconstruction of buildingconversion of building characterre-entry of tenantbona fide requirementharmonious construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arose from three petitions for leave to appeal filed by tenants occupying shops in a dilapidated hundred-year-old building, seeking to challenge eviction orders obtained by the landlord for the purpose of reconstruction. The landlord's sanctioned plan envisaged replacing the existing structure, which included ground-floor shops, entirely with a residential building. The primary legal question was whether a landlord is barred under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 from converting a non-residential building into a residential building upon reconstruction, given that the tenant's right to re-entry under Section 13(5-B) cannot be exercised if no shops exist in the new structure. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that Section 13(2)(vi) places no limitation on the type of new building to be constructed and no law prohibits converting a non-residential building to a residential one upon reconstruction. Harmoniously interpreting the provisions, the Court held that Section 13(5-B) applies only where the reconstructed building retains the character of the old building, and does not apply when non-residential property is converted into residential property.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 13(5-B) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 debar a landlord from converting a non-residential building into a residential building upon reconstruction?
  • Whether the tenant's right to claim possession under Section 13(5-B) applies where a non-residential building is converted into a residential building after reconstruction?
  • Can a landlord seek eviction for reconstruction under Section 13(2)(vi) if the sanctioned reconstruction plan does not contain corresponding commercial spaces for existing tenants?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz and Others vs Mian Rafiuddin through His Legal Heirs1983 SCMR 928 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-24
  Section 145 Cr.P.C.Section 147 Cr.P.C.breach of the peacepossession disputeMagistrate jurisdictioncivil suit pendencyremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that set aside a Magistrate's proceedings under Section 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and remanded the matter to be treated as proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the authority to convert proceedings between sections when the underlying dispute concerned possession, and whether the pendency of civil litigation ousted the Magistrate's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the appeal. The Court held that the High Court is fully competent to apply the law correctly to the pleadings and material before it, and that a Magistrate's jurisdiction under Section 145 is not ousted by the mere pendency of a civil suit unless a decree or order regulating possession has been passed. Furthermore, the Court established that prolonged litigation does not automatically negate the apprehension of a breach of the peace, which remains a factual determination for the Magistrate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere pendency of a civil suit oust a Magistrate's jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the High Court empowered to convert proceedings initiated under Section 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the passage of time during prolonged litigation automatically extinguish the apprehension of a breach of the peace necessary for Section 145 proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz and 2 Others vs The State1983 SCMR 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-17
  murderocular testimonycorroborationinvestigative lapsesFIR tamperingacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for the murder of two individuals. The core legal question concerns the reliability of ocular testimony in a case where the FIR failed to name the accused, eye-witnesses were allegedly inimical, and significant investigative irregularities were present, including tampering with official records and unexplained delays in post-mortem examinations. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that when eye-witnesses are closely related to the deceased and have an existing enmity with the accused, their testimony requires strong, independent corroboration, which was absent here. Furthermore, the court found the investigation to be fundamentally flawed, noting evidence of tampering with the FIR and inquest reports to alter dates, and the failure of the prosecution to connect the appellants to the crime through forensic evidence, especially since the firearms recovered did not match the crime empties. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to name accused persons in the FIR, when they are known to the complainant, cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Is strong corroborative evidence required for the testimony of eye-witnesses who are closely related to the deceased and have an existing enmity with the accused?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the investigating officer is found to have tampered with official documents such as the FIR and inquest reports?
  • Does the lack of forensic matching between recovered firearms and crime empties entitle the accused to an acquittal in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• A. S. Rizvi vs Pakistan Etc.S1983 SCMR 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-08
  pensionemolumentsdeputation payspecial payCivil Service RegulationsFundamental RulessuperannuationService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which had dismissed his appeal regarding the computation of his pension emoluments. The petitioner, who retired as Deputy Secretary on deputation with the Board of Industrial Management, contended that his special pay and deputation pay should be included in his emoluments for pension calculation purposes. The respondents opposed the petition on the ground that deputation pay is not specifically declared as an emolument reckoning for pension under Paragraph 7(5) of the Civil Service Regulations, 1939. Furthermore, it was established that the special pay of Rs. 100 was not admissible for the deputation post and had subsequently been converted into deputation pay to avoid requiring a refund from the petitioner. The Supreme Court examined the definition of 'emoluments' under Paragraph 7(5) of the Civil Service Regulations, 1939 and the relevant rules, holding that deputation pay could not be counted toward pension calculations as it was not specifically declared as reckoning for pension.

  Questions settled

  • Whether deputation pay falls within the definition of emoluments for the purpose of computing pension under Paragraph 7(5) of the Civil Service Regulations, 1939?
  • Can special pay that was mistakenly granted contrary to rules and later converted into deputation pay be counted as an emolument reckoning for pension?
  • What components constitute 'emoluments' for the purpose of calculating a civil servant's pension under the Civil Service Regulations, 1939?
  Read full judgment →
• A. Ghani Sayeed vs National Bank of Pakistan1983S C M R 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-30
  constitutional petitionservice rulesstatutory rulesNational Bank of Pakistanleave to appealmaster and servantdismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Vice-President of the National Bank of Pakistan, sought leave to appeal against a Sind High Court judgment that dismissed his constitutional petition challenging his removal from service. The petitioner had been retired following an inquiry under the National Bank of Pakistan Staff Rules, 1980. The High Court had dismissed the petition in limine, holding that constitutional remedies were unavailable because the petitioner's employment was governed by internal bank regulations rather than statutory provisions. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that his employment was governed by statutory rules having the force of law, invoking Article 4 of the Constitution of 1973, and contended that nationalization of banks brought their functionaries under the affairs of the Federation. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the case required a definitive ruling on whether the applicable service rules were statutory or non-statutory in character, and whether any non-compliance with such rules would entitle the petitioner to maintain a constitutional petition despite not holding a public or statutory office.

  Questions settled

  • Are the service rules governing employees of the National Bank of Pakistan statutory or non-statutory in character?
  • Does the non-compliance with statutory service rules entitle an employee, who does not hold a public or statutory office, to maintain a constitutional petition?
  • Does the nationalization of banks render the service rules of bank employees statutory in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• A. D. Parvez vs Pakistan through Secretaries, Ministry of Information1983 SCMR 329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-09
  civil servantreversiondisciplinary proceedingspromotion irregularityservice tribunaladministrative lawPakistan National Centre
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment regarding the reversion of a civil servant from the post of Resident Director to Assistant Resident Director. The petitioner, an employee of the Pakistan National Centre (PNC), which became an attached department of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, argued that his reversion constituted a punishment under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and was procedurally flawed. The core legal questions were whether the reversion amounted to a disciplinary punishment requiring adherence to the Efficiency and Discipline Rules and whether the petitioner’s initial promotion to Grade-18 was valid given the absence of formal service rules and the failure to utilize the established Selection Board. The Supreme Court held that the reversion was not a punishment but a necessary administrative adjustment due to the repatriation of a senior officer, as the petitioner was the junior-most Resident Director. Furthermore, the Court found the petitioner’s promotion irregular, noting it bypassed the Selection Board and violated service tenure requirements. The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reversion of a junior officer to accommodate a repatriated senior officer constitute a punishment under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  • Can a promotion be considered irregular if it bypasses an established Selection Board in the absence of formal service rules?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to the protection of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, when the action taken against them is an administrative adjustment rather than a disciplinary measure?
  Read full judgment →
• Ziarat Gul vs Ahmad Khan and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-20
  pre-emptionvacant siteexempted propertyagricultural landconstruction of a housepre-emption suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arises out of a pre-emption suit concerning a parcel of land measuring about 11 marlas, which was decreed in favor of the plaintiff-respondent and upheld through the appellate stages. The core legal question was whether the vendee-appellant was entitled to the statutory exemption from pre-emption under section 5(c) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950, given that he owned a share in a residential house and previously purchased another plot of land which he occasionally used for agricultural purposes. The Supreme Court held that while the appellant's fractional ownership of a house within the permissible size limit did not disqualify him from claiming the exemption, his ownership of a previously purchased plot intended for construction constituted a "vacant site" under the statute, notwithstanding its subsequent temporary agricultural use. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the term "vacant site" in section 5(c) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950 refers to a plot intended for building a house upon which no structure has yet been raised, and its character is not altered by intervening agricultural use.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ownership of a share in a house within the permissible size limit destroy the exemption from pre-emption under section 5(c) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950?
  • What is the legal meaning of the term "vacant site" under section 5(c) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950?
  • Does the temporary or intervening agricultural use of a plot previously purchased for building a house alter its character as a "vacant site" for the purposes of pre-emption exemption?
  Read full judgment →
• Zakauddin Alias Billa vs Muhammad Ismail1982 SCMR 1197 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-31
  evictiondefault in payment of rentspecial oathwithdrawal of offerRent Controller proceedingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a tenant's second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed concurrent eviction orders passed against the tenant on the ground of default in rent payment. During the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the tenant offered to be bound by a special oath taken by the landlord on the Holy Qur'an, under which the tenant agreed to immediate eviction if the landlord took the oath regarding the default and rent amount. Subsequently, the tenant sought to withdraw this offer through an application, which the Rent Controller rejected as mala fide, thereafter administering the oath and ordering eviction. The Supreme Court considered whether the tenant could unilaterally withdraw the oath offer and whether the Oaths Act applied to Rent Controller proceedings. The Court held that it is discretionary for the forum to permit or refuse the withdrawal of such an offer, and circumstances justified refusing it here. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that a Rent Controller is not bound by strict technical procedures of civil or criminal courts or the Oaths Act. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party unilaterally withdraw an offer to settle a case on a special oath after having made it?
  • Is a Rent Controller bound by the technical procedures of the Oaths Act or the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Does a Rent Controller constitute a court strictly bound by formal procedural codes?
  Read full judgment →
• Zain Khan Khalil and 2 Other vs Government of N. W. F. P. through Chief1982 PLD Supreme Court 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-16
  civil servantsseniorityabsorptionad hoc appointmenttemporary serviceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioners' appeal regarding the determination of their seniority. The petitioners were initially appointed as Lawyer Magistrates in the P.C.S. (Executive Branch) on temporary and ad hoc bases between May and June 1972, with express conditions that their service would not count towards seniority or regular appointment. Subsequently, on November 27, 1978, the Governor of N.-W.F.P. promulgated an amendment via notification under section 26 of the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants Act, 1973, substituting rule 10 of the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964, to regularize and absorb Lawyer Magistrates and assign them suitable seniority. The core legal question concerns the interpretation of rule 10 as to whether the petitioners' seniority should be reckoned from their initial temporary induction in 1972 or from their date of regular absorption. The Supreme Court held that the phrase prohibiting seniority earlier than the respective dates of appointment as Lawyer Magistrates referred to the date of regular absorption under the rule and not to prior temporary service. The petition was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether temporary and ad hoc service rendered prior to regular absorption can be counted towards seniority under rule 10 of the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964?
  • Does rule 10 of the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964 permit seniority to be dated back to the initial periodic induction of a civil servant?
  • Are periodic ad hoc appointment terms and conditions considered unconscionable when they explicitly bar the accumulation of seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Zaheer Ud Din vs The Additional Settlement Commissioner and Other1982 SCMR 925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-21
  constitutional jurisdictionfinding of factsettlement authoritiesspecial leave to appealtransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition seeking the transfer of an Ihata claimed to be part and parcel of a shop already transferred to him. The core legal question was whether the High Court could interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with a concurrent finding of fact rendered by the settlement authorities regarding the nature of the disputed property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the finding of fact by the settlement department was unexceptionable, supported by cogent reasons, and did not suffer from any omission or misreading of the record, thereby warranting no interference under constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact recorded by competent settlement authorities cannot be re-examined or interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 unless tainted with misreading or omission.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a finding of fact by settlement authorities in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is an Ihata considered part of a shop when determined as an independent unit by settlement authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafarullah vs Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and Another1982 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-04
  unfair meansexamination malpracticedisqualificationwrit jurisdictionclean hands doctrineBoard of Intermediate and Secondary Educationresult notification
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition against the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education. The petitioner, having initially been declared successful in the Intermediate Examination, was subsequently issued a charge-sheet for using unfair means, specifically substituting answer books. A Special Disciplinary Committee disqualified the petitioner from the examination and barred him from appearing in the next three examinations. The petitioner contended that the Board lacked legal authority to recall the initially notified result and that the Committee was improperly constituted. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the Board possessed the legal competence to recall and amend results previously notified. Furthermore, the Court found that the petitioner had been granted adequate opportunity to defend himself, having been confronted with the evidence and required to answer a questionnaire. Crucially, the Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to grant relief under its constitutional jurisdiction because the petitioner had not approached the Court with clean hands. The petition was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education have the legal authority to recall or amend a result once it has been notified in the Gazette?
  • Can a High Court refuse to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution if the petitioner has not approached the Court with clean hands?
  • Does the constitution of a three-member disciplinary committee instead of a two-member committee cause prejudice to a candidate if the procedure followed was otherwise fair?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafar Qureshi and Others vs Khawaja Maqsoodul Hassan Etc.S1982 SCMR 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-05
  rent restrictiondefault in rent paymentstriking off defencerent controllertenancy disputedeposit of rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a rent dispute where the petitioners, tenants of the respondent, challenged the dismissal of their Second Appeal from Order (S.A.O.) by the High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the Rent Controller correctly struck off the petitioners' defence due to their failure to comply with an order under Section 13(6) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance regarding the timely deposit of monthly rent. The Rent Controller had found that the petitioners defaulted on rent payments for two specific months, April 1974 and October 1974. The Supreme Court examined the petitioners' contention that they were denied sufficient opportunity to prove compliance and that the delay for one month was negligible. The Court upheld the Rent Controller's findings, concluding that a default had indeed occurred. Regarding the delay, the Court held that the Rent Controller exercised valid discretion in striking off the defence, noting that the delay was not merely one day when considering the grace period provided. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the discretion to strike off a tenant's defence upon finding a default in the deposit of monthly rent?
  • Can a tenant claim that a delay in rent deposit was negligible when the Rent Controller has already determined a default occurred?
  • Is a finding of fact by a Rent Controller regarding rent default subject to interference when the tenant fails to demonstrate compliance with deposit orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Yaqoob and Others vs Amir Hussain1982 SCMR 777 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-08
  mortgage redemptionlimitation periodburden of proofwithholding evidenceadverse presumptionsuit for declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the successors-in-interest of a mortgagee against the mortgagor's successors. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the right of redemption for the 1914 mortgage had expired due to the passage of sixty years, thereby extinguishing the defendants' rights and confirming the plaintiffs' ownership. The trial court, the first appellate court, and the High Court dismissed the suit, finding that the plaintiffs failed to produce the mortgage deed to establish when the right to redeem accrued. The Supreme Court examined whether the limitation period under the Limitation Act 1908 had expired. The Court held that the burden of proof rested on the plaintiffs to establish their plea by producing the best evidence, specifically the mortgage deed. In the absence of this deed, the Court could not determine the accrual of the right to redeem. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that adverse presumptions arise against a party withholding primary evidence, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce a mortgage deed prevent a court from determining if the right to redeem has become time-barred?
  • Can a court draw adverse presumptions against a party who withholds the primary evidence necessary to prove their own case?
  • Is the burden of proof on the plaintiff to produce the mortgage deed when asserting that the defendant's right to redeem has been extinguished by efflux of time?
  Read full judgment →
• West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority and 2 Others1982 SCMR 1167 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-09
  land acquisitioncompensationconsent decreeappellate settlementprice modification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 29-R of 1981 and Civil Appeal No. 272 of 1979 involving the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority. The core legal question addressed was the determination of the appropriate price per kanal for land acquisition or compensation, which was the subject of the impugned orders. Upon preliminary hearing and discussion, the parties reached a mutual agreement to resolve the dispute. The Court accepted this consensus, holding that the impugned orders should be maintained in their entirety, with the sole modification that the price be adjusted from Rs. 4,000 per kanal to Rs. 3,000 per kanal. Consequently, the Court disposed of the pending application and appeal in accordance with the terms of this agreement, with no order as to costs. This judgment establishes the principle that where parties reach a settlement during appellate proceedings, the Court may dispose of the matter by incorporating the agreed-upon terms into its final order, thereby modifying the impugned decision to reflect the mutual consensus of the litigants.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of an appeal based on a mutual agreement reached between the parties during the hearing?
  • Is a court empowered to modify the price determined in an impugned order if the parties agree to such a change?
  Read full judgment →
• Wazir Muhammad Etc. vs Abdul Aziz and Another1982 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-11
  pre-emptionclerical errorpleadingspartial pre-emptionMartial Law Regulationdivisibility of sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the petitioners (defendant-vendees) challenged the lower courts' concurrent findings in favor of the plaintiffs. The core legal questions concerned whether the trial court correctly dismissed the suit based on the omission of certain Khasra numbers in the plaint, and whether the court could dismiss the suit on the ground of a violation of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 without such a plea being raised in the pleadings. The Supreme Court upheld the lower appellate court's decision, affirming that the omission of specific Khasra numbers in the plaint was a clerical error that did not constitute partial pre-emption, as the property was otherwise correctly identified. Furthermore, the Court held that a court cannot base a decision on a factual ground, such as an alleged violation of a regulation, that was neither pleaded nor proven by the parties. The principle established is that a party cannot secure a judgment on a factual issue that was not formally raised in the pleadings or subjected to inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court dismiss a suit based on a factual ground that was never raised in the pleadings or issues?
  • Does the omission of specific Khasra numbers in a plaint, where the property is otherwise correctly identified, constitute partial pre-emption?
  • Is a sale of land indivisible when the sale consideration is a single lump sum?
  Read full judgment →
• Wasi Ahmed Rizvi vs Federation of Pakistan1982 PLD Supreme Court 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-16
  Shariat BenchLachesRes JudicataConstitutional JurisdictionProcedural LawRepugnancy to IslamJudicial Usage
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a decision of the Shariat Bench of the High Court, which dismissed a petition seeking to declare the judicial doctrines of laches and res judicata repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal question was whether these doctrines constitute 'law' subject to the jurisdiction of the Shariat Benches or whether they are excluded as matters of court procedure under Article 203-B of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the doctrines of laches and res judicata are essentially procedural in nature. The Court affirmed that the definition of 'law' in the Constitution expressly excludes any law relating to the procedure of any court or tribunal. Consequently, because these doctrines govern the conduct of litigation and the exercise of discretionary relief, they fall within the exclusion clause and are immune from challenge in the Shariat Benches. The principle established is that judicial usages and doctrines pertaining to court procedure are not subject to the repugnancy jurisdiction conferred upon the Shariat Benches by the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Are the judicial doctrines of laches and res judicata subject to the jurisdiction of the Shariat Benches?
  • Does the exclusion of laws relating to the procedure of any court or tribunal in Article 203-B of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 encompass the doctrines of laches and res judicata?
  • Is the law of limitation considered procedural and thus protected from challenge under Article 203-B of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Waryam Akhtar vs Chairman, Municipal Committee and 5 Other1982 SCMR 942 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-29
  ration depotcancellation of authorizationwrit petitionleave to appealnatural justicemalafide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had challenged the cancellation of the authorization of a ration depot held by the petitioner. The core legal questions concerned whether the cancellation order passed by the Food Allotment Board, Sheikhupura, was vitiated by mala fide and whether the petitioner was denied a proper opportunity of hearing and cross-examination. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings were conducted fairly, as the petitioner was associated with the enquiry, given opportunities to present evidence, and failed to raise the objection regarding cross-examination before the High Court in his pleadings. The Court concluded that the dismissal of the writ petition was fully merited and accordingly refused leave to appeal, affirming that administrative decisions rendered upon proper enquiry and without procedural prejudice will not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cancellation of a ration depot authorization is open to constitutional challenge on the ground of mala fide when supported by adequate enquiry material?
  • Can an objection regarding the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, not raised in the writ petition, be entertained for the first time during arguments?
  • Whether an administrative authority's detailed enquiry conducted in the presence of the affected party satisfies the requirements of a fair hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad vs Settlement Commissioner Etc.S1982 SCMR 272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-12
  fraudulent allotmentsettlement of landinheritance claimresumption of landtainted allotmentwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the allotment of agricultural land initially obtained by the appellant through fraudulent means. After the Deputy Settlement Commissioner resumed the land, the Lahore High Court, in a previous writ petition, upheld the finding of fraud but allowed the appellant to retain land equivalent to his inheritance share from his father, Umar Din, while leaving the share of his sister, Alam Bibi, to be decided by the Settlement Authorities. The core legal question was whether the appellant could adjust his inheritance share from his sister against the tainted allotment obtained fraudulently. The Supreme Court held that the appellant could not claim protection for the interest inherited from his sister against the fraudulent allotment. The Court reasoned that the High Court’s previous judgment only protected the appellant’s inheritance from his father and did not authorize the Settlement Authorities to allow adjustments for other claims against a tainted allotment. The principle laid down is that a party cannot seek to adjust legitimate inheritance claims against an allotment that is ab initio fraudulent, as such taint precludes the legal right to claim protection for additional interests.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party adjust a legitimate inheritance claim against an allotment that was obtained through fraud?
  • Does a High Court order allowing a party to retain land based on one inheritance claim authorize Settlement Authorities to adjust other, separate inheritance claims against the same tainted allotment?
  • Is an allotment obtained through fraudulent means subject to resumption regardless of subsequent claims of inheritance?
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• Wali Muhammad vs Khushdil and Other1982 SCMR 1012(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-08
  consent decreecivil revisionspecial leave to appealcounsel authorityfinality of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for special leave to appeal against an order passed by the High Court in a civil revision petition. The core legal question was whether a party, having consented to a settlement through their counsel before the High Court, could subsequently challenge the resulting decree in the Supreme Court. The High Court had recorded that the petitioner, through counsel, agreed to accept a specific sum of Rs. 60,000 as a refund of the sale price paid to the vendor, and the respondents had agreed to pay this amount, leading to a consent decree. The Supreme Court held that in light of the fact that the impugned order was passed with the express consent of the parties' counsel, there were no grounds to interfere with the High Court's judgment. Consequently, the petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle affirmed is that a party is bound by a consent decree entered into by their counsel, and such a decree cannot be challenged on appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a decree in the Supreme Court that was passed by the High Court with the consent of their counsel?
  • Is a consent decree binding upon the parties who agreed to it through their legal representatives?
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• Wali Muhammad and Other vs The State1982 PLD Supreme Court 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-13
  criminal appealcommon intentionvicarious liabilityocular testimonymedical evidenceappreciation of evidencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of three appellants for the murder of Muhammad Hassan Baladi under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside arms offences. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular testimony, the impact of alleged discrepancies between medical and testimonial evidence, and the scope of vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding an accused whose specific participation was disputed. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions of two appellants, finding the prosecution evidence, including the recovery of weapons and corroborative testimony, credible. However, the Court acquitted the third appellant, Rajo. The Court held that where eye-witnesses falsely attribute specific overt acts (hatchet blows) to an accused that are contradicted by medical evidence, and where no other evidence establishes a pre-concert or common intention, mere presence at the scene is insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 34. The principle laid down is that constructive liability requires proof of an overt act or shared intention, and mere presence does not automatically attract criminal liability.

  Questions settled

  • Is mere presence at the scene of a crime sufficient to establish vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus apply to the appreciation of evidence in Pakistani criminal courts?
  • Can an accused be held liable under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the prosecution fails to prove any overt act or common intention?
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• Wahid Buxsoomro vs Ghulam Muhammad Baluch1982 SCMR 541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-11
  ex parte ejectmentsetting aside ex parte orderdefault in rentpersonal requirementrent controllerspecial leave to appealcompetency of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of an appeal by the Sind High Court. The petitioner had filed an ejectment application against the respondent tenant on the grounds of default in rent and personal requirement. The Rent Controller passed an ex parte ejectment order, leading to the tenant's dispossession. Subsequently, the Rent Controller set aside the ex parte order, and the petitioner's appeal against that order was dismissed by the High Court for lack of legal competence. The petitioner contended that the respondent's application to set aside the ex parte order was barred under sub-section (2) of section 19 and that the appeal under section 21(1) was maintainable. The Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal to consider the important questions of law raised regarding the competency of applications and appeals under the relevant rent restriction laws, directing status quo as to possession pending the hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for setting aside an ex parte order is barred under sub-section (2) of section 19 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Is an appeal under section 21(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 competent against an order setting aside an ex parte ejectment order?
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• Umar Fayyaz Khan vs Abdul Khaliq, Etc1982 SCMR 1173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-29
  land allotmentwrit jurisdictionremandsitting allotteerehabilitation and settlementdisputed questions of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court in its writ jurisdiction, which remanded a land settlement dispute to the Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision. The appellant, claiming to be a sitting allottee, argued that the High Court should have decided the matter on the merits instead of remanding it, as there was sufficient material to establish his preferential right over the respondents under paragraph 8 of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme. The respondents contested this claim, pointing to a subsequent order by an Additional Settlement Commissioner that declared the entry relied upon by the appellant to be fabricated. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the assertion of being a sitting allottee is neither undisputed nor substantiated by admitted facts, the controversy involves disputed questions of fact that require a proper inquiry and a hearing for both parties. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's order of remand as the appropriate procedure to resolve the factual dispute and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court justified in remanding a land settlement case where the factual status of a party as a sitting allottee is disputed and not substantiated by admitted facts?
  • Can the Supreme Court decide disputed questions of fact regarding land allotment status when the underlying record is contested as being fabricated?
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• Ubaidullah vs Sher Muhammad1982 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-24
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentleave to appealopportunity of producing evidencerent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of the petitioner-tenant's second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the ejectment order granted by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the District Judge on the ground of default in rent payment. The core legal question is whether the Rent Controller failed to provide the petitioner with an adequate opportunity to prove that he was not a defaulter and that the landlord had refused to accept the rent. The Supreme Court held that the record clearly demonstrated that the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity to produce evidence and defend his case, yet failed to substantiate his claims or deny non-payment. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, affirming the principle that procedural fairness is satisfied when a party is given adequate opportunity to present evidence and is not prejudiced by the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can claim denial of opportunity to prove rent payment when the record shows sufficient opportunity was granted?
  • Does the failure of a tenant to deny non-payment of rent or produce evidence of tender justify an order of ejectment?
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• U. H. Joseph and Others vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1982 SCMR 752 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-15
  condonation of delaytime-barred petitionintra-court appealbona fide prosecutionsettlement schemeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a Constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court regarding the transfer of property under the Settlement Scheme. The petitioners challenged the restoration of property to the respondents after it had been resumed, alleging multiple transfers. Following the dismissal of their Constitutional petition and the subsequent rejection of their Intra-Court Appeal as incompetent, the petitioners filed the current petition before the Supreme Court. A preliminary issue arose regarding a 12-day delay in filing the petition. The core legal question was whether the time spent prosecuting an incompetent Intra-Court Appeal could be condoned as a bona fide pursuit of a legal remedy. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that they had diligently or in good faith pursued their remedy, noting that the incompetence of the Intra-Court Appeal had been brought to the attention of their counsel during the proceedings. Consequently, the Court refused to condone the delay, holding that the petition was time-barred and dismissing it accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can the time spent prosecuting an incompetent Intra-Court Appeal be condoned as a bona fide pursuit of a legal remedy?
  • Does the mere filing of an incompetent appeal constitute sufficient grounds for the condonation of delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
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