Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammadiqbal Khan Niazi vs Vice Chancellor, University of Punjab1979 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-18
  medical college disciplinerusticationexpulsionprospectus rulesdomestic tribunalstrict constructionultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a writ petition filed by a medical student who was expelled from Nishtar Medical College, Multan, for a period of three years following an inquiry by the College Disciplinary Committee regarding an assault on a professor. The Lahore High Court dismissed the student's writ petition and subsequent intra-court appeal, holding that the relevant provisions of the General Disciplinary Rules contained in the College Prospectus empowered the Principal to impose expulsion for a period exceeding one year. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prospectus rules properly construed empowered the Principal to rusticate or expel a student for a period exceeding one year, and whether the prospectus constituted valid subordinate legislation or a binding contractual code subject to strict construction. The Supreme Court held that the terms 'rusticate' and 'expel' were synonyms denoting temporary dismissal, and that Rule 4 limited the maximum period of rustication to one year. The Court further held that the prospectus was not a statutory instrument or a public representative bye-law, and that penal provisions within such domestic rules must be construed strictly and fairly. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the impugned orders and declared the appellant's rustication valid for one year only.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the terms rustication and expulsion in college disciplinary rules are synonyms limiting the maximum period of punishment to one year?
  • Do college prospectus disciplinary rules carry statutory force akin to subordinate legislation by public representative bodies?
  • Whether a domestic tribunal empowered by a college prospectus can impose penalties of extreme severity without express statutory guidelines?
  • Does the principle against retrospective or differential penalties under Article 12 of the Constitution apply to the interpretation of domestic disciplinary rules in educational prospectuses?
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• Muhammad Yunus vs The State and Another1979 SCMR 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-05
  murder convictionconcurrent findingseye-witness credibilityF.I.R. recordingmitigating circumstancesdeath sentenceself-defence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the trial court, a decision upheld by the High Court. The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing that the eye-witnesses were unreliable due to their relationship with the deceased and that the First Information Report (F.I.R.) was recorded at the crime scene rather than the police station. Additionally, the appellant contended that his injuries, which remained unexplained by the prosecution, suggested a potential plea of self-defence, and that mitigating circumstances warranted a lesser sentence. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the veracity of eye-witnesses and the timing of the F.I.R. were supported by evidence and did not warrant interference. The Court further noted that the appellant's injuries were consistent with an accidental fall, not a scuffle, and that the alleged mitigating factors did not render the death sentence illegal. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence, while noting the appellant's right to seek executive clemency.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries on the accused's person automatically cast doubt on the prosecution case?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the credibility of eye-witnesses?
  • Is a sentence of death illegal merely because the High Court declined to exercise its discretion to impose a lesser penalty based on alleged mitigating circumstances?
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• Muhammad Umran vs Malik Aman and Other1979 SCMR 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-22
  suit for possessionadverse possessionlimitationburden of proofspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the concurrent findings of the lower courts and the Peshawar High Court, which decreed the plaintiff-respondent's suit for possession of land. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff's suit was time-barred under Article 142 of the Limitation Act 1908 due to an alleged failure to state the date of dispossession, and whether the defendant had established a plea of adverse possession by growing trees on the disputed strip of land. The Supreme Court held that since the plaintiff was the acknowledged owner of the land and the defendant raised a plea of adverse possession, the burden lay on the defendant to prove the precise date and overt acts perfecting prescriptive title, which the defendant failed to do, and that trees standing on the owner's land belong to the owner. The key principle laid down is that where a defendant sets up a plea of adverse possession against the rightful owner, the burden of proving prescriptive title through clear overt acts rests entirely on the defendant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff in a suit for possession of land is required to prove the date of dispossession when the defendant sets up a plea of adverse possession?
  • Does the mere act of growing trees on another person's land constitute sufficient evidence to establish adverse possession?
  • Upon whom does the burden lie to prove prescriptive title when adverse possession is pleaded against the rightful owner?
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• Muhammad Tufail vs The State and Another1979 SCMR 437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-13
  quashment of proceedingscriminal proceedingscivil and criminal concurrent proceedingsforgeryabuse of processspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's application for the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated against him under sections 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether criminal proceedings regarding an alleged forged agreement should be quashed simply because the genuineness of the same agreement is simultaneously being adjudicated in a civil court. The Supreme Court held that there is no bar in law to civil and criminal actions continuing at the same time, and that the mere summoning of the petitioner by the magistrate does not constitute a fit stage for quashing proceedings. The key principle laid down is that while simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings are permissible, a party may seek quashment at a later stage if evidence reveals that the matter involves purely civil liability and the criminal prosecution constitutes an abuse of the court's process.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings and civil actions regarding the same document continue at the same time?
  • Is the mere summoning of an accused by a magistrate an appropriate stage for the quashment of criminal proceedings?
  • When can a party apply for the quashment of criminal proceedings on the ground that the matter involves only civil liability?
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• Muhammad Siddique vs Shah Pasand Khan and Other1979 SCMR 619 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-03
  spes successionistemporary injunctionpresumptive heiralienation of propertyMuhammadan Lawinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside the ad interim injunction granted to the petitioner by the Additional District Judge. The petitioner had filed a suit seeking a declaration and a temporary injunction to restrain his 120-year-old grandfather from alienating his immovable property, alleging that the grandfather was of failing mental and physical condition and under the undue influence of other defendants. The core legal question was whether a presumptive heir can restrain an ancestor from alienating property during their lifetime based on an expectation of inheritance. The Supreme Court held that under Muhammadan Law, a presumptive heir has no vested right in praesenti in the property of an ancestor and possesses only a spes successionis, which is a mere expectation of succeeding by survival. Consequently, a presumptive heir cannot restrain an ancestor from dealing with or disposing of their property during their lifetime. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a presumptive heir has a vested right in praesenti in the property of an ancestor during the ancestor's lifetime?
  • Does Muhammadan Law recognise spes successionis or an expectation of succeeding to the property of another by survival?
  • Can a presumptive heir maintain an action to restrain an ancestor from disposing of their immovable property?
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• Muhammad Siddiq vs The State And 2 Other1979 SCMR 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-27
  bail cancellationSection 307 PPCheinous offencejudicial discretionpost-arrest bailcross-cases
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the High Court's order cancelling the petitioner's bail in a case involving an offence under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, accused of causing a permanent eye injury to the complainant with a firearm, had initially been granted bail by an Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court subsequently cancelled this bail, noting the gravity of the injury, the fact that the occurrence happened in broad daylight, and that the petitioner was apprehended on the spot with the crime weapon. The core legal question was whether the High Court's cancellation of bail was justified given the existence of a cross-case and the petitioner's contentions regarding medical evidence and procedural delays. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the bail cancellation was proper due to the severity of the offence and the incriminating circumstances. The key principle affirmed is that bail may be properly cancelled where the initial grant of bail by a lower court is found to be improper upon a judicial appraisal of the material facts, particularly in heinous offences.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court cancel bail granted by an Additional Sessions Judge if the initial grant is found to be improper?
  • Does the existence of a cross-case automatically entitle an accused to bail in a case involving a serious injury?
  • Is the recovery of a crime weapon at the scene of the crime a relevant factor for the court to consider when deciding on bail cancellation?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Fazal Muhammad and Other1979 SCMR 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-28
  lambardar appointmentLand Revenue Rulesdisqualification of headmandismissal of headmanstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition regarding the appointment of a lambardar. The core legal question was whether Rule 18(d) of the Land Revenue Rules, which provides for the dismissal of a headman who has mortgaged his holding and delivered possession to the mortgagee, could be applied to disqualify a candidate at the time of their initial appointment. The Supreme Court examined the text of Rule 18(d) and observed that the provision explicitly pertains to the 'dismissal' of headmen rather than the criteria for their initial appointment. The petitioner's counsel conceded that the rule was not relevant to appointment matters. Consequently, the Court held that Rule 18(d) was not attracted in the circumstances of the case and upheld the High Court's order. The principle laid down is that statutory provisions governing the dismissal of an official cannot be conflated with or applied to the qualifications required for the initial appointment of that official.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 18(d) of the Land Revenue Rules apply to the initial appointment of a lambardar?
  • Is the provision regarding the dismissal of a headman who has mortgaged his holding applicable to the qualification criteria for appointment?
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• Muhammad Shahbaz vs The State1979 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-11
  post-arrest bailtampering with prosecution witnessaffidavit of prosecution witnessdiscretion of High Courtpetitions for special leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two criminal petitions for special leave to appeal filed against the orders of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's applications for post-arrest bail. The core legal question concerns the propriety of refusing bail on the ground that the accused attempted to tamper with the prosecution case by obtaining an affidavit from a prosecution witness who disowned his police statement. The Supreme Court held that the matter of bail is essentially within the discretion of the High Court, and since the High Court exercised its discretion reasonably based on material before it without violating any fundamental principles of the administration of criminal justice, interference was unwarranted. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts will not interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal of bail unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or in violation of fundamental principles.

  Questions settled

  • Whether obtaining an affidavit from a prosecution witness disowning his police statement constitutes tampering with the prosecution case disentitling an accused to bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal of bail when no fundamental principle of justice has been violated?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right when incriminating articles are recovered from premises connected to him?
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• Muhammad Shah Alam vs Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor1979 SCMR 443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-16
  rent evictiondefault in payment of rentburden of proofappreciation of evidencecontradictory pleadingsequitable relieflandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding an eviction order against a tenant. The landlord sought eviction on grounds of rent default, personal requirement, and material impairment of the property. The core legal question was whether the landlord's contradictory statements regarding the commencement date of the rent default—alleged in the pleadings versus stated in evidence—vitiated his claim, and whether the burden of proof was correctly applied. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appellate court had correctly reconciled the apparent contradiction in the landlord's testimony by accounting for the time elapsed since the institution of proceedings. Furthermore, the Court held that while the Rent Controller initially misallocated the burden of proof, the Additional District Judge rectified this by relying on established evidence, specifically a diary maintained by the landlord recording payments. The Court affirmed that a tenant who contumaciously denies the landlord's title is disentitled to equitable relief. The principle established is that minor testimonial inconsistencies, when satisfactorily explained and supported by independent documentary evidence, do not invalidate a claim for eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between a landlord's pleadings and testimony regarding the date of rent default automatically invalidate an eviction application?
  • Can an appellate court rectify a misallocation of the burden of proof made by a Rent Controller?
  • Does a tenant's contumacious denial of a landlord's title disentitle the tenant from seeking equitable relief in eviction proceedings?
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• Muhammad Shafi vs Deputy Registrar, Co Operative Societies, Lahore1979 SCMR 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-20
  co-operative societiesarbitrationjurisdictionembezzlementcivil liabilitybusiness of the societywrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's challenge to proceedings initiated against him under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925. The petitioner, a former Branch Manager of the Punjab Provincial Co-operative Bank Limited, faced allegations of embezzlement. The Department initiated arbitration proceedings under Section 54 of the Act to recover the funds, while a separate police investigation was ongoing. The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Registrar to refer the dispute to arbitration, arguing it did not touch upon the 'business of the society' and alleging mala fides. The High Court upheld the proceedings, finding the dispute fell within the scope of Section 54. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the authority assuming jurisdiction must determine, in the first instance, whether the dispute relates to the business of the society. The Court affirmed that the petitioner remains entitled to raise the jurisdictional objection regarding the applicability of Section 54 before the designated authority.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dispute regarding the embezzlement of funds by a former bank manager considered a dispute touching the business of a society under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925?
  • Does the authority assuming jurisdiction under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 have the power to determine in the first instance whether a dispute falls within its scope?
  • Can proceedings under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 be initiated simultaneously with a criminal investigation for the same alleged embezzlement?
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• Muhammad Sarfraz vs The State1979 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed Azhar vs Martial Law Administrator, Punjab and Other1979 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-14
  constitutional petitionquashment of proceedingsOffence of Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979jurisdiction of courtsacademic exerciseHadd punishmentwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner under the Pakistan Penal Code for theft. The petitioner argued that no case existed against him, that the Offence of Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, ousted the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, and that the potential trial before a Summary Military Court was unwarranted. The Supreme Court held that the petition was premature because no order referring the case to a Military Court had been passed, rendering the challenge academic. Regarding the Ordinance, the Court held that it did not establish a new hierarchy of exclusive courts; rather, it empowered existing courts of competent jurisdiction to apply Islamic punishments (Hadd) where applicable, while retaining the Pakistan Penal Code for cases not meeting the evidentiary threshold for Hadd. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the Ordinance did not divest ordinary courts of jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, as factual disputes regarding police mala fides and the petitioner's involvement required evidence to be established at trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Offence of Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 establish a new hierarchy of courts with exclusive jurisdiction?
  • Can a court adjudicate the validity of a potential future order by a Martial Law authority that has not yet been passed?
  • Can the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, resolve factual disputes regarding the mala fides of the police?
  • Does the Offence of Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 divest ordinary courts of jurisdiction to try theft cases?
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• Muhammad Sadiq vs Muhammad Sarwar and 2 Other1979 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  acquittalmurderocular evidencecorroborationmedical evidencerecovery of weapontime-barred petitioncondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arose out of a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant, Muhammad Sadiq, against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which altered the conviction of respondent Fateh Mohammad from murder to Section 326 PPC and reduced respondent Mohammad Sarwar's sentence from death to life imprisonment for the murder of Fazal and assault on Muhammad Sadiq. Concurrently, respondent Mohammad Sarwar filed a time-barred petition for leave to appeal against his conviction. The Supreme Court evaluated whether the ocular evidence could be safely relied upon without independent corroboration. The Court observed that the ocular testimony was riddled with material inconsistencies regarding the time and manner of the occurrence, the motive alleged by the prosecution was unproven, and the medical evidence contradicted the alleged distance from which the shots were fired. Furthermore, the recovery of the gun violated mandatory legal provisions as it lacked public witnesses. Consequently, the Supreme Court condoned the delay in Mohammad Sarwar's petition, accepted the appeals, and acquitted both accused due to failure of proof.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court condone delay in a time-barred petition for leave to appeal filed by a convicted accused during the hearing of a complainant's appeal?
  • Whether ocular evidence that is inherently improbable and contradicted by medical evidence can form the basis of a criminal conviction without corroboration?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a weapon recovery made without the attestation of public witnesses in disregard of statutory provisions?
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• Muhammad Sadiq and Another vs The State1979 SCMR 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-02-29
  review petitionlimitationdeath sentencegeneral amnestycommutation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  These review petitions arise from an order of the Supreme Court dismissing petitions for special leave to appeal against sentences of death. The review petitions themselves were barred by 73 days, with no satisfactory explanation provided for the delay. The core legal question concerns whether the review petitions are maintainable despite the delay and whether the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of a presidential general amnesty circular granting commutation of death sentences. The Supreme Court held that the review petitions are barred by limitation and that the circular is inapplicable as the death sentences were not pending execution at the relevant time, while noting that review is not the appropriate remedy for such a plea. The Court established the principle that delay without satisfactory explanation warrants dismissal of review petitions and that a general amnesty applying to death sentences pending execution at a specific date cannot cover sentences confirmed at a later date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether review petitions filed with a delay and without satisfactory explanation are liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation?
  • Does a presidential general amnesty commuting death sentences pending execution on a specific date apply to death sentences confirmed after that date?
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• Muhammad Sadiq and Another vs The Chief of Army Staff_C. M. L. A. and Another1979 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-06
  mercy petitiondeath sentenceChief Martial Law Administratorconstitutional petitiondiscretionary powerjudicial reviewLaws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had declined to interfere with the rejection of the petitioners' mercy petition following their conviction and sentence of death for murder. The core legal questions involve whether the Chief Martial Law Administrator possesses the power under Article 48 of the Constitution to advise the President on mercy petitions in the absence of a Prime Minister, and whether the rejection of such petitions is open to judicial review under Article 199. The Supreme Court held that under Article 3(1) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977, the Chief Martial Law Administrator effectively stepped into the role of the Prime Minister to advise the President, and that the disposal of mercy petitions is a discretionary matter not subject to interference in the absence of clear proof of bias or colorable exercise of power. The key principle laid down is that the Chief Martial Law Administrator is the competent authority to deal with mercy petitions under the constitutional framework operating during martial law, and presidential decisions thereon are discretionary and generally immune from constitutional interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Martial Law Administrator has the power to act under Article 48 of the Constitution in place of the Prime Minister regarding mercy petitions?
  • Can the High Court interfere under Article 199 of the Constitution with the President's discretionary decision on a mercy petition?
  • Does the rejection of a mercy petition become open to judicial review on the ground of bias without strong data or exactitude?
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• Muhammad Saddiq vs Secretary Educat10n, Government of Baluchistan and Other1979 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-25
  service lawsenioritycadreservice tribunalinter-provincial allocationspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal, Baluchistan, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his seniority ranking. The petitioner, a former Junior Research Fellow in the Punjab government, was allocated to the Province of Baluchistan following the disintegration of One Unit. He sought to have his seniority as an Assistant Professor fixed from the date of his initial appointment as a Junior Research Fellow, arguing that the posts were of the same grade and therefore interchangeable. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could claim seniority over other respondents in the Department of Education despite not having held the post of Assistant Professor within the same cadre prior to his absorption. The Supreme Court upheld the Service Tribunal's decision, holding that the petitioner had no established right to claim seniority over respondents who were already senior in the same cadre and had been promoted prior to his allocation. The court affirmed that seniority cannot be claimed across different cadres based solely on comparable grades.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant claim seniority in a new cadre based on the principle of comparable grade from a previous ex-cadre post?
  • Does a civil servant have an established right to seniority over colleagues in a department if they did not hold the post within the same cadre prior to absorption?
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• Muhammad Riaz vs Pakistan and Other1979 SCMR 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-12
  death sentencestay of executionShariat Benchrepugnancy to Islamcompounding of offenceconstitutional jurisdictioninterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed a writ petition seeking to stay the execution of a death sentence. The petitioner, having been sentenced to death for murder, contended that he had compounded the offence with the legal heirs of the deceased in accordance with Islamic law. He argued that the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the execution of death sentences were repugnant to the injunctions of Islam and that the execution should be stayed pending a decision by the Shariat Bench on this issue. The Supreme Court held that under Article 203-D of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, proceedings in any court or tribunal are not required to be stayed or adjourned merely because a petition has been filed challenging the validity of a law on the grounds of repugnancy to Islamic injunctions. Consequently, the High Court correctly refused to stay the execution, as it lacked the jurisdiction to grant such interim relief under Article 199 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a petition before a Shariat Bench challenging a law as repugnant to Islam require the stay of pending judicial proceedings?
  • Does a High Court have the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to stay the execution of a death sentence pending a decision by a Shariat Bench on the validity of the relevant procedural laws?
  • Are courts required to adjourn proceedings if a question regarding the repugnancy of a law to Islamic injunctions is raised?
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• Muhammad Rashid vs The State1979 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-25
  post-arrest bailvicarious liabilityunlawful assemblycommon objectmurdersupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the bail application of the petitioner, Muhammad Rashid, who was charged along with co-accused under sections 302, 307, 148, 109, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and attempted murder. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner and his co-accused formed an unlawful assembly, pursued the complainant, and inflicted injuries while a co-accused committed murder in prosecution of their common object. The core legal question was whether courts at the bail stage can examine the applicability of constructive or vicarious liability under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that courts are justified at the bail stage in examining whether a case of constructive liability is made out based on the available material, subject to established rules of caution. The key principle laid down is that the question of vicarious liability under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be evaluated during bail adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can courts examine the question of constructive liability under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the bail stage?
  • Whether an accused alleged to have caused only simple injury while being a member of an unlawful assembly is entitled to bail?
  • Does the application of the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar bail for an accused connected via an unlawful assembly?
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• Muhammad Ramzan vs The State and Other1979 SCMR 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-15
  quashment of proceedingsprivate complaintcognizancepolice investigationoral orderrehearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a petition for the quashment of criminal proceedings. The core legal questions involve the competence of a High Court to recall or rehear an orally pronounced order before it is signed and sealed, and whether an application made to an executive authority (Deputy Commissioner) directing police investigation constitutes taking cognizance of a private complaint under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that an oral pronouncement not yet signed and sealed does not bar the High Court from rehearing the matter, and that referring an application to the police under section 156(3) without recording the complainant's statement under section 200 does not amount to taking cognizance of a private complaint, leaving the police free to investigate. The key principle laid down is that until a judgment or order is formally signed and sealed, the court retains jurisdiction to reconsider its view, and executive forwarding of a grievance to the police for investigation distinct from taking judicial cognizance under section 200 is legally permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court can rehear and reconsider an order that was orally pronounced but not yet signed and sealed?
  • Does forwarding an application to the police by an executive authority amount to taking cognizance of a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a magistrate refer a matter to the police under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without recording the statement of the complainant?
  • When is a court precluded from referring a matter to the police for investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Rafiq vs Abdur Rehman and 2 Other1979 SCMR 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-23
  bail cancellationblind murderinvestigation reportjudicial discretioneye-witness credibilitycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal filed by the complainant seeking the cancellation of bail granted to eight respondents accused of murder. The core legal question was whether police investigation reports, which characterized the incident as a "blind murder," are binding on the court when deciding bail applications, and whether the High Court erred in granting bail based on these reports. The Supreme Court held that while police investigation reports are not strictly binding on the courts, they constitute relevant material that may be considered during the bail stage to assess the strength of the prosecution's case. Applying this principle, the Court upheld the bail for seven respondents, finding the presence of the alleged eye-witnesses doubtful. However, the Court cancelled the bail of the eighth respondent, Abdul Qayum, noting that specific evidence—his role in luring the deceased from his home—distinguished his position and established a prima facie link to the crime. The principle established is that investigative findings, though non-binding, are permissible considerations for courts in evaluating bail entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Are police investigation reports binding on a court when deciding a bail application?
  • Can a court consider police investigation reports at the bail stage?
  • Does the presence of specific evidence linking an accused to the crime warrant the cancellation of bail despite a 'blind murder' finding by the police?
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• Muhammad Nazir vs The State1979 SCMR 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-04
  review petitionre-appraisal of evidencecriminal appealself-defencespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed by Muhammad Nazir against the order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan refusing to grant special leave to appeal. The core legal questions involve whether discrepancies in evidence warrant a re-appraisal of testimony in review, how injuries sustained by an accused during an incident are considered, and whether a plea of sudden fight and self-defence can be sustained in the absence of corroborative recoveries such as the weapon used. The Court held that contentions relating to the re-appraisal of evidence do not furnish a ground for review, and that the trial evidence conclusively established the petitioner's guilt without material effect from minor discrepancies, while the plea of self-defence and failure to consider injuries were properly addressed and dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be used to re-evaluate evidence or revisit concurrent factual findings of guilt when the trial record conclusively supports the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be maintained on the ground that the evidence was discrepant and ought to be re-appraised?
  • Whether injuries sustained by an accused during an occurrence can form the basis for review when duly considered by the courts below?
  • Does the absence of motive and the occurrence of a sudden fight automatically entitle an accused to the right of self-defence without supporting recoveries?
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• Muhammad Musa vs Jamal Muhammad Etc.S1979 SCMR 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-25
  pre-emptionadditional evidenceremandcourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plaintconsolidated suits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over pre-emption rights regarding land, where two rival suits were consolidated. The trial court dismissed the respondent's suit, citing his failure to produce the latest Jamabandi to prove ownership and his failure to rectify a court-fee deficiency. The trial court decreed the petitioner's suit. On appeal, the Additional District Judge allowed the respondent to produce additional evidence (the Jamabandi) and held that the trial court was not justified in rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without issuing a specific direction to deposit the court-fee. The case was remanded for a fresh decision. A Single Judge of the Lahore High Court upheld this remand, finding the appellate court's decision to allow additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to be justified. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitioner's appeal, affirming that the lower appellate court acted within its discretion to allow additional evidence and that the rejection of a plaint for court-fee deficiency requires prior specific direction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court allow the production of additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a trial court justified in rejecting a plaint for deficiency in court-fee without first issuing a specific direction to the plaintiff to deposit the required amount?
  • Does the failure to produce a Jamabandi at the trial stage preclude an appellate court from allowing its production as additional evidence?
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• Muhammad Munawar vs Ch. Khurshid Alam1979 SCMR 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-29
  rent restrictioneviction orderclerical errorinherent powermisdescription of propertyexecution of orderreview jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing a second appeal concerning the correction of a property description in an eviction order. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller possesses the jurisdiction to correct a patent misdescription of the suit property in an eviction order after the order has been affirmed on appeal, or whether such an act constitutes an impermissible review of the judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller retains the inherent power to rectify clerical errors or patent misdescriptions on the face of the record to ensure the order accurately reflects the subject matter of the dispute, especially where the parties were fully aware of the property's identity throughout the litigation. The Court clarified that such rectification does not amount to a review of the judgment. Furthermore, it established that an order of a Rent Controller is not a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, but is merely executed as if it were one. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the correction served the interests of substantial justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to correct a patent misdescription of property in an eviction order after the order has been affirmed on appeal?
  • Does the correction of a clerical error in an eviction order by a Rent Controller constitute an illegal review of the order?
  • Is an order passed by a Rent Controller considered a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jan and 2 Others vs The State1979 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-23
  post-arrest bailsmugglingcontrabanddiscretionary jurisdictionprima facie caseleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by Muhammad Jan, Bahadur Sher, and Gul Bar against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed their application for post-arrest bail. The petitioners were apprehended by police on the Peshawar-Kohat Road while transporting a truck containing contraband items, including 25 air-conditioners, a significant quantity of charas, and foreign cloth, with the vehicle's number plates removed. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing bail on the grounds that the petitioners' individual culpability required further inquiry. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' contention, holding that the material on record established a prima facie case of involvement for all three accused. The Court found no flaw in the High Court's exercise of discretionary jurisdiction regarding the denial of bail. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the High Court's order, while noting that the petitioners could reapply for bail if additional material became available later in the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere assertion that individual culpability requires further inquiry automatically entitle an accused to bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal of bail when a prima facie case is established?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against an order dismissing a bail application where no legal flaw is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jaffar vs Secretary, Government of Pakistan and Other1979 SCMR 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-29
  special leave to appealinterim stay ordermedical college admissionwrit jurisdictionreview petitioninternal working of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had declined to grant an interim stay order in a review petition regarding the petitioner's admission to a medical college. The petitioner, Muhammad Jaffar, had been admitted to Punjab Medical College against a reserved seat for Tribal Agencies, but his admission was subsequently challenged by respondent Javed Iqbal via a writ petition, which the High Court allowed. The petitioner sought a stay order in his review petition, claiming the High Court's refusal was based on the erroneous assumption that the previous order had already been complied with. The Supreme Court held that it would not interfere in the High Court's internal proceedings or factual determinations regarding the status of compliance. The Court emphasized that such matters of fact fall within the domain of the High Court and that the petitioner should seek relief directly from the High Court or the Chief Justice regarding the urgency of the hearing date. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's internal management of its docket and hearing dates?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere in factual determinations regarding the compliance of a High Court order during special leave proceedings?
  • Can a petitioner seek relief from the Supreme Court regarding the urgency of a hearing date in the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail vs Province of Punjab1979 SCMR 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-11
  service matterseniority and promotionjurisdiction of civil courtService Tribunalterms and conditions of serviceconstitutional barspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave arises from a revisional order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil suit filed by the petitioner, a Research Assistant, against the Province of Punjab regarding seniority and promotion. The core legal question was whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit relating to the seniority and promotion of a civil servant, or if such matters fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that matters of seniority and promotion pertain to the terms and conditions of service, over which the Service Tribunal possesses exclusive jurisdiction under the relevant statutes and Article 212 of the Constitution, thereby barring the jurisdiction of civil courts. The key principle laid down is that civil courts cannot entertain suits concerning service matters such as seniority and promotion when an administrative tribunal has been established with exclusive jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit filed by a civil servant to establish seniority and claim promotion?
  • Do seniority and promotion fall within the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution bar the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters where an Administrative Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction?
  • Can a civil servant claim promotion as a matter of right through a civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail vs Patten Malak and Other1979 SCMR 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-22
  bail cancellationcommon intentionineffective firingjudicial discretionmurdercriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant, Muhammad Ismail, seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondents, Pattan Malak, Nowsher, and Bakhtmand, by the Peshawar High Court. The respondents were accused of murder alongside a co-accused, Namdad, in a case involving a dispute over a hedge. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting bail to the respondents on the basis that their firing was ineffective, despite the charge being under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was a valid exercise of discretion. The Court reasoned that because the dispute arose suddenly and the respondents' firing did not cause any injuries, their case was distinguishable from that of the co-accused who allegedly fired the fatal shot. The key principle laid down is that at the bail stage, the court may distinguish between the roles of co-accused, even where Section 34 is invoked, if the facts and circumstances warrant such differentiation, and the Supreme Court will not interfere with such discretionary orders absent fundamental legal or factual infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted to co-accused in a murder case where their firing remained ineffective?
  • Does the invocation of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 preclude the grant of bail to co-accused whose firing did not cause injury?
  • Is the grant of bail by the High Court a matter of discretion that the Supreme Court will only interfere with if there is a fundamental legal or factual infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail vs Deputy Commissioner, Nawabshah and 3 Other1979 SCMR 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-03
  allotment of landmunicipal propertyvoid ab initiolocal governmentstatutory interpretationexecutive authoritypublic auction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the allotment of a plot of land in Nawabshah, initially granted to the petitioner by the Chief Minister of Sind and subsequently cancelled by the Deputy Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the Chief Minister possessed the legal competence to directly transfer or dispose of land vested in Municipalities and People's Councils under the Sind People's Local Government Ordinance, 1972. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Minister lacked the authority to alienate Municipal property. The Court determined that the power to transfer such land is vested exclusively in the People's Councils, subject to specific statutory procedures. Consequently, the initial allotment order by the Chief Minister was void ab initio, and the subsequent cancellation order was legally sound. The judgment affirmed that statutory provisions governing the disposal of Municipal property must be read as a whole, and the executive government cannot bypass the established legal framework for local self-government to unilaterally dispose of Municipal assets, as any contract not executed in conformity with the governing statute is not binding.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chief Minister have the authority to directly transfer or dispose of land vested in Municipalities and People's Councils?
  • Is a contract for the transfer of Municipal property binding if it is not executed in conformity with the provisions of the Sind People's Local Government Ordinance 1972?
  • Does the amendment to Section 42(4) of the Sind People's Local Government Ordinance 1972 empower the Provincial Government to dispose of Municipal property directly?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaq vs Ahmad Nawaz Malik, Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffargarh and Another1979 SCMR 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-08
  transfer of casebailcancellation of bailjudicial biasremandcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed an application to transfer a murder trial from the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffargarh. The petitioner alleged that the Sessions Judge acted improperly by granting bail to two accused persons, Muhammad Ismail and Muhammad Aslam, purportedly in defiance of High Court orders and based on false medical evidence. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that the petitioner failed to provide necessary documentation to support these allegations. Regarding Muhammad Ismail, the Court held that the bail order predated the High Court's relevant order, rendering the allegation of defiance factually impossible. Regarding Muhammad Aslam, the Court found that his detention had been declared illegal by the High Court due to violations of statutory remand provisions, and the Sessions Judge had acted conscientiously in subsequent proceedings. The Court held that mere dissatisfaction with bail orders does not constitute valid grounds for case transfer and that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any bias or illegal exercise of discretion by the trial judge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere grant of bail by a trial court constitute sufficient grounds for the transfer of a criminal case?
  • Can a trial court be accused of flouting a High Court order if the trial court's order was passed before the High Court's order was issued?
  • Is a failure to comply with statutory remand provisions a valid ground for declaring detention illegal?
  • Does a petitioner's failure to document the record in a petition for leave to appeal justify its dismissal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ijaz vs The S. H. O., Police Station, Rajana, Faisalabad1979 SCMR 490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-17
  writ of mandamusregistration of FIRcognizable offencejudicial discretionspecial leave to appealalternative remedyprivate complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed his writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The petitioner had requested the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Station House Officer to register a criminal case under Sections 364, 342, and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court is mandatorily required to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the registration of an F.I.R. under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 whenever a cognizable offense is reported. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court is under no absolute obligation to grant such relief. The Court affirmed that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is a matter of judicial discretion, and the High Court properly exercised its discretion by directing the petitioner to pursue alternative remedies, such as filing a private complaint, rather than seeking police intervention. The judgment establishes that the mere allegation of a cognizable offense does not entitle a party to a writ of mandamus.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court mandatorily required to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the registration of an F.I.R. under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the mere report of a cognizable offense entitle a complainant to a writ of mandamus for the registration of a case?
  • Is the refusal of the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus for the registration of an F.I.R. a valid exercise of judicial discretion when alternative remedies exist?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Muhammad Anwar and 2 Other1979 PLD Supreme Court 943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-27
  murderacquittaleye-witness credibilitymedical evidencechance witnessinterested witnessappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the acquittal of two respondents by the High Court in a murder case under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, overturning the trial court's conviction and death sentence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence by disbelieving the prosecution's eye-witnesses and rejecting the motive. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the acquittal. The Court held that the eye-witnesses were unreliable, characterizing them as chance and interested witnesses whose presence at the scene was doubtful. Crucially, the Court established that medical evidence, specifically the nature and pattern of the injuries, directly contradicted the eye-witnesses' account of how the attack occurred. The Court reasoned that the injuries indicated the deceased was attacked while lying on a cot, whereas the witnesses claimed he was attacked after rising. Furthermore, the Court noted that the physiological state of the deceased suggested death occurred at a time inconsistent with the prosecution's narrative, rendering the eye-witness testimony inherently untrustworthy and the prosecution's case doubtful.

  Questions settled

  • Can medical evidence regarding the nature and position of injuries be used to discredit the testimony of eye-witnesses?
  • Does the presence of digested food and bodily waste in a deceased person's system provide evidence regarding the time of death?
  • Is a witness who lacks a valid reason for being at the scene of a crime considered a chance witness whose testimony requires corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hassan Khan vs Muhammad Azam Khan 3 and Other1979 SCMR 617 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-24
  execution proceedingswrit jurisdictionconstitutional jurisdictionevictionprocedural lawwitness examinationcompromise
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arose from execution proceedings initiated by respondents to evict the petitioner from a garage following a final judgment by the Supreme Court. During execution, the petitioner filed objections claiming an oral compromise had been reached, allowing him to remain as a tenant upon payment of rent and litigation costs. The Executing Court disallowed the petitioner's request to examine additional witnesses because he failed to file a list of witnesses as required by procedural law. The petitioner challenged this order through revision and subsequently a writ petition, both of which were dismissed. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with the Executing Court's procedural order regarding witness examination. The Supreme Court held that the Executing Court acted within its jurisdiction, and its orders, even if allegedly erroneous, were not subject to interference via constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Court further observed that the petitioner's claim of an undocumented oral compromise after years of litigation was implausible, concluding that the objections were merely a device to frustrate the eviction process.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with an order passed by an Executing Court regarding the examination of witnesses?
  • Is an Executing Court's procedural order subject to challenge via a writ petition if the court acted within its jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure to file a list of witnesses under Order XVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 justify the refusal to examine witnesses in execution proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hassan and 4 Others vs The State1979 SCMR 345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-12-21
  review petitionexpectancy of lifeprivate defenceacquittaldeath sentencemiscarriage of justiceappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks a review of a Supreme Court judgment that had set aside the acquittal of the petitioners, restoring their convictions and sentences, including a death sentence for petitioner Mohammad Hassan. The petitioners argued that the Court had overlooked medical evidence regarding charring on the deceased's bodies, which they contended supported a plea of private defence, and further argued that the death sentence should be commuted based on the doctrine of expectancy of life following their initial acquittal. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the arguments merely sought a re-examination of the merits, which is impermissible in review proceedings. The Court affirmed that the evidence, including the nature of injuries and the plea of private defence, had been fully considered in the original judgment. Regarding the sentence, the Court clarified that the doctrine of expectancy of life is not an absolute rule but depends on the facts of each case, particularly concerning delays in appellate disposal, and does not apply where an acquittal resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Is a review petition an appropriate forum for the re-examination of evidence on merits?
  • Does the doctrine of expectancy of life automatically preclude the imposition of a death sentence following the reversal of an acquittal?
  • Under what circumstances does the doctrine of expectancy of life apply to cases involving the reversal of an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Ahmad Hussain1979 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-01
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantpersonal bona fide requirementimpairment of utilityspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing his second appeal in limine, which upheld his ejectment from a rented shop. The respondent landlord had filed an ejectment petition on the grounds of default in rent, impairment of utility by damaging wooden fixtures, and personal bona fide requirement for his jobless graduate son to start a carpet business. The Rent Controller found against the tenant on the grounds of impairment of utility and personal requirement, while ruling in his favor regarding the default in rent, and ordered eviction. The High Court dismissed the tenant's appeal. The Supreme Court considered the concurrent findings of fact established through evidence regarding the bona fide personal requirement and the damage to fixtures. Holding that the findings were well-founded and unrebutted by the tenant, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, granting four months to vacate the premises subject to the regular payment of rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding personal bona fide requirement for ejectment can be interfered with when unrebutted?
  • Does damaging wooden fixtures of a rented premises constitute impairment of its utility warranting eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif and Others vs Khushi Muhammad Etc.S1979 SCMR 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-20
  bail cancellationdelay in challannon-submission of challancriminal procedurejudicial discretionmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order cancelling the bail previously granted to the petitioners in a case involving sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the delay in the submission of the challan (charge sheet) provided sufficient grounds for the grant of bail, thereby rendering the High Court's cancellation order improper. The Supreme Court held that while inordinate delay in the submission of a challan can be a valid ground for bail, it is not an absolute rule. Courts must examine the specific circumstances causing the delay. In this instance, the delay was partly attributable to the petitioners' own actions and procedural complications, rather than solely the prosecution's failure. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to cancel the bail, emphasizing that the petitioners' request for further investigation made the commencement of the trial uncertain. The principle laid down is that delay in challan submission must be evaluated contextually, and bail is not justified where the accused contributes to the delay or where the case falls under the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the delay in the submission of a challan automatically entitle an accused to the grant of bail?
  • Should a court consider the reasons behind the delay in the submission of a challan when deciding a bail application?
  • Can a court cancel bail if the accused has contributed to the delay in the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Gul and Another vs Nazar Abbas and Other1979 SCMR 258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-16
  rent restrictionlandlord and tenantejectment applicationinterlocutory rent depositcivil court decreerelationship of landlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which directed the petitioners to deposit arrears of rent and future monthly rent during the pendency of a second appeal filed by the respondents. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in ordering the deposit of rent under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, based on a civil court decree declaring the respondents' ownership, which was obtained after the initial ejectment application was filed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court was entitled to consider the subsequent civil court decree as evidence of ownership. Furthermore, the Court noted that the alleged original landlord had appeared before the Rent Controller and disclaimed ownership, supporting the respondents' claim. The Court emphasized that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that they had paid rent to any party, indicating an attempt to evade liability. The judgment reaffirms that courts may consider subsequent developments, such as civil decrees, to establish the prima facie relationship of landlord and tenant for the purpose of interlocutory rent deposit orders.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court consider a civil court decree obtained after the filing of an ejectment application when determining a request for rent deposit?
  • Is a tenant entitled to withhold rent payments on the pretext of a dispute regarding the ownership of the premises?
  • Does the disclaimer of ownership by a previous alleged landlord support a finding of the landlord-tenant relationship for the purpose of a rent deposit order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fazal Alias Bodi vs The State1979 SCMR 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-22
  post-arrest bailconsistency in bailco-accused bailmurder caseSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court refusing his third application for post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The primary ground urged before the Supreme Court was that a co-accused, to whom an identical role was attributed, had already been released on bail by the High Court, and that the petitioner was entitled to similar relief on the principle of consistency. The Supreme Court did not examine the merits of the case or the question of statutory delay, but converted the petition into an appeal and held that the petitioner must be released on bail to maintain consistency in the judicial treatment of co-accused persons facing the same allegations. The Court laid down the principle that where a co-accused assigned a similar role has been granted bail within the same case, the principle of consistency requires that subsequent similarly situated accused persons should likewise be granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person is entitled to bail on the principle of consistency when a co-accused with an identical role has already been released on bail?
  • Does the release of a co-accused on bail furnish a valid ground for the grant of bail to another co-accused assigned a similar role?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din vs Muhammad Saleem1979 SCMR 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-26
  dismissal in defaultrestoration of appeallimitation periodcondonation of delayinherent powers of courtsufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed his application for the restoration of a regular second appeal that was previously dismissed in default. The petitioner had sought restoration under Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 for condonation of delay. The High Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 does not apply to restoration applications for appeals dismissed in default. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner conceded the inapplicability of Section 5 but argued that the appeal should have been restored under the inherent powers of the court pursuant to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to justify his absence on the date of hearing despite receiving a registered notice. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, noting that the petitioner failed to explain the delay and that the absence appeared deliberate.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to an application for the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default?
  • Can inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be invoked to restore an appeal dismissed in default when the applicant fails to justify their absence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota vs Faiz Ahmad1979 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-12
  promissory noteburden of proofconsiderationexecution of documentnegotiable instrumentspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed a second appeal in a suit for the recovery of Rs. 10,000 based on a promissory note. The petitioner-defendant denied executing the note, alleging his thumb impression was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation regarding a separate undertaking. The trial court dismissed the suit, doubting the evidence of consideration and execution. However, the lower appellate court reversed this, finding the execution proved and noting that the defendant failed to substantiate his allegations of fraud. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the trial court's findings. The Court held that the evidence, including the testimony of the scribe and the failure to cross-examine the fingerprint expert, sufficiently proved the execution of the promissory note. Affirming the High Court's decision, the Court laid down that under the Negotiable Instruments Act, once the execution of a promissory note is established, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove the absence of consideration, which the petitioner failed to discharge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving the absence of consideration shift to the defendant once the execution of a promissory note is established?
  • Can a court draw an adverse inference under the Evidence Act when a party fails to produce witnesses to support the source of funds?
  • Is the testimony of a handwriting expert sufficient to prove the execution of a document if the witness is not cross-examined on that point?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs Muhammad Ramzan and 2 Other1979 SCMR 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-06
  ex parte decreerestitution of possessionRent Controller jurisdictionexecution of decreelandlord and tenanteviction proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the restitution of possession of a property following the setting aside of an ex parte eviction decree. The landlord obtained an ex parte eviction order against the tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 and subsequently took possession of the property. After the ex parte decree was set aside, the tenant sought restitution of possession, which the Rent Controller initially dismissed, citing a lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed this, holding that the Rent Controller possesses the jurisdiction to order restitution while acting in the capacity of a civil court. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, affirming that while a Rent Controller acts as a specialized tribunal when passing ejectment orders under section 13 of the Ordinance, they function as a civil court when executing those orders. Consequently, the Rent Controller possesses the inherent jurisdiction to entertain applications for the restitution of possession. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed in limine, confirming that the Rent Controller is competent to handle restitution proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to order the restitution of possession after an ex parte eviction decree is set aside?
  • Does a Rent Controller act as a civil court when executing an ejectment order passed under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub Shah and 4 Others vs Sarwar Shah and Another1979 SCMR 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-25
  pre-emptionlimitationmixed question of law and factmarket valueconcurrent findings of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' revision application maintaining concurrent findings of the lower courts in a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions involved whether the pre-emption suit was barred by limitation, whether the suit land was exempt from pre-emption under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1950, and whether the market value of the land was properly determined. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the question of limitation could not be raised for the first time when it was not pleaded in the written statement or agitated before the first appellate court as a mixed question of law and fact, that findings on exemption from pre-emption concluded by concurrent factual determinations cannot be reagitated, and that findings regarding market value based on evidence are questions of fact not open to interference. The key principle laid down is that mixed questions of law and fact not raised in pleadings or initial appellate stages cannot be urged subsequently, and concurrent findings of fact based on evidence remain undisturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of limitation involving mixed questions of law and fact be raised for the first time when it was omitted from the written statement and the first appeal?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact regarding the market value of suit land open to review by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a suit for pre-emption against a second vendee run from the date of the mutation in favor of the first vendee or the second vendee when limitation was not properly pleaded?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub Khan vs Superintendent, Central Jail Etc.S1979 SCMR 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-06
  mercy petitiondeath sentencewrit jurisdictioncommutation of sentenceexecution of sentencepresidential discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from a request for relief against the execution of a death sentence, following the petitioner's filing of mercy petitions before the Prime Minister and the Provincial Government. The core legal question was whether the court could interfere in the execution process based on pending or subsequent mercy petitions where the initial mercy petition had been dismissed. The Supreme Court held that once a mercy petition has been dismissed, the original sentence remains operative unless mercy is explicitly granted and the sentence is commuted. Relying on the principle established in Muhammad Sadiq (C.P.S.L.A. No. 182 of 1978), the Court affirmed that the discretion of the President regarding mercy petitions is not subject to interference through writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court determined that it could not take cognizance of subsequent mercy petitions that had not resulted in a commutation order. The petition was dismissed, reaffirming that the existing sentence holds the field absent a formal grant of clemency.

  Questions settled

  • Can the court interfere in the execution of a death sentence through writ jurisdiction based on a pending mercy petition?
  • Does the filing of a subsequent mercy petition automatically stay the execution of a death sentence after an initial mercy petition has been dismissed?
  • Is the discretion of the President in deciding a mercy petition subject to judicial review?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Rehmatullah Khan and Other1979 SCMR 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-12
  declaration and possessionexchange deedrevenue mutationerroneous entryestoppellimitationadverse possessionredemption of mortgage
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment and decree of the Peshawar High Court, which accepted the second appeal of the plaintiffs and restored the trial court's decree in a suit for declaration and possession of agricultural land. The dispute arose from a 1945 registered exchange deed wherein the plaintiffs' predecessor exchanged a 1/16th share of land, but the revenue officer erroneously recorded it as a 1/4th share in the mutation. The petitioner subsequently purchased the land based on the erroneous revenue entries. The core legal questions involved whether the erroneous revenue entry created estoppel against the original owner, and whether the suit was barred by limitation and adverse possession. The Supreme Court held that the erroneous revenue entry, not made at the instance of the original owner, did not create an estoppel, and limitation ran from the date the land became available for possession upon redemption of the mortgage in 1966, rendering the suit timely. The court laid down that a mistaken entry in revenue records does not override a registered deed, and a subsequent vendee is expected to examine the foundational document.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an erroneous entry in a revenue mutation contrary to a registered exchange deed creates an estoppel against the original owner?
  • From what date does limitation run for a suit for possession of land previously held under a mortgage?
  • Does a subsequent vendee gain a valid title from an incorrect revenue entry without examining the foundational registered deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi Etc.1979 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-05
  ex parte decreesubstituted servicefraud on the courtwrit jurisdictionwaiver of objectionscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order refusing to interfere with the setting aside of an ex parte decree. The petitioner had obtained an ex parte decree in a suit for declaration regarding a property sale by providing an incorrect address for the defendant, thereby procuring substituted service through publication. The respondent, a resident abroad, subsequently applied to set aside the decree, alleging fraud and suppression of his correct address. The trial court and revisional court set aside the decree, finding that the petitioner had deliberately misled the court. The Supreme Court addressed whether the ex parte decree was validly obtained and whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion. The Court held that the petitioner committed fraud on the court by suppressing the defendant's correct address to secure substituted service. Consequently, the Court upheld the decision to set aside the ex parte decree, emphasizing that substantial justice requires the suit to be decided on merits. The Court further noted that procedural objections not raised before the trial court are deemed waived.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deliberate suppression of a defendant's correct address to obtain substituted service constitute fraud on the court?
  • Can a party raise procedural objections like limitation or invalidity of a power of attorney in a higher forum if they were not raised before the trial court?
  • Under what circumstances may a court set aside an ex parte decree obtained through substituted service?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf and Another vs The State1979 SCMR 399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-21
  bail cancellationmurderdelay in challanminority of accusedsupreme court petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court cancelling the bail previously granted to the petitioners by the Additional Sessions Judge in a case under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioners were accused of murdering the deceased by inflicting multiple knife blows. The High Court cancelled their bail upon the submission of the challan, holding that reasonable grounds existed to believe they were guilty of the offence. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the High Court failed to properly consider the inordinate delay in the submission of the challan and the minority of petitioner No. 1. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had duly applied its mind to the facts and that the discretion to cancel bail was not exercised arbitrarily or perversely. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition while directing that the trial be given priority and heard at an early date, establishing that cancellation of bail following the submission of the challan, where reasonable grounds of guilt exist, warrants no interference unless the High Court's discretion is exercised arbitrarily.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted on the ground of non-submission of challan can be cancelled after the challan has been submitted?
  • Does the minority of an accused coupled with delay in trial automatically entitle them to bail in a capital charge?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in cancelling bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar vs Mst: Nasim Begum1979 SCMR 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-04
  ejectmentpersonal needlandlord and tenantconcurrent findingsspecial leave to appealrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent orders of the District Judge which ordered the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from the disputed shop on the ground of personal need. The core legal question concerned whether the landlord's son, for whose benefit the shop was required, was in occupation of another suitable shop in the same locality. The Supreme Court held that since it was established as a matter of fact that the landlord's son did not occupy another shop, the further requirement regarding the suitability of another shop under the relevant statutory provision did not arise. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of fact regarding personal need and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the landlord must be in occupation of another suitable shop for the ground of personal need to fail?
  • Does the question of suitability of another shop arise when it is established that the landlord or her child does not occupy another shop?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding personal need in an ejectment matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar vs Abdul Shakoor1979 SCMR 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad and Others vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Multan1979 SCMR 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-10-28
  land allotmentrehabilitation schemeclaim verificationrefugee claimsvoid ab initiovested rightsadministrative instructions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the allotment of land to refugees from Alwar State. The core legal questions involved the validity of a Press Note issued by the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, which prescribed a method for verifying land claims akin to Schedule VI of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956, and whether this conflicted with paragraph 29 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. Additionally, the court examined the legality of cancelling the respondents' original allotment without notice and the subsequent re-allotment to the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that the Press Note was validly issued under paragraph 23 of the Scheme and did not violate paragraph 29. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the cancellation of the respondents' allotment without proper notice was void ab initio, and the petitioners could not acquire vested rights through such void proceedings. The Court established that administrative instructions issued under the Scheme are valid unless explicitly barred, and that failure to reserve land during pending objections renders subsequent allotments legally infirm.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner issue a Press Note prescribing a verification method for refugee claims that differs from the procedure in paragraph 29 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme?
  • Does the cancellation of a land allotment without notice to the allottee render the subsequent allotment to a third party void ab initio?
  • Is there a mandatory requirement under paragraph 20 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme to reserve land when objections regarding a claim are pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad and Others vs Mukhtiarkar Kandiaro Etc.S1979 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-15
  adverse possessionevacuee propertycustodian of evacuee propertyland ownershipspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute over agricultural land in District Nawab Shah. The petitioners, claiming ownership through a 1947 sale deed, failed to obtain confirmation from the Custodian of Evacuee Property, causing the land to vest in the Central Government and subsequently transfer to a third party. When the new owner sought Batai (share of produce), the petitioners challenged the Mukhtiarkar's notice before the High Court, which dismissed their petition. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners abandoned their claim under Evacuee Laws, instead asserting ownership based on adverse possession exceeding 12 years. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners' claim of adverse possession against the Government was legally untenable. The Court affirmed that possession of land, even for a duration exceeding 12 years, does not confer title against the Government once the property has vested in it under the relevant evacuee property laws. Consequently, the petitioners had no valid legal claim to the disputed land, and the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claim of adverse possession be successfully maintained against the Government regarding land vested in it?
  • Does possession of land for more than 12 years automatically confer ownership rights against the State?
  • Does the failure to obtain confirmation from the Custodian of Evacuee Property regarding a sale deed result in the land vesting in the Central Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin and 4 Others vs The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan, Lahore1979 SCMR 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Waqf propertiesex parte proceedingsclosure of evidenceremand of casediscretion of High Courtspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of proceedings initiated by the petitioners under Section 7 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance XXI of 1959 before the District Judge, Lahore, seeking a declaration that the disputed property was their private property and that the notification issued by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf assuming its management was without lawful authority. The District Judge eventually accepted the application and declared the property to be non-waqf after closing the respondent's case for non-production of evidence under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. On appeal, a learned Single Judge of the High Court remanded the matter for a fresh decision to ensure a disposal on merits, a view subsequently upheld by a Letters Patent Bench. The Supreme Court held that the discretionary order of the High Court remanding the case to permit the production of evidence upon payment of costs did not warrant interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in remanding a case for decision on merits by setting aside the closure of evidence despite the negligence of a party?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with the discretionary remand order of a lower appellate bench when costs have been awarded to compensate for default?
  • What is the scope of challenge under Section 7 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance XXI of 1959 regarding notifications issued by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram and Others vs Sultan Saleem and Other1979 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-27
  rendition of accountsco-sharersjoint landrevenue courtspecial leave to appealPunjab Tenancy Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the orders of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the defendants' writ petition and subsequent review petition in limine. The plaintiffs had filed a suit under Section 77(k) of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887 for the rendition of accounts of joint land situated in four villages, alleging the defendants were in cultivating possession in excess of their shares, which resulted in concurrent findings and preliminary decrees against the defendants through the revenue hierarchy up to the Board of Revenue. The core legal question was whether co-sharers in possession of joint land in excess of their shares are liable for rendition of accounts, and whether unlitigated claims concerning land in a fifth village could defeat this liability. The Supreme Court held that co-sharers in possession in excess of their entitlement are liable to render accounts, and extraneous claims regarding property not the subject-matter of the suit cannot invalidate the impugned orders. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-sharer in cultivating possession of joint land in excess of their share is liable for rendition of accounts?
  • Can a claim regarding land situated in a different village, which was not the subject-matter of the original suit, be raised to challenge a decree for rendition of accounts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Khan Etc. vs Deputy Settlement and Rehabilitation1979 SCMR 272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-29
  settlement of landallotment disputespeaking orderrehabilitation and settlementconcurrent findingswrit jurisdictionsuperior claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of agricultural land in Tehsil Pakpattan, District Sahiwal, between the petitioners and respondent No. 2. The core legal question was whether the Assistant Settlement Commissioner’s order, which confirmed the land in favor of the respondent, was legally deficient for failing to be a 'speaking order' and whether the High Court erred in upholding that decision. The Supreme Court held that the order was not deficient, as the relevant khata contained a detailed, reasoned decision explaining that the respondent held a superior claim due to an earlier allotment and priority in the village settlement records. The Court affirmed the High Court’s dismissal of the writ petition, noting that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any factual error or violation of fundamental legal principles in the concurrent findings of the lower authorities. The key principle laid down is that where a summary order in a case file is supplemented by a detailed, reasoned order in the relevant record (khata), the requirement for a 'speaking order' is satisfied, and concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities will not be disturbed absent a clear legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Does a summary order in a case file fail the test of a 'speaking order' if the detailed reasoning is recorded in the relevant khata?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding land allotment priority made by settlement authorities and the High Court?
  • Does an earlier claimant in a village settlement have priority over a subsequent allottee in the event of double allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Walayat Khatun vs Khalil Khan and Another1979 PLD Supreme Court 821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-31
  pre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plaintlimitation periodjudicial discretionprocedural negligencevested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns the rejection of a pre-emption suit due to the plaintiff's failure to rectify a deficient court-fee within the court-ordered timeframe. The core legal question was whether a court is mandatorily required to grant time to make up court-fee deficiencies under Order VII, Rule 11(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, particularly when the limitation period has expired or the plaintiff is negligent. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial court's rejection of the plaint. The Court held that while Sections 148 and 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 grant judicial discretion to extend time, this power is not to be exercised mechanically. Courts must strike a balance between assisting a suitor and protecting a defendant's vested right of limitation. Where a plaintiff is negligent, contumacious, or lacks bona fides, or where granting time would unfairly prejudice the defendant, the court is not obligated to grant extensions. The court must apply its mind judicially to the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court mandatorily required to grant time to a plaintiff to make up a deficiency in court-fee under Order VII, Rule 11(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the court have the discretion to refuse an extension of time for payment of court-fee if the plaintiff is found to be negligent or lacking in bona fides?
  • Can a court grant an extension of time for court-fee payment if doing so would deprive the defendant of a vested right of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Taj Mahal Bibi and Other vs Abdul Wa14eed and Or11ers1979 PLD Supreme Court 975 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-20
  displaced personsverification of claimsagreed areasevacuee propertyallotment cancellationjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court arising from proceedings under section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal question concerns the proper construction of section 2(3) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956, specifically whether it bars verification of all property left in India or only agricultural land situated outside municipal limits in the agreed areas, and whether a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner could annul a verification order beyond the prescribed limitation period. The Supreme Court held that section 2(3) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 only excludes agricultural land outside municipal limits in the specified agreed areas, while urban property and land within municipal limits remain eligible for verification. The Court further held that the Deputy Commissioner acting as a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to set aside the verification order after the expiry of the statutory limitation period. The appeal was accepted, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the original verification and allotment orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 2(3) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 bar the verification of urban property and land situated within municipal limits in agreed areas?
  • Whether a revision petition under section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 is competent against an order passed by a Deputy Commissioner acting as a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • Can a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner set aside a land verification order after the expiry of the prescribed limitation period?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sharifan vs Muhammad Yousaf1979S C M R 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-11
  transfer of suitrestitution of conjugal rightsdissolution of marriageconstitutional petitionSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Mst. Sharifan under Article 184 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan seeking the transfer of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed against her by her husband, Muhammad Yousaf, from the Court of Family Court Judge, Nowshera Feroz, Sind to Lahore, Punjab, where the petitioner had earlier instituted a suit for dissolution of marriage. The core legal question considered by the Court was whether a petition for the transfer of a civil suit between different provinces is maintainable under Article 184 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Article 184 of the Constitution does not warrant the institution of an application for the transfer of a civil suit of this nature. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 184 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan warrant the institution of an application for the transfer of a family suit from one province to another?
  • Can the Supreme Court transfer a suit for restitution of conjugal rights pending in Sind to a court in Lahore under Article 184?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina (Represented by Legal Heirs) vs Muhammad Zia Ullah Khan, Chief Settlement Commissioner Etc.S1979 SCMR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-21
  leave to appealsettlement lawstransfer of propertyacquiescenceDeputy Settlement Commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal regarding the transfer of a portion of property in Khanewal under settlement laws. The core legal question is whether a party whose claim form was rejected by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and who failed to file an appeal or revision against that initial order can subsequently challenge the transfer proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having failed to challenge the initial rejection of her form, acquiesced in that order and could not later resile from that position or maintain a challenge against the transfer of the property. The key principle laid down is that failure to challenge an adverse initial order of a Deputy Settlement Commissioner through available statutory remedies constitutes acquiescence, precluding the aggrieved party from subsequently questioning the final transfer of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to appeal against the initial rejection of a claim form by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner amount to acquiescence?
  • Can a party excluded from property transfer in initial proceedings challenge subsequent orders without appealing the original adverse order?
  • Whether settlement authorities are justified in excluding a non-appealing claimant from property transfer.
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rabia vs Ahmad Ali and 8 Other1979 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-27
  court-feedeficiency in court-feememorandum of appealrevisional jurisdictiondiscretionvaluation of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed a revision petition against the appellate court's refusal to extend time for making up a deficiency in court-fee. The core legal question concerns whether the appellate court and High Court rightly exercised their discretion in declining to extend time under section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for making good an insufficient court-fee affixed on a memorandum of appeal, filed under an outdated valuation following amendments introduced by the Punjab Finance Act 1973. The Supreme Court held that the lower forums exercised their discretion on sound grounds without illegality or arbitrariness, and therefore revisional interference under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was unwarranted. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere in revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when an appellate court declines to exercise discretion under section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to extend time for making up a deficiency in court-fee?
  • Does an appellant commit a fatal error by affixing court-fee on a memorandum of appeal according to repealed law rather than amended statutory provisions?
  • Is an appellate court bound to grant an extension of time to make up a deficient court-fee where the appellant fails to show good cause for the delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mansab and Others vs Kh. Muhammad Daud and Other1979 SCMR 306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-17
  evacuee propertystatutory tenancyevictionexecution proceedingsDisplaced Persons Actrent controllitigation tactics
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the eviction of tenants from an evacuee shop in Peshawar. The dispute arose from the Settlement Department assigning two different numbers to the same shop, leading to conflicting claims of ownership and tenancy. The respondent, Khawaja Muhammad Daud, purchased the shop via public auction after the previous transfer to one Anwar Shah was cancelled for non-payment. The respondent sought eviction of the occupant, Irshad Ahmad, for default in rent payment. Following unsuccessful litigation by the occupant and Anwar Shah, the occupant's legal heirs (the petitioners) filed objections in execution proceedings, claiming they were statutory tenants entitled to notice under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were merely set up by the occupant to protract litigation after he failed to retain possession. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, finding the respondent to be the lawful transferee and the petitioners' claims to be a tactical attempt to obstruct the execution of a valid eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Can legal heirs of a deceased tenant claim statutory tenancy status to obstruct execution proceedings after the original occupant has failed in eviction litigation?
  • Does a transferee of an evacuee property through public auction acquire valid title despite previous administrative errors in property numbering?
  • Is a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, required for every individual occupant if the property transfer is valid and the occupant is a defaulter?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Fatima vs DR. Amanullah and 3 Other1979 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-18
  evacuee propertysettlement schemepermanent transfer deedwrit petitionfactual findingsstrength of title
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee house located in a rural area. The house was initially transferred to respondent No. 1 in May 1968, and a permanent transfer deed was issued. The petitioner, claiming a subsequent transfer of the same property under Settlement Scheme No. VII in August 1968, challenged the respondent's transfer. Although the petitioner succeeded in an initial appeal, the Settlement Commissioner (Land) restored the transfer to respondent No. 1. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, finding that the petitioner had failed to establish her own entitlement or possession of the property, and that she could not succeed by merely relying on the alleged weaknesses of her adversary's title. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that factual findings regarding possession and identity of the property had been adequately considered below and that a party seeking a transfer must succeed on the strength of their own title.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner challenging the transfer of evacuee property succeed solely by pointing out weaknesses in the adversary's title without establishing their own entitlement?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent factual findings of settlement authorities and the High Court regarding possession and identity of property?
  • Does the settlement law prohibit the transfer of evacuee properties to minors?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Chanan Jan vs Muhammad Siddiq and Another1979 SCMR 525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-19
  bailpost-arrest bailmurderArms ActSupreme CourtHigh Courtbail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, where a learned Single Judge granted bail to the respondent in a case involving charges under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and Section 13 of the Arms Act. The High Court's decision to grant bail was based on the finding that the respondent's case fell within the ambit of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner sought to challenge this bail order before the Supreme Court. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and directing notice to the Advocate-General, Punjab, the Supreme Court considered the matter. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the Lahore High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent under the specified provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a case involving Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and Section 13 of the Arms Act?
  • What is the scope of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for granting bail?
  • Can a Supreme Court petition challenge a High Court order granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bhag Sultan and Others vs Superintendent District Jail, Rawalpindietc1979 SCMR 292 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-06
  mercy petitionexecutive clemencyChief Martial Law Administratorjudicial reviewmercy jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions challenging the exercise of mercy jurisdiction by the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) regarding death row convicts. The petitioners contended that the CMLA’s stated policy of being guided by the decisions of courts of law when disposing of mercy petitions was an improper and illegal exercise of jurisdiction. It was argued that the power of mercy is distinct from the judicial process, and that authorities should prioritize human considerations, such as the plight of the convict's family, rather than relying on judicial findings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, reiterating its reasoning from a prior case (C.P.S.L.A. No. 182 of 1978). The Court held that mercy and justice cannot be entirely divorced from one another. Consequently, when exercising the power of mercy, the authority may legitimately consider whether justice was properly administered in the underlying legal proceedings. The Court affirmed that judicial outcomes remain a relevant factor for the executive authority when evaluating mercy petitions, thereby rejecting the argument that such considerations are legally improper.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Chief Martial Law Administrator legally barred from considering judicial decisions when exercising the power of mercy?
  • Can the power of mercy be entirely divorced from considerations of justice?
  • Are judicial outcomes a relevant factor for an authority exercising the power of mercy?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Barkat Bibi vs Gulzar and Another1979 SCMR 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-30
  bail cancellationcommon intentionmurdersubmission of challancriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court upon a petition for cancellation of bail directed against an order of the Lahore High Court whereby respondent No. 1 was granted bail in a case registered under sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting bail to an accused charged with a capital offense where a specific role of catching hold of the deceased was attributed to him in furtherance of a common intention under section 34, and whether the mere submission of a challan warrants bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting bail, noting that section 34 was prima facie attracted and the submission of a challan without commencement of trial is insufficient to justify bail. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the bail order, and directed that the respondent be taken into custody. The key principle laid down is that the mere filing of a challan does not constitute a ground for further inquiry under section 497(2) for granting bail, and active participation through common intention in a murder precludes bail at a pre-trial stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere submission of a challan to the trial court make a case one of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the purpose of granting bail?
  • Are the provisions of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 prima facie attracted where an accused is alleged to have caught hold of the deceased while a co-accused inflicted fatal blows?
  • Does section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar a party from moving the Supreme Court directly against a bail order passed by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Almas Begum and Others vs Fazal Bakhsh and Other1979 SCMR 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-11
  civil revisionexecution of decreecompromise decreenovation of contractlandlord and tenanturban rent restrictionpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which dismissed the petitioners' objections against the execution of a consent decree for possession. The core legal question was whether a compromise deed entered into during the pendency of an ejectment suit—granting the judgment debtor time to vacate the premises upon payment of a monthly sum for use and occupation—amounted to a novation of contract creating a tenancy relationship governed by rent restriction laws. The Supreme Court held that the agreement did not constitute a tenancy or novation of contract, but merely granted a grace period with compensation for vacating the land, and thus the decree remained fully executable through execution proceedings. The key principle laid down is that a compromise allowing a judgment debtor a limited period of occupation and payment during that time does not create a tenancy or attract the provisions of urban rent restriction laws so as to bar execution of a consent decree for possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does a compromise agreement granting a judgment debtor a limited period to vacate premises and pay monthly compensation create a tenancy relationship?
  • Whether a compromise allowing temporary occupation during execution proceedings constitutes a novation of contract under rent laws?
  • Can a consent decree for possession be executed directly without resorting to rent restriction proceedings when temporary respite has been granted?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Afzal Begum and Other vs Y. M. C. A. through Its General Secretary1979 PLD Supreme Court 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-18
  ex parte ordersubstituted serviceejectmentlimitation periodabatement of appealguardian ad litemattaining majorityUrban Rent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing two miscellaneous petitions seeking to set aside an ex parte ejectment order passed under Section 15 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The core legal questions pertained to whether substituted service under Order V Rule 20 CPC constitutes 'due service' for computing limitation, which Article of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to applications for setting aside ex parte orders under rent legislation, the impact of non-impleadment of an heir under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 on abatement, and whether a guardian ad litem continues to represent a minor upon attaining majority. The Supreme Court held that substituted service is valid due service unless proven to be fraudulently procured. The Court clarified that an ejectment order under Section 15 is an appellate order rather than a decree; thus, Article 169 of the Limitation Act does not apply, and such applications are governed by the residuary Article 181, which prescribes a three-year limitation period. Furthermore, partial representation of an estate by existing heirs prevents total abatement, and under Order XXXII Rule 3(5) CPC, a guardian ad litem continues until formally discharged.

  Questions settled

  • Does substituted service under Order V Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure constitute due service for calculating the limitation period to set aside an ex parte decree or order?
  • Which Article of the Limitation Act 1908 governs an application to set aside an ex parte appellate order passed under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does an appeal abate in toto if one heir is omitted from the record when the estate of the deceased respondent is already represented by other co-heirs?
  • Does the authority of a guardian ad litem automatically terminate when a minor defendant attains majority during pending legal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• MR. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto vs The State1979 SCMR 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-23
  review petitionconstitution of benchad hoc judgesupreme court rulescriminal miscellaneous petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal miscellaneous petition filed on behalf of the petitioner, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in a criminal review petition, seeking the recall and nomination of two retired or indisposed judges (Mr. Justice Qaisar Khan and Mr. Justice Waheeduddin Ahmad) as ad hoc judges under Article 182 of the Constitution to sit on the Bench for the disposal of the review petition. The core legal question is whether the bench hearing a review petition must be reconstituted to include judges who retired or fell ill during the original appeal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that under Rule 6 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, the review application shall be posted before the same Bench that delivered the judgment, provided they are available, and since the judgment under review was delivered by seven available judges, there is no justification to recall retired or incapacitated judges. The key principle laid down is that review petitions must be heard by the surviving members of the original bench that delivered the judgment, and benches will not be altered or reconstituted based on extra-judicial considerations or the absence of judges due to unavoidable circumstances like retirement or prolonged illness.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retired judge can be recalled as an ad hoc judge under Article 182 of the Constitution to sit on a review petition?
  • Does Rule 6 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules require a review application to be posted before the same Bench that delivered the judgment?
  • Can a bench continue hearing a case when one of its members becomes incapacitated due to prolonged illness?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Assia vs Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Etc.1979 PLD Supreme Court 949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-12
  Income Tax Actbest judgment assessmentreference to High Courtquestion of lawfilm artist incomerejection of accountstax estimation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two civil petitions for special leave to appeal against a consolidated order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner-assessee's applications under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, refusing to direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer questions of law. The petitioner, a film artist, challenged the rejection of payment certificates issued by film producers by the Income-tax Officer, who instead estimated her income based on her standard of living, wealth statements, and prevailing industry practices. The core legal question was whether the income-tax authorities were justified in rejecting the producer certificates without direct positive falsification and whether the appellate order gave rise to a referable question of law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the income-tax authorities possess wide discretion to assess income to the best of their judgment and are not bound to accept unverified certificates or unreliable accounts, and that findings regarding the unreliability of accounts are questions of fact. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's refusal to order a reference, establishing that concurrent factual findings by tax authorities based on material evidence and standard of living do not raise questions of law warranting a reference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Income-tax Officer is bound to accept payment certificates produced by an assessee in the absence of written agreements and corroborative evidence?
  • Does the question of unreliability of an assessee's accounts constitute a question of fact or a question of law?
  • Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in refusing to refer questions under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, when the findings are based purely on appraisal of facts?
  • Can income-tax authorities rely on parallel cases, living standards, and wealth statements to make a best judgment assessment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Ajab Khan vs Secretary, Food, Punjab and 2 Other1979 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-19
  writ jurisdictionfindings of factdepot authorisationcancellation of authorisationappreciation of evidencenatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of the petitioner's depot authorisation in District Campbellpur. The core legal question concerns the scope of interference by the High Court under constitutional writ jurisdiction regarding concurrent findings of fact made by administrative authorities. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact based on material before the competent authorities cannot be interfered with under writ jurisdiction, nor is the appreciation of evidence permissible. Furthermore, technical objections regarding multiple orders passed by the District Magistrate cannot be raised for the first time before the appellate or revisional forums if not properly pressed, particularly when no violation of natural justice occurred. The key principle laid down is that superior courts will not disturb concurrent factual findings of administrative tribunals in constitutional jurisdiction where such findings are supported by some evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by administrative authorities in its writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether the appreciation of evidence is permissible under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does a technical defect regarding multiple administrative orders of the same effect invalidate the cancellation of a depot authorisation if not raised before lower authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Sultan Sikandar Zulqernain Etc. vs The State the State Asghar1979 SCMR 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Stanmar Compania Maritima and Another vs Sub Martial Law1979 SCMR 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-24
  martial law ordersmaritime lienadmiralty suitarrest of vesselwrit petitionconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, owners of a sea-going vessel, challenged orders issued by the Sub-Martial Law Administrator permitting the off-loading of cargo from their arrested vessel. The High Court dismissed their writ petition, holding that necessary parties were not impleaded and that extraordinary jurisdiction could not be utilized to settle a private civil dispute. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, while the Advocate-General conceded that the impugned orders lacked legal sanction though issued bona fide to protect shippers' interests. The Supreme Court held that the orders of the Martial Law Authorities lacked legal sanction and had no legal effect on the rights of the parties under the relevant law. Since the cargo had already been off-loaded and no operative order was sought, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed after clarifying the correct legal position. The key principle established is that administrative or martial law actions lacking legal backing cannot affect the substantive legal rights of parties.

  Questions settled

  • Do orders issued by Martial Law Authorities without legal sanction affect the legal rights of parties?
  • Can the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court be utilized to settle a civil dispute between parties?
  • Will leave to appeal be granted when the impugned orders are declared to have no legal effect and the primary relief has already been rendered infructuous?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Four Friends vs Domex Boric Etc.S1979S C M R 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-18
  review petitionforma pauperistemporary injunctioncivil procedurespecial leave to appealmaintainability of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had previously dismissed a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The petitioner, a company, had initially sought a temporary injunction to restrain the Water and Power Development Authority from finalizing payments to a respondent while the petitioner's application to sue in forma pauperis was pending. The Supreme Court had previously held that until permission to sue in forma pauperis was granted, no plaint existed, rendering the provisions for temporary injunctions inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court noted prima facie evidence that the petitioner's claim had already been satisfied. In the review petition, the petitioner argued that since permission to sue in forma pauperis had now been granted, the previous order should be reviewed. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the subsequent grant of permission to sue in forma pauperis did not invalidate the correctness of the previous order, which was based on the circumstances existing at that time, and noted that the petitioner had already renewed its prayer for relief before the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a temporary injunction be granted under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before permission to sue in forma pauperis is granted?
  • Does the subsequent grant of permission to sue in forma pauperis justify a review of a previous order dismissing a petition for temporary injunction?
  • Is a review petition maintainable when the original order was based on the legal circumstances existing at the time of the decision?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Fine Art Dyers and Printerss vs Haji Abdul Rasool and Othfrss1979 SCMR 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-03
  evictiondefault in payment of rentlandlord and tenantforfeiture of titlerestoration of titlespecial leave to appealestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning an eviction dispute over a plot in Karachi, where landlords sought the ejectment of their tenants under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 on the ground of default in rent payment. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the eviction application, holding that no default occurred due to a temporary forfeiture of the landlords' title by the government. Upon appeal, the Additional District Judge reversed this decision and ordered eviction, a view largely upheld by the High Court of Sind, which found that tenants were unjustified in withholding rent after the landlords' title was formally restored. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the tenants' petition, holding that once a landlord's title is restored and notice is given under Section 13-A of the Ordinance, tenants have no justification to withhold rent or scrutinize the landlord's title, especially when they are estopped from questioning the status of the landlord from whom they originally rented the property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether tenants are justified in withholding rent during the period when the landlord's title to the property stands forfeited by the government?
  • Can tenants refuse to pay rent and question the title of their landlord after the landlord's title has been restored and notice has been served under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Are tenants estopped from questioning the status of their landlord from whom they originally took the property on rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Crescent I Films, Mangal Mansion, Royal Park, Lahore vs Mumtaz Muhammad Khan and 3 Other1979 SCMR 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-18
  temporary injunctionadverse possessioncivil revisiondiscretionary powerinterlocutory ordersuit for declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's civil revision regarding the refusal of temporary injunctions by the trial and appellate courts. The petitioner, claiming ownership of property through adverse possession, sought an injunction in a suit for declaration following an earlier ejectment order passed against a third party (Rafiq) for rent default and unauthorized subletting. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in exercising their discretion to refuse the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any illegality in the exercise of discretion by the lower courts in denying the injunction. Furthermore, the Court clarified that observations made by the High Court regarding the competency of the suit, made during interlocutory proceedings for a temporary injunction, are merely tentative and do not prejudice the case on its merits. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are observations made by a High Court regarding the competency of a suit in an order concerning temporary injunctions binding on the trial court?
  • Does the refusal of a temporary injunction by lower courts constitute an illegal exercise of discretion when the petitioner fails to establish a prima facie case?
  • Can a party claim ownership through adverse possession to obtain a temporary injunction against an ejectment order based on rent default?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Al Mehram Builderss vs Province of Sind and Another1979 SCMR 585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-06
  contractual frustrationrecovery of arrearsland revenuetoll tax collectionbreach of contractascertained debtconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition challenging the recovery of arrears of land revenue by the provincial government. The core legal questions were whether the contractual amount owed by the petitioners was "ascertained" and thus recoverable as arrears of land revenue, and whether the contract was frustrated by supervening events related to the 1977 general elections. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, ruling that the petitioners' liability was fixed by the agreement and that the plea of frustration was a mere pretext, as the petitioners continued toll collection despite the alleged disturbances. The Court held that the government was not required to file a suit for determination of the amount because the debt was admitted and ascertained under the contract. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot avoid contractual liability by raising a plea of frustration when they continue to perform the contract, and an admitted, ascertained contractual debt remains recoverable as arrears of land revenue without the need for a separate judicial determination.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim frustration of contract while continuing to perform the obligations under that contract?
  • Is an admitted and ascertained contractual debt recoverable as arrears of land revenue without a separate judicial determination?
  • Does a government's decision to take over toll plazas due to a lessee's default render the outstanding contractual debt unascertained?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehraj Din and Others vs Settlement Commissioner (L) and Other1979 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-12
  condonation of delaylimitationtime-barred petitiondue diligencepredecessor-in-interestreview petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against an order passed by the High Court. The primary legal question addressed by the Court was whether the petitioners had provided sufficient grounds to justify the condonation of a significant delay of 206 days in filing the petition against the High Court's main order dated 18-3-1976. While the petitioners challenged the review order dated 23-9-1979, they conceded that their real grievance lay with the main order. The Court examined the explanation offered for the delay and found it unsatisfactory. The Court held that it was implausible that the petitioners were unaware of the long-standing litigation conducted by their predecessor-in-interest, noting that due diligence would have revealed the existence of the proceedings. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision to dismiss the review petition on the grounds of limitation. The key principle laid down is that a party seeking condonation of delay must provide a satisfactory and credible explanation, and ignorance of ongoing litigation involving a predecessor-in-interest does not constitute a valid ground for condonation when due diligence could have uncovered the facts.

  Questions settled

  • Does ignorance of litigation conducted by a predecessor-in-interest constitute a sufficient ground for the condonation of delay?
  • Can a petition be entertained when the primary order challenged is significantly time-barred and no satisfactory explanation for the delay is provided?
  • Is a review petition maintainable if the explanation for the delay in filing is found to be unsatisfactory by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Muhammad vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner and Other1979 SCMR 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-08-02
  evacuee propertywrit petition against a dead personnullity in lawCH FormDeputy Settlement Commissionerimpleadment of deceased respondent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of an evacuee house and shop in Rawalpindi. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner had filed a CH Form claiming possession, but learned that the property had been transferred to a rival claimant. After exhausting departmental remedies, the petitioner challenged the transfer via a writ petition in the High Court, impleading the rival claimant who had already died prior to the institution of the petition. The High Court rejected the petition on merits and also noted that it was inherently defective as it was filed against a deceased person. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner's counsel conceded that the writ petition was filed against a dead person but argued the High Court should not have ruled on the merits. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, confirming that judicial or quasi-judicial orders passed against a deceased person are a nullity in law, rendering the High Court's observations on the merits of no legal consequence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal effect of judicial observations on merits made in proceedings instituted against a deceased person?
  • Is a writ petition filed against a sole respondent who died prior to its institution maintainable?
  • Does an order passed against a person who had died long before the initiation of proceedings constitute a nullity in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Gul Khan vs The State1979 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-26
  review jurisdictiondeath sentencemotiveocular testimonyextenuating circumstancesage of offendercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for review arose from the Supreme Court's dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal against a death sentence confirmed by the Lahore High Court for murder. The petitioner challenged the conviction and sentence, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish motive, that the court ignored inconsistencies in ocular testimony, and that the petitioner's youth (fifteen years old) at the time of the offense constituted an extenuating circumstance warranting a lesser sentence. The Supreme Court held that the motive was sufficiently established by evidence linking the petitioner to the narcotics trade and the subsequent raid. Regarding the petitioner's age, the Court found the plea inconsistent with previous statements made before the trial court and noted that review jurisdiction does not permit the re-determination of such factual questions, especially when not raised with due diligence at the leave stage. The Court affirmed that the ocular testimony had been correctly evaluated in the totality of evidence. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed, and the Court declined to consider new evidence regarding the petitioner's age presented post-judgment, directing the applicant to the Executive Government.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise new grounds in a review petition that were not argued during the hearing of the petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is the determination of an accused's age, when inconsistent with previous statements, a matter that can be re-opened in review jurisdiction?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to re-evaluate factual findings regarding motive and ocular testimony in a review proceeding?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Ghulam Nabi vs Muhammad Shafiq and Another1979 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-14
  bail cancellationmurder trial delaymisuse of bailsupreme court of pakistancriminal miscellaneous
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Lahore High Court dismissing an application for the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent, who was accused in a murder case under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether bail granted on the ground of inordinate delay in trial should be cancelled, and whether subsequent events of alleged misuse of bail can invalidate a previously correct order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's refusal to cancel bail was proper based on the circumstances existing at the time of the impugned order, and that subsequent alleged criminal acts cannot be used to reverse an order that was correct when passed. However, the Court clarified that the petitioner is at liberty to move the appropriate court for cancellation of bail based on the fresh allegations of misuse. The key principle laid down is that an order refusing or granting bail is evaluated based on the circumstances prevailing at the time of its making, and subsequent conduct must be raised through fresh proceedings for bail cancellation before the appropriate forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted on the ground of inordinate delay in trial can be cancelled based on subsequent events occurring after the bail order?
  • Can an appellate court set aside a bail cancellation order on the basis of facts that transpired after the said order was passed?
  • What is the appropriate remedy when an accused misuses the concession of bail by committing a subsequent offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehar Gul Muhammad vs Mehran Engineering and Technology`1979 SCMR 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-20
  deputationrepatriationcivil servicepermanent absorptionwrit petitiondiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court of Sind, which challenged the repatriation of the petitioner, an engineer, from the Mehran University of Engineering and Technology back to his parent department, the Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation. The core legal question was whether a deputationist has a vested right to be permanently absorbed by the borrowing institution in the absence of a formal agreement or undertaking, and whether the borrowing institution can be compelled to retain him. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a borrowing institution has the absolute right to return a deputationist to his parent department at any time and cannot be legally compelled to retain him. The Court further observed that informal internal endorsements or expressions of intent by university officials do not constitute a binding commitment for permanent absorption. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a borrowing institution be legally compelled to retain a deputationist if it no longer requires his services?
  • Does an internal administrative endorsement expressing a desire to accommodate an employee constitute a binding legal commitment for permanent absorption?
  • Can a deputationist claim a vested right to permanent absorption in the borrowing department without a formal written agreement or undertaking?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehar Din vs Nazar Hussain and 3 Other1979 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-28
  bail cancellationabsconding co-accusedvicarious liabilitywitness intimidationjudicial discretioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order refusing to cancel the bail of respondents accused of murder. The petitioner sought cancellation primarily on grounds that the respondents were threatening witnesses and that a co-accused, who was a principal offender, remained an absconder whose arrest required the cancellation of the respondents' bail. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that allegations of witness intimidation were vague, unsupported by police reports, and denied by counter-affidavits. Regarding the abscondence of the co-accused, the Court held that co-accused cannot be penalized or have their bail cancelled based on the assumption that they are harboring an absconder without cogent material or evidence. Furthermore, the Court observed that the apprehension of an absconder is a police duty, not a ground to cancel the bail of others. Finally, the Court noted that arguments regarding vicarious liability under Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, had been previously rejected by the High Court in an order that was not challenged, and thus could not be re-litigated.

  Questions settled

  • Can the bail of co-accused be cancelled solely on the ground that a principal accused remains an absconder?
  • Is the failure of the police to apprehend an absconding co-accused a valid ground to cancel the bail of other co-accused?
  • Can allegations of witness intimidation justify the cancellation of bail if they are vague and unsupported by police reports?
  Read full judgment →
• Maseh Ullah and Another vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 21979 SCMR 369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-11
  settlement lawssurplus land transferplinth areanon-transferee occupantzoning regulationsproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the decisions of the Settlement Commissioner and Deputy Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of surplus land attached to a property. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, who had already been transferred a portion of the property along with three times the plinth area under settlement laws, were entitled to additional surplus land, or whether such surplus land should be transferred to a non-transferee occupant. The Court held that the petitioners had received their full entitlement under the relevant settlement laws and that the surplus land was correctly allocated to the non-transferee occupant based on the applicable Central Government Order. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that zoning regulations from the Improvement Trust could override established settlement laws, noting that the cited zoning scheme was not sanctioned. The key principle laid down is that settlement entitlements are strictly governed by the specific settlement laws and prescribed plinth area ratios, which cannot be superseded by unsanctioned municipal zoning letters or claims to additional land beyond the statutory entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Can municipal zoning letters override statutory entitlements regarding the transfer of surplus land under settlement laws?
  • Is a non-transferee occupant entitled to the transfer of surplus land attached to a house if the primary transferee has already received their entitlement of three times the plinth area?
  • Does the transfer of surplus land under the Central Government Order dated 22-10-1962 depend on the sanctioned status of local improvement schemes?
  Read full judgment →
• Martial Law Administrator, Zone `D' and Other vs Muhammad Niaz1979 PLD Supreme Court 921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-23
  Martial LawMilitary Courtjurisdictioncorruptioninfructuous appealspecial lawstate necessity
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the Martial Law Administrator against a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had declared the proposed trial of the respondent before a Summary Military Court for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 to be illegal. The High Court had held that scheduled offences under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958 were triable exclusively by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, and that Martial Law Orders could not apply to ordinary offences unless committed while resisting Martial Law. During the pendency of the appeal, the Deputy Attorney-General for Pakistan stated that the authorities had decided to try the respondent under the ordinary law, specifically the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appeal had become infructuous. The Court disposed of the appeal, observing that the broad legal propositions laid down by the High Court were prima facie open to exception and must be confined to the individual case of the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal becomes infructuous when the state decides to try the accused under the ordinary law instead of a Military Court?
  • Whether the broad legal findings of a High Court regarding the jurisdiction of Military Courts should be confined to the individual case when the main appeal is disposed of as infructuous?
  Read full judgment →
• Martial Law Administrator, Zone `B' and 2 Others vs Sattar Gul and Another1979 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-24Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hassan vs Pakistan and Other1979 SCMR 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-02
  customs duty rebateexport rebatequestion of factleave to appealexcise and customsappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute regarding the refund of a customs duty rebate granted to the petitioner, a firm engaged in exporting cotton bags. The petitioner had received a rebate based on specific cloth specifications (16s/16s, 48 x 52 and 21s/21s, 60 x 60). However, authorities subsequently discovered that the cloth actually used was of a different, lower specification (14s/14s, 40 x 40), leading to a demand for the refund of the rebate. After unsuccessful appeals to the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs and the Federal Government, and a dismissed writ petition in the High Court, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the court could interfere with the factual determination regarding the specifications of the cloth used. The Supreme Court held that the dispute involved a determination of a question of fact—specifically whether the cloth used matched the specifications for which the rebate was granted—which could not be adjudicated at the leave-to-appeal stage. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that disputed questions of fact are generally outside the scope of such appellate review.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a determination of a question of fact during a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is a dispute regarding the actual specifications of goods used for a customs rebate considered a question of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Alim Etc. vs Mst. Ghulam Kubra Etc.S1979 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-25
  pre-emptionexecution of decreesuperior right of pre-emptionconsolidation of suitsdecretal amountconditional decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the execution of a pre-emption decree involving three sets of competing pre-emptors. The trial court consolidated three separate suits and decreed them with specific conditions regarding payment priority and timelines. The first and second sets of pre-emptors were deemed to have superior rights over the third set (the petitioners). The core legal question was whether the first set of pre-emptors had complied with the conditions of the decree, thereby rendering the petitioners' subsequent claim for execution invalid. The Supreme Court held that the first set of pre-emptors had indeed fulfilled the payment requirements within the stipulated time, as the court found the full amount was effectively deposited. The Court further held that a subsequent withdrawal of funds by one set of pre-emptors, occurring after the deadline and after the funds had already been adjusted towards the decree, did not invalidate the compliance of the first set of pre-emptors. Consequently, the petitioners had no right to execute their decree, as their right was contingent upon the failure of the prior pre-emptors to comply.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of funds by one set of pre-emptors after the deadline for payment affect the validity of a decree already complied with by another set of pre-emptors?
  • Can a subsequent set of pre-emptors execute a decree when the prior set of pre-emptors has already fulfilled the conditions of the decree?
  • Does the automatic adjustment of deposited funds towards a decretal amount constitute compliance with a conditional decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Manager, Government Printing & Stationery Press, Peshawar and 21979 PLD Supreme Court 981 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-06-03
  service tribunalcompulsory retirementcompetent authoritydisciplinary actionjurisdictionappointing authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the N.-W. F. P. Service Tribunal, Peshawar, which dismissed the appellants' appeal against the District Judge's order affirming the civil court's decree in favor of respondent Sadiq Ali. The respondent, a Foreman in the Government Printing Press, Peshawar, had been compulsorily retired from service by the Controller, Government Printing and Stationery Department, N.-W. F. P., following disciplinary proceedings under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960. The core legal question was whether the Controller was the competent authority under the relevant rules to take disciplinary action and impose the penalty of compulsory retirement on the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the Controller was not the appointing or competent authority and lacked jurisdiction to pass the impugned retirement order, as the powers continued to vest in the successor to the Superintendent, Government Press, Lahore, under the transitional provisions of the Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that orders passed without jurisdiction by an incompetent authority are a nullity in law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Controller of Government Printing and Stationery Department is the competent authority to take disciplinary action against an employee of the Government Printing Press, Peshawar?
  • What is the effect of the dissolution of the Province of West Pakistan on the continuity of disciplinary jurisdiction over civil servants under the Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970?
  • Can an order of compulsory retirement passed by an officer who is not the appointing or competent authority be sustained in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Akram vs The State1979 SCMR 56 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-11
  pre-arrest bailabetmentfurther inquirycriminal investigationfalse implicationbail before arrest
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was accused of abetting offences under sections 148, 302, 307, 363, 366, 109, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was not present at the scene of the crime and to whom no overt act was attributed, was entitled to pre-arrest bail despite allegations of instigation. The Supreme Court observed that the investigating officer had expressed an opinion that the petitioner was innocent and falsely implicated, noting significant discrepancies in witness statements regarding the alleged instigation. Consequently, the Court held that the case required further inquiry. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, granting the petitioner pre-arrest bail, subject to the condition that he joins the investigation. The key principle laid down is that where the investigation suggests innocence and there is an absence of overt acts or presence at the crime scene, a case for further inquiry is established, warranting the concession of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner entitled to pre-arrest bail when the investigating officer has opined that the petitioner is innocent and falsely implicated?
  • Does the absence of an overt act or presence at the scene of the crime constitute a ground for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Can bail before arrest be granted to an accused person alleged to have instigated a crime without specific details of the instigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Hamid Sarfaraz vs Federation of Pakistan a&D Another1979 PLD Supreme Court 991 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-03
  constitutional petitionconstitution of benchesrecusal of judgesAttorney-General right of audienceMartial Law Order 12bias and regionalismwithdrawal of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of a constitutional petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution challenging the detention of Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan under Martial Law Order 12. Prior to arguing the merits, petitioner's counsel raised preliminary objections regarding Bench composition, regional representation, and the qualification of the Attorney-General (who also held the portfolio of Law Minister) to appear before the Court. The Supreme Court rejected all preliminary objections, holding that the constitution of Benches is the exclusive privilege and duty of the Chief Justice, and litigants cannot choose their Bench. The Court strongly condemned regional or parochial insinuations against judges, affirming that judges are bound by their oath to perform even-handed justice without fear or favour. Additionally, the Court held that under Article 100 of the Constitution, the Attorney-General retains his right of audience and does not lose status by undertaking additional legal duties or portfolios assigned by the Federal Government. The petition was ultimately disposed of as withdrawn upon counsel's request.

  Questions settled

  • Does a litigant or counsel have the right to request a Bench of their own choice or object to a Bench on regional grounds?
  • Does the Attorney-General for Pakistan lose his right of audience under Article 100 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by holding the additional portfolio of Law Minister?
  • Are the statutory disabilities placed on a Supreme Court Judge under Article 207 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 applicable to the Attorney-General for Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Major Attique Ahmad and Another vs The Government of Pakistan1979 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-26
  evacuee landallotment of landrehabilitation lawsdisplaced personsvested rightavailable propertyclaimant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the allotment of evacuee land to a local respondent. The appellants, claiming entitlement to the land based on their status as displaced persons, argued that the land was improperly allotted to the respondent, who was not a claimant. The core legal question was whether the land was available for transfer to the appellants and whether the prior allotment to the respondent was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation laws, specifically the Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordinance 1948 and subsequent legislation, did not distinguish between refugees and locals regarding land allotment. Consequently, the allotment to the respondent was valid and the land was not available for transfer to the appellants. The Court affirmed that the appellants possessed no vested right to any specific property, only a general beneficial right to seek allotment against their entitlements. The principle laid down is that where land has been validly allotted under existing schemes, it ceases to be available for transfer, and claimants cannot displace prior valid allottees to satisfy their own claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordinance 1948 distinguish between refugees and locals regarding the allotment of evacuee land?
  • Can a claimant displaced person demand the allotment of specific land that has already been validly allotted to another party?
  • Does a claimant possess a vested right to a specific piece of evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Is land that has been validly allotted to a local considered available for transfer to other claimants?
  Read full judgment →
• M. G. Hassan and 4 Others vs Sheikh Riazul Haq and 5 Other1979 SCMR 15 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-04-29
  specific performanceamendment of plaintmesne profitscivil revisioncase decidedmultiplicity of litigationlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a civil revision petition as incompetent. The underlying dispute arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell property, wherein the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to amend their plaint under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to include a prayer for mesne profits. The High Court, relying on precedent, held that an order allowing an amendment of a plaint does not constitute a "case decided" under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, thus rendering the revision petition incompetent. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, noting that mesne profits may be awarded even without a specific prayer, rendering limitation arguments regarding such a claim largely irrelevant. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that amendments aimed at avoiding multiplicity of litigation should be allowed provided they do not prejudice vested legal rights or fundamentally alter the suit's nature. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the amendment was rightly allowed and the trial court's order was unexceptionable.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order allowing an amendment of a plaint constitute a 'case decided' under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court award mesne profits even if there is no specific prayer for them in the plaint?
  • Is an amendment to a plaint seeking mesne profits permissible if it avoids multiplicity of litigation and does not prejudice the defendant's vested rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Khushi Muhammad vs Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Lahore and 31979 SCMR 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-16
  temporary injunctionnecessary partyimpleadmentcivil procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the decision of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's revision petition and upheld the District Judge's order refusing to implead the petitioner as a party to an appeal. The core legal question is whether a person in possession of a part of the suit land is a necessary party to an appeal arising out of temporary injunction proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts rightly refused to implead the petitioner in the appellate proceedings concerning a temporary injunction, as the appellate court could effectively adjudicate the matter without him, noting that his separate application to be impleaded as a party before the trial court was still pending adjudication. The key principle laid down is that a party whose possession is not affected by a temporary injunction and whose application to be impleaded is pending before the trial court is not a necessary party to an interlocutory appeal arising from such injunction proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person in possession of a part of the suit land a necessary party in an appeal arising out of an application for a temporary injunction?
  • Can an appellate court effectually adjudicate upon a temporary injunction matter without adding a third party whose pending application for impleadment is before the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Khushi Muhammad and 4 Others vs The State1979 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-11
  quashment of proceedingsinherent jurisdictionabuse of processacquittal at any stagealternative remedycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a petition for quashment of criminal proceedings. The petitioners were charged under Section 201, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for allegedly urging a driver to flee after he struck and killed a police constable. The petitioners argued that the sole prosecution witness regarding their involvement had exonerated them, rendering further prosecution an abuse of the court's process. The Supreme Court considered whether the inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, should be invoked when an alternative statutory remedy exists. The Court held that Section 561-A is not an alternative or additional jurisdiction but is reserved for cases where no other procedure is available. Noting the introduction of Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which empowers a Magistrate to acquit an accused at any stage if the charge is groundless, the Court ruled that the petitioners must first exhaust this specific remedy before the trial Magistrate. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, directing the trial Magistrate to consider the petitioners' acquittal under Section 249-A.

  Questions settled

  • Can the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked when an alternative statutory remedy is available?
  • Does the power of a Magistrate to acquit an accused at any stage under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude the use of Section 561-A for the same purpose?
  • Is the inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 an alternative or additional jurisdiction to the ordinary course of criminal procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Khushal Khan vs Najabat Ali Etc.S1979 SCMR 620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-02
  bail cancellationforged F.I.R.misreading of evidencemurder casecriminal procedurespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to respondents in a murder case. The High Court had granted bail based on a discrepancy found in the certified copy of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) provided to it, which suggested the respondents were armed with lathis rather than hatchets. The petitioner contended that this order was based on a misreading of the F.I.R. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the High Court had not misread the document placed before it, as the certified copy indeed contained the discrepancy. However, it was discovered that the certified copy submitted by the respondents was forged. The Supreme Court held that since the High Court did not misread the evidence presented to it, leave to appeal was not warranted. Instead, the Court dismissed the petition while granting the petitioner liberty to move the High Court for cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically citing the discovery of the forged document as a valid ground for such an application.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bail order be challenged on the ground of misreading of evidence when the High Court relied on a forged document presented by the accused?
  • Is the discovery of a forged document used to obtain bail a valid ground for an application for cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a High Court err in law if it grants bail based on a certified copy of an F.I.R. that is later discovered to be forged?
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• Khaqan Industries Ltd. vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan Etc.S1979 SCMR 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  Companies Actinquiry into affairs of companyRegistrar of Joint Stock Companiesconstitutional petitionleave to appealpending civil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had challenged an order of the Central Government appointing an Inquiry Officer under the Companies Act to investigate the affairs of the petitioner-Company. The core legal questions concerned whether the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies was required to afford a hearing before reporting to the Government, whether subsection (6) of section 137 of the Companies Act applied instead of subsection (5), and whether pending civil litigation barred statutory inquiry proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the Registrar's actions properly fell under section 137(5) after seeking an explanation and documents, that no prior notice or hearing was mandated before submitting a report, and that civil litigation does not bar proceedings under the Companies Act. The petition was dismissed as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies is required to afford an opportunity of being heard before submitting a report to the Central Government under section 137 of the Companies Act?
  • Does the pendency of civil litigation between a company and a complainant operate as a bar to the initiation of inquiry proceedings under the Companies Act?
  • When does subsection (6) of section 137 of the Companies Act apply as opposed to subsection (5)?
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• Khan Muhammad vs Sardar Amjad Farooq Khan Etc.S1979 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-26
  review petitionpre-emptionnature of transactionexchange versus saleconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two petitions for review of a consolidated order dismissing civil petitions for special leave to appeal. The petitioner had filed a suit for possession of land by pre-emption, claiming that a transaction framed as an exchange was actually a sale designed to defeat his pre-emption rights. The trial court decreed the suit, but the District Judge reversed the decision and dismissed the suit upon re-evaluating the evidence and finding the plaintiff's witnesses untrustworthy. The High Court rejected the second appeal in limine, and the Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the leave petitions. In the review petitions, the core legal question involved whether the lower courts misread the evidence or erred in determining the true nature of the transaction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent factual findings regarding the reliability of witnesses and the nature of the transaction as a genuine exchange rather than a sale were unassailable, and that no grounds for review were made out. The review petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transaction embodied as an exchange can be treated as a sale for the purposes of pre-emption without sufficient proof?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the credibility of witnesses be interfered with in second appeal or leave to appeal?
  • What constitutes sufficient grounds for entertaining a review petition against an order dismissing a leave to appeal?
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• Khan Afsar and Others vs Mst. Elahi Khanum and 5 Other1979 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-23
  agricultural landregistered mortgagerevenue recordcompromise deedlimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from a dispute over agricultural land originally transferred via a registered sale deed in 1909, which the original owner later claimed was fraudulently executed instead of a mortgage. The original transferees conceded this, rescinded the sale, and executed a registered mortgage deed in 1910. A third party subsequently filed a pre-emption suit, which resulted in a compromise acknowledging the owner's title and the valid mortgage. The Supreme Court considered whether long-standing revenue entries contrary to the registered mortgage could override it, whether a compromise deed reciting a pre-existing registered mortgage required compulsory registration, and whether the suit was within limitation. The Court held that revenue entries lost efficacy once the underlying sale deed was rescinded and replaced by a registered mortgage, that a compromise deed reciting an already registered transaction does not require separate registration, and that the suit was within the limitation period under Article 148 of the Limitation Act. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether long-standing revenue entries can override a registered mortgage deed executed after the rescission of an earlier sale?
  • Does a compromise deed filed in court require compulsory registration when it merely recites an already existing registered mortgage deed?
  • What is the applicable period of limitation for a suit relating to redeemed or mortgaged property under Article 148 of the Limitation Act?
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• Khalil Uz Zaman and Another vs The State1979 SCMR 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-29
  post-arrest baildelay in trialjudicial discretionleave to appealcriminal procedurebail on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which refused to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioners facing trial for offences under sections 302, 366, and 452 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail due to the delay in the trial proceedings and whether an affidavit claiming the alleged victim was the wife of the first petitioner constituted sufficient grounds for bail. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court exercised its discretion lawfully in refusing bail. The Court determined that the delay in trial was not sufficient to warrant bail, particularly given the State's assurance that the case would be heard within eight to nine months due to the appointment of additional judges. The key principle laid down is that the grant of bail on the ground of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, and the appellate court will not interfere unless the lower court acted illegally in exercising that discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Is the refusal of bail by a High Court on the ground of delay in trial a matter of judicial discretion?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with the refusal of bail if the lower court has not acted illegally?
  • Does the availability of a new affidavit regarding the marital status of the victim provide sufficient grounds for a fresh bail application in the High Court?
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• Khalil Ur Rehman vs The State1979 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-11
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationcounter versionfurther inquirycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court which had cancelled the post-arrest bail previously granted to the petitioner by the Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerns the propriety of cancelling bail in a murder case where a counter-version exists and is supported by contemporaneous medical evidence of injuries sustained by the accused party. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the High Court erred in miscalculating the delay in filing the private counter-complaint and in overlooking the medical evidence establishing foundational support for the counter-version. The Court ruled that the existence of a substantiated counter-version involving injuries to the accused party brings the case within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, justifying the grant of bail. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the bail granted by the Additional Sessions Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the existence of a counter-version supported by medical evidence justifies the grant of post-arrest bail for further inquiry?
  • Can the High Court interfere with a discretionary order of the Sessions Court granting bail without sound legal grounds?
  • Whether the mere delay in filing a private counter-complaint vitiates the evidentiary value of injuries sustained by the accused party at the time of the incident?
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• Khalid Farooq and 3 Others vs Hakim Nazar Muhammad and Another1979 SCMR 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-27
  condonation of delaylimitation periodspecial leave to appealsufficient causetime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was barred by 21 days. The core legal question was whether the erroneous advice given by local district court lawyers regarding the period of limitation, based on a local diary rather than standard legal works, constituted sufficient cause for condonation of delay under the law. The Supreme Court held that no sufficient cause was made out, observing that the petitioners failed to act with due diligence by consulting district lawyers instead of Supreme Court Advocates, and reiterated that ignorance of law is no excuse. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition as time-barred, holding that valuable rights accrued to the respondents by the efflux of time cannot be jeopardized by flimsy explanations for delay. The key principle laid down is that mistaken legal advice resulting from inadequate research by local practitioners does not constitute sufficient cause to condone a significant delay in filing a petition, particularly where due diligence is lacking.

  Questions settled

  • Whether erroneous legal advice given by local district court lawyers constitutes sufficient cause for condoning a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does ignorance of the law excuse a party from complying with the prescribed period of limitation?
  • Can a valuable right accrued to respondents by the efflux of time be jeopardized by a flimsy explanation for delay?
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• Karamat Ali vs The State and Another1979 SCMR 438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-02
  bail cancellationmurderdelay in trialparity of bailsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court which cancelled the bail granted to the petitioner by the Sessions Judge in a murder case registered under section 302/34. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds of delay in the commencement of the trial and parity of treatment with co-accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that delay per se is not a sufficient ground for granting bail unless it is unconscionable and amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. The key principle laid down is that while undue delay in trial can be a ground for bail, the delay must reach a level of being unconscionable or abusive of court process to warrant relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay per se in the commencement of a trial is a sufficient ground for the grant of bail?
  • Does a petitioner have a right to bail on the ground of parity when the roles attributed to co-accused require factual inquiry?
  • Under what circumstances does delay in trial constitute a ground for the grant of bail?
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• Karachi Cricket Association vs Secretary, Education Department, Government of Sind And 4 Other1979 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-07Read full judgment →