Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Baqir Hussain Etc. vs Mst. Yatim Bibi Etc.S1978 SCMR 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-02
  Rehabilitation Settlement Schememutation of inheritanceright-holderallotment of landlacheswrit jurisdictionevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment that accepted a writ petition filed by the respondent, Mst. Yatim Bibi. The dispute concerned the inheritance of land allotted to a widow, Mst. Yatim Bibi, following her migration to Pakistan. The petitioners, claiming to be reversioners of her deceased husband, had obtained a mutation of inheritance in their favor, excluding the widow. The core legal question was whether the mutation of inheritance in favor of the reversioners was valid, or if the widow, as a right-holder under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, was entitled to the allotment. The Supreme Court held that according to the special jamabandi entries, the respondent was the rightful owner of the land abandoned in India and thus entitled to the allotment under paragraph 29 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the mutation in favor of the petitioners was improper and that the respondent had not been negligent or guilty of laches in pursuing her rights.

  Questions settled

  • Is a widow who is a right-holder under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme entitled to the allotment of land abandoned in India regardless of inheritance claims by reversioners?
  • Does the sanctioning of a mutation of inheritance apply when a right-holder is entitled to land under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme?
  • Can a writ petition be dismissed on the grounds of laches if the petitioner has been vigilantly pursuing the matter?
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• Banaras vs The State1978 S CMR 191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-12
  criminal appealpost-arrest bailsick personidiopathic epilepsymurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the refusal of bail to the appellant, who is facing trial under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly stabbing the deceased. The core legal question is whether the appellant, suffering from idiopathic epilepsy, qualifies for bail under the statutory exception for sick persons provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the appellant is indeed suffering from a serious disease and cannot receive adequate specialized treatment or care of his choice within the jail hospital setting. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the Court directed that the appellant be released on bail during the pendency of the trial subject to furnishing appropriate security. The key principle laid down is that an accused suffering from a serious chronic illness whose treatment and management pose significant difficulties for jail authorities may be granted bail under the statutory proviso for sick persons.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused suffering from idiopathic epilepsy entitled to bail as a sick person under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the inability of jail authorities to provide adequate treatment and care for a serious disease justifies the release of an accused on bail?
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• Bacha Said WSW vs State1978 PLD Supreme Court 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-06-20
  double murdereyewitness testimonynatural witnesschance witnessabscondencedeath sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the confirmation of the appellant's death sentence for a double murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a difference of opinion in the High Court. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eyewitness testimony, particularly distinguishing between natural and chance witnesses, the corroborative value of medical evidence, and whether an accused can be legally classified as an absconder without formal proclamation proceedings under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of a natural witness, even if uncorroborated, is sufficient to sustain a conviction if found reliable and truthful, and that abscondence can be established through factual evasion of arrest independently of formal proclamation under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that minor discrepancies or exaggerations do not discredit an otherwise natural and trustworthy eyewitness whose presence at the scene is unquestionable, and that abscondence as a corroborative circumstance is a question of fact proven by eluding law enforcement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the solitary testimony of a natural eyewitness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder without independent corroboration?
  • Can an accused person be legally regarded as an absconder without the issuance of a formal proclamation under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a minor discrepancy between the First Information Report and the deposition in court vitiate the entire testimony of an eyewitness?
  • Whether medical evidence inconsistent with minor details of an ocular account is sufficient to discard the prosecution case entirely?
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• Baber Pervez vs The State1978 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-04
  bailcriminal trialleave to appealjudicial discretionburden of proofappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's bail application in a murder case. The petitioner, charged under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sought bail primarily on the grounds that the evidence against him was manufactured, the judicial and police record had been lost necessitating a de novo investigation, and that a parallel investigation had been ordered, thereby invoking the provisions of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail based on these contentions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court had exercised its discretion properly. The Court emphasized that the petitioner failed to provide any record to substantiate his claims regarding the lost case files or the parallel investigation. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that grounds for bail must be supported by the record and should generally be raised before the appropriate forum (the High Court) in the first instance, rather than being introduced for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise new grounds for bail in a petition for leave to appeal that were not urged before the High Court?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail solely on the allegation that the judicial or police record has been lost without supporting evidence?
  • Does the existence of a parallel investigation automatically entitle an accused to bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Aurangzeb vs The State1978 SCMR 255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-23
  leave to appealmurderdeath sentenceocular testimonyrelated witnessesappreciation of evidencemitigation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a leave to appeal petition filed by the petitioner against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 24-1-1978, which dismissed his appeal against conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and confirmed the death sentence awarded under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, the credibility of related witnesses, and the plea of mitigation based on the petitioner's age. The Supreme Court held that minor contradictions do not discredit eye-witnesses, that related witnesses can be relied upon in the absence of serious enmity, and that a twenty-year-old offender acting independently in a cold-blooded murder does not merit leniency. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether trivial contradictions in the testimony of eye-witnesses are sufficient to discard their evidence in a murder trial?
  • Can the testimony of related eye-witnesses be relied upon without independent corroboration in the absence of serious enmity?
  • Does a twenty-year-old offender committing a cold-blooded murder qualify for a lesser penalty based on tender age?
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• Ata Muhammad vs Shera and 4 Other1978 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-21
  bail cancellationmurdercross-versionaggressorcriminal procedurespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant, Ata Muhammad, seeking to challenge an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed his application for the cancellation of bail granted to respondents 1 to 4 in a murder and murderous assault case. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court and the Sessions Court erred in granting and maintaining bail to the accused respondents, and whether grounds existed for cancellation of bail due to cross-injuries and the determination of the aggressor. The Supreme Court held that the lower forums properly exercised their discretion considering that the accused party also sustained injuries during the incident and the question of who was the aggressor required trial determination, and further noted that allegations of abusing the concession of bail could be raised before the trial court with proper material. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted to accused persons can be cancelled when both parties sustained injuries and the question of who was the aggressor is yet to be determined at trial?
  • Can allegations of suborning prosecution witnesses while on bail be urged before the trial court with proper materials?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent orders of the lower courts maintaining bail in criminal matters without compelling grounds?
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• Ata Muhammad vs Province of Punjab Etc.S1978 SCMR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-26
  locus standilimited ownerreversionary rightscustomary lawspecial leave to appealgiftcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a civil suit filed by the petitioner, Ata Muhammad, challenging a 1954 gift of landed property made by his grandmother, Mst. Rehmate, who held the property as a limited owner. The petitioner sought a declaration that the gift was void and ineffective against the rights of reversioners. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding the petitioner lacked a cause of action as he was not a collateral of the original owners. This dismissal was upheld by both the District Judge in appeal and the High Court in second appeal. The Supreme Court examined whether the petitioner had the locus standi to maintain the suit. The Court held that as the son of a daughter, the petitioner was not a reversioner, and his mother, being the daughter of the original owner, was still alive, thereby precluding his standing. Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioner's claim of being a collateral, noting the existence of a prior relative. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the son of a daughter have locus standi to challenge a gift made by a limited owner while his mother is still alive?
  • Can a person maintain a suit as a collateral when a closer relative is still alive?
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• Ata Muhammad and Another vs Taj Muhammad1978 SCMR 161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-30
  ejectmentwilful defaultlandlord and tenantrent restrictionstatutory tenanttransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent against the petitioner regarding a shop in Mianwali. The core dispute involved the petitioner's failure to pay rent since 1962, following a protracted legal battle over the property's title, which was ultimately decided in the respondent's favor. The petitioner contested the ejectment, arguing that the default was not wilful due to ongoing litigation regarding the property's ownership. The Supreme Court addressed whether the petitioner's failure to pay rent during the pendency of title litigation constituted wilful default under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Court held that the petitioner was obligated to pay rent once the Settlement Commissioner upheld the respondent's title. By failing to pay rent since 1962, the petitioner committed a deliberate and wilful default. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the respondent was entitled to an ejectment order. The judgment establishes that ongoing litigation concerning property title does not absolve a tenant of the obligation to pay rent, and failure to do so constitutes wilful default.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of litigation regarding the title of a property absolve a tenant from the obligation to pay rent?
  • Does a failure to pay rent during the pendency of title litigation constitute wilful default under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Is a tenant liable for ejectment if they fail to pay rent after the title of the landlord has been upheld by the Settlement Commissioner?
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• Asadullah Beg vs Ashiq and Another1978 SCMR 424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-08-02
  refugee land allotmentrehabilitation schemepermissible ceilinglachesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a service and rehabilitation matter where the petitioner, a refugee, challenged an order dated 30-7-1962 passed by the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, which sliced away certain land from his allotment as it exceeded the permissible ceiling of 12.5 acres under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Scheme. The petitioner's belated revision and subsequent writ petition before the Lahore High Court were dismissed due to laches and negligence. The core legal question was whether an allegedly ex parte and void order could be quashed despite prolonged delay and laches, and whether the petitioner had a legal right to retain land exceeding the prescribed ceiling. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that even assuming the impugned order had defects, the petitioner could not be granted land in excess of the permissible ceiling prescribed by law, and the High Court correctly refused relief. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte order passed without notice can be quashed despite prolonged laches on the part of the petitioner?
  • Can a petitioner claim relief for land allotment that exceeds the permissible ceiling fixed under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Scheme?
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• Anwar Khan vs The State1978 SCMR 314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-06-21
  special leave to appealbailmurderright of self-defencedelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against the order of the High Court dismissing the bail application of the petitioner, who was accused of giving a fatal hatchet blow to the deceased during an occurrence on 29-9-1974. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner is entitled to bail on the grounds of the right of private defence and the delay in the trial proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that without evidence on record, a prima facie case of self-defence cannot be raised at the bail stage, and mere delay in trial is insufficient to grant bail in heinous offences like murder. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with a direction to the trial court to expedite the disposal of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can the plea of self-defence be considered at the bail stage without evidence on the record?
  • Is mere delay in the conclusion of a murder trial a sufficient ground for the grant of bail?
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• And Another vs Maula Dad Ahd Other1978 SCMR 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-17
  land reformsgift of agricultural landmortgaged propertytransfer of propertywrit petitionsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court which accepted a writ petition and declared certain orders of the Land Reforms Authorities to be without lawful authority. The first respondent had gifted agricultural land to his minor sons, which was previously mortgaged with the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. The Land Reforms Authorities had rejected the gift on the ground that the property was mortgaged without the mortgagee bank's consent and counted the land towards the transferor's total holding under Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The High Court held that the gift was not barred under the Agricultural Development Bank Ordinance or its rules, as a transfer during the subsistence of a mortgage is not void. The Supreme Court considered contentions regarding physical possession, the applicability of section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, and the completeness of the gift. Finding no force in the contentions, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Land Reforms Authorities were not justified in treating the gifted land as belonging to the transferor.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a gift of agricultural land encumbered by a mortgage is void under the Agricultural Development Bank Ordinance 1961 without the consent of the mortgagee bank?
  • Does a transfer of immovable property during the subsistence of a mortgage automatically render the transfer void for the purposes of land reform declarations?
  • Can the question of completeness of a gift based on pending mutation be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court as a mixed question of law and fact?
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• Amir Khan vs Fateh Khan Etc.S1978 SCMR 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-17
  interlocutory orderstay orderspecial leave to appealright of passageregular second appealmaintainability of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against an interlocutory order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in a Regular Second Appeal. The dispute concerned the construction of a wall and the existence of a right of passage through the respondent's land. The petitioner sought to challenge the High Court's refusal to vacate a stay order, which had been confirmed based on evidence (Exh. 4) indicating the existence of a passage to the north of the plaintiff's lawn. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core question of whether an appeal is maintainable against an interlocutory order of the High Court in such circumstances. The Court held that no appeal lies against an interlocutory order of this nature. Furthermore, the Court observed that the High Court had sufficient prima facie grounds to confirm the stay order based on the evidence presented. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that interlocutory orders are generally not subject to appeal before the Supreme Court in this context.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by the High Court in a Regular Second Appeal?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an interlocutory order where the High Court has prima facie evidence supporting a stay order?
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• Allah Yar vs Abdul Haq Etc.1978 SCMR 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-14
  land settlementlegal heirslocus standiallotment cancellationmukhbari applicationinheritance dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan for the second time via a petition for leave to appeal arising from property and land settlement disputes. The core legal question concerns the rightful inheritance of land abandoned by a deceased refugee, Butey Khan, and the standing of a third-party informant to challenge allotments made to recognized legal heirs. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and the High Court—establishing that Gamun Khan was the sole and nearest legal heir of the deceased—were unexceptionable, and that the petitioner, an informant lacking a proprietary claim or locus standi as an heir, could not maintain a challenge against the inheritance adjudication or demand the specific land allotted to the rightful heirs. The key principle laid down is that a third-party informant in settlement proceedings possesses no locus standi to contest the determination of legal heirs between rival claimants or to claim allotment of land restored to the rightful heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a third-party informant have the locus standi to challenge the determination of legal heirs in land settlement proceedings?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding inheritance by settlement authorities and the High Court warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can an informant demand the allotment of land restored to the recognized legal heirs of a deceased refugee?
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• Allah Rakha vs Muhammad Shafi1978 SCMR 437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-08-02
  ejectmentbona fide personal requirementres judicataurban rent restrictionwithdrawal of applicationgood faith
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondent landlord against the petitioner tenant under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959, seeking possession of a shop on the ground of bona fide personal use. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, but the appellate court and subsequently the Lahore High Court in second appeal accepted the landlord's claim. Before the Supreme Court, the tenant contended that a prior ejectment application withdrawn in 1972 pursuant to a compromise rendered the subsequent 1975 application barred by res judicata under Section 14 of the Ordinance, and that the prior compromise reflected adversely on the landlord's good faith. The Supreme Court held that Section 14 applies only to cases 'decided' by the Rent Controller and not to withdrawn applications based on private settlements, and that a prior postponement of need does not eternally debar a landlord from seeking ejectment when need subsequently arises. Finding no legal or factual error in the concurrent findings of the lower courts on good faith, the Court dismissed the petition, granting the tenant time to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the withdrawal of a prior ejectment application on the basis of a private compromise constitutes a 'decision' by the Rent Controller so as to attract the bar of res judicata under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959?
  • Does the withdrawal of a previous ejectment application pursuant to a compromise permanently debar a landlord from filing a subsequent ejectment application for personal use?
  • What is the scope of interference by the Supreme Court with concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide requirement of a landlord in rent matters?
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• Allah Dad and 2 Other vs The State1978 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-07-08
  corpus delictiabscondencecapital punishmentSection 342 CrPCocular testimonyinterested witnesscorroborationmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the convictions and death sentences imposed for the murder of two individuals. The core legal questions concerned whether a murder conviction is sustainable when the corpus delicti is missing; whether the abscondence of an accused provides sufficient corroboration of guilt; whether an omission to question an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding specific evidence vitiates the trial; and whether the death sentence was appropriate. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions and sentences. The Court held that a conviction for murder can be sustained even without the recovery of the dead body, provided homicidal death is established through reliable evidence. It affirmed that abscondence is relevant evidence of guilt under Section 8 of the Evidence Act 1872, though its weight depends on the circumstances. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an omission to question an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is a curable irregularity under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, provided no failure of justice occurred.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the corpus delicti is missing?
  • Does the failure to question an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding specific evidence automatically vitiate a conviction?
  • Is abscondence of an accused admissible as evidence of guilt under the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Can interested ocular testimony be relied upon for conviction without independent corroboration?
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• Allah Bakhsh and Another vs The State1978 PLD Supreme Court 171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-17
  murderocular testimonyinterested witnessesrecovery evidenceballistic expertinquest reportcriminal appealchain of custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony of interested witnesses, corroborated by the recovery of crime empties and weapons, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The appellants challenged the genuineness of the recoveries, citing procedural omissions in the inquest report and delays in forensic analysis. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the convictions were sound. The Court ruled that the ocular testimony, while requiring careful scrutiny due to the witnesses' relationship with the deceased, was corroborated by the forensic evidence. It further established that procedural irregularities, such as failing to list crime empties in the inquest report or delays in sending items to the ballistic expert, do not automatically invalidate the evidence if the recovery is otherwise established and the chain of custody remains intact. The Court affirmed that such omissions are directory rather than mandatory and do not necessarily cast doubt on the investigation's bona fides.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to mention crime empties in an inquest report under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 invalidate the recovery evidence?
  • Can the ocular testimony of interested witnesses be relied upon for a conviction if corroborated by forensic evidence?
  • Does a delay in sending crime empties to a ballistic expert automatically imply manipulation of evidence?
  • Are the requirements of Rule 25.35 of the Punjab Police Rules regarding the listing of articles in an inquest report mandatory or directory?
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• Ali Muhammad And Others vs Fazla and Other1978 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-18
  review petitionleave to appealevacuee propertypossessiondue diligencead interim orderstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged the Supreme Court's order dismissing a petition for leave to appeal concerning a dispute over agricultural evacuee land. The petitioners sought to rely on an ad interim status quo order from a 1958 High Court writ petition to establish their continued possession of the disputed land, a document they failed to produce during the initial hearing. The core legal question was whether the failure to produce available documents during the original proceedings constitutes a valid ground for review. The Court held that the review petition must be dismissed. It reasoned that the document in question was part of the record of the earlier writ petition and could have been procured with reasonable diligence; therefore, forgetfulness was not a valid excuse. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that a party cannot be permitted to introduce new evidence after the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal to create grounds for review. Equitable claims regarding long-standing possession do not constitute valid grounds for review of a final order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party introduce new evidence in a review petition that was available but not produced during the original proceedings?
  • Does the failure to exercise reasonable diligence in procuring documents for an initial hearing constitute a valid ground for review?
  • Can equitable arguments regarding long-standing possession serve as a basis for reviewing a final order?
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• Ali Muhammad (through His Legal Heirs) vs Hussain Bakhsh and Other1978 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-20
  review petitionsettlement lawtransfer of propertylocus standinew plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition filed against the judgment of this Court dismissing the petitioner's civil appeal, which had upheld the High Court's decision setting aside the transfer of an entire property (Haveli) in favor of the petitioner by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The core legal question in the review petition is whether new pleas regarding the locus standi of the respondents and their status as Jammu & Kashmir refugees can be raised for the first time in review proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that contentions not raised before the lower settlement authorities and the High Court, and which proceeded on admitted facts during the main appeal, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in review. The key principle laid down is that new factual pleas and grounds not previously urged cannot be entertained in a review petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether new pleas regarding locus standi can be raised for the first time in review proceedings?
  • Can a party challenge factual positions admitted or not denied during the main hearing in a subsequent review petition?
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• Ali Jan vs Muhammad and Another1978 SCMR 312 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-28
  maurusi bazgarpermanent tenantappreciation of evidencejurisdiction of civil courtspecial leave to appealland revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a civil dispute over the tenancy and possession of agricultural land situated in village Rangi of Kalat Division. The original plaintiff instituted a suit for a declaration and permanent injunction, claiming to be the permanent tenant (Maurusi Bazgar), which was decreed by the Qazi. On appeal, the Majlis-e-Shoora reversed the decision and dismissed the suit. However, a Single Judge of the High Court accepted the subsequent second appeal and restored the Qazi's judgment. The core legal questions involved the proper appreciation of evidence by the High Court and whether a new plea regarding the jurisdiction of civil courts under the Land Revenue Act could be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court had duly considered and weighed the evidence on record, and refusing to entertain the new jurisdictional plea not raised in the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's finding based on the appreciation of evidence can be challenged on the ground that individual testimonies were not explicitly discussed?
  • Can a new plea regarding the jurisdiction of civil courts under the Land Revenue Act be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a suit for declaration and permanent injunction is incompetent if the plaintiff is found to be in possession of the land?
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• Ali Gohar vs The State1978 SCMR 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-13
  post-arrest bailocular evidencejudicial discretioncriminal liabilityspecial leave to appealF.I.R. attribution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind, which dismissed the petitioner's application for post-arrest bail in a criminal case. The petitioner was charged under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, including Section 302, following a violent political confrontation where gunfire resulted in deaths and injuries. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing bail given the petitioner's arguments regarding the ambiguity of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) concerning the identity of the shooter, a plea of alibi, and the petitioner's advanced age. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the presence of ocular evidence from injured witnesses who specifically attributed the gunfire to the petitioner established sufficient grounds to deny bail. The court affirmed that where there is positive attribution of a specific criminal act by eyewitnesses, the exercise of judicial discretion to refuse bail is proper and does not constitute a case of 'no evidence.'

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of ocular evidence from injured witnesses implicating an accused in a murder case justify the denial of bail?
  • Is the High Court's discretion in refusing bail properly exercised when there is specific attribution of gunfire to the accused in the F.I.R.?
  • Can a plea of alibi and the age of the accused override positive ocular evidence in a bail application?
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• Ali Ahmad and 2 Others vs The State1978 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-23
  double murderacquittalbenefit of the doubtocular testimonycontradictions in evidencerecovery of weaponcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, filed under Article 185(2)(a) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court which reversed the trial court's acquittal and convicted the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for double murder, sentencing them to transportation for life. The core legal question centered on the reliability of the ocular testimony, the corroborative value of recoveries, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the acquittal, holding that the prosecution's narrative was riddled with material contradictions regarding the time of occurrence, unexplained injuries to a victim who had no prior enmity, doubtful recoveries, and improbable witness conduct, thus entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in reversing an acquittal based on a re-evaluation of evidence that suffered from material contradictions?
  • Does the presence of semi-digested food in the deceased's stomach create a strong doubt regarding the prosecution's alleged time of occurrence?
  • Whether uncorroborated ocular testimony of interested witnesses can sustain a conviction for murder when the medical evidence contradicts the prosecution's narrative?
  • What is the evidentiary value of alleged weapon and blood-stained clothing recoveries when kept by an accused for an extended period without independent corroboration?
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• Akram Khan vs The State and Another1978 SCMR 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-14
  post-arrest bailplea of alibijudicial discretionmurder caseleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Peshawar High Court granting bail to the respondent in a case involving Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner contended that the High Court erred by granting bail based on a plea of alibi, citing precedent suggesting such pleas should be reserved for trial. The Supreme Court observed that while earlier jurisprudence suggested alibi pleas should be left for trial, subsequent rulings established that each case must be decided on its own merits, as no universal rule can be applied. In the present case, the High Court had exercised its discretion by considering official documentation from the respondent's military unit confirming his duty status at the time of the occurrence. Finding no evidence that the High Court's order was unreasonable, perverse, or an improper exercise of discretion, the Supreme Court upheld the decision. The Court affirmed that bail decisions involving alibi pleas are fact-specific and do not require a uniform rule of exclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of alibi be considered by the High Court when deciding on a bail application?
  • Is there a universal rule requiring that a plea of alibi must always be left for the trial court to decide?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail?
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• Ahmad Hasan and Another vs Muhammad Daraz and Another1978 PLD Supreme Court 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-13
  Malakand Protected AreaUrban Rent RestrictionTribal AreasEjectmentCivil Court JurisdictionStatutory InterpretationRevision Petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges the dismissal of a revision petition by the Peshawar High Court, which upheld a civil court decree for the ejectment of tenants from a shop in the Malakand Protected Area. The core legal question was whether the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 applied to the area, thereby ousting civil court jurisdiction, and whether the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 required prior notice for the suit. The Supreme Court held that the Ordinance did not apply because the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance Application to Certain Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province Regulation I of 1973 explicitly modified the definition of 'Urban Area' to mean only areas declared as such by government notification. As no such notification existed for the disputed area, the Ordinance was not operative. Furthermore, the Court refused to entertain the plea regarding the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as it was a new factual contention not raised in subordinate courts. The judgment establishes that specific statutory modifications in regulations governing Tribal Areas override general definitions in principal legislation, and new factual pleas cannot be raised for the first time in revision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 apply to the Malakand Protected Area in the absence of a government notification declaring it an 'Urban Area'?
  • Can a party raise a new factual contention regarding the lack of notice under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 for the first time during a revision petition?
  • Does the definition of 'Urban Area' in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 automatically apply to Tribal Areas without specific government notification under the applicable Regulation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Hussain vs Ghulam Rasool and 3 Other1978 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-13
  admission policybona fide residentjudicial reviewfinding of factconstitutional jurisdictioneducational institution admission
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over admission to an Engineering College seat reserved for the Chaghai District. The petitioner, Abid Hussain, challenged the High Court's judgment that favored the respondent, Ghulam Rasool. The Selection Committee had initially rejected the respondent's application solely because he received his education in Sind. The High Court, however, determined that the respondent was a bona fide resident of Chaghai District, relying on revenue records and official certificates, despite his education outside the province. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court could interfere with the Selection Committee’s decision and whether the respondent’s residency status was correctly determined. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court’s finding of fact regarding the respondent's residency was based on substantial evidence and was not open to review. Furthermore, the Court established that a laconic administrative finding, lacking proper reasoning, does not preclude judicial review. It clarified that bona fide resident does not necessitate continuous physical presence in the province at all times.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with an administrative finding that is laconic and lacks proper reasoning?
  • Does the term bona fide resident for provincial admission purposes require continuous physical presence in the province?
  • Is a finding of fact by a High Court based on evidence open to review by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rauf and Another vs Mst. Zainab And 3 Other1978 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-30
  adverse possessionspecial leave to appealadmission of partypossession of propertysecond appealappreciation of evidenceorphan female
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a second appeal regarding a suit for possession of a house. The plaintiff, an orphan female, sued the defendants (her relatives) for possession, asserting ownership. The defendants claimed title through adverse possession. The trial court, the District Judge in appeal, and the High Court all ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding she was the owner and the defendants had not established adverse possession. The Supreme Court addressed contentions regarding the misreading of evidence, the admissibility of a prior admission by a defendant, the non-consideration of a dower deed, and the exclusion of a Jirga decision. The Court held that the defendant's prior admission was properly considered, and documents like the dower deed were correctly excluded as they were not put to the plaintiff at trial. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that possession by relatives of an orphan female living with them does not constitute adverse possession. The petition was dismissed as substantial justice had been done.

  Questions settled

  • Can an admission made by a defendant in a previous suit be used against them in a subsequent suit if it was put to them during examination?
  • Does the possession of property by relatives of an orphan female living with them constitute adverse possession?
  • Can documents not put to the opposite party during trial be relied upon to bind that party?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid vs Saeed Akhtar1978 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-18
  specific performancetemporary injunctionprima facie casebalance of conveniencecivil revisiondispossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed a civil revision regarding the refusal of a temporary injunction. The petitioner, having filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property, sought an injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to restrain the respondent from selling the property and dispossessing him. While the trial court initially granted the injunction, the Additional District Judge vacated it on appeal. The High Court upheld this decision, finding that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case, noting that the property was occupied by the petitioner's relatives as tenants rather than by the petitioner in his own right as a transferee. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's findings, holding that in the absence of a prima facie case, the petitioner was not entitled to injunctive relief. The petition was dismissed as the Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner entitled to a temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance if they fail to establish a prima facie case?
  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction to restrain dispossession when the petitioner is not in possession of the property in their own right?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid and Another vs The State1978 SCMR 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-16
  constructive liabilitydeath penaltysentence enhancementcriminal appealcommon intentionmurderclemency
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the enhancement of sentences from transportation for life to death by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the death penalty was appropriate for the appellants, Abdur Rashid and Ali Jan, given the nature of their involvement and the evidence of constructive versus direct liability. The Supreme Court held that where a conviction for murder is based on constructive liability under Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, rather than the direct infliction of a fatal blow, the death penalty is generally not warranted. Consequently, the Court reduced the death sentence of Abdur Rashid to transportation for life, as his involvement was constructive. Similarly, the Court reduced Ali Jan's death sentence to transportation for life for the murder of Mohabbat Ali due to lack of direct evidence of a fatal blow, but upheld the death sentence for the murder of Riasat Ali, as the evidence established he struck the deceased on the head with a formidable weapon, demonstrating clear intent to kill.

  Questions settled

  • Is the death penalty appropriate for a conviction based solely on constructive liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does striking a victim on the head with a formidable weapon establish sufficient intent to justify a death sentence?
  • Can an appellate court reduce a death sentence to transportation for life when the evidence shows the accused did not inflict the fatal blow directly?
  Read full judgment →
• Amin vs The State1978 SCMR 244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-12
  smugglingcontraband goodsconscious possessionburden of proofcustoms offenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction and sentence under the Customs Act for smuggling contraband goods, namely wrist-watches and chains hidden in a cavity of a truck. The core legal questions involve whether the prosecution proved conscious possession and whether the burden shifted to the accused to provide a lawful excuse under the relevant statutory provisions. The Supreme Court held that once the petitioner was found in conscious possession of the smuggled goods, the burden correctly shifted to him under the statute to prove a lawful excuse, which he failed to do by neglecting to produce the permanent driver in defense. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and the High Court's acquittal of the co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the burden of proving a lawful excuse for possessing smuggled goods shifts to the accused under Section 156(89) of the Customs Act?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused due to lack of evidence of conscious possession vitiate the conviction of the main accused found in conscious possession?
  • What constitutes conscious possession of contraband goods found concealed in a vehicle?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Shakoor vs Abdur Rashid Alias Sheeda and 2 Other1978 SC MR 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-05-31
  leave to appealculpable homicideappreciation of evidencemurder convictionself-defencecriminal revisionfactual findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that modified a conviction for murder. The trial court had convicted the respondent under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, while the High Court converted this to a conviction under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment, and upheld the acquittal of a co-accused. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of the evidence and in rejecting the prosecution's version of the incident. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were supported by the material on the record, particularly regarding the implausibility of the prosecution's motive and the physical evidence of injuries on the accused. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the High Court's factual determination. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not disturb findings of fact made by the High Court when such findings are based on a reasonable evaluation of the evidence and the circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's factual findings regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses in a criminal appeal?
  • Does the presence of injuries on an accused person, contrasted with the absence of injuries on the complainant, support a defense version of an altercation?
  • Is a conviction under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 appropriate when a fatal shot is fired to rescue a friend rather than with the intention to kill?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid and 3 Others vs The State1978 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-31
  house-trespasscriminal revisioncross-examinationconcurrent findingsmatrimonial disputeleave to appealprocedural waiver
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order maintaining the petitioners' convictions under Sections 323, 452, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while modifying their sentences. The petitioners argued that their right to cross-examine the complainant regarding the F.I.R. was violated and that the elements of house-trespass under Section 452 were not met, as their entry was for matrimonial reconciliation. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions. Regarding the procedural objection, the Court held that the petitioners failed to raise the issue of cross-examination before the trial court, the appellate court, or the revisional court, and thus could not raise it at the belated stage of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Court found no prejudice. Regarding the substantive objection, the Court held that concurrent findings of fact established that the petitioners entered the complainant's house armed with sticks and caused injury, which satisfied the requirements for house-trespass with preparation for causing hurt. The petition was dismissed, affirming that concurrent findings on evidence regarding trespass and intent are generally not disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise an objection regarding the denial of cross-examination for the first time at the Supreme Court level if it was not agitated before the trial or appellate courts?
  • Does entering a house while armed with sticks to resolve a matrimonial dispute constitute house-trespass under Section 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the commission of house-trespass?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs Muhammad Ishaq and 2 Other1978 SCMR 78 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-14
  review petitionlimitationcondonation of delaypetitions for leave to appealauction purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court dismissing a petition for leave to appeal on the ground of being barred by limitation by 109 days. The core legal question concerns whether sufficient cause and daily explanation of delay were established to condone the 109-day delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's judgment, which had restored a property transfer in favor of the auction purchaser. The Supreme Court held that no justification or satisfactory explanation had been made out to reopen the matter, noting that the petitioner failed to show promptitude upon knowing the decision. The court laid down the principle that a party seeking condonation of delay must satisfactorily explain each day of delay and show promptitude, and that a review petition is not competent when no sufficient ground for reopening the case is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition is competent when the original petition for leave to appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation?
  • Does a delay of 109 days in filing a petition for leave to appeal require a satisfactory explanation for each day of delay?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to condonation of delay without showing sufficient justification and promptitude?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghaffar vs Anwarul Hassan Etc.1978 SCMR 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-12-17
  suspension of sentencebail pending appealjudicial discretioncircumstantial evidencelife imprisonmentappellate power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which granted bail and suspended the sentence of a respondent convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The petitioner challenged the High Court's authority to suspend a sentence of life imprisonment under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arguing that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and without sufficient reasoning. The Supreme Court held that Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not restrict the Appellate Court's discretion to grant bail based on the nature of the conviction or the sentence imposed. The Court affirmed that while such discretion must be exercised judicially, the High Court had properly considered the weak nature of the circumstantial evidence and the lack of identification of the deceased in the trial court's judgment. Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that the High Court's exercise of discretion was sound, and the petition was dismissed, establishing that the power to suspend a sentence pending appeal is broad and discretionary.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 restrict the Appellate Court's discretion to grant bail based on the severity of the sentence or conviction?
  • Is the discretion of the Appellate Court to suspend a sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 absolute or must it be exercised judicially?
  • Can an Appellate Court suspend a sentence of life imprisonment pending the hearing of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Bari vs Khadim Hussain1978 PLD Supreme Court 78 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-25
  ejectmentreconstructionbona fide requirementlandlord and tenantpersonal neednon-residential premisesrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an ejectment order against a tenant from non-residential premises, sought by the landlord for reconstruction purposes. The core legal questions were whether a landlord can evict a tenant from non-residential premises to reconstruct it into a residential building, and whether the grounds of "reconstruction" and "personal need" are mutually exclusive. The Supreme Court held that the pleas of bona fide reconstruction and personal requirement are not mutually exclusive; rather, linking them can strengthen a landlord's case. Furthermore, the Court held that Section 13(2)(vi) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, does not restrict a landlord to reconstructing a building of the same type or purpose as the original. The Court affirmed that changing the nature of a building from non-residential to residential through reconstruction is a valid ground for ejectment, provided the requirement is reasonable and in good faith. The principle established is that the statutory right to reconstruct is not limited to maintaining the existing character of the premises, and the penal provisions of the Ordinance serve as a safeguard against bad faith.

  Questions settled

  • Are the pleas of reasonable and bona fide requirement for reconstruction and the requirement for personal use mutually exclusive?
  • Does the law prohibit the reconstruction of a non-residential building into a residential one for the landlord's personal use?
  • Is the right to seek ejectment for reconstruction limited to rebuilding the premises for the same purpose and character as the original?
  Read full judgment →
• A. G. Sikandar vs Haji Abdul Hamid1978 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-05
  eviction applicationstriking off defencetentative rent depositwillful defaultdenial of titlenotice of attornmentleave to appealremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an eviction application filed by the respondent-landlord on grounds of willful default and personal requirement under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The petitioner-tenant denied title, but the Rent Controller held that an implied landlord-tenant relationship existed and ordered tentative rent deposit under Section 13(6). The petitioner defaulted in depositing future rent, prompting the Rent Controller to strike off his defence without examining his objections. The petitioner appealed to the District Court and Lahore High Court, claiming ignorance of the law, bereavement in the family, pending appeal, and lack of notice under Section 13-A. The High Court dismissed the second appeal, holding that the objections lacked merit and that non-service of Section 13-A notice was a mixed question of fact not raised in the courts below. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that striking off defence is justified when no valid cause is shown and new factual pleas cannot be raised for the first time before the apex court. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant resist an order striking off defence for default in rent deposit on the ground that an appeal against the tentative rent order was pending without a stay?
  • Whether a plea regarding non-service of notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 can be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Is it necessary to remand a case to the Rent Controller for examining a tenant's objections to striking off defence if the appellate and High Courts have already fully considered and rejected those objections on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Zarin Shah and 2 Others vs The State1977 SCMR 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-09
  criminal appealmurdercommon intentionbenefit of doubteyewitness testimonyacquittalsimple hurt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Peshawar High Court's judgment, which had reversed the trial court's acquittal of the appellants for the murder of Muhammad A.I Shah and for causing hurt to Mehr Shah. The core legal question concerned the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the validity of the appellants' counter-version regarding a struggle at their shop, and the application of common intention in a murder case. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Zarin Shah for murder, finding the prosecution's eyewitness account consistent and rejecting the defence's claim of a prior attack at their shop. Regarding Zahir Shah, the Court held that the specific role attributed to him—holding the deceased—was doubtful, thereby granting him the benefit of the doubt and acquitting him. The conviction of Multan Shah for causing simple hurt was maintained. The judgment reaffirms that minor injuries on an accused or their family members do not necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case if the primary evidence is credible and the defence version lacks corroborative marks of a struggle at the alleged scene.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of minor injuries on an accused or their family members automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can an appellate court convict an accused after the trial court has acquitted them based on the same evidence?
  • Is the benefit of the doubt applicable to one co-accused while maintaining the conviction of another in a joint criminal charge?
  Read full judgment →
• Yusuf Ali Khan, Bar at Law vs Muhammad Javed Iqbal Cheema1977 SCMR 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-02-13
  civil procedureframing of issuesrevisional jurisdictioninterlocutory ordersintra-court appealinheritance mutationspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a civil dispute concerning inheritance and revenue mutations. The petitioner instituted a civil suit for a declaration and challenged certain revenue orders. During the trial, the Senior Civil Judge framed an additional issue, which was subsequently deleted by the Additional District Judge in revision upon a statement made by the petitioner's counsel. The petitioner's review and clarification applications were dismissed. The petitioner then approached the High Court through a constitutional petition, which was dismissed in limine by a Single Judge. A subsequent intra-court appeal to a Division Bench was dismissed as incompetent pursuant to the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was competent against an interlocutory order at an intermediate stage of a suit, and that the Division Bench correctly ruled the intra-court appeal to be incompetent. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, with observations that the petitioner's apprehensions regarding the presentation of evidence were unfounded as all relevant points were covered by the existing issues.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is competent against an order passed at an intermediate stage in the course of the trial of a suit?
  • Does an intra-court appeal lie to a Division Bench of the High Court against an order of a Single Judge relating to the deletion of an issue in civil proceedings under the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972?
  • Does the distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction affect the maintainability of a revision petition before the District Judge?
  Read full judgment →
• Waheeduddin vs Allah Ditta and 5 Other1977 SCMR 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-31
  criminal appealacquittaldying declarationocular evidencepartisan witnessesPakistan Penal Codeappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of charges under sections 148, 302/149, 307/149, and 323/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned the reliability of the prosecution's evidence, specifically the ocular testimony and the dying declaration, in light of significant discrepancies and improvements made during the trial. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding that the prosecution witnesses were partisan and had deliberately embellished their accounts to fill lacunae. Furthermore, the Court held that the dying declaration was suspect because it was recorded at a police station in the presence of interested relatives rather than by a Magistrate. The Court affirmed the principle that appellate courts should not interfere with acquittals unless the judgment is perverse or unreasonable. It emphasized that dying declarations made in the presence of police and relatives are inherently less credible, and that material improvements in testimony undermine the overall veracity of the prosecution's case. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration recorded at a police station in the presence of interested relatives considered reliable?
  • What is the evidentiary value of ocular testimony that has been materially improved or embellished during the trial?
  • Under what circumstances should an appellate court interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Wahajuddin and Another Mehr Khan Mst. Raziabegum vs Mst. Razia1977 SCMR 260 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Wahad Bakhsh and Another vs The State1977 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-20
  escape from lawful custodyacquittalre-appraisal of evidencecriminal appealunproved documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court setting aside the acquittal of the appellants under section 224 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency and legality of evidence relied upon by the High Court to reverse an acquittal for escaping from lawful custody, particularly where material documents and inspection notes were unproved and defense witnesses were left un-cross-examined. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in relying on unproved inspection notes and remand orders, failing to discuss prosecution evidence adequately, and ignoring unchallenged defense testimony. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentences, and discharged the appellants from their bail bonds. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court must properly evaluate the evidence on record and cannot base a conviction for escaping lawful custody on inadmissible or unproved documents while ignoring un-cross-examined defense evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can rely on unproved inspection notes to reverse an acquittal?
  • Is it necessary for the prosecution to prove lawful custody and escape beyond reasonable doubt in a charge under Section 224 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • What is the evidentiary value of defense witnesses whose testimony is left un-cross-examined by the prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• The Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore through Its Chairman vs Col.1977 SCMR 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitionsupplementary awardtime-barred objectionsreference to tribunaltown improvement
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave directed against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan at Lahore. The core matter involves land acquisition proceedings under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 and the Land Acquisition Act, wherein a supplementary award concerning the respondents' land was announced by the Land Acquisition Collector. The respondents filed objections against the award, which the Collector dismissed as time-barred for not being presented within six months, refusing to refer them to the Tribunal. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, counsel for the respondents stated they no longer wished to challenge the validity of the award, and with the consent of the parties, the objections had already been referred to and decided by the tribunal. Consequently, the Supreme Court noted that the award remained in the field and the objections had been duly disposed of by the tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether objections against a land acquisition award can be treated as barred by time if not presented within six months of the making of the award?
  • Can a Land Acquisition Collector refuse to refer objections to the Tribunal for adjudication?
  • What is the effect when objections to an award are referred to and decided by the tribunal with the consent of parties during the pendency of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Zone Lahore vs Messrs Taj1977 SC M R328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income taxdepreciation rateplant and machineryIncome-tax Rulesassessment yearnewspaper production planttax reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a reference under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act 1922 regarding the rate of depreciation allowable on printing plant and machinery. The assessee, engaged in printing religious books, claimed depreciation at 10% under Rule 8(2) Clause III(3)M of the Income-tax Rules for 'newspaper production plant and machinery'. The Income-tax Officer and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal restricted depreciation to 7% under the general Clause III(1), reasoning that the rate depended on the nature of the concern or the purpose for which the machinery was used, rather than the class of machinery itself. The High Court answered the reference against the revenue, holding the assessee entitled to 10% depreciation. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that Clause III(3) applies to specific classes of plant and machinery irrespective of the nature of the concern or the particular purpose to which they are put. Since the machinery indisputably belonged to the class of newspaper production plant and machinery, 10% depreciation was correctly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rate of depreciation under Rule 8(2) Clause III(3) of the Income-tax Rules is determined by the class of machinery itself or by the nature of the concern using it?
  • Whether an assessee using newspaper production plant and machinery to print religious books rather than newspapers is entitled to depreciation under Clause III(3)M of the Income-tax Rules?
  Read full judgment →
• T. I. P. Ltd., Karachi vs First Sind Labour Court and Other1977 SCMR 403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-06-05
  Payment of Wages Actad hoc reliefNational Pay Scalesdeduction from wagesoption of pay scalesprivate company employeesindustrial agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a dispute regarding the fixation of wages and alleged deduction of ad hoc relief under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The core legal questions involve whether the employees, who were governed by private agreements and company directives rather than government servant rules, experienced an unlawful deduction from their wages when National Pay Scales were implemented, and whether petitions under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act were maintainable. The Supreme Court held that since the government rules and instructions regarding ad hoc relief and pay scales did not apply to the respondents, and because the employees voluntarily opted for the new National Pay Scales introduced by company directive without any improper fixation, no unlawful deduction of wages had occurred. Consequently, the employees were not entitled to relief under the Payment of Wages Act. The key principle laid down is that where employees' remuneration and benefits are governed by private industrial agreements and specific management directives rather than statutory government rules, claims regarding wage deductions must be assessed strictly in accordance with those governing instruments and the terms of voluntary option.

  Questions settled

  • Whether government rules and instructions regarding ad hoc relief and pay scales apply to employees of a private company governed by bilateral agreements and company directives?
  • Does the implementation of National Pay Scales pursuant to a company directive and voluntary employee option constitute an unlawful deduction from wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
  • Can employees who have voluntarily opted for new pay scales subsequently claim separate ad hoc relief contrary to the terms of the company directive?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Shahbaz Hassan vs Syed Muhammad Hussain and Other1977 SCMR 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-03-23
  pre-emptionostensible exchangesale disguised as exchangeburden of proofcircumstantial evidenceright of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a pre-emption suit filed by the appellant challenging a land transfer ostensibly structured as an exchange, claiming it was in reality a sale intended to defeat his preferential right of pre-emption as an heir. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the High Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff's evidence merely raised suspicions rather than proof. Upon a grant of leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined the circumstantial evidence, notably that the exchange deed and a simultaneous sale deed of the acquired land to third parties were presented and registered together, with the vendor receiving cash directly without ever possessing the exchange land. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent transactions constituted parts of a single scheme and that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently shifted the onus of proof onto the respondents, which they failed to discharge. The Court concluded that the transaction was indeed a sale masked as an exchange to defeat pre-emption, and accordingly allowed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ostensible exchange of land can be treated as a sale for the purpose of pre-emption when executed simultaneously with the sale of the acquired land to third parties?
  • When does circumstantial evidence regarding simultaneous registration of transfer deeds shift the onus of proof to the defendants in a pre-emption suit?
  • Can suspicion arising from the interconnected nature of land transfer transactions be sufficient to displace the burden of proof regarding the real nature of a transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Sibtain vs West Pakistan Government through the Collector, Muzaffargarh1977 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-04-19
  contractual disputegovernment contractorcivil appealleave to appealmaintainability of appealinterpretation of contractevidence evaluation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a contractual dispute between a government contractor and the Province of West Pakistan regarding payment for the supply of 'pilchi' for river diversion works. The appellant claimed payment for materials supplied in 'compacted mattress' form, while the respondent contended the supply was in 'loose roll' form, which carried a lower rate. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the appeal under the 1962 Constitution, which the Court resolved by granting leave to appeal. On the merits, the Court examined the evidence, including measurement books and witness testimony, to determine the form of the supplied material. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, finding that the evidence consistently supported the conclusion that the pilchi was supplied in 'loose roll' form rather than 'compacted mattress' form. Consequently, the Court held that the appellant was entitled only to the rates applicable to loose rolls, plus the specified rate for roll-making, and dismissed the appeal, affirming the final accounting performed by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal filed under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require special leave to appeal under Article 58 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
  • Are tentative running payments made to a contractor subject to final accounting upon the completion of the contract?
  • Can a court rely on witness testimony and measurement books to determine the specific form of materials supplied under a government work order?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ali Nawaz vs Member, Board of Revenue and 6 Other1977 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-04-22
  consolidation of holdingsminorguardian ad litemnatural guardianprocedural irregularityBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from consolidation proceedings initiated in 1962. The core legal question was whether an order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, was binding upon the appellant, who was a minor at the time of the proceedings and for whom no formal guardian ad litem had been appointed under the relevant rules. The appellant contended that under Rule 25 of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1960, the failure to appoint a guardian vitiated the order. The Supreme Court observed that the appointment of a guardian under the rule is discretionary. It found that the appellant's father, acting as a natural guardian, was aware of the revision proceedings and had filed a power of attorney on the minor's behalf. Furthermore, the adjustments ordered by the Member, Board of Revenue, resulted in the appellant retaining his original land. Consequently, the Court held that the absence of a formally appointed guardian did not invalidate the order, as the minor's interests were adequately protected by his natural guardian. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor under Rule 25 of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Rules 1960 mandatory or discretionary?
  • Does the failure to formally appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor in consolidation proceedings automatically vitiate the order if the minor's interests were represented by a natural guardian?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Akhlaque Hussain and Another vs Water and Power Development1977 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-02-23
  amendment of plaintimpleadment of partyjoint liabilitycause of actionbona fidesadministration of justicerevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arose from an order of the Lahore High Court, which accepted a revision petition filed by the respondent, Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), and set aside a trial court order allowing the appellants to amend their plaint to implead WAPDA as a co-defendant in a suit for damages. The core legal question was whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the amendment of the plaint to add a joint liability claim and implead WAPDA. The Supreme Court held that procedural rules governing the amendment of pleadings must serve the administration of justice and be liberally exercised. Amendments necessary to determine the real question in controversy between parties should generally be allowed, provided they do not substitute an entirely distinct cause of action or cause undue injury to the opposing party. Reversing the High Court's order and restoring that of the trial court, the Supreme Court ruled that allegations of joint liability raised factual issues for trial, and the High Court erred in deeming the application mala fide.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances should a trial court liberally allow an application for amendment of a plaint?
  • Does an amendment of pleadings that introduces factual allegations of joint liability alter the fundamental cause of action?
  • Can a High Court set aside an order allowing an amendment of plaint without evidence showing mala fides or prejudice to the opposing party?
  Read full judgment →
• Sui Gas Transmission Company vs Sui Gas Employees Union and Other1977 SCMR 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-10-04
  interim injunctionprima facie caseworkmanindustrial disputetemporary injunctionbalance of convenience
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an interim order passed by the High Court refusing to grant a temporary injunction to the plaintiff-appellant, Sui Gas Transmission Co. Ltd., which sought to restrain the defendants, who are Junior Executives, from becoming members of the Sui Gas Employees' Union. The core legal question concerns the principles governing the grant of interim injunctions and whether the defendants fall within the definition of 'workmen' or 'employers' under the law. The Supreme Court held that the learned Judge in the High Court erred in his approach by failing to properly determine whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case based on the pleadings, having been improperly influenced by vague objections to the maintainability of the suit. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeal by setting specific interim conditions and directing the High Court to expedite and conclude the trial of the suit within a fixed timeframe. The key principle laid down is that in dealing with an application for an interim injunction, the primary consideration is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case by raising a serious question of fact or law on the face of the plaint.

  Questions settled

  • What is the primary consideration when dealing with an application for an interim injunction?
  • Whether an objection to the maintainability of a suit can defeat an interim injunction without a legal defect appearing on the face of the plaint?
  • Do Junior Executives performing supervisory duties fall within the definition of workmen under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj Din vs Naseeruddin and Another1977 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-15
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentwilful defaultappreciation of evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court dismissing the landlord's second appeal against the reversal of an ejectment order. The core legal question concerns whether the tenants committed a wilful default in the payment of rent and whether concurrent factual findings regarding the bona fides of the tenants and the refusal of the landlord to accept rent warrant interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the appreciation of evidence by the lower appellate court and the High Court is final and that findings of fact based on such appraisal will not be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court does not undertake a reappraisal of evidence to disturb concurrent factual findings regarding default where no legal infirmity is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent factual findings regarding wilful default in rent payment?
  • Does the refusal of a landlord to accept rent justify the deposit of rent in court by the tenant?
  • Can a second appeal be entertained on the mere ground of incorrect appraisal of evidence by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Shabbir Hussain (Represented by His Legal Heirs) vs Abdul Raoof and Other1977 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-02-24
  abatement of appealsubstitution of legal heirsevacuee propertysettlement authoritiesmode of divisionwrit jurisdictiondiscretion of settlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the dismissal of a Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court, arising out of settlement proceedings regarding an evacuee house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved whether the appeal had abated due to the death of the original appellant and failure to bring legal representatives on record within the prescribed period, and whether the High Court properly exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction regarding the mode of property division by settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that the appeal had indeed abated as the legal heirs failed to apply within time without showing sufficient cause, and further held on merits that the division of property by the Settlement Commissioner based on actual possession was just and not arbitrary. The key principles laid down are that the mode of division of property is within the domain of statutory functionaries and superior courts will only interfere if the power is exercised without proper judicial discretion, and that failure to substitute legal representatives within the limitation period results in abatement unless sufficient cause is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal abates when legal representatives fail to apply for being brought on the record within the prescribed period of limitation?
  • Can the superior courts interfere with the mode of division of property determined by statutory settlement functionaries in the absence of a capricious or arbitrary exercise of power?
  • Whether knowledge of pending litigation can be presumed against legal heirs residing in the same disputed property and possessing a registered will mentioning the litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Iqbal vs The State1977 SC M R316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-01-19
  murdersectarian animositysentence enhancementmitigating circumstancescapital punishmentretracted confessioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the enhancement of a sentence from life imprisonment to death by the High Court for a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether sectarian animosity, which motivated the murder, could be considered a mitigating circumstance warranting a lesser penalty. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the death sentence. The Court held that religious or sectarian zeal is not a mitigating or extenuating circumstance for murder; rather, it is an aggravating factor. The primary sentence for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is death, and a lesser sentence of life imprisonment is only appropriate where valid mitigating circumstances exist. The Court emphasized that it would be dangerous to suggest that murders committed for religious reasons should not result in the death penalty, unless committed under grave and sudden provocation. The conviction was affirmed based on eye-witness testimony, recovery of blood-stained clothing, and a retracted confession, all of which proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does sectarian animosity or religious zeal constitute a mitigating circumstance for the offence of murder?
  • Is the primary sentence for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 death?
  • Can a High Court enhance a sentence of life imprisonment to death in a criminal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Shafqat Ali Chattha and 2 Others vs The State1977 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-03-20
  contempt of courthabeas corpusbailiffpolice record fabricationcriminal contemptsupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court convicting three appellants for contempt of court for fabricating police records to defeat a habeas corpus order for the recovery of a detenu. The core legal question involves determining whether the appellants committed contempt by obstructing the court bailiff and falsifying police station registers. The Supreme Court held that the conviction and sentence of the Station House Officer were justified to maintain the prestige of the court, while the conviction of the Moharar Assistant Sub-Inspector was set aside due to a lack of evidence showing his complicity in the fabrication. The key principle laid down is that acts designed to deliberately flout or defeat judicial orders, such as fabricating official police records during a court-ordered raid, constitute punishable contempt of court, and the appellate court will not interfere with contempt sentences unless there is a legal error or lack of evidence regarding specific individuals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the fabrication of police station records to frustrate a court-ordered habeas corpus recovery constitutes contempt of court?
  • Can a police officer's conviction for contempt be sustained in the absence of evidence showing active complicity in the fraudulent act?
  • Does the tendering of a belated unconditional apology automatically purge contempt where the accused aggravated the charge by filing false counter-reports?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Muhammad and 4 Others vs The State1977 SCMR 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  anticipatory bailpre-arrest bailattempted murderpolitical malicecriminal appealbail discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's order rejecting the appellants' application for anticipatory bail in a criminal case registered under sections 148, 307, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellants, office-bearers of the Pakistan National Alliance, were accused of attempted murder following a political procession and subsequent altercation. The appellants argued that the prosecution was motivated by political malice, citing the improbability of the alleged design to kill and the inconsistency in the medical evidence regarding the single bullet injury sustained by the victim despite multiple assailants firing. The Supreme Court, while noting that it would be inappropriate to express a definitive opinion on the appellants' culpability or pre-empt the trial court's functions, determined that the circumstances warranted the grant of pre-arrest bail. The Court held that for the limited purpose of anticipatory bail, the appellants had made a sufficient case for relief. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellants were admitted to bail subject to furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate for a court to express a definitive opinion on the culpability of an accused during the adjudication of an anticipatory bail application?
  • Does the existence of political rivalry and allegations of malice constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of pre-arrest bail in cases of attempted murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Habibullah Khan vs Province of West Pakistan and Other1977 SC M R321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Salehon Muhammad and Another Salehon Muhammad and Another vs Shera and Other Khan Muhammad and Other1977 SCMR 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptionowner of the estatevillage abadiproprietary bodyPunjab Pre-emption Actstare decisisagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil appeals regarding the right of pre-emption over agricultural land in village Kuthiala Sher Khan. The core legal question was whether an owner of land situated within the village abadi (residential area) qualifies as an "owner of the estate" under Section 15(c), thirdly, of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913, thereby possessing a superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that owners of land in the village abadi do not constitute "owners of the estate" within the meaning of the Act. The Court affirmed that the term "owner of the estate" is not synonymous with "owner in the estate" and is intended to refer exclusively to the proprietary body of the village who own revenue-paying land. The Court emphasized that interpreting the statute to include mere householders in the abadi would defeat the legislative purpose of the Pre-emption Act, which seeks to restrict pre-emptive rights to the proprietary body. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the long-standing judicial interpretation and the principle of stare decisis.

  Questions settled

  • Does an owner of land in the village abadi qualify as an 'owner of the estate' under Section 15(c) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
  • Is the term 'owner of the estate' synonymous with 'owner in the estate' for the purposes of pre-emption rights?
  • Does the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 grant pre-emptive rights to non-proprietors residing in the village abadi?
  Read full judgment →
• Salehon and Muhammad Khan and 2 Others vs The Statethe State1977 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-02
  criminal appealmurderacquittalcorroborationocular evidenceextra-judicial confessionbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves two connected criminal appeals arising from a violent incident resulting in six deaths. The trial court convicted three of the accused (sons of appellant Salehon) under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced them to death, while acquitting Salehon and four others. On appeal, the High Court maintained the convictions of the three sons, upheld the acquittals of four persons, but on an equal division between the bench, a reference to a third Judge led to the conviction of Salehon under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined the sufficiency of corroboration for the ocular testimony regarding Salehon, noting that in appeals against acquittal and given the over-implication of co-accused, safe administration of justice required independent and reliable corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the evidence against Salehon lacked such necessary corroboration and thus set aside his conviction and sentence, while dismissing the appeals of his three sons whose convictions were firmly supported by corroborated eye-witness and forensic evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony implicating an accused requires reliable independent corroboration when co-accused have been falsely implicated or acquitted?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on uncorroborated eye-witness testimony in an appeal against an order of acquittal?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of conviction maintained by the High Court supported by medical evidence and recoveries?
  Read full judgment →
• Salahuddin Khan vs Frontier Sugar Mills and Distilllery Ltd. and Other1977 SCMR 223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-11-23
  company lawcompromiseshareholders disputeboard of directorschief executivesettlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in an appeal involving rival groups of shareholders of a company. The core legal question concerns the resolution of internal corporate management disputes and the legitimacy of the removal of the Chief Executive and certain directors. The court records a settlement arrived at between the parties in the interest of the smooth functioning of the company. The holding of the court is that the compromise, which binds the parties to a prior agreement regarding the composition of the Board of Directors and the reinstatement and continuation of the appellant as Chief Executive until a specified date, is accepted. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the settlement. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court may dispose of corporate disputes in terms of a lawful compromise reached between shareholder factions to ensure the harmonious management of the company.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can dispose of an appeal based on a compromise reached between rival shareholder groups?
  • Are parties bound by a settlement agreement regarding the composition of the Board of Directors and the tenure of corporate officers?
  • Can a company's Chief Executive continue in office pursuant to a settlement agreement approved by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sakin Muhammad vs The State1977 SCMR 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-12-21Read full judgment →
• Saeeduddin Ahmad Naqvi and Others vs Abdul Ghafoor and Other1977 SCMR 306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-03-29
  Rehabilitation and Settlement SchemeWrit jurisdictionCondonation of delayRevisional jurisdictionDisplaced personsLand allotmentAdministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of land to displaced persons under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, could properly interfere with proceedings before a Rehabilitation Commissioner regarding the condonation of delay in a revision petition. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the Rehabilitation Commissioner's proceedings, as the Commissioner possessed the statutory jurisdiction to entertain the revision and determine whether to condone the delay. The Court established the principle that where a tribunal or authority is vested with the jurisdiction to decide a matter, including the power to condone delay, the High Court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction to preemptively quash those proceedings. However, because the appellants' case lacked merit on the facts—as the respondents had surrendered the excess land and the remaining allotment was within permissible limits—the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the final result of the case, ultimately dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, interfere with proceedings before a Rehabilitation Commissioner regarding the condonation of delay in a revision petition?
  • Does a Rehabilitation Commissioner possess the jurisdiction to determine whether to condone the delay in filing a revision petition?
  Read full judgment →
• S. A. Saeed vs Chief Administrator of Aufaq and Other1977 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-06-17
  Auqaf propertyrent enhancementcompromise decreetenancy disputesurrender of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal originated from a dispute regarding the Auqaf Department's attempt to retrospectively enhance the rent of a property occupied by the appellant, Mr. S. A. Saeed, from Rs. 12 to Rs. 230 per mensem. The appellant challenged the enhancement via a writ petition, and the High Court subsequently ruled that the Department was entitled to recover the enhanced rent, albeit with a modified effective date. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties reached a mutual compromise. Under the terms of the settlement, the appellant agreed to surrender vacant possession of the premises within six weeks. In exchange, the respondents agreed to waive their demand for the enhanced rent, allowing the appellant to pay the original rate of Rs. 12 per mensem until the date of surrender. The Court disposed of the appeal in terms of this compromise, stipulating that failure by the appellant to comply with the agreed terms would result in the dismissal of the appeal with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dispute regarding the retrospective enhancement of rent for Auqaf property be resolved through a compromise agreement between the tenant and the Auqaf Department?
  • What are the consequences of a party failing to comply with the terms of a compromise agreement reached during the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat alias Rhaman alias Waryam alias Badshah vs The State1977 PLD Supreme Court 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-04-04
  circumstantial evidencelast seen togetherburden of proofmurderrapeabductioncriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted by the trial court under sections 366, 376, and 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the abduction, rape, and murder of a young woman, and sentenced to death, which was upheld by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether circumstantial evidence—specifically that the deceased was last seen in the company of the appellant before disappearing and her dead body being discovered days later miles away—was sufficient to sustain convictions for rape and murder. The Court held that the circumstance of the deceased being last seen in the company of the accused, by itself, is insufficient to sustain a charge of murder or rape without additional corroborative links, such as incriminating recoveries, a strong motive, or close proximity of time and space. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution and never shifts to the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the convictions and sentences for murder and rape while maintaining the conviction for abduction under Section 366.

  Questions settled

  • Is the sole circumstance of the deceased being last seen in the company of the accused sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder and rape?
  • Does Section 106 of the Evidence Act 1872 shift the burden of proof to the accused to prove his innocence in a criminal trial?
  • What additional corroborative evidence is required to link an accused to a crime when the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence of being last seen together?
  Read full judgment →
• Rahat Siddiqui vs Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education1977 SCMR 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-07
  examination malpracticedisciplinary proceedingsnatural justiceright to counseleducational boardresult gazettefraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore. The appellant, a student, was accused of colluding with examiners to inflate his marks in a Social Studies paper. The core legal questions were whether disciplinary rules regarding examination malpractice cease to apply after the declaration of results, and whether a candidate has a statutory right to legal representation before a disciplinary committee. The Supreme Court held that disciplinary rules, specifically Rule 8(iv), remain applicable even after the publication of examination results, as the Result Gazette does not confer absolute sanctity or immunity from subsequent correction of fraud. Furthermore, the Court held that the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973, does not grant a right to legal representation in such domestic inquiries, particularly when specific Board rules explicitly prohibit it. The Court affirmed that the appellant was provided sufficient opportunity to defend himself, satisfying the requirements of natural justice, and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the declaration of examination results in a Gazette grant immunity to a candidate against disciplinary action for malpractice?
  • Does Section 22 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act 1973 grant a candidate a right to be represented by a lawyer in disciplinary proceedings before an educational board?
  • Can a disciplinary committee of an educational board prohibit legal representation during an inquiry?
  • What is the scope of natural justice in domestic inquiries conducted by educational authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Officer on Special Duty, Central Record Office and Others Chief1977 SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-10-26
  finality of ordersdisplaced personsland settlementconfirmed allotmentfraud vitiates proceedingsministerial functionsstatutory jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the finality of orders passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner (or his delegate) regarding the genuineness of land claims under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether a confirmed allotment, once adjudicated as genuine by the Deputy Commissioner exercising delegated powers, could be reopened for fresh inquiry based on allegations of fraud, and whether the Officer on Special Duty (O.S.D.), Central Record Room, possessed the jurisdiction to initiate such proceedings. The Supreme Court held that once an order regarding the genuineness of a claim is passed under sections 10 and 11 of the 1958 Act, it attains finality under section 22 of the same Act, absent any revision under section 21. The Court affirmed that the O.S.D. performs ministerial functions and lacks the judicial authority to cancel confirmed allotments. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that bona fide transferees for value cannot be penalized for alleged fraud by their predecessors-in-title. The principle laid down is that statutory finality of administrative orders cannot be bypassed by reopening settled inquiries, even upon allegations of fraud, unless specific statutory review mechanisms are invoked.

  Questions settled

  • Can an order passed by a Deputy Commissioner exercising delegated powers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 be reopened after it has attained finality?
  • Does the Officer on Special Duty (O.S.D.) of the Central Record Room have the jurisdiction to cancel a confirmed allotment of land?
  • Can a bona fide transferee for value be penalized for fraud committed by their predecessor-in-title?
  • Does the finality provision in section 22 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 preclude the reopening of a claim inquiry based on allegations of fraud?
  Read full judgment →
• Nusrat vs Nasir Ahmad and Another1977 SCMR 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-03
  murderacquittalfalse implicationpolitical rivalryocular evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which acquitted the respondent, Nasir Ahmad, of a murder charge under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondent and his brother murdered the deceased, Shah Mir, using a pahora. While the trial court convicted the respondent, the High Court acquitted him, finding the prosecution case was engineered by a rival faction leader, Nazar Hussain Shah. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, specifically the damaging admissions made by the deceased's mother regarding the influence of Nazar Hussain Shah, who had directed the filing of the FIR and offered to fund the litigation due to political rivalry. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained given the evidence of fabrication and partisan influence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution case was fatally undermined by these admissions, confirming the High Court's acquittal. The principle laid down is that where prosecution witnesses are shown to be acting under the influence of a third party with a motive to falsely implicate the accused, the entire prosecution case becomes unreliable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution case is shown to be engineered by a third party with a motive to falsely implicate the accused?
  • Does the involvement of a third party in directing the filing of an FIR and funding litigation cast sufficient doubt on the credibility of prosecution witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Nur Ahmad and 4 Other vs Muhammad Yusuf Khan and 2 Other1977 SC M R283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptionevacuee propertyconfirmed allotteeKatchi Abadicivil jurisdictionsale of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the right of pre-emption over land sold by a confirmed allottee of evacuee property. The appellants, who purchased 65 kanals and 4 marlas of land in Gujranwala, contested a pre-emption suit filed by the respondents, arguing that the land was evacuee property and thus not subject to pre-emption. The Senior Civil Judge and the High Court both ruled against the appellants, holding the sale pre-emptible. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the sale of evacuee property, specifically by a confirmed allottee, is subject to the law of pre-emption. Relying on the precedent established in Fazal Elahi v. Muhammad Munawar (PLD 1973 SC 347), the Court held that such sales are indeed pre-emptible. Furthermore, the Court rejected the appellants' argument that the land was exempt under the Transfer of Evacuee Lands (Katchi Abadi) Act 1972, noting that the land had not been declared a Katchi Abadi by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that confirmed allottees of evacuee property are subject to pre-emption claims.

  Questions settled

  • Is the sale of land by a confirmed allottee of evacuee property subject to the right of pre-emption?
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a pre-emption suit regarding evacuee property?
  • Can land be exempted from pre-emption under the Transfer of Evacuee Lands (Katchi Abadi) Act 1972 if it has not been declared a Katchi Abadi by the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Ahmad vs Naim Akhtar and Another1977 SCMR 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-03
  criminal appealmitigating circumstanceslesser penaltyexpectation of lifedelay in hearingsentence reductioncapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction of the respondent under sections 302, 307, and 456 of the P.P.C., but reducing the sentence for murder from death to transportation for life due to surrounding circumstances and lack of premeditation. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether these circumstances constituted a valid mitigating factor for awarding the lesser penalty under section 302. However, due to prolonged delays in bringing the appeal to a hearing—largely caused by the appellant's own procrastination—and the fact that more than five years had elapsed since the High Court reduced the sentence, the respondent had acquired an expectation of life. Following its consistent practice not to inflict the maximum penalty after such extensive lapse of time, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the lesser sentence, dismissed the appeal, and confirmed the sentence of transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether prolonged delay in bringing an appeal to a hearing and the resulting expectation of life justify declining to impose the death sentence?
  • Do sudden excitement and lack of premeditation constitute valid mitigating factors for awarding a lesser penalty under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • What is the consistent practice of the Supreme Court regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty after a long lapse of time following a sentence reduction or acquittal by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazo Alias Ali Nawaz vs The State1977 SCMR 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-03-07
  criminal appealcircumstantial evidenceretracted confessionmurderrecoveriesbenefit of doubtmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which maintained the appellant's conviction and sentence of transportation for life under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence and a retracted judicial confession, alleging that the appellant and his co-accused lured the deceased away, leading to his murder and subsequent burial, along with certain recoveries. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, noting that the retracted confession was inconsistent with the medical evidence showing exclusively incised wounds, whereas the confession mentioned blunt weapon blows. Furthermore, the court found serious doubts regarding the alleged discovery of the dead body and the recovery of a hatchet from water, noting contradictions in witness testimonies and a lack of credible proof connecting the recovered items to the crime. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and directed the appellant's immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retracted judicial confession inconsistent with medical evidence can be relied upon to sustain a conviction?
  • Can a conviction based on circumstantial evidence stand when the testimonies regarding last-seen and recoveries suffer from material contradictions?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon from water without proof of bloodstains at the time of seizure connect the accused to the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs The State1977 SCMR 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-28
  murderdying declarationocular evidenceacquittalcriminal appealrecovery evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of his father's first cousin, Taj Din. The trial court had acquitted the co-accused, finding that the alleged eye-witnesses were not present at the scene and had been influenced by local political animosity. The conviction of the appellant was based solely on two alleged oral dying declarations and the recovery of a blood-stained weapon. The Supreme Court considered whether such evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction after the ocular testimony had been entirely rejected. The Court held that once the eye-witnesses were disbelieved, the prosecution's case was severely undermined, requiring strong independent evidence for conviction. The Court found the oral dying declarations unreliable, as they were not mentioned in the First Information Report, and noted significant discrepancies in the recovery evidence. Consequently, the Court concluded that the remaining evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, set aside the judgment of the lower courts, and acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on oral dying declarations when the ocular evidence has been rejected by the court?
  • Does the rejection of eye-witness testimony in a murder case create a general doubt requiring strong independent evidence for conviction?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the recovery evidence of the weapon is discrepant and unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Hussain vs The State1977 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-17
  murderdying declarationright of private defenceappellate jurisdictionmedical jurisprudencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant Nazar Hussain for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellant along with co-accused attacked the deceased with knives following an altercation over carrying paddy crops, resulting in the fatal injury of the victim. Although the High Court disbelieved the eye-witnesses and police recoveries, it convicted the appellant based on a dying declaration corroborated by the injuries found on the appellant and his own partial admission of presence and participation at the crime scene under a plea of private defense. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction for murder could be sustained upon a dying declaration when medical evidence suggested the deceased's trachea was cut, allegedly impairing speech. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the medical report indicated the wound was trachea deep rather than completely severed, that speech in a whisper remains possible, and that the dying declaration was duly corroborated by the appellant's admission and physical injuries. The court laid down the principle that a dying declaration, if proved to be made while the declarant is conscious, can safely form the basis of a conviction even in the presence of minor medical contradictions, especially when corroborated by the accused's own version of events and self-inflicted or retaliatory injuries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dying declaration can be relied upon to sustain a murder conviction when medical evidence suggests the trachea of the deceased was injured?
  • Can an accused be convicted on the basis of a dying declaration and self-admitted participation, even if the primary ocular testimony and police recoveries are disbelieved?
  • Does a wound that is trachea deep completely preclude a person from making a brief statement or speaking in a whisper?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab and Others vs Allah Rakha and Other1977 SCMR 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-04-13
  giftundue influenceMarzul Mautburden of proofcustomary lawmental capacity
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave arising from a judgment and decree of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for possession of land gifted by the deceased Mohammad Din to the respondents. The plaintiffs challenged the two registered gift deeds executed in January 1951 on the grounds of lack of sound disposing mind, Marzul Maut (death-bed illness), and undue influence. The trial court held the gifts to be void due to Marzul Maut. The District Judge partially upheld the gifts, setting aside the one in favor of Allah Rakha due to undue influence. The High Court dismissed the suit entirely, finding no undue influence and noting the abatement of appeals regarding certain deceased parties. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the findings of the High Court were supported by evidence, that the donor possessed sound mental and physical capacity at the time of execution, and that the gifts were the spontaneous acts of the donor, who was displeased with the litigious plaintiffs. The key principle laid down is that the mere existence of a fiduciary or dependent relationship and a position to dominate the will is insufficient to void a transaction; it must be proven that unfair advantage was actually taken and that the gift was not a free and spontaneous act of the donor.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rule of Marzul Maut under Shariat Law applies retrospectively to gifts executed before the amendment of Shariat Law in March 1951 when the parties were governed by customary law?
  • Does the mere fact that a donor is old and living with a donee conclusively establish that a gift was procured by undue influence?
  • What is the burden of proof under Section 16 of the Contract Act 1872 when a transaction appears unconscionable and one party is in a position to dominate the will of another?
  Read full judgment →
• Naushad vs Jehanzeb and Another1977 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-01-17
  sentence enhancementinadequate sentencecarnal intercoursecriminal revisionserved sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court declining to enhance the sentence of the respondent who was convicted under Section 377, Pakistan Penal Code for committing carnal intercourse with a five-year-old child and sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment by a Magistrate. The core legal question is whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to enhance a sentence under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the original sentence awarded by the trial court has already been served out by the convict. The Supreme Court held that the High Court is fully competent to enhance a manifestly inadequate sentence even if the convict has already undergone the sentence served upon them. The key principle laid down is that the completion of a lenient or inadequate sentence does not oust or bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to enhance the punishment under revision or appeal powers when the initial sentence is manifestly inadequate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to enhance a sentence under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the convict has already undergone the sentence awarded by the trial court?
  • Can a manifestly inadequate sentence for an offence under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code be enhanced after the original term of imprisonment has been served out?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmad and Another vs The State1977 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-18
  dying declarationhostile witnessescriminal appealmurder convictionrecovery of incriminating articlesRegister Malkhanacorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants were convicted of abduction, rape, and murder, with the trial court and High Court relying primarily on the victim's dying declaration after prosecution witnesses turned hostile. The appellants challenged the conviction, arguing the dying declaration was unreliable because the doctor did not explicitly testify to its recording in his presence, and that alternative officials were available to record it. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the doctor's signature on the dying declaration and his prior confirmation of the victim's fitness to make a statement sufficiently established its authenticity. The Court further held that the absence of relatives during the recording of the statement negated claims of tutoring. Additionally, the Court ruled that the lower courts erred in excluding evidence of recoveries, noting that the failure to record the receipt of sealed parcels in the daily diary was immaterial, as such entries belong in the Register Malkhana, not the daily diary. The dying declaration, corroborated by physical evidence and resistance injuries on the appellants, was deemed sufficient to sustain the convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of a specific entry regarding the receipt of sealed parcels in a police daily diary invalidate the evidence of recovery?
  • Is a dying declaration reliable when the medical officer confirms the victim's fitness to testify and signs the statement, even if the officer does not explicitly testify to witnessing the recording?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on a dying declaration when material prosecution witnesses have turned hostile?
  Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad and Another vs The State1977 SCMR 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-06-10
  criminal appealcompromiseacquittalmurderous assaultcomposition of offenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioners for a murderous assault, initially under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was subsequently altered by the Sessions Judge to Section 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with a reduced sentence of one and a half years rigorous imprisonment. The matter had been pending in the High Court for approximately ten years before being dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a compromise reached between the parties after a significant lapse of time—twelve years post-incident—could be accepted to set aside the conviction. The Supreme Court, noting that the complainant and victim had confirmed the compromise with the petitioners, who were his neighbors, exercised its discretion to accept the composition. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the appeal based on the compromise, and acquitted the petitioners, ordering their immediate release. The judgment affirms the principle that in appropriate circumstances, particularly where the victim consents, a compromise can be recognized to resolve criminal proceedings even at the appellate stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court accept a compromise between parties to set aside a criminal conviction at the leave to appeal stage?
  • Does the confirmation of a compromise by the complainant justify the acquittal of the accused in a case of murderous assault?
  • Is a long delay in the disposal of a revision petition a relevant factor when considering a compromise between parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younus and 3 Others vs Sardar Baqir Ali and Another1977 SCMR 4 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-03-03
  quashing of criminal proceedingscriminal breach of trustcheatingabetmentindividual criminal liabilityjoint liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave was directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had refused to quash criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants under Sections 406 and 420 read with Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings could be maintained against all appellants when the underlying transaction, specifically the receipt of money, was executed solely by one appellant, Muhammad Younus, and the evidence failed to establish that the firm involved was a joint enterprise. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of evidence linking the other appellants to the transaction or establishing a joint firm, the criminal proceedings against them were unsustainable. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal in part, quashing the proceedings against the three appellants who were not parties to the receipt, while directing that the case proceed against Muhammad Younus alone. The judgment reinforces the principle that criminal liability in cases of breach of trust and cheating must be grounded in specific individual involvement or clear evidence of joint liability.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings under Sections 406 and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be quashed against co-accused if the evidence only implicates one individual in the transaction?
  • Is it permissible to continue criminal proceedings against one accused while quashing them against others in the same case?
  • Does the absence of evidence regarding a joint firm preclude the prosecution of all partners for an alleged criminal act committed by only one partner?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique and Another vs Ghulam Jillani and Another1977 SCMR 275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-04-12
  Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958property transfersettlement authoritiesindivisible unitwrit jurisdictionLetters Patent Appealdisplaced person
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellants sought the transfer of a shop-cum-residential property as a single, indivisible unit. Settlement authorities, however, divided the property into distinct units, transferring the shop and residential portions to the respective parties while reserving three disputed back rooms for auction, finding them to be an independent residential unit. The appellants challenged this division, arguing the property should have been treated as one. The High Court dismissed their writ petition and subsequent Letters Patent Appeal, affirming the Settlement authorities' jurisdiction to divide the property. The Supreme Court upheld the decision, holding that the Settlement authorities acted within their lawful discretion under the Act to divide the property. The Court rejected the argument that the authorities were unaware of their powers to treat the property as a single unit. The appeal was dismissed, confirming that the disputed rooms constituted a separate unit, though the Court noted the appellant could still pursue a claim for the rooms as a house through appropriate channels.

  Questions settled

  • Do Settlement authorities have the jurisdiction to divide a property into separate units under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a property be claimed as an indivisible unit if it contains distinct shop and residential portions?
  • Is the High Court's interference in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction warranted when Settlement authorities have lawfully exercised their discretion in property division?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddiq vs The State1977 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-13
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptiontainted moneyburden of proofpatwarimutationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding his conviction for accepting illegal gratification while working as a patwari. The core legal questions involve the evaluation of the defence plea regarding tainted money recovery, the effect of a witness's relationship with the complainant, and whether the prosecution established the link between the bribe acceptance and the official act of entering a mutation. The Supreme Court held that once tainted money was recovered from the petitioner, the onus shifted to him to explain its receipt, and the minor misreading regarding an independent witness did not vitiate a conviction supported by sufficient evidence. Furthermore, the initial act of entering a mutation by a patwari forms the necessary foundation for further official action. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts on the establishment of the prosecution case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of tainted money shift the onus to the accused to explain its receipt?
  • Does the misreading of a witness's relationship with the complainant vitiate a conviction where other sufficient evidence exists?
  • Is the initial act of entering a mutation by a patwari considered a necessary link in corruption cases involving mutation entries?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddiq Etc. vs Ghulam Muhammad1977 SCMR 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-27
  No-Objection Certificateactionable nuisancelocus standimisrepresentationinjunctioncinematograph licensecivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed the appellants' suit for a permanent injunction against the respondent's operation of an open-air cinema. The appellants, residents of Kundian Town, alleged that the respondent obtained a 'No-Objection Certificate' (NOC) through misrepresentation regarding the proximity of a mosque and their residences. The core legal question was whether the NOC was invalid due to fraud and whether the cinema's operation constituted an actionable nuisance. The Supreme Court held that while the respondent obtained the NOC by suppressing material facts, this was a matter between the respondent and the licensing authority. The Court ruled that the appellants lacked locus standi to challenge the NOC's validity on these grounds, as no statutory rules were violated at the time of issuance. Furthermore, the Court upheld the High Court's finding that the appellants failed to establish that the cinema's operation constituted an actionable nuisance interfering with their property rights or religious practices. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the cinema could continue subject to conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of material facts in an application for a 'No-Objection Certificate' for a cinema automatically invalidate the certificate?
  • Can private individuals maintain a suit to challenge the grant of a 'No-Objection Certificate' based solely on the applicant's misrepresentation to the licensing authority?
  • What constitutes an actionable nuisance regarding the operation of a cinema in proximity to residential areas and a mosque?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi vs Aziz Ahmed and Another1977 SCMR 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-20
  murdergrave and sudden provocationconjectures and speculationsmitigating circumstancesfamily honoursentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which altered the respondent's conviction from Section 302 to Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing his sentence from death to ten years' rigorous imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the respondent stabbed the deceased with a knife in the street after accusing him of teasing his sister. The respondent claimed he acted under grave and sudden provocation, asserting his sister was being dragged by the deceased. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the High Court's finding of provocation was based on mere conjectures and speculations, as there was no evidence on record to show the respondent's sister was present in the street, and the eye-witnesses had repudiated the defence plea. The Supreme Court held that a conviction cannot be altered on the basis of conjectures unsupported by evidence. Consequently, the Court restored the conviction under Section 302, but reduced the sentence from death to transportation for life, noting that the respondent acted out of a sense of family honour.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court alter a conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder based on mere conjectures and speculations without supporting evidence?
  • Whether a plea of grave and sudden provocation can be accepted in the absence of any evidence showing the presence of the provoked person's relative at the crime scene?
  • Does acting out of a sense of family honour constitute a mitigating circumstance sufficient to reduce a death sentence to transportation for life under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq and Another vs The State1977 SCMR 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-06
  criminal appealocular evidencedying declarationplea of alibicorroborationmurder convictioncommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a Lahore High Court order that modified the appellants' convictions from Section 302/149 to Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while maintaining death sentences for the murder of two individuals. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular evidence, the validity of the appellants' alibi, and whether alleged evidentiary infirmities—such as inconsistencies in the time of occurrence and the failure to send a weapon for ballistic analysis—undermined the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the ocular evidence, corroborated by medical reports and dying declarations, sufficiently established the appellants' guilt. The Court affirmed that minor discrepancies in testimony do not necessarily invalidate a prosecution case when the core narrative is supported by independent evidence. Furthermore, the Court held that a plea of alibi must be substantiated by credible evidence and that the physical proximity of the alibi location to the crime scene rendered the defense's claim improbable. The judgment reinforces the principle that consistent ocular evidence, when corroborated by medical findings, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to send a weapon for ballistic examination necessarily invalidate a conviction based on other corroborating evidence?
  • Can a plea of alibi be rejected if the accused's location at the time of the offense was in close proximity to the crime scene?
  • Does a minor inconsistency regarding the time of occurrence in a dying declaration automatically discredit the entire prosecution case?
  • Is ocular testimony sufficient to sustain a conviction when corroborated by medical evidence, even if some witnesses are excluded?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan Khan and Another vs Muhammad Hafeez Khan and Other1977 SCMR 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-04-11
  evacuee landRehabilitation Settlement Schemeimplied revocation of willMuslim Law of inheritancecustomary lawgift deedreview petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged the dismissal of a special leave to appeal concerning the allotment of evacuee land. The petitioners sought to enforce a 1942 will and a 1947 gift made by their father, which the Settlement authorities had declined to recognize, opting instead to distribute the estate according to Muslim Law under Paragraph 46 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The core legal questions were whether the 1947 gift impliedly revoked the 1942 will under customary or Muslim law, and whether the Settlement authorities erred in excluding the dispositions. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent gift of the same property by the testator during his lifetime effectively and impliedly revoked the earlier will under both Muslim and customary law. Consequently, the will became inoperative, and the estate was correctly distributed according to the personal law of the deceased. The Court affirmed that the petitioners could not benefit from the gifts due to their failure to establish them in the revenue records, thus upholding the application of Paragraph 46 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent gift of property by a testator during his lifetime impliedly revoke an earlier will under Muslim and customary law?
  • Is a will enforceable under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme if the testator dies after the partition of the subcontinent?
  • Can a party claim the benefit of a gift in evacuee land proceedings if the gift was not recorded in the revenue records?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique vs The State1977 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-05-15
  extra-judicial confessionretracted confessionmurdercircumstantial evidencecapital punishmentcorroborationbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the sentence of death for the murder of his cousin. The prosecution case rested primarily upon an extra-judicial confession made to independent villagers, a motive involving illicit relations with the deceased's wife, the appellant's unexplained absence from employment, and subsequent recoveries of incriminating articles and the weapon of offence. The core legal questions pertained to the admissibility and evidentiary value of a retracted extra-judicial confession, the reliability of independent witnesses regarding extra-judicial confessions, and the sufficiency of circumstantial corroboration. By a majority decision, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and dismissed the appeal, ruling that a retracted extra-judicial confession, when voluntarily made and duly corroborated by unimpeachable recoveries and circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to sustain a capital conviction. The key principle laid down is that the retraction of a confession has no bearing on whether it was voluntarily made in the first instance, provided independent corroborative evidence firmly establishes the guilt of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the retraction of an extra-judicial confession destroy its evidentiary value regarding its initial voluntary nature and truth?
  • Whether an extra-judicial confession made to village lambardars and independent citizens can form the basis of a conviction without corroboration?
  • Is an extra-judicial confession rendered inadmissible under Section 24 of the Evidence Act 1872 simply because it was made to a village Lambardar in the absence of any threat, promise, or inducement?
  • What is the legal weight of incriminating recoveries and motive when assessing the reliability of a retracted extra-judicial confession in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz and Others vs The State1977 SCMR 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-05
  death sentencemurderhatchet injuriescommon objectmitigating circumstancescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where he was sentenced to death for the murder of a co-villager over a land dispute. Leave to appeal was granted solely to consider the propriety of the death sentence, as the appellant contended that the fatal injuries on the deceased were caused by blunt weapons, whereas he was armed with a hatchet. The Supreme Court examined the medical evidence and found that the appellant had inflicted multiple forceful incised wounds with a hatchet on the head of the deceased and had also injured other prosecution witnesses. The Court observed that the appellant had a strong motive, played the major role in mounting the armed attack, and was the chief culprit in the incident. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the death sentence was rightly awarded and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a death sentence is appropriate for an accused armed with a sharp-edged weapon when the fatal injuries are caused by blunt weapons, but the accused played the major role in the attack?
  • Does the infliction of multiple forceful hatchet blows on vital parts of the body justify the imposition of the capital sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan vs Khizar Hayat and and Other1977 SCMR 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-24
  criminal appealcommon intentionwitness credibilitycorroboration of evidencecriminal trespasshurtappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the High Court's order regarding the conviction of the respondent, Khizar Hayat, for various offences arising from a land dispute. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency of evidence to establish the respondent's criminal liability, particularly given the inconsistencies in eye-witness accounts regarding his specific overt acts. The Supreme Court observed that the respondent was not implicated in the assault on the deceased in the FIR or by witnesses. Furthermore, witness testimony regarding the respondent's role in assaulting two prosecution witnesses was contradictory and lacked corroboration. However, the Court found credible evidence that the respondent participated in the assault on one specific witness, P.W. Riaz. Consequently, the Court set aside the original convictions for more serious charges and convicted the respondent under sections 447 and 323 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The principle laid down is that where multiple accused are lumped together in testimony, conviction requires specific, corroborated evidence of individual participation, and general allegations are insufficient to sustain convictions for serious offences.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the evidence fails to attribute specific overt acts to him?
  • Does the lumping of multiple accused persons in witness testimony without specific attribution of injuries suffice for a conviction?
  • Is a conviction sustainable under Section 323 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the evidence only corroborates the assault on one of several alleged victims?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jamil Alias Loli and Another vs The State1977 SCMR 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-17
  common intentionvicarious liabilitymurdercriminal liabilityjoint liabilityappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of two appellants for the murder of one Rab Nawaz. The core legal question was whether Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was correctly applied in convicting both appellants, given that only one bullet struck the deceased while the other missed. The Court held that the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was legally sound. The evidence established that both appellants arrived armed and fired shots at the deceased simultaneously, demonstrating a shared common intention to commit the murder. The Court affirmed that even if it were uncertain which specific appellant fired the fatal shot, their joint action and presence with a common purpose brought them within the ambit of Section 34. The key principle laid down is that where multiple accused act in concert with a shared intent to kill, they are vicariously liable for the resulting death, regardless of which specific act caused the fatal injury.

  Questions settled

  • Does the application of Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 require that the fatal injury be attributed to a specific accused?
  • Can two persons be convicted for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when only one bullet strikes the deceased?
  • Does the presence of multiple armed assailants acting in concert satisfy the requirement of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaq vs Afzal Elahi Usmani1977 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-14
  ejectmentdefault in rentrestoration of appealdismissal in defaultdiscretion of courtservice of noticelandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the High Court's dismissal of a second appeal in default and the subsequent refusal to restore it. The petitioner, a tenant facing ejectment, had contested the service of a notice under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, arguing that the relationship of landlord and tenant was not established. The Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge had concurrently found that the petitioner refused the notice, thereby establishing the tenancy and confirming the ejectment order due to default in rent payment. In the High Court, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioner sought restoration, citing his counsel's lack of access to the cause list and the counsel's illness, both of which were rejected by the High Court for lack of evidence and negligence. The Supreme Court held that no question of law arose and that the High Court had exercised its discretion neither illegally nor arbitrarily. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, though the petitioner was granted two months to vacate the premises subject to continued rent payments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's refusal to restore an appeal dismissed in default constitutes an illegal or arbitrary exercise of discretion?
  • Can a tenant who refuses to accept a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, claim that the relationship of landlord and tenant was not established?
  • Is the illness of counsel a sufficient ground for restoration of an appeal dismissed in default if not supported by medical evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Zafar vs The State1977 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-02-16
  post-arrest bailcorruptionsanction for prosecutiongovernment servantdelay in trialforged billsFederal Investigation Agency
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal by Muhammad Iqbal Zafar, an Assistant Food Controller, challenging the High Court's dismissal of his post-arrest bail application. The appellant was arrested on 7 September 1976 pursuant to a case registered by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) under Sections 402, 409, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, regarding allegations of connivance in preparing false and forged bills for wheat transportation. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to bail considering the prolonged nature of judicial custody, the status of investigation, the requirement of sanction for prosecuting public servants, and the anticipated delay in the conclusion of the trial. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted bail, observing that although the investigation was complete and the challan submitted, requisite prosecution sanction for government servants had not been obtained, the case involved approximately seventy prosecution witnesses alongside voluminous records, and the trial would foreseeably take years to conclude.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused government servant is entitled to bail when sanction for prosecution has not yet been obtained despite the submission of the challan?
  • Whether the likelihood of protracted trial due to voluminous records and numerous prosecution witnesses constitutes a valid ground for granting bail?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs The State1977 SCMR 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-06-08
  post-arrest bailmurdercommon intentionparity in bailage as ground for bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal case where the petitioners sought bail in connection with an altercation resulting in culpable homicide amounting to murder. The core legal question is whether the petitioner Muhammad Hussain was entitled to post-arrest bail on the grounds of age and parity with a co-accused who was granted bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's case was distinguishable from the co-accused who was released, as the petitioner was specifically alleged to have caused injuries to the deceased, and that advanced age alone at 70 years does not automatically entitle an accused to the concession of bail in such circumstances. The court established the principle that parity in bail cannot be claimed when the factual role and attribution of injuries differ among co-accused, and age alone is insufficient for bail in serious offences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether advanced age alone entitles an accused to the concession of post-arrest bail in a murder case?
  • Can an accused claim parity for bail when his role is distinguishable from a co-accused who has been granted bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat vs Manager, W. P. I. D. C., Salt Mines, Khewra1977 SCMR 205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-11-18
  Miner BookWrit jurisdictionW.P.I.D.C.Employment disputeConstitutional petitionNatural justiceMisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the possession of a "Miner Book" at the Khewra Salt Mines, which functioned as a permit for employment. The appellant challenged an order by the Manager of the Salt Mines that re-allotted a Miner Book to the respondent, contending that the order was passed ex parte without notice and that a prior administrative decision had attained finality. The High Court dismissed the appellant's constitutional petition, citing the appellant's conduct and the lack of necessity for a formal show-cause notice given the public nature of the inquiry. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the High Court had misread the evidence regarding the appellant's medical incapacitation. However, the Court held that the appeal must fail on broader grounds. Relying on the precedent established in The Chairman, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Dacca and another v. Rustam Ali and another, the Court determined that the appellant, as an employee of the West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, could not invoke the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable against the West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation by its employees?
  • Does a misreading of evidence by the High Court automatically entitle an appellant to relief if the underlying petition is not maintainable?
  • Can an administrative order be challenged in writ jurisdiction if the petitioner is an employee of a statutory corporation not subject to constitutional guarantees?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Abdur Rahman and Other1977 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-02-13
  compensation to victimmandatory dutycriminal procedureenhancement of sentencefine recoverygrievous injury
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the sentencing of respondents convicted of attempted murder and being armed with deadly weapons. The core legal question was whether the High Court failed to comply with the mandatory statutory requirements of Sections 544-A and 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by not awarding compensation to the appellant, who suffered grievous physical and mental injuries, including the loss of sight and speech, out of the fine imposed on the respondents. The Supreme Court held that Section 544-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, imposes a mandatory duty on the court to award compensation to the victim unless reasons for not doing so are recorded. The Court emphasized that the purpose of this provision is to alleviate the suffering of the injured and act as a deterrent against violent crime. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and directed that a portion of the fine imposed on the respondents be paid to the appellant as compensation for his injuries.

  Questions settled

  • Is the duty to award compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory for the court?
  • Can the appellate court direct that a fine imposed on a convict be paid to the victim as compensation?
  • Does the failure of a trial court to award compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a legal error that can be rectified on appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Daurez vs The State1977 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-11-23
  criminal appealdouble murderhostile witnessesocular evidenceballistic evidencedeath sentencecommutation of sentencecorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the double murder of Muhammad Azeem and Ghulam Hussain, and for a murderous assault on Ghulam Abbas. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in rejecting the testimony of two hostile witnesses—the deceased’s wife and son—who attempted to exonerate the appellant, and whether the prosecution’s ocular evidence, corroborated by forensic ballistic reports and physical evidence, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions and sentences. The Court held that testimony from witnesses who are closely related to the accused and have been won over by the family can be rejected, particularly when contradicted by independent, natural witnesses and forensic evidence. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that minor, trifling contradictions in ocular testimony do not invalidate the evidence of otherwise trustworthy witnesses. Finally, the Court ruled that the time taken in the finalization of a capital case, unless extraordinary or inordinate, does not automatically justify commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment in cases of cold-blooded murder.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of witnesses who are closely related to the accused and have been won over by the family be rejected by the court?
  • Does the presence of minor or trifling contradictions in the statements of eye-witnesses invalidate their entire testimony?
  • Does the delay in the finalization of a capital case automatically justify the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the evidence of a single, disinterested, and natural witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashiq vs Muhammad Tufail and Another1977 SCMR 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-13
  post-arrest bailcommon intentionmurderbail cancellationcriminal conspiracyovert act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal converted into an appeal, challenging the order of the High Court granting post-arrest bail to respondent No. 1, who was accused under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether the High Court was justified in granting bail by holding that the applicability of common intention required further enquiry because the victims were allegedly not the intended targets. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to properly consider the provisions of Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in light of the specific allegations—namely that the respondent was present, armed with a pistol, raised a lalkara, and fled with co-accused after fatal shots were fired. The Court ruled that a prima facie case existed and the High Court exercised its discretion on wrong grounds. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, allowed the appeal, and directed the respondent to surrender to his bail bond, laying down the principle that constructive liability under Section 34 must be duly weighed when evaluating bail in heinous offences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in granting bail by holding that common intention required further enquiry because the victims were allegedly not the intended targets?
  • Does the presence of an accused armed with a weapon who raised a lalkara constitute a prima facie case under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the purpose of bail?
  • Can an order granting bail be set aside when the High Court exercises its discretion on wrong grounds regarding constructive liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram and 3 Others vs The State1977 SCMR 433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-06-06
  criminal appealmurdereyewitness testimonymedical evidenceappreciation of evidencecorroborationcriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentence of transportation for life for murder, recorded by the trial court and upheld by the Lahore High Court. The prosecution alleged that the appellants murdered the deceased due to a suspected illicit liaison. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether it was safe to rely on the solitary testimony of a related and partisan witness, especially when allegedly contradicted by medical evidence regarding the time of the occurrence and the contents of the deceased's stomach and bladder. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the ocular testimony of the primary witness was natural, corroborated by other independent witnesses whose evidence had been wrongly discarded on conjectures, and supported by incriminating recoveries of weapons stained with human blood. The Court laid down the principle that reliable and natural eyewitness testimony should not be discarded on mere speculation or minor discrepancies concerning medical evidence or stomach and bladder contents.

  Questions settled

  • Can reliable eyewitness testimony be discarded solely on the basis of speculation regarding medical evidence and stomach or bladder contents?
  • Whether the evidence of independent witnesses can be rejected on minor discrepancies concerning the reason for their presence at the spot?
  • Does the presence of a related witness render their ocular account inherently untrustworthy without proof of enmity or motive to falsely implicate?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abbas vs The State1977 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-08-12
  Review PetitionProsecution SanctionPublic ServantAnti-CorruptionCognizanceConflict of Opinion
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking reconsideration of an order dated 25th January 1974, which had dismissed a petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question concerned whether the Special Judge-cum-Enquiry Officer, Anti-Corruption, could take cognizance of an offence under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, without proper prosecution sanction. The Court had previously held, relying on precedent, that the statutory bar to prosecution without sanction applied only to individuals who were public servants at the time the court took cognizance, rather than at the time of the commission of the offence. However, noting a conflict of judicial opinion in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court on this exact question, the Court directed that the review petition be heard alongside other pending appeals raising the same issue to resolve the conflict.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the statutory bar requiring sanction for the prosecution of a public servant applies only to persons who are public servants at the time the court takes cognizance of the offence.
  • Can a court take cognizance of an offence under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 without proper sanction if the accused has ceased to be a public servant at the time of cognizance?
  • How should the Supreme Court proceed when there is a conflict of opinion within its own decisions on a material question of law in a review petition?
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• Mst. Umar Bibi and 3 Others vs Bashir Ahmad and 3 Other1977 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-11-24
  majority awardumpire appointmentoral giftMuslim Law giftColonization of Government Lands Actproprietary rightsmalikanaarbitration
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a dispute concerning 200 Kanals of land originally held by a deceased tenant under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912. The appellants, being the deceased Muslim Law heirs, challenged a majority arbitration award that was made a rule of the court upholding an oral gift made by the deceased in favour of his nephews. The core legal issues raised were whether the appointment of an umpire upon joint request of the parties was valid, whether the majority award was vitiated by the umpire's participation from the outset, whether the transaction violated Section 19 of the 1912 Act, and whether Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 invalidated the unregistered/oral gift.

  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the majority award signed by two arbitrators and the umpire was valid under Section 10(3) of the Arbitration Act 1940. Furthermore, because the donor paid the full malikana and acquired complete proprietary rights prior to his death, Section 19 of the 1912 Act no longer barred the transfer. Lastly, Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 expressly excludes gifts under Muslim Law from Section 123, thereby validating an oral gift where delivery and acceptance of possession are established.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 exempt oral gifts made by Muslims from the registration requirements of Section 123 of the same Act?
  • Does the prohibition against transfer under Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 apply to a gift made after the tenant acquires full proprietary rights by paying malikana?
  • Can an arbitration award signed by a majority of arbitrators including the umpire prevail under Section 10(3) of the Arbitration Act 1940 where an arbitration agreement provides for more than three arbitrators?
  • Is an umpire empowered to participate in arbitration proceedings from the beginning if the arbitration agreement expressly permits such participation?
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• Mst. Shamimakhtar vs Najma Baqai and 3 Other1977 SCMR 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-07-23
  arbitration agreementstamp dutyinstrumentestoppelarbitration awardcivil court jurisdictionStamp Act 1899
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the estate of a deceased person, which was referred to arbitration. The trial court made the umpire's award a rule of the court, but the High Court reversed this, holding the arbitration agreement invalid for lack of proper stamping and lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether correspondence between the parties constituted a valid arbitration agreement and if it required stamp duty. The Court held that the correspondence clearly evidenced the parties' intent to arbitrate, satisfying the requirements for a written arbitration agreement. Crucially, the Court ruled that such correspondence did not constitute an instrument requiring stamp duty under the Stamp Act 1899, as stamp duty applies to the instrument recording the bargain, not the underlying transaction. Furthermore, the Court found that respondents who had accepted benefits under the award were estopped from challenging its validity. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the trial court's decision, affirming the enforceability of the arbitration award.

  Questions settled

  • Does an arbitration agreement require a formal signed deed to be legally valid?
  • Is correspondence between parties sufficient to constitute a written arbitration agreement?
  • Does an arbitration agreement formed through correspondence require stamp duty under the Stamp Act 1899?
  • Are parties who have accepted benefits under an arbitration award estopped from challenging its validity?
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• Mst. Shamim Akhtar vs Mst. Ashraf Begum Alias Ashraf Bai1977 SCMR 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-12-15
  evacuee propertystatutory tenancyejectmentrent defaultstatutory noticeDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a High Court judgment confirming the ejectment of the appellant from an evacuee property transferred to the respondent. The respondent sought ejectment on grounds of default in rent payment, sub-letting, and personal bona fide use. The appellant contested the ejectment, primarily arguing the lack of a statutory notice required under the relevant settlement law. The Rent Controller found the appellant liable for ejectment due to rent default, a finding upheld by the District Judge and the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the rule laid down in the majority decision of Evans' case regarding the necessity of statutory notice applied to the instant case, thereby precluding ejectment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to demonstrate possession of the premises prior to 20 December 1958, a prerequisite for claiming the privileges of a statutory tenant under the governing legislation. Consequently, the Court affirmed the ejectment order, establishing that the protections of statutory tenancy are contingent upon proving possession before the specified cut-off date.

  Questions settled

  • Is a tenant entitled to the protections of a statutory tenant under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 without proving possession prior to 20 December 1958?
  • Does the failure to issue a statutory notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 automatically invalidate ejectment proceedings if the tenant does not qualify as a statutory tenant?
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• Mst. Shahzad Bibi vs The State1977 SCMR 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-06-14
  habeas corpusminor custodynatural guardianguardianship courtcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order passed by the Lahore High Court in proceedings under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regarding the custody of minor children. The core legal question was whether the High Court was competent, within the scope of habeas corpus proceedings, to deprive the mother, who was the natural guardian, of the custody of her minor children and place them in a Darul Aman pending a Guardian Judge's decision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that where serious allegations exist against the natural guardian regarding the welfare and potential harmful disposal of the minors, the proper course is for the claimant to approach the Guardian Judge for custody adjudication. The Court established that summary habeas proceedings under section 491 are not the appropriate forum to resolve disputed questions of guardianship and minor welfare when serious allegations necessitate a thorough investigation by the competent Guardianship Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is competent to deprive a natural guardian of the custody of minor children?
  • Is a habeas corpus petition under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 the appropriate forum to decide disputed questions of minor custody involving serious allegations against the guardian?
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• Mst. Rehman Begum vs Mst. Mahmoodi Begum and Other1977 SC M R314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-06-02
  allotment of landsettlement disputewrit petitionerror on the face of recordremand orderimpleadment of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the allotment of agricultural land measuring 91 kanals and 11 marlas in Tehsil Chunian, District Lahore. The appellant, Mst. Rehman Begum, claimed the land based on her mother's inheritance, while other parties, including sitting allottee Mst. Mehmoodi Begum, asserted competing claims. The Chief Settlement Commissioner eventually declared Mehmoodi Begum as the senior allottee with preferential rights. The appellant challenged the proceedings in a writ petition. Although the High Court formally impleaded Mehmoodi Begum as a co-respondent, the High Court's final judgment erroneously observed that Mehmoodi Begum was not a party and that her allotment remained unaffected, while remanding the rest of the case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan noted this factual error on the face of the record. With the respondents' counsel conceding that Mehmoodi Begum was indeed a party and that the remand order should operate against all claimants, the Supreme Court corrected the error, ensuring the remand order applied to all parties for a fresh determination of their respective claims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court's judgment remanding a case can exclude a party from its operation based on a factually incorrect assumption that the party was not impleaded?
  • Can an error apparent on the face of the record regarding the impleadment of a necessary party be corrected by the Supreme Court to ensure a comprehensive remand?
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• Mst. Iffat Sultana vs Altaf Ur Rahman1977 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-10-06
  guardianshipcustody of minortransfer of proceedingsjurisdictioninterim injunctionfinality of judicial ordersGuardians and Wards Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a custody dispute under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. The respondent filed for custody in Karachi, but the Chief Justice of the West Pakistan High Court ordered the proceedings transferred to the District Court, Lahore. Despite this final transfer order, the Karachi Civil Judge proceeded to adjudicate the matter and granted custody to the respondent. The appellant challenged this in the Sind & Baluchistan High Court, where an initial stay was discharged. The core legal question was whether the Karachi courts retained jurisdiction after the final transfer order. The Supreme Court held that the transfer order of the West Pakistan High Court was final and binding, thereby divesting the Karachi courts of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order discharging the interim injunction and directed that no further custody orders be issued until the appellant's pending appeal is resolved. The principle established is that a final judicial order transferring a case between jurisdictions must be respected, and subsequent proceedings conducted in defiance of such an order are void and without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a final order transferring a case from one court to another divest the original court of jurisdiction?
  • Can a court proceed with a case after a superior court has ordered its transfer to another jurisdiction?
  • Is an order discharging an interim injunction sustainable when the underlying jurisdictional basis of the trial court is challenged?
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• Mst. Ghafooran vs Muhammad Bashir And Other1977 SCMR 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-03-29
  transfer of propertysettlement lawsletters patent appealrehabilitation commissionerproperty division
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal concerning the transfer of a disputed house in Mandi Bahauddin under settlement laws. The core legal question involved the interpretation of a Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner's order dividing the property and whether the High Court correctly construed the extent of transfer based on the text of the order rather than missing visual markings on a photograph. The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench correctly interpreted the text of the order to ascertain the true intention of the transfer, as the underlying photograph bearing demarcation lines was unauthenticated and unsigned. The Court laid down the principle that in construing administrative or quasi-judicial property transfer orders, unambiguous textual intent prevails over missing or unauthenticated visual exhibits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can rely on the text of a settlement order when the underlying documentary photograph is missing and unauthenticated?
  • Does the text of a quasi-judicial transfer order prevail over unsigned graphical demarcations?
  • How should conflicting property numbers and divisions in settlement proceedings be resolved by courts?
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• MR. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto vs The State and Another1977 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-23
  special leave to appealtransfer of criminal casequo warrantojudicial biasconstitutional petitionacting chief justicebail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging the constitutional validity of the Lahore High Court's composition, the appointment and authority of its Acting Chief Justice, administrative orders transferring a criminal challan case and a private complaint to a Full Bench, and allegations of bias. The petitioner contended that the Acting Chief Justice's appointment was invalid, that holding the office of Chief Election Commissioner created a constitutional bar, that the transfer of the case without notice violated section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that the Acting Chief Justice was biased. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that questions regarding the validity of the High Court's constitution and the capacity of the judges should be raised before the Full Bench in the first instance or through appropriate quo warranto proceedings rather than direct appeal, that the High Court possesses powers under section 526(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to transfer cases on its own initiative without prior notice, and that objections regarding judicial bias must first be raised before the judge concerned. The Court established that appellate jurisdiction cannot be invoked prematurely before the High Court has addressed these preliminary challenges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether questions regarding the constitutional validity of a High Court's bench can be raised directly in a petition for special leave to appeal under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 without being agitated before the High Court in the first instance?
  • Does the High Court have the power under section 526(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to transfer a criminal case on its own initiative without issuing prior notice to the accused person?
  • Must allegations of bias against a judge be raised before the judge concerned in the first instance rather than directly before the Supreme Court?
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