Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Bashir Ahmad and Another vs The State1971 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-25
  self-defenceprivate defenceculpable homicidemurderballistic expertcorroborationinjured witnessescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellants, Bashir Ahmad and Noori, under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder and attempted murder, which had been upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the plea of self-defence raised by the appellants was reasonably possible and sustainable based on the evidence, and whether the appellants exceeded any right of private defence. The Supreme Court held that the plea of self-defence was rightly rejected by the lower courts, as the site plans, medical evidence showing close-range gunshots with burnt and black margins, and the absence of injuries on the appellants rendered the defence version improbable. However, considering the totality of circumstances and corroborative ballistic evidence, the Court altered the conviction under section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code, while maintaining the sentence of transportation for life. The key principle laid down is that a plea of self-defence must be evaluated by juxtaposing prosecution and defence allegations against proved facts and circumstances, and close-range firing without injuries to the accused negates such a plea.

  Questions settled

  • How is a plea of self-defence to be evaluated by a court against the background of proved facts and circumstances?
  • Does medical evidence showing close-range firearm injuries with burnt and black margins negative a plea of self-defence?
  • Whether the absence of injuries on the accused persons affects the sustainability of a plea of self-defence?
  • When does an offence of murder convert to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• Barkat Ali and Others vs Mst. Fazal Bibi and 2 Other1971 SCMR 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-24
  mutationfraudnext friendunsound mindconcurrent findings of factprocedural irregularitycivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil suit challenging a land mutation on grounds of fraud, collusion with revenue staff, and lack of consideration. The respondents alleged that the mutation was fictitious and that one respondent, being deaf and dumb, could not have consented to the sale. While the trial court dismissed the suit, the Additional District Judge reversed this decision, and the High Court dismissed the petitioners' appeal in limine. The core legal questions were whether the appeal before the Additional District Judge was incompetent due to the failure to appoint a next friend for a deaf and dumb respondent, and whether the respondents were precluded from relief because the specific type of fraud proved at trial differed from that pleaded. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was competent, as deafness and dumbness do not equate to unsoundness of mind under the law, and the fraud proved was consistent with the allegations. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of fact regarding the fraudulent nature of the mutation and dismissed the petition, establishing that procedural irregularities causing no prejudice do not invalidate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere fact that a party is deaf and dumb necessitate the appointment of a next friend under Order XXXII Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party succeed in a claim of fraud if the specific evidence presented at trial varies slightly from the initial pleadings?
  • Does a procedural irregularity that causes no prejudice to the opposing party invalidate an appellate proceeding?
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• Bakhat Jamal vs The State1971 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-07
  murderdying declarationcriminal appealdeath sentenceretracted confessioncorroborationappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted by the trial court for the murder of his wife and sentenced to death, a conviction later upheld by the High Court. The appellant challenged this on appeal, questioning whether his retracted version was corroborated by evidence and if the death sentence was legally appropriate. The Supreme Court examined the dying declaration of the deceased, which explicitly charged the appellant with shooting her, and found it consistent with the medical evidence and the circumstances of the occurrence. The Court rejected the appellant’s defense that the gun discharged accidentally during a struggle with his brothers-in-law, noting that physical evidence—specifically the firing of two distinct shots at different locations—rendered his account impossible. Consequently, the Court held that the dying declaration, supported by the surrounding facts and the impossibility of the defense's narrative, provided sufficient proof of guilt. The conviction and the death sentence were maintained, as the evidence conclusively established the appellant's culpability for the murder, dismissing the appeal in its entirety.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration sufficient to sustain a conviction when corroborated by surrounding circumstances?
  • Can a defense of accidental discharge be sustained when physical evidence of multiple shots contradicts the narrative?
  • Does the presence of a dying declaration, when consistent with medical evidence, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Badsha Khan vs The State1971 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-20
  bail pending appealappeal against acquittalnon-bailable warrantsmurdercriminal procedureSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for bail filed by the petitioner, Badsha Khan, who had been acquitted of murder by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi, but whose acquittal became the subject of an appeal filed by the State under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the High Court. Upon admitting the appeal, the High Court issued non-bailable warrants for the petitioner's arrest. The petitioner subsequently sought bail from the High Court, which was rejected both on the ground that the earlier arrest warrant order barred reconsideration and on the merits of the case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in refusing bail pending the State's appeal against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the refusal of bail was justified given the prompt reporting of the crime, the specific attribution of fatal knife blows to the petitioner in the First Information Report, and the presence of named eye-witnesses without apparent motive for false implication. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order issuing non-bailable warrants upon the admission of an appeal against acquittal bars a subsequent application for bail?
  • Is bail to be granted during the pendency of an appeal against acquittal when the accused is implicated in the First Information Report with fatal blows supported by eye-witness testimony?
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• Azizul Hamid vs Masood Qureshi and Another1971 SCMR 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-04
  undertaking to courtapprobate and reprobatesearch warrantscriminal revisionpublic policycriminal breach of trustresiling from undertaking
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court rejecting a reference under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. A dispute between the petitioner (a film distribution agent) and the respondents (film producers) led to a civil suit for rendition of accounts and subsequent criminal proceedings under Sections 406 and 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 against the petitioner. Pursuant to search warrants issued under Sections 94 and 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, film prints were seized. The petitioner applied before the Magistrate offering an undertaking to produce the remaining prints in court to stop execution of further search warrants. Upon the Magistrate directing production pursuant to this undertaking, the petitioner sought revision. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's rejection of the reference, holding that a party cannot approbate and reprobate in the same breath. Having given a clear undertaking that prevented search warrants from being pursued, the petitioner was precluded by public policy and fairness from resiling therefrom.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who gives an undertaking to court to avoid the execution of search warrants subsequently resile from that undertaking on the ground that the search warrants were illegal?
  • Whether a revision under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 lies against an order passed pursuant to a party's voluntary undertaking?
  • Does the principle of approbate and reprobate apply to bar a litigant from challenging an order passed in accordance with their own express undertaking?
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• Ayub Ali vs The State1971 SCMR 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-17
  theftpossession of stolen propertyburden of prooflimitationspecial leave petitioncriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the concurrent findings of the lower courts convicting the petitioner under Section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the theft of a bicycle and sentencing him to two years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions involved the propriety of placing the onus of proof on the accused when found in possession of stolen property, and the sufficiency of the explanation for a delay in filing the petition. The Supreme Court held that the onus was rightly placed upon the petitioner under Section 114, illustration 'a' of the Evidence Act, and that the explanation offered for the delay was unsatisfactory and unsupported by evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed both on merits and as being barred by limitation. The key principle laid down is that a person found in possession of recently stolen property must satisfactorily account for such possession under the Evidence Act, and insufficient or unverified explanations regarding delay in filing petitions will not condone limitation periods.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the onus to account for possession of a stolen bicycle is rightly placed upon the accused caught red-handed under the Evidence Act?
  • Does an unverified claim of a transport strike and delayed letters constitute sufficient ground to condone delay in filing a petition for special leave?
  • Whether a conviction under Section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code is sustainable when the accused claims a mistaken belief of ownership regarding a stolen cycle?
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• Ayezuddin Ahvad vs The Controlling Authority and Sub Divisional1971 SCMR 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-30
  special leave to appealno-confidence motiondisqualification of membersElectoral College ActBasic Democracies Orderautomatic cesser of office
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Chairman of the Nimagachi Union Council to challenge the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court of East Pakistan regarding a no-confidence resolution passed against him. The core legal question was whether members of the Union Council who voted in the no-confidence resolution had automatically ceased to be members due to alleged disqualification under the Electoral College Act without a formal inquiry and notification. The Supreme Court held that there is no automatic cesser of office, and a member continues to hold office until a formal notification is issued following the prescribed statutory inquiry procedure. Furthermore, under the Basic Democracies Order, a local council member must be removed through prescribed procedures. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a member of an electoral college automatically cease to be a member upon incurring a disqualification under section 53(3) of the Electoral College Act?
  • Is a notification by the Commissioner required to effect the cesser of office of a disqualified member under the Electoral College Act?
  • Can a new point not urged before the High Court be allowed to be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court without proper averment?
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• Atta Muhammad Qureshi vs The Settlement Commissioner, Lahore1971 PLD Supreme Court 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-28
  settlement lawproperty transferconverted usenatural justiceshow-cause noticerevisional powersmandatory provisionvoid orderdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned the cancellation of a property transfer to a claimant displaced person. The appellant had initially secured transfer of a property as a house from the Deputy Settlement Commissioner based on its converted use, despite its original classification as a shop. Subsequently, the Additional Settlement Commissioner and Settlement Commissioner reversed this transfer, deeming it an illegal multiple transfer of shops and interpreting the 'converted use' provisions differently. The Supreme Court held that the 'converted use' of a property under the relevant Press Note and Settlement Scheme was to be determined by its actual use on 20th December 1958, irrespective of its original structure or locale. The Court further ruled that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had the ordinary power to effect such transfers. Crucially, the Court found the Additional Settlement Commissioner's order of cancellation to be a nullity, as it was passed without affording the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, in violation of the mandatory Section 20(5) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appeal was allowed, and the original transfer order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'converted use' of a property for transfer under settlement laws depend on its structural alteration or its actual use on 20th December 1958?
  • Can a Deputy Settlement Commissioner transfer property based on its converted use under the Chief Settlement Commissioner's Press Note?
  • Is an order passed by an Additional Settlement Commissioner under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, revising a previous order without giving the affected person a reasonable opportunity of being heard, a nullity?
  • Does a subsequent opportunity of being heard in a higher forum cure the defect of a mandatory statutory requirement for a show-cause notice not being met at an earlier stage?
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• Asif Ali vs The State1971 PLD Supreme Court 223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-29
  criminal appealadjournmentright to be heardcounsel withdrawalappellate procedureCode of Criminal Procedurejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 326, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, after the High Court dismissed his appeal in the absence of both the appellant and his counsel. The core legal question was whether the High Court judge acted illegally by proceeding to judgment after refusing an adjournment request, which led the appellant's counsel to withdraw. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the dismissal was neither illegal nor unjustifiable. The Court held that while counsel are entitled to professional consideration, they cannot dictate the court's schedule or control proceedings to suit their personal convenience. The judiciary retains the inherent power to regulate its docket and confine proceedings to relevant limits. The principle established is that where an appellant is absent and their counsel withdraws following a refused adjournment, the appellate court is not precluded from deciding the appeal on the merits based on the available record, provided the requirements of Section 423, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regarding the perusal of the record and opportunity for hearing, have been satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Does the refusal of an adjournment request by an appellate court, leading to the withdrawal of counsel, constitute a denial of the right to be heard?
  • Can an appellate court decide a criminal appeal on the merits when the appellant is absent and their counsel has withdrawn?
  • Does the term 'if he appears' in Section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandate the personal presence of the appellant for the disposal of an appeal?
  • To what extent can counsel control the scheduling and proceedings of a court?
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• Ashfaq-Ur-Rehman Khan., Majid & Co., Lahore vs Ch. Muhammad Afzal and Another., Ch. Muhammad Afzal and Another1971 PLD Supreme Court 766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-28
  ejectmentrent duestatute of limitationtime-barred rentdeposit of rentinterlocutory orderpendente lite rent
  Summary & questions settled

  These two appeals by special leave arose from ejectment proceedings under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. In a prior round of litigation, the Supreme Court ruled that time-barred rent prior to the filing of ejectment applications could not be ordered to be deposited under Section 13(6). On remand, the Rent Controller ordered the tenants to deposit arrears for three years prior to the filing date as well as rent that accumulated during the decade-long pendency of the proceedings. The tenants challenged the order, contending that rent falling due after the filing of ejectment applications, but more than three years prior to the Rent Controller's subsequent remand order, was time-barred.

  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. The Court held that an order under Section 13(6) directing deposit of future monthly rent is interlocutory in nature and remains operative until final determination. Because the tenants admitted to depositing monthly rent under the original operative order, or were otherwise in default of it, no part of the rent accumulating during the pendency of ejectment proceedings could be deemed barred by limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Is rent that accumulates during the pendency of ejectment proceedings subject to the statute of limitation under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does an interlocutory order of a Rent Controller directing the deposit of future monthly rent under Section 13(6) remain operative until the final disposal of ejectment proceedings?
  • Can a tenant plead limitation regarding rent accumulating during the pendency of ejectment applications when an earlier direction to deposit monthly rent remains in force?
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• Asghar vs The State1971 SCMR 703 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  review petitionerror apparent on face of recordgrave and sudden provocationself-defencefrivolous petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed against the Supreme Court's order dismissing Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 111 of 1970. The petitioner's counsel argued that the courts, including the Supreme Court, had misjudged the petitioner's defense as one of self-defense rather than grave and sudden provocation. The core legal question was whether a review could be granted on the basis of a newly introduced plea of grave and sudden provocation that was never originally contemplated by the petitioner. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the contention was entirely misconceived and imaginatively introduced by counsel for the first time. The Court reaffirmed the principle that a review petition cannot be entertained where no error apparent on the face of the record is disclosed, and warned counsel against filing frivolous review petitions without merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be granted based on a new plea raised for the first time by counsel?
  • What constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of reviewing a Supreme Court judgment?
  • Whether a review lies when no error of law or fact is disclosed in the original judgment?
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• Asadullah vs Muhammad Ali and 5 Others1971 PLD Supreme Court 541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-04
  murderacquittal appealocular evidencecorroborative evidencedeath penaltyexpectation of lifemiscarriage of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that acquitted five respondents of murder and related charges, overturning their conviction by the trial court. The core legal questions concern whether the High Court erred in disregarding ocular testimony and incriminating recoveries, and whether the death penalty should be restored upon reversing an acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misapplied the law by isolating ocular evidence from corroborative evidence, specifically ignoring incriminating recoveries of blood-stained weapons and clothing that confirmed the accused's guilt. The Court affirmed that corroborative evidence must be read alongside ocular testimony to test its veracity, not in isolation. Consequently, the acquittal was set aside, and the convictions were restored. Regarding sentencing, the Court established that while the 'doctrine of expectation of life' may mitigate sentences in cases of inordinate delay, it does not preclude the imposition of the death penalty where a patently erroneous acquittal has caused a miscarriage of justice in a brutal, cold-blooded murder case. The principal offender was sentenced to death, while the others received life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Should ocular evidence be appraised in isolation from corroborative evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Does an acquittal by a subordinate court create an absolute bar against the imposition of the death penalty by an appellate court?
  • Under what circumstances does the doctrine of expectation of life apply to sentencing in an appeal against acquittal?
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• Allahbanda and Another vs Haji Akhiauddin and Another1971 SCMR 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-10
  quashment of proceedingsabuse of processsuccessive applicationscriminal complainttransfer of casepolice protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed a second application for the quashment of criminal proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioners, facing a complaint under Sections 419 and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, had previously sought quashment, which was not pressed, and a transfer of the case, which was granted. Subsequently, they filed a second application for quashment, which the High Court dismissed, holding it lacked competence to review the previous order. The core legal question was whether a second application for quashment under Section 561-A could be maintained without fresh material. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that repeated applications for quashment without new evidence constitute an abuse of the process of the court. The Court further observed that allegations of danger to the petitioners' lives upon attending court in another district should be addressed by seeking police protection rather than through repeated transfer applications. The principle established is that successive applications for quashment under Section 561-A, Cr. P. C. are not maintainable absent fresh material.

  Questions settled

  • Can a second application for quashment of proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be maintained without the introduction of fresh material?
  • Does the filing of repeated applications for quashment without new evidence constitute an abuse of the process of the court?
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• Allah Bakhsh vs Ahmad Din and 2 Other1971 SCMR 462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-03
  murderacquittal appealappreciation of evidenceocular testimonyminor discrepanciesblood-stained weaponsmedical corroborationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court acquitting the respondents who had been convicted and sentenced to death under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of a village official. The core legal question was whether the High Court misappreciated the ocular testimony and improperly discarded the evidence of eye-witnesses based on minor inconsistencies and misconceptions regarding medical corroboration and the timing of witnesses' arrival. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence, overlooked well-established principles governing criminal appeals against conviction, and misconstrued minor discrepancies as fatal flaws. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that minor inconsistencies are normal in human testimony and that the recovery of blood-stained weapons is relevant corroborative evidence even if the human origin of the blood cannot be conclusively determined by a serologist due to disintegration. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the acquittal was set aside, and the respondents were convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, with their sentences modified to transportation for life considering the passage of time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor inconsistencies in the statements of eye-witnesses are sufficient to discredit their otherwise independent and trustworthy testimony?
  • Does the failure to ascertain the human origin of blood on a recovered weapon render the recovery entirely useless as corroborative evidence?
  • What are the established principles governing the review of criminal proceedings and the reversal of an acquittal by an appellate court?
  • Is medical evidence required to be in absolute verbatim conformity with ocular testimony to sustain a conviction for murder?
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• Ali Asghar vs The State1971 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-09
  capital sentencemurdermitigating circumstancescommutation of sentencespouse murdertransportation for lifesudden provocation
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Ali Asghar, was convicted of the murder of his wife and sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge, Hazara, which sentence was confirmed by the Peshawar High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the appropriateness of the death sentence. The evidence showed the appellant beat his wife with a club over domestic grievances, resulting in death from cumulative shock of multiple blunt weapon injuries. The defense raised contentions regarding the appellant's mental state. Upon review of the circumstances, the Supreme Court noted mitigating factors: the deceased's provocative nature, the absence of individually fatal or grievous injuries, the cumulative cause of death, the lack of premeditation using a handy stick at the spur of the moment, and the existence of minor children who would be orphaned by the execution. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the capital sentence should be commuted. The Court ruled that where multiple non-fatal injuries cumulatively cause death without premeditation and under sudden provocation from a quarrelsome spouse, transportation for life is the appropriate sentence rather than death.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cumulative effect of non-fatal injuries caused without premeditation constitutes a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence?
  • Is a sentence of transportation for life more appropriate than death when a murder is committed at the spur of the moment over domestic grievances?
  • Does the presence of minor children who have lost their mother serve as a mitigating factor in considering the commutation of a capital sentence for a father?
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• Al-Haj Abdur Rab vs Mobarakullah and Another1971 PLD Supreme Court 857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-19
  commitment proceedingsquashmentprocedural irregularitySection 211 CrPCprejudice to accusedcriminal trialmandatory provisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for the quashment of a commitment order, challenging a Magistrate's failure to comply with Section 211 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate's failure to ask the accused for a list of defense witnesses after framing charges constitutes an illegality that automatically vitiates the commitment proceedings. The Supreme Court held that while the duty imposed by Section 211 is mandatory, non-compliance does not inherently vitiate the proceedings as an illegality. Instead, it is a procedural irregularity curable under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused. The Court established the principle that procedural lapses in commitment proceedings do not necessitate quashment unless the accused demonstrates actual prejudice. Finding that the appellant had been afforded opportunities to present a defense and had claimed to be tried, the Court concluded that the procedural error did not warrant interference and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a Magistrate to comply with the provisions of Section 211 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically vitiate commitment proceedings?
  • Is the non-compliance with Section 211 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 an illegality or a curable irregularity?
  • Must an accused demonstrate actual prejudice to obtain the quashment of commitment proceedings based on a procedural lapse?
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• Akbar Ali vs Julian H. Dinshaw and 2 Other1971 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-18
  quashing of criminal proceedingscivil nature of disputepartnership propertymisappropriationabuse of processcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which had quashed criminal proceedings initiated by the petitioner against the respondents. The dispute arose from allegations of misappropriation and fraudulent sale of partnership property, specifically a trawler, during the pendency of arbitration proceedings regarding partnership accounts. The core legal question was whether the dispute, which essentially concerned partnership accounts and property disposal, constituted a criminal offence or was merely a civil dispute. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the allegations did not disclose a criminal offence and that the dispute was civil in nature. The Court affirmed that criminal courts should not be used to harass parties in matters that are essentially civil, particularly when the property in question was accounted for in the firm's books. The principle laid down is that where a dispute over partnership property and accounts is civil in nature, criminal proceedings are an abuse of process and should be quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed when the underlying dispute is essentially of a civil nature?
  • Does the sale of partnership property by partners during pending arbitration necessarily constitute a criminal offence?
  • Is it appropriate for the High Court to consider documents and accounts to determine if a criminal complaint discloses a cognizable offence?
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• Ahmad Nawaz vs The State1971 P Cr. L J 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-15
  murderright of private defenceself-defenceaggressorbenefit of the doubtsudden fightcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Ahmad Nawaz, for murder under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court and High Court partially accepted the defence version that the complainant party were the aggressors who ambushed the accused and initiated the assault, causing injuries to the appellant's companion, Bakhsha. However, the High Court sustained the conviction on the ground that the fatal shot struck the deceased from behind while retreating, negating the right of private defence. The core legal question is whether the right of private defence of person is vitiated when defensive firing results in an injury to an assailant from behind during a sudden, concerted attack by an aggressive party. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts misapplied the law by compartmentalizing actions taken in the heat of a sudden, concerted assault, and that the appellant was fully entitled to the right of self-defence. The appeal was accepted, giving the appellant the benefit of the doubt, resulting in his acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence is lost when a fatal injury is inflicted on an assailant from behind during a sudden, concerted attack?
  • Does the acceptance of the defence version regarding the origin of aggression warrant a full consideration of the plea of self-defence for all ensuing acts?
  • Is an accused disentitled to the right of self-defence merely because the retaliatory firing caused harm to an assailant who was not facing the accused at the exact moment of the shot?
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• Ahmad Din vs Muhammad Shafi and Others1971 PLD Supreme Court 762 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-06
  rehabilitation authoritiesinheritance of refugeesjurisdiction of civil courtsmutation of inheritancelimitation perioddeclaratory suitconsequential relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a civil suit filed by the appellant for a declaration that he was the sole heir of a deceased refugee, Allah Bakhsh, and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with his possession. The mutation of inheritance had originally been attested in 1953 under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme, allotting shares to various claimants. Years later, the appellant filed an appeal against the mutation and subsequently instituted a declaratory suit. The trial court dismissed the suit as time-barred and barred by jurisdiction, but the first appellate court remanded the matter. The High Court reversed this decision, holding the suit to be not maintainable, barred by civil court jurisdiction, and time-barred. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Rehabilitation Authorities possess exclusive jurisdiction to decide questions of inheritance relating to refugee right-holders under the relevant rehabilitation laws, thereby barring the jurisdiction of civil courts. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the declaratory suit filed nearly nine years after the mutation order was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory suit challenging the inheritance mutation of a deceased refugee right-holder?
  • Do rehabilitation authorities possess exclusive jurisdiction to decide questions of inheritance regarding refugees under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme?
  • Whether the time spent in prosecuting a time-barred appeal against a mutation order can be excluded in computing the period of limitation for a civil suit under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• Ahmad and 3 Others vs The State1971 PLD Supreme Court 720 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-23
  private defencejoint liabilitycommon intentionculpable homicidegrievous hurtland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute over land possession where the appellants, armed with hatchets and lathis, assaulted the complainant party, resulting in one death and multiple injuries. The trial court convicted the appellants under Section 304 Part I read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which the High Court maintained on the ground that the appellants exceeded their right of private defence of property. The Supreme Court examined whether joint liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 could be attracted for the fatal injury when the right of private defence was exceeded. The Court observed that the right of self-defence is subject to Section 99 and is negatived if the harm caused is disproportionate. Finding that the appellants acted out of spite rather than self-defence, but lacked the intention to kill as they used only blunt weapons on the deceased, the Court held that they shared a common intention to cause grievous hurt. Consequently, the Court altered the convictions from Section 304 Part I to Section 325 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a case falls under Part I or Part II of Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when there is no intention to cause death but knowledge of the likelihood of death exists?
  • Can the principle of joint liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be applied to make all accused liable for a single fatal injury when they act in concert to cause grievous hurt?
  • What are the limitations on the exercise of the right of private defence of body or property under Section 99 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Advocate-General, Government of East Pakistan, Dacca vs Benoy1971 PLD Supreme Court 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  loss of citizenshipmigration certificateforeigners actburden of prooftemporary refugedomicilecitizenship act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave challenged an order of the High Court of East Pakistan acquitting the respondents of charges under section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. The respondents, original citizens of Pakistan, left for India in 1964 during communal disturbances using a migration certificate but returned to Pakistan within a couple of months. The prosecution alleged they lost their Pakistan citizenship and became foreigners. The core legal question was whether temporary migration to India under a migration certificate during disturbances amounts to a loss of Pakistan citizenship under the law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that migration requires an intention to permanently abandon domicile and acquire a new one in the country of arrival, which was absent here. The Court laid down that mere departure to India under a migration certificate for temporary shelter due to extraordinary circumstances does not extinguish a person's Pakistan citizenship, and the burden remains on the prosecution to prove that an admitted citizen has lost such status.

  Questions settled

  • Does temporary departure from Pakistan to India under a migration certificate during communal disturbances constitute migration resulting in the loss of Pakistan citizenship?
  • Where a person is an admitted citizen of Pakistan prior to traveling abroad, does the burden of proof lie on the prosecution to establish that citizenship was lost?
  • What constitutes migration under the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 in terms of domicile and intention to settle permanently?
  • Does the mere grant of an Indian migration certificate confer Indian citizenship or prove the permanent abandonment of Pakistan citizenship?
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• Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha., Muhammad1971 PLD Supreme Court 791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-03
  evacuee propertylimited estatecustomary lawrehabilitation settlement schemestock of descentreversionersMuslim Personal Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals regarding the devolution of evacuee property allotted to females in Pakistan in lieu of limited estates (customary life estates) held in India. The core legal question was whether such property, upon the death of the female allottee, devolves upon her own heirs or the heirs of the last male owner. The Supreme Court held that the allotment of land in Pakistan in lieu of a limited estate does not alter the character of the holding or the stock of descent. The female allottee holds the property as a representative of the last male owner, and the allotment does not constitute self-acquired property. Consequently, upon the termination of the limited interest, the property must devolve upon the heirs of the last male owner, as determined by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962. The key principle laid down is that the Rehabilitation and Settlement laws did not intend to change the line of succession or create a new stock of descent for female limited owners.

  Questions settled

  • Does the allotment of evacuee property to a female in lieu of a limited estate in India create an absolute estate in her favor?
  • Upon the death of a female allottee holding land in lieu of a limited estate, who are the rightful heirs to the property?
  • Does the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme, 1957, change the stock of descent for evacuee property allotted to female limited owners?
  • Is a female allottee of evacuee property considered a fresh stock of descent under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman and 5 Others vs The Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab, Lahore and 8 Other1971 SCMR 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-08
  evacuee propertynon-evacuee declarationcompensation poolspecial leave to appealjurisdiction of Custodian
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a house in Sialkot, which was declared non-evacuee property by the Custodian. The core legal questions involve whether the original owner, Chooni Lal, qualified as an evacuee under the relevant statutes, whether the Custodian had jurisdiction to make such a declaration after the property supposedly entered the compensation pool, and whether a delay in filing the initial application barred the relief. The Supreme Court held that Chooni Lal was not an evacuee because he had left Pakistan long before Partition in 1945 and settled in East Africa, and further found that the compensation pool notification explicitly excluded properties with pending proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an individual who left the territories now comprising Pakistan prior to the critical date of March 1, 1947, and did not acquire evacuee property in India or reside there, does not fall within the statutory definition of an evacuee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who left the territory now comprising Pakistan prior to the 1st day of March 1947 can be classified as an evacuee under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act XII of 1957?
  • Does the filing of a claim in Bharat by or on behalf of a person create a legal presumption that such person is an evacuee?
  • Did the Custodian lack jurisdiction to declare a property non-evacuee after the issuance of the notification under section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid vs The State1971 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-23
  criminal appealappeal against acquittalmurderappreciation of evidenceeyewitness testimonyPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by right under the Constitution arose from a judgment of the High Court which reversed the acquittal of the appellant by the Sessions Judge and convicted him under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for stabbing a young man to death with a knife. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony in a criminal trial and the principles governing the interference of an appellate court with an order of acquittal on appeal by the State under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted on recognized principles in disagreeing with the trial court, as the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for discarding reliable eye-witness testimony were speculative and artificial. The Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that an appellate court will re-examine evidence and set aside an acquittal if the trial court's conclusions are perverse, based on misinterpretation of evidence, or result in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal in a State appeal?
  • Does an order of acquittal weaken the presumption of innocence of the accused?
  • Whether minor discrepancies in witness statements and absence of blood at the immediate spot of attack are sufficient to reject trustworthy ocular evidence in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rahman Alias Kaner Bap and Another vs Nirmala Sundari Debi1971 SCMR 2 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-15
  temporary injunctionprima facie possessioncustodian of enemy propertyspecial leave to appealcivil revisionrent execution case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of East Pakistan, which refused to interfere with a temporary injunction granted by a Munsif in a suit for permanent injunction. The respondents, having purchased the suit lands in a rent execution case and obtained possession through court in 1960, sought to restrain the petitioners from dispossessing them. The petitioners claimed possession as tenants and alleged a subsequent settlement from the Custodian of Enemy Property. The core legal question was whether the lower courts exercised their discretion soundly in granting the temporary injunction based on the respondents' prima facie possession. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts exercised their discretion on sound judicial principles. The Court observed that if the respondents had obtained valid possession through court, the property could not be treated as enemy property, and the petitioners' own application for settlement from the Custodian undermined their claim of existing tenancy. The petition was rejected, affirming that the matter required trial on evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction where the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of possession through a court auction?
  • Does an application by a party for settlement of land from the Custodian of Enemy Property contradict a claim of existing tenancy rights over the same land?
  • Is a High Court's refusal to interfere in revision with a trial court's discretionary order of temporary injunction justified when the discretion was exercised on sound judicial principles?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rahim vs Abdur Rasheed and 3 Other1971 SCMR 641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-04
  evacuee propertyear-marking listlimitationcondonation of delaylocus standiconstitutional petitionsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of an evacuee property in Lyallpur. The core legal question concerns the finality of an order placing an evacuee property on the ear-marking list upon the petitioner's refusal to take it, and the maintainability of a time-barred appeal and subsequent constitutional petition against its subsequent transfer to another occupant. The Supreme Court held that the initial order placing the property on the ear-marking list upon the petitioner's refusal became final and extinguished the petitioner's entitlement, rendering any subsequent challenge futile, and that the delay in filing the appeal was rightly not condoned. The Court laid down the principle that failure to challenge an adverse settlement order within time extinguishes the party's locus standi, and that a belated challenge initiated only when ejectment is threatened is an afterthought that warrants no interference under constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unchallengeable order placing an evacuee property on the ear-marking list extinguish a claimant's entitlement?
  • Whether a time-barred appeal against the transfer of property without sufficient ground for condoning delay is maintainable?
  • Can a party who fails to challenge a settlement order in time maintain a constitutional petition against the subsequent transfer of the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah vs Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore and 3 Others1971 PLD Supreme Court 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-02-27
  property taxannual valuehotel assessmenttrade earnings basisfair renthypothetical tenantconstitutional petitionmunicipal taxation
  Summary & questions settled

  These twelve certificated appeals challenge the assessment of annual value of various hotels in Karachi for levying property taxes under the City of Karachi Municipal Act, 1933. The core legal question concerned the appropriate method for assessing the annual rental value of hotel premises and whether rent ceilings fixed under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, impact such assessments. The Supreme Court held that the municipal authorities erred in adopting a 'Trade Earnings' formula based on a percentage of imaginary room charges without statutory backing or allowance for profit and capital outlay. The Court ruled that 'annual value' under section 97(2) of the 1933 Act represents the rent bare premises would reasonably command from year to year, excluding furniture, machinery, and trade profits, and that rent ceilings under rent restriction laws constitute a relevant consideration. The appeals, with one exception settled by compromise, were allowed and the assessments set aside for fresh determination.

  Questions settled

  • What is the appropriate method for assessing the annual value of a building used as a hotel for levying property taxes under the City of Karachi Municipal Act, 1933?
  • Whether the ceilings on rent fixed in the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, have any impact on the assessment of annual value under the City of Karachi Municipal Act, 1933?
  • Can the annual rental value of a hotel premises be determined based on the trade earnings or business profits of the occupier under section 97(2) of the City of Karachi Municipal Act, 1933?
  • Does the failure to exhaust alternative statutory remedies bar a petitioner from invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court when coercive recovery steps are threatened?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wahid vs The Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and Another1971 SCMR 719 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-29
  Lambardar appointmentadministrative measurewrit jurisdictionlimitationlachesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition against the appointment of a permanent Lambardar. The petitioner, a former temporary Lambardar whose Dhal Bachh was removed due to absence and misbehaviour, challenged the appointment of the respondent as permanent Lambardar made by the Collector in January 1965, after a delay of approximately four years. The core legal questions relate to the laches and limitation in challenging administrative appointments and the maintainability of writ petitions regarding the appointment of a Lambardar. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the revenue authorities based on delay and limitation, and further reaffirmed that the appointment of a Lambardar is essentially an administrative measure to which no right can be claimed that is competently agitable in the writ jurisdiction. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of a Lambardar is an administrative measure that can be agitated in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Does a belated challenge to the appointment of a permanent Lambardar suffer from laches and limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wahid vs Agha Muhammad Yaqub Khan1971 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-01
  arbitration awardrule of the courtobjections to awardadjournmentaffidavit evidencecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a dispute concerning a partnership business that was allegedly referred to arbitration. An award was rendered, and when filed in court to be made a rule of the court, the appellant filed written objections challenging it. On the date fixed for evidence, the trial court refused an adjournment requested by the appellant due to his son's illness, and proceeded to make the award the rule of the court without examining the appellant or considering his sworn affidavit containing objections. The High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal in limine. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the trial court acted properly in making the award the rule of the court without examining the appellant who was present. The Supreme Court held that under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, affidavits form primary evidence when challenging an award, and the trial court erred in making the award the rule of the court as a matter of course without adverting to and deciding the appellant's objections. The appeal was accepted and the case remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can make an arbitration award the rule of the court without deciding the objections raised against it?
  • Do affidavits serve as primary evidence under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act when the validity of an arbitration agreement or award is challenged?
  • Is it proper for a court to refuse to examine an objector present in court who has filed a sworn affidavit in support of his objections to an arbitration award?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wahab vs Jamal and 6 Other1971 SCMR 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-24
  acquittaldying declarationFirst Information Report delayreappraisal of evidenceself-defencecriminal appealprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted six respondents of charges under Section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reversing their convictions for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in its reappraisal of evidence, specifically regarding the credibility of eye-witnesses, the reliability of a dying declaration, and the impact of a significant delay in lodging the First Information Report. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding the prosecution's case riddled with inconsistencies. The Court observed that the medical evidence contradicted the dying declaration, the eye-witness testimony was doubtful, and the unexplained delay in reporting the crime suggested fabrication. Furthermore, the Court noted that the prosecution suppressed the presence of a weapon found near the deceased, which supported the respondent's plea of self-defence. The principle laid down is that where prosecution evidence is inherently improbable, contradictory to medical findings, and tainted by unexplained delays, an acquittal by the High Court is well-founded and warrants no interference by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the medical evidence contradicts the dying declaration regarding the number of assailants and injuries?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report undermine the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • Is an acquittal justified when the prosecution suppresses material evidence, such as a weapon found at the crime scene?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Siddique MD. Azhar Ali Mian and Another vs The State the State1971 SCMR 628 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-06Read full judgment →
• Abdul Salam vs Sharif Ahmad and Another1971 SCMR 596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-25
  ejectment proceedingsrent restrictionmaintainability of appealappellate authorityimpleadment of partyexecution of decreeWest Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his application to be impleaded as a party in ejectment proceedings. The respondent had initiated ejectment proceedings against another party under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The petitioner sought to join these proceedings, but the Rent Controller rejected his application, a decision upheld by the High Court on the basis that no appeal lay against such an order. The core legal question was whether an appeal to the High Court was maintainable under section 15(4) of the Ordinance, given the petitioner's argument regarding the non-specification of classes of cases by the Government. The Supreme Court held that the amendment to section 15(1) rendered the petitioner's argument regarding the non-specification of cases redundant. The Court affirmed that appeals to the High Court are restricted to instances where no appellate authority has been appointed for an area, and dismissed the petition, while clarifying that the executing court must determine the petitioner's rights before executing any eviction decree against him.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the High Court against an order of the Rent Controller under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 where an appellate authority has been appointed?
  • Does the amendment to section 15(1) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 render the provision in section 15(4) regarding the non-specification of classes of cases redundant?
  • Can an executing court execute an eviction decree against a third party claiming independent possession without first determining their rights in the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Salam alias Abul Khair and Another vs Alah Miah Serang and Another1971 PLD Supreme Court 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  ex parte decreefraudulent suppression of summonssecond appealsection 103 CPCremandfindings of factlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave was filed against the judgment and decree of a Single Judge of the High Court of East Pakistan in a second appeal arising out of a suit for setting aside an ex parte decree on the ground of fraudulent suppression of summonses. The trial Court had dismissed the suit, but the first appellate Court reversed that decision and decreed the suit. On second appeal, the High Court set aside the first appellate Court's decree and restored the trial Court's decision on the ground that the lower appellate Court omitted to consider certain evidence, without the High Court itself evaluating that evidence or arriving at its own finding of fact. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in disposing of the second appeal without exercising its powers under Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to determine the omitted issues of fact based on the evidence. The Supreme Court held that where the first appellate Court omits to consider material evidence, the High Court must comply with Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by examining the evidence itself or remanding the matter. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the first appellate Court for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • What is the duty of the High Court under Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the first appellate Court omits to consider material evidence on record?
  • Can the High Court in second appeal restore the trial court's decree based on omitted evidence without evaluating that evidence itself under Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether a case should be remanded to the first appellate Court for fresh decision when that court fails to consider key items of evidence on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rauf vs The Crown1971 SCMR 256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-03-08
  murderhearsay evidenceeye-witnessesabscondingcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave was preferred by the appellant, Abdul Rauf, against the decision of the Judicial Commissioner of the N.-W.F.P. which confirmed his death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution's case rested on the testimony of six alleged eye-witnesses, the appellant's absconding, and a motive involving a rejected marriage proposal. The High Court had discarded four of the eye-witnesses as unreliable due to their omission from the First Information Report. The Supreme Court analyzed the remaining two witnesses, Malik Zargul Khan and Shahzad Gul, and found that neither had actually witnessed the shooting; instead, both relied on hearsay from unidentified bystanders who were never produced as witnesses. The Court held that the conviction could not stand on hearsay evidence and that the appellant's absconding did not suffice to prove guilt in the absence of credible direct evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained solely on the basis of hearsay statements from unidentified bystanders who were not produced at trial?
  • Does the absconding of an accused person, by itself, suffice to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt when the ocular evidence is discarded or found to be unreliable?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a witness's statement transferred under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the witness contradicts their own testimony regarding the identity of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid vs The State1971 SCMR 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1958-11-07
  illegal gratificationtrap witnessburden of proofbenefit of doubtrehabilitation inspectorappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant, a Rehabilitation Inspector, under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The core legal question revolves around whether the inferences drawn from the established facts by the courts below—specifically regarding the appellant's receipt of tainted currency notes and his subsequent conduct—legitimately proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to conclusively establish that the money was received as an illegal gratification, noting that the appellant openly held the notes without concealment and immediately moved towards his superior officer's room to report the bribe-giver. The Court established the key principle that where an accused person's conduct is equally consistent with a bona fide intention to report a bribe-giver as it is with the acceptance of a bribe, the inference of guilt cannot be sustained, and the benefit of the doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inference of guilt can be sustained under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 when the accused's conduct immediately following the receipt of money is equally consistent with a bona fide intention to report the bribe-giver?
  • Does the failure of an accused to produce defense witnesses before the police during investigation automatically render the defense version an afterthought?
  • Whether the uncorroborated conduct of a public servant openly carrying currency notes towards a superior officer's room constitutes sufficient proof of accepting a bribe?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid vs Nazir Hussain and 5 Other1971 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-13
  appeal against acquittalright of private defencemurdersuppression of injuriesself-defencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan which set aside the convictions and sentences of the respondents for murder and assault, resulting in their acquittal. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the respondents given the mutual injuries sustained by both parties and the plea of self-defence. The Supreme Court held that the complainant party was the aggressor and that the respondents, having sustained injuries including a wound on a vital part of the head of one of the respondents, acted within their right of private defence. The court laid down the principle that where prosecution witnesses suppress injuries sustained by the accused and the evidence indicates the complainant party was the aggressor, the accused are entitled to the right of private defence under Section 100 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, justifying the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused by prosecution witnesses warrants an inference that the complainant party was the aggressor?
  • Does an injury on a vital part of the body of an accused give rise to a reasonable apprehension causing the right of private defence to extend to the causing of death under Section 100 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is interference called for with an order of acquittal by the High Court when the evidence demonstrates that injuries were sustained on both sides in a sudden fight?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid vs Ali Nawaz1971 SCMR 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-29
  enhancement of sentencerigorous imprisonmentmaximum sentencecriminal referencespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a criminal case where the petitioner was initially convicted under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to a fine of thirty rupees by a Magistrate. On a reference by the Sessions Judge, who highlighted the severity of the injuries caused, the High Court issued a rule for enhancement of sentence and subsequently enhanced the petitioner's sentence to three years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged this enhancement, arguing that the High Court had imposed a sentence appropriate for a conviction under Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since three years' rigorous imprisonment is the maximum legal sentence prescribed under Section 324, and is far below the maximum penalty of transportation for life under Section 326, the sentence was legal and appropriate. The Court laid down the principle that it will not interfere with a legal sentence where no question of principle is involved.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is legal and within the statutory limits?
  • Will the Supreme Court of Pakistan interfere with a legal sentence imposed by a High Court in the absence of any question of principle?
  • Can a High Court enhance a sentence to the maximum statutory limit prescribed for that offence if the facts and circumstances of the case warrant it?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid and 6 Others Abdul Majid vs The State the State1971 SCMR 31 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-29
  murderappreciation of evidencefirst information reportextra-judicial confessionspecial leave to appealsentence differentiation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which maintained the convictions of seven petitioners under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, but modified the death sentences to transportation for life, except for the first petitioner, Abdul Majid, whose death sentence was confirmed. The core legal question involves the appreciation of evidence, the weight to be given to omissions in the first information report, seizure lists, and police statements, and the validity of differentiating sentences among co-accused. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the guilt of six petitioners involved mere appreciation of evidence and did not warrant interference, thereby dismissing their petitions. However, the Court granted leave to appeal to Abdul Majid specifically to examine whether there was valid justification for differentiating his sentence regarding the use of the weapon.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence concurrently evaluated by lower courts in the absence of a substantial departure from principles relating to the appreciation of evidence?
  • Can the non-mention of the recovery of a weapon in the first information report be utilized to contradict the direct testimony of witnesses other than the maker of the report?
  • Is an omission in a seizure list that was never put to the investigating officer in cross-examination a valid ground to challenge the recovery at the appellate stage?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal solely to examine whether there was valid justification for differentiating the sentence of a specific co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Latif vs The State1971 SCMR 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-19
  criminal appealmisreading of evidenceidentificationright of private defenceillegal arrestcitizen arrestfirearm injuriesarms recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by special leave, arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan upholding the appellant's conviction under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 13(d) of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, while reducing the sentence under the former. The core legal questions concern whether the High Court misread the evidence regarding the identification of the accused, whether the complainant party had the lawful authority under section 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to pursue and arrest the accused in the absence of a cognizable and non-bailable offense committed in their view, and whether the right of private defence accrued upon an illegal arrest. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions, holding that the High Court patently misread the evidence regarding witness identification, that the private citizens had no legal authority under section 59 to arrest the accused, and that the illegal arrest triggered the right of private defence. Furthermore, the Court held that the conviction under the Arms Ordinance was unsustainable due to a complete lack of weapon recovery.

  Questions settled

  • Does a misreading of prosecution evidence regarding the identity of an accused warrant the setting aside of a conviction?
  • Do private persons possess the legal right under section 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to pursue and arrest individuals who have not committed a cognizable and non-bailable offense in their view?
  • Does an illegal attempt to arrest by private individuals give rise to a right of private defence for the accused?
  • Can a conviction under section 13(d) of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 be sustained when no weapon was recovered from the possession of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid vs The State1971 SCMR 781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-25
  quashment of proceedingsdelay in trialcriminal miscellaneousspecial judge anti-corruptiondischarge of bail bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against the Lahore High Court's order dismissing an application for the quashment of criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner in multiple cases. The petitioner faced several cases under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 before a Special Judge, Anti-Corruption. Initially discharged under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 due to a lack of sanction, proceedings were later revived after the sanction was produced, leading to conviction in one case and subsequent appeals being dismissed. When the remaining cases resumed years later, the petitioner sought quashment on the ground of long delay. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that delay per se, without fault by the accused, is insufficient for quashing proceedings. The core legal question concerned whether proceedings should be quashed solely due to prolonged delay when the record was unavailable. The Supreme Court held that the delay was adequately explained by the unavailability of the record for several years, justifying the refusal to quash the proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does delay per se, without fault on the part of the accused person, constitute sufficient ground for quashing criminal proceedings?
  • Is the unavailability of the judicial record for several years considered a valid explanation for trial delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid Khan vs The Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and 2 Other1971 SCMR 711 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1966-06-17
  review petitionevacuee propertyexcess arealocus standisettlement authoritiesdiscretionary powerpublic auction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought a review of a portion of the Supreme Court's judgment dated 15 April 1966, which held that the transfer of an 'excess area' in an evacuee house compound was within the discretion of the Settlement Authorities and that the petitioner lacked locus standi to challenge it after his own transfer claim was rejected. The petitioner contended that under instructions from the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the excess area should have been sold by public auction, which he wished to bid on. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a mere desire to bid at an auction does not confer a vested right to force a property to auction. The Court reaffirmed that a petitioner whose claim for transfer of the property has been finally rejected lacks locus standi to assert any rights regarding its subsequent disposal. However, the Court noted that if any binding administrative instructions were violated, the petitioner could approach the Chief Settlement Commissioner in a competent forum.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere desire to bid for a property at a public auction confer a vested right to compel the authorities to bring that property to auction?
  • Does a petitioner whose claim for the transfer of evacuee property has been finally rejected retain locus standi to challenge the disposal of the excess area of that property?
  • Can a party raise new administrative instructions for the first time in a review petition before the Supreme Court if they were not mentioned during the main appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid Khan vs Province of West Pakistan and 4 Other1971 SCMR 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-03
  Treasury ContractorContract of GuaranteeDefalcationSecondary EvidenceVicarious LiabilityConcurrent Findings of FactIndemnity
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a civil suit filed by the Government against a Treasury Contractor, Abdul Hamid Khan, to recover funds defalcated by his employee from the Kohat Treasury. The petitioner contested liability, arguing he had not entered into the alleged contract of guarantee, that his liability was limited to Rs. 30,000, and that the Treasury Officer’s failure to adhere to safety rules absolved him of responsibility. Additionally, he argued that the defalcation did not occur within the scope of employment under Section 238 of the Contract Act. The trial court permitted secondary evidence to establish the contract's terms and decreed the suit, a decision upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, noting that the matter was concluded by concurrent findings of fact. The Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the alleged negligence or connivance of the Treasury Officer in facilitating the defalcation diminished the contractor's liability to indemnify the Government under the contract of guarantee. The petition was dismissed as no valid legal grounds for interference were established.

  Questions settled

  • Can secondary evidence be admitted to prove the terms of a contract of guarantee when the original document is missing from the record?
  • Does the negligence or connivance of a Treasury Officer in facilitating defalcation diminish the liability of a Treasury Contractor to indemnify the Government under a contract of guarantee?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the exercise of its special jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani vs Settlement Commissioner and 2 Other1971 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-21
  abatementlegal representativesnecessary partiesLetters Patent Appealwrit petitionevacuee propertysubstitution of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which declared his Letters Patent Appeal to have abated following the death of a joint transferee respondent during the pendency of the appeal. The core legal question was whether private respondents in a writ petition who would be adversely affected by the setting aside of an impugned order are necessary parties, such that the death of one without timely substitution causes the appeal to abate. The Supreme Court held that persons to be adversely affected by the quashing of an order under Article 98 of the Constitution are necessary parties, as no effective order can be made in their absence without violating principles of natural justice. The Court laid down the principle that beneficiaries of an impugned administrative or settlement order are indispensable parties in constitutional writ proceedings, and failure to bring their legal representatives on record within the prescribed limitation period under the Code of Civil Procedure results in the abatement of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether private respondents who are beneficiaries of an impugned order are necessary parties in a constitutional writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
  • Does the death of a joint transferee respondent without timely substitution of legal representatives result in the abatement of a Letters Patent Appeal arising from writ proceedings?
  • Can a court make an effective order under Article 98 of the Constitution in the absence of persons who would be adversely affected by the quashing of the impugned order?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani vs Hafiz Abdul Khaliq Rahmani and Another1971 SCMR 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-17
  quashment of criminal proceedingsabuse of process of the courtcivil disputecriminal complaintspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the quashment of criminal proceedings. The petitioner had previously filed a civil suit for the recovery of a monetary loan, which was dismissed, and the dismissal was upheld in revision by the High Court. Four years later, the petitioner filed a private criminal complaint under section 420 of the Penal Code against the respondent. The Magistrate initially dismissed it, but upon revision, proceedings were remanded and process was issued. The High Court subsequently quashed the criminal proceedings under section 561-A read with section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The core legal question was whether the criminal complaint constituted an abuse of the process of the Court given the prior civil proceedings and the delay. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the criminal complaint was not bona fide, the dispute was essentially of a civil nature, and the High Court rightly quashed the proceedings as an abuse of the process of the court. The key principle laid down is that utilizing criminal proceedings as a belated device following an unsuccessful civil suit regarding the same transaction amounts to an abuse of the process of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a criminal complaint four years after the dismissal of a related civil suit amount to an abuse of the process of the court?
  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash criminal proceedings arising from a dispute of a civil nature?
  • Can a party initiate criminal proceedings under section 420 of the Penal Code after unsuccessfully pursuing a civil remedy for the recovery of money?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs The State1971 SCMR 155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-22
  post-conviction bailappellate bailjudicial discretionleave to appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court refusing bail to the petitioner, who had been convicted under Section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to six years of rigorous imprisonment by a Section 30 Magistrate. The core legal question was whether the High Court improperly exercised its discretion in denying bail to a convicted person pending appeal, particularly given the length of the sentence and the anticipated delay in the appeal hearing. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's discretion in granting or refusing bail to a convict is not to be interfered with unless it is exercised on principles unsupported by law. The Court emphasized that a convict does not have an inherent right to bail, and at the appellate stage, the court is not required to re-examine the prima facie case for conviction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the High Court's refusal to grant bail was deemed a proper exercise of judicial discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Does a convicted person have an inherent right to be released on bail pending the hearing of their appeal?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in refusing bail to a convict?
  • Is the High Court required to consider the merits of a conviction when deciding on a bail application pending appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Karachi and 3 Other1971 SCMR 602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-19
  special leave to appealwrit petitionsettlement authoritiessuccessive litigationcause of actionres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a dispute over the transfer of Flat No. 1/1 in Karachi, which was previously subjected to multiple rounds of litigation between the petitioner and the respondent up to the Supreme Court. After failing in the initial litigation, the petitioner initiated a fresh round of litigation before the Settlement authorities claiming the flat on the ground that the respondent had never applied for its transfer. The Settlement authorities rejected the claim, and both a writ petition and a subsequent Letters Patent appeal in the High Court were dismissed. The core legal question is whether a litigant can be permitted to agitate new grounds in successive litigation regarding the same cause of action that could and should have been raised earlier. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined to entertain the fresh writ petition based on the principle that a litigant cannot split up grounds to seek relief at different times. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a litigant be allowed to split up grounds to seek relief in respect of the same cause of action through different petitions at different times?
  • Whether a fresh writ petition can be entertained when the petitioner failed to agitate the available grounds in previous litigation relating to the same matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ali vs Adam Ibrahim1971 SCMR 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-26
  evacuee propertyevictionrent controlstatutory noticeconcurrent findings of factnew plea in appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an eviction order issued by the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan. The petitioner, an occupant of an evacuee plot, challenged an eviction order granted in favour of the respondent, who had acquired the property via a Provisional Transfer Order from the Settlement Department. The respondent sought eviction based on the petitioner's failure to pay rent following a notice served under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, but the Additional District Judge accepted the respondent's appeal, ordering eviction. The High Court upheld this decision, finding that the statutory notice was served and rent remained unpaid. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued the property was a building site, necessitating a suit for possession rather than eviction proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that as this argument was not raised in the lower courts, it could not be introduced for the first time. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of fact regarding the service of notice and non-payment of rent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new legal argument regarding the nature of the property for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a tenant liable for eviction under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 if they fail to pay rent after receiving a notice under Section 30?
  Read full judgment →
• Abbas vs The State1971 SCMR 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-01
  murder convictionocular evidenceballistic evidencedying declarationcorroborationcriminal appealfirearm recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the conviction of the appellant, Abbas, for the murder of two individuals, Kamal and Abdur Rahman. The appellant and his co-accused were initially convicted by the trial court, and their convictions were largely upheld by the High Court, which relied on ocular testimony from two female witnesses, the oral dying declaration of one deceased, and ballistic evidence linking recovered firearms to the crime scene. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently established the appellant's guilt, specifically regarding the corroboration of the ocular evidence through the recovery of the weapon allegedly used by him. The Supreme Court examined the admissibility of evidence regarding the borrowing of the firearm and the reliability of the ballistic reports. The Court held that the prosecution had satisfactorily established the appellant's guilt, finding the ocular testimony credible and sufficiently corroborated by the recovery of the weapon and the dying declaration. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that consistent ocular testimony corroborated by independent forensic evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in murder cases.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of interested witnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction if corroborated by independent forensic evidence?
  • Can the prosecution abandon a witness who is deemed to have been won over by the accused?
  • Does the recovery of a firearm and matching ballistic evidence provide sufficient corroboration for ocular testimony in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• A. T. M. Tobarakullah Bhuiyan vs The State1971 SCMR 4 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-30
  criminal misappropriationforgerydocumentary evidencepublic servantembezzlementspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Superintendent of a State Orphanage, challenged his conviction for criminal misappropriation and the use of a forged document. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, entrusted with funds to purchase blankets for orphans, misappropriated a significant sum by submitting a fabricated cash memo that inflated the number of blankets purchased from the Dacca Central Jail. The petitioner contended that the number of blankets claimed was consistent with the orphanage's stock and that the salesman, a co-accused, was solely responsible for the forgery. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the evidence supported the conviction, specifically focusing on the discrepancy between the petitioner's submitted bill and the jail's actual sales records. The Court held that the documentary evidence, particularly the jail register showing insufficient stock to support the petitioner's claim, conclusively established the petitioner's guilt. The Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the petitioner's reliance on the forged cash memo to justify his expenditure bill demonstrated his complicity in the misappropriation. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the submission of a forged cash memo to justify an expenditure bill constitute sufficient evidence of criminal misappropriation?
  • Can a conviction for misappropriation be sustained based primarily on documentary evidence contradicting the accused's claims?
  • Is an accused liable for misappropriation when the quantity of goods claimed to have been purchased exceeds the actual stock available at the source of purchase?
  Read full judgment →
• A. M. Mahiul Huq vs MD. Shamsul Alam and Another1971 SCMR 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-17
  Nikah Registrarappointment cancellationcompetent authorityMuslim Family Lawsadministrative lawwrit jurisdictionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the appointment and cancellation of a Nikah Registrar in the Chittagong district. The petitioner, an existing Nikah Registrar, challenged the appointment of the first respondent as a second Nikah Registrar for the same Union Councils. The petitioner successfully appealed to the Secretary, Judicial Department, Government of East Pakistan, who cancelled the respondent's appointment. The respondent challenged this cancellation in the High Court, which ruled that the Secretary lacked the legal authority to cancel the appointment, as the power to revoke or cancel such a license rested solely with the Union Council under the relevant rules. The High Court further interpreted the law to allow for multiple Nikah Registrars within a Union Council, provided their jurisdictions were distinct. Upon the petitioner's appeal for special leave, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision. The Court held that because the cancellation order was issued by an incompetent authority, it was legally unsustainable, thereby rendering the challenge to the underlying statutory interpretation moot in the present proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Provincial Government have the authority to cancel the appointment of a Nikah Registrar under the East Pakistan Muslim Family Laws Rules, 1961?
  • Can more than one Nikah Registrar be appointed for the same Union Council?
  • Is an order passed by an incompetent authority sustainable in law?
  Read full judgment →
• _Civil~11970 PLC 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-04-29
  industrial disputeindustrial awardrunning staffextension of awardtermination noticestatutory interpretationcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from six civil appeals and a writ petition concerning an industrial dispute between the Pakistan Western Railway and its ticket examiners regarding their status as 'running staff'. The Industrial Court had issued an award in 1962 in favor of the ticket examiners, which was subsequently extended. The Province of West Pakistan challenged the extensions and the validity of the award's continued operation. The High Court dismissed the Province's appeals as incompetent and accepted the ticket examiners' writ petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that an extension of an award does not constitute a fresh 'industrial dispute' or 'award' under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance 1959, and therefore no right of appeal lies against such an extension. Furthermore, the Court ruled that under Section 14(5) of the Ordinance, an award continues to be binding on the parties even after the expiry of its maximum statutory period of operation, until the expiry of two months from the date a valid written notice of intention to terminate is served by one party on the other.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the extension of the period of an industrial award constitutes a fresh 'industrial dispute' or 'award' giving rise to a right of appeal under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance 1959?
  • Does an industrial award continue to bind the parties after the expiry of its maximum statutory period of operation if no valid notice of termination has been served?
  • Can an interim order of the Industrial Court declaring a termination notice premature be appealed as an award under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar vs Zulfiqar and ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 1042 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-10
  transfer of criminal casenecessary partylocus standicomplainant rightscriminal proceduremurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court dismissing an application to recall a transfer order. The petitioner, the brother of the deceased and the complainant in a murder case, sought to challenge the transfer of the trial from the Sessions Judge, Lyallpur, to the Additional Sessions Judge, Lyallpur, on the grounds that the transfer order was passed without notice to him. The core legal question was whether the complainant or a relative of the deceased is a necessary party to a transfer application in a criminal case and thus entitled to notice and a hearing. The Supreme Court held that in criminal murder trials, the only opposing party is the State. Consequently, the relatives of the deceased or the complainant who lodged the First Information Report are neither proper nor necessary parties to the proceedings. The Court affirmed that the petitioner had no legal right to be impleaded or heard in the transfer application, and the High Court was justified in deciding the matter in his absence.

  Questions settled

  • Is the complainant or a relative of the deceased a necessary party to a criminal transfer application?
  • Does the complainant in a murder case have a legal right to be heard during proceedings for the transfer of a trial?
  • Who constitutes the opposite party in a criminal murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar and Another vs The State1970 P Cr. L J 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1958-03-20
  dacoitybenefit of doubtcriminal appealrecovery of evidenceforensic scienceacquittal reversalidentification of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which reversed the trial court's acquittal of the appellants and convicted them of dacoity with murder under section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency of evidence to sustain convictions for dacoity, specifically regarding the identification of recovered property and the reliability of forensic evidence linking an accused to the crime scene. The Supreme Court held that while the conviction of one appellant, Zulfiqar, was supported by direct evidence and forensic proof—specifically, empty shell casings matching the gun recovered at his instance—the conviction of the other appellant, Sultan, was unsafe. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish a definitive link between the recovered clothes and the items identified in court, thereby entitling Sultan to the benefit of the doubt. The judgment reinforces the principle that in criminal cases, where a critical link in the chain of evidence is missing, the accused must be granted the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to link recovered property to items identified in court entitle an accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Can a conviction for dacoity be sustained based on forensic evidence linking an accused's recovered weapon to shell casings found at the crime scene?
  • Is the reversal of an acquittal by a High Court valid when the prosecution fails to establish a critical link in the chain of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ali Khan and 10 Others vs Muhammad Mubarak Khan and Other1970 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-13
  displaced personsland settlementdelegated powerscompetency of appealrevisionconstitutional petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a dispute regarding agricultural land in Okara, Sahiwal, where the petitioners were found to be in possession of an excess area by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner acting as a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1950, and the excess land was allotted to the respondent as an informer. The petitioners' subsequent appeal and revision before the settlement authorities were rejected on the ground that orders passed by a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner are not subject to appeal or revision, a view upheld by the High Court in a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that appeals and revisions under Chapter VI of the Act apply only to orders passed in the exercise of ordinary functions under Section 9, and not to orders passed by authorities exercising delegated powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal or revision lies against an order passed by a settlement authority acting as a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • Do the appeal and revision provisions in Chapter VI of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1950 apply to orders passed under delegated powers?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahoor Ahmad vs Abdul Aziz and Other1970 SCMR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-11
  settlement propertywrit jurisdictiontransfer of propertyspecial leave to appealcomposite property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court, which had dismissed his writ petition challenging the final order of the Settlement authorities. The core legal question was whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner's decision to divide the composite property into independent units and transfer a portion to the respondent, Abdul Aziz, was open to interference in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction in dividing the property and transferring the portion to the respondent, and no valid ground for interference was established. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a competent departmental authority's order passed within jurisdiction cannot be disturbed under writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with a final order of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner passed within his powers?
  • Whether a composite property can be divided into independent units for transfer to persons in possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Yusuf Ali Khan, Barrister-at-Law vs The State1970 PLD Supreme Court 350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-07
  contempt of courtadvocate privilegequalified privilegescandalising the courttransfer applicationprofessional misconductunconditional apology
  Summary & questions settled

  These two criminal appeals arise from contempt of court proceedings initiated by the High Court against the appellant, a barrister and advocate, resulting in his conviction and sentencing for professional misconduct and contempt. The first appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 1969) relates to scandalous allegations of corruption and bias made against a Sessions Judge in a transfer application drafted by the appellant on a client's instructions. The second appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1969) arises from a highly offensive and threatening confidential letter sent directly by the appellant to a High Court Judge, accusing him of personal hostility and bias. The core legal questions concern whether an advocate enjoys absolute or qualified privilege for statements made in pleadings, whether a private communication to a judge constitutes contempt without publication, and the validity of a conditional apology. The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, holding that an advocate's privilege is qualified rather than absolute, that publication is not a strict prerequisite for contempt when a private communication tends to interfere with the administration of justice, and that a defense of justification combined with a tardy, conditional apology does not warrant mitigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an advocate enjoys absolute privilege or qualified privilege in respect of defamatory or scandalous statements made in pleadings on behalf of a client?
  • Does a private confidential communication sent to a judge containing reflections on his judicial conduct constitute contempt of court in the absence of formal publication?
  • Can a plea of justification and truth be legally sustained in proceedings for criminal contempt of court?
  • Under what circumstances may an apology be accepted as a mitigating factor in contempt proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Yousaf Ali vs Fazal Mohammad Malik and 3 Other1970 SCMR 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-12-18
  special leave to appealnecessary partywrit proceedingssettlement authoritiestransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan rejecting the petitioner's application to be impleaded as a party in pending writ proceedings concerning the transfer of a shop. The petitioner, a local in possession of the shop, had submitted an L.S. Form for its transfer after the initiation of the dispute between other claimants before the settlement authorities. The core legal question is whether a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the settlement authorities is entitled to be impleaded as a party in the resulting writ petition before the High Court. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner was not a party before the settlement authorities and the litigation in the High Court was strictly confined to the dispute between the existing parties regarding the correctness of the transfer, the petitioner had no right to be impleaded in those proceedings. The key principle laid down is that a party who did not participate in the administrative proceedings and lacks direct standing in the pending judicial review between other contenders cannot claim a right to be impleaded as a necessary party in constitutional writ petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who was not a party before the settlement authorities can be impleaded as a party in writ proceedings arising therefrom?
  • Does a local person in possession of a property who submitted a transfer form after the initiation of departmental proceedings have a right to join pending constitutional litigation between other claimants?
  • When is a party considered an interested person entitled to join pending high court writ proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Younus Sattar and Another vs The Assistant Collector of Central1970 SCMR 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-03-07
  writ jurisdictionsummary dismissaltax refundmala fidedepartmental remedieslachesconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court of East Pakistan. The petitioners had challenged several notifications issued under the Sea Customs Act, alleging they were violative of the Constitution and issued with mala fide intent to benefit a specific company. The High Court had summarily dismissed the writ petition, reasoning that the relief of tax refund could not be granted under Article 98 of the Constitution, that the petition was filed with delay, and that the allegation of mala fide involved controversial questions of fact requiring evidence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the petitioners' contentions regarding the summary dismissal of the writ petition merit consideration. Specifically, the Court will examine whether the High Court erred in dismissing the petition in its entirety despite the potential validity of other grounds for relief, and whether the pursuit of departmental remedies under the Sea Customs Act justifies the timing of the writ petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition be summarily dismissed solely because the relief of refund of taxes is sought?
  • Does the pursuit of departmental remedies under the Sea Customs Act constitute a valid explanation for delay in filing a writ petition?
  • Is a High Court justified in summarily dismissing a writ petition when multiple grounds for challenge are raised, including allegations of mala fide?
  Read full judgment →
• West Pakistan Government vs S. Abdul Khaliq, Accountant, Hazara1970 SCMR 721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pay revision rulesretrospective effectultra vires notificationcivil servant remunerationconstitutional writ petitionterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave, brought by the Province of West Pakistan, challenges the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, which accepted the respondent accountant's writ petition and declared him entitled to the prescribed scale of pay of an Accountant with effect from 14th October 1955 rather than 7th May 1962. The core legal question revolves around whether the inclusion of the post of Accountant in the Schedule of the Pay Revision Rules via a notification on 1st March 1962 operates retrospectively from 14th October 1955 under the statutory rules, and whether a note appended to the notification barring retrospective effect is ultra vires. The Supreme Court held that the retrospective operation from 14th October 1955 is mandated by the substantive provisions of the West Pakistan (Non-Gazetted) Civil Services Pay Revision Rules, 1959, and that rule-making powers under rule 18 do not permit executive notifications to override statutory rules, rendering the restricting note ultra vires. The Court laid down that subordinate notifications cannot curtail the retrospective applicability granted by principal statutory pay revision rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the inclusion of a post in the Schedule of the West Pakistan (Non-Gazetted) Civil Services Pay Revision Rules, 1959 entitles the incumbent to the prescribed scale from 14th October 1955?
  • Can a note appended to an executive notification override the substantive provisions of statutory rules regarding retrospective effect?
  • Whether a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 is maintainable regarding the protection of remuneration under Article 178?
  Read full judgment →
• Wazir Khan vs The State1970 SCMR 791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1958-10-07
  murdercriminal appealappreciation of evidenceeyewitness testimonybenefit of doubtmurder convictionsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, confirming the conviction and sentence of death imposed upon the appellant, Wazir Khan, by the Additional Sessions Judge of Mianwali for the murder of Azim Khan. The prosecution case alleged that following a family dispute regarding marriage arrangements, the appellant and his co-accused entered a courtyard, where the appellant shot and killed Azim Khan. Although the trial court acquitted the co-accused and rejected parts of the prosecution's narrative regarding a second murder, it accepted the eyewitness testimony concerning the fatal attack on Azim Khan. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the testimony of eyewitnesses could be selectively relied upon to convict one accused while acquitting others arising from the same transaction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that eyewitness testimony can be segregated and acted upon where natural witnesses provide credible, corroborated accounts regarding a distinct incident within the same transaction. The key principle established is that the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus rule does not apply in Pakistani jurisprudence, and courts may safely separate grain from chaff in appreciating witness testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses can be selectively relied upon to convict one accused while acquitting others involved in the same transaction?
  • Does the rejection of a portion of prosecution evidence necessitate the outright rejection of the entire case against an accused?
  • Whether an appellate court should interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of ocular evidence by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Wazid Moral Alias Wazid Ali and 13 Others Wazid Moral vs The State1970 SC M R256 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Wazid Moral Alias Wazid Ali and 13 Others the State and Wazid Moral1970 P Cr. L J 652 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-06-14
  cross-casesright of private defenceculpable homicide not amounting to murderfree fightunlawful assemblybenefit of doubtappeal against acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  These two appeals by special leave arise out of a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan disposing of cross-cases and a revision regarding a violent clash between two rival groups resulting in a death and multiple injuries. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court correctly assessed the evidence in the cross-cases independently, whether the accused acted within the right of private defence, and whether individual criminal liability could be sustained in a free fight where identification was doubtful. The Supreme Court held that each criminal case must be decided independently upon the evidence led therein, and the High Court erred in disposing of one appeal merely based on findings in a cross-case. The Court found that the complainant party were the initial aggressors who pursued the accused to their dwelling house, giving rise to a right of private defence, but the main appellant exceeded that right by inflicting a fatal blow. The ratio decidendi establishes that where a party is attacked and pursues a lawful right of private defence against aggression up to their property, causing death by exceeding that right attracts Section 304 Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code, and individual participation must be proven beyond doubt in a free fight.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal appeal be disposed of solely on the basis of findings of fact arrived at in a separate cross-case?
  • Whether the right of private defence of property and person extends to causing death when repelling an aggressive intrusion into one's dwelling house?
  • Is a conviction sustainable in a free fight where individual participation and specific attribution of fatal or injurious blows cannot be determined with certainty?
  • Does exceeding the right of private defence by inflicting a fatal injury convert the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part II of Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad and Another vs Ghulam Rasool1970 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08
  pre-emptionevacuee propertyabandonment of issuesecond appealcourt-feepetitions for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal calls in question a judgment of the High Court passed in second appeal arising out of a pre-emption suit. The petitioner-vendees resisted the suit on the grounds that the sale of evacuee property was not pre-emptible and that the court-fee was deficient. The trial court decided both issues against the petitioners, who subsequently abandoned the contention regarding evacuee property during their first appeal before the District Judge. When the petitioners sought to re-agitate both points in second appeal, the High Court disallowed the plea regarding the non-competency of the suit due to prior abandonment and ruled against them on the court-fee issue. The core legal question was whether a party can re-raise in second appeal an issue expressly abandoned before the lower appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its powers in refusing to permit the petitioners to agitate an abandoned matter. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that points abandoned in an intermediate appellate court cannot be revived in second appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can re-agitate in second appeal an issue that was expressly abandoned before the lower appellate court?
  • Is the sale of an evacuee property subject to pre-emption under the law?
  • Whether the High Court has the power to refuse leave to raise a point abandoned in the intermediate appellate forum?
  Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad and 7 Others vs The Border Area Committee, Bahawalnagar1970 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-16
  evacuee landallotment cancellationBorder Area Committeejudicial reviewwrit jurisdictionMartial Law Regulationconstitutional law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the cancellation of land allotments by the Border Area Committee, Bahawalnagar, regarding evacuee land held by the appellants. The Committee cancelled these allotments based on an interpretation of the Addendum to Martial Law Regulation 9, Zone B, dated 5th November 1960, which purportedly required reducing allotments of claimant displaced persons to the area held as temporary allottees. The appellants challenged this, arguing their allotments were confirmed prior to the Addendum's effective date. The High Court initially dismissed the writ petition in limine, citing lack of jurisdiction based on prior precedent regarding Martial Law period orders. The Supreme Court held that while Martial Law Regulations previously ousted jurisdiction, the promulgation of the 1962 Constitution restored the High Court's authority under Article 98. The Court determined that the Border Area Committee, as an authority performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Centre, is subject to judicial review. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, declaring the Committee's cancellation order to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution to review orders passed by the Border Area Committee?
  • Are orders passed by the Border Area Committee after the promulgation of the 1962 Constitution immune from judicial scrutiny?
  • Is the Border Area Committee considered an authority performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Centre for the purposes of writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat vs Abdur Rashid and 2 Other1970 SCMR 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-08
  Criminal Law Amendment ActTribunal findingsDistrict Magistrate powersremand orderambiguous findingsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal case originally referred to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1963. Following the Tribunal's submission of findings, one member provided an ambiguous opinion regarding the accused's guilt. The District Magistrate remanded the case to the Tribunal specifically to clarify this member's finding. The High Court set aside this remand order, ruling it unauthorized under Section 10(2)(a) of the Act, and directed that the case be referred to the Tribunal as a whole for a collective finding. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court erred in its interpretation. The Supreme Court clarified that the Tribunal is required to submit findings on the guilt or innocence of the accused, and until every member has recorded an unequivocal finding, the Tribunal has not fulfilled its statutory duty. Consequently, the District Magistrate possesses the authority to remand the case to the Tribunal, or to specific members, to ensure a clear finding is reached, as this is essential for the District Magistrate to determine if the requisite majorities for conviction or acquittal exist.

  Questions settled

  • Does the District Magistrate have the authority to remand a case to a Tribunal member for clarification of an ambiguous finding under the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1963?
  • Is a collective finding by the Tribunal required under Section 10 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1963 before the District Magistrate can act?
  • Can a District Magistrate remand a case to the Tribunal for further inquiry if one member has failed to provide an unequivocal finding on the guilt or innocence of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• The Vice Chairman, East Pakistan Enemy Property Management Board1970 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-02
  enemy propertyDefence of Pakistan Ruleswrit jurisdictioncustodian of enemy propertyspecific performancespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which invalidated two notifications issued by the Vice-Chairman of the East Pakistan Enemy Property Management Board and the Additional Custodian of Enemy Property. The notifications declared the Hanuman Rice and Oil Mills as enemy property and authorized the Deputy Commissioner of Dinajpur to manage it. The respondents, who claimed an interest in the mills through a partnership formed with a previous purchaser, challenged the notifications, asserting the property was not enemy property. The High Court ruled in favor of the respondents, declaring the notifications issued without lawful authority. The petitioners contend that the High Court erred in its determination regarding the status of the property as enemy property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, particularly given the circumstances surrounding the previous owner's departure to India. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the disputed mills constitute enemy property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, ordering the existing stay to continue pending the final hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Hanuman Rice and Oil Mills constitutes enemy property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules?
  • Does property acquired through a court decree for specific performance vest in the Custodian of Enemy Property if the transferor subsequently leaves for India?
  Read full judgment →
• The University of Peshawar and Another vs Syed Bashir Ahmad1970 PLD Supreme Court 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-07-10
  probationary periodautomatic confirmationstatutory contractuniversity servicewrit petitioninfructuous appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arose from a writ petition filed by a Reader in Law against the University of Peshawar, seeking confirmation of service from the date of expiry of his probationary period. The High Court had allowed the petition, holding under Rule 5 of the University of Peshawar (Recruitment, Discipline, Punishment and Appeal) Service Rules that the probationer was deemed automatically confirmed upon the expiry of the maximum period of probation. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether Rule 5 provides for automatic confirmation of a probationer upon the expiry of the maximum probationary period, and whether an employee can establish legal rights of service without executing a written contract as mandated by Section 45 of the Peshawar University Act 1950. The Supreme Court observed that Rule 5 does not envisage automatic confirmation and that compliance with the statutory requirement of executing a written contract under Section 45 is essential. However, upon the advice of the Court, the University Syndicate agreed to confirm the respondent on a regular basis with effect from 5th September 1961 along with all consequential financial benefits, rendering the appeal infructuous.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 5 of the University of Peshawar Service Rules provide for automatic confirmation of an employee upon the expiration of the maximum probationary period?
  • Can a statutory employee claim service rights in the absence of a written contract mandated by Section 45 of the Peshawar University Act 1950?
  • Are administrative instructions issued by the Government to its departments automatically applicable to autonomous statutory bodies such as a University?
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• The State vs Khan Beg and 5 Others1970 P Cr. L J 704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-15
  acquittal appealbenefit of doubtocular testimonypolice statementsubstantive evidenceappraisal of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the State challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted six respondents of charges under sections 302/149 and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relating to the murder of three individuals. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appraisal of evidence, particularly by allegedly relying on an inadmissible police statement to discredit eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court improperly referenced a police statement as substantive evidence, this error did not necessitate interference because the High Court’s conclusion regarding the doubtful presence of the eye-witnesses was independently supported by material contradictions and inconsistencies in their testimonies. The Court reaffirmed the principle that it will not interfere with an order of acquittal unless it can be demonstrated that none of the grounds for acquittal are supportable. Finding that the High Court’s decision was based on valid evidentiary grounds, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, maintaining the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statement made to the police be used as substantive evidence during a criminal trial?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by a High Court?
  • Does the improper reference to an inadmissible police statement by a High Court automatically invalidate an acquittal if other evidence supports the decision?
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• The State vs Khan Beg and 5 Other1970 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-15
  appeal against acquittalpolice statementsubstantive evidenceeye-witness credibilitybenefit of doubtinterference with acquittaltriple murder
  Summary & questions settled

  The State appealed by special leave against a High Court judgment setting aside the convictions and death sentences of six respondents under Sections 302/149 and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of three relatives. The prosecution alleged that the respondents assaulted the victims following a family dispute. Leave to appeal was granted primarily on the ground that the High Court had improperly relied upon an inadmissible police statement of a witness as substantive evidence to discredit the eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court re-examined the evidence and held that while a police statement cannot be used as substantive evidence, the High Court’s acquittal was independently supported by material contradictions, unnatural witness conduct, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, and weak motive. Reaffirming the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an order of acquittal unless all grounds supporting it are wholly unsupportable, the Court held that excluding the police statement did not undermine the High Court's finding of reasonable doubt. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statement made by a witness to the police during investigation be relied upon as substantive evidence at trial?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by a High Court?
  • Whether an order of acquittal remains sustainable if independent grounds of reasonable doubt exist despite the High Court erroneously referring to an inadmissible police statement?
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• The State vs Fatfh Khan and 3 Others1970 P Cr. L J 759 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  murderacquittal appealeye-witness credibilityappreciation of evidencemiscarriage of justiceF.I.R.blood feud
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a State appeal against the acquittal of four respondents by the High Court in a murder case. The respondents were initially convicted by the Sessions Judge for the murder of the deceased in the District Bar Room, Mianwali, based on direct eye-witness testimony. The High Court subsequently acquitted the respondents, discrediting the eye-witnesses due to minor inconsistencies in their statements and surmises regarding their presence. The core legal question was whether the High Court's rejection of the eye-witness testimony and subsequent acquittal was based on a misconstruction of evidence and unreasonable inferences. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning was far-fetched and contradicted by the established circumstances, including the immediate recording of the F.I.R. and the presence of police officials. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that minor, immaterial discrepancies in testimony do not necessarily render witnesses unreliable, especially when their presence is corroborated by independent circumstances. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal, restored the convictions, and sentenced the respondents to transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Does a minor inconsistency in an eye-witness's testimony regarding collateral facts necessarily render their entire evidence unreliable?
  • Can an appellate court set aside a conviction based on surmises that contradict the established circumstances of the crime?
  • Is the presence of eye-witnesses at the scene of a crime sufficiently established when their statements are recorded immediately by police officials present at the scene?
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• The State vs Fateh Khan and 3 Other1970 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-26
  murderacquittaleye-witness testimonycriminal appealappreciation of evidenceFIRtransportation for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by the State challenges the High Court's acquittal of the respondents in a murder case. The core legal question is whether the High Court's rejection of eye-witness testimony and subsequent acquittal was based on sound judicial reasoning or mere surmises and misappreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning for disbelieving the eye-witnesses—such as minor discrepancies in testimony and the timing of the FIR—was far-fetched, speculative, and contradicted by the established facts of the case. The Court affirmed that the presence of the eye-witnesses was established beyond doubt, and the prosecution had successfully proven the guilt of the accused. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal, restored the convictions recorded by the trial court, and sentenced the respondents to transportation for life. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court cannot discard consistent eye-witness testimony based on trivial inconsistencies or conjectures that are physically impossible or unsupported by the record, especially when the crime occurred in public view and was promptly reported.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court set aside a conviction based on trivial inconsistencies in witness testimony that do not affect the material facts?
  • Is it permissible for an appellate court to reject eye-witness testimony based on speculative surmises that contradict established physical facts?
  • Does the recording of an FIR by a police officer present at the scene of a crime, rather than at a police station, invalidate the report?
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• The State Abdur Rahman and 3 Others vs Abdur Rahman and 3 Others1970 P Cr. L J 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-08
  leave to appealculpable homicidemurderintention to cause deathnature of injuriescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against a judgment of the High Court, which had modified the convictions of four respondents from murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondents were originally sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge for the murder of Muhammad Shafi, but the High Court reduced the conviction, reasoning that the respondents only possessed the knowledge that their actions were likely to cause death, rather than the intention to cause death. The State challenged this, arguing that the nature and extent of the injuries—specifically those on vital parts and the severity of the beating—warranted a conviction for murder under Section 302. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the respondents' actions satisfied the requirements of clauses 2ndly and 3rdly of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, thereby constituting murder. Non-bailable warrants were issued for the respondents' arrest.

  Questions settled

  • Does the infliction of multiple injuries on vital parts of a deceased, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, satisfy the requirements of clauses 2ndly and 3rdly of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder be sustained when the injuries inflicted are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death?
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• The State Abdur Rahman and 3 Others vs Abdur Rahman and 3 Other the State1970 SCMR 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-08
  leave to appealmurderculpable homicideconversion of sentencegrievous injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against the judgment of the High Court, whereby the respondents' convictions under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Muhammad Shafi were altered to section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code, reducing their sentences to eight years' rigorous imprisonment. The respondents had been originally sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge, Lyallpur, after being found guilty of causing a large number of injuries resulting in death. The core legal question is whether the respondents' acts, involving numerous injuries including one sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, attract clauses 2ndly and 3rdly of section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code rather than culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Supreme Court held that the nature and multiplicity of the injuries, particularly the fracture of ribs and damage to vital organs, require deeper examination regarding the applicability of murder provisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and ordered the issuance of non-bailable warrants for the arrest of the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in converting the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder given the multiplicity of injuries?
  • Do multiple injuries inflicted on vital parts of a deceased attract clauses 2ndly and 3rdly of section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• The Secretary, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Dacca the Secretary, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Dacca vs MD. Serajul Haque MD. Sekandar Mia1970 SCMR 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-24
  master and servanttermination of servicenatural justiceshow cause noticestigmaconstitutional protectionservice of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that declared the termination of two employees of the East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation illegal for lack of a show-cause notice. The respondents, whose services were terminated on the ground that they were no longer required, argued they were entitled to constitutional protection and natural justice. The Supreme Court held that the respondents, as employees of a corporation, were not entitled to the protection of Article 177 of the 1962 Constitution. Furthermore, the Court determined that because the termination orders contained no stigma or charges, they did not constitute a penalty. The Court clarified that an internal office note mentioning employee deficiency does not convert a non-stigmatic termination order into a penalty. Applying the principles of master and servant, the Court ruled that the Corporation was entitled to terminate services in accordance with the contract of employment without affording a show-cause opportunity, provided the order itself is free of stigma. The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's decision was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of a statutory corporation entitled to the protection of Article 177 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
  • Does an internal office note regarding employee efficiency convert a non-stigmatic termination order into a penalty?
  • Is a show-cause notice required when terminating an employee's services under the ordinary law of master and servant?
  • Does a termination order that does not contain any charge or stigma constitute a penalty?
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• The Secretary, B. D. L. C. Department, Government of East Pakistan and 2 Others vs Syed Ahmed, Member, Shikarpur Union Council1970 SCMR 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  no-confidence motionballot paper validitydirectory vs mandatorylocal government electionstatutory interpretationUnion Council
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the validity of a ballot paper in a no-confidence motion against a Union Council Chairman. The core legal question was whether the absence of a member's signature on the ballot paper rendered the vote invalid under the applicable rules. The Circle Officer had rejected the respondent's ballot paper solely due to the lack of a signature, causing the no-confidence motion to fail for lack of the required two-thirds majority. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the requirement for a signature or thumb impression on the ballot paper form was merely directory rather than mandatory. The Court reasoned that the specific sub-rule governing the voting procedure provided detailed instructions for both the Presiding Officer and the members but notably omitted any requirement for the member to sign the ballot paper. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the absence of a signature did not invalidate the ballot, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a member's signature on a ballot paper invalidate a vote cast in a no-confidence motion under the East Pakistan Local Councils (Vote of No-Confidence) Rules, 1963?
  • Is the requirement for a signature on a ballot paper in a no-confidence motion directory or mandatory?
  • Can a vote be rejected for a procedural omission not explicitly required by the governing sub-rule?
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• The Province of West Pakistan through the Deputy Commissioner, Khairpur vs Imam Bakhsh1970 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-09
  special leave to appealconcurrent findings of factdate of birthwrongful retirementservice booksecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below establishing that the correct date of birth of the respondent was 25 May 1916 rather than 25 May 1905, as erroneously entered in his service book. Consequently, his retirement from the post of Salt Inspector in the Industries Department of the Government of West Pakistan with effect from 24 May 1965 was held to be illegal and void, and the decree in his favor was maintained. The core legal question concerned the propriety of interfering with concurrent findings of fact regarding a date of birth in a second appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was entirely justified in declining to interfere with these concurrent factual determinations under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact affirmed by the lower appellate court are binding in second appeal and do not warrant interference or the grant of special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a date of birth in a second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether retirement based on an incorrect date of birth entered in a service book is illegal and void when concurrent findings establish the true date of birth?
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• The Lungla (Sylhet) Tea Co. Ltd., Sylhet vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Dacca Circle, Dacca1970 SCMR 872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-03
  income tax assessmentrevenue receiptsquestion of lawtaxable incomebalance sheet accountingcompensation for land acquisitionappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an order of the High Court of East Pakistan, which declined to direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer questions of law regarding the taxability of compensation received by a tea company. The appellant, a tea company, received compensation from the Government of India prior to 1947 for land acquisition. In 1954, the company allocated a portion of these funds to its Profit and Loss account as revenue. The Income-tax Officer assessed this amount as income for the 1955-56 assessment year. The core legal question was whether this sum, received earlier but accounted for in 1954, was taxable in the 1955-56 assessment year, and whether the Tribunal’s refusal to refer the matter involved a question of law. The Supreme Court held that the classification of the funds as revenue in the 1954 balance sheet justified the assessment. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the nature of the receipts was a question of fact, not law, and that the limitation argument was not properly raised before the Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the classification of a receipt as revenue in a company's balance sheet sufficient to justify its assessment as income in that year?
  • Does the determination of whether a sum constitutes a revenue receipt involve a question of fact or a question of law?
  • Can a party raise a question of limitation before the Supreme Court if it was not raised before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal?
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• The Karachi Parsi Co Operative Housing Society Ltd. vs The Karachi1970 SCMR 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-14
  municipal taxesstreet lightingstreet sweepinglimitation periodLetters Patent Appealspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court passed in a Letters Patent Appeal regarding a dispute over municipal taxation and civic services between the Karachi Parsi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and the Karachi Municipal Corporation. The core legal question concerns the liability of the respondent-Corporation to refund expenses incurred by the petitioner-Society on street lighting and street sweeping after the Society's area was included within the limits of the Karachi Municipal Corporation by a notification dated 11th October 1952. The High Court upheld the petitioner-Society's claim in part while dismissing the remainder as barred by time. The Supreme Court evaluated the petition seeking leave to appeal against the High Court's decision. The principle laid down involves the extent of municipal liability for civic services upon the extension of municipal limits and the application of limitation periods to claims for recovery of such expenses.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a municipal corporation is liable to refund expenses incurred by a housing society for civic services when the corporation fails to provide them after extending its limits?
  • Are claims for the refund of municipal service charges subject to the laws of limitation?
  • Does the inclusion of a housing society's area within municipal limits make the corporation liable to collect taxes and provide street lighting and sweeping?
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• The Home Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Home1970 SCMR 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-26
  leave to appealright of hearingcriminal law amendmentstay of proceedingsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan on a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court regarding the interpretation of Section 3 read with Section 25 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. The core legal question examined is whether it is incumbent upon the Commissioner to grant a hearing to an accused person before making an order of reference of their case to a Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the argument of the learned Advocate General raising a question of law for final determination is supported, and accordingly granted leave to appeal. Additionally, the Court granted a prayer for a stay of the Full Bench's direction requiring cases to be returned to the Division Benches for disposal pending the final decision of the appeal. The key principle laid down is that substantial questions regarding statutory interpretations of administrative hearing requirements under the Act warrant a full determination by the apex court, justifying interim stays to preserve the status quo.

  Questions settled

  • Is it incumbent upon the Commissioner to grant a hearing to an accused person before making an order of reference to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when a substantial question of law arises regarding the interpretation of statutory hearing requirements?
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• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi vs Messrs Zamindara1970 SCMR 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-10
  income taxfirm registrationpartnership deedquestion of factspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's application under subsection (2) of section 66 of the Income-tax Act seeking a direction to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer a question of law. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal was justified in allowing registration to the respondent firm for the assessment year 1964-65 under section 26-A of the Income-tax Act on the basis of a partnership deed dated 1st March 1963. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether a partnership existed prior to the execution of the deed was purely a question of fact determined by the Tribunal upon consideration of relevant circumstances, and no question of law arose for examination by the High Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the view that factual determinations by the Tribunal regarding partnership creation do not warrant interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of the existence of a partnership prior to the execution of a partnership deed constitutes a question of fact or a question of law?
  • Is an Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's finding regarding the creation of a partnership open to reference under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act when based on factual circumstances?
  • Whether a firm is entitled to registration under section 26-A of the Income-tax Act on the basis of a partnership deed executed on 1st March 1963 for the assessment year 1964-65?
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• The Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan and 2 Others vs Aswab Ali and Another1970 SCMR 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-01
  certificate proceedingsrecovery of taxnotice of demandpartner liabilitydenial of membershipnatural justicesales taxincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether certificate recovery proceedings can be initiated against an individual denying membership in an assessee-firm without serving a personal notice under section 29 of the Income-tax Act or section 12 of the Sales Tax Act. The Supreme Court held that where a person denies being a partner or member of the assessee-firm, and no prior notice has been served upon him or liability established during assessment, certificate proceedings cannot be taken against him without affording an opportunity of being heard and serving the requisite statutory notices. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision setting aside the certificate proceedings, establishing that an individual sought to be made liable must be served with a notice of demand under section 29 to enable them to dispute their liability or status as an assessee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether certificate proceedings can be started against a person who denies his membership of the assessee-firm without issuing a personal notice on him under section 29 of the Income-tax Act or section 12 of the Sales Tax Act?
  • Whether after the assessment has been completed the Department can enter upon an inquiry and hold that a person who denies his liability to pay tax is a member of the assessee-firm?
  • Does section 44 of the Income-tax Act warrant taking action against a person who denies his membership of the assessee-firm where there is no finding of dissolution or discontinuance?
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• The Chittagong Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Chittagong vs C. S. Limited1970 PLD Supreme Court 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

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• The Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of Pakistan1970 SCMR 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-09
  leave to appealwrit jurisdictionfranchise withdrawaladministrative lawestoppelprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order passed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The core legal question involves the validity of an administrative order that effectively withdrew a franchise after the grantee had fulfilled all procedural requirements and incurred significant financial expenditure—specifically mentioned as three lakhs of rupees—based on the reliance of that franchise. The Supreme Court observed that these circumstances raise difficult questions of law regarding the legitimacy of such administrative actions. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the High Court's decision. The Court further directed the petitioner to provide the necessary copies of documents to expedite the preparation of the case for hearing and set the security amount at Rs. 2,500.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative authority validly withdraw a franchise after the grantee has satisfied all procedural requirements and incurred significant expense in reliance upon it?
  • Does the withdrawal of a franchise after substantial investment by the grantee raise a justiciable question of law in writ jurisdiction?
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• Tawaib Khan and Another vs The State1970 PLD Supreme Court 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-29
  murderdying declarationblood-feudappraisal of evidencefalsus in uno falsus in omnibuscriminal appealbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellants, Khawaja Muhammad and Tawaib Khan, for the murder of Niaz Gul under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which convictions were confirmed by the High Court. The core legal question involves the evaluation of ocular testimony and dying declarations in the context of a long-standing blood-feud and interested witnesses, and whether the evidence can be safely relied upon to sustain convictions. The Supreme Court held that while dying declarations and testimony of related witnesses possess sanctity, they require close scrutiny, and the court must sift the grain from the chaff in light of physical circumstances and probabilities. The Court found the case against Khawaja Muhammad proved beyond doubt, supported by his false alibi and corroborative physical evidence, but acquitted Tawaib Khan due to grave doubts regarding his participation and improbable injury attribution. The key principle laid down is that the maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' does not apply automatically, and courts must rigorously evaluate partisan evidence and dying declarations against surrounding physical circumstances to prevent false implications arising from enmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether dying declarations can be accepted as the whole truth without reservations in cases involving deep-rooted blood-feuds?
  • Can the uncorroborated testimony of an interested or partisan witness be safely relied upon without close scrutiny of the physical circumstances?
  • Whether the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is applicable in the administration of criminal justice in Pakistan?
  • How should courts evaluate discrepancies between initial police statements and subsequent dying declarations regarding the number of gunshots fired?
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• Taja vs The Crown1970 P Cr. L J 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-05-31
  approver testimonycorroborationmurderdeath sentencecriminal appealrecovery of keys
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court confirming the death sentence of the appellant, Taja, for the murder of an elderly widow, Mst. Daulan, allegedly committed to seize her land and property. The principal evidence against the appellant rested on the testimony of an accomplice, Faqir approver, who claimed that both he and the appellant strangled the deceased and stole her property. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the approver's testimony received sufficient and independent corroboration regarding the appellant's specific participation in the crime. The Court held that the recovery of keys from the appellant's possession, which fitted the locks in the victim's house, and the medical evidence matching the approver's account provided strong, objective, and independent corroboration satisfying the rule of prudence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an approver requires independent corroboration connecting the specific accused to the crime?
  • Can the recovery of keys belonging to the victim from the possession of the accused serve as sufficient corroboration of an approver's testimony?
  • Whether subjective considerations regarding an approver's relationship to the accused can replace objective external corroboration?
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• Syed Yousuf Zaman vs Roshan Ali and 3 Other1970 SCMR 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-06
  limitationcondonation of delayexclusion of timecomposite propertysettlement proceedingsnew plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for Special Leave to Appeal was filed against the High Court of West Pakistan's dismissal of a Letters Patent Appeal, which arose from a writ petition challenging a Settlement Authority's decision to transfer only the upper floor of a composite property to the petitioner. The petition was barred by a one-day delay. The petitioner's counsel argued that under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908, the day the judgment was pronounced and the day the copy was applied for (being the same day) should be excluded twice, effectively making the petition within time. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, holding that Section 12(2) does not permit the same day to be excluded twice. On the merits, the petitioner contended that the initial appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner was time-barred, rendering subsequent proceedings void. However, because this point was not raised before the lower settlement authorities or the High Court, the Supreme Court held it could not be raised for the first time before it. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the same day can be excluded twice under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 if the copy of the judgment is applied for on the day of its pronouncement?
  • Can a plea of limitation regarding lower departmental proceedings be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not pressed before the High Court or the lower authorities?
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• Syed Yasin Sakaff Shah vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary,1970 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-09
  date of birthservice recordgovernment servantwrit petitionquestion of factretirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court of West Pakistan, which had upheld the retirement of the petitioner based on his recorded date of birth. The petitioner challenged the correctness of his date of birth entered in his service book as 20th July 1914, contending it should be 20th July 1916 as originally recorded during his earlier employment with the police. The core legal question concerned the determination of a disputed entry regarding a government servant's date of birth and whether writ proceedings are appropriate for resolving such factual disputes. The Supreme Court held that the dispute regarding the correct date of birth is a question of fact that cannot be appropriately resolved in writ proceedings and requires regular proceedings. The key principle laid down is that disputed questions of fact regarding a service record, such as a date of birth, should be pursued through a regular suit rather than a constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a disputed question of fact regarding a government servant's date of birth be resolved in writ proceedings?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a government servant seeking correction of an entry in their service book?
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• Syed Shahzad Hussain vs The Secretary to Government of1970 SCMR 674 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-23
  special leave to appealcooperative societiesrepayment of loansrevisionvested rightfinding of factwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was directed against the Lahore High Court's dismissal in limine of a writ petition. The petitioner had challenged a recovery notice issued by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, for a loan obtained from the Pakistan Industrial Cooperative Bank Ltd. On remand, the Deputy Registrar rejected the petitioner's list of witnesses as vague and found his liability established, dismissing allegations that the Bank's ex-manager was a sleeping partner. The petitioner's subsequent revision was rejected as incompetent, and the High Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity but had adopted dilatory tactics. The Court ruled that a revision is not a vested right but is subject to the discretion of the revisional authority. It further held that since the petitioner admitted the advance of the loan, his liability was established, and any claims against the ex-manager could be pursued separately in a civil court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the remedy of revision under the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies and Co-operative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance 1966 constitutes a vested right of a party?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding loan liability and execution of pledge documents be interfered with in writ jurisdiction where sufficient opportunity of hearing was provided?
  • Whether a debtor's claim that a bank official was a sleeping partner in his firm absolves the debtor of his liability to the bank under the Co-operative Societies framework?
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• Syed Said Muhammad and Another vs The Quetta Municipal Committee1970 SCMR 420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-16
  octroi dutymunicipal taxationtax schedulesleave to appealmunicipal administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal arising from a dispute concerning the validity of the tariff of octroi duty levied by the Quetta Municipal Committee. The core legal question is whether the tariff of octroi duty levied under the Quetta Municipal Laws, 1946, remains valid and continues to hold good after the enforcement of section 35 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, which mandates that municipal committees shall be guided by Model Tax Schedules framed by the Government in levying any tax, rate, toll, or fee. The Court held that the reasoning and conclusions of the learned judges below require further consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal subject to the furnishing of security in the sum of rupees one thousand.

  Questions settled

  • Does the tariff of octroi duty levied under the Quetta Municipal Laws, 1946, remain valid after section 35 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 comes into force?
  • Are municipal committees bound to be guided by Model Tax Schedules framed by the Government when levying taxes, rates, tolls, or fees under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960?
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• Syed Nazeer Ahmad Shah vs The Federation of Pakistan1970 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-24
  review petitionrailway serviceremoval from serviceservice lawsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed by Syed Nazeer Ahmad Shah against this Court's previous judgment dated 8th November 1965, challenging the validity of a Divisional Officer's order directing his removal from railway service and alleging non-production of certain documents by the railway authorities. The core legal question is whether the re-arguing of settled points regarding the authority to remove from service and complaints regarding non-production of documents not raised at the initial hearing constitute valid grounds for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that matters fully considered in the original judgment cannot be re-argued through a review and that complaints regarding document production not raised at the hearing cannot be entertained. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be used to re-litigate points already adjudicated upon or to raise new procedural grievances not urged at the original hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party re-argue the validity of an order of removal from railway service through a review petition after the matter has been fully considered in the main judgment?
  • Whether a complaint regarding the non-production of documents, not raised at the original hearing of the appeal, can be entertained for the first time in review?
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• Syed Mehdi Hasnain vs Muhammad Ayub and Another1970 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  summary evictionexecutive orderpossessionproperty rightsinfructuous petitioncivil court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an executive order issued by the District Magistrate, Karachi. The District Magistrate had ordered the eviction of the respondent from a property in Serai Quarter, Karachi, which the petitioner claimed to own through purchase from a transferee of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Department. The High Court, finding the District Magistrate's eviction order lacked legal sanction and validity, set it aside and directed the restoration of possession to the respondent. Before the Supreme Court, it was confirmed that the respondent had already been restored to possession pursuant to the High Court's order. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petition had become infructuous and dismissed it. The Court clarified that the High Court's order, which focused solely on the illegality of the summary eviction, did not prejudice the petitioner's underlying property rights. The Court affirmed that such rights remain subject to adjudication and establishment through appropriate proceedings in the civil courts, rather than through summary executive action.

  Questions settled

  • Can a District Magistrate summarily evict a person from property without legal sanction?
  • Does a High Court order restoring possession to a person evicted by an illegal executive order prejudice the underlying title claims of the petitioner?
  • Is a petition rendered infructuous if the relief granted by the High Court has already been executed?
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• Syed Baqir Hussain Shah vs Malik Muhammad Ali and 2 Other1970 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-12
  quo warrantoElectoral Collegeelection petitionwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for a writ in the nature of quo warranto and a declaration challenging the holding of the office of Chairman of a Union Council by the respondent, along with a notification relating to membership of the Electoral College. The core legal question concerned the validity of a declaration of election results based on partial polling where further polling had been approved by the Provincial Election Authority following a disturbance, and whether a writ petition was maintainable when no regular election petition had been filed under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the legal questions raised merited detailed consideration regarding the legality of ignoring subsequently polled votes and the applicability of constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a declaration of election results based only on votes cast on an earlier date is valid when the Provincial Election Authority approved further polling due to a disturbance?
  • Can a writ of quo warranto be maintained against the holder of a public office if no regular election petition was filed under section 58 of the Electoral College Act?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution to interfere with election matters under the circumstances of incomplete polling?
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• Syed Baqar Hussain Jafri vs National Bank of Pakistan1970 SCMR 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  National Bank of Pakistanpower of attorneydelegation of powersinstitution of suitpreliminary issuecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a decision on a preliminary issue in a suit for recovery filed by the respondent-Bank against the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the person who instituted the suit on behalf of the National Bank of Pakistan was legally authorized to do so, and specifically whether the appointment of an attorney to file and conduct court cases amounts to an impermissible delegation of powers or requires notification in the official Gazette under the relevant statutory framework. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of an attorney to conduct court cases is a routine administrative matter that does not constitute a delegation of the Central Board's statutory powers, but rather the appointment of an agent under the Civil Procedure Code. The Court affirmed the lower court decisions and dismissed the petition, ruling that the attorney was competently constituted and authorized to act for the Bank.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appointment of an attorney by the National Bank of Pakistan to institute and conduct a suit amount to an impermissible delegation of powers?
  • Whether an attorney appointed to conduct court cases on behalf of the National Bank of Pakistan must be notified in the official Gazette of Pakistan?
  • Can a bank lawfully appoint an agent to institute legal proceedings under Order III Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
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• Syed Aziz Ur Rahman vs Mst. Habib Bano and 5 Other1970 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-03
  leave to appeallimitationtime-barred petitionstay of possessionprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The primary procedural issue addressed by the Court involves a reported delay of seven days, rendering the petition prima facie time-barred. Upon examination of the certified copy of the order under appeal, the Court observed that the dates regarding the preparation and delivery of the copy appeared to have been corrected and overwritten. Consequently, the Court declined to dismiss the petition on the ground of limitation at this preliminary stage. Instead, the Court exercised its discretion to grant leave to appeal, explicitly leaving the question of limitation open for a definitive decision at the final hearing, should an objection be raised by the opposing party. Additionally, the Court directed the petitioner to furnish security in the amount of Rs. 1,000 and ordered the continuation of the stay regarding the delivery of possession of the property in dispute, thereby maintaining the status quo pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal while leaving the question of limitation open for future determination?
  • Does the presence of overwritten dates on a certified copy of an order necessitate immediate dismissal of a petition on limitation grounds?
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• Syed Ali vs Abdul Khaliq1970 SCMR 345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-08
  pre-emptionco-sharer tenantlimitationagricultural landstatutory notice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments of the lower courts and the High Court which granted pre-emption of agricultural land to the respondent co-sharer tenant. The core legal question was whether the pre-emption application was barred by limitation on the ground that the pre-emptor had prior knowledge of the transfer by virtue of being an attesting witness to the registered kobala, despite the absence of statutory notice under Section 89 of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act. The Supreme Court held that under Section 96 of the said Act, a co-sharer tenant is entitled to claim pre-emption within four months of the service of notice under Section 89, or within four months of the date of knowledge of the transfer if no such notice has been served. The Court laid down the principle that the statutory limitation period of four months for filing a pre-emption application runs from the date of receipt of the obligatory notice under Section 89, and the mere attestation of the transfer deed does not alter the statutory limitation period when the mandatory notice has not been served.

  Questions settled

  • Within what period must a co-sharer tenant claim pre-emption under the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act?
  • Does the knowledge of a transfer derived from being an attesting witness to a kobala start the limitation period for pre-emption when no notice under Section 89 has been served?
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• Suruj Mia and Others vs Kalagazi1970 SCMR 804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal revisionspecial leave to appealconcurrent findings of factassaultmedical evidenceeye-witness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of East Pakistan, which had dismissed the petitioners' criminal revision against their conviction and sentence. The petitioners were convicted under Section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for assaulting the complainant, Abdul Mannan, with iron rods and lathis. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the petitioners' guilt, based on the testimony of eye-witnesses and medical evidence, warranted interference by the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established the case through credible eye-witness testimony, which was further corroborated by the independent medical evidence of the Medical Officer who examined the victim's injuries. Finding no merit in the petition, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' reliance on the consistent evidence presented. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact when they are supported by reliable, corroborated evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when evidence is corroborated?
  • Is medical evidence sufficient to corroborate eye-witness testimony in assault cases?
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• Surkhru vs The State1970 SCMR 660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-20
  post-arrest bailmurder chargebail refusalcriminal petitionFirst Information Report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the High Court in a criminal case. The petitioner is facing a murder charge, with the First Information Report specifically attributing the fatal gunshot to the deceased Ghulam Hussain to the petitioner. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail given the direct and specific allegation of murder. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly refused to grant bail considering the grave nature of the allegation and the specific role attributed to the petitioner in the First Information Report. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that where an accused is directly nominated with a fatal blow in a murder case, bail is ordinarily refused unless exceptional grounds for further inquiry are established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused directly charged with a fatal gunshot in the First Information Report is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's order refusing bail in a murder case?
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• Sultan Muhammad vs The Crown1970 SCMR 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1953-02-10
  murderright of private defenceretracted confessiondying declarationcriminal appealself-defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence of death confirmed by the Judicial Commissioner, subsequently commuted to transportation for life. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether adequate consideration was given to the appellant's right of private defence, notwithstanding that the plea was not formally raised during the trial. Upon examining the evidence, including a retracted confession, a dying declaration, and witness statements, the Court found that physical circumstances such as the absence of blackening on the deceased's clothing and the distance between the parties contradicted the theory of a close-quarters struggle where the appellant's life was in danger. The Supreme Court held that the appellant fired at the deceased while running away and escaping, without any necessity or justification of private defence. The key principle laid down is that physical evidence, such as the absence of bullet charring and spatial distance, can conclusively negative a claim of self-defence and establish that the accused acted without justification when an avenue of escape was available.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of self-defence can be considered by an appellate court when it was not raised during the trial or preceding enquiry?
  • Does the absence of charring or blackening on the deceased's clothes or wound exclude the possibility of a close-quarters struggle?
  • Is a retracted confession stating the right of private defence admissible and reliable when contradicted by physical evidence and a dying declaration?
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• Sultan Muhammad vs The Crown'1970 P Cr. L J 670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-10
  murderprivate defenceretracted confessiondying declarationcriminal appealhouse-trespass
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the appellant, Sultan Muhammad, was entitled to the right of private defence regarding his conviction for the murder of one Khuban under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant had entered the deceased's house to commit adultery and shot the deceased with a rifle when surprised upon the husband's unexpected return. Although the plea of self-defence was not raised at trial, the Supreme Court evaluated the prosecution evidence, including a retracted confession, a dying declaration, and statements of an eyewitness. The Court held that physical circumstances—specifically the absence of powder charring on the wound or clothing and the distance between the parties—disproved the claim of a close-range struggle and established that the appellant shot the victim while attempting to escape when no threat to his life existed. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for murder, ruling that the right of private defence was not available to the accused, and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence can be successfully claimed when an accused shoots a victim while fleeing from the scene of a house-trespass?
  • Does the absence of charring or blackening on a bullet wound exclude the possibility of a close-range struggle between the accused and the deceased?
  • Can a retracted confession and an inconsistent dying declaration be evaluated together to determine the true sequence of events in a murder trial?
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• Sultan Muhammad vs Mst. Hamida Begum and 18 Other1970 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-26
  ex parte decreesubstituted servicelimitation periodfraudulent suppressiondate of knowledgecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court order that dismissed a revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908. The underlying dispute involved an ex parte decree obtained by the petitioner against nineteen defendants after substituted service via newspaper publication. One defendant applied to set aside the ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, alleging fraudulent suppression of addresses. The trial court and High Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the application was time-barred, holding that limitation runs from the date of knowledge of the decree when fraudulent suppression of service is alleged, rather than from the date of the decree itself. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, noting that because the newspaper citations contained incorrect addresses, the defendants were not duly served. The Court held that substituted service is ineffective if the publication itself contains incorrect information, preventing the running of limitation from the date of the decree. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as the lower courts correctly applied the law regarding limitation in cases of fraudulent service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for setting aside an ex parte decree run from the date of the decree or the date of knowledge when fraudulent suppression of service is alleged?
  • Is substituted service via newspaper publication effective if the publication contains incorrect addresses of the defendants?
  • Can an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be filed after the expiry of 30 days if the summons was not duly served?
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