Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Nawaz and Another vs The District Magistrate, Hazara and 5 Other1970 SCMR 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-03
  criminal law amendmenttribunal referenceright of hearingnatural justicewrit jurisdictionbail cancellationsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal case registered against the petitioners under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code on 22nd April 1965. The Commissioner, Peshawar Division, referred the question of the petitioners' guilt to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963. The petitioners challenged the reference before the High Court via a writ petition, arguing that the reference order was passed without affording them a hearing. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that any initial illegality was cured by a subsequent hearing before the Member, Board of Revenue. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held, following precedent, that the Commissioner's reference made without hearing the accused was without lawful authority. However, considering the repeal of the said Act and inordinate delay, the Court declined to grant leave to appeal, instead advising the Provincial Government to cancel the reference and transfer the case to a court of competent jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, made without hearing the accused, is without lawful authority?
  • Can the illegality of an order of reference passed without a hearing be cured by a subsequent hearing given by a higher revenue authority?
  • How should pending proceedings under a repealed special law be handled in cases of inordinate delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Najibullah Khan vs Government of Pakistan and 3 Other1970 SCMR 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-04
  Martial Law Regulationdisplaced personsland settlementpast and closed transactionfundamental rightsspecial leave to appealacquiescence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a displaced person from India, was allotted lands in Pakistan under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. Following Martial Law Regulation No. 89 in August 1961, his entitlement was scaled down, and excess lands were ordered to be surrendered. Subsequently, the petitioner accepted the government's offer to purchase the excess land on preferential terms and paid installments until August 1966. When a later installment demand was made in May 1967, the petitioner challenged the validity of Martial Law Regulation No. 89 before the High Court via a writ petition, alleging violation of constitutional equality provisions and Fundamental Right No. 15. The High Court dismissed the petition in limine due to laches and acquiescence. Seeking special leave to appeal, the petitioner contended that a constitutional right cannot be defeated by laches and that the regulation became assailable under the 1962 Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Fundamental Rights were suspended by the proclamation of emergency, that the curtailment of entitlement in 1961 constituted a past and closed transaction, and that the subsequent purchase of land did not reopen the settled matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Martial Law Regulation No. 89 could be challenged as violative of fundamental rights after the commencement of the 1962 Constitution?
  • Does the curtailment of land entitlement under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 constitute a past and closed transaction?
  • Whether subsequent payments of installments for the purchase of excess land render the prior entitlement curtailment an ongoing transaction?
  • Can a petitioner challenge land entitlement reduction after acquiescing to the government's offer to purchase the excess land?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Luqman vs The State1970 PLD Supreme Court 10 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The provided judgment text is empty. Consequently, it is impossible to provide a summary, identify statutory provisions, extract keywords, formulate legal questions, or identify the author of the opinion.

  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif and Another vs Muhammad Hussain and 9 Other1970 PLD Supreme Court 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-07-10
  murderunlawful assemblybenefit of doubtacquittal appealinjured witnessesinterested witnessesappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the High Court’s acquittal of the respondents in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the respondents formed an unlawful assembly, murdering one person and injuring several others. The trial court convicted some respondents, but the High Court acquitted all, citing the benefit of doubt due to deep-seated enmity and lack of independent evidence. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the injured witnesses’ testimony was credible and should not be discarded. The Supreme Court faced the core question of whether the High Court’s acquittal was based on a sound appreciation of evidence or if it warranted interference. Wahiduddin Ahmad, J. opined that while the principal accused deserved acquittal, the remaining respondents should be convicted based on the injured witnesses' testimony. However, Sajjad Ahmad, J. disagreed, holding that the prosecution’s case was so tainted by hostility and exaggeration that it was unsafe to rely on the same evidence to convict the remaining respondents after acquitting the principal ones. Consequently, the acquittal was maintained, affirming that appellate interference with an acquittal requires strong, independent corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of injured witnesses can be relied upon when the prosecution case is otherwise tainted by enmity and exaggeration?
  • Is it safe to convict some accused persons based on evidence that has been rejected against their co-accused in the absence of independent corroboration?
  • Under what circumstances should the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal order passed by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan vs Muhammad Ali Khan and Other1970 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-09
  abatement of appeallegal representativessubstitutionlimitation periodpre-emptionprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which dismissed a Regular Second Appeal (R.S.A.) as having abated. The original dispute involved a decree for possession of agricultural land obtained by the respondent's predecessor-in-interest based on superior rights of pre-emption. Following the death of the sole respondent during the pendency of the second appeal, the petitioner failed to implead the legal representatives within the statutory period. The petitioner contended that the limitation period should commence from the date of his actual knowledge of the death, rather than the date of death itself. The High Court rejected this plea, finding the petitioner's claim of ignorance regarding the death implausible, and subsequently dismissed the appeal as abated. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no error in the dismissal of the appeal for failure to implead the legal representatives in time. The court affirmed that procedural requirements regarding the substitution of legal representatives must be strictly adhered to, and ignorance of a party's death is not a valid excuse when evidence suggests otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for impleading legal representatives of a deceased respondent commence from the date of the party's death or the date of the appellant's knowledge of the death?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal as abated when the appellant fails to bring legal representatives on record within the prescribed time?
  • Is a finding of fact by the High Court regarding the date of knowledge of a party's death subject to interference if the finding is based on evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan Alias Malta and 2 Others vs The State1970 SCMR 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1959-10-12
  murderdeath sentenceocular evidencemedical evidencegunshot injuriesjoint trialcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court judgment that confirmed the death sentences of the appellants for the murders of two individuals. The core legal questions concerned the legality of a joint trial for accused persons committed under separate orders, and whether the ocular evidence was reliable given alleged inconsistencies with medical evidence regarding the nature and distance of gunshot injuries. The Supreme Court held that there was no material conflict between the eyewitness accounts and the medical evidence. The Court reasoned that eyewitness estimations of distance during a chaotic pursuit are inherently imprecise, and that medical findings regarding the range of fire and the nature of wounds did not definitively contradict the prosecution's version of events. Furthermore, the Court clarified that injuries on the front of the victims were consistent with victims turning while fleeing. Consequently, the Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, establishing that minor discrepancies in medical testimony do not automatically invalidate credible direct evidence, and that eyewitness testimony regarding distance during a dynamic pursuit should not be held to impossible standards of precision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a conflict between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding the distance of firing automatically invalidate eyewitness testimony?
  • Can injuries on the front of a victim be reconciled with a prosecution theory that the victim was shot while fleeing?
  • Whether the presence of gunshot injuries on the front of a victim necessarily contradicts the testimony that the victim was shot while running away?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail and 20 Others vs Mst. Nawab Bibi and Other1970 SCMR 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  limitationtime-barredpetition for leave to appealprocedural delaydismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question presented was whether the petition could be entertained despite a significant delay in filing. The Court examined the limitation period applicable to the filing of the petition and determined that the petition was barred by time by 367 days. Consequently, the Court held that the petition could not be adjudicated upon its merits due to this procedural defect. The decision reinforces the fundamental legal principle that strict adherence to statutory limitation periods is mandatory for the maintainability of legal proceedings. As the petition was filed well beyond the prescribed time limit without sufficient justification provided to condone such a substantial delay, the Court dismissed the petition as time-barred, thereby affirming that procedural compliance regarding limitation is a prerequisite for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained if it is filed 367 days beyond the limitation period?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Islamuddin (Represented by Heirs) and 2 Others vs S. Ejaz1970 SCMR 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-04
  settlement propertytransfer of propertycomposite buildingresidential and business unitswrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of urban property consisting of a residential portion and a shop under settlement laws. The core legal question involves the authority of settlement authorities to divide a composite building containing residential and business units into separate units for disposal and transfer, and whether a shop located in a commercial area can be claimed as part of a residential house. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner is duly authorized by law to divide buildings consisting of both residential and business units into separate units and allot them separately. Furthermore, the Court noted that the property was situated in a predominantly commercial area and could not be claimed as part of the residential portion, and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the writ petition due to inordinate delay. The key principle laid down is that settlement authorities possess the lawful power to divide composite properties into distinct residential and business units for separate disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner is authorized by law to divide a building consisting of residential and business units into separate units?
  • Can a shop located in a predominantly commercial area be claimed as an integral part of a residential portion?
  • Does an inordinate delay of more than three years in filing a writ petition justify its dismissal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State1970 SCMR 777 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-20
  murderstrangulationapprehension at the spotconfessional statementspecial leave to appealconcurrent findingscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the West Pakistan High Court, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld his conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of an 8/9-year-old girl, Mst. Sabri, though he was acquitted of the rape charge under Section 376. The core legal question concerned whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the petitioner's apprehension at the scene and his involvement in the murder warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was based on a proper appreciation of reliable eyewitness testimony, a confessional statement, and corroborating medical evidence, finding no grounds to interfere with the lower courts' findings. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution witnesses have no motive to falsely implicate an accused and their testimony is supported by independent evidence, direct apprehension at the crime scene, and medical reports, concurrent findings of guilt will not be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when the conviction is based on reliable eyewitness testimony and medical evidence?
  • Does apprehension of the accused at the spot by eyewitnesses serve as strong corroboration of guilt in a murder charge?
  • Whether the absence of motive for prosecution witnesses to falsely implicate the accused sustains a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Amtul Batul1970 SCMR 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  ejectmentdefault in rentretrospective operationurban rent restrictionlandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute over residential premises in Karachi, which were transferred to the respondent in 1959 and subsequently let out to the petitioner in 1961. The petitioner defaulted on rent payments from July 1961 to December 1963, prompting the respondent to file an ejectment application. The Rent Controller ordered the petitioner's eviction, a decision upheld by both the First Appellate Authority and summarily by the High Court of West Pakistan. The core legal question addressed is whether Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, has retrospective application to ejectment proceedings instituted before its enactment, and whether prolonged rent default can be condoned due to collateral disputes in the Settlement Department. The Supreme Court held that Section 13-A cannot be applied retrospectively to an ejectment application filed in 1963 before the provision came into force in 1965, and that arrears exceeding two years of rent cannot be condoned based on pending settlement department disputes. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, apply retrospectively to ejectment applications filed before its enactment?
  • Can a tenant's default in rent exceeding two years be condoned merely because a collateral dispute is pending in the Settlement Department?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Husain vs Abdul Razzaq and Another1970 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  temporary injunctionexpert opinionadmissibility of evidencecross-examinationremand of casecivil procedurespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a High Court order remanding a civil suit for permanent injunction to the trial court. The petitioner, a landowner, sought to restrain the respondents from operating a brick kiln, alleging that smoke emissions threatened his garden. The trial and appellate courts granted a temporary injunction based on a certificate from an agricultural expert. The High Court, however, set aside these orders, ruling that the expert's certificate was inadmissible as evidence because it lacked supporting affidavits and the author had not been produced for cross-examination. The core legal question was whether a court can rely on an expert's certificate as substantive evidence without the author being examined as a witness. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that such documents are inadmissible without the author's testimony. The key principle laid down is that an expert's opinion or certificate, when contested, cannot be treated as legal evidence unless the author is produced as a witness in court and subjected to cross-examination by the opposing party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court rely on an expert's certificate as evidence if the author has not been produced for cross-examination?
  • Is an expert's certificate admissible in civil proceedings without supporting affidavits or oral testimony?
  • Does a court err by granting an injunction based solely on an expert's document that has been contradicted by the same expert?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Ch. Muzaffar Hussain and 2 Other1970 SCMR 583 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-10
  displaced persontransfer of propertylandlord and tenantpast and closed transactionleave to appealestoppel of tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court at Lahore, which had allowed a writ petition filed by a local respondent and set aside the transfer of a house previously made in favor of the petitioner, a claimant displaced person. The core legal question concerns whether the transfer of the property had become a past and closed transaction, and whether the respondent, having previously accepted the petitioner as his landlord and paid rent, was barred in law from disputing the petitioner's title. The Supreme Court held that there was force in the contentions raised by the petitioner regarding the transaction being past and closed and the estoppel against disputing the landlord's title under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transfer of property in favor of a claimant displaced person constitutes a past and closed transaction that cannot be subsequently challenged?
  • Is a tenant who has accepted a petitioner as his landlord and paid rent barred in law from disputing the landlord's title under Section 116 of the Evidence Act?
  • Can settlement authorities review a transfer order after the power of review has been taken away by law?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif and Others vs Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha1970 SCMR 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-07
  settlement proceedingsrevisiontransfer of landstatus quosupreme court appealdemarcation proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on March 4, 1970, to examine the validity of an order passed by the Settlement Commissioner in revision, which set aside the transfer of certain lands in favour of the petitioners and ordered a fresh division. The core legal question concerned whether the Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to alter transfer orders during demarcation proceedings, and whether one of the petitioners was improperly excluded under a misconception. The Court held that pending the final determination of the appeal, the impugned order of fresh division passed by the Settlement Commissioner should not be given effect to, and the status quo between the parties must be maintained. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court may grant an order to maintain the status quo during the pendency of an appeal to prevent the execution of a disputed administrative or quasi-judicial order that threatens to alter rights before the matter is fully adjudicated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner has jurisdiction to alter orders of transfer in demarcation proceedings?
  • Can the Supreme Court order the maintenance of status quo during the pendency of an appeal against an order of the Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Gul vs The State1970 SCMR 797 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-01
  murderSection 302 PPCeyewitness testimonydelay in FIRrelated witnessescorroborative evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his co-villager, which was affirmed by the High Court of West Pakistan. The prosecution case rested on the eyewitness testimony of the deceased's son, uterine brother, and relative, supported by motive evidence and the location of the occurrence near a mosque. The petitioner challenged the conviction primarily on grounds of delay in lodging the First Information Report, discrepancies between the weapon named in the FIR ('bandook') and at trial ('rifle'), and arguments regarding the target and direction of the shot. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that although the delay in lodging the FIR remained unexplained, it was not fatal as the prosecution gained no unfair advantage and only a single assailant was named without prior background enmity. The Court affirmed that natural related witnesses corroborated by local circumstances provide reliable evidence, and minor descriptive terms for firearms do not undermine the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging a First Information Report render the prosecution case doubtful if no false implication or advantage is gained?
  • Can the testimony of related eyewitnesses sustain a conviction for murder if they are natural witnesses corroborated by the physical surroundings of the occurrence?
  • Does describing a firearm as 'bandook' in an Urdu First Information Report constitute a material discrepancy when trial evidence specifies a rifle?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din and Another vs Government of Pakistan and 9 Other1970 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-04
  evacuee propertyequity of redemptionmortgagee rightssettlement authoritiescompensation poolimmovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who held possession of certain lands as mortgagees, challenged the allotment of these lands to respondents by the Settlement Authorities. The petitioners argued that the land was not evacuee property, that it could not be treated as such after 1957, that the mortgagor's right was merely a right to sue, and that their possession could not be disturbed until redemption. The High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the equity of redemption is immovable property which vested in the Custodian in 1947, and that the petitioners held only a charge over the property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, affirming that the property was indeed evacuee property and that the petitioners' rights were limited to a charge over the property for the mortgage money due. The Court held that the petitioners could seek assessment and recovery of this charge through the proper forum as provided by the statute, and that their rights were not prejudiced by the allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Is the equity of redemption considered immovable property?
  • Does the equity of redemption vest in the Custodian as evacuee property?
  • Can a mortgagee of evacuee property claim a charge over the property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Chand Mia vs Muhammad Noab Ali Alias Noab and Other1970 SCMR 855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  special leave to appealorder of remandsecond appealnecessary partyhouse rentEast Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against an order of remand passed by the High Court of East Pakistan in a second appeal. The petitioner had instituted a suit for the recovery of arrears of house rent against the respondents, which was decreed by the trial Court and upheld by the first appellate Court. However, the first appellate Court failed to consider a crucial issue regarding whether the Province of East Pakistan was a necessary party. Consequently, the High Court set aside the decisions and remanded the matter. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in remanding the second appeal for reconsideration of a material issue not properly addressed by the lower appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the remand order was lawful and well-founded, as the issue required the evaluation of legal precedents and the potential taking of further evidence which the High Court could not appropriately undertake at the second appeal stage. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can order a remand in a second appeal when the lower courts failed to consider a material issue?
  • Is an order of remand illegal or without jurisdiction when the unresolved issue requires the taking of further evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota and 12 Others vs Ch. Faiz Muhammad and 8 Other1970 SCMR 592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-29
  dispossessioncriminal procedurepossession disputefinality of ordersmagisterial jurisdictionimplementation of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a dispute over the possession of two squares of land, where the respondent filed an application under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Following an inquiry, the Additional District Magistrate passed an order on 27 November 1962, declaring the respondent had been illegally dispossessed and was entitled to recover possession. Despite this, the Magistrate later dismissed the respondent's application for implementation, claiming the original order was merely declaratory and lacked specificity regarding the land's identity. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Sessions Judge and the High Court, finding that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to review the final order of 27 November 1962. The Court held that an order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is not merely declaratory but requires a determination of possession, and that the identity of the land was sufficiently established in the initial application and preliminary order. Consequently, the Magistrate's refusal to implement the order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Additional District Magistrate have the jurisdiction to review a final order passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an order passed under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 merely declaratory in nature?
  • Can a Magistrate refuse to implement an order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the grounds of lack of specificity if the land was identified in the preliminary order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs Mst. Rehmat Bibi and 5 Other1970 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-15
  inheritance disputepaternityconcurrent findings of factspecial leave to appealmutation of propertyappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the West Pakistan High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal regarding the inheritance of agricultural land. The core dispute concerned the paternity of the respondent, Mst. Rehmat Bibi, who claimed to be the daughter of the deceased, Noor Muhammad. The petitioner, a collateral heir, alleged that the respondent was not the deceased's daughter but the child of the widow from a previous marriage, and sought a declaration of ownership of the disputed share. The trial court, the district court, and the High Court all concurrently found that the respondent was indeed the daughter of the deceased, based on the evidence presented. The Supreme Court held that where there are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding paternity, the Supreme Court will not re-open such findings unless they are perverse or against the evidence, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Finding no such error, the petition was dismissed, affirming the established principle that concurrent findings of fact are generally final in appellate review.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts?
  • Is the burden of proof regarding paternity shifted to the plaintiff when challenging a mutation entry?
  • Can a finding of fact be re-opened in the Supreme Court if it is not perverse or against the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir Alias Shikra vs The State1970 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  murderappreciation of evidenceeye-witness testimonyabscondencecriminal petitiondeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, convicted of murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the West Pakistan High Court, filed a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question involved the appreciation of prosecution evidence and the reliability of eye-witness testimony, including allegations of a delayed First Information Report and the presence of charring marks from close-range firearm shots. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts properly appraised the evidence, that minor procedural irregularities by the police do not vitiate the prosecution case, and that unrelated eye-witnesses without enmity towards the accused provide reliable testimony. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related and unrelated eye-witnesses can be relied upon in a murder trial when corroborated by other circumstances?
  • Does a procedural irregularity by the police in recording the First Information Report vitiate the entire prosecution case?
  • What is the evidentiary value of the abscondence of an accused person after the commission of a crime?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh and 5 Others vs S. A. A. Khan, C. S. P. Member, Board1970 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-13
  writ jurisdictiondisputed titlerevenue boardcivil courtlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the decision of the High Court of West Pakistan refusing to interfere in writ jurisdiction with an order of the Member, Board of Revenue, which directed the petitioners to seek their remedy in a civil court regarding a disputed land. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the Revenue Board's order relegating the parties to a civil court when title is seriously disputed and no relationship of landlord and tenant is established. The Supreme Court held that where complicated questions of fact and law regarding title are involved and the respondents genuinely dispute the petitioners' title while claiming possession in their own right, the Revenue Board acted within its jurisdiction in directing the parties to resolve the matter through a civil court. The key principle laid down is that revenue authorities and writ courts should not adjudicate upon complex, disputed questions of title, which are properly left for determination by civil courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Board of Revenue can direct parties to seek remedy in a civil court when complicated questions of title are involved?
  • Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with an order of the Board of Revenue relegating a title dispute to a civil court?
  • Is a revenue court the appropriate forum to adjudicate upon a serious dispute of title where the relationship of landlord and tenant is absent?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azim Khan and Another vs The District Tribunal, Mianwali1970 SCMR 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-10
  leave to appealcourt-feewrit petitionconstitutional jurisdictioncivil naturebail proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the High Court passed under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962, seeking release on bail pending proceedings under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance. The core legal question was whether a petition for leave to appeal arising from a writ petition relating to bail in proceedings under the said Ordinance is of a criminal nature exempt from standard court-fee or of a civil nature requiring a stamp of Rs. 250. The Supreme Court held that the petition is of a civil nature requiring the requisite court-fee stamp, following its recent precedent in Ex-Captain Muhammad Akram Khan. The key principle laid down is that petitions for leave to appeal arising from writ petitions under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution are classified as civil in nature and must be duly stamped accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal arising from a writ petition under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution is of a civil or criminal nature?
  • Does a petition for leave to appeal from a High Court order concerning bail in proceedings under the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance require a court-fee stamp of Rs. 250?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azam vs The State.1970 P Cr. L J 805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  quashing of commitment orderprima facie evidencecommittal proceedingsframing of chargecriminal trialleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's application for the quashing of a commitment order passed by a Magistrate. The petitioner and a co-accused were committed to the Court of Sessions to stand trial for murder and attempted murder under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly declined to quash the commitment order, given the petitioner's contention that the evidence on record was insufficient to justify framing a charge. The Supreme Court held that the petition for leave to appeal must be dismissed. The Court reasoned that it was premature to conclude at the committal stage that there was a total absence of evidence against the petitioner, as the First Information Report specifically named the accused and there was prima facie evidence implicating them. The key principle laid down is that the High Court should not interfere with a committal order where there is prima facie evidence to support the framing of charges, as the accused must stand trial to test the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court should quash a commitment order when there is prima facie evidence against the accused?
  • Is it appropriate for a court to determine the sufficiency of evidence for conviction at the committal stage?
  • Does the naming of an accused in the First Information Report constitute sufficient grounds to proceed to trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azam vs The State1970 SCMR 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  commitment orderquashing of proceedingsprima facie casecriminal trialleave to appealmurder charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the West Pakistan High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's application for the quashing of a commitment order passed by a Magistrate. The petitioner and a co-accused were committed to the Court of Sessions to stand trial for offences under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a criminal case registered against them regarding a shooting incident. The core legal question was whether the commitment order should be quashed on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to implicate the petitioner. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that there was sufficient prima facie evidence on the record to warrant the trial. The Court affirmed that it is premature to quash commitment proceedings when there is evidence available to implicate the accused, and that the accused must face trial before the Sessions Court. The Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the evaluation of evidence at the commitment stage is limited to determining the existence of a prima facie case.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate to quash a commitment order when there is prima facie evidence against the accused?
  • Does the existence of named accused in an F.I.R. constitute sufficient grounds to proceed to trial?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order dismissing a petition for quashment of proceedings when evidence exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azad and 6 Others vs The State1970 SCMR 780 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1957-04-15
  criminal appealcommon intentionunlawful assemblyconstructive liabilityriotinggrievous hurtmurderappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from convictions for murder, rioting, and causing grievous hurt following a violent election-day clash. The core legal questions were whether the evidence sufficiently established the primary appellant's guilt for murder and whether the constructive liability for the other appellants should be predicated on Section 149 or Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court upheld the murder conviction, finding the eyewitness testimony credible. Regarding the other appellants, the Court held that while they were liable for grievous hurt, the application of Section 149 was inappropriate because the violence consisted of sporadic, isolated assaults rather than a unified mass attack. Consequently, the Court substituted the basis of liability to Section 34, reflecting joint responsibility for specific acts. The judgment establishes the principle that where assaults are sporadic and isolated, constructive liability is more appropriately grounded in common intention under Section 34 rather than the common object of an unlawful assembly under Section 149. Furthermore, the Court reiterated its practice of not interfering with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether constructive liability for grievous hurt should be based on Section 149 or Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in cases of sporadic assaults?
  • Can a conviction under Section 325 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 323 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the evaluation of witness evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Raja vs The State the State (a) Penal Code (XLV Of 1860),1970 SCMR 450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam And Raja vs The State- The State- Respondents (a)1970 P Cr. L J 987 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and Another vs The Border Area Committee, Lahore1970 SCMR 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  Border Area Committeeexternmentwrit jurisdictionundesirable personscompensationstatutory compliancenatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the actions of the Border Area Committee regarding the petitioners' externment. The petitioners, residents of a border area, were proceeded against under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959, for activities prejudicial to the security or economy of Pakistan. After failing to respond to notices or participate in proceedings, they were declared undesirable persons and subsequently externed. The petitioners later sought permission to re-enter the area, claiming ownership of immovable property, which was refused. The High Court dismissed their challenge, finding the Committee's actions regular and noting the petitioners' own negligence in failing to disclose their property interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioners could not complain of illegality when their own non-compliance with statutory notices caused the situation. The Court emphasized that the petitioners' right to compensation for their immovable property remained protected under the High Court's order, and thus, no interference was warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who fails to respond to statutory notices and participate in administrative proceedings later challenge the resulting order as illegal?
  • Does the failure of a party to disclose immovable property to the Border Area Committee preclude them from later claiming compensation for that property?
  • Is the High Court justified in dismissing a writ petition against an administrative order where the petitioner's own negligence caused the adverse outcome?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashram Khan and an Other vs Mst. Said Jan and 5 Other1970 SCMR 775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-24
  pre-emptionsale versus exchangesecond appealquestions of fact and lawspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed a second appeal in a suit for pre-emption. The petitioners filed the suit alleging that a transaction of sale of land and a haveli was disguised as an exchange to defeat their right of pre-emption. The trial and appellate courts concurrently found that the haveli was transferred separately in 1950 and that the transfer of agricultural land was genuinely an exchange rather than a sale, a concurrent finding of fact upheld by the High Court in second appeal. The core legal question was whether the characterization of the transaction as a sale or an exchange was a pure question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact, and whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts rightly concluded the transaction was an exchange and that the subsequent sale a year and three months later did not alter the nature of the original exchange transaction. The key principle laid down is that the determination of whether a transaction is a sale or an exchange based on the sequence and nature of subsequent transfers is essentially a question of fact supported by evidence, and timing distinct from immediate succession (unlike a transfer occurring merely two days later) negates any presumption of a disguised sale.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the characterization of a transaction as a sale or an exchange is a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact?
  • Can the High Court interfere in second appeal with concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of a property transaction?
  • Does a subsequent sale of land received in exchange, occurring a significant period after the exchange, render the original transaction a sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf, Mushtaq Ahmad vs DR. Arshad Malik, C. S. P., Chairman, District Family the Deputy Commissioner_Chairman, Family Planning Board, Lahore1970 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-31
  temporary government employeetermination of servicewrit jurisdictionshow-cause noticeconstitutional protectionservice matterunsatisfactory performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal filed by former temporary Family Planning Officers whose services were terminated by the Family Planning Department. The core legal question was whether temporary government employees, whose services were terminated due to unsatisfactory performance, are entitled to a show-cause notice under the constitutional framework, despite the temporary nature of their employment. The Supreme Court held that the petitions must be dismissed. The Court reasoned that under Article 179(2) of the Constitution, temporary employees are expressly denied the protections afforded by Articles 175 to 178, which would otherwise require an opportunity to show cause against termination. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the High Court correctly refused to exercise writ jurisdiction, as the petitioners failed to demonstrate that any specific law enacted under Article 174 provided them with a right to a hearing. The Court clarified that if the petitioners felt aggrieved by the stigma attached to their termination or alleged a breach of service conditions, their appropriate remedy lay in seeking redress through civil courts rather than through constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Are temporary government employees entitled to a show-cause notice before the termination of their services under the Constitution of 1962?
  • Does the High Court have writ jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination of temporary government employees where no statutory right to a hearing exists?
  • Can temporary employees claim the protection of Articles 175 to 178 of the Constitution of 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif Gulab Khan and 6 Others Imtiaz Khan and Another vs The State. the State. the State1970 SCMR 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-17
  cognizance of offencepolice reportcancellation of casemagisterial discretioncriminal procedureinvestigation report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding the initiation of criminal proceedings. The petitioners faced various criminal charges, but the Crimes Branch, upon investigation, recommended the cancellation of these cases, deeming them false. The Additional District Magistrate, Jhelum, disagreed with the Crimes Branch's recommendation and directed the police to submit a proper challan, effectively taking cognizance of the offences. The petitioners challenged this, arguing that the Magistrate could not proceed when the police report recommended cancellation. The High Court rejected this contention and transferred the cases to another jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that a Magistrate is not bound by a police report recommending the cancellation of a case. The Court affirmed that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate retains the authority to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(b) regardless of a negative report submitted by the police under Section 173. The Magistrate is entitled to independently evaluate the facts and proceed with the case if they disagree with the investigating officer's conclusions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate bound by a police report recommending the cancellation of a criminal case?
  • Can a Magistrate take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 despite a negative report from the police?
  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to order the submission of a challan when the investigating officer has recommended the cancellation of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif Gulab Khan and 6 Others Imtiaz Khan and Another vs The State the State the State Criminal Procedure Code (v of 1898),1970 P Cr. L J 896 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-17
  cognizance of offencepolice reportcancellation of casemagisterial discretioncriminal procedurechallan
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a criminal petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which upheld a Magistrate's decision to proceed with a case despite a police report recommending cancellation. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate is legally bound by a police report recommending the cancellation of a case, or if the Magistrate retains the authority to take cognizance of an offense and order the submission of a challan despite such a negative report. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the Magistrate is not bound by the conclusions of the investigating officer. The Court affirmed that a Magistrate possesses the judicial discretion to take cognizance of an offense under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, regardless of whether the police report suggests the case should be cancelled. The principle established is that a Magistrate’s power to take cognizance of an offense is independent of the police's opinion in a report submitted under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate bound by a police report recommending the cancellation of a criminal case?
  • Can a Magistrate take cognizance of an offense despite a negative report submitted by the police?
  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to order the police to submit a challan after receiving a report recommending case cancellation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar vs The State1970 SCMR 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-16
  murdersentence commutationheat of passionprovocationdeath penaltycriminal appealsurgical negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Fazal Elahi and sentenced to death, a decision upheld by the High Court. Leave to appeal was granted to determine whether the lesser sentence of transportation for life was appropriate given the circumstances. The prosecution established that the appellant, seeking an individual named Abdul Ghafoor, engaged in a quarrel with the deceased. The altercation escalated into a physical struggle, during which the appellant stabbed the deceased, who later died in the hospital. The appellant argued that the incident occurred in the heat of passion following provocation and that the offence should be reduced to Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, citing potential surgical error. The Supreme Court rejected the plea of self-defence, noting the deceased was unarmed, and dismissed the claim of surgical negligence. However, the Court held that the sudden nature of the fight, arising from a heated exchange, constituted sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant commuting the death sentence to transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sudden altercation and exchange of abuses constitute sufficient provocation to mitigate a death sentence for murder?
  • Is the plea of self-defence available to an accused who kills an unarmed person during a physical struggle?
  • Can an accused successfully argue that death resulted from surgical error rather than the inflicted injury without specific evidence of such negligence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amir vs Member (Colonies) Board of Revenue, West1970 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-25
  lambardari grantproprietary rightsgovernment grantvested rightland resumptionwrit jurisdictionadministrative policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court regarding the acquisition of proprietary rights in land held under a lambardari grant. The petitioner, a temporary lambardar who later became permanent, sought to acquire proprietary rights in the allotted land at a price of Rs. 130 per acre, based on an old policy. The Board of Revenue, however, fixed the price at Rs. 800 per acre in accordance with current policy, and upon the petitioner's refusal to pay this amount, ordered the resumption of the land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed a vested right to acquire proprietary rights at a previously quoted price. The Supreme Court held that a government grant is a favor, not a vested right, and the government retains the authority to revise its policies regarding such grants. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the petitioner could not dictate the terms or price of the grant, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a lambardari grant confer a vested right upon the grantee to acquire proprietary rights at a fixed price?
  • Is the government entitled to revise its policies regarding the price for acquiring proprietary rights in lambardari grants?
  • Can a grantee of state land dictate the terms and conditions for the acquisition of proprietary rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Alias Muhammad Ali vs Raja and 7 Other1970 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-02
  giftreversionary rightsfemale proprietary rightsalienation of propertycolonization of government landsjurisdictionappellate jurisdictionstatutory interpretationDarya Burdi Schemelife estate
  Summary & questions settled

  This certificated appeal arose from a civil suit seeking a declaration that a gift of land by Mst. Salehon in favor of the appellant was null and void against the reversionary rights of the plaintiffs. The core legal questions concerned the interpretation of "on account of some male person" in Section 30-A(b) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, regarding a female tenant's proprietary rights, and the High Court's jurisdiction to deliver judgment after the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962 came into effect. The Supreme Court held that Mst. Salehon's tenancy was acquired "on account of some male person" (her deceased husband Ahmad) as she received the land due to his prior loss, not in her own independent right. Therefore, Section 30-A(b) applied, restricting her alienation powers, and the gift was void. The Court further ruled that the High Court retained jurisdiction to announce judgment because the appeal was not "pending hearing" under Section 28(3) of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962, as arguments had concluded before the Ordinance's commencement. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the phrase "on account of some male person" in Section 30-A(b) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  • Does Section 30-A(b) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, apply to grants made under the Darya Burdi Scheme to a widow in lieu of her deceased husband's lost property?
  • When does an appeal cease to be "pending hearing" for the purpose of transfer of jurisdiction under Section 28(3) of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962?
  • Can a High Court deliver judgment in an appeal if arguments were heard before the commencement of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962, which altered appellate jurisdiction thresholds?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs The State1970 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-24
  murder convictioninterested witnessescorroboration of evidencerecovery of weaponspecial leave to appealcriminal appealblood-stained weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner for the murder of Muhammad Saleem under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court initially convicted the petitioner and three co-accused, but the High Court acquitted the co-accused while maintaining the petitioner's conviction and death sentence. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained based on the testimony of interested eye-witnesses when corroborated by the recovery of a blood-stained weapon. The Supreme Court held that while the evidence of interested witnesses requires corroboration in cases of enmity, the recovery of a weapon at the instance of the accused, which was subsequently confirmed by a Serologist to be stained with human blood, provided sufficient corroborative evidence to support the conviction. The Court affirmed that the High Court had properly appreciated the evidence and that no grounds existed to interfere with the sentence. The judgment reinforces the principle that recovery of a weapon linked to the accused can serve as valid corroboration for interested witness testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of interested witnesses be relied upon to sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence?
  • Does the recovery of a blood-stained weapon at the instance of an accused serve as sufficient corroboration for eye-witness testimony?
  • Is a conviction for murder sustainable when co-accused are acquitted based on a lack of corroborative evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram vs The State1970 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-29
  illicit charasrecovery witnessespolice stock witnessessearch and recoverypetition for leave to appealexcise offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Akram against his conviction under section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act for the possession of illicit charas. The core legal question concerned whether the recovery of the contraband violated section 103 of the Criminal Procedure Code due to the alleged status of the recovery witnesses as police stock witnesses and their residence outside the immediate locality. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit, finding that the witnesses were residents of areas close to the place of recovery and that at least one witness was an independent zamindar not disqualified from testifying. The court established the principle that witnesses residing in areas close to the place of recovery who are not biased or proven to be stock witnesses satisfy the requirements for validating a search and recovery under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of recovery witnesses residing close to the place of recovery satisfy the requirements of search?
  • Can witnesses who have assisted excise officials in the past be automatically categorized as police stock witnesses?
  • Whether the provisions of search require witnesses to be strictly from the immediate locality of the recovery?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram vs Mst. Islam Bibi and 7 Other1970 SCMR 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-03-29
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritiesinformerstatutory interpretationpending proceedingsjurisdictionrepeal of law
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the transfer of an evacuee shop. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities retained jurisdiction to transfer evacuee property to an informer after the amendment of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, via Ordinance No. II of 1962. The petitioner argued that proceedings were pending prior to the law change and thus protected under the General Clauses Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the amendment to Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, by Ordinance No. II of 1962, removed the power of the Central Government to approve alternative methods of property disposal, effectively stripping Settlement Authorities of the jurisdiction to transfer property to informers. Furthermore, the Court noted that the reference by the Enforcement Staff was made after the change in law, rendering the proceedings incompetent. The key principle established is that the repeal or amendment of a statutory provision authorizing a specific administrative power terminates that power, and pending proceedings cannot be saved where the underlying jurisdiction for the action itself has been extinguished by legislative change.

  Questions settled

  • Does the amendment of Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 by Ordinance No. II of 1962 extinguish the power of Settlement Authorities to transfer property to informers?
  • Can proceedings initiated after a change in law be considered 'pending proceedings' protected by the General Clauses Act 1897?
  • Does the deletion of a clause authorizing a specific method of property disposal remove the Central Government's power to approve such disposal methods?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar Hussain and 4 Other vs Government of West1970 PLD Supreme Court 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional jurisdictionjudicial reviewexecutive authorityultra vireswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the interpretation and application of statutory provisions in a writ petition context. The primary legal question centers on whether administrative or executive orders passed without lawful authority or in violation of statutory rules can be sustained under constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court evaluated the scope of judicial review over executive actions, examining whether procedural non-compliance invalidated the impugned orders. Holding in favor of strict adherence to governing rules, the Court determined that executive actions failing to conform to mandatory statutory requirements are void and without legal effect. The Court re-affirmed the fundamental principle that statutory bodies and executive authorities must act strictly within the parameters defined by law, and any exercise of power exceeding statutory limits or violating principles of natural justice is subject to correction under constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an executive order passed in violation of statutory rules is void and without legal effect?
  • Can administrative decisions exceeding statutory power be corrected under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does procedural non-compliance with mandatory statutory provisions invalidate an administrative action?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar Khan vs Sultan Ghani and Other1970 SCMR 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-24
  Sale deedConsiderationPossession of landEvidence ActRecital in deedNon-payment of sale priceContractual dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for possession of land, where the appellant, Muhammad Akbar Khan, sold 192 kanals and 4 marlas to the respondent, Sultan Ghani, via a sale deed. The appellant forcibly re-entered the land, claiming the full sale price of Rs. 60,000 had not been paid, specifically alleging Rs. 26,000 remained outstanding despite a recital in the deed stating private receipt. The lower courts concurrently found against the appellant on the question of payment and the identity of the land. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court held that the appellant was precluded by Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act from going behind the recital in the sale deed that the entire sum had been paid, as he had not pleaded that the sale was vitiated by fraud, intimidation, want of due execution, want of capacity to contract, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law, as per the second proviso to Section 92. The respondent's suit for possession was thus rightly decreed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellant contradict the recital of payment in a registered sale deed if fraud or other vitiating factors are not pleaded?
  • Does the Evidence Act preclude a party from going behind the recitals in a sale deed regarding the payment of consideration?
  • Is a party bound by the recitals in a sale deed concerning the receipt of consideration when no vitiating circumstances under the Evidence Act are alleged?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar and Another vs Muhammad Aslam And Another1970 SCMR 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-04
  compromiseadjustment of suitthird party statementcontractual agreementretraction of agreementdiscretion of courtarbitration actoaths act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether an agreement between parties to have a suit decided by the statement of a third person constitutes an adjustment under Order XXIII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, or an arbitration under the Arbitration Act, or an oath under the Oaths Act 1873. The appellants filed a suit for rendition of accounts and dissolution of partnership and subsequently agreed to abide by the statement of one Abdur Razzak. Before Abdur Razzak's statement was recorded, the appellants applied to retract from the agreement alleging misconduct, but the trial court proceeded to record the statement and decreed the suit. The Supreme Court held that such an agreement does not amount to an adjustment under Order XXIII Rule 3, nor does it fall under the Oaths Act or the Arbitration Act, but operates as a contract which the court may enforce in its discretion. The Court ruled that parties may retract from such agreements before the third person's statement is made, and the court must exercise its discretion whether to hold the parties to it based on the circumstances. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Is an agreement to have a suit decided by the statement of a third person an adjustment within the purview of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can parties to an agreement to abide by a third person's statement retract from the agreement before the statement is recorded in court?
  • Does an agreement to be bound by the statement of a third person fall under the provisions of the Oaths Act 1873 or the Arbitration Act?
  • How should a trial court exercise its discretion when a party seeks to resile from an agreement to have a dispute decided by a third person?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal, vs The Crown1970 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1953-02-06
  criminal appealwitness credibilityresiling witnessesadmissibility of evidencecommitting magistratetransfer of statementsculpable homicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, affirmed by the High Court. The core legal question concerns the admissibility and evidentiary value of statements made by prosecution witnesses before a Committing Magistrate, which were transferred to the Sessions file under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, despite being marked 'subject to objection' by the trial judge. The appellant contended that the failure to formally decide these objections rendered the statements inadmissible. The Court held that the transfer of such statements to the Sessions file is valid and they constitute substantive evidence in the case, even if the witnesses resile from their earlier testimony at trial. The key principle laid down is that while witnesses who materially alter their testimony are inherently unreliable, a trial court may, after careful scrutiny, rely on their earlier statements made before a Committing Magistrate if it concludes those statements were truthful and the subsequent changes were deliberate attempts to favor the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can statements made before a Committing Magistrate be treated as substantive evidence in a Sessions trial if the witnesses resile from their testimony?
  • Does a trial court's notation that evidence is transferred 'subject to objection' invalidate the admissibility of that evidence if the objection is not formally adjudicated?
  • Is a conviction sustainable based on statements transferred from a Committing Magistrate's record when the witnesses have turned hostile at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs The Crown1970 P Cr. L J 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1953-02-06
  criminal appealculpable homicidetransfer of statementcommitting magistratehostile witnesseye-witness testimonycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave from a decision of the High Court affirming the appellant's conviction under section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question concerns the admissibility and legal effect of previous statements of eye-witnesses made before the Committing Magistrate that were transferred to the Sessions file under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 'subject to decision of objection'. The Supreme Court held that the statements were validly admitted and treated as evidence in the case, despite the ambiguous phrasing of the trial judge, as they were read out and relied upon without any precise objection being pressed. The key principle laid down is that where witnesses resile from their statements at the trial, the court may, after careful scrutiny and caution, rely upon their previous statements made before the Committing Magistrate if found to be true and deliberately altered at the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether previous statements of witnesses made before the Committing Magistrate can be treated as evidence under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when transferred subject to objections?
  • Can a court rely on statements made before the Committing Magistrate in preference to resiled statements made during the trial?
  • What is the duty of the court when evaluating witnesses who alter their statements in material particulars between the committing court and the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afsar and 7 Others vs Allah Ditta and 13 Other1970 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-03
  occupancy rightsabandonment of tenancyPunjab Tenancy Actrevenue recordssecond appealextinction of tenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a second appeal in a suit filed by landlord-petitioners seeking a declaration that the respondent-tenants had abandoned their occupancy rights and were consequently ineligible to acquire ownership rights under Section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the minority of certain co-sharer tenants constituted a sufficient cause for non-cultivation under Section 38 of the Act. The District Judge reversed this decision, placing the burden of proof on the tenants. On second appeal, the High Court restored the trial court's judgment, holding that revenue records consistently reflected the respondents as tenants, a tenancy cannot be extinguished in part, and minority constituted sufficient cause. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, holding that a finding of fact can be interfered with in second appeal where material evidence, such as consistent revenue entries, was ignored by lower courts. The Supreme Court also affirmed that a tenancy cannot be extinguished in part. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact be disturbed in a second appeal if material evidence was ignored by the lower courts?
  • Whether the minority of a co-sharer tenant can constitute a sufficient cause for non-cultivation under Section 38 of the Punjab Tenancy Act?
  • Can an occupancy tenancy be extinguished in part?
  Read full judgment →
• Mughal Khan vs The State1970 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-26
  murderspecial leave to appealmedical evidenceeyewitness testimonycriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, upholding the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence of death for the murder of Umar Din deceased. The prosecution case is that the petitioner stabbed the deceased with a knife following a dispute over the deceased serving the petitioner's opponent. The defense contended that the occurrence happened differently, alleging the deceased attacked the petitioner first, and further argued that medical evidence regarding an empty stomach contradicted the prosecution's timeline. The core legal question was whether the direct eyewitness testimony should prevail over the medical evidence regarding the time of meals and whether the conviction was sustainable. The Supreme Court held that in the face of reliable direct eyewitness evidence, no adverse importance can be attached to the medical evidence regarding the stomach contents. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can medical evidence regarding the contents of the stomach override reliable direct eyewitness testimony in a murder case?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts based on appreciation of evidence?
  • Is a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code sustainable when supported by natural eyewitnesses and corroborated circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarik Shah vs Mst. Bakhmala and 3 Other1970 SCMR 611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-27
  mortgage redemptionadverse possessioninheritance mutationspecial leave to appealproprietary rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's Regular Second Appeal regarding a property dispute. The petitioner claimed exclusive ownership of certain land, asserting that he had redeemed the property from a mortgage using his own funds and had maintained possession for over 12 years, thereby challenging the inheritance mutation of his deceased brother. The core legal question was whether the act of redeeming mortgaged property confers ownership upon the redeemer or merely substitutes them as the mortgagee, and whether the petitioner could claim the mortgage amount in the current proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not become the owner by redeeming the land; rather, he merely stood in the shoes of the mortgagee. The Court affirmed that the petitioner could not be granted relief for the mortgage amount in the present suit, as his claim was based on exclusive ownership, not mortgage recovery. The principle laid down is that a redeemer of mortgaged property cannot claim ownership based on redemption, and any claim for the recovery of mortgage funds must be pursued through a separate, appropriate suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the redemption of mortgaged property by one co-owner confer exclusive ownership upon the redeemer?
  • Can a plaintiff who pleads exclusive ownership of property in a suit be granted relief for the recovery of mortgage funds in the same proceedings?
  • Does a person who redeems a mortgage on behalf of others merely stand in the shoes of the mortgagee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zaitoon and Another vs Farzand Ali and 8 Other1970 SCMR 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-12
  writ petitionstatus quo orderdiscretionary reliefviolation of stay orderpendente lite purchaserlocus standiallotment of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the allotment of agricultural lands in the district of Multan. The core legal question involves whether a petitioner who violates a status quo order passed by the High Court during pending writ proceedings remains entitled to discretionary constitutional relief, and whether a pendente lite purchaser of the disputed property can challenge the High Court's order. The Supreme Court held that a petitioner who commits an act of highhandedness by alienating disputed property in direct violation of a stay order disentitles herself to any discretionary relief from the court. The Court further held that a purchaser pendente lite who was not a party to the original writ petition lacks locus standi to challenge the High Court's order and purchases the property at his own peril. The key principle laid down is that interference with the due course of justice through the breach of a court's interim injunction bars a litigant from obtaining discretionary remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Does the violation of a status quo order by a petitioner disentitle her to discretionary relief in a writ petition?
  • Does a pendente lite purchaser have locus standi to challenge an order passed in a writ petition to which they were not a party?
  • At whose peril does a person purchase property that is subject to pending litigation and interim stay orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sharam Khatoon Alias Hakim Zadi vs The State and 7 OTHERSs1970 P Cr. L J 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-07
  criminal transfer applicationtransfer of criminal caseapprehension of dangerjudicial discretionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal transfer application filed under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerns the exercise of judicial discretion by the High Court in refusing to transfer a criminal case on the grounds of alleged threats and danger to the life of the petitioner and her witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the High Court properly exercised its discretion, noting that transferring the case to another nearby city would not remedy the alleged apprehensions and dangers. The Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal while issuing a specific administrative direction to the Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad, to provide armed escorts for the petitioner and her witnesses to and from the trial court on the dates of hearing. The key principle laid down is that discretionary orders of the High Court regarding the transfer of criminal trials will not be interfered with by the apex court unless discretion is shown to have been exercised improperly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to transfer a criminal case based on general apprehensions of danger?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court dismissing a criminal transfer application under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without proof of improper exercise of discretion?
  • Can the Supreme Court issue administrative directions for police protection to witnesses attending court hearings despite dismissing a transfer petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sharam Khatoon Alias Hakim Zadi vs The State And 7 Other1970 SCMR 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-07
  criminal transfertransfer of criminal casepolice escortwitness securityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal transfer application by the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench. The petitioner had previously obtained an order transferring her criminal case from Naushero Feroze to Tando Allahyar, but subsequently filed another transfer application under Section 526, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking a further transfer to Hyderabad city on the ground that her life and the lives of her witnesses were in danger. The High Court dismissed the second transfer application. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to transfer the criminal trial to another station despite apprehensions of danger to the petitioner and her witnesses. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the dismissal of the petition for leave to appeal, holding that instead of transferring the case, adequate security arrangements should be provided to ensure safe passage. The key principle laid down is that where security concerns are raised regarding the attendance of parties and witnesses at trial, the appropriate remedy is to direct police protection and escorts rather than disrupting the judicial proceedings through a transfer of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal case should be transferred on the ground of danger to the life of the petitioner and witnesses?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct police escort for witnesses and parties attending a trial instead of ordering a case transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sardara and Another vs Hanifullah and 15 Other1970 SCMR 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-03
  limited ownercustomary lawdower deedoccupancy tenancyinheritancespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a dispute over agricultural land and residential property originally owned by Said Rehman, who died in 1932. Upon his death, mutation was effected in favor of his widow, Mst. Sahib Jamala, under customary law as a limited owner. Mst. Sahib Jamala transferred the property to the petitioners before her death in 1958, following which the respondents (heirs of Abdur Rahim) instituted a suit for possession, claiming she was a limited owner and that a family arrangement existed. The trial court and District Judge decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, but the High Court modified the decree regarding certain Mianas situated in village Mian Isa, holding them to be validly transferred to Mst. Sahib Jamala by a dower deed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, holding that contentions regarding occupancy tenancy and its conversion not raised before the High Court were deemed abandoned, and that concurrent findings on property ownership supported by the record warranted no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a point regarding occupancy tenancy and its conversion not raised before the High Court be agitated for the first time in the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a widow holding property as a limited owner under custom can validly transfer property received through a dower deed executed by her husband?
  • Are findings of fact regarding the location and status of property based on revenue records binding in second appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Omai and Othress vs Hakeem Khan and Other1970 SCMR 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-03
  adverse possessioninheritance disputepossession of propertysecond appealspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute over the estate of Amar Din, who died in 1912, involving a claim for possession of a one-third share by his son Hakeem Khan. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners had established adverse possession over the suit land for the requisite statutory period of over twelve years. The Senior Sub-Judge, Bannu, initially dismissed the suit, finding the petitioners to be in adverse possession. However, the District Judge, Derajat, and subsequently the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, concurrently held that the possession of the petitioners was not proved to be adverse to the knowledge of the plaintiff, thus decreeing the suit and dismissing the second appeal. The Supreme Court considered the petition for special leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of fact regarding adverse possession. The Court upheld the judgments of the lower appellate and high courts, reinforcing the principle that a party claiming adverse possession must establish it clearly to the knowledge of the rightful owner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the burden of proving adverse possession lies on the person claiming it against the rightful owner?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding adverse possession be disturbed in second appeal without showing perversity?
  • Whether a suit for possession of inheritance is barred by time when adverse possession is not proved to the knowledge of the plaintiff?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasiban Bibi vs The Australasia Bank, Lahore and 2 Other1970 SCMR 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-20
  bona fide purchaserequitable mortgagetransfer of propertydue diligencetitle deedsurban immovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that denied the petitioner protection as a bona fide purchaser of a house. The house had been subject to an equitable mortgage created by the original owner, Muhammad Bashir, in favour of the respondent-Bank through the deposit of title deeds. The petitioner claimed protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, arguing that her reliance on revenue records, which showed no encumbrances, constituted sufficient inquiry. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's limited inquiry into revenue records satisfied the requirement for a bona fide purchaser to act with reasonable care. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioner's inquiry was insufficient. The Court established the principle that for urban immovable property, a purchaser's duty of inquiry is not satisfied by merely checking revenue records; it must extend to demanding the title deeds, which would have disclosed the existing equitable mortgage. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does reliance solely on revenue records constitute sufficient inquiry for a purchaser to claim protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • Is a purchaser of urban immovable property required to demand title deeds to establish bona fide status?
  • Can a purchaser claim protection as a bona fide purchaser if they fail to discover an equitable mortgage that would have been revealed by requesting the title deeds?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Murad Begum and Others vs Muhammad Rafiq and Other1970 SCMR 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-05
  special leave to appeallegal representativesabatement of appealnecessary partiescultivators
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' appeal on the ground that it had abated in its entirety for want of bringing on record the legal representatives of certain deceased parties. The core legal question is whether the non-joinder or failure to bring on record the legal representatives of certain deceased persons—who were allegedly mere cultivators with no independent title and had been given up in prior proceedings—resulted in the abatement of the entire appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in holding that the whole appeal fell through on account of the said abatement, given that the contesting parties and principal representatives were on the record and the deceased individuals allegedly held no independent rights. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the appeal could proceed without those representatives, while directing the petitioners to furnish security for costs and maintaining the stay of execution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal abates in its entirety due to the failure to bring on record the legal representatives of parties who died during the pendency of the suit?
  • Do cultivators possessing no independent right to retain property constitute necessary parties whose absence causes an appeal to fail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Keneez Amna and Others vs The First Additional District Judge and Other1970 SCMR 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-28
  settlement lawsdivisibility of propertywrit jurisdictionfinding of factspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of a residential building in Hyderabad under settlement laws, where rival applications for transfer were filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners and the third respondent. The core legal question is whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, can interfere with a concurrent finding of fact by settlement authorities regarding the divisibility of a house into separate residential units. The Supreme Court held that the question of divisibility of a house is a question of fact determined by settlement authorities after considering various factors, and such a finding cannot be challenged or interfered with in writ proceedings. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact rendered by specialized settlement tribunals regarding the physical divisibility of property are final and immune from judicial review under writ jurisdiction unless shown to be illegal or perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of divisibility of a house is a question of fact that can be challenged in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact arrived at by settlement authorities regarding property units?
  • Does a Letters Patent Bench properly dismiss a writ petition challenging a concurrent factual determination of settlement authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaneez Fatima vs Settlement Commissioner (with the1970 SCMR 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-27
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyprovisional transfer ordersettlement authoritiespossession rightsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of evacuee property, specifically a residential building in Hyderabad, between the petitioner, Mst. Kaneez Fatima, and respondent, Mst. Zainab Khatoon. The core legal questions involve determining the exact portion of the disputed property transferred to the respondent via an Appendix and a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.), and whether the petitioner’s claim for the transfer of the portion of the first floor in her possession was rightly refused by the settlement authorities. The petitioner argued that the respondent was never in possession of the first floor, thus excluding it from the transfer. The High Court had previously dismissed the petitioner's writ petition, concluding that the transfer to the respondent encompassed the portion occupied by the petitioner. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the ambiguity regarding the extent of the property transferred to the respondent necessitates a judicial construction of the relevant transfer documents. The Court determined that the petitioner's entitlement to the property depends on the resolution of the scope of the respondent's transfer.

  Questions settled

  • What is the exact portion of the disputed building transferred to the respondent under the issued Appendix and Provisional Transfer Order?
  • Is the petitioner entitled to the transfer of the portion of the first floor currently in her possession?
  • Does the transfer of property to the respondent include the portion of the first floor occupied by the petitioner despite the respondent's lack of possession of that specific area?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Iqbal Begum vs The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and Other1970 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-25
  settlement disputeproperty demarcationwrit petitionsupreme court appealtransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the demarcation of boundaries of adjacent properties in Lahore transferred under settlement laws. The petitioner, Mst. Iqbal Begum, sought the transfer of an adjoining property claimed to be part of her allotted house, while the respondent contended that portions had been wrongly included. Settlement authorities demarcated the boundaries, and the Settlement Commissioner held the properties to be distinct. A subsequent writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether courts can interfere with the factual demarcation and finding of distinct properties by settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that courts cannot interfere with the demarcation or the finding of fact that two distinct houses exist, provided the boundaries are delineated and safeguards are in place regarding payment. The key principle laid down is that factual determinations regarding property demarcation by specialized settlement authorities are final and not open to judicial interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can courts interfere with the demarcation of properties determined by settlement authorities?
  • Whether a finding of fact regarding the existence of distinct houses by settlement authorities can be challenged in writ jurisdiction?
  • Is a party entitled to claim multiple properties beyond what was transferred under the final settlement order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ilhamia and Another vs Muhwali (Represented by Heir) and Other1970 SCMR 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-28
  inheritancemutationagricultural landspecial leave to appealconcurrent findings of factShariat Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, which dismissed the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal regarding a claim for possession of agricultural land. The dispute originated from the inheritance of land originally owned by one Sardar, who died prior to the introduction of Shariat Law in December 1935. The petitioners, Mst. Ilhamia and Mst. Zarjan, challenged the validity of mutation No. 3401, attested on February 22, 1938, which recorded a sale of half the suit land by the predecessor Jamaldar to a third party. The core legal question was whether the mutation, attested by the widow of the deceased seller based on her statement regarding the transaction and receipt of consideration, could be successfully challenged by the petitioners to increase their share of the inheritance. The Supreme Court held that since the trial court, the first appellate court, and the High Court had all concurrently accepted the correctness of the mutation based on the evidence presented, the petitioners were precluded from re-agitating the issue. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mutation of land sale be challenged in a second appeal when the lower courts have concurrently accepted its correctness based on evidence?
  • Does the attestation of a mutation by a widow on behalf of her deceased husband, based on his prior transaction and receipt of consideration, constitute a valid transfer of land?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Iffat Begum vs Mst. Rashida Begum and Another1970 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-03
  settlement of propertytransfer of propertyfinality of ordersDisplaced Persons Actjurisdiction of Settlement Commissioneradministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a building site in Rawalpindi between two rival claimants, Mst. Iffat Begum and Mst. Rashida Begum. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially transferred the entire plot to Mst. Rashida Begum, but later issued a subsequent order reserving the plot for Mst. Iffat Begum. Following appeals, the Additional Settlement Commissioner divided the plot equally between the parties, a decision upheld in revision. Mst. Rashida Begum challenged this in the High Court, which held that the initial transfer order in her favor had attained finality under Section 22 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, because it was not appealed against, rendering the subsequent order transferring a portion to Mst. Iffat Begum unlawful. Mst. Iffat Begum sought special leave to appeal, contending that the initial order was passed without notice to her and despite her pending application, and that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction by transferring the entire plot when only half was requested.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unappealed order of a Deputy Settlement Commissioner attain finality under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a Settlement Commissioner lawfully issue a subsequent order transferring property that has already been subject to a final transfer order?
  • Does a Deputy Settlement Commissioner act in excess of jurisdiction by transferring an entire plot when the applicant only requested half?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajran vs Sardar Muhammad1970 SCMR 656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-10
  limitationcondonation of delaysufficient causeignorance of lawdue diligencegood faithleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of a Second Appeal from Order (S.A.O.) as time-barred. The petitioner sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908, pleading ignorance of the law of limitation. The core legal question was whether a litigant's personal ignorance of the law of limitation, in the absence of wrong legal advice, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court of Pakistan refused leave to appeal, holding that ignorance of the law does not constitute sufficient cause where the litigant acts without due diligence. The Court laid down the principle that while wrong advice by a lawyer may constitute sufficient cause in certain circumstances, a litigant who has no knowledge of the law of limitation does not act in good faith or with due diligence if they take it upon themselves to determine the time for filing an appeal in disregard of the prescribed statutory limits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a litigant's personal ignorance of the law of limitation constitute 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can the involvement of valuable rights of a petitioner serve as a proper ground for condonation of delay in civil matters?
  • Under what circumstances can wrong advice given by a lawyer constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay under the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Batul Begum vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner;1970 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  writ jurisdictionquestion of factsettlement authoritiesprior occupationadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court. The core dispute between the parties concerned the determination of prior occupation of the premises in question, with the departmental authorities having ruled in favor of the second respondent, Syed Zahoor Hussain. The High Court had previously declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction, reasoning that the dispute involved a pure question of fact rather than a question of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that findings of fact made by departmental authorities are generally not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that appellate or writ courts will not re-examine factual determinations made by competent administrative or settlement authorities unless there is a clear legal error or jurisdictional defect.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings of departmental authorities in writ jurisdiction?
  • Is a dispute regarding prior occupation of premises a question of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs The State and Other1970 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-30
  autrefois acquitretrialfinality of acquittalcriminal proceduredouble jeopardyremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of retrial orders following the setting aside of a criminal trial due to procedural irregularities. Four accused persons were initially tried, resulting in the conviction of two and the acquittal of two others. The High Court set aside the convictions due to the trial being conducted by successive judges, remanding the case for retrial. During the retrial, the trial judge excluded the previously acquitted accused from the proceedings. The petitioner sought to include them, arguing that the entire trial, including the acquittals, was set aside. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the acquittal of the respondents had attained finality as it was never challenged by the State or the petitioner. The Court affirmed the principle of autrefois acquit, ruling that an acquittal remains valid and binding unless specifically challenged and set aside by a competent appellate court. Consequently, the respondents could not be retried on the same charges, as the order of acquittal had become final and was not subject to reopening simply because the convictions of their co-accused were quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order setting aside a trial due to procedural irregularity automatically vacate the acquittal of co-accused persons who were not parties to the appeal?
  • Can an accused person be retried on the same charges after an order of acquittal has become final and was not challenged by the prosecution?
  • Does the principle of autrefois acquit bar the retrial of an accused whose acquittal was not specifically set aside by an appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bakhshi vs Bashir Ahmad and Another1970 PLD Supreme Court 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-14
  habeas corpuschild marriagepubertycustody of minorMuslim Personal Lawvalidity of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which granted a habeas corpus petition under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and set the detenu, Mst. Shamim alias Nasreen, at liberty. The core legal question was whether a Muslim female who has attained puberty but is under sixteen years of age can contract a valid marriage, and whether her mother retains the right of custody. The Supreme Court held that while the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 penalizes the marriage of a female under sixteen, the marriage itself does not become invalid under Muslim Personal Law. Furthermore, a mother loses her right of custody upon marrying a stranger and once the minor attains puberty. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, with the clarification that observations made would not prejudice the pending criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a marriage contracted by a Muslim female under the age of sixteen years become invalid under Muslim Personal Law?
  • Does a mother lose the right of custody of her minor daughter upon marrying a stranger?
  • Can a habeas corpus petition under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be invoked to set a detenu at liberty who is of consenting age and wishes to live with her husband?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Asifa Sultana vs Honest Taders, Lahore and Another1970 PLD Supreme Court 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-01
  special oathoaths actjudicial discretionresiling from agreementexecution of ejectmentrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a revision petition in an ejectment execution matter. The core legal question was whether a party who offers to abide by the special oath of the opposing party under the Oaths Act 1873 can subsequently resile from that agreement, and under what circumstances the court may permit it. The Supreme Court held that an agreement to be bound by the statement or oath of the opposite party is contractual in nature, and a party may be permitted to resile from it based on sufficient cause and at the discretion of the court, which discretion must be exercised justly according to the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court laid down that while sections 9 to 12 of the Oaths Act govern special oaths, the question of resiling from such an offer is governed by general legal principles and judicial discretion, which will not be interfered with in revision unless perverse or based on no evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who offers to abide by the oath of the opposite party subsequently resile from the agreement?
  • Whether the discretion to permit a party to resile from an oath agreement depends on the facts and circumstances of each case?
  • Is an agreement to be bound by the statement of the opposite party in the nature of a contract?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court permit a party to withdraw from a special oath agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Asghari Begum vs Corporation of the City of Lahore and Another1970 SCMR 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08
  review petitionforma pauperiscourt feeevacuee propertycivil proceduresupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a review petition seeking a review of the Court's earlier order dated 2nd October 1969, which had refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The petitioner had sought permission to pursue her civil suit in forma pauperis for the recovery of Rs. 50,000 against the Corporation of the City of Lahore for the alleged illegal demolition of her house. Both the trial court and the High Court found that the petitioner possessed sufficient means to pay the court-fee, having obtained evacuee property valued at Rs. 6,000 as a permanent transferee. The core legal question addressed is whether a review of the previous order refusing special leave to appeal is warranted based on findings of fact regarding the petitioner's financial capacity. The Supreme Court held that no valid ground or reason was established to review the prior order, as it was founded on concurrent findings of fact regarding the petitioner's ability to pay the court-fee. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court review an order refusing special leave to appeal based on concurrent findings of fact?
  • Does the ownership of evacuee property as a permanent transferee constitute sufficient means to pay court-fees in a pauper suit?
  • Under what circumstances will a review petition against an order refusing leave to appeal be entertained?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ahmadi Begum vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and Other1970 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-12
  Settlement lawproperty transferadministrative jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionspecial leave to appealdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of property by Settlement authorities. The petitioner, Mst. Ahmadi Begum, challenged the orders of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, arguing that she should have been allotted the entire premises rather than only the portion in her possession. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities acted within their jurisdiction in dividing the property into two independent commercial units and determining the status of the respondent as a displaced person. The Supreme Court observed that while there was a factual dispute regarding the petitioner's C.S. Form application, the primary basis for the Commissioner's decision was the long-standing division of the property into two distinct portions occupied by the respective parties. The Court held that the Settlement authorities possessed the jurisdiction to divide the property into independent units and to determine the status of the occupants. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's refusal to interfere with the administrative orders and dismissed the petition, establishing that administrative findings on property division and occupant status are within the competent jurisdiction of Settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to divide a property into independent units for transfer purposes?
  • Can the High Court interfere with the factual findings of Settlement authorities regarding the status of an occupant as a local or a displaced person?
  • Is a property division order by a Settlement authority sustainable if it is based on the long-standing possession of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Abida and Another vs Haji Muhammad Boota and 3 Other1970 SCMR 78 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-11
  settlement disputeprovisional transfer orderwrit petitionproperty transferspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding two property numbers relating to a building in Lahore, which were subjected to conflicting transfer orders under the settlement laws. Mst. Abida and another obtained a provisional transfer order for one property number, and later successfully had an adjoining property number included in their transfer order by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, a decision which was upheld through successive departmental appeals and revisions. However, the rival transferees, Haji Muhammad Boota and another, challenged the inclusion through a constitutional writ petition in the High Court. The Single Judge set aside the departmental orders favoring Mst. Abida, a decision subsequently affirmed by the Letters Patent Bench. Seeking special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the final settlement authority acted within its jurisdiction and that the High Court erred by not remanding the matter in case of any irregularity. The Supreme Court considered the contentions regarding the powers of the settlement authorities and the propriety of the High Court's interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of the final settlement authority determining that two property numbers related to the same property?
  • Should the High Court have remanded the case for disposal in accordance with law if the departmental order suffered from any irregularity?
  Read full judgment →
• Mostaque, Ahmed vs Anil Das and 2 Other1970 SCMR 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-01
  persona designatarevisional jurisdictioncivil proceedingsubordinate courtjudicial functiondisturbed persons rehabilitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave addressed whether an order passed by a District Judge under section 3 of the East Pakistan Disturbed Persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1964, is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appellant contended that the District Judge acted as a persona designata, thereby excluding the High Court's revisional powers. The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework, specifically sections 7-B and 7-C of the Ordinance, which confer powers of a civil court upon officers acting under the Ordinance and deem proceedings before them to be civil proceedings. The Court held that the jurisdiction to hear appeals under section 3 was conferred upon the Court of the District Judge—an existing court subordinate to the High Court—rather than on the District Judge as a persona designata. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the District Judge exercised judicial functions, rendering the order amenable to revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed by a District Judge under section 3 of the East Pakistan Disturbed Persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1964, open to revision by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Does a District Judge acting under section 3 of the East Pakistan Disturbed Persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1964, act as a persona designata or as a court subordinate to the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Montaz Ali vs The State1970 SCMR 850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-18
  criminal revisioncondonation of delaylimitationsurrendercriminal appealsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the summary dismissal of his criminal revision petition by the High Court on the ground of limitation. The petitioner was convicted under sections 457 and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment along with a fine, which conviction and modified sentence were upheld by the appellate court on 4th June 1969. The petitioner filed his criminal revision petition nearly nine months later on 2nd March 1970 along with an application for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court examined the delay application and found the grounds stated therein to be unreasonable, noting that the petitioner failed to surrender to undergo imprisonment or explain why he avoided the process of law. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in dismissing the revision on limitation and that the case was not a fit one for interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that unexplained delay and failure to surrender disentitle a petitioner to discretionary relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing a criminal revision petition summarily on the ground of limitation?
  • Does failure to surrender and explain delay in filing a revision petition warrant the refusal of condonation of delay?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the summary dismissal of a revision petition where no reasonable grounds for delay are shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Momtazul Karim and Others vs Abu Hussain and Another1970 SCMR 816 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-19
  specific performancecontract of salebona fide purchaserreadiness and willingnesskhas possessionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which affirmed the decree of the trial Court granting specific performance of an oral contract of sale regarding the Mercantile Bank Building. The plaintiff claimed he entered into a contract to purchase the building for Rs. 65,000, paid Rs. 58,000 within the stipulated period, and sought specific performance when the vendor attempted to sell the property to third parties, namely the petitioners. The trial Court and the High Court concurrently found that the contract was established, that the vendor received the payments, and that the petitioners were not bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The Supreme Court examined contentions regarding the plaintiff's readiness to pay a minor variance in the balance consideration, alleged delay, and the redundancy of a decree for khas possession in a specific performance suit. The Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies in calculated balances do not negate the plaintiff's continued readiness, that the suit was within limitation, and that a decree for khas possession, though redundant, caused no prejudice, ultimately dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a minor discrepancy in the calculation of the balance consideration negate the plaintiff's continued readiness to perform a contract of sale?
  • Whether a decree for khas possession in a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale is redundant or prejudicial?
  • Is a subsequent purchaser with notice of a prior contract of sale entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser for value?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohiuddin vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner,1970 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-29
  condonation of delayLetters Patent Appealbarred by timewrong forumgross negligencesettlement writspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the petitioner's Letters Patent Appeal as barred by time. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone the delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner exhibited gross negligence and a lack of due care and caution in prosecuting the proceedings, noting that even after the petition was returned from the wrong forum, the petitioner failed to refile a properly constituted appeal within the time allowed by the High Court registry. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no justification to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that time spent in a wrong forum may be excluded under a liberal view, but subsequent unexplained delays and gross negligence by a party will disentitle them to a condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time spent in prosecuting an appeal in a wrong forum can be excluded for the purpose of limitation?
  • Does gross negligence and lack of due care in refiling an appeal justify the refusal to condone delay?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary power in refusing to condone delay when properly exercised?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Shafqat vs The State1970 SCMR 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  Special leave to appealConvictionFirst Information ReportMaterial witnessOcular testimonyMotivePakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition for special leave to appeal against a conviction under Section 326/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions revolved around the impact of the alleged absence of a First Information Report (FIR) and the non-examination of a material witness (the injured party, Riazul Hassan) on the reliability of the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction and sentence. The Court held that the absence of an FIR does not cause prejudice if there is no material contradiction between the witness's statement and the report, and the witness later admits to making the report. It further ruled that the prosecution is not bound to produce every witness, and a conviction can be based on other reliable evidence, even if a material witness is not examined, provided the court is satisfied with that evidence. Motive was deemed immaterial if the ocular testimony is sufficiently reliable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a First Information Report automatically prejudice the accused?
  • Is the prosecution bound to produce every witness?
  • Can a conviction be based on other reliable evidence even if a material witness is not produced?
  • Is motive essential for conviction if other evidence is reliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ali vs Abdul Majid and Another1970 SCMR 273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-23
  Settlement Scheme No. 1displaced personproperty transfercancellation of transferauctionrestoration of propertyequitable jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld the restoration of property to a claimant displaced person. The respondent No. 1 had been transferred property under Settlement Scheme No. 1, but the transfer was cancelled by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner due to an alleged non-genuine claim surrender and subsequent failure to pay the required price within a short notice period. The property was then auctioned to the petitioner. The respondent No. 1 successfully challenged the cancellation before the Settlement Commissioner, arguing that the default was due to mischance and that the auction was conducted hastily, denying him the statutory 30-day period to pay the dues and seek restoration. The Supreme Court affirmed the Settlement Commissioner's decision, holding that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner acted hastily in cancelling the transfer and auctioning the property before the expiry of the period during which the original transferee could have sought restoration. The Court concluded that the Settlement Commissioner's order was just and that the High Court correctly declined to interfere in its equitable jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Deputy Settlement Commissioner can cancel a property transfer and auction it before the expiry of the statutory period allowed for the original transferee to pay the dues and seek restoration?
  • Is the High Court justified in refusing to interfere with an order of the Settlement Commissioner that restores property to a transferee after a hasty cancellation and auction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Aboo Abdullah vs Province of East Pakistan and 2 Other1970 SCMR 328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-09
  leave preparatory to retirementgovernment servantevictiondamagesrecovery of possessionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired Deputy Inspector-General of Police, initiated a civil suit against the Province of East Pakistan and others seeking damages for his alleged illegal eviction from a room in the Provincial Circuit House. The eviction occurred while the petitioner was on leave preparatory to retirement. The petitioner challenged the legality of this eviction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to specifically determine the interpretation of 'retirement' in the context of government service. The core legal question before the Court is whether a government servant who proceeds on leave preparatory to retirement and relinquishes charge on a specific date is considered to have retired from service from that date, pursuant to the provisions of the East Bengal Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Act, 1952. This determination is essential to establish the legal status of the petitioner at the time of the eviction and the applicability of the relevant recovery of possession statute.

  Questions settled

  • Is a government servant who takes leave preparatory to retirement and hands over charge considered to have retired from service from that date for the purposes of the East Bengal Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Act, 1952?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Muhammad Bakhatyar vs The Province of West Pakistan through1970 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1960-04-14
  refugee statusevacuee propertyallotment cancellationnatural justicewrit petitionrehabilitation authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This case comes before the Supreme Court as an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court summarily dismissing the appellant's writ petition. The appellant, claiming to be a refugee and Nawab from India, challenged an order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner (General) confirming that he was not a refugee, directing his ejectment from an allotted house in Lahore, and cancelling the allotment of certain lands and a garden. The core legal questions involved whether the rehabilitation authorities' finding was vitiated by mala fides, reliance on secret police reports without opportunity to challenge, or violation of natural justice. The Supreme Court held that the appeal must be dismissed, as the authorities' finding was substantially supported by ample independent evidence, including explicit admissions made by the appellant himself during the inquiry, rendering any reliance on secret reports non-prejudicial. The key principle laid down is that where a quasi-judicial order is independently and strongly grounded on material on record and clear admissions by a party, the order is not vitiated even if extraneous or secret reports are referenced.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner determining a person's status as a non-refugee is vitiated if it relies on material other than disputed secret reports?
  • Can a writ petition succeed against a rehabilitation order when findings of fact are supported by admissions made by the petitioner during an inquiry?
  • Whether the initiation of ejectment proceedings during the pendency of an inquiry into a person's refugee status violates the principles of natural justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Khan vs The Crown1970 P Cr. L J 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1955-02-03
  appeal against acquittalmurdercredibility of witnessessudden fightcriminal appealpresumption of innocencecommon object
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction and death sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident where the appellant, Mirza Khan, was convicted by the High Court after being acquitted by the trial judge. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court gave proper weight to the trial judge's views on witness credibility and the presumption of innocence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the trial judge's acquittal was based on erroneous assumptions, including a non-existent 'general rule' of false implication in the district, and that the High Court acted correctly in correcting a manifest error with due regard to established principles regarding appeals against acquittal. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court gave proper weight and consideration to the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of witnesses when reversing an acquittal?
  • Does a general rule exist in the Mianwali district that innocent persons are routinely and falsely implicated in criminal cases?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with findings of fact reached upon the evidence by the High Court in the absence of a violation of fundamental principles of criminal justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Daulat Hussain vs Abdul Khaliq and Another1970 SCMR 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-26
  murderacquittalappraisal of evidenceeye-witness testimonymedical evidencecriminal appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal matter where the respondent, Abdul Khaliq, was initially convicted of murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Sessions Judge, Jhelum, and sentenced to death. The West Pakistan High Court subsequently set aside this conviction and acquitted the respondent, leading the petitioner to seek leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appraisal of evidence, specifically regarding the credibility of eye-witness testimony and the plausibility of the prosecution's narrative. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's acquittal, finding that the eye-witness accounts were inconsistent with the medical evidence, which showed injuries on the chest and abdomen despite claims the victim was shot from behind. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's skepticism regarding the prosecution's theory of the respondent's movements from Karachi. The Supreme Court held that where prosecution evidence is contradictory to medical findings and lacks logical corroboration regarding the accused's presence, an acquittal is justified. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in rejecting eye-witness testimony that contradicts medical evidence?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to explain the accused's movements and means of travel to the scene of the crime?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere with a High Court acquittal when the lower court has properly appraised the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Hossain Sowdagar vs The Province of East Pakistan and Other1970 SCMR 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-22
  Urban Immovable Property Taxwaqf estatetax exemptioncharitable purposesreligious purposeswrit petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging the assessment of Urban Immovable Property Tax on a building belonging to a waqf estate. The core legal question was whether a building belonging to a waqf estate and occupied by a bank is exempt from Urban Immovable Property Tax under section 6(a) of the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957, merely because the income derived from it is utilized for religious or charitable purposes. The Supreme Court held that the building is not exempt from tax under the said provision because it is not exclusively occupied for religious or charitable purposes, notwithstanding that the rental income is ultimately used for such purposes. The key principle laid down is that the statutory exemption under section 6(a) of the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957, requires the building itself to be occupied for religious or charitable purposes, and the ultimate utilization of the income derived therefrom for such purposes does not suffice to attract the exemption.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a building belonging to a waqf estate and occupied by a tenant is exempt from Urban Immovable Property Tax under section 6(a) of the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957, when the income derived from it is used for religious or charitable purposes?
  • Does the word 'for' in section 6(a) of the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957, mean 'for the benefit of'?
  • What is the scope of tax exemption for buildings and lands exclusively occupied for religious or charitable purposes under the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Mushtaq Ahmad vs Ch. Bashir Ahmad,1970 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-10
  First Appeal from OrderStay of ExecutionEx Parte DecreeMoney DecreeInterlocutory OrderSecurity
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition seeking leave to appeal against an interlocutory order passed by the High Court in a First Appeal arising from an ex parte money decree of Rs. 50,000 based on a pro-note. By the impugned order, the High Court admitted the appeal but refused to grant a stay of execution of the decree, while directing that the decree-holder could not withdraw the decretal amount without furnishing adequate security to the satisfaction of the executing court. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's refusal to stay execution alongside the conditional allowance of withdrawal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the interlocutory discretion exercised by the High Court regarding execution and security. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts possess discretionary power in execution matters during pending appeals, and conditional stay orders requiring security for withdrawal are competent when balancing the interests of both judgment-debtor and decree-holder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is bound to stay the execution of an ex parte money decree upon admitting an appeal against it?
  • Can an appellate court permit the decree-holder to withdraw the decretal amount subject to furnishing adequate security?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an interlocutory order refusing a stay of execution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad vs Government of West Pakistan and Another1970 SCMR 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-24
  religious processionspolice powerslicense refusalMuharram processionPolice Act 1861regulation of processions
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a resident of Talagang, sought special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his writ petition challenging the refusal of a license by the Superintendent of Police to take out a Muharram procession. The petitioner contended that under Section 30 of the Police Act 1861, the police lack the authority to ban processions. The High Court had held that the police possess the power to regulate processions, and since a license had already been granted to another resident of the same village, the refusal to the petitioner was not unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed this, holding that while Section 30 of the Police Act 1861 does not authorize an absolute ban on processions, it does empower the police to regulate them, including the discretion to refuse a license to a specific applicant in appropriate circumstances. The Court found no grounds for interference, noting that the petitioner was not forbidden from participating in the procession for which a license had already been issued to his co-villager.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 30 of the Police Act 1861 authorize the police to impose an absolute ban on taking out processions?
  • Does the power to regulate processions under Section 30 of the Police Act 1861 include the discretion to refuse a license to a specific applicant?
  • Is the refusal of a license to one applicant unlawful when a license for a similar procession has already been granted to another person in the same locality?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Rash Id vs The State1970 SCMR 694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1959-11-03
  transfer of casesreasonable apprehension of biasfair trialcriminal procedurewitness intimidationspecial magistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan rejecting the appellant's application for the transfer of criminal cases pending against him from the Court of a Special Magistrate. The charges against the appellant and his employees fell under sections 420 and 467 of the Pakistan Penal Code. During the trial, a prosecution witness gave evidence favorable to the defence, whereupon the Magistrate made remarks indicating an intention to arrest him immediately for prevarication, acting under a mistaken belief regarding section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate's attitude, even if bona fide, was likely to create a reasonable apprehension in the appellant's mind of bias and a lack of judicial detachment. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate's premature assessment of the witness's veracity was highly improper and justified a reasonable apprehension that the accused would not receive a fair trial. The Court laid down the principle that a trial judge giving positive indications during a pending trial that a witness is a liar creates alarm and the apprehension of bias, warranting the transfer of the case to secure the due dispensation of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the attitude of a trial Magistrate threatening to arrest a witness during proceedings is likely to create a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of the accused?
  • Does a Magistrate's premature assessment of a witness's statement at an intermediate stage disqualify him from proceeding with the case?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an interlocutory order passed by the High Court under section 526 of the Criminal Procedure Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nurullah and 2 Others vs District Magistrate, Lahore and 3 Other1970 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-15
  No-Objection Certificatewrit jurisdictioncinematograph rulesexecutive discretionstatutory dutyjudicial reviewlocal objections
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment dismissing a petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, which sought to invalidate a 'No-Objection Certificate' granted for constructing a cinema. The appellants argued that the certificate was obtained by concealing the proximity of mosques and a school, in violation of Rule 5 of the West Pakistan Cinematograph Rules, 1962, and that the authorities failed to consider local objections. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its approach. While the High Court correctly noted that it cannot act as an appellate authority or substitute its decision for executive discretion, it failed to address whether the executive had acted in accordance with the law. The Court emphasized that executive authorities must follow the statutory procedure, which includes inviting and considering local objections. Because the government had not yet finalized its decision on the objections, the Supreme Court directed the government to perform its statutory duty, noting that the government retains the power to withdraw a certificate if it was granted based on incorrect information or procedural failure.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court under its writ jurisdiction substitute its own decision for that of an executive authority exercising statutory discretion?
  • Does the failure of an executive authority to consider local objections as required by statutory rules render a decision liable to review?
  • Is the grant of a 'No-Objection Certificate' for a cinema subject to the requirement of inviting and hearing local objections?
  • Does the government have the authority to withdraw a 'No-Objection Certificate' once granted if it was obtained through misrepresentation or procedural error?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Jamal Shah vs The Second Election Tribunal, West Pakistan, Lahore and Another1970 SCMR 123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-03
  election petitionballot paperselection tribunaljurisdictionmarked votesmodus operandileave to appealcorrupt practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an election petition concerning the National Assembly constituency of N.W.F. Peshawar-2, held in March 1965. The petitioner, Mian Jamal Shah, sought leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld an Election Tribunal's decision to declare Khan Nasrullah Khan as the elected candidate. The Tribunal had excluded twenty-six votes deemed to contain intentional, identifiable markings, specifically camouflaged numbers, which the Tribunal interpreted as a modus operandi. The core legal question concerns the scope of the Election Tribunal's jurisdiction to re-examine and exclude votes based on such markings, particularly when the Member of the Election Commission had previously adjudicated matters relating to the count. The Court noted a lack of consensus in previous Supreme Court judgments regarding whether matters strictly relating to the count fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Member or if the Tribunal possesses concurrent authority. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to clarify the jurisdictional boundaries between the Election Tribunal and the Member of the Election Commission regarding the exclusion of marked ballot papers.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Election Tribunal have the jurisdiction to exclude ballot papers bearing intentional and identifiable marks if the Member of the Election Commission has already adjudicated the count?
  • Is a matter relating strictly to the vote count within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member of the Election Commission?
  • Can an Election Tribunal exclude votes for being marked in a suspicious manner without a formal finding of corrupt or illegal practice?
  Read full judgment →
• MFSSRS Fazalur Rehman Muhammad Iqbal vs Chief Settlement1970 SCMR 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02
  evacuee propertylocus standifinality of orderssuo motu revisiontransfer of propertyDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee building. The petitioner, a non-claimant, initially failed to secure the transfer of the property, which was awarded to a claimant respondent. After his appeal against the transfer was dismissed in 1960, the petitioner did not pursue further remedies until he filed an application for suo motu revision, relying on a government memorandum concerning oil company properties. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having failed to challenge the finality of the initial transfer order, possessed the locus standi to reopen the matter based on a subsequent memorandum. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner lacked standing, as his entitlement had been conclusively determined by the earlier unappealed order. Furthermore, the Court held that the memorandum conferred rights only upon oil companies, not individuals. Consequently, the Additional Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner's application. The principle laid down is that a party cannot reopen a settled matter regarding property entitlement once the initial adjudication has attained finality through failure to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party have locus standi to challenge a property transfer order after failing to appeal the initial decision regarding their entitlement?
  • Can an individual assert rights under a government memorandum intended exclusively for oil companies?
  • Does an Additional Settlement Commissioner have jurisdiction to entertain a revision application from a party who has no legal entitlement to the property in question?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Qamaruddin Ahmad & Co. D. B. Ghadially vs Haji Din Muhammad1970 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  arbitration awardrule of the courtunregistered firmpartnership actad hoc judgespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court in Letters Patent Appeals, which upheld the dismissal of objections against an arbitration award. The core legal questions involve whether an arbitrator misconducted himself by not basing the award on an alleged agreement regarding mode of payment, whether an unregistered firm is barred under partnership law from participating in proceedings where it did not file objections, and whether an ad hoc judge of the Supreme Court ceases to be a judge of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator did not misconduct himself, that section 69 of the Partnership Act does not bar a respondent firm from participating if it did not file objections, and that an ad hoc judge remains a judge of the High Court under the Constitution. The key principles laid down are that independent agreements not made the basis of an award can be enforced separately, and that an ad hoc judge's tenure does not extinguish their High Court judgeship.

  Questions settled

  • Does an arbitrator misconduct himself by failing to base an award on an alleged separate agreement regarding the mode of payment?
  • Is an unregistered respondent firm barred under section 69 of the Partnership Act from participating in proceedings where it did not file objections to an arbitration award?
  • Does a judge cease to be a judge of the High Court upon being appointed as an ad hoc Judge of the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Motor Owners Mutual Insurance Company Ltd., Lahore vs Din Muhammad and 5 Other1970 SCMR 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-10
  third party insurancemotor vehicle accidentinsurer liabilitystatutory interpretationscope of defensecompensation claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by an insurance company against a High Court decree awarding compensation to the heirs of a deceased victim of a motor vehicle accident. The core legal question was whether an insurer, when sued by a third party for compensation, is restricted to the specific grounds of defense enumerated in Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, or if it may raise broader defenses such as limitation or negligence. The Supreme Court held that the language of Section 96(2) is exhaustive regarding the grounds upon which an insurer may defend such an action. Consequently, the Court affirmed that an insurance company is precluded from raising defenses outside those explicitly listed in the statute, such as limitation or negligence. The principle laid down is that the statutory scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, strictly limits the scope of an insurer's defense in third-party liability claims to the specific conditions set forth in Section 96(2), thereby preventing insurers from avoiding liability on grounds not expressly provided by the legislature.

  Questions settled

  • Is an insurance company entitled to defend a third-party compensation suit on grounds other than those specified in Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939?
  • Can an insurer raise the defense of limitation or negligence in a suit filed by a third party under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939?
  • Does Section 96(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 restrict an insurer from avoiding liability except in the manner provided by Section 96(2)?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakasia Paint Mills Ltd. vs DR. Abdul Rauf and 9 Other1970 SCMR 739 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-27
  evacuee propertycompensation poolland acquisitiondisplaced personsallotment cancellationproperty titleindustrial land acquisition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court decision regarding the ownership of evacuee agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner-firm, having taken possession of the land for industrial purposes and constructed buildings thereon without finalizing acquisition proceedings, acquired any legal right, title, or interest that precluded the land from being allotted to displaced persons. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner-firm acquired no legal interest in the land, as the intended acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act was never finalized. Consequently, the land remained part of the compensation pool and was lawfully available for allotment to displaced persons under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The Court affirmed the principle that mere possession or correspondence regarding potential acquisition does not confer title, and parties constructing permanent structures on land without finalized legal acquisition do so at their own risk. The petition was dismissed, emphasizing that the land could not be diverted from the compensation pool without proper statutory acquisition.

  Questions settled

  • Does possession of evacuee land for industrial purposes without finalized acquisition proceedings confer legal title upon the occupant?
  • Can land remain in the compensation pool if acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act remain incomplete?
  • Are allotments of evacuee land to displaced persons valid if the land was previously occupied by a third party without legal title?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the authority to dispose of properties in the compensation pool to non-displaced persons?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Oxford Knitting Mills vs Sukkur Municipality, Sukkur and Another1970 SCMR 537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-15
  lease of municipal propertyControlling Authoritysanction of leasevested rightwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against the order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition in limine. The matter originated from the lease of a municipal plot by the Sukkur Municipality to the petitioner for 99 years. Under the West Pakistan Municipal Committee (Property) Rules, 1962, a lease exceeding three years required sanction by the Commissioner as the Controlling Authority. The Controlling Authority sanctioned the lease at a higher rate per square foot than originally offered by the Municipality. The petitioner challenged this modification through various administrative remedies, which were dismissed, and subsequently filed a constitutional petition. The Supreme Court held that the Controlling Authority possessed full competence to modify the lease terms submitted for sanction and that the petitioner acquired no vested right in the property prior to approval. Finding no illegality in the Controlling Authority's order, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a proposed lessee acquire a vested right in municipal property prior to the sanction of the lease by the Controlling Authority?
  • Can the Controlling Authority under the West Pakistan Municipal Committee (Property) Rules 1962 alter the terms of a lease submitted for its approval?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mehfil Cinema through Faizanul Haq, the Managing Partner vs Government of West Pakistan through Member,1970 SCMR 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-03
  writ petitioninterim staysuspension of lawultra viresentertainments dutyspecial leave to appealnon-prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court of West Pakistan challenging notices issued under section 6-A of the West Pakistan Entertainments Duty Act, 1958, as inserted by the West Pakistan Entertainments Duty Ordinance, 1969, and also questioned the vires of the Ordinance. Although no one appeared for the petitioner at the hearing, the High Court admitted the petition for regular hearing due to its public importance and suo motu stayed the recovery of tax exceeding 50 percent. Dissatisfied with the partial stay, the petitioner sought special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court should have suspended the operation of the statutory provision itself. The Supreme Court held that the petition was wholly misconceived because a party not appearing before the High Court has no cause to complain against its order, and furthermore, no court can suspend the operation of a law unless that law has first been declared ultra vires, as interim relief is limited to staying actions taken under the law upon a prima facie case. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court suspend the operation of a law before declaring it to be ultra vires?
  • Does a party that failed to appear before the High Court have cause to complain against an order passed in its absence?
  • What is the extent of interim relief a court can grant regarding actions taken under a challenged statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs M. A. Nawaz & Co. (Regd.) and 5 Others vs National Bank of Pakistan through Its Regional Manager, Multan1970 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-03
  money suitoverdraft accountarbitration proceedingsstay of suitpledged assetsinsurance claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a money suit initiated by the respondent-Bank against the petitioners for the recovery of Rs. 2,08,795.05, representing an outstanding balance on an overdraft account secured by a pledge of the petitioners' factory building and goods. Following the destruction of the insured assets by fire, the petitioners initiated arbitration proceedings against the insurance company to recover their losses. The core legal question was whether the pending arbitration proceedings between the petitioners and the insurance company regarding the insurance claim justified a stay of the recovery suit filed by the Bank against the petitioners under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court held that the Bank, not being liable for the fire loss, had no legal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceedings between the petitioners and the insurance company. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the petitioners' application for a stay of proceedings. The key principle established is that a suit for recovery of a debt cannot be stayed merely because the debtor is pursuing separate arbitration proceedings against a third party for insurance claims related to the pledged assets.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for recovery of a debt be stayed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 due to pending arbitration proceedings between the defendant and a third party?
  • Does a bank's recovery suit against a debtor depend on the outcome of the debtor's insurance claim arbitration against an insurer?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Landhi Industrial Trading Estates Ltd., Karachi vs Government1970 SCMR 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-26
  ex parte decreeservice of summonscivil proceduregovernment litigationsetting aside decreerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court decision that refused to interfere with a trial court's order setting aside an ex parte decree. The petitioner, Messrs Landhi Industrial Trading Estates Ltd., had obtained an ex parte decree against the Government of West Pakistan regarding tax immunity. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the decree. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the initial service of summons on the Government was legally defective. Specifically, the summons had been improperly served upon the Excise Department rather than through the proper officers authorized to accept service or the Government Pleader, as mandated by procedural law. Consequently, the Court held that the trial court was justified in setting aside the ex parte decree to allow for a decision on the merits. The key principle established is that service of process upon the Government must strictly adhere to the statutory requirements regarding authorized agents to be considered valid.

  Questions settled

  • Is service of summons on the Excise Department sufficient to constitute valid service upon the Government of West Pakistan?
  • Does a trial court have the authority to set aside an ex parte decree if the initial service of process was legally defective?
  • Must service of process against the Government be effected through authorized officers or the Government Pleader under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs K. B. Chisti and 2 Others vs The Deputy Registrar, Co Operative1970 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-06
  co-operative societiesexclusive jurisdictionouster of jurisdictionrepayment of loanscivil court jurisdictiondelegation of powersrecovery of arrears
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order declining to interfere with the Registrar, Co-operative Societies' determination regarding the liability of a firm for an overdraft loan. The core legal questions were whether the Registrar retained jurisdiction to determine liability despite a pending civil suit and a withdrawn suit, and whether the Registrar could delegate inquiry powers to a local Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies and Co-operative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance XIV of 1966 explicitly ousted the jurisdiction of civil courts regarding loan liabilities of co-operative societies. The Court affirmed that once information is provided to the Registrar, the dispute is removed from civil court jurisdiction to the Registrar's exclusive authority, regardless of pending litigation or limitation periods. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioner could not challenge the delegation of inquiry powers to a local Commissioner because the petitioner had requested that appointment. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that the Ordinance creates a specialized, exclusive forum for recovering co-operative loans, overriding general civil jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies and Co-operative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance XIV of 1966 oust the jurisdiction of civil courts to adjudicate loan liabilities?
  • Does the definition of 'loan' under the Ordinance include subject-matter currently pending in civil litigation?
  • Can a party challenge the delegation of inquiry powers to a local Commissioner if the party itself requested that appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ilam Din &Sons vs Asghar Ali and Another1970 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-10
  withdrawal of suitformal defectsdeclaratory suitrevisional jurisdictionleave to appealprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed a revisional application challenging a trial court's decision to allow the withdrawal of a declaratory suit with liberty to file a fresh one. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in permitting the withdrawal based on the existence of formal defects in the suit. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the trial court correctly identified formal defects in the frame of the suit. Specifically, the defendant had raised objections regarding the defect of parties, the necessity of impleading a representative in his personal capacity, the maintainability of a mere declaratory suit, and the vagueness of the prayer. The Court held that these objections collectively constituted formal defects justifying the withdrawal of the suit under the relevant procedural provisions. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petitioner's argument that the withdrawal order was illegal, affirming that the trial court acted within its discretion to allow the plaintiff to rectify these procedural deficiencies through a fresh suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court permit the withdrawal of a suit with liberty to file a fresh one if formal defects exist in the frame of the suit?
  • Do objections regarding the defect of parties and the maintainability of a declaratory suit constitute formal defects sufficient to allow the withdrawal of a suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Faqir Spinning Mills Ltd. vs Government of West Pakistan1970 SCMR 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-14
  arbitrationarbitration awardcontract disputepower house constructionregistered post
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding a contract for the construction of a Power House at Gambat, entered into between the petitioner and the former State of Khairpur, the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 1. The dispute was referred to the arbitration of respondent No. 2, who made his award and transmitted it in duplicate to each of the contesting parties by registered post in the first week of November 1957. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the circumstances surrounding the arbitration proceedings and the making of the award. The core legal question involved the validity and transmission of the arbitration award under the relevant legal framework. The court held that the arbitrator duly made and sent the award to the contesting parties as required. The key principle laid down relates to the proper communication and transmission of arbitration awards by post to the parties involved in commercial and contractual disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration award sent by registered post in duplicate to the contesting parties constitutes valid communication of the award?
  • Can a dispute arising from a construction agreement with a predecessor State be validly referred to arbitration?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Elahi Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory, Gujrat vs Government of West Pakistan through1970 SCMR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-23
  cotton feelegislative competenceultra viresretrospective legislationwrit jurisdictionvalidation ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner-firm challenged the levy of a cotton fee on ginned and pressed cotton for the years 1961-62 to 1968-69, arguing that the West Pakistan Cotton Control (Validation of Levy of Fees) Ordinance (XIII of 1966) was ultra vires the 1962 Constitution, that no valid notification existed for the levy, and that the demand was improperly restricted to factory occupiers. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding the petitioners liable under a 1952 notification and rejecting the constitutional challenge based on precedent regarding retrospective legislation. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The Court held that the challenge to the Ordinance was without substance, noting that under Article 133 of the 1962 Constitution, the validity of a law could not be questioned on the grounds of legislative competence. Consequently, the Court upheld the liability of the petitioners to pay the cotton fee at the prescribed rate, ruling that the legislative power to enact the Ordinance was not subject to judicial invalidation on the basis of competence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the validity of a law be challenged on the ground that the Legislature lacked the power to enact it under the 1962 Constitution?
  • Does Article 133 of the 1962 Constitution preclude the questioning of a law's validity based on legislative competence?
  • Is the West Pakistan Cotton Control (Validation of Levy of Fees) Ordinance (XIII of 1966) ultra vires the 1962 Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Badri Narayan Agarwala vs Messrs Pak Jute Balers Ltd_1970 PLD Supreme Court 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-06
  arbitration agreementarbitration awardrule of the courtSection 33 Arbitration ActSection 32 Arbitration Actexistence of contractarbitration proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether a party can challenge the existence of an arbitration agreement—by denying the execution of the underlying contract—within proceedings to make an arbitration award a rule of the court, or if such a challenge requires a separate suit. The appellant contended he never signed the contract containing the arbitration clause. The lower courts held that the existence of the contract could not be challenged in these proceedings and required a separate suit. The Supreme Court held that Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 1940 permits a party to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement, and Section 32 of the Arbitration Act 1940 explicitly bars a separate suit for such declarations. Consequently, such a challenge must be raised within the arbitration proceedings themselves. The Court ruled that denying the execution of the contract is a valid ground to challenge the existence of the arbitration clause, rendering the award 'otherwise invalid' under Section 30(c) of the Arbitration Act 1940. The matter was remitted to the trial court to determine the execution of the contract.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the existence of an arbitration agreement by denying the execution of the contract containing it?
  • Does Section 32 of the Arbitration Act 1940 bar a separate suit to challenge the existence of an arbitration agreement?
  • Can the existence of an arbitration agreement be challenged as a defense in proceedings to make an award a rule of the court?
  • Does an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 1940 require an affidavit to be maintainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Adage Advertising, Lahore vs Messrs Shezan International1970 SCMR 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-20
  winding-upcompanies actbona fide disputedebtspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner-firm filed an application under the Companies Act for the winding-up of the respondent-company alleging inability to pay a debt of Rs. 58,933/72 for advertising services rendered. A learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the petition on the ground of a bona fide dispute regarding the debt, and a Letters Patent Bench upheld the decision. The core legal question was whether a winding-up petition can proceed when the debt is subject to a bona fide and substantial dispute concerning payments made to principals. The Supreme Court held that a winding-up order will not be made on a debt that is bona fide disputed, and the provisions of the Companies Act cannot be used as an instrument of oppression. The petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that genuine monetary disputes requiring trial should be resolved in a Civil Court rather than through winding-up proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a winding-up order be made on a debt that is bona fide disputed by a company?
  • Whether the provisions of the Companies Act can be used as a vehicle of oppression for the recovery of disputed debts?
  • Should a genuine dispute regarding payments made to principals through an agent be resolved in a winding-up proceeding or a Civil Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Messers Afiluddin Brothers Ltd. vs Messrs Pak. Jute Balers, Narayanganj1970 SCMR I · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Meraj Din vs Noor Muhammad and 3 Other1970 SCMR 542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-09
  special leave to appealauction bidconfirmation of auctionsettlement schemeproperty transferinchoate right
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a dispute over the transfer of a shop in Sheikhupura, which was claimed by the respondent under Settlement Scheme No. VI as a burnt site. The petitioner was the highest bidder in a subsequent auction of the property, but the auction was never confirmed in his favour due to pending writ proceedings initiated by the respondent. The core legal question was whether an unconfirmed highest bidder at a public auction acquires any enforceable right in the property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that until an auction is confirmed by the relevant competent authority, the highest bidder acquires no right in the property whatsoever, especially when the auction terms permit the rejection of bids without assigning reasons. The Court concluded that the petitioner's auction was inchoate and dismissed the petition, affirming that pending writ proceedings and the lack of confirmation preclude any vested right for the bidder.

  Questions settled

  • Does the highest bidder at a public auction acquire any right in the property before the auction is confirmed?
  • Can an unconfirmed auction bid be treated as a complete and enforceable transaction?
  • Does a highest bidder have enforceable rights when the auction terms permit the rejection of bids without assigning reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Muhammad and Another vs The State1970 SCMR 688 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-24
  murderdeath sentencecorroborationinterested witnessesabsconsionmotivemitigating circumstancescommutation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, which confirmed the death sentences of the appellants, Mehr Muhammad and Wasiullah, convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of their first cousin, Shamsher Ali. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency and reliability of corroborative evidence required to sustain the convictions based on the testimony of closely related eye-witnesses, as well as the question of whether a family feud or revenge constitutes a mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding the conviction, holding that the testimony of the eye-witnesses was sufficiently corroborated by independent material factors, including prompt FIR, recovery of empty shells, medical evidence, the site plan, absconsion of one appellant, and established motive. However, the Court altered the death sentences of the appellants to transportation for life, taking into consideration the background of a prior family feud and revenge. The key principle laid down is that while private revenge itself is not a mitigating circumstance, specific features of a family feud can warrant the commutation of a death sentence to transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of closely related eye-witnesses requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the absconsion of an accused person furnish sufficient corroboration of his guilt?
  • Can a prior family feud and revenge serve as a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence to transportation for life?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Din and 7 Other vs Border Area Committee, Bahawalnagar and Another1970 PLD Supreme Court 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-13
  border area committeeouster of jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionland allotmentmartial law regulationevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the cancellation of the appellants' confirmed land allotment in the border belt of Bahawalnagar by the Border Area Committee under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation 1959 (Martial Law Regulation No. 9, Zone B). The Committee cancelled the allotment on the erroneous premise that a prior restoration order was an interpolation and that a subsequent Addendum dated 5th November 1960 restricted all allotments to initial temporary allotments. The High Court dismissed the appellants' writ petition in limine, holding it lacked jurisdiction to review orders of the Border Area Committee. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the ouster of jurisdiction in Martial Law Regulations ceased to be effective against the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 (then Constitution of Pakistan 1962) from its commencement date. The Court further held that the Addendum only applied to claimants who registered or transferred claims between 1952 and 1959 and had not yet obtained permanent allotments, making the Committee's cancellation order ultra vires and void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the ouster of jurisdiction clauses in Martial Law Regulations remain effective against the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court after the commencement of the Constitution?
  • Can the statutory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 be divested or restricted by sub-constitutional legislation without a constitutional amendment?
  • Whether the Addendum dated 5th November 1960 to Martial Law Regulation No. 9, Zone B, applies retrospectively to reduce already confirmed permanent allotments to the level of initial temporary allotments?
  Read full judgment →
• MD. Yunus vs Abdur Rahim and 4 Other1970 SCMR 806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-22
  special leave to appealsale deedhandwriting expertburden of proofadverse inferenceconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's second appeal and affirming concurrent findings of the lower courts that dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The petitioner's claim was based on a disputed sale deed alleged to have been executed by defendant No. 1. The core legal question involved the determination of the authenticity of the execution of the sale deed in light of expert handwriting evidence, comparison of admitted signatures, and supporting oral testimony. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower appellate court and the High Court regarding the non-execution of the sale deed by defendant No. 1 were well-founded and supported by both expert and oral evidence. The Court further held that no adverse inference could be drawn against the defendant for failing to supply standard signatures where the plaintiff had not requested such a measure for comparison. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution of a sale deed can be interfered with when supported by expert and oral evidence?
  • Can an adverse inference be drawn against a party for failing to supply standard signatures when the opposing party never requested the court to obtain and send such signatures for expert comparison?
  Read full judgment →