Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Principal Nishtar Medical College Multan Versus Muhammad Iqbal Khan Niazi1979 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-19
  review petitionfinality of judgmentstudent expulsiondisciplinary rulesscope of reviewlimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed by the Principal of Nishtar Medical College against a Supreme Court judgment that had reduced a student's expulsion period from three years to one year, based on the interpretation of the General Disciplinary Rules of the prospectus. The petitioner sought a review of the judgment to restore the original expulsion order or, alternatively, to obtain permission to transfer the respondent to another medical college. The core legal question was whether the merits of the case and the interpretation of the disciplinary rules could be re-argued in review proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding it incompetent. The Court reaffirmed the principle that review proceedings are neither a re-hearing of the whole case nor an appeal against the judgment under review. Because finality attaches to the judgments of the Supreme Court, parties cannot use review petitions to reiterate contentions already considered and repelled. Furthermore, the Court noted that the request for transfer was outside its jurisdiction and that the petition was time-barred by eighty-one days.

  Questions settled

  • Is a review petition before the Supreme Court a re-hearing of the entire case?
  • Can a party use a review petition to re-argue points that were already considered and rejected in the original judgment?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the transfer of a student between colleges in a review proceeding?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haque Versus State1979 SCMR 507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal compromiseacquittal on compromisecausing injurycriminal petitionsentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition filed by Abdul Haque and others, who were convicted under section 325 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing injury to the complainant, Muhammad Nawaz, and sentenced to varying terms of rigorous imprisonment. Their convictions and sentences were upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge, Multan, and subsequently by the High Court in a revision petition. Upon approaching the Supreme Court, the petitioners submitted that a compromise had been reached between the parties. The complainant appeared in person, confirmed the compromise, and stated it was achieved through the intervention of respectable local persons. The core legal question concerned the effect of a compromise between the parties in a criminal matter. The Supreme Court accepted the compromise, converted the petition into an appeal, accepted the appeal on the basis of the compromise, and acquitted the petitioners while directing their immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal petition be accepted on the basis of a compromise between the parties?
  • Whether an appellate court can acquit petitioners based on a confirmed compromise?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Ullah Versus Muhammad Yusuf1979 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-19
  settlement proceedingstransfer of propertylachesPermanent Transfer Deedpreferential rightspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, concerning the transfer of a house under settlement laws. The core legal question revolves around whether a belated appeal challenging a transfer order could be entertained after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) and whether the petitioner had established any preferential right of transfer. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's gross laches, abandonment, and non-pursuit of his claim for seven years, coupled with the intervening issuance of the P.T.D. and the lack of any superior claim on merits, justified the High Court's setting aside of the orders passed by the settlement authorities. The key principle laid down is that prolonged laches and non-pursuit of a remedy by a claimant, alongside the finality attached to a P.T.D., preclude the reopening of settlement proceedings, particularly when no preferential right to transfer is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a belated appeal against a transfer order can be entertained after a lapse of seven years and the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Does an occupant with a later date of possession possess a preferential right of transfer over an allottee with an earlier date of possession?
  • Whether gross laches and non-pursuit of a settlement claim render the interference of settlement authorities without lawful authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim Versus State1979 SCMR 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique Versus State1979 SCMR 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-11
  stolen propertydishonest retentionpresumption of guiltEvidence Actcriminal revisionpossession of stolen goodsburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the dishonest receipt or retention of stolen property. The petitioner, a truck owner, was apprehended while transporting stolen goods belonging to the Oil and Gas Corporation during the night. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in convicting the petitioner when he denied the recovery and failed to provide an explanation for the possession of the stolen goods. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the conviction was legally sound. The Court affirmed that while possession of stolen property alone does not constitute an offence, the court may invoke the presumption under Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act 1872 when a person is found in recent possession of stolen goods and fails to account for such possession. Since the petitioner offered no explanation and denied the recovery, the presumption of guilt was correctly applied, and the Court declined to re-appraise the evidence absent any misreading.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of stolen property alone constitute an offence under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the court apply the presumption under Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act 1872 when an accused fails to account for the possession of stolen goods?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to re-appraise evidence in a criminal revision petition where no misreading or disregard of evidence is alleged?
  Read full judgment →
• Mis Akbar Versus Kala1979 SCMR 303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-01-10Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Yar Versus Punjab Province1979 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-17Read full judgment →
• Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Lahore Division, Lahore Versus Ahman1979 SCMR 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Canal and Drainage Actunauthorized water usespecial chargesultra vireslegislative amendmentinfructuous appealwatercourse definition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment that declared an administrative order imposing special charges for unauthorized water use from a canal ultra vires the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873. The core legal question was whether the original Section 33 of the Act, which specifically referenced 'watercourses,' authorized the imposition of charges for illicit water extraction from government-maintained canals. The High Court held that the Act contained a lacuna, as it failed to distinguish between watercourses and government-maintained canals, thereby invalidating the administrative order. During the pendency of the appeals, the legislature promulgated the Canal and Drainage (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 1971, which substituted Section 33 to explicitly cover unauthorized water use from canals, with retroactive effect. The Supreme Court held that while the amendment effectively nullified the basis of the High Court’s judgment, the appellants could not challenge the High Court’s decision on grounds not raised before it. Consequently, the Court ruled that the appeals had become infructuous due to the legislative change and dismissed them without costs.

  Questions settled

  • Did the original Section 33 of the Canal and Drainage Act 1873 authorize the imposition of special charges for unauthorized water use from a canal maintained by the Provincial Government?
  • Can an appellate court set aside a High Court judgment based on a legislative amendment that was not presented to or considered by the High Court?
  • Does the Canal and Drainage (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance 1971 apply retroactively to validate administrative orders previously declared ultra vires?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Shakoor Versus Abdur Rashid1978 SCMR 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-06-01
  leave to appealmurderculpable homicideappreciation of evidenceprivate defencerival versionscriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court modifying the conviction of respondent No. 1 from murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while dismissing the revision petition against the acquittal of respondent No. 2. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the prosecution's version of events and accepting the defence plea that the fatal shot was fired during an altercation to rescue a co-accused, thereby altering the nature of the offence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court's appreciation of evidence—pointing to inconsistencies in the prosecution's narrative, the presence of injuries on the defence side, and the absence of injuries on the complainant—was based on material on record, and no interference was warranted. The court affirmed that concurrent findings or well-reasoned appellate evaluations of conflicting evidence by the High Court will not be disturbed lightly where plausible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's appreciation of evidence when the High Court's view is supported by material on record?
  • Does firing a shot to rescue a co-accused during an altercation alter the offence from murder under Section 302 to culpable homicide under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the absence of injuries on the complainant party and the presence of injuries on the accused party support the plausibility of the defence version?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Versus Rashid Akhtar Nadvi1978 SCMR 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  contempt of courtunconditional apologysuo motu noticescurrilous allegationsattachment of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from contempt proceedings initiated suo motu by the former Chief Justice of Pakistan following the publication of an interview in a London-based weekly newspaper, wherein the respondent made false and disparaging allegations regarding a conversation with the former Chief Justice, alongside an aerogramme sent directly to him. The core legal question was whether the respondent's published statements constituted gross contempt of court and how the court should deal with an unconditional apology tendered by the contemnor. The Supreme Court held that the statements per se amounted to gross contempt of the Supreme Court. However, because the respondent tendered an unconditional apology at the earliest opportunity with real contriteness, and considering the view of the Attorney-General, the court accepted the apology, discharged the contempt notice, and ordered the release of the attached property and accrued rent. The key principle laid down is that while the publication of false and scurrilous statements against a judge constitutes gross contempt, an unqualified apology offered promptly with genuine contrition may be accepted by the court to discharge the notice without imposing punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the publication of a false and imaginary account of a conversation with a judge constitutes contempt of court?
  • Can an unconditional apology tendered with real contriteness absolve a contemnor from punishment in contempt proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Choori Versus Ghulam Hussain1978 SCMR 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Latif Versus Muhammad Farooq1978 SCMR 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-10
  murderacquittalself-defenceprivate defence of propertytrespasscriminal appealbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court acquitting the first respondent of murder. The prosecution alleged two separate incidents: first, a morning quarrel over land possession where the respondent inflicted injuries, and second, an afternoon attack resulting in the death of the deceased. The trial court convicted the respondent, but the High Court acquitted him, holding that the evidence indicated a single incident wherein the deceased and prosecution witnesses were trespassers, and the respondent acted in the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence. The Supreme Court examined the record and held that the prosecution version of two separate incidents was unnatural and uncorroborated, as the evidence established that the deceased and his associates were the aggressors who trespassed into the land being cultivated by the accused party. The Court affirmed that the accused was fully entitled to exercise the right of private defence of person and property. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellant in a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court can abandon the appeal at will against the established practice of the Court?
  • Does the presence of a single continuous incident of scuffle support a plea of right of private defence against aggressors attempting forcible dispossession?
  • Is an appellate court justified in reversing a conviction where the prosecution witnesses' presence is doubtful and their narrative is inconsistent with medical and circumstantial evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ramzan Versus Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land), Multan1978 SCMR 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-21
  displaced personsland settlementexcess land cancellationdelegated powersappellate jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionretrospective amendmentsupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan summarily dismissing a writ petition challenging the cancellation of excess land allotted to the appellant, a displaced person. The core legal question was whether an order passed by a Settlement Authority in exercise of delegated powers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 was immune from appeal or revision. The Supreme Court held that subsequent retrospective legislative amendments, specifically subsection (3) added to section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972, expressly made orders passed under delegated powers subject to appeal, review, and revision under Chapter VI of the Act. Consequently, the appellate and revisional orders passed against the appellant were competently made. The key principle laid down is that orders passed by settlement authorities in exercise of delegated powers are fully subject to appellate and revisional jurisdiction as provided by the statute, particularly in light of retrospective legislative clarification.

  Questions settled

  • Are orders passed by a Settlement Commissioner in exercise of delegated powers subject to appeal and revision?
  • Can a concurrent finding of fact regarding excess land allotment be challenged in the Supreme Court when leave was granted on a limited question?
  • Whether an objection regarding the locus standi of a party can be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad Versus Settlement Commissioner1978 SCMR 311 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman Versus State1978 SCMR 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-14Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad Versus State1978 SCMR 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-17Read full judgment →
• Nazir Versus State1978 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asbfaq Versus Muhammad Tahir1978 SCMR 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-11Read full judgment →
• Banaras Versus State1978 SCMR 191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-13Read full judgment →
• Shamim Nusrat Versus Khurshid Jahan Begum1978 SCMR 177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-04Read full judgment →
• Aziz Khan Versus Haider Khan1978 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-06
  civil revisionremand of caserevenue recordsmutation entryappellate jurisdictionsufficiency of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Peshawar High Court which set aside an appellate decree and remanded a civil suit for fresh trial. The petitioner had filed a suit for declaration regarding the ownership of agricultural land, alleging that a mutation entry was fraudulent. While the trial court dismissed the suit, the appellate court decreed it in the petitioner's favor. The High Court, in revision, found the evidence provided by revenue officials to be insufficient and sketchy, necessitating a remand for further evidence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in remanding the case for fresh evidence rather than deciding the matter on the existing record. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was just and proper because the revenue officials' evidence was crucial, and the trial court had failed to record their detailed statements. The Court affirmed that when evidence is inadequate to reach a positive finding on a material issue, a remand for fresh proceedings to ensure a complete record is a valid exercise of judicial discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court remand a civil suit for fresh trial if the evidence on record is found to be insufficient or sketchy?
  • Is it permissible for a court to order a remand when the trial court failed to record detailed statements of crucial witnesses?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to set aside an appellate decree if the underlying evidence is inadequate for a positive finding?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Khan (A. Khan) Versus Choteykhan1978 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Javed Ahmad Versus State1978 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-07-09Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Ghulam Muhammad Versus State1977 SCMR 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-14
  fabrication of evidencedying declarationprosecution directionCode of Criminal Procedureex parte orderinterest of justicecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court order directing the prosecution of an Assistant Sub-Inspector and a doctor under Sections 193 and 218 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly fabricating a dying declaration and giving false evidence. The High Court had issued this direction ex parte without prior notice to the appellants. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was legally exercised. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the evidence of fabrication—specifically the absence of a thumb impression on a statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898—to be inconclusive, reasoning that a fabricator would likely have forged such an impression. Concluding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a successful prosecution and that proceeding at such a late stage would not serve the interests of justice, the Court set aside the High Court's direction for prosecution, thereby allowing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can order the prosecution of witnesses for fabricating evidence without providing them prior notice?
  • Does the absence of a thumb impression on a statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 conclusively prove that the statement was fabricated?
  • Is it appropriate to direct the prosecution of public servants for fabricating evidence when the evidence of such fabrication is not free from doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Machine Tool Factory Versus Zahid H. Usmani1977 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-10-10
  jurisdictionestoppelconstitutional petitionindustrial relationsspecified authorityessential services
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the High Court of Sind dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition which challenged the publication of directions issued by the National Industrial Relations Commission in the official Gazette. The core legal question concerns whether an employer, having successfully persuaded labor forums and the High Court that jurisdiction lay exclusively with the specified authority under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1962, can subsequently challenge the jurisdiction of that very authority after submitting to its proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the specified authority having itself insisted upon that remedy and submitted to its jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that a party who successfully pleads before a court that an alternative forum possesses exclusive jurisdiction is estopped from subsequently turning around and challenging the jurisdiction of that alternate forum after participating in its proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer who successfully contends that a Labour Court lacks jurisdiction and that the matter must go before the specified authority under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1962 is subsequently estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of that specified authority?
  • Can a party who submits to the jurisdiction of a specified authority and defends a case on merits later challenge its jurisdiction in constitutional proceedings?
  • Does a subsequent differing judicial view by a High Court allow a party to resile from its previously adopted jurisdictional stance and approbate and reprobate?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique Versus State1977 SCMR 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-06-28
  culpable homicidesudden fightheat of passionprivate defencespecial leave to appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from the judgment of the High Court maintaining the conviction of the petitioner under Section 304, Part I, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while reducing his sentence to seven years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question involved whether the case attracted the exception of sudden fight without premeditation or established a right of private defence. The Supreme Court held that where the origin of the fight is obscure and the evidence establishes a sudden mutual combat in the heat of passion without premeditation or undue advantage taken by the offender, conviction under Section 304 Part I is proper, and the plea of self-defence cannot be sustained when unsupported by evidence. The key principle laid down is that in the absence of proof regarding the initial aggressor and where a sudden fight occurs between the parties, the courts will view the altercation as mutual combat, negating a general right of private defence unless substantiated by the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is sustainable when the origin of the fight remains obscure and unproved?
  • Can the plea of right of private defence be accepted when it is not raised at the trial and cannot be spelled out from the record?
  • Does a sudden fight without premeditation in the heat of passion warrant a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad Versus The State1977 SCMR 450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-12-07
  murderself-defenceright of private defencecriminal appealconviction alterationculpable homicideappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted by the trial court under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mehr Dil, but the High Court altered the conviction to Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to imprisonment for life. The prosecution alleged the appellant fired shots from his house following an altercation over flute playing, resulting in deaths and injuries. The appellant raised a plea of self-defence, claiming he was attacked by a mob and fired in retaliation. The Supreme Court held that the evidence, including the recovery of the licensed gun used in the crime and the appellant's own admissions, established his guilt. The Court rejected the plea of self-defence, finding that the mob's actions—throwing stones and breaking the door—were a reactive response to the appellant's initial indiscriminate firing, rather than an unprovoked attack. The Court affirmed the conviction under Section 302 but modified the sentence from imprisonment for life to transportation for life, noting the legal requirements at the time of the offence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court alter a conviction from Section 304 to Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the evidence establishes intentional killing?
  • Does the right of self-defence under Section 100 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply when the accused initiates the violence and the mob's subsequent actions are a reaction to that violence?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution evidence is partially rejected regarding the formation of an unlawful assembly but corroborated by physical evidence like the recovery of a crime weapon?
  • Can a sentence of imprisonment for life be substituted for transportation for life if the former was not the prescribed legal sentence at the time of the offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakhio Versus State1977 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Settlement Scheme No. VIIDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958property transferrural propertypossessiondivision of propertySettlement Authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition regarding the transfer of a house in village Piplan, District Mianwali, under Settlement Scheme No. VII. The core legal questions were whether the Settlement Authorities possessed the jurisdiction to divide a rural property valued under Rs. 10,000, and whether the High Court correctly upheld the division of the house based on the possession of the parties. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Authorities acted within their jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that paragraph 4 of the Revised Settlement Scheme No. VII explicitly permits the application of general principles from the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 and other Settlement Schemes (I, IV, and VI) to facilitate the disposal of property occupied by multiple persons. Consequently, the power to divide the property is inherent in these schemes to resolve competing claims of possession. The Court found no merit in the appellant's contention that division was impermissible, ultimately dismissing the appeal and affirming the transfer orders made by the Settlement Authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Do Settlement Authorities have the power to divide a rural house under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • Can general principles from the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 be applied to the disposal of property under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • Is a plea regarding the lack of power to divide property maintainable if raised for the first time in the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Hayat Versus State1977 SCMR 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ocular evidencemedical evidencemurder convictionwitness credibilityrelated witnessespost-mortem examinationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and sentence of the appellants for the murder of their co-villager. The primary legal questions concerned the reliability of the prosecution's ocular evidence, specifically whether the testimony of related and partisan witnesses could be accepted, and whether such evidence was fatally contradicted by medical findings regarding the deceased's bladder and intestinal contents. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. The Court held that ocular evidence, if natural and consistent, should not be discarded based on speculative medical theories regarding digestion or physiological functions, particularly when the medical expert was not specifically examined on those points. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the presence of witnesses at the scene was natural and that discrepancies in collateral details did not undermine their credibility. The judgment establishes that courts should avoid rejecting reliable ocular testimony based on conjectures about the time of occurrence derived from post-mortem findings, emphasizing that judges are not medical experts and should rely on direct expert testimony rather than speculative interpretations of medical reports.

  Questions settled

  • Can ocular evidence be discarded based on speculative medical theories regarding the deceased's bladder and intestinal contents?
  • Is the testimony of related and partisan witnesses inherently unreliable in a murder case?
  • Does a discrepancy in land record entries regarding crop status necessarily invalidate the presence of a witness at the scene?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram Versus The State1977 SCMR 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ocular testimonydying declarationidentification parademurderarsonmotivecompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentences of the appellants for murder and arson. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular testimony provided by related witnesses, the identification of the accused at night in the light of fire and moonlight, the sufficiency of the dying declaration, and the establishment of motive. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the ocular testimony was credible and did not require independent corroboration simply due to the witnesses' relationship to the deceased, as they were natural witnesses to the incident. The Court further held that the dying declaration was genuine and consistent with the ocular evidence, and that the identification of the appellants was reliable given the witnesses' familiarity with them. The Court also upheld the findings regarding the motive and the forensic evidence linking the weapon to the crime. While maintaining the sentences, the Court exercised its power to impose mandatory compensation to the heirs of the deceased under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere relationship of eye-witnesses to the deceased render their testimony unreliable without independent corroboration?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on identification of the accused at night in the light of fire and moonlight?
  • Is the imposition of compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory upon conviction for murder?
  • Does a discrepancy in the date of abscondence in witness testimony necessarily discredit the entire prosecution case regarding motive?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakhio Versus State1977 SCMR 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income taxdepreciationplant and machinerynewspaper production plantincome tax rulesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a tax reference regarding the rate of depreciation permissible on plant and machinery used for printing religious books. The respondent concern claimed depreciation at the rate of 10% under clause III(3) of rule 8(2) of the Income-tax Rules framed under the Income-tax Act of 1922, whereas the Income-tax Officer allowed 7% under clause III(1). The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the lower authority's view, holding that the rate depended on the particular use to which the machinery was put rather than the classification of the machinery itself. Upon a reference, the High Court ruled in favor of the assessee, holding that depreciation was governed by clause III(3)M, which applied to newspaper production plant and machinery regardless of the specific use or concern. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that depreciation under clause III(3) is determined by the classification of the plant and machinery itself rather than the particular purpose for which it is utilized, thereby dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether depreciation on plant and machinery under clause III(3) of rule 8(2) of the Income-tax Rules is determined by the classification of the machinery or the particular purpose for which it is used?
  • Does clause III(3)M of the Income-tax Rules apply to newspaper production plant and machinery regardless of the specific concern using it?
  • Was the High Court correct in answering the reference in favor of the assessee allowing depreciation at the rate of 10%?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore Versus Taj Company Ltd.1977 SCMR 328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-arrest bailanticipatory bailattempted murdercriminal appealPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from an order of the Lahore High Court rejecting the appellants' application for pre-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under sections 148, 307, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The case involved allegations that the appellants, office-bearers of a political alliance, opened fire on the complainant and the injured party following a political dispute, resulting in a bullet injury to the victim. The core legal question was whether the appellants were entitled to pre-arrest bail in the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that without pre-empting the trial court's functions on the merits, the case was a fit one for the grant of anticipatory bail. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the appellants were admitted to pre-arrest bail upon furnishing appropriate security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail should be granted when the accused are nominated in a promptly lodged First Information Report with specific roles assigned?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant anticipatory bail while refraining from expressing a definite opinion on the merits of the case?
  • Whether alleged political malice is a sufficient ground for the grant of pre-arrest bail in an attempted murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sind Versus Arsala Khan1977 SCMR 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  abatement of appeallegal representativescondonation of delaylimitation periodprocedural default
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns a preliminary objection regarding the abatement of an appeal due to the failure to bring the legal representatives of a deceased appellant on record within the prescribed limitation period. The appellant, Seth Ahmad Ali, died on March 3, 1972, but an application to substitute his legal representatives was not filed until February 9, 1976, nearly four years later. Despite multiple notices issued by the Court Registry between 1974 and 1976, no action was taken by the counsel or the legal representatives. The Court examined the application for condonation of delay, which cited family ailments and financial difficulties as reasons for the delay. The Court held that the explanation provided was vague, unsupported by medical evidence, and insufficient to justify the gross delay of 1,348 days. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal on this technical ground, affirming the principle that unexplained, inordinate delay in substituting legal representatives warrants the dismissal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay of nearly four years in bringing legal representatives on record warrant the dismissal of an appeal?
  • Is a vague assertion of family illness, unsupported by medical evidence, sufficient grounds to condone a significant delay in legal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Ali Versus Muhammad Ramzan1977 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land allotmentsettlement disputecancellation of allotmentrevenue recordsleave to appealpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the disputed allotment of agricultural land measuring 23 kanals and 7 marlas in District Multan, initially claimed to have been allotted to the appellants' father in 1952. The core legal question is whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner acted without lawful authority in cancelling the alleged prior allotment and reallotting the land to the respondent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the factual premise upon which leave was granted was incorrect, as revenue records (RL II and Khasra Girdawaris) demonstrated that no land was ever allotted to the appellants' father and neither he nor the appellants were ever in possession of the disputed property. The key principle laid down is that claims of unlawful cancellation of land allotment fail when the foundational assertion of a prior valid allotment and continuous possession is disproven by official revenue records.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order cancelling a land allotment stand if the foundational claim of a prior valid allotment is disproven by revenue records?
  • Can an appellant maintain a challenge against the reallotment of state land without proving prior valid allotment and possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Ilam Din Versus Lal Muhammad1977 SCMR 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  review petitionLumbardari grantproprietary rightserror apparent on the face of the recordstate land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed against the dismissal of an appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had upheld the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition challenging the Government's cancellation of a sale of Lumbardari land. The core legal question involved the applicability of a prior precedent regarding proprietary rights in state-owned land grants and whether any error apparent on the record warranted a review of the court's earlier decision. The Supreme Court held that the review petition lacked merit as no error apparent on the face of the record was pointed out, and new contentions could not be raised in review. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be used to re-argue a case or introduce new questions of fact not previously urged, absent any patent error on the face of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition is maintainable when no error apparent on the face of the record is pointed out?
  • Can a new question of fact or a fresh contention be raised for the first time in a review petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah Khan Versus Province of West Pakistan1977 SCMR 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ejectmentreconstructionurban rent restrictioncompromiseleave to appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from three consolidated appeals concerning the ejectment of tenants from three shops under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on the ground of reconstruction. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, but the Additional District Judge reversed the decision, and the High Court subsequently dismissed the landlords' second appeals and Letters Patent Appeals. Upon granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan recorded a compromise reached between the parties during the hearing. The Court held that the appeals be decided in terms of the compromise, whereby the tenants agreed to vacate the premises within one month for reconstruction, and the landlords undertook to complete reconstruction within four months and relet the newly constructed shops to the respective respondents pursuant to section 13(5-B) of the Ordinance, with rent to be fixed by the Rent Controller. The key principle laid down is that parties can settle urban rent disputes by mutual compromise before the apex court, binding them to statutory obligations of reletting reconstructed premises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order for ejectment on the ground of reconstruction can be resolved through a compromise in the Supreme Court?
  • What are the obligations of a landlord who obtains ejectment of tenants for reconstruction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • How is the rent of newly reconstructed premises to be determined upon reletting to the previous tenants?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Iqbal Versus State1977 SCMR 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil appealallotment of agricultural landsettlement proceedingswrit petitionremanderror apparent on the face of the record
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute regarding the allotment of agricultural land measuring 91 kanals and 11 marlas in Tehsil Chunian, District Lahore, involving competing claims of inheritance, consolidation proceedings, and subsequent allotments by settlement authorities. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court committed a factual error apparent on the face of the record by observing in its judgment that a necessary party, Mst. Mehmoodi Begum, had not been impleaded or claimed relief against, despite being formally added as a co-respondent during the writ proceedings, thereby prejudicing the scope of the remand order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court's observation was indeed factually incorrect and partially negated the remand order. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, maintaining the order of remand while clarifying that the earlier order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in favour of Mst. Mehmoodi Begum would not remain protected from re-examination, and directed that she be included as a party in the fresh proceedings before the Chief Settlement Commissioner for a comprehensive determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does an observation by the High Court that a co-respondent was not impleaded constitute an error apparent on the face of the record when records show the party was formally added?
  • Can a remand order by the High Court operate against a party who was duly impleaded as a co-respondent in the writ petition?
  • Whether settlement authorities must re-examine claims in their entirety when a remand order affects the underlying allotment rights of all contesting parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehman Begum Versus Mahmoodi Begum1977 SCMR 314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  culpable homicideself-defensesentencing discretionjudicial review of sentencedeterrencemitigating circumstancescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the sentence of transportation for life imposed upon the appellant following his conviction under Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in awarding the maximum sentence based on the perceived deterioration of the law and order situation, despite the appellant’s plea of self-defense. The Supreme Court held that while courts may consider deterrence and the general law and order situation when exercising sentencing discretion, such discretion must be exercised judicially by weighing specific mitigating factors. In this case, the Court found that the appellant did not act with brutality, the weapon choice was fortuitous, and the deceased had initiated the altercation. Consequently, the Court held that the maximum sentence was not justified and reduced the sentence to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The key principle established is that sentencing must balance the object of deterrence against the specific circumstances of the offense, including the absence of callousness and the nature of the provocation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court consider the general law and order situation when exercising sentencing discretion?
  • Is a sentence of transportation for life appropriate for a conviction under Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 where the accused acted in self-defense without brutality?
  • Should a court rely solely on general crime statistics to impose a maximum sentence without considering the specific mitigating circumstances of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Bakhshish Elahi Versus The State1977 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Rehabilitation and Settlement SchemeWrit jurisdictionCondonation of delayRevisional jurisdictionDisplaced personsLand allotmentStatutory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of land to displaced persons under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme, specifically regarding the excess of land entitlement. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, could properly interfere with the Rehabilitation Commissioner's proceedings regarding the condonation of a two-year delay in filing a revision petition. The Supreme Court held that the High Court should not have interfered with the Rehabilitation Commissioner’s exercise of revisional jurisdiction, as the Commissioner possessed the statutory authority to determine whether to condone the delay. The Court established that where a statutory authority is seized of jurisdiction, including the power to condone delay, the High Court should not interfere in writ jurisdiction to preempt the exercise of that discretion. However, the Court ultimately dismissed the appeal on its merits, finding that the respondents had surrendered sufficient land to remain within their entitlement limits, rendering the appellants' challenge groundless.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with the proceedings of a Rehabilitation Commissioner regarding the condonation of delay?
  • Does the jurisdiction of a Rehabilitation Commissioner to revise orders include the power to condone delay?
  • Does a Rehabilitation Commissioner have the authority to decide whether to condone delay in filing a revision petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Nur Ahmad Versus Muhammad Yusuf Khan1977 SCMR 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-02-25
  pre-emptionevacuee propertyconfirmed allotteecivil court jurisdictionkatchi abadisale deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the High Court upholding the maintainability of a pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land purchased by confirmed allottees. The core legal question was whether the sale of evacuee property by a confirmed allottee was subject to right of pre-emption and whether civil courts had jurisdiction to entertain such suits. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding, based on precedent, that the sale of land by a confirmed allottee of evacuee property is pre-emptible and that civil courts possess jurisdiction over such matters. The Court further held that land not declared as Katchi Abadi by the Chief Settlement Commissioner does not fall within the definition of the Transfer of Evacuee Lands (Katchi Abadi) Act 1972 so as to bar pre-emption. The key principle laid down is that confirmed allottees' sales of evacuee property are amenable to pre-emption laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sale of evacuee property by a confirmed allottee is pre-emptible?
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a pre-emption suit regarding evacuee property?
  • Whether land not declared as Katchi Abadi by the Chief Settlement Commissioner is exempt from pre-emption under the Transfer of Evacuee Lands (Katchi Abadi) Act 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• Javid Dastgir Mirza Versus State1977 SCMR 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-03-21
  contempt of courtviolation of stay orderunconditional apologymistake of factmistake of lawsuperior ordersmagistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court convicting the appellant, a Magistrate, of contempt of court for demolishing a shop in deliberate defiance of an interim injunction issued by a civil court. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant's belated apology warranted acquittal and whether he was protected under general exceptions for acting under superior orders or by mistake of fact under the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a belated and reluctant apology does not purge contempt, that an executive order cannot override a judicial stay order, and that obeying an unlawful executive command despite knowledge of a court injunction constitutes a mistake of law rather than fact, affording no statutory protection. The key principle laid down is that judicial orders must be obeyed, and public servants cannot claim protection for flouting stay orders on the pretext of superior executive directions without seeking vacation of the injunction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a belated apology can be accepted as a sufficient ground to purge contempt of court?
  • Does an executive order from a superior authority justify the flouting of a judicial stay order?
  • Can a public servant claim the benefit of mistake of fact under section 76 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for obeying an unlawful order in violation of an injunction?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah Khan Versus Province of West Pakistan1977 SCMR 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-03-16
  review petitionlambardari grantproprietary rightserror apparent on the face of the recordland grant cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed by the legal representatives of Sardar Habibullah Khan against the dismissal of their appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The original dispute concerned the cancellation of a land grant and the refusal of proprietary rights to the deceased appellant, who had been appointed as a Lambardar in 1940 and sought to purchase the land pursuant to a government memo of 1951. After the High Court dismissed their writ petition challenging the cancellation order, leave to appeal was granted to examine the applicability of a precedent, which was ultimately held to be inapplicable. In the review petition, the petitioners failed to point out any error apparent on the face of the record and raised a new factual question regarding hereditary status. The Supreme Court held that no ground for review was made out and dismissed the review petition. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot succeed in the absence of an error apparent on the face of the record and cannot be used to agitate new questions not previously established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition can be maintained without showing an error apparent on the face of the record?
  • Can a new question of fact be raised for the first time in a review petition before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamim Iqbal Versus State1977 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-01-26
  contempt of courtunqualified apologyabuse of processhabeas corpuscriminal contemptsentencing leniency
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a conviction for contempt of court. The appellant, a police official, engineered a fictitious habeas corpus petition under the guise of a third party to manipulate judicial proceedings for personal motives, specifically to facilitate the recovery of a woman he had allegedly enticed. Upon investigation, the High Court determined the petition was fraudulent and initiated contempt proceedings against the appellant and his accomplices. The core legal question was whether an unqualified apology automatically purges contempt of court and necessitates acquittal. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that an unqualified apology does not automatically purge contempt, particularly when the contempt is of a serious nature involving the abuse of judicial process. The court affirmed that while an apology may be considered for mitigation of sentence, it does not absolve the contemner of guilt once the allegations are admitted. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, finding that the High Court had already exercised sufficient leniency in sentencing given the gravity of the appellant's conduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the tendering of an unqualified apology automatically purge contempt of court?
  • Can a court convict a person for contempt of court if they tender an unqualified apology after the evidence is closed?
  • Is an unqualified apology a sufficient ground to set aside a conviction for serious contempt of court?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzar Khan Versus Sind Labour Court No. Karachi1977 SCMR 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-06-30
  workman definitionindustrial relationstermination of serviceindustrial disputelabour court jurisdictionreinstatementmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the High Court dismissing a Constitution petition regarding the termination of the appellant, a Head-Chowkidar and Assistant Manager (Security). The core legal question was whether the appellant qualified as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and whether his termination was lawful. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was indeed a 'workman' under the definition provided in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, noting that the High Court had erroneously applied the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, instead of the relevant Ordinance. The Court established the principle that the definition of 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is broad and covers employees regardless of the specific nature of their duties, provided they do not fall within the definition of an employer. However, the Court declined to remand the matter for further proceedings because the appellant had admitted the allegations of misconduct during the inquiry, which had been conducted fairly and impartially. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the termination of services was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Head-Chowkidar qualify as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Is the definition of 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, limited to those performing manual or clerical work?
  • Should a case be remanded for reconsideration on merits if the employee has already admitted to the allegations of misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamim Akhtar Versus Ashraf Begum1977 SCMR 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-12-16
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentstatutory tenantevacuee propertysecond appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing a second appeal and confirming concurrent orders for the appellant's ejectment from a disputed house formerly evacuee property. The respondent-landlord sought ejectment on grounds of default in rent payment, subletting, and personal bona fide use. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment upon finding a default in rent, which was maintained by the District Judge and the High Court, holding that the requirement of a statutory notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act was obviated because the tenancy commenced under a fresh rent note executed pursuant to a settlement between the parties. The core legal question was whether the rule laid down in the majority decision in Evan's case applied to exempt or protect the appellant as a statutory tenant. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to prove possession of the premises prior to 20 December 1958 to claim privileges under section 30 of the Act, and that the appellant was duly a tenant under the fresh rent note. The principle laid down is that a tenant cannot claim statutory protections under section 30 without establishing prior qualifying possession, particularly where a new tenancy is created by the parties' settlement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rule laid down in the majority decision in Evan's case is attracted when a tenancy commences under a fresh rent note executed during settlement?
  • Is a tenant entitled to the privileges of a statutory tenant under section 30 of Act XXVIII of 1958 without proof of possession prior to 20th December 1958?
  • Does default in the payment of rent render a tenant liable to ejectment despite disputes regarding statutory notices?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Ali Versus State1977 SCMR 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-06
  negligencepolice custodyescape from custodycriminal appealappreciation of evidenceburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, challenging the appellant's conviction for negligence in the discharge of his duties as a police constable. The appellant was charged with allowing an under-trial prisoner to escape from custody while escorting him to court. The core legal question was whether the evidence established that the appellant was negligent in his duties, thereby facilitating the prisoner's escape. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence, found that the prisoner's escape from handcuffed custody could not have occurred without the appellant's negligence, as the handcuffs could not have been removed or broken without notice. The Court held that the prosecution had successfully discharged its burden of proof regarding the offence. Furthermore, the Court determined that the matter involved a question of the appreciation of evidence rather than a question of law. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the escape of a prisoner from police custody constitute negligence under Section 223 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the question of whether a police officer was negligent in allowing a prisoner to escape a question of law or a question of fact?
  • Does the prosecution bear the burden of proving negligence in a case involving the escape of a prisoner from custody?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Ali Khan Versus Muhammad Raza Khan1977 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-06-27
  inheritance mutationrefugee right holderpast and closed transactionsretrospective effectabandonment of appealrehabilitation and settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the inheritance of agricultural land allotted to a deceased refugee owner. The petitioner, a pre-deceased daughter's son, challenged the inheritance mutations of the deceased owner's estate. Although he succeeded in respect of lands in one district, his appeal against the inheritance mutation of lands in another district was initially abandoned and subsequently re-filed following a change in the law. The Lahore High Court set aside the favorable orders of the Rehabilitation Authorities, holding that the mutation had attained finality. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that a subsequent amendment to paragraphs 46 and 46-A of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme, even if couched in retrospective language, cannot reopen past and closed transactions. Furthermore, the petitioner, having abandoned his initial appeal against the mutation, was precluded from re-agitating the matter through a subsequent appeal based on a subsequent change in the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subsequent amendment to a statutory scheme reopen past and closed transactions that have already attained finality?
  • Whether a party who has voluntarily abandoned an appeal against an inheritance mutation can subsequently file a fresh appeal against the same mutation based on a subsequent change in the law?
  • Does the retrospective application of paragraphs 46 and 46-A of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme apply to cases where the inheritance dispute was already finalized prior to the amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulla Versus Ali Nawaz1977 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-07
  criminal appealacquittalretrialculpable homicidegrave and sudden provocationocular testimonymiscarriage of justiceappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of four respondents accused of murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in acquitting the respondents by relying on minor discrepancies in ocular testimony and an inadmissible statement by the Investigating Officer, while failing to consider that even the defense's alternative version of events—alleging grave and sudden provocation—would constitute culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Supreme Court held that the acquittal resulted from an unrealistic appraisal of evidence and a failure to address the legal consequences of the defense's own version. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal and ordered a retrial. The key principle laid down is that courts must evaluate evidence in a realistic and judicial manner; an acquittal is improper where the evidence is sufficient to establish criminal liability, and courts cannot ignore the legal implications of a defense version that admits to the act of killing, even if asserting mitigating circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court set aside an acquittal if the trial court failed to consider the legal implications of the defense's own version of events?
  • Does an admission of killing under grave and sudden provocation warrant an acquittal or a conviction for culpable homicide?
  • Should an acquittal be overturned when it is based on an unrealistic appraisal of evidence and minor discrepancies in witness testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad Versus State1977 SCMR 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-18
  death penaltysentencing discretionwatta marriagecriminal appealmurdercommon intentiondying declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the Lahore High Court’s confirmation of the death sentence imposed upon the appellant for the murder of Muhammad Ramzan. The appellant, along with co-accused, was convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. While the co-accused received sentences of transportation for life, the appellant was sentenced to death. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether there existed a valid legal basis to discriminate the appellant's sentence from that of his co-accused. Upon review, the Court held that the death penalty was appropriate. The evidence established that the appellant was the primary instigator of the conflict, stemming from a dispute over a 'watta' marriage, and acted with particular brutality by inflicting multiple knife blows upon the deceased. The Court affirmed that where an accused acts as the source of mischief and demonstrates heightened culpability, the imposition of the death penalty is justified, and there is no ground to interfere with the lower court's sentencing discretion. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the death penalty justified for an accused who is the primary instigator of a murder?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with a death sentence where the trial court found the accused acted with particular brutality?
  • Does the role of an accused as the 'source of mischief' in a dispute provide a valid basis for sentencing differentiation from co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Versus State1977 SCMR 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-06
  criminal breach of trustcorruptionentrustmentburden of proofappreciation of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the conviction of the appellant, an Accountant-cum-Cashier, for criminal breach of trust and corruption regarding alleged missing security deposits and lease monies. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the "entrustment" of funds to the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, given that departmental rules mandated such payments be made directly to the Post Office or State Bank, not to the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's evidence was self-contradictory, unreliable, and failed to prove entrustment. The Court observed that the Sub-Divisional Officers involved had acted in violation of departmental procedures by accepting funds themselves. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, ruling that the lower courts had erroneously shifted the burden of proof onto the accused based on disputed signatures. The key principle laid down is that in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the absolute burden of proving the essential element of entrustment, and conviction cannot rest on surmises or unreliable, contradictory witness testimony when the accused denies the receipt of funds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the admission of a signature on an office note-sheet automatically establish the entrustment of funds in a criminal breach of trust case?
  • Can a conviction for criminal breach of trust be sustained when the prosecution's evidence regarding the receipt of funds is self-contradictory and violates established departmental procedures?
  • Is it permissible for a court to shift the burden of proof onto an accused person to prove their innocence in a corruption case?
  Read full judgment →
• Yasin Versus State1977 SCMR 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-19
  vicarious liabilitycommon intentionmurderalteration of convictioncriminal appealsudden fight
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether the appellant was rightly held vicariously liable under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder committed by his brother. The appellant and his co-accused brother were originally convicted under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of the deceased following a sudden altercation arising from a family dispute. The Supreme Court observed that although the appellant held the deceased during the scuffle while his brother inflicted the fatal knife blow, there was no evidence of any pre-planned conspiracy or prior knowledge on the part of the appellant that his brother was armed with a deadly weapon. The court held that in the absence of a shared common intention to cause death, the appellant's liability could not be extended to murder merely due to his participation in the grappling. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, altered it to an offense under section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and sentenced the appellant to the period already undergone.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person be held vicariously liable under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for a murder committed by a co-accused without proof of prior knowledge that the co-accused was armed with a deadly weapon?
  • Whether the absence of a pre-conceived plan precludes the application of common intention in a sudden altercation resulting in a fatal injury?
  • Under what circumstances can a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code be altered to one under Section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzar Khan Versus Sind Labour Court No. 4, Karachi1977 SCMR 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-06-30
  workmanindustrial relationstermination of servicejunior labour courtconstitution petitiondomestic inquirychowkidar
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court dismissing the appellant's constitution petition against the termination of his services as Head Chowkidar and Assistant Manager, Security, by respondent No. 3. The core legal questions involve whether the appellant qualifies as a 'workman' under section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and whether he is entitled to relief under section 25-A thereof. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misconceived the law by applying the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, instead of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and that upon the admitted duties and salary of Rs. 350 per month, the appellant is indeed a 'workman'. However, because the appellant categorically admitted the allegations against him during the domestic inquiry and the Junior Labour Court found the inquiry fair and impartial, a remand is not warranted in the interest of justice. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the termination of services stands legally.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Head Chowkidar supervising other chowkidars qualifies as a 'workman' under section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does the definition of 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, require the performance of manual or clerical work?
  • Whether the High Court erred in applying the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, instead of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Versus Sarfaraz1977 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-23
  bail cancellationmurdernon-bailable offencecriminal procedureeyewitness testimonydelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an application for cancellation of bail granted to the respondents facing charges under sections 302, 379, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner challenged the initial pre-trial bail granted irregularly through administrative directions of the District Magistrate and upheld by the Sessions Court and the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question concerned the propriety of bail granted in a heinous murder case supported by eyewitness accounts and whether the High Court misconstrued section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and disposed of it by directing the trial court to conduct an expeditious trial and clarifying that if the trial judge, after examining the eyewitnesses, finds reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed a non-bailable offence, the judge remains free to cancel the bail. The key principle laid down is that trial courts retain the authority to reconsider and cancel bail upon evaluating ocular evidence during trial if reasonable grounds emerge connecting the accused to a non-bailable offence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court cancel bail after examining eyewitnesses if reasonable grounds appear for believing the accused committed a non-bailable offence?
  • Whether pre-trial bail granted through executive interference by a District Magistrate is sustainable under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does evaluation of eyewitness discrepancies and delay justify the grant of bail in a murder case punishable with death or imprisonment for life?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin Versus Government of West Pakistan1976 SCMR 97 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Asia Fatima Versus Abdul Hameed Farqui1976 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-14Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Chrome Mines Ltd. Versus Phibr Asia Ltd.1976 SCMR 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-22Read full judgment →
• Sher Gul Versus State1976 SCMR 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-13Read full judgment →
• Imam A1i Shah Versus Muhammad Sharif Khan1976 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-13Read full judgment →
• Macdonald Laytn & Costain Ltd. Versus Avari Hotels Ltd.1976 SCMR 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-24
  bank guaranteearbitrationinjunctionmobilisation fundsub judicecontractual dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a construction company, entered into a contract with the respondent for the construction of a hotel, which included a provision for a mobilisation fund secured by a bank guarantee. Following a dispute where the petitioner ceased construction work, the respondent sought to encash the bank guarantee. The petitioner filed an application before the High Court under the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking an injunction to restrain the respondent from encashing the guarantee. The High Court dismissed the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, it was noted that an appeal against the High Court's order was already pending before the High Court itself. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere, holding that the matter should first be adjudicated by the High Court in the pending appeal. The petition was dismissed on the principle that the Supreme Court will generally not entertain a matter while an appeal regarding the same subject matter is already sub judice before the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Should the Supreme Court entertain a petition when an appeal regarding the same matter is already pending before the High Court?
  • Can a party seek an injunction to restrain the encashment of a bank guarantee under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  Read full judgment →
• Kalimullah Versus Amin Hazin1976 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-08-12
  landlord and tenantestoppel of tenantevacuee propertyejectment proceedingsdefault in rentsub-lettingspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises out of ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondent against the petitioner for default in rent and unauthorized sub-letting. The property in question originally belonged to evacuees who had sold it prior to migration, leading to subsequent lease and sub-lease transactions, ultimately resulting in the petitioner becoming a sub-tenant under the respondent. When the respondent sought ejectment, the petitioner contested the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller on the ground that the property was evacuee property. The Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge ruled against the petitioner, and the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan dismissed the second appeal, holding that the petitioner was estopped under section 116 of the Evidence Act from challenging the landlord's title. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that a tenant who has accepted a landlord and entered into possession cannot challenge that landlord's title. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant who has accepted a landlord and entered into possession of premises is estopped from challenging the title of that landlord?
  • Does a Rent Controller have jurisdiction to hear an ejectment application when a tenant raises a dispute regarding the evacuee status of the property despite having accepted the tenancy?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehan Versus State1976 SCMR 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-24
  criminal appealrecovery witnessespolice officerscross-examinationarms actconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition aggrieved by an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan which maintained his conviction and sentence under section 13(e) of the Arms Act. The core legal question involved the credibility of recovery witnesses who were police officers and whether minor discrepancies in their statements regarding the exact location of the recovered revolver warranted disbelieving them. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the mere fact that both recovery witnesses are police officers is no reasonable ground for disbelieving them, particularly when they were not cross-examined on behalf of the petitioner. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can police officers be considered reliable recovery witnesses when their testimony is left un-cross-examined?
  • Does a minor discrepancy in the description of where a weapon was recovered from vitiate the testimony of recovery witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Versus Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner1976 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-08-15Read full judgment →
• Zahira Versus Abdul Hakeem Patel1976 SCMR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-08-13
  evacuee propertyindustrial concernbrick-kilnagricultural landallotmentsettlement of claims
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of 27 acres of evacuee property in Quetta, involving competing claims between the heirs of an allottee of a brick-kiln and an allottee of agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the entire 27-acre tract, which included a brick-kiln, should be classified as an 'industrial concern' or if only the portion physically occupied by the kiln qualified as such, with the remainder being 'land' subject to agricultural settlement. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, which affirmed the bifurcation of the property. The Court held that the mere extraction of earth for brick manufacturing from adjacent land does not convert that land into an 'industrial concern'. The principle laid down is that for property to be classified as an industrial concern, it must be directly utilized for the industrial purpose; land merely providing raw materials like earth does not lose its character as 'land' under the Land Settlement Act. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, finding the High Court's apportionment of the property to be just and proper.

  Questions settled

  • Does the extraction of earth for brick manufacturing convert the surrounding land into an industrial concern?
  • Can land used for a brick-kiln be classified as an industrial concern under the Land Settlement Act?
  • Is a notification issued after a temporary allotment applicable to the final transfer of evacuee property?
  Read full judgment →
• Rahtmat Bakhsh Versus Muhammad and Iqbal1976 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-09
  acquittalocular evidencemedical evidencebenefit of doubtspecial leave to appealburden of proofcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged the acquittal of two respondents by the Lahore High Court, who had previously been convicted for the murder of an eighteen-year-old youth under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s acquittal, based on discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence, lack of independent witnesses, and doubts regarding the prosecution’s motive, was perverse or legally unsustainable. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding that the High Court’s reasoning was sound. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, noting significant contradictions between the eye-witnesses' testimony regarding the firing distance and the medical evidence showing scorching, which indicated a much closer range. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the failure to produce independent witnesses in a populated area, combined with improvements in the prosecution's story regarding the motive, justified the High Court's skepticism. The principle laid down is that the burden of proof remains on the prosecution, and the accused cannot be required to prove their innocence simply because the prosecution claims it is improbable they would falsely implicate the wrong persons.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the distance of firing stated by eye-witnesses and the distance indicated by medical evidence regarding scorching justify an acquittal?
  • Can the failure of the prosecution to produce independent witnesses in a populated area be a valid ground for doubting the veracity of related eye-witnesses?
  • Does the improbability of falsely implicating an accused shift the burden of proof to the defense to establish their innocence?
  • Is the appellate court's appreciation of evidence regarding the credibility of witnesses a sufficient ground for the Supreme Court to interfere in its special jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sher, Versus Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner,Rawalpindi1976 SCMR 526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-11Read full judgment →
• Qutubuddin Versus Hidayat Ullah Khan Mkal1976 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-02Read full judgment →
• Sherzada Khan Versus Commissioner (F. C. R.), Peshawar1976 SCMR 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-07Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Khan Versus MRS. S. Henry Lai1976 SCMR 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-14Read full judgment →
• Subhanuddin Versus State1976 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-03Read full judgment →
• Yusaf Ali Khan Versus Muhammad Ali1976 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-12Read full judgment →
• Abdul Latif Versus Deputy Settlement Cmmissiner1976 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi Versus Settlement Commissioner (Lands)1976 SCMR 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Feroze Versus Muhammad Arif1976 SCMR 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-20
  criminal petitionalteration of convictiongrievous hurtsudden fightlack of premeditationnon-vital partsentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking enhancement of sentence or alteration of conviction in a criminal case where the respondent was originally convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, which the High Court subsequently altered to section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether a single stab blow delivered to the thigh during a sudden altercation, which unintentionally severs a femoral artery and causes death, constitutes murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, or alternatively grievous hurt. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that an ordinary person cannot be presumed to know the precise location of internal arteries in limbs, and therefore a single blow to a non-vital part of the body without premeditation warrants conviction for voluntarily causing grievous hurt with a dangerous weapon rather than murder. The key principle laid down is that where an assailant inflicts a single blow to a non-vital limb during a sudden fight without premeditation, and death results solely from the accidental severing of an artery, the intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death cannot be attributed to the assailant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a single stab blow to the thigh resulting in the severance of an femoral artery constitutes murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an ordinary person be presumed to have the knowledge of the precise location of arteries and veins in the human body?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a legal sentence of imprisonment passed by a competent High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani Versus Nazir Ahmad1976 SCMR 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-23Read full judgment →
• Murad Bibi Versus Chief Settlement and Rebabilitation Commissioner,Pakistan1976 SCMR 491 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yamin Versus Settlement Commissioner1976 SCMR 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-01Read full judgment →
• Noor Jehan Versus Bstan1976 SCMR 486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-03Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad Versus Fazal-Ur-Rahman1976 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqub Versus Abdul Latif1976 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  interlocutory injunctioneasement by necessityeasement by prescriptionrevisional jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesevacuee propertydiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil revision order of the Lahore High Court, which refused to grant an interlocutory injunction to the petitioner. The petitioner, a transferee of a residential tenement, sought a declaration of easement rights over the roof of a shop transferred to the respondent by Settlement Authorities. The petitioner claimed rights of easement by necessity and prescription to use the roof and pass sullage water. The trial court refused the injunction, citing the finality of the Settlement Authorities' transfer of the shop 'along with its roof' to the respondent and the availability of an alternative passage. Although the District Judge initially reversed this, the High Court restored the trial court's order in revision. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's exercise of revisional jurisdiction was not arbitrary. The Court emphasized that the matter of granting interim relief lies within the discretion of the courts below, and interference is unwarranted where the trial court's order is based on sound reasoning and the absence of irreparable injury.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of an interlocutory injunction a matter of discretion for the trial court?
  • Can a High Court in revisional jurisdiction restore a trial court's order refusing an injunction if that order is based on sound reasoning?
  • Does the absence of a finding of irreparable injury justify the refusal of an interlocutory injunction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum Qureshi Versus Government F Punjab1976 SCMR 48 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  review petitionappointment tenureofficiating appointmentstatutory interpretationservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition filed against the dismissal of a civil petition for special leave to appeal, wherein the petitioner sought a re-interpretation of the tenure of his appointment as Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's four-year tenure commenced from the date he took over as officiating Chairman or from the date of a subsequent notification specifying his terms and conditions of deputation. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the petitioner's initial appointment was a fresh regular appointment to a substantive vacancy under section 14 of the relevant Ordinance, and the subsequent notification was merely supplementary. The Court laid down the principle that the substance of an appointment and the enjoyment of the full statutory term prevail over technical objections regarding the use of the term 'officiating' or minor procedural irregularities in the notification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the tenure of a statutory appointment commences from the date of taking over office or from the subsequent notification of terms and conditions?
  • Does the use of the word 'officiating' in an initial notification alter the substantive nature of a fresh regular appointment?
  • Can technical pleas regarding procedural irregularities in an appointment notification invalidate the enjoyment of a full statutory term?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamslud-Din Versus Khuda Bakhsh1976 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Feroze Versus Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner,Sargdha Division1976 SCMR 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-12Read full judgment →
• Wazir Gul Versus State1976 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-27Read full judgment →
• Shera Versus Khan1976 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-10
  petition for leave to appealoral saleagricultural landappreciation of evidencemutationsecond appealdismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine the petitioner's second appeal against the District Judge's judgment setting aside the trial court's decree and dismissing the petitioner's suit for eviction and possession of agricultural land. The core legal question concerns the appreciation of oral evidence in competing oral sales of agricultural land, specifically regarding discrepancies in witness testimony, the relevance of currency notes ceasing to be legal tender, and the failure of the plaintiff to explain the absence of mutation or documentary proof of substantial cash payment. The Supreme Court held that the District Court rightly interfered with the trial court's appreciation of evidence due to material discrepancies in the plaintiff's oral evidence, including the mention of high-denomination currency notes that were no longer legal tender at the time of the alleged transaction. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court is justified in reversing a trial court's finding of fact where the trial court has ignored material contradictions in oral evidence, the absence of mutation by a stranger purchaser, and the lack of corroborative documentary evidence for substantial cash transactions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with the trial court's appreciation of evidence when the trial court has ignored material discrepancies in witness testimonies?
  • Does the failure of a plaintiff purchaser to obtain mutation or provide documentary evidence for a substantial cash transaction undermine an oral claim to agricultural land?
  • Whether a second appeal raising purely factual disputes regarding the appreciation of evidence is fit to be dismissed in limine?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzor Hussain Ghazi Versus Ijaz Hussain Shah1976 SCMR 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-08Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta Versus Raslan Bibi1976 SCMR 459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-10
  evictionpersonal requirementgood faithsecond appealdismissal in liminelandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's second appeal against the District Judge's order directing the petitioner's eviction from a leased shop. The respondents, legal heirs of the original lessor, sought eviction on the ground of personal requirement to run a goldsmith business. The Rent Controller had dismissed the eviction application, but the District Judge reversed this, finding the requirement to be in good faith and the existing premises unsuitable. The Supreme Court examined the contentions regarding the non-examination of evidence, the suitability of alternative spaces (a thara and a chaubara), and allegations of mala fides due to a co-owner's actions concerning another property. The Court held that the High Court rightly dismissed the appeal, that a first-floor shop is not as suitable for a goldsmith business as a ground-floor shop, and that the conduct of a co-owner cannot impute mala fides to the landlords. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second appeal can be dismissed in limine without summoning and examining the record?
  • Does the conduct of a co-owner in reletting another property affect the bona fides of a landlord seeking eviction for personal requirement?
  • Is a first-floor shop considered suitable alternative premises for a ground-floor goldsmith business?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. I. Khan Versus Controller of Rents1976 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-08
  power of attorneyspecial oathrent restrictionevictioncompromise of litigationauthority of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld an eviction decree passed by a District Judge in a rent dispute. The core legal question was whether an attorney, acting under a power of attorney that authorized entering into agreements regarding pending litigation, possessed the authority to settle an appeal by offering to abide by a special oath taken by the opposing party. The Supreme Court held that the power of attorney, while requiring strict construction, expressly empowered the attorney to enter into agreements on behalf of the petitioner regarding the litigation. Consequently, the Court determined that the authority to settle the litigation included the power to compromise the appeal through a special oath agreement. The Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the constitutional petition, ruling that the attorney had not exceeded his authority. The key principle laid down is that a general power of attorney to enter into agreements regarding pending litigation encompasses the authority to settle such litigation through a special oath, provided the construction of the power is reasonable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a power of attorney authorizing an agent to enter into agreements regarding pending litigation include the power to settle the litigation via a special oath?
  • Should a power of attorney be construed strictly?
  • Can an eviction decree based on a special oath agreement be challenged on the basis of the attorney's lack of authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Rajasab Khan Versus State1976 SCMR 452 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Mumtaz Hussain Versus Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore1976 SCMR 450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-10
  waqf propertyeviction orderwrit petitionalternative remedytemporary injunctionstatutory barWest Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a dispute concerning field No. 218 in Jhelum, which was notified as waqf property by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961, followed by an eviction order under section 6-A. The petitioner challenged the notification and eviction through a petition under section 7 of the Ordinance before the District Court, which was initially dismissed as time-barred, and also filed a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court remanded the section 7 petition for a fresh trial but dismissed the writ petition. The Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner could maintain a writ petition alongside proceedings under section 7, and whether the bar on temporary injunctions under section 9 of the Ordinance justified bypassing statutory remedies. The Supreme Court held that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to defeat express provisions of statutory law or to circumvent statutory bars against interim relief. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that disputed questions of fact regarding the nature of the property must be decided in the remanded statutory proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition can be maintained alongside a pending petition under section 7 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961?
  • Does the statutory bar on temporary injunctions under section 9 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961 justify invoking writ jurisdiction?
  • Can disputed questions of fact regarding whether a property is waqf be decided in writ proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Star Textile Mills Ltd. Versus Ivth Sind Labor Court1976 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-07Read full judgment →
• Allah Di Versus Settlement Commissioner1976 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-01
  settlement disputeCH formtransfer of propertybuilding sitehouse definitionauctionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of property No. 81-D, Model Town, Lahore. The petitioner, a non-claimant occupant of two garages on the property, had applied for its transfer on a CH form. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially transferred the property to the petitioner and another respondent in equal shares, but the property was subsequently auctioned to a third party. The Settlement authorities later treated the property as a building site rather than a house, directing its transfer to the auction purchaser. On a writ petition, the Lahore High Court held that the property should have been treated as a house and directed the Settlement authorities to consider the petitioner's form afresh for the portion in her possession along with three times the plinth area. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that since the petitioner had only applied for the transfer of one-quarter of the property in her CH form, she could not claim any area beyond what she had actually applied for, and substantial justice had been done.

  Questions settled

  • Can an applicant for evacuee property claim transfer of an area larger than what was actually applied for in their CH form?
  • Whether a property containing servant quarters and garages used as a residence should be treated as a house or a vacant building site under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the cancellation of an auction by settlement authorities require notice to the affected transferees who held prior P.T.O.s?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqbol Bibi Versus Ibrahim1976 SCMR 443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif Versus Zubaida Begum1976 SCMR 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-01
  evictionex parte proceedingsrent controllimitationdilatory tacticsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against eviction orders passed by a Rent Controller and subsequently upheld by the 1st Appellate Court and the High Court. The petitioner had faced ex parte eviction proceedings due to repeated defaults in appearance. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for his non-appearance to justify setting aside the ex parte proceedings and whether the appeal against the final eviction order, which was filed with an eighteen-month delay, was maintainable. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for his default or to provide material to rebut the grounds for eviction. Furthermore, the Court noted the petitioner's use of dilatory tactics to obstruct the eviction process for five years. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural defaults without sufficient cause and unexplained, significant delays in filing appeals are fatal to a petitioner's case, particularly when dilatory tactics are evident.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal against an eviction order be entertained when it is filed with an unexplained delay of eighteen months?
  • Does a petitioner's failure to show sufficient cause for repeated non-appearance justify the refusal to set aside ex parte eviction proceedings?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when it is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Muhammad Versus Muhammad Yunis1976 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-22Read full judgment →
• Sher Zaman Versus State1976 SCMR 423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-19Read full judgment →
• Haliman Versus Muhammad Din1976 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-25
  abatement of suitlegal representativessubstitution of heirstenants-in-commonremandinheritance under custom and Muslim law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged an order of the High Court upholding the dismissal of a suit due to abatement following the death of one of the defendants. The core legal question was whether the failure to bring on record the legal representatives of a deceased defendant results in the total abatement of the suit where another heir of the deceased is already a party to the proceedings in a different capacity. The Supreme Court held that since the heirs of a deceased Muslim succeed as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants, and given that another brother of the deceased defendant who was already on record substantially represented the estate, the suit did not abate either in whole or in part. The Court laid down the principle that where legal representatives of a deceased defendant are already on the record of a suit in another capacity, no application under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is necessary, and the suit will not abate. The appeal was accordingly accepted and the case remanded for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to implead the legal representatives of one deceased defendant result in the total abatement of a suit?
  • Do the heirs of a deceased Muslim succeed as tenants-in-common or as joint tenants?
  • Does a suit abate when a legal representative of the deceased defendant is already a party to the proceedings in another capacity?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad Versus Abdul Karim1976 SCMR 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-07Read full judgment →
• Rahatallah Versus State1976 SCMR 410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqub Versus Chairman, Election Tribunal, N.-W. F. P1976 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-04-01
  election petitionstay orderappellate jurisdictioninterim reliefcontinuation of suitelection tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from the 1970 General Elections in Pakistan, where the appellant's election to the Provincial Assembly was declared void by an Election Tribunal. The appellant filed an appeal in the High Court under section 64(3) of the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance, 1970, and sought a stay of the Tribunal's order, which the High Court refused on the grounds that the Ordinance did not expressly confer jurisdiction to grant a stay. Upon special leave, the Supreme Court examined whether an appellate court possesses the ancillary or incidental power to grant interim relief by suspending the operation of an impugned order. The Supreme Court held that the power to suspend the operation of an order during the pendency of an appeal is reasonably incidental and ancillary to the main appellate jurisdiction, and when read with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the High Court indeed possesses the jurisdiction to stay the operation of the Tribunal's order. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to suspend the operation of an Election Tribunal's order during the pendency of an appeal under section 64(3) of the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance, 1970?
  • Is the power to grant interim relief by suspending the operation of an order appealed against considered incidental or ancillary to the main appellate jurisdiction when the statute is silent?
  • Can provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 be invoked in election appeals to grant a stay of the impugned order?
  Read full judgment →
• Settlement Authority Versus Akhtar Sultana1976 SCMR 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-10-30
  dismissal for non-prosecutionadjournmentabsence of counselsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal filed by the Settlement Authority against Akhtar Sultana. The core legal question concerns the disposal of an appeal where neither the appellant nor its counsel or Advocate-on-Record is present at the hearing, and an adjournment is sought merely through an improper telephonic message. The court held that requesting an adjournment by a telephonic message demonstrates discourtesy to the court. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution with no order as to costs due to the respondent's absence. The key principle laid down is that appeals may be summarily dismissed for non-prosecution when parties fail to make a proper appearance and attempt to secure adjournments through informal and discourteous means.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal can be dismissed for non-prosecution when the appellant and counsel fail to appear?
  • Is seeking an adjournment through a telephonic message acceptable practice before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →