Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad, Afiya Shehrbano Zia and others vs Supreme Judicial Council through its Secretary, Supreme Court Building, Islamabad and others2024 SCP 101, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-21
  judicial accountabilitySupreme Judicial Councilmisconduct proceedingsabatement of proceedingsjudicial independenceconstitutional interpretationretirement of judge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals filed against a judgment of a two-member bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which dismissed a constitutional petition in limine. The core legal question was whether proceedings initiated by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) against a judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court abate upon the judge's retirement or resignation. The appellants contended that such proceedings should continue to their logical conclusion to ensure accountability and maintain public trust. The Court held that once the SJC has initiated proceedings against a judge—specifically by issuing a notice—those proceedings do not automatically abate or become infructuous upon the judge's subsequent retirement or resignation. The Court emphasized that it is the prerogative of the SJC to proceed with such matters. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional mandate for judicial accountability under Article 209 cannot be circumvented by a judge simply by resigning or retiring after the SJC has formally taken cognizance and initiated proceedings, as this would undermine the independence and integrity of the judiciary.

  Questions settled

  • Do proceedings pending before the Supreme Judicial Council abate upon the retirement or resignation of a judge?
  • Can a judge avoid accountability under Article 209 of the Constitution by resigning or retiring during the pendency of proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council?
  • Does the Supreme Judicial Council have the jurisdiction to continue an inquiry against a judge after they have retired or resigned if the proceedings were initiated while the judge was in office?
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• Federal Public Service Commission through Chairman, Islamabad and another vs Shiraz Manzoor and others2024 PLC (C.S) 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-24
  service tribunalpromotionvested rightrecruitment policyeligibility criteriacivil servantsFederal Public Service Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federal Public Service Commission sought leave against a consolidated judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal whereby respondents' appeals were allowed, and the competent authority was directed to modify the Rules of 2009 to mandate exclusive appointment to the post of Reader through promotion from Assistants. The core legal question was whether the framing of the SRO of 2009, prescribing 40% promotion and 60% initial appointment for the post of Reader, violated the terms and conditions of service or infringed any vested right of the respondents, given that no rules governed the post prior to 2009. The Supreme Court held that civil servants have no vested right in promotion or in the continuation of existing eligibility criteria, and the competent authority is fully empowered to formulate recruitment policies in the interest of efficiency without judicial interference unless vested rights are violated. The Tribunal had transgressed its jurisdiction by substituting its own policy. The appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's judgment set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rules prescribing the mode of appointment to a post for which no previous rules existed infringe any vested right of existing employees?
  • Does a civil servant have a vested right in promotion or in the non-alteration of eligibility criteria for promotion?
  • Can a service tribunal substitute its own recruitment policy for the one formulated by the competent authority?
  • When can a court or tribunal interfere with the formulation and creation of a recruitment policy by the competent authority?
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• Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through its Director2024 SCP 386, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-20
  suo motu jurisdictionjudicial overreachright to be hearddue processwrit jurisdictionhousing scheme allotmentaudi alteram partemseparation of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions filed against a High Court judgment and interlocutory order regarding housing schemes developed by the Federal Government Employees Housing Authority (FGEHA). The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, could exercise suo motu powers to declare a government policy unconstitutional when that policy was not challenged by any party, and whether it could issue directions without providing a fair hearing to affected parties. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its constitutional authority by deciding issues beyond the scope of the pleadings and prayers. It ruled that High Courts do not possess suo motu jurisdiction and that judicial review must be confined to the specific grievances raised. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the principle of audi alteram partem and the right to a fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, necessitate that affected parties be heard before any adverse order is passed. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order were set aside, and the cases were remanded for fresh adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court exercise suo motu jurisdiction to declare a government policy unconstitutional when that policy was not challenged by the parties?
  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem require that affected parties be given a notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court passes an order affecting their rights?
  • Is a High Court permitted to grant relief that was not specifically prayed for in the writ petition?
  • Does the constitutional scheme of Pakistan confer suo motu powers upon the High Courts?
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• Fazli Akbar Khan and others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through District Collector, Mardan and others2024 SCP 322, 2024 SCMR 2071 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-25
  land acquisitionreference petitionlimitationlachescompensationReferee Courtconstitutional petitionjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning land acquisition proceedings. The petitioners' land was acquired for a public purpose under an award dated October 11, 2010. Dissatisfied with the compensation, the petitioners filed a reference petition under sections 18, 30, 31, and 34 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Land Acquisition Collector rejected the reference under section 18 as being barred by limitation while referring it under sections 30 and 31. The Referee Court subsequently dismissed the petition as not maintainable. Instead of challenging the Referee Court's order, the petitioners impugned the Collector's order before the High Court after a delay of 33 months. The High Court dismissed the writ petition as time-barred and hit by laches. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's findings, holding that the reference under section 18 was clearly time-barred and that the constitutional petition challenging the Collector's order suffered from unexplained and inordinate delay, thus attracting the doctrine of laches. The Supreme Court consequently refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference petition filed under section 18 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 beyond the prescribed statutory period is maintainable?
  • Can a constitutional petition challenging an order of the Land Acquisition Collector be entertained when filed after an inordinate delay of 33 months?
  • What is the extent of jurisdiction exercised by a Referee Court when a matter is referred to it under sections 30 and 31 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
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• Farooq Ahmed vs Secretary Balochistan Provincial Assembly, Quetta, etc2024 SCP 304, 2024 SCMR 2034, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-06
  public appointmentconflict of interestcivil servant statusnepotismservice tribunal jurisdictionrecruitment rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the withdrawal of his appointment as Deputy Secretary (BPS-18) in the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat. He had simultaneously invoked the jurisdictions of the High Court and the Balochistan Service Tribunal, both of which dismissed his claims on the merits. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the petitioner's appointment was validly made and whether the employees of the Assembly Secretariat hold the status of civil servants. The Court held that the officers and employees of the Assembly Secretariat belong to a distinct service under the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 2009, and are not civil servants under the Balochistan Civil Servants Act, 1974. On the merits, the Court found that the recruitment process was tailored to benefit the petitioner, whose father was the Secretary of the Secretariat, in grave violation of the statutory promotion-based recruitment rules and the principle of conflict of interest. The Court affirmed that public appointments must strictly adhere to statutory rules, transparency, and fairness, dismissing the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Do the officers and employees of the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat hold the status of civil servants under the Balochistan Civil Servants Act 1974?
  • Can a public appointment be sustained if it is made in violation of the prescribed statutory mode of recruitment and rules?
  • What is the legal effect of a conflict of interest where a public official participates in or influences the recruitment process of their own family member?
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• Faqir Syed Anwar ud Din decd. thr. LRs Muhammad Azeem Sheikh vs Syed2024 SCP 367, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 31 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-22
  regular second appealconcurrent findingsunsoundness of mindbona fide purchaserburden of prooffraudulent transfercivil procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the High Court, which had affirmed concurrent findings of two competent courts and dismissed regular second appeals filed under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The underlying litigation involved a suit for declaration, partition, and possession filed by the son as next friend on behalf of his mother, who suffered from chronic mental ailments and unsoundness of mind. The plaintiff had been deprived of her inherited agricultural land and residential property through fraudulent transactions orchestrated by one of her siblings, who had held public office. The trial court and lower appellate courts decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defendants failed to prove the validity of the transactions or establish that a subsequent vendee was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The Supreme Court evaluated whether concurrent findings of fact warrant interference in second appeal and examined the burden of proof required to claim protection as a bona fide purchaser. The Court held that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence cannot be interfered with under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 unless vitiated by misreading or non-reading of evidence, and that a subsequent vendee asserting bona fides bears the initial onus to prove payment of consideration, good faith, and reasonable inquiry. The Supreme Court accordingly declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact rendered by two lower courts can be interfered with under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908?
  • What is the nature of the initial onus that a subsequent vendee must discharge to claim the status of a bona fide purchaser under section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Can the question of a person's unsoundness of mind be adjudicated by a civil court in a regular suit independently of proceedings under the Lunacy Act, 1912?
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• Faisal Ali vs District Police Officer, Gujrat and another2024 SCP 385, 2025 SCMR 92, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-23
  service tribunaldepartmental inquiryshow cause noticemisconductdue processnatural justiceproportionality testpolice constable
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner police constable's appeal against his dismissal from service. The petitioner was initially issued show cause notices for absence from duty, but was ultimately dismissed on the ground of conviction in a criminal case through an ex-parte inquiry. The core legal question was whether a departmental authority can penalize an employee for misconduct or grounds never mentioned in the show cause notice, and whether an ex-parte regular inquiry conducted without associating the accused violates due process. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that departmental proceedings and resultant penalties must strictly confine themselves to the allegations communicated in the show cause notice, and an employee cannot be penalized on extraneous grounds without a fair opportunity of defense. The Court laid down that a show cause notice forms the essential foundation of disciplinary proceedings, and traveling beyond its precinct violates natural justice; additionally, the Court elucidated the distinct nature of discreet, fact-finding, and regular inquiries, and discussed the principles of proportionality and reasonableness in awarding departmental punishments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether departmental disciplinary proceedings can travel beyond the allegations contained in the show cause notice?
  • Is it mandatory to associate the accused employee in a regular departmental inquiry?
  • What is the distinction between discreet, fact-finding, and regular inquiries in service matters?
  • When can a court or tribunal interfere with the quantum of punishment awarded by a departmental authority?
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• Faheem Ullah vs The State through P.G. Punjab and another2024 SCMR 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-20
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausecriminal proceduremala fide implicationenmitybail concession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against the Peshawar High Court's orders declining post-arrest bail to the petitioners in separate criminal cases. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail in offences that fall outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court observed that in both cases, the offences charged under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were outside the prohibitory clause. Furthermore, the Court noted the existence of prior enmity between the parties, arising from a related murder case in which the petitioners' relatives were involved, suggesting potential mala fide or ulterior motives for the petitioners' implication. Given that the petitioners had been incarcerated since June 2023 without the conclusion of the trial, the Court held that the petitioners were entitled to the concession of bail. The petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, granting bail subject to the furnishing of bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

  Questions settled

  • Are offences falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 generally bailable?
  • Does the existence of prior enmity between parties constitute a valid ground for granting post-arrest bail?
  • Can the prolonged incarceration of an accused without the conclusion of the trial justify the grant of bail?
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• Faheem Anwar Memon and others vs The State through Prosecutor2024 SCP 215, 2024 SCMR 1536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-11
  prisoner escapecriminal negligenceprison officialscommon intentionanti-terrorismappraisal of evidencecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises out of convictions and sentences handed down following the escape of two under-trial prisoners (UTPs) belonging to a proscribed organization from the judicial complex adjacent to the Central Prison, Karachi. The core legal question revolves around whether high-ranking prison officials and subordinate staff possessed the requisite common intention or exhibited proven criminal negligence leading to the escape under relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Supreme Court held that while subordinate police constables and escorts directly facilitated the escape through active connivance and false record-keeping, the prosecution failed to provide definite and concrete evidence of criminal negligence or connivance against the prison superintendent, deputy superintendent, and assistant superintendents. Consequently, the petitions of the subordinate staff were dismissed, whereas leave was granted and appeals allowed for the senior prison officials, setting aside their convictions. The key principle laid down is that criminal liability under penal statutes for public servants requires definite and concrete evidence of negligence or active connivance, as opposed to mere administrative lapses or presumptions applicable in departmental proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether definite and concrete evidence is required to prove criminal negligence against a public servant under penal provisions relating to the escape of a prisoner?
  • Can senior prison management be held criminally liable for a prisoner escape without proof of active connivance or direct sharing of common intention?
  • Whether presumptions or surrounding circumstances sufficient for departmental disciplinary action can substitute for strict proof in criminal proceedings?
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• Fahad vs The State and another2024 SCMR 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-13
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryconfessional statementcircumstantial evidencemurdercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition impugning an order that declined post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a criminal case registered under sections 302, 311, 201, 202, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail when statements under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not implicate him and the case otherwise falls within the scope of further inquiry. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, granting bail to the petitioner. The court held that where statements under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure fail to mention the petitioner and no substantial circumstantial evidence connects him to the crime apart from a prior application by the deceased, the case falls within the ambit of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a case fall for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when statements under section 164 do not implicate the accused?
  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted when the only evidence against the accused is a prior application filed by the deceased and no confessional statement names him?
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• Ex. Col. Muhammad Azad Minhas Inayatullah Khan and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence etc2023 SCP 280, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 235, 2024 PLJ SC 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-12
  Field General Court MartialPakistan Army Actalternative chargedouble jeopardylachesconstitutional jurisdictionservice benefitsmilitary discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a consolidated appeal and constitutional petition challenging the conviction and sentencing of former Army officers by a Field General Court Martial (FGCM) under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The appellants were convicted for conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline after failing to report a conspiracy. The core legal questions addressed whether the FGCM proceedings were coram non judice or mala fide, whether conviction on an alternative charge is permissible when the principal charge fails, and whether the withdrawal of service-related housing benefits upon dismissal constitutes double jeopardy. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that military personnel are exclusively subject to the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, for disciplinary violations. The Court affirmed that conviction on alternative charges is legally recognized, and that constitutional petitions filed after inordinate delays are barred by laches. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the forfeiture of service benefits following dismissal from service is a lawful consequence of termination and does not violate the principle of double jeopardy.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person be convicted for an alternative charge under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, if the principal charge is not proved?
  • Does the withdrawal of service-related perks and housing benefits following dismissal from the Army constitute double jeopardy?
  • Are proceedings of a Field General Court Martial subject to judicial review by constitutional courts on grounds other than mala fides or lack of jurisdiction?
  • Does an inordinate delay in filing a constitutional petition against a court-martial conviction warrant dismissal on the grounds of laches?
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• Election Commission of Pakistan through Chief Election Commissioner, Islamabad. (In both cases) vs Salman Akram Raja and others, Omar Hashim Khan and others2024 SCP 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-20
  Election TribunalsElection Commission of Pakistanconsultation processleave to appealwrit petition maintainabilityjudicial appointmentsaggrieved partyPractice and Procedure Act
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil Petitions for leave to appeal were filed by the Election Commission of Pakistan against a single Judge judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the process of appointing Election Tribunals. The High Court had held that primacy rests with the Chief Justice of the High Court in the consultation process for appointing Election Tribunals, relying on constitutional precedents regarding judicial appointments and administrative tribunals. The petitioner argued that under Articles 219(c), 222(d), and 225 of the Constitution, alongside Section 140 of the Elections Act, 2017, the power to appoint Election Tribunals is explicitly vested in the Commission upon consultation with the Chief Justice, without requiring judicial primacy. Issues were also raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petitions, the locus standi of the contesting candidates, the necessity of intra-court appeals under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, and the impleadment of additional parties. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the substantial constitutional questions raised, directed notice to the Attorney-General for Pakistan, and referred the matter to the Committee under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chief Justice of a High Court enjoy primacy in the consultation process for appointing Election Tribunals under Section 140 of the Elections Act, 2017 and the Constitution?
  • Can a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution be maintained against an administrative consultation process between the Election Commission of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of a High Court?
  • Are political candidates 'aggrieved parties' within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution regarding delay or disputes in the notification of Election Tribunals?
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• Election Commission of Pakistan through Chief Election Commissioner, Islamabad and others vs Salman Akram Raja and others2024 SCP 331, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-24
  Election Tribunalsconsultation with Chief JusticeElection Commission of Pakistanappointment of judgesconstitutional bodyelection petitionswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from appeals filed by the Election Commission of Pakistan against a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the authority to appoint Election Tribunals and the requirement of consultation with the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court. The core legal question involved the interpretation of constitutional provisions and statutory sections governing the appointment of Election Tribunals and the nature of consultation required between the Election Commission and the High Court Chief Justice. The Supreme Court facilitated a meeting between the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court and the Chief Election Commissioner, leading to an amicable resolution and consensus on the appointments. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned High Court judgment and disposed of the appeals, emphasizing that disputes between constitutional bodies and officeholders should be resolved through meaningful consultation rather than litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Election Commission of Pakistan is required to consult the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court for the appointment of sitting judges as Election Tribunals?
  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan demand a panel of judges from the Chief Justice of the High Court for appointment as Election Tribunals?
  • Are writ petitions maintainable against administrative correspondence and orders concerning the appointment of Election Tribunals between constitutional authorities?
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• Election Commission of Pakistan thr. its Secretary, Islamabad vs Dawood2024 SCP 3, 2024 SCMR 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-02
  Election Commission of PakistanReturning OfficerElection scheduleEx-parte orderAdministrative discretionScrutiny of nomination papers
  Summary & questions settled

  The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) challenged an ad-interim ex-parte order of the Peshawar High Court, which had suspended an ECP notification replacing a Returning Officer. The ECP contended that the replacement was necessitated by the officer's ill health and was a valid exercise of administrative discretion. The respondents failed to demonstrate any grievance or legal basis for challenging the appointment. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's ex-parte order, issued without notice to the ECP, disrupted the election schedule and jeopardized the electoral process. The Court held that the ECP acted within its authority for justifiable reasons and that no allegations were leveled against the newly appointed officer. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, dismissed the underlying writ petition, and directed that the scrutiny of nomination papers proceed according to a revised schedule to ensure the integrity of the election process. The judgment emphasizes that courts should exercise caution in passing ex-parte orders that interfere with the constitutional mandate of the ECP to conduct elections.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court pass an ad-interim ex-parte order suspending an Election Commission of Pakistan notification regarding the appointment of a Returning Officer without notice?
  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the authority to replace a Returning Officer on medical grounds?
  • Is the exercise of administrative discretion by the Election Commission of Pakistan in appointing election staff subject to judicial interference absent allegations of illegality?
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• Ejaz Ahmad vs Additional District Judge, Pasroor and others2024 SCMR 1106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-17
  specific performanceoral agreementpower of attorneyfraudulent decreeante-datingcivil revisioncosts
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an oral agreement, which was decreed just four days after filing based on the statement of a purported attorney, prior to the return date of the summons. The defendant subsequently challenged the decree under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging fraud. The application was allowed, and the decision was upheld by both the revisional court and the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the decree was unsustainable. The Court observed that the trial court failed to verify the identity of the attorney, examine the original power of attorney, or pass an order ante-dating the hearing. The Court laid down the principle that a court must strictly verify the identity and authority of a power of attorney holder before decreeing a suit on their statement, and that obtaining a decree through such procedural lapses constitutes fraud, justifying the imposition of costs for protracted litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit be validly decreed on the statement of an attorney without the court verifying the original power of attorney and the attorney's identity?
  • Is a decree sustainable if passed before the return date of the summons without any formal application or order for ante-dating the hearing?
  • Whether an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is maintainable against a decree obtained through a purported attorney without proper service of summons?
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• Duniya Gul and another vs Niaz Muhammad and others2024 SCP 25, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-16
  closure of evidenceadjournmentscivil procedurepenal provisionSupreme Courtfirst appeal against order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the Peshawar High Court's judgment dismissing the petitioners' first appeal against an order of the trial court that struck off their right to produce oral evidence. The core legal question concerned whether the trial court was justified in invoking Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to close the petitioners' evidence after they repeatedly failed to produce it despite numerous adjournments, warnings, and costs. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was fully justified in striking off the petitioners' right to produce oral evidence, as all necessary conditions—specifically, the granting of time with a clear warning of penal consequences and subsequent default by the party—were duly satisfied. The key principle laid down is that courts must rigorously enforce final opportunities granted for producing evidence and curb the detrimental practice of granting liberal, unjustified adjournments that obstruct the prompt delivery of justice.

  Questions settled

  • What conditions must be satisfied before a court can invoke Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to close a party's right to produce evidence?
  • Whether a trial court is justified in striking off the right to produce oral evidence after a party fails to comply with multiple final opportunities and specific warnings?
  • Does the liberal granting of adjournments by lower courts contribute to the backlog of litigation in the judicial system?
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• Dr.Faryal Maqsood and another vs Khurram Shehzad Durrani and others2024 SCP 365, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-23
  dissolution of marriagedowerdowryKhulapolygamyMuslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961Section 2(iia) Dissolution of Muslims Marriages Act 1939restitution of conjugal rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a family dispute involving claims for dower, dowry, maintenance, and the dissolution of marriage. The core legal questions addressed were whether the trial court correctly decreed the recovery of dower and maintenance, whether the appellate court erred in granting dissolution via Khula without the wife's request, and whether Section 2(iia) of the Dissolution of Muslims Marriages Act 1939 remains a valid ground for dissolution. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings on dower, dowry, and maintenance were concurrent and sustainable. It ruled that a court cannot grant Khula without an express or implied request from the wife. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Section 2(iia) of the Dissolution of Muslims Marriages Act 1939, which allows for dissolution when a husband takes an additional wife in contravention of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, remains a valid and subsisting provision. The Court set aside the lower courts' decrees regarding Khula and cruelty, instead dissolving the marriage based on the husband's contravention of the Ordinance of 1961.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula without an express or implied request from the wife?
  • Does the repeal of Section 13 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 affect the validity of Section 2(iia) of the Dissolution of Muslims Marriages Act 1939?
  • Is the taking of an additional wife in contravention of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 a valid ground for the dissolution of marriage under the Dissolution of Muslims Marriages Act 1939?
  • Can the High Court, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction, decide questions of fact requiring the recording of evidence?
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• Dr. Khalid Iqbal Talpur vs Province of Sindh & others2024 SCP 381, 2025 SCMR 20, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-15
  service lawstatutory interpretationreappointmentage of superannuationadministrative lawharmonization of rulespublic office
  Summary & questions settled

  The dispute concerned the appointment and reappointment of the Executive Director (ED) of the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences, specifically whether the statutory retirement age of 60 years constitutes an absolute bar to reappointment. The Supreme Court held that the relevant rules governing appointment and reappointment must be harmonized rather than treated as mutually exclusive. The Court determined that while initial appointment is subject to the 60-year age limit, the provision for reappointment functions as a narrow, exceptional mechanism that allows for exceeding this limit. The Court rejected the High Court’s finding that the 60-year cap was an absolute bar. It established that the Board must follow a two-stage process: first, evaluating the outgoing ED for reappointment based on objective, exceptional performance; and second, if the Board proceeds, conducting a competitive selection process where the outgoing ED is considered alongside other candidates. The Board is mandated to provide detailed, written, and public reasons for any decision to reappoint, ensuring transparency and compliance with the statutory framework.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory age of superannuation constitute an absolute bar to the reappointment of an outgoing Executive Director?
  • Can two sets of rules enacted under the same statutory power be harmonized when they appear to conflict regarding age limits?
  • What is the mandatory two-stage process for the reappointment of an Executive Director when the Board exercises its discretion under the relevant rules?
  • Is the provision for reappointment of an Executive Director an independent power or an exception to the general rule of appointment?
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• Defence Housing Authority thr. its Secretary DHA Complex Lahore Cantt vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab Cooperatives Department Lahore etc2024 SCP 406, 2025 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-13
  cooperative housing societymerger agreementallotment of plotsuccessor liabilityconstitutional petitionfrivolous litigationcontractual obligations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court regarding the rights of an allottee of a residential plot within a cooperative housing society that subsequently merged with the Defence Housing Authority (DHA). The core legal question was whether the DHA, having assumed all liabilities and obligations of the society through a merger agreement, was bound to honor the allotment of a plot to the respondent and comply with the directives of the Cooperative Societies authorities. The Supreme Court held that the merger agreement explicitly obligated the DHA to resolve all outstanding issues of the society's members and to hand over possession of allotted plots. The Court determined that the DHA’s attempt to evade these obligations by challenging the jurisdiction of the Cooperative Societies authorities was meritless. The key principle laid down is that a successor entity, upon assuming the liabilities of a predecessor through a formal merger agreement, is legally bound to fulfill the existing contractual obligations and rights of the predecessor's members.

  Questions settled

  • Does a successor entity that assumes the liabilities of a cooperative housing society through a merger agreement become bound to honor the allotment of plots to existing members?
  • Can a successor entity challenge the jurisdiction of regulatory authorities regarding disputes that arose from the predecessor entity's obligations?
  • Is a petition that attempts to re-litigate settled issues through miscellaneous applications under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable?
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• Criminal Original Petition vs Contempt proceedings against Senator Faisal2024 SCP 176, 2024 SCMR 1338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-17
  contempt of courtfreedom of speechshow cause noticesub judicejudiciarypress conferencemedia broadcast
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two separate press conferences held by Senator Faisal Vawda and Member of the National Assembly Mustafa Kamal, which were broadcast live on television and social media. In these press conferences, both individuals allegedly leveled malicious and serious allegations against the judiciary, commented on judges of the superior courts, and spoke about sub judice cases pending before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether these public statements prima facie constituted contempt of court under the constitutional and statutory framework. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the statements prima facie appeared to be contemptuous. Consequently, the Court issued show-cause notices to both individuals, directing them to submit explanations and appear in person. The Court also warned television channels and media outlets that broadcasting or publishing material constituting contempt of court could subject them to similar contempt proceedings, emphasizing the constitutional limits on the right to freedom of speech.

  Questions settled

  • Whether public allegations against judges of the superior courts and comments on sub judice cases in a press conference prima facie constitute contempt of court?
  • What are the constitutional limits imposed on the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can television channels and media outlets be proceeded against for contempt of court for broadcasting or publishing contemptuous material?
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• Contempt proceedings vs Contempt proceedings against Senator Faisal2024 SCP 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-05
  contempt of courtmedia liabilitybroadcast regulationunconditional apologyPEMRAcontempt proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns contempt of court proceedings initiated against Senator Faisal Vawda and Mr. Mustafa Kamal following press conferences held on 16 May 2024. The core legal question involves determining whether the statements made during these press conferences constitute contempt of court and the subsequent liability of media outlets that broadcast the material. Regarding Mr. Mustafa Kamal, the Court acknowledged his submission of an unconditional and unqualified written apology, seeking the mercy of the Court. Conversely, Mr. Faisal Vawda requested additional time to file a further reply. The Court observed that the live broadcast of these press conferences by numerous television channels prima facie appears to constitute contempt of court, referencing a previous order dated 17 May 2024. Consequently, the Court directed that notices be issued to all channels involved, to be served through the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority, requiring them to submit explanations within two weeks. The Court also tasked the Attorney-General with identifying specific contemptuous remarks in the transcripts and accepted a volunteer's offer to provide religious texts regarding slanderous speech.

  Questions settled

  • Does the live broadcasting of press conferences containing potentially contemptuous material render the broadcasting channels liable for contempt of court?
  • Can a party facing contempt proceedings be granted additional time to file a reply after an initial submission?
  • Is an unconditional and unqualified apology sufficient to address contempt of court allegations?
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• Contempt proceedings against Senator Faisal Vawda vs N/A2024 SCP 223, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-28
  contempt of courtfreedom of speechfreedom of the pressslanderdefamationunconditional apologyelectronic media liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from contempt proceedings initiated against Senator Faisal Vawda and MNA Mustafa Kamal following press conferences they held in Islamabad on May 15 and 16, 2024, wherein they made malicious allegations against the judiciary and commented on sub judice matters. The core legal questions involved balancing the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and expression and freedom of the press under Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution against the constitutional exceptions of contempt of court and the inviolability of human dignity under Article 14, as well as examining the liability of television channels for broadcasting contemptuous statements. The Supreme Court held that freedom of speech is not absolute and does not permit slandering judges or courts, but accepted the unconditional apologies tendered by Vawda and Kamal, thereby withdrawing their show cause notices. Concurrently, the Court found the preliminary replies submitted by various television channels unjustified and issued formal show cause notices to 34 channels for broadcasting and rebroadcasting the contemptuous press conferences. The key principle laid down is that the broadcaster of slander or contemptuous material cannot escape liability by claiming they are merely transmitters, and media houses must verify content and exercise strict care to protect the public sphere from pollution by disinformation and falsehoods.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 takes precedence over the dignity of persons and contempt of court exceptions?
  • Can television channels escape liability for broadcasting contemptuous press conferences by claiming they are not the originators of the statements?
  • Does an unconditional and sincere apology from a contemnor warrant the withdrawal of show cause notices in contempt proceedings?
  • What are the legal obligations and reporting requirements for television channels when responding to show cause notices for broadcasting contemptuous material?
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• Commissioner, Rawalpindi/Province of the Punjab, etc. vs Naseer Ahmed,2023 SCP 279, 2024 SCMR 1037 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-11
  land acquisitionaddendum notificationmarket valuecompensationpublic purposefundamental rightsright to propertyurgency provisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the legality of land acquisition proceedings for the Dadhocha Dam, specifically examining the validity of an addendum to a preliminary notification under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and its effect on compensation. The core legal questions were whether the District Collector had the authority to issue an addendum notification after a prolonged delay and what the legal effect of such an addendum is on the determination of market value for compensation under Section 23 of the Act. The Court held that while the District Collector possesses the power to issue an addendum under the General Clauses Act, such power must be exercised within a reasonable time before moving to subsequent stages like Section 5 or 17(4). Crucially, the Court ruled that when an addendum modifies the land to be acquired, the date of the addendum's publication becomes the material date for determining the market value of the land under Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, ensuring adequate compensation in line with Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the District Collector has the lawful authority to issue an addendum to a preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • What is the legal effect of an addendum notification on land acquisition proceedings and the determination of compensation under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Can an addendum or corrigendum to a preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 be issued after a notification under Section 5 or Section 17(4) has already been issued?
  • Which date is to be taken as the date of publication of the Section 4 notification for assessing market value when an addendum notification has expanded the area of land to be acquired?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-X, Lahore vs M/s. Paul LeatherPTCL 2024 CL. 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-07-09
  Sales Tax Act 1990Tax FraudInvestigative AuditZero RatingRexine ManufacturerShow Cause NoticeLaboratory Testing
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a petition filed by the tax authorities challenging the judgment of the High Court, which had affirmed the Appellate Tribunal's decision setting aside a show cause notice and an adverse assessment order issued against the respondent manufacturer. The department had initiated an investigative audit under Section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, alleging tax fraud under Section 2(37) on the premise that the respondent manufactured plastic sheets rather than zero-rated Rexine under Section 4(c), as the respondent had not declared purchases of textile fabric. The Supreme Court observed that the department's allegation was founded purely on presumptions, visual impression, and surmises, without conducting laboratory tests on the collected product samples or verifying third-party sales and purchases. Moreover, the respondent's status as a Rexine manufacturer had been accepted in prior audits. The Court held that an omission to declare an unregistered supplier without evidence of concealment or deception does not constitute tax fraud or justify a re-audit. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can tax authorities establish an allegation of tax fraud under Section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 based purely on visual impression without laboratory tests or third-party verification?
  • Does the mere failure of a taxpayer to declare the name of an unregistered supplier in sales tax returns constitute proof of tax fraud absent evidence of concealment or deception?
  • Can tax authorities initiate a re-audit and issue a subsequent show cause notice on surmises where the taxpayer's declarations were accepted in multiple prior audits?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III. Rto, Rawalpindi, etc vs M/s2024 SCP 377, PTCL 2025 CL. 33, 2025 SCMR 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-06
  Sales Tax Act 1990Appellate AdjudicationMandatory vs DirectoryStatutory TimeframeRight to AppealFair TrialTax GovernanceReview Petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged a prior Supreme Court judgment declaring the first and second provisos to Section 45B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, as mandatory provisions, rendering appellate orders passed beyond the 180-day statutory timeframe void. The core legal question was whether these timeframes for appellate adjudication are mandatory or directory. The Court, by a majority, held that these provisions are directory. Distinguishing between original adjudication—where strict timelines prevent indefinite tax liability—and appellate adjudication—which concerns a taxpayer’s constitutional right to appeal and fair trial—the Court reasoned that mandatory interpretation would unfairly prejudice taxpayers due to administrative delays. The Court emphasized that statutory timelines for appellate bodies should not be used to negate a citizen's right to access justice or to penalize appellants for the tardiness of state functionaries. Consequently, the failure to decide an appeal within the prescribed period does not render the resulting order a nullity. The judgment was recalled, and the matter remanded to the Appellate Tribunal for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Are the first and second provisos to Section 45B(2) of the Sales Tax Act 1990 mandatory or directory provisions?
  • Does the failure of the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide an appeal within the statutory timeframe render the appellate order void?
  • Is there a legal distinction between original adjudication and appellate adjudication regarding the mandatory nature of statutory timeframes?
  • Can a taxpayer's right to appeal be negated by the failure of the appellate authority to decide the matter within the prescribed statutory period?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Regional Tax Office, Peshawar vs M/sPTCL 2024 CL. 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-07-04
  input tax refundsales taxtax liabilityregistered persontax recoverystatutory compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the denial of an input tax refund claim by the Commissioner Inland Revenue to a registered buyer, on the grounds that the supplier failed to deposit the collected sales tax into the government treasury. The core legal question was whether a registered buyer, having complied with payment requirements under Section 73 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, can be held liable for the supplier's failure to deposit input tax, thereby forfeiting the buyer's right to a refund. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where a buyer has fulfilled its statutory obligations, including payment via crossed cheque, and where the tax authority has failed to take action against the defaulting supplier (who remained registered and not blacklisted), the burden of the supplier's default cannot be shifted to the buyer. The Court established the principle that a registered buyer cannot be penalized for the tax authority's failure to recover dues from a supplier, particularly when the buyer had no means to verify the supplier's compliance and the authority failed to exercise its enforcement powers against the actual defaulter.

  Questions settled

  • Can a registered buyer be denied an input tax refund solely because the supplier failed to deposit the collected sales tax into the government treasury?
  • Does a registered buyer bear the liability for a supplier's failure to deposit sales tax when the buyer has complied with the payment requirements of Section 73 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Is it permissible for the tax authority to shift the burden of recovering tax from a defaulting supplier to a compliant registered buyer?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Large Taxpayers Office, Islamabad (In all2024 SCP 104, 2024 SCMR 853, 2024 PTD 1085 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-29
  interim reliefpublic revenueconstitutional jurisdictionmandatory proceduresupertaxincome taxsupreme court interference
  Summary & questions settled

  Through these petitions, the petitioner sought leave to appeal against the interim order of the Islamabad High Court restraining the recovery of supertax under Section 4C of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001. The core legal question was whether the High Court complied with the mandatory procedure under Article 199(4) of the Constitution when granting interim relief that impeded the collection of public revenue without issuing notice to the prescribed law officer or recording reasons that the challenged order was without jurisdiction on the face of the record. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Article 199(4) are mandatory, and failure to provide notice and an opportunity of hearing to the prescribed law officer, along with a failure to record reasons regarding jurisdiction, renders the interim order illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court established the principle that interim orders affecting the assessment or collection of public revenue must strictly adhere to the procedural prerequisites of Article 199(4) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Article 199(4) of the Constitution regarding interim orders affecting public revenue are mandatory?
  • Can a High Court grant interim relief impeding public revenue collection without giving notice to the prescribed law officer?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an interim order passed by a High Court?
  • Whether an interim order suspending a fiscal statute without complying with constitutional safeguards is sustainable?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs M_s Millat Tractors Limited, Lahore and others2024 SCP 80, PTCL 2024 CL. 426, 2024 PTD 483, 2024 SCMR 700, PLJ 2024 SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  tax assessmentincome taxunexplained incomeamendment of assessmentnotice requirementretrospective applicationprospective applicationsubstantive rightsdefinite informationdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court addressed civil petitions concerning tax references and Intra Court Appeals, primarily questioning the procedural requirements for amending tax assessments under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal issues were whether a separate notice under Section 111 is a prerequisite for initiating assessment amendment proceedings under Section 122, and the retrospective applicability of an Explanation added to Section 111 via the Finance Act, 2021, which aimed to dispense with a separate Section 111 notice. The Court held that for tax years prior to the Explanation's introduction, a separate Section 111 notice and its conclusion into a Commissioner's opinion were mandatory to constitute "definite information" under Section 122(5) before Section 122 proceedings could formally commence. Even if notices under Sections 111 and 122(9) are issued simultaneously, Section 111 proceedings must finalize first. The Court ruled that the Explanation to Section 111 applies prospectively only, as it abridges a substantive right of the taxpayer. Thus, for prior tax years, a separate notice under Section 111 is required.

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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Islamabad vs M/s Fauji Foundation &2024 SCP 64, 2024 SCMR 788, 2024 PTD 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-01
  income from businessnotional gainfair market valueamendment of assessmentdefinite informationtax jurisdictionlong-term investment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Revenue challenges the judgment of the High Court regarding the amendment of an original tax assessment order of the taxpayer-respondent, a charitable trust, for Tax Year 2012. The core legal question was whether the increase in the fair market value of a subsidiary company's shares held by the taxpayer as a long-term investment is taxable under the head "income from business" pursuant to section 18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and whether the prerequisites for amending an assessment under section 122(5) were met. The Supreme Court held that the notional gain resulting from the revaluation of shares without actual realization or disposal, and absent a direct connection to the carrying on of a business, does not constitute business income under section 18(1)(d). Furthermore, the Court held that the Taxation Officer lacked jurisdiction to amend the assessment because no "definite information" was acquired subsequent to the original assessment, as the action was merely a reanalysis of existing data provided by the taxpayer. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the increase in the fair market value of shares held as a long-term investment is taxable as income from business under section 18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can notional or unrealized gains from the revaluation of shares be subjected to tax without disposal?
  • What are the mandatory conditions required for a Taxation Officer to assume jurisdiction for amending an assessment under section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does a mere reanalysis of existing information provided in the tax return constitute "definite information" for the purpose of reopening an assessment?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-IV, Large Taxpayer Unit, Karachi vs M_s Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd., KarachiPTCL 2024 CL. 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales taxfake invoicesinput tax adjustmentburden of proofshow cause noticereverse onustax evasion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition seeking leave against a judgment of the High Court answering questions of law in a sales tax reference application against the Department. The respondent taxpayer had been issued a show-cause notice alleging the claim of input tax against fake or flying invoices allegedly issued by eight distinct entities, and demanding recovery along with surcharge and additional tax. The Supreme Court evaluated whether the sales tax authorities could shift the burden of proof onto the taxpayer without conducting a proper audit or inquiry to substantiate allegations. The Court held that under the Sales Tax Act 1990, the burden of proof to establish that tax has not been paid or that invoices are fake rests squarely on the Department, and there is no concept of a reverse onus under the Act of 1990 comparable to other specialized statutes. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Where the Department alleges that a registered person has claimed input tax against fake or flying invoices, on whom does the burden of proof lie under the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Can the sales tax authorities lawfully issue a show-cause notice and shift the burden of proof onto a taxpayer without conducting an audit or inquiry under the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Does the Sales Tax Act 1990 contain any provision providing for a reverse onus of proof similar to section 187 of the Customs Act 1969?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-IV, Karachi (In all cases) vs M/s A.P.2024 SCP 26, PTCL 2024 CL. 119, 2024 SCMR 741, 2024 PTD 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-12
  double taxation conventioninternational shipping profitstreaty interpretationancillary shipping activitiescontainer detention chargestax treatyOECD Model Convention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether income derived from Container Detention Charges (CDC), Container Service Charges (CSC), and Terminal Handling Charges (THC) by non-resident shipping companies qualifies as "profits from the operation of ships in international traffic" under the Pakistan-Denmark and Pakistan-Belgium Double Taxation Conventions. The core legal question is the interpretation of the scope of these treaty provisions regarding ancillary shipping activities. The Supreme Court held that such charges are intrinsically connected to and ancillary to the operation of ships in international traffic. Consequently, these profits fall within the scope of Article 8 of the respective Conventions and are eligible for the beneficial tax treatment stipulated therein. The Court established the principle that international tax treaties require a broad, purposive, and independent interpretive approach, distinct from domestic law, and that activities facilitating or supporting international shipping operations—including container-related services and cargo handling—are integral to the definition of shipping profits under international model tax conventions.

  Questions settled

  • Do Container Detention Charges, Container Service Charges, and Terminal Handling Charges qualify as profits from the operation of ships in international traffic under double taxation conventions?
  • Should international tax treaties be interpreted using the same principles as domestic tax legislation?
  • What criteria determine whether an activity is ancillary to the operation of ships in international traffic for tax treaty purposes?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Riaz Bottlers (Pvt.) Ltd. [Now Lotte2024 SCP 86, PTCL 2024 CL. 420, 2024 SCMR 684, 2024 PLC 183, 2024 PTD 772, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-19
  Workers Profit Participation Fundtrading liabilityspecial law versus general lawincome tax assessmentstatutory liabilityreference application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a tax reference concerning the assessment of M/s Riaz Bottlers (Pvt.) Ltd. for the assessment year 2001-2002, where the taxation officer made an addition on account of the Workers Profit Participation Fund (WPPF) and interest thereon under Section 25(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue deleted the addition, holding that companies are allowed to use WPPF funds under the Companies Profits (Workers' Participation) Act, 1968, and the income therefrom is exempt. The Lahore High Court dismissed the department's reference application, upholding the Tribunal's view. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the WPPF amount constituted a trading liability attracting Section 25(c) of the repealed Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the amount transferred to the WPPF is a statutory liability rather than a trading liability, and therefore does not fall within the ambit of Section 25(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that special law takes precedence over general law. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amount transferred to the Workers Profit Participation Fund qualifies as a trading liability under Section 25(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does a special law take precedence over a general law regarding tax exemptions on Workers Profit Participation Funds?
  • Whether the income arising out of funds under the Companies Profits (Workers' Participation) Act, 1968 is exempt from income tax?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue and others vs SKB-KNK Joint Venture, etc.2024 SCP 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-23
  tax jurisdictiondelegation of powersfiscal legislationFederal Board of Revenueadministrative lawstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from petitions challenging a notification issued under Section 209 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which transferred jurisdiction over Large Taxpayer Units (LTU) in Quetta and Peshawar to Karachi and Islamabad, respectively. During the proceedings, the Federal Board of Revenue withdrew the impugned notifications, rendering the primary grievance infructuous. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the petitions as having borne fruit. However, the Court highlighted significant systemic concerns regarding the Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007. Specifically, it questioned the scope of delegation powers under Section 8 of the Act, particularly whether such delegation applies to fiscal laws lacking explicit delegation provisions, and noted the absence of necessary conditions in delegation notifications. Furthermore, the Court observed the failure to operationalize the Policy Board under Section 6 and the lack of a functional data bank as mandated by Section 14. The Attorney General for Pakistan assured the Court that these legislative and administrative concerns would be addressed in the upcoming Finance Act and that the Policy Board would be made functional.

  Questions settled

  • Does the delegation power under Section 8 of the Federal Board of Revenue Act 2007 apply to fiscal laws that do not explicitly provide for such delegation?
  • Must delegation notifications issued under Section 8 of the Federal Board of Revenue Act 2007 specify the conditions under which such powers are delegated?
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• City District Government, Karachi vs Akram Nabi and others2024 SCMR 1215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-26
  amenity plotsland use conversionpublic parkKarachi Development Authorityrelief not prayed forMaster Planillegal allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment concerning the cancellation of illegal land allotments within a designated public park, the Bagh-e-Ibn-e-Qasim, in Karachi. The core legal questions were whether land earmarked as an amenity plot could be converted to commercial use and whether the High Court possessed the authority to grant relief—specifically the provision of alternate property—that was not requested by the petitioners. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment. The Court held that the Karachi Development Authority Order, 1957, strictly prohibits the conversion of amenity plots into commercial use, emphasizing that land reserved for public benefit cannot be diverted for private profit. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the High Court erred by granting relief that was not prayed for, especially when such relief contravened the city's Master Plan and applicable land-use laws. The judgment reinforces the principle that amenity plots are protected for public use, and judicial relief must remain within the scope of the pleadings and the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can land designated as an amenity plot be converted to commercial use?
  • Is it legally permissible for a court to grant relief that was not specifically prayed for by the litigants?
  • Does the Karachi Development Authority Order, 1957, prohibit the conversion of public parks into commercial properties?
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• Chief Executive Officer NPGCL, Genco-III, TPS Muzafargarrah vs Khalid2024 SCP 45, 2024 PLC 104, 2024 SCMR 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-16
  ex-parte judgmentindustrial relationslimitationdoctrine of electionres judicatacondonation of delaygrievance petitionNIRC
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution challenged a Lahore High Court judgment which upheld the National Industrial Relations Commission’s (NIRC) refusal to set aside an ex-parte judgment. The respondent, a former employee, had filed a grievance petition against his dismissal. Although the petitioner initially contested the matter, it later failed to appear, leading to an ex-parte decree. The petitioner subsequently filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the decree, which was dismissed as time-barred, as was a subsequent appeal to the Full Bench of the NIRC. The Supreme Court examined Section 58 of the Industrial Relations Act (IRA), 2012, and Regulation 45 of the NIRC Regulations, 2016. The Court held that while CPC procedures apply to NIRC proceedings, the petitioner failed to justify the delay or file a condonation application under Section 85 of the IRA. Applying the 'doctrine of election,' the Court ruled that once a party chooses a specific legal remedy, they cannot later seek concurrent remedies to circumvent limitation periods. The petition was dismissed.

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• Chief Commissioner/ Commissioner Ir Zone-II/Zone-III, Rto, Peshawar vs2024 SCP 90, PTCL 2024 CL. 414, 2024 SCMR 858, 2024 PTD 865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-19
  tax refundfinal tax regimeterritorial jurisdictionpetroleum productsFATAtax immunitycommission income
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, the Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue, challenged a High Court judgment that favored taxpayers regarding their claims for tax refunds. The respondents, who operated petrol pumps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), sought refunds for taxes deducted under Section 156A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, arguing that the Ordinance did not extend to FATA. The core legal question was whether income derived from commissions or discounts on petroleum products, where the contractual arrangements and tax deductions occurred outside FATA, was immune from taxation under the Ordinance of 2001. The Supreme Court held that the tax deduction under Section 156A constituted a final tax regime on income arising from the commission or discount, which occurred in taxable areas outside FATA. The Court ruled that mere operation of business premises in FATA does not grant immunity from taxation; the taxpayer must prove the taxable income was not derived from areas where the statute applies. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment, as the respondents failed to establish such immunity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the operation of a business within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) automatically grant immunity from the application of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is tax deducted under Section 156A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, on commissions or discounts for petroleum products considered a final tax?
  • Where a contractual arrangement and the resulting income (commission) arise outside the territorial limits of FATA, can the taxpayer claim immunity from the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue, Regional Tax Office, Bahawalpur and others vs Baqa Muhammad Lashari2024 SCMR 1164, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1001, 2024 PLJ SC 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-15
  civil serviceadvance incrementsseniority-cum-fitnesshigher qualificationOffice Memorandumservice tribunalcontinuing claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that granted the respondent two advance increments for acquiring higher educational qualifications. The core legal question was whether a civil servant, promoted on a seniority-cum-fitness basis, is entitled to advance increments for obtaining a higher qualification (Intermediate) that was the prescribed qualification for the promotional post, pursuant to the Finance Division's Office Memorandum of 1992. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that the respondent’s case fell squarely within the ambit of the 1992 Office Memorandum, as clarified by subsequent memoranda in 2011 and 2019. The Court rejected the argument that the claim was time-barred, characterizing it as a continuing claim. The key principle laid down is that civil servants who acquire higher qualifications while in service, which are prescribed for their promotional posts, are eligible for advance increments, and such financial claims arising from service conditions are treated as continuing claims rather than being subject to strict limitation bars.

  Questions settled

  • Are civil servants promoted on a seniority-cum-fitness basis entitled to advance increments upon acquiring higher qualifications prescribed for the promotional post?
  • Does the acquisition of higher qualifications while in service entitle a civil servant to advance increments under the Finance Division's 1992 Office Memorandum?
  • Is a claim for advance increments by a civil servant considered a continuing claim for the purpose of limitation?
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• Chaudhary Ghulam Hussain and another vs M/s Saudi Pak Commercial2024 SCP 397, 2025 SCMR 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-15
  execution proceedingsauction salesetting aside salelimitationfinancial institutionsmaterial irregularityobjection petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of an Execution First Appeal by the Lahore High Court under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The petitioners challenged the auction and subsequent sale confirmation of their mortgaged property, which was executed to satisfy an ex-parte recovery decree. The petitioners contended that the auction lacked transparency, the property was undervalued, and they were denied the opportunity to match the highest bid. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the petitioners failed to deposit the matching sale price despite being granted permission, and failed to demonstrate any material irregularity or fraud in the auction proceedings. Furthermore, the Court noted that under Article 166 of the Limitation Act, 1908, an application to set aside an execution sale must be filed within thirty days, whereas the petitioners filed their objections after more than three years. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, holding that the execution proceedings and sale confirmation were legally sound and the objection petition was barred by limitation.

  Questions settled

  • What is the limitation period under Article 166 of the Limitation Act 1908 for filing an application to set aside a sale in execution of a decree?
  • Can an auction sale be set aside under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without proving substantial injury resulting from a material irregularity or fraud?
  • What are the pre-requisites for a judgment-debtor to apply to set aside an execution sale under Order XXI Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Chanzeb Akhtar, Haji Mirza Zafar vs The State and another2024 SCP 189, 2024 SCMR 1413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-21
  life imprisonmentmitigating circumstancesabsence of motivelast seen evidenceforensic science laboratoryballistic reportcourt witnessSection 302 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered a petition for leave to appeal against an Islamabad High Court judgment that upheld the conviction of the petitioner under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but reduced his sentence from death to life imprisonment. The petitioner was accused of shooting and killing his wife. The case relied on circumstantial evidence, including a 'last seen' witness who saw the petitioner fleeing the scene with a pistol, a positive ballistic report matching crime scene empties to the recovered pistol, and court witness testimony regarding an affidavit from the petitioner's brother. The prosecution failed to establish a motive. The Supreme Court affirmed that while motive is not an essential element to establish guilt for murder, the absence of proved motive serves as a valid mitigating factor justifying the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment. Finding no illegality or infirmity in the High Court's appraisal, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove motive in a murder case prevent a conviction under Section 302 PPC?
  • Can the absence or non-establishment of a motive serve as a mitigating circumstance to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment?
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• Chairman/Dean Sheikh Zayed Hospital, Lahore vs Amjad Mehmood Khan2024 SCP 338, 2025 SCMR 168, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-12
  pensionary benefitsrecurring cause of actioncontractual servicecivil servantservice lawlachesCivil Service Regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which allowed the respondent's appeal regarding the inclusion of his prior contractual service in the calculation of his pensionary benefits. The core legal questions were whether a claim for pensionary benefits is barred by laches when filed years after retirement, and whether contractual service followed by regularization qualifies for inclusion in pension calculations under the Civil Service Regulations. The Court held that pensionary benefits constitute a recurring cause of action, meaning claims are not automatically barred by delay or laches. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under Article 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations, contractual service is considered 'temporary service' and must be included in pension calculations provided it was continuous and followed by regularization. The key principle laid down is that while contractual service counts towards the calculation of pension benefits, it cannot be aggregated with regular service to satisfy the minimum qualifying service period required for pension eligibility; the employee must still meet the qualifying service threshold as a regular employee.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claim for pensionary benefits constitute a recurring cause of action that avoids the bar of laches?
  • Does the term 'temporary service' in Article 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations include contractual service?
  • Can contractual service be aggregated with regular service to meet the minimum qualifying period for pension eligibility?
  • Under what conditions does contractual service count towards the calculation of pension benefits?
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• Chairman, Board of Control, Canteen Stores, HQ, Rawalpindi & others vs Muhammad Azam Khan & others2024 SCP 95, 2024 SCMR 862, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-22
  Canteen Stores DepartmentConstitutional jurisdictionMaster and servantWrit petitionService of PakistanArmed ForcesNon-governmental commercial organization
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment reinstating terminated employees of the Canteen Stores Department (CSD). The core legal questions were whether CSD employees are in the service of the Armed Forces, thereby barring High Court jurisdiction under Article 199(3) of the Constitution, and whether the CSD qualifies as a 'person' or 'authority' under Article 199(5) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the CSD is a non-governmental commercial organization, not a government department, and its employees are not in the service of Pakistan or the Armed Forces. The Court determined that the CSD operates autonomously with its own funds, is not a body politic or corporate, and does not perform sovereign functions. Consequently, the relationship between the CSD and its employees is governed by the ordinary law of Master and Servant rather than constitutional law. The Court concluded that the writ petitions were incompetent, allowed the appeal, and set aside the High Court’s orders, affirming that the CSD does not fall within the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Canteen Stores Department considered to be in the service of the Armed Forces of Pakistan?
  • Does the Canteen Stores Department fall within the definition of 'person' or 'authority' under Article 199(5) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is the relationship between the Canteen Stores Department and its employees governed by the law of Master and Servant?
  • Can the High Court exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the Canteen Stores Department?
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• Chairman Pakistan Ordinance Factories, Pof Board, Wah Cantt vs Akhtar2024 SCP 394, 2025 SCMR 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-27
  Service Tribunaldisciplinary proceedingswilful absencejudicial discretionmajor penaltyremoval from servicecompulsory retirementservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged the Federal Service Tribunal's decision to convert the respondent's removal from service into compulsory retirement. The respondent, an employee of the Pakistan Ordinance Factories, had been removed for wilful absence after traveling abroad without sanctioned leave. The core legal question concerned the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, to interfere with departmental disciplinary penalties. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by arbitrarily reducing the punishment. The Court affirmed that the award of punishment is primarily the function of the competent authority. The Tribunal’s power to modify penalties is not discretionary or unbridled; it must be exercised with circumspection, providing legally sustainable reasons, and only when the penalty is perverse or demonstrably disproportionate. The Court emphasized that wilful absence constitutes gross misconduct, and personal achievements like foreign education do not mitigate such disciplinary infractions. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's order, and restored the original penalty of removal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have unbridled discretion to modify disciplinary penalties imposed by a competent authority?
  • Can a Tribunal reduce a major penalty of removal from service based solely on the employee's academic achievements?
  • Does wilful absence from duty without sanctioned leave constitute gross misconduct justifying removal from service?
  • Is a regular inquiry mandatory when the absence from duty is admitted by the employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman Federal Public Service Commission, Islamabad and others vs Dr.2024 SCP 286, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1251, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 915, PLJ 2024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-13
  Service Tribunals ActActing ChairmanStatutory InterpretationSplit OpinionTribunal ProcedureStrict Construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a decision of the Federal Service Tribunal, where a split opinion occurred between two members, one of whom was an Acting Chairman. The core legal question was whether the term 'Chairman' in Section 3A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, which dictates the procedure for resolving equally divided opinions among tribunal members, encompasses an 'Acting Chairman' appointed under Section 3(7) of the same Act. The Supreme Court held that the statutory provision creating an exception to the general rule of adjudication—where the Chairman's opinion prevails in the event of a tie—must be construed strictly. Because the legislature explicitly distinguished between the Chairman and an Acting Chairman in the Act, the Court determined that the weightage given to the Chairman's opinion cannot be extended to an Acting Chairman. Consequently, the Court set aside the proceedings and remanded the matter to the Chairman for a fresh decision. The key principle established is that statutory exceptions regarding the powers of specific office-holders must be interpreted strictly and cannot be expanded by implication to include temporary substitutes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'Chairman' in Section 3A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 include an 'Acting Chairman'?
  • What is the procedure when members of a Bench of the Federal Service Tribunal are equally divided in opinion?
  • Can an Acting Chairman exercise the specific powers granted to the Chairman under Section 3A(2)(c) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore & others vs Sufi Nazir2024 SCP 76, 2024 SCMR 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-29
  Evacuee Trust PropertyRent AssessmentDelegated LegislationLegitimate ExpectationAdministrative FairnessStatutory InterpretationSocial Legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a Peshawar High Court judgment that declared amendments to clauses 10 and 11 of the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee Trust Properties, 1977, as unreasonable and arbitrary. The core legal question was whether the revised procedure for assessing and reassessing rent for evacuee trust properties violated principles of fairness and reasonableness. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that the amendments were valid. The Court reasoned that the new procedure, which mandates market-based rent assessment, provides for public inspection, allows for tenant objections, and grants a right of hearing, effectively addresses the procedural deficiencies identified in the Muzzafar Khan case. The Court emphasized that administrative actions must adhere to the principle of legitimate expectation, requiring transparency and predictability. By balancing the interests of the trusts—which rely on rental income for charitable purposes—and the tenants, the Court concluded that the Scheme’s provisions are neither mechanical nor unbridled, thus upholding the legality of the rent assessment framework.

  Questions settled

  • Are the amendments to clauses 10 and 11 of the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee Trust Properties, 1977, regarding rent assessment, legally valid?
  • Does the principle of legitimate expectation require administrative bodies to provide a fair procedure for rent assessment?
  • Can rent assessment procedures for evacuee trust properties be considered reasonable if they include provisions for public inspection and tenant hearings?
  Read full judgment →
• Capital View Point Restaurant (La Montana), Islamabad and others vs Capital Development Authority through its Chairman, Islamabad, etc2024 SCP 299, 2024 SCMR 2010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-03
  Margalla Hills National Parkreview petitionconsent orderunregistered partnership firmillegal commercial leaseenvironmental protectioncontemptuous behavior
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses multiple review petitions and miscellaneous applications arising from a previous short order and detailed judgment concerning commercial establishments, including restaurants, operating within the protected Margalla Hills National Park. The core legal questions involve whether review lies against consent orders and undertakings given to the court, the legal status of licenses versus leases in public lands, the binding effect of unregistered partnerships to initiate legal proceedings and make undertakings, and the validity of lease agreements executed by non-legal entities like the Remount Veterinary and Farms Directorate. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions and applications, holding that solemn undertakings given to the court cannot be resiled from, unregistered firms cannot maintain legal proceedings under the Partnership Act 1932, and commercial operations within a protected national park violate environmental and wildlife laws. Furthermore, the Court withdrew a concession of preference previously extended to operators who had promised to vacate voluntarily, due to their subsequent retracting behavior. The key principles established relate to the strict protection of national parks, the inviolability of undertakings given in court, and the incapacity of unregistered entities to enforce contractual rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition is maintainable against a consent order or a solemn undertaking given before the Court?
  • Can an unregistered partnership firm or its partners initiate legal proceedings to enforce rights arising from a contract?
  • Does a partner have the implied authority to bind the firm through commitments and actions?
  • Whether commercial restaurants can legally operate within a protected national park under expired licenses or void leases?
  Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority, Islamabad thr. its Chairman & others vs M.2024 SCP 182, 2024 SCMR 1381, 2024 PLJ SC 634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-13
  Capital Development AuthorityMaster PlanFuture Useallotment of plotswrit jurisdictionnecessary partiesadministrative discretionland use
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from writ petitions challenging the Capital Development Authority's (CDA) creation and allotment of residential plots in Sector F-11/4, Islamabad, which the petitioners alleged violated the Master Plan. The Islamabad High Court initially cancelled the allotments, directing departmental action against officials. The core legal question was whether the CDA's designation of land for 'Future Use' in the Master Plan prohibited its subsequent allotment for residential purposes, and whether the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgments and restoring the cancelled allotments. The Court held that the term 'Future Use' in the Master Plan does not imply a prohibition against residential utilization, nor does it reserve land for amenity purposes. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that administrative decisions regarding land use cannot be struck down absent a clear violation of law or the Master Plan. Additionally, the Court noted the procedural failure of the High Court in cancelling property rights without impleading the affected allottees as necessary parties, thereby violating principles of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the designation of land for 'Future Use' in the Capital Development Authority Master Plan prohibit its allotment for residential purposes?
  • Can a High Court cancel property allotments in its constitutional jurisdiction without impleading the affected allottees as necessary parties?
  • Is the exercise of administrative discretion by the Capital Development Authority regarding land use subject to judicial interference absent a proven violation of law or the Master Plan?
  Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority, CDA, through its Chairman, CDA, Islamabad vs Ahmed Murtaza and another2024 SCP 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  frivolous litigationspecial costsnon-transferable plotmisrepresentationspecific performanceconsent decreepublic institution
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Capital Development Authority (CDA), challenged a judgment of the Islamabad High Court which had accepted a constitutional petition filed by Respondent No. 1. The CDA contended that the disputed plot was non-transferable outside the family of the original allottee under the allotment letter and lease agreement. However, the record revealed that the CDA itself had previously transferred the plot to Respondent No. 2 and several other non-family members, and had conceded to these facts in a prior suit resulting in a consent decree. The High Court in a previous FAO had already decided the transferability issue on merits against the CDA, which the CDA failed to fully disclose in its petition. The Supreme Court held that the CDA's petition was frivolous, vexatious, and a deliberate attempt to mislead the Court by withholding material facts. Emphasizing that public institutions must take responsibility for their decisions and cannot use courts to remedy internal managerial failures, the Court dismissed the petition and imposed special costs of Rs. 500,000 to be deposited in an approved charity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public authority challenge the transfer of a property on the ground of non-transferability when it has itself repeatedly authorized and executed such transfers to non-family members?
  • Whether the failure of a petitioner to disclose prior relevant litigation and orders between the same parties constitutes a misrepresentation that warrants the imposition of special costs?
  • Can the Supreme Court impose special costs under the Supreme Court Rules 1980 on a public institution for pursuing vexatious and frivolous litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal Haque vs Kamran Ali Afzal, Secretary, Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others2024 SCP 262, 2024 SCP 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-25
  environmental protectioncontempt of courtNational Parkjudicial disciplineadministrative lawguzara forestRules of Business
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns contempt petitions and miscellaneous applications regarding the preservation of the Margalla Hills National Park and the administrative status of the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board (IWMB). The Court addressed allegations of mala fide administrative actions, including the unauthorized transfer of the IWMB to the Ministry of Interior and the removal of its Chairperson, which were subsequently withdrawn by the Federal Government. The Court emphasized the binding nature of its orders under Articles 189 and 190 of the Constitution, condemning a subordinate court's attempt to frustrate its demolition orders via injunctions and referring the matter to the Islamabad High Court. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Galiyat Development Authority lacks the legal authority to permit construction in protected guzara forests or National Parks, as its statutory mandate requires prioritizing forest conservation and wildlife preservation. The Court directed the Capital Development Authority to investigate illegal housing societies within the National Park, reaffirming that the protection of the environment and the National Park remains a paramount obligation for all state authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subordinate court issue an injunction to restrain the execution of a Supreme Court order?
  • Does the Galiyat Development Authority have the legal authority to permit construction within protected guzara forests?
  • Is the transfer of a statutory board between ministries subject to the Rules of Business, 1973?
  • What is the scope of the duty of subordinate courts under Article 190 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal Haque and others vs Kamran Ali Afzal, Secretary, Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others2024 SCP 274, 2024 SCMR 1749 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-17
  contempt of courtMargalla Hills National ParkRules of Business 1973conflict of interestenvironmental protectionadministrative lawcabinet secretary
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns contempt proceedings and administrative oversight regarding the protection of the Margalla Hills National Park. The core legal questions involve whether the Cabinet Secretary acted in conflict of interest regarding the arbitrary removal of the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board Chairperson, and whether the transfer of the Board to the Interior Division violated the Rules of Business, 1973. The Court held that the government’s reversal of the removal notification and the transfer memorandum addressed the immediate administrative impropriety. However, the Court initiated contempt proceedings against Luqman Ali Afzal for willfully breaching a court undertaking to vacate an illegal restaurant and for scandalizing the Court. The judgment establishes that administrative decisions regarding the allocation of business between government divisions must possess a rational nexus to the division's functions, serve the public interest, and strictly adhere to mandatory consultation requirements under the Rules of Business, 1973. Additionally, the Court emphasized that environmental protection mandates and judicial orders cannot be subverted by the exercise of familial influence or administrative manipulation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the transfer of government business between divisions require prior consultation with the Cabinet Division under the Rules of Business, 1973?
  • Can a party be held in contempt for initiating a media campaign to scandalize the Court after giving a voluntary undertaking to vacate illegal premises?
  • Is the allocation of business between government divisions subject to the requirement of a rational nexus with the division's functions and public interest?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmed (deceased) through his L.Rs., etc vs Nazir Ahmad, etc2024 SCP 275, 2024 SCMR 1984, 2024 PLJ SC 845 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-19
  family settlementpower of attorneyregistration of documentsproperty partitionrevocation of agencyspecial equity
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns a dispute among brothers regarding the validity of property transfers and the enforceability of a family settlement. The core legal question was whether a family settlement, recorded in a memorandum, required registration and attestation to be binding, and whether the power of attorney used to transfer the disputed land was validly revoked. The Supreme Court held that the family settlement was a bona fide arrangement aimed at resolving disputes and fostering family harmony, and thus, it was binding on the parties. The Court ruled that such settlements, when acting as memoranda of oral agreements, do not require compulsory registration under the Registration Act, 1908. Furthermore, the Court found the alleged revocation of the power of attorney to be a fabrication. The key principle laid down is that family settlements are governed by special equity, prioritizing the preservation of family peace over technical legal requirements applicable to strangers, and that courts should uphold them when made in good faith, provided they are not tainted by fraud or undue influence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a memorandum recording an oral family settlement require compulsory registration under the Registration Act 1908?
  • Are the strict precautionary principles governing an agent's transfer of a principal's property applicable to transfers made pursuant to a bona fide family settlement?
  • Can a family settlement be upheld by a court even if it lacks formal attestation by two witnesses?
  • Is a family settlement binding on parties even if it is not registered?
  Read full judgment →
• Bakht Biland Khan and others vs Zahid Khan and others2024 SCP 346, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-30
  inheritancefemale inheritanceshariahmutationfrivolous litigationexemplary costsrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from a civil suit filed by the petitioners (brothers) challenging the inheritance mutation of their deceased father, Shah Jehan, who passed away in 1988. The petitioners sought to exclude their sisters from inheriting their father's estate on the ground that the father had gifted them cash and dowry during his lifetime. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court all dismissed the petitioners' claims. On further petition, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether daughters can be excluded from their father's inheritance on the basis of lifetime gifts or dowry. The Court held that such a proposition is completely contrary to Islamic Shariah and the law of Pakistan. The Court strongly condemned the practice of male heirs depriving female heirs of their legal inheritance through protracted and frivolous litigation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition with exemplary costs of five hundred thousand rupees to be distributed among the deprived heirs, and directed the revenue authorities to ensure the estate is distributed in accordance with Shariah.

  Questions settled

  • Can daughters be excluded from their father's inheritance on the ground that they received gifts or dowry during his lifetime?
  • What measures can the Supreme Court take against male heirs who engage in frivolous litigation to deprive female heirs of their inheritance?
  • Whether revenue authorities are bound to ensure the distribution of a deceased's estate among all legal heirs in accordance with Shariah?
  Read full judgment →
• Babar Anwar vs Muhammad Ashraf and another2024 SCP 128, 2024 SCMR 734, 2024 PLJ SC 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-24
  power of attorneyHibagift deedconcurrent findingscivil revisionfiduciary dutyalienation of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a revision against concurrent findings of lower courts, which had decreed a suit for the cancellation of a registered gift deed. The core legal question was whether a general attorney possesses the authority to gift a principal's property to a third party or themselves without explicit consent, and whether such a transfer is valid under Islamic law. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings. The Court held that a general power of attorney does not inherently authorize an agent to gift the principal's property, especially to themselves or their kin, without specific, proven instructions and consent from the principal. The Court emphasized that a valid 'Hiba' (gift) requires the donor's intent, acceptance, and delivery of possession. It further established that an attorney must obtain express permission from the principal before alienating property, particularly when the transaction benefits the attorney or their relations. The Court also noted that inconsistent pleas—claiming both gift and sale—undermine the validity of the transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a general attorney gift a principal's property without obtaining specific permission or consent from the principal?
  • Does a plea of gift and a plea of sale regarding the same property constitute mutually destructive arguments?
  • What are the essential legal requirements for a valid Hiba under Islamic law?
  • To what extent can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• B.P. Pakistan Exploration and Production, Inc. vs Ashique Hussain Halepoto2024 SCP 119, 2024 SCMR 833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-07
  land acquisitioncompulsory acquisition chargespublic purposeadditional compensationSection 28-Amarket valueinterest on compensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the determination of compensation for agricultural land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of appeals by a company, the appropriate calculation of compensation, the applicable rate for compulsory acquisition charges under Section 23(2), the retrospective effect of the omission of Section 28-A, and the entitlement to interest on compensation where rent was previously paid. The Supreme Court held that appeals under Section 54 are maintainable. Regarding compulsory charges, the Court clarified that the determining factor is the purpose of acquisition stated in the notification; if declared a 'public purpose,' the rate is 15%, regardless of the beneficiary being a company. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Section 28-A, having been omitted with retrospective effect, provides no basis for additional compensation. Finally, the Court held that interest on compensation is only payable from the date the landowner ceased receiving lease payments, as possession is deemed to continue until that point. The judgment affirms that the purpose of acquisition, as declared by the government, dictates the statutory compulsory charges.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal maintainable by a company against a judgment of a Referee Court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Does the declaration of 'public purpose' in an acquisition notification mandate a 15% compulsory charge, even if the acquisition is for a company?
  • Can additional compensation under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 be claimed after its retrospective omission?
  • From what date is interest on compensation payable when the acquiring company was previously paying lease rent to the landowner?
  Read full judgment →
• Azhar Pervaiz Bukhari vs The State & another2024 SCP 247, 2024 SCMR 1719, PLJ 2025 SC (Cr.C.) 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-01
  pre-arrest baildishonoured chequemala fidecriminal breachlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court declining his pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for issuing a dishonoured cheque amounting to Rs. 80,00,000/-. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner established mala fide on the part of the complainant, whether the case warranted further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the petition was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was specifically nominated, did not deny his signatures on the cheque, and failed to establish any mala fide or ulterior motives, rendering the FIR for theft of the cheque false. The Court ruled that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary equitable relief requiring proof of mala fide, and dismissed the petition both on the ground of unexplained delay in filing and on merits, refusing leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted without establishing mala fide on the part of the complainant or the investigating agency?
  • Does the issuance of a dishonoured cheque where signatures are undisputed warrant further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed on the ground of an un-condoned delay of 35 days?
  Read full judgment →
• Ayaz and others vs Mustafa Saeed and others2024 SCP 370, 2025 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-25
  public service commissionrecruitment processage relaxationexecutive discretionquota allocationre-advertisementtransparencymeritocracy
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil petitions for leave to appeal were filed against a High Court judgment that invalidated a Sindh Public Service Commission (SPSC) selection process for Assistant Conservator of Forests posts. The controversy arose from SPSC issuing an addendum altering quota allocations, extending application deadlines without re-advertising, increasing vacancies from two to seven without public notification, and maintaining an unauthorised waiting list. Furthermore, an umbrella upper age relaxation of up to 15 years was granted under executive notification. The core legal questions were whether public recruitment processes could be validly altered through unadvertised addenda and whether excessive executive age relaxations comply with administrative law standards. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the High Court's decision to strike down the selection process and order fresh advertisements. The Court held that public recruitment must be transparent and competitive, requiring additional vacancies and changed terms to be publicly re-advertised. It further struck down the 15-year age relaxation, establishing that executive discretion must be exercised reasonably, proportionally, and without arbitrary misuse.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public service commission increase advertised vacancies or alter quota terms without re-advertising them for general public competition?
  • Does an excessive blanket relaxation of upper age limits by executive notification violate administrative standards of reasonableness and proportionality?
  • Under what conditions, if any, can a public service commission recommend candidates from a waiting list for newly created or unadvertised vacancies?
  Read full judgment →
• Aurangzaib Alamgir vs Muhammad Sajid & others2024 SCP 419, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-15
  quashment of proceedingsinherent jurisdictionabuse of processIllegal Dispossession Actcriminal procedurecognizanceremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged a High Court order that dismissed a petition for the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question was whether a High Court can summarily dismiss a quashment petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, solely because the trial court had already taken cognizance of the matter. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s dismissal was legally flawed as it failed to address the substantive grounds raised by the petitioner regarding the alleged abuse of process. The Court emphasized that while Section 561-A inherent jurisdiction is not a substitute for ordinary remedies like acquittal under Sections 249-A or 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, it remains a curative power to prevent the abuse of judicial process. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for a fresh decision on merits. The principle laid down is that the mere taking of cognizance by a trial court does not preclude the High Court from examining the merits of a quashment petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court summarily dismiss a quashment petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, solely on the ground that the trial court has taken cognizance?
  • Is the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, an alternative to the remedies provided under Sections 249-A or 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What constitutes an 'abuse of process' warranting the exercise of inherent jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Attaullah vs The State2024 SCP 161, 2024 SCMR 1210, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-04
  post-arrest baildoctrine of parityrule of consistencyfurther inquiryCustoms Actcriminal appealbail discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal challenges the High Court’s order refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was implicated in a case involving the theft of petroleum products under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner is entitled to bail based on the doctrine of parity, given that co-accused persons with similar roles were previously granted bail, and whether the prosecution's case warrants further inquiry. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s role was not sufficiently distinguishable from the co-accused who were already granted bail, and that the determination of his direct or vicarious liability requires evidence at trial. Consequently, the Court granted bail, emphasizing that bail is the rule and jail is the exception. The key principle laid down is the doctrine of parity in criminal cases, which mandates that where the ascribed role of an accused is identical to that of co-accused persons who have received relief, the benefit of bail should be extended to ensure like cases are treated alike, subject to judicial assessment of the specific roles involved.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of parity apply to bail applications where co-accused with similar roles have already been granted bail?
  • What is the legal significance of the doctrine of further inquiry in the context of bail adjudication?
  • Is the discretion to grant bail considered punitive or preventative in nature?
  • Does the rule that bail is the rule and jail is the exception apply to cases involving the Customs Act, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Atif Ali vs The State, etc2024 SCP 326, 2024 SCMR 2066 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-30
  pre-arrest baildishonoured chequebusiness transactionfurther inquiryulterior motivesrendition of accounts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioner in respect of an FIR registered under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, concerning a dishonoured cheque issued in connection with business transactions and an alleged loan. The core legal questions involved whether the disputed cheque was issued with dishonest intention for repayment or handed over as a blank guarantee, and whether a case for pre-arrest bail was made out. The Supreme Court held that given the previous business dealings, the filing of a prior suit for rendition of accounts by the petitioner, and the dispute regarding whether the cheque was given as a guarantee, the case called for further inquiry, and the apprehension of arrest with ulterior motives was well-founded. The Court confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner, establishing that where business disputes and conflicting claims regarding the issuance of a cheque as a guarantee exist, the matter falls within the ambit of further inquiry warranting pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 when the issuance of the disputed cheque as a guarantee or for the repayment of a loan requires further inquiry?
  • Does a prior civil suit for rendition of accounts between the parties affect the criminal proceedings under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be confirmed on the ground of malafide and apprehension of unjustified harassment by the police?
  Read full judgment →
• Asmat Ullah Khan and others vs The State and others2024 SCP 231, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 251, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-15
  kidnapping for ransomcall data recordransom recoveryabatement of appealbenefit of doubtdefence evidenceocular testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from criminal petitions filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed appeals against the Trial Court's judgment convicting the petitioners under Section 365-A/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 and Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and sentencing them to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involved the credibility of ocular testimony, the evidentiary value of unverified call data records and unmarked ransom money, and the effect of the death of an appellant on criminal proceedings involving financial penalties. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and acquitted the petitioners, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to glaring contradictions, an uncorroborated recovery of ransom, and a credible defence version established through witnesses and official records. The key principles laid down include that unverified call data records and unmarked currency notes cannot form the basis of a conviction, that corroborative pieces of evidence like recoveries are irrelevant when primary ocular testimony is untrustworthy, and that under Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, an appeal against a sentence of fine or forfeiture of property does not abate upon the death of the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unverified call data record lacking authorization, seals, and transcripts can be relied upon as credible evidence?
  • Does a criminal appeal against a sentence of fine or forfeiture of property abate upon the death of the appellant under Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Can corroborative evidence such as recoveries sustain a conviction when the primary ocular account fails to inspire confidence?
  • Whether the failure of the police to mark or sign currency notes intended for ransom payment renders the recovery doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Asma Haleem vs Abdul Haseeb Chaudhry and others2024 SCP 249, 2024 SCMR 1714, 2025 PLJ SC 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-30
  partition suitfrivolous litigationvexatious litigationimposition of costscourt auctionabuse of processjudicial backlog
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a partition suit concerning a residential property in Islamabad. After a preliminary decree was issued, a court auctioneer conducted auction proceedings, which the petitioner objected to. Although the appellate court initially allowed the petitioner's appeal against the trial court's rejection of her objections, the Islamabad High Court reversed this decision in a revision petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dismissing the petition, found the litigation to be completely frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court process aimed at delaying the matter and depriving the petitioner's siblings and mother of the lawful auction proceeds. Emphasizing the severe backlog of over 2.2 million pending cases in Pakistan, the Court highlighted the necessity of rooting out speculative litigation to prevent the clogging of the justice system. Consequently, the Court declined leave to appeal and imposed exemplary costs on the petitioner to discourage such practices.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can be penalized with exemplary costs for pursuing frivolous and vexatious litigation that delays the resolution of genuine disputes?
  • How does speculative litigation impact the overall administration of justice and the pendency of cases in Pakistani courts?
  • Under what provision of the Supreme Court Rules 1980 can the Supreme Court of Pakistan impose costs to curb the practice of instituting vexatious cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali & another vs The state through Prosecutor General Punjab2024 SCP 192, 2024 SCMR 1408, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-22
  narcoticschain of custodysafe transmissioncharasacquittalprocedural infirmitypolice rulessample analysis
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the conviction and ten-year rigorous imprisonment of two petitioners under Section 9(c) read with Section 15 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (CNSA). The prosecution alleged the recovery of several kilograms of charas from the bodies of the petitioners during a vehicle search. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution established a continuous and safe chain of custody for the narcotic samples. The Supreme Court observed that the samples were dispatched to the laboratory beyond the 72-hour limit prescribed by Rule 4(2) of the CNSA (Government Analysts) Rules 2001 without explanation. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to produce the witness responsible for the transmission of samples and failed to properly record entries in Register No. XIX as required by Rule 22.70 of the Police Rules, 1934. Holding that the prosecution must prove every link in the chain of custody beyond reasonable doubt, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants due to these fatal procedural infirmities.

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• Ashfaq Hussain and another vs Ghulam Nabi and another2024 SCP 209, 2024 SCMR 1560 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-12
  rented premisesevictionsublettinglandlord and tenantunauthorized partnershipremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had set aside concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Court ordering the eviction of the respondent from a commercial premises. The core legal question concerns whether the respondent’s act of entering into a partnership with third parties to operate a clinic in the rented shop, without the landlords' consent or knowledge, constitutes unauthorized subletting under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record, particularly the respondent's admissions regarding the lack of notice to the landlords about the original tenant's death and the subsequent introduction of new partners into the premises. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter for a fresh decision, directing the High Court to re-evaluate the evidence and provide both parties an opportunity for a hearing. The judgment reinforces the principle that courts must rigorously evaluate evidence in rent disputes regarding unauthorized subletting and the necessity of landlord consent.

  Questions settled

  • Does entering into a partnership agreement with third parties to operate a business in a rented premises without the landlord's consent constitute subletting?
  • Is a tenant required to inform the landlord of the death of the original tenant and the subsequent change in occupancy?
  • Can a High Court set aside an eviction order without properly evaluating the evidence regarding unauthorized subletting?
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• Anjuman Ghulaman Mustafa vs Darul Islamia Society & others2024 SCP 67, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-26
  execution of decreelimitation periodcivil revisiondecree-holderjudgment-debtorleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from concurrent findings of three courts below dismissing the petitioner's objection regarding the limitation period for executing a civil decree. The core legal question presented was whether the execution proceedings initiated after the dismissal of a civil revision were barred by limitation under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, when no stay order had been obtained during the appellate and revisional proceedings. The Supreme Court held that once a decree is challenged through appeal or revision up to the court of last instance, the period of limitation for execution runs from the date of the final decree passed by that court of last instance, irrespective of whether the lower court's decree was affirmed, reversed, or modified, provided no further challenge was brought before the Supreme Court. The key principle laid down is that the decree of the court of last instance becomes the executable decree, and limitation for its execution commences from that final adjudication when higher appellate remedies are exhausted without invoking the jurisdiction of the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • From which date does the period of limitation for filing an execution petition run when a trial court decree is challenged in appeal and revision?
  • Does the absence of a stay order during appellate or revisional proceedings affect the executability of the original decree before the final disposal of the case?
  • When does the principle laid down in Bakhtiar Ahmad regarding the clogging of limitation apply to execution petitions?
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• Amna Naz vs The State & another2024 SCP 408, 2025 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-07
  post-arrest bailwoman accusedprohibitory clausecustoms smugglingcustodial interrogation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which declined post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under the Customs Act, 1969 and the Import & Export (Control) Act, 1950. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, a woman found in possession of foreign-made mobile phones at the airport without import documents, was entitled to post-arrest bail despite the offence falling within the prohibitory clause. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, granting post-arrest bail to the petitioner. The holding establishes that the case of a female accused must be examined under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and bail cannot be denied solely based on the prohibitory clause or the sentence prescribed, especially when custodial interrogation is no longer required and there is no risk of abscondence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the case of a female accused must be examined under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be declined to an accused solely on the ground that the alleged offence falls within the prohibitory clause?
  • Is travel history alone a sufficient ground to deny post-arrest bail in custom-related offences?
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• Amir Sultan and others vs Adjudicating Authority-III EOBI, Islamabad and others2024 SCP 105, 2024 SCMR 826, 2024 PLC 164, 2024 PLJ SC 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-18
  old-age pensionEmployees' Old-Age Benefits Act 1976EOBIpension eligibilitycontribution periodbeneficial legislationsocial security
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan involved conflicting decisions of various High Courts regarding the interpretation and application of Section 22(2) of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. The core legal issue was whether the exception under Section 22(2), which reduces the required contribution period for old-age pension eligibility, applies to any insured person based solely on their age upon entering insurable employment, or whether it applies strictly to those who attained the requisite age on specific cut-off dates. The Supreme Court held that the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 is a beneficial statute that must be construed liberally to advance social security goals under Article 38 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. However, Section 22(2) provides a specific exception tied explicitly to two cut-off dates: 1st July 1976 or the date the Act becomes applicable to an establishment under Section 1(4). The Court ruled that to qualify for the exception, an employee must be employed and satisfy the prescribed age criteria on one of these cut-off dates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the exception reducing pension contribution years under Section 22(2) of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act 1976 applies automatically based solely on an employee's age when entering employment?
  • What are the relevant cut-off dates for invoking the benefit of reduced contribution years under Section 22(2) of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act 1976?
  • Can an employee who enters insurable employment after the statutory cut-off dates avail the reduced pension contribution exception under Section 22(2) of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act 1976?
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• Amer Ishaq & others vs Province of KPK, etc.2024 SCP 246, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-11
  environmental constitutionalismair pollutionstone power crushersNational Environmental Quality Standardsright to a clean and healthy environmentpublic healthfundamental rightsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a Constitution Petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, addressing the severe environmental degradation and air pollution caused by stone power crushers in village Suraj Galli, District Haripur, and challenging the vires of certain provisions of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Power Crushers (Installation, Operation and Regulations) Rules, 2020 and Act, 2020. The core legal question centered on whether non-compliant stone crushing plants violating National Environmental Quality Standards (NEQS) and safe distance requirements should be closed to protect public health and fundamental rights to life and dignity. The Supreme Court held that the operating plants failed to rebut findings of environmental non-compliance and ordered their immediate closure by the Environmental Protection Agency, KPK. Additionally, the Court mandated federal and provincial governments to update the NEQS within three months and directed the provincial EPA to submit compliance reports regarding other crushing plants across the province. The judgment reinforces the doctrines of environmental constitutionalism, sustainable development, and public health protection as integral components of constitutional fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether stone crushing plants operating in violation of National Environmental Quality Standards and safe distance requirements can be ordered to be sealed in the public interest?
  • Does the constitutional right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan include within its ambit the right to a clean and healthy environment?
  • Are the Federal and Provincial Governments obligated under law to update the National Environmental Quality Standards to effectively combat modern environmental crises?
  • What is the scope of environmental constitutionalism and judicial enforcement of sustainable development principles in Pakistani jurisprudence?
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• Amanullah vs Muhammad Shareef Khan2024 SCP 15, 2024 SCMR 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-31
  pre-emptiontalb-e-ishhadtalb-e-muwathibatstatutory noticeKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act 1987civil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a notice of talb-e-ishhad—the second mandatory demand in pre-emption proceedings—is legally valid when issued on a printed, stereotyped pro forma rather than a customized document. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a printed template is insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987. The Court reasoned that talb-e-ishhad requires a specific application of mind and must convey the necessary particulars tailored to the facts of each case. By relying on generic forms, a pre-emptor fails to comply with the mandatory procedural formalities. The Court emphasized that pre-emption is a "feeble right," and strict adherence to the prescribed procedure is essential. Consequently, the Court affirmed that such notices must be drafted individually to reflect the specific circumstances of the claim, and the use of ready-made forms renders the notice invalid and the pre-emption claim ineffective.

  Questions settled

  • Is a notice of talb-e-ishhad issued on a printed, stereotyped pro forma legally valid under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987?
  • What is the legal significance of the term 'majlis' in the context of performing talb-e-muwathibat?
  • Does the right of pre-emption require strict compliance with procedural formalities regarding the tendering of notices?
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• Aman Ullah vs United Bank Limited through President and others2023 SCP 334, 2024 SCMR 71, 2024 PLC 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-02
  workmanBranch ManagerIndustrial Relations ActNational Industrial Relations Commissiongrievance petitionsupervisory dutiespower of attorneyburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Officer Grade-II serving as Branch Manager at United Bank Limited, was dismissed from service following an inquiry into transaction irregularities. He filed a grievance petition under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act 2012 before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). The NIRC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction after determining that the petitioner was not a 'workman'. This finding was upheld by the Full Bench of the NIRC and subsequently affirmed by the Peshawar High Court in writ jurisdiction. The core question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner fell within the definition of 'workman' under Section 2(xxxiii) of the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that determination of workman status depends on the pith and substance of actual duties performed rather than designation alone. As the petitioner exercised extensive supervisory and managerial powers under a power of attorney and supervised subordinates, he was not a workman, rendering his grievance petition before the NIRC non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • What is the litmus test for determining whether an employee is a 'workman' or employed in a managerial/supervisory capacity under labour laws?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when an employee claims the status of a 'workman' contrary to their assigned managerial or supervisory role?
  • Is the absence of the power to hire and fire staff conclusive in establishing that an employee is a workman rather than a manager?
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• Allah Bakhsh deceased through L.Rs & others vs Muhammad Riaz & Others2024 SCP 333, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-11
  General Power of AttorneySpecific PerformanceConcurrent FindingsFiduciary DutySale Deed ValidityCivil Revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed their revision application regarding a suit for declaration, specific performance, and injunction over agricultural land. The core dispute arose from an oral agreement to sell land to five brothers, followed by one brother (Petitioner No. 1) using a General Power of Attorney to transfer the land to his own sons and his brother's sons. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court concurrently ruled against the petitioners, finding the transfer fraudulent. The Supreme Court addressed whether an attorney may alienate a principal's property to close relatives without special permission and the validity of a multi-page sale deed lacking signatures on all pages. The Court held that an attorney requires explicit prior approval from the principal to transfer property to close relatives, and failing this, such transactions are invalid. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that multi-page documents must be signed on each page to be legally binding. Finding no perversity in the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general power of attorney holder require special permission from the principal to transfer property to close relatives?
  • Is a multi-page sale deed legally valid if the parties have not signed or thumb-marked every page?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts?
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• All Public Universities BPS Teachers Association (Apubta) through its2024 SCP 292, 2024 SCMR 1887 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-29
  public sector universitiesVice-Chancellor appointmentstenured positionsacting charge appointmentsHigher Education Commissionstatutory body meetingsuniversity governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises out of proceedings concerning widespread non-compliance with statutory provisions by public sector universities across federal and provincial jurisdictions. The primary legal issue centers on whether public sector universities can lawfully operate with long-vacant executive positions and fail to convene mandatory periodic statutory body meetings. The Supreme Court issued comprehensive directions requiring Vice-Chancellors, Rectors, provincial secretaries, and Higher Education Commission officials to submit written explanations and appear in court regarding persistent statutory breaches. These include leaving key positions—such as Vice-Chancellors, Registrars, Controllers of Examinations, and Treasurers—vacant or under acting charge, and failing to hold prescribed statutory meetings of Senates, Syndicates, and Boards. The Court held that public sector universities funded by the public exchequer must adhere strictly to their governing statutes rather than operate on personal whims. Disregarding statutory requirements concerning tenured appointments and administrative governance adversely impacts academic standards, harms university reputations, and undermines the validity and recognition of awarded degrees.

  Questions settled

  • Are public sector universities required to strictly fill tenured administrative and executive positions in accordance with their respective governing statutes?
  • Does the failure of a public university to hold mandatory statutory meetings of its Senate, Syndicate, or Board constitute a violation of its governing law?
  • Can executive heads of public sector universities make temporary or ad-hoc administrative appointments to key tenured positions in contravention of statutory requirements?
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• All Public Universities BPS Teachers Association (Apubta) through its2024 SCP 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-01
  public importanceconstitutional petitionuniversity governancefundamental rightsvice chancellor appointmentstatutory complianceeducational policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the All Public Universities BPS Teachers Association, representing public sector university faculty, to address systemic governance failures in public universities across Pakistan. The petitioner alleged that numerous universities operate without appointed Vice Chancellors, leave tenured positions vacant, and fail to convene statutory decision-making bodies like syndicates and senates as required by law. The petitioner argued that these failures violate the right to be treated in accordance with the law under Article 4, the right to equality under Article 25, and undermine the Principles of Policy regarding education under Article 37 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, overruling office objections, held that the petition raises matters of public importance concerning the enforcement of Fundamental Rights and constitutional obligations. Consequently, the Court entertained the petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, directing the registration of the petition and issuing notices to respondents to submit detailed comments regarding vacancies in leadership positions and compliance with statutory meeting requirements. The Court emphasized that governance failures in public institutions directly impact the constitutional rights of citizens and the functional autonomy of universities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of public sector universities to fill statutory positions and hold mandatory meetings constitute a matter of public importance under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Can the Supreme Court entertain a petition regarding the administrative governance of public sector universities under its original jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure to appoint Vice Chancellors in public universities violate the fundamental rights of citizens?
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• All Pakistan Muslim League thr. its Chairman Jahan Zarin vs Election2024 SCP 17, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-12
  political party delistingElection Commission of PakistanElections Act 2017party enlistmentconsolidated statements of accountspolitical party statusstatutory compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) which delisted the All Pakistan Muslim League (APML) as a political party. The appellant, Jahan Zarin, initially filed the appeal in the name of the APML, which the court noted no longer existed as a political party due to the absence of elected office bearers. The core legal question was whether the ECP acted lawfully in delisting the party for failing to comply with statutory requirements, specifically the submission of consolidated statements of accounts for four years as mandated by law. The Supreme Court upheld the ECP's decision, noting that the appellant failed to demonstrate any illegality or unconstitutionality in the impugned order. The court confirmed that the party had failed to fulfill the mandatory prerequisites for enlistment under the Elections Act, 2017, and the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that political parties must strictly adhere to statutory financial reporting and organizational requirements to maintain their legal status and enlistment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a political party be delisted by the Election Commission of Pakistan for failing to provide consolidated statements of accounts?
  • Does the failure to maintain elected office bearers in accordance with a party constitution justify the delisting of a political party?
  • Is the Election Commission of Pakistan empowered to delist a political party for non-compliance with the requirements of the Elections Act, 2017?
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• Ali Raza vs Regional Police Officer & another2024 SCP 107, 2024 SCMR 840, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 770, 2024 PLJ SC 891 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-14
  departmental appeallimitation periodpolice disciplinary proceedingsservice appealper incuriammisconductdismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arises from the dismissal of a service appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioner, a police constable dismissed from service for misconduct under the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, filed a departmental appeal after a delay of over nine months. The departmental authority and the Tribunal rejected the appeal as time-barred. The core legal question addressed is whether a departmental appeal can be dismissed on the ground of time-lapse when the specific efficiency and discipline rules do not prescribe a limitation period. The Supreme Court held that where service rules do not provide a limitation period for a departmental appeal, the sixty-day time frame specified under Section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, applies. The Court laid down the principle that the statutory limitation period under general civil servant legislation governs departmental appeals in the absence of specific timelines in departmental rules, and prior judgments ignoring such statutory provisions are per incuriam. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a departmental appeal can be dismissed on the ground of limitation when the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975 do not provide a specific period for filing an appeal?
  • Does the limitation period specified under Section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 apply when service rules are silent on the timeframe for a departmental appeal?
  • Can a plea regarding the date of communication of a punishment order be raised for the first time before the service tribunal or the Supreme Court without being urged before the departmental appellate authority?
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• Ali Khan vs Government of Pakistan through A.G. Islamabad and another2024 SCP 71, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 486, 2024 PLJ SC 355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-21
  abuse of processwithdrawal of petitionexemplary costsoriginal jurisdictioncontemptuous conductconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed directly under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan relating to elections, but its contents were widely publicized in the electronic and print media prior to its fixing. Shortly after filing, the petitioner sought to withdraw the petition and abruptly left the country on a one-way ticket, failing to appear despite multiple notices. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether such conduct amounted to an abuse of the process of the court aimed at exploiting judicial proceedings for media publicity and undermining constitutional bodies. The Court held that filing a petition for ulterior publicity and abandoning it while fleeing the jurisdiction constitutes a clear abuse of the process of the court. The Court permitted the withdrawal of the petition but dismissed it with exemplary costs of five hundred thousand rupees, payable equally to the Pakistan Bar Council and the Supreme Court Bar Association, and directed that the petitioner should not be permitted to unlawfully use a military rank of which he had been stripped following a court martial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether seeking withdrawal of a constitutional petition after achieving media publicity constitutes an abuse of the process of the court?
  • Can the Supreme Court impose costs on a petitioner who abandons a petition and leaves the country?
  • Whether an individual stripped of a military rank through a court martial can continue to use that rank in judicial proceedings?
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• Ali Gohar Khan vs Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad & others2024 SCP 284, 2024 SCMR 1945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-21
  recounting of votesconsolidation of resultselection disputeReturning OfficerElection Commission of Pakistanconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an election dispute concerning the recounting of votes in the NA-97 Faisalabad-III constituency. The petitioner, who was the runner-up candidate, claimed to have submitted a timely application for a recount to the Returning Officer (RO) under Section 95(5) of the Elections Act 2017. The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) accepted his representation and ordered a recount, which reversed the result in his favor. However, the Lahore High Court set aside the ECP's order in its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the petitioner had fulfilled the statutory prerequisite of submitting a written recount request before the commencement of the consolidation proceedings. Finding that the petitioner's alleged application was undated, unsigned, and unsupported by the RO's records, the Court held that the prerequisite was not met. Consequently, the ECP had no authority to order a recount after consolidation. The Court dismissed the petition, refusing leave to appeal, and affirmed the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether submitting a written request for a recount before the commencement of consolidation proceedings is a mandatory prerequisite for a recount under Section 95(5) of the Elections Act 2017?
  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan direct a Returning Officer to recount ballot papers after the consolidation of results has been completed if no prior valid application was made?
  • How does the failure to provide a dated and signed application for a recount affect a candidate's claim for a recount under the Elections Act 2017?
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• Ali Anwar Paracha vs The State & another2024 SCP 234, 2024 SCMR 1596, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-04
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausefurther inquirycriminal liabilitybail as rule
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Islamabad High Court denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving a dishonoured cheque. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the offence and the evidentiary gaps regarding the underlying business transaction. The Supreme Court observed that the complainant failed to substantiate the alleged cash transaction, and the foundational elements of the offence required further inquiry. Holding that the offence under Section 489-F does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court reiterated the principle that in non-bailable offences punishable by less than ten years, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is an exception. Furthermore, the Court held that the mere registration of other criminal cases does not automatically disentitle an accused to bail if a prima facie case for further inquiry exists. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the petitioner was granted post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the mere registration of other criminal cases against an accused sufficient ground to deny bail if a prima facie case for further inquiry exists?
  • What are the foundational elements required to constitute an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Alay Javed Zaidi vs Habibullah & Others2024 SCP 63, 2024 SCMR 781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-07
  fair rentchange of ownershiplandlord and tenantwillful defaultstatutory noticecommercial tenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court of Sindh, which had upheld the concurrent findings of the lower rent fora. The dispute arose when the respondent purchased a commercial property and sought the determination of fair rent under Section 8 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979. The petitioner-tenant contended that he had no notice of the change of ownership under Section 18 of the Ordinance and that the enhanced rent was unjustified. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the previous landlady's written communication returning the rent and directing payment to the new owner, as well as the filing of the fair rent application itself, constituted substantial compliance and sufficient notice of the change of ownership. On the issue of fair rent, the Court reiterated that all four factors under Section 8 of the Ordinance need not co-exist. Given the commercial nature of the locality and the massive economic changes since the inception of the tenancy in 1974, the Court found the enhancement justified and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the filing of a legal application by a new landlord constitutes substantial compliance with the notice requirement of change of ownership under Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Is it mandatory for all four factors listed in Section 8 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 to co-exist for a Rent Controller to determine and enhance fair rent?
  • Does a tenant's continued deposition of rent in the name of a previous landlord, despite having actual knowledge of the transfer of ownership, constitute willful default?
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• Akhtar Nasir Ahmed vs Province of Punjab through District Collector Gujrat2024 SCP 361, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-09
  inheritance mutationlaw of limitationtime-barred suitconcurrent findingsprocedural delaycivil procedurestatute of repose
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged the dismissal of a suit regarding the validity of an inheritance mutation sanctioned in 1982, which the petitioner contested in 2009. The core legal question was whether the law of limitation applies to inheritance disputes and if the petitioner’s 27-year delay was excusable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the suit was time-barred. The Court held that the law of limitation is not inapplicable to inheritance cases and that the petitioner failed to justify the delay. The Court reaffirmed that statutes of limitation are statutes of peace and repose designed to provide certainty in human affairs. It emphasized the principle 'vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt,' noting that the law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. Furthermore, the Court held that a plaintiff must specifically plead grounds for exemption from limitation in the plaint, and failure to do so, combined with an extraordinary delay, renders the claim untenable.

  Questions settled

  • Is the law of limitation applicable to suits involving inheritance disputes?
  • Does a plaintiff have a duty to specifically plead grounds for exemption from the law of limitation in the plaint?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of perversity or arbitrariness?
  Read full judgment →
• Ajmal Ali Shiraz vs Commissioner Inland Revenue PeshawarPTCL 2024 CL. 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-03
  amended assessmentdelegation of powerDeputy Commissioner Inland Revenuejurisdictionunauthorized officerincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a challenge to an amended assessment order passed under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether an amended assessment order passed by a Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, without proof of valid delegation of power from the Commissioner, was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Section 177 and Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, any delegation of the Commissioner's power to amend an assessment under Section 122 could not be made to an officer below the rank of Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue. Since the respondent failed to produce any record showing that the Deputy Commissioner was duly authorized or delegated the requisite powers, the court ruled that the amended assessment order was passed by an unauthorized officer. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned amended assessment order as being in contravention of the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can an amended assessment order under Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 be passed by a Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue without a valid delegation of power?
  • Whether the Commissioner Inland Revenue can delegate the power to amend an assessment to an officer below the rank of Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue under Section 210(1A) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • What is the legal status of an amended assessment order passed by an officer who has not been shown to possess the requisite delegated authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Ullah and others vs District Education Officer (Male), Buner and others2024 SCP 306, 2024 SCMR 2004, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-27
  civil servantspromotion eligibilityjurisdictional barService Tribunalconstitutional petitionregularization of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment that dismissed on merits a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The petitioners, regularized civil servants, had challenged their exclusion from a Departmental Promotion Committee meeting on the grounds of eligibility. The core legal question was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a petition regarding a civil servant's eligibility for promotion in light of the constitutional bar under Article 212. The Supreme Court held that eligibility for promotion constitutes a term and condition of service, falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunals Act 1974. The Court distinguished eligibility from fitness, clarifying that while fitness is excluded from the Tribunal's jurisdiction, eligibility is not. Consequently, the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 was completely ousted by Article 212, rendering the petition unmaintainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding the High Court's findings on merits to be per incuriam.

  Questions settled

  • Does the determination of a civil servant's eligibility for promotion fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • How does the legal concept of eligibility for promotion differ from the concept of fitness for promotion under civil service laws?
  • Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 apply even when a departmental order is alleged to be without jurisdiction, mala fide, or in violation of fundamental rights?
  • Can a High Court entertain a constitutional petition under Article 199 regarding the terms and conditions of a civil servant's service?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Sikander vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Aeoi Zone, Lahore2024 SCP 298, 2025 SCMR 140, 2025 PTD 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-15
  civil reviewincome tax assessmentconcealment of assetse-portaladditional evidenceerror apparent on the face of the recordscope of review
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition was filed against the Supreme Court's order dismissing a civil petition, which had challenged a Lahore High Court decision. The core issue arose from a tax assessment under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, where the petitioner was charged to tax for allegedly concealing a UK bank account. The petitioner contended that the relevant documents, including foreign loan details, were already e-filed on the FBR e-Portal, but the High Court had treated them as impermissible 'new evidence' produced for the first time before the Appellate Tribunal. By a majority of two to one, the Supreme Court allowed the review petition and recalled its earlier order. The majority held that the petitioner's legal and factual grounds regarding the availability of documents on the e-Portal had escaped the Court's attention during the initial dismissal, necessitating a re-appraisal of the record. Conversely, the dissenting opinion emphasized that the scope of review is strictly limited under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and cannot be used for re-appreciating evidence or re-arguing appellate grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the Supreme Court to consider key factual and legal grounds raised in a petition constitutes a sufficient reason to allow a civil review petition?
  • Can documents that were allegedly available on the FBR e-Portal at the time of filing tax returns be treated as impermissible 'new evidence' if produced before the Appellate Tribunal?
  • What is the scope of the Supreme Court's review jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party seek re-appreciation of evidence or re-argue grounds already decided at the appellate stage under the guise of a review petition?
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• Ahmad Ali vs The State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar, etc2024 SCP 307, 2024 SCP 29, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 969, PLJ 2024 SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-07
  post-arrest bailcross-casesfurther inquirycriminal procedurebail discretionconcurrent findingscounter-version
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the lower courts in a criminal case involving cross-versions of an incident resulting in deaths and injuries. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the principle of 'cross-cases' or 'further inquiry' when both parties were armed and engaged in a mutual altercation, despite the petitioner's failure to explicitly plead self-defence in the police daily diary. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's version did not constitute a genuine cross-version because it failed to explain the motive or the circumstances of the firing, and thus declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The key principle laid down by the majority is that for a matter to qualify as a cross-case warranting bail, the counter-version must provide a distinct and coherent narrative of the incident, rather than a mere assertion of a counter-case, and the absence of a specific plea of self-defence or motive in the initial record may undermine such a claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere assertion of a counter-case in a police daily diary automatically constitute a cross-case for the purpose of granting bail?
  • Is a court required to interfere with concurrent orders of lower courts refusing bail if no illegality is pointed out?
  • Can a party claim the benefit of a cross-case for bail purposes if their version fails to explain the motive or circumstances of the firing?
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• Ahmad Nawaz vs Manzoor Hussain2024 SCP 205, 2024 SCMR 1525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-31
  pre-arrest bailfraud and forgeryfurther inquirydelay in FIRliberty of a person
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's order declining pre-arrest bail to the petitioners in a case registered under sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioners are entitled to pre-arrest bail in a case involving allegations of fraud, forgery, and the conversion of a lease agreement into a sale agreement through blank stamp papers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them, setting aside the impugned orders and granting pre-arrest bail to the petitioners. The holding is grounded on the principle that the FIR was lodged with an unexplained delay of approximately five months, a status quo order was already in the field, and the case fell within the purview of further inquiry. Furthermore, the court reiterated the established principle that liberty is a precious constitutional right and it is generally better to err in granting bail than in refusing it, as unjustified imprisonment cannot be adequately repaired upon eventual acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unexplainable delay in lodging an FIR for forgery and fraud constitutes a ground for further inquiry warranting pre-arrest bail?
  • Is it preferable to err in granting bail rather than refusing it in light of the constitutional right to personal liberty?
  • Whether the existence of a civil suit and a status quo order concerning the subject property impacts the grant of pre-arrest bail in criminal proceedings?
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• Adnan Shafai vs The State and another2024 SCP 221, 2024 SCMR 1479, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-05
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayprevention of corruptionfair trialright to libertyabuse of process
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the Lahore High Court's dismissal of the petitioner's post-arrest bail application in a case involving allegations of corruption, cheating, and extortion under Sections 161, 162, 109, and 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The petitioner sought bail on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of his trial, having been detained for over a year without the trial being finalized. The prosecution opposed the bail, arguing that the delay was attributable to the petitioner due to his filing of an application under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and granted bail. The Court held that the statutory right to bail due to delay, flowing from Articles 9 and 10A of the Constitution, cannot be denied unless the accused orchestrated a concerted, deliberate effort to delay the trial through frivolous or repetitive applications. Filing a single, legitimate application for protection of rights under Section 265-K does not constitute such a deliberate delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a single application under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a deliberate attempt by the accused to delay trial so as to deprive them of statutory bail?
  • What threshold of conduct or delay must the prosecution demonstrate to deny an accused bail under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • How should the statutory provisions governing bail on the ground of delay be interpreted in light of constitutional guarantees of liberty and fair trial?
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• Adnan Shafai vs The State & another2024 SCP 208, 2024 SCMR 1543, PLJ 2025 SC (Cr.C.) 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-05
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaycorruptionanti-money launderingfair trialabuse of process
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant him post-arrest bail in a case involving allegations of financial irregularities and corruption under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, and the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010. The petitioner argued that he was entitled to bail on the statutory ground of delay, as the trial had not concluded despite his detention exceeding one year. The prosecution contended that the petitioner caused delays by filing multiple applications. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, an accused in a non-capital case is entitled to bail if detained for over a year, unless the delay is due to their concerted effort or they are a hardened criminal. The Court held that filing applications to protect constitutional rights does not constitute a design to delay the trial. Finding no concerted effort to delay and that the petitioner was not a hardened criminal, the Court allowed the appeal and granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of procedural applications for the protection of constitutional rights by an accused constitute a concerted effort to delay trial under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What constitutes a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' for the purpose of denying statutory bail under the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can mere mathematical counting of adjournments sought by the defense be sufficient to deny post-arrest bail on statutory grounds of delay?
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• Adil Khan Bazai vs Election Commission of Pakistan and another2024 SCP 399, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-12
  defectionpolitical partyNational Assembly membershipElection Commission of Pakistandisqualificationindependent member
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of a declaration of defection made by the Party Head of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML(N)) against the appellant, Adil Khan Bazai, which had resulted in the loss of his National Assembly seat. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the procedural and substantive requirements for declaring a member of a political party as having defected were satisfied in the instant case. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned judgments passed by the Election Commission of Pakistan. The Court held that the declarations of defection made by the Party Head were not confirmed. Consequently, the Court ordered the restoration of the appellant's membership in the National Assembly, specifically clarifying that he holds this seat as an independent member rather than as a member of the PML(N) Parliamentary Party. The decision emphasizes the judicial scrutiny required regarding the process of disqualification based on alleged defection from a political party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a declaration of defection by a Party Head be set aside if the procedural requirements are not met?
  • Does the restoration of a National Assembly seat following a set-aside defection order imply the member retains their original party affiliation?
  • Is a member of the National Assembly who is cleared of defection charges entitled to sit as an independent member?
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• Additional Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate of Appraisement (West), Customs House, Karachi vs M_s K. S. Sulemanji Esmailji and Sons Pvt. Ltd. Karachi2024 SCP 312, 2025 SCMR 121, 2025 PTD 260, PTCL 2025 CL. 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-18
  customs dutytariff classificationPCT HeadingClassification Committeerefund claimHarmonised SystemExplanatory Notes
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding the correct tariff classification of imported 'BOPP' Printed Laminated Packaging Film (Metalized). The respondent-company sought a refund under Section 33 of the Customs Act 1969, claiming it paid excess customs duty due to an incorrect declaration of the PCT Heading. The Classification Committee determined the goods fell under PCT Heading 3920.2040 (attracting 25% duty) by applying Rule 3(c) of the General Rules for Interpretation. The Customs Appellate Tribunal and the High Court set aside this determination, substituting their own classifications. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that classification of goods is a highly specialized, technical job requiring expertise. The Court laid down that the Classification Committee, established pursuant to international commitments, is the competent body whose rulings carry a presumption of regularity. Such technical findings cannot be substituted by the Tribunal or High Court unless they are demonstrably arbitrary, fanciful, or in violation of the Rules of Interpretation and Explanatory Notes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Customs Appellate Tribunal or the High Court can substitute the technical findings of the Classification Committee without demonstrating that such findings are arbitrary or in violation of the Rules of Interpretation?
  • What is the legal status and evidentiary value of the classification rulings issued by the Classification Committee under the Customs Act 1969?
  • How should Rule 3(c) of the General Rules for Interpretation be applied when multiple specific PCT headings merit equal consideration?
  • Are the Explanatory Notes to the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System considered an authentic source of interpretation under the Customs Act 1969?
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• Abrar Ahmad Farooq and others vs The State and others2024 SCP 178, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 815 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-18
  double murderprivate vendettacourt premisesterrorismmitigating circumstanceslife imprisonmentscheduled offencepolice witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a double murder committed within the court premises of the Sessions Court, Attock. The appellants had fired upon and killed two handcuffed individuals in police custody to avenge the previous murder of their father. The trial court had convicted the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, sentencing them to death. The Supreme Court examined whether the offense fell within the definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 and whether the death penalty was appropriate. The Court held that since the motive was a private vendetta with no design to create terror or insecurity, the conviction under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 could not be sustained, even though the offense was triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court as a scheduled offense. Furthermore, the Court recognized the motive of avenging a father's murder as a mitigating circumstance, thereby reducing the death sentences to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a murder committed within court premises to avenge a private enmity automatically constitute an act of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can an Anti-Terrorism Court convict an accused under Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 for a scheduled offense if there is no design to create fear or insecurity?
  • Whether the motive of avenging the murder of a close relative (such as a father) can be treated as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can the testimony of police officials who witnessed an occurrence while escorting custody-prisoners be relied upon to sustain a conviction in the absence of animus?
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• Abid Shahid Zuberi & Ors vs Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary &2024 SCP 373, 2025 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-17
  withdrawal of petitionArticle 184(3)proposed legislationhypothetical questionslocus standijudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and a Constitution Petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging a proposed legislative document that had not yet been introduced in Parliament. The Registrar's office raised several objections, including that the petition sought to challenge a non-existent law, failed to array the appropriate legislative members as parties, violated Article 248 of the Constitution regarding the immunity of certain respondents, and posed hypothetical questions. Furthermore, objections were raised regarding the petitioners' standing as advocates and members of the Pakistan Bar Council, suggesting they lacked authorization from their respective bodies. Upon the engagement of senior counsel, the petitioners sought to withdraw both the appeal and the unnumbered Constitution Petition. The Supreme Court, acknowledging the request made by the petitioners and their counsel, dismissed the appeal and the petition as withdrawn. The judgment essentially records the procedural termination of the proceedings at the request of the petitioners, without delving into the merits of the constitutional challenges raised.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution be maintained against a proposed law that has not yet been introduced in Parliament?
  • Does Article 248 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 provide immunity to certain respondents from being arrayed as parties in a constitutional petition?
  • Are lawyers permitted to initiate litigation as members of the Pakistan Bar Council without authorization from their respective representative bodies?
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• Abid Hussain, Mushtaq Ahmad vs The State, Abid Hussain etc2024 SCP 232, 2024 SCMR 1608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-26
  murdercriminal appealdelay in FIRocular accountrelated witnessesbenefit of doubtmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a majority decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, examines the sustainability of a murder conviction under Section 302(b)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the credibility of related eye-witnesses, the effect of delay in lodging the First Information Report, the impact of an unproved or mysterious motive, and the reliability of ocular accounts corroborated by medical evidence. The majority of the Court held that delayed reporting, inconsistencies in the prosecution's narrative, and doubts regarding the weapon recovery rendered the case against the appellant doubtful, leading to the setting aside of the conviction and sentence. Conversely, the dissenting opinion maintained that related witnesses and plausible explanations for delay sufficiently established guilt. The legal principles laid down reaffirm that while related witnesses are not inherently unreliable, material discrepancies, delayed reporting without proper foundation, and doubtful recoveries can create reasonable doubt, warranting the benefit of acquittal to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in lodging the First Information Report is fatal to the prosecution case when explained?
  • Does the mere close relationship of a witness with the deceased render their testimony untrustworthy?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution's case if the alleged motive is not proved or remains shrouded in mystery?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on ocular testimony when recovery evidence is declared inconsequential?
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• Abdullah Jumani and others vs Province of Sindh & others2024 SCP 109, 2024 SCMR 1258, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 900 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-29
  suo motu jurisdictionArticle 199service regularizationcontractual employeesjudicial overreachvires of statuteright to fair trialArticle 10-A
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from civil appeals filed against a common judgment of the Sindh High Court, which dismissed constitutional petitions brought by contractual Deputy District Attorneys seeking service regularization under Section 3 of the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013. The High Court had unilaterally declared the 2013 Act ultra vires and ordered the reversal of regularizations without a direct constitutional challenge or giving notice to affected employees. The core legal questions pertained to whether the High Court possesses suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution and whether it exceeded its judicial powers in striking down a statute without hearing affected parties. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned High Court judgment, and remanded the constitutional petitions for fresh decision. The Apex Court held that High Courts lack suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 and cannot exercise powers beyond the scope of the petitions before them. Furthermore, invalidating regularizations without affording a right of hearing to affected employees violates Article 10-A and principles of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court possess suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can a High Court declare a legislative enactment ultra vires when its constitutionality is not directly challenged by any party to the proceedings?
  • Does striking down service regularizations without issuing notice or affording a hearing to affected employees violate Article 10-A of the Constitution?
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• Abdullah Channah vs The Administrative Committee & others2024 SCP 175, 2024 SCMR 1250, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-08
  subordinate judiciaryservice tribunal jurisdictionseniority fixationmaintainability of service appealadministrative committee ordersterms and conditions of servicebelated service appeals
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an order passed by the Sindh Subordinate Judicial Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's service appeal regarding seniority fixation for non-prosecution and on the ground of maintainability, holding that it could not be filed against the Administrative Committee of the High Court. The core legal questions involved whether a service appeal by a member of the subordinate judiciary against an administrative order of the High Court's Administrative Committee is maintainable before the Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, and whether long delays in deciding service appeals frustrate the administration of justice. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Service Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction under the relevant law to decide matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of members of the subordinate judiciary, including seniority, and that such appeals are maintainable against administrative orders affecting their terms and conditions. The Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for a fresh decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a service appeal filed by a member of the subordinate judiciary against an administrative order of the High Court's Administrative Committee is maintainable before the Subordinate Judicial Service Tribunal?
  • Does the Sindh Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal possess exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of judicial officers?
  • What is the effect of prolonged pendency of service appeals for decades on the rights of judicial officers and the administration of justice?
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• Abdul Rehman Khan Kanju and others vs Election Commission of Pakistan2024 SCP 264, 2024 SCP 1902 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-12
  recount of voteselection petitionwrit jurisdictionElection Tribunalconsolidation of resultsconstitutional petitionReturned Candidate
  Summary & questions settled

  These Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal arose from disputes in the general elections of February 8, 2024, concerning the recount of ballot papers under Section 95(5) of the Elections Act 2017. In the subject constituencies, the margin of victory was within the statutory threshold, and the runner-up candidates applied for recounts. The Returning Officers rejected the applications, citing law-and-order disruptions or lack of substantiation. The Election Commission of Pakistan subsequently ordered recounts, which were challenged by the returned candidates in the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. The High Court set aside the recount orders. The Supreme Court, by a 2 to 1 majority, set aside the High Court's judgments. The Court held that counting and recounting are administrative-ministerial acts, not judicial ones, and do not constitute a grievance under Article 199. Furthermore, the High Court lacked jurisdiction because the petitioners had an adequate alternative remedy via election petitions before the Election Tribunal under Article 225 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to stop or set aside a recount of ballot papers when an adequate alternative remedy exists before the Election Tribunal?
  • Does the amendment to Section 95(5) of the Elections Act 2017 remove the discretion of the Returning Officer to refuse a recount if the statutory margin of victory threshold is met?
  • Can a Returning Officer refuse to perform the statutory duty of recounting ballot papers on the ground of law and order situations or mob disruption?
  • Is the counting and recounting of ballot papers considered a judicial act or an administrative-ministerial act?
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• Abdul Qudoos son of Haji Abdul Razzaq vs Hafiz Israr Ahmed son of Haji2024 SCP 254, 2024 SCMR 1705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-26
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationalibi evidencemala fidestentative assessmentjudicial discretioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the Balochistan High Court's order cancelling the petitioner's pre-arrest bail in a case involving Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in cancelling bail granted by the Sessions Judge, who had relied on alibi evidence including Call Data Records (CDR) and CCTV footage. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's cancellation was unjustified, noting that the petitioner had not abused the concession of bail and that the Sessions Court had conducted a proper tentative assessment of the material. The Court emphasized that the petitioner's apprehension of arrest due to mala fides was not baseless, particularly given the investigating officer's failure to verify the provided alibi evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Sessions Court's order confirming the pre-arrest bail. The judgment reaffirms that appellate courts should not interfere with the sound exercise of judicial discretion in bail matters absent evidence of misuse or clear legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court cancel pre-arrest bail without evidence of misuse of the concession by the accused?
  • Is the failure of an investigating officer to verify alibi evidence provided by an accused a valid ground for granting pre-arrest bail?
  • When can an appellate court interfere with the discretion exercised by a Sessions Court in granting pre-arrest bail?
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• Abdul Qadeer vs The state2024 SCP 143, 2024 SCMR 1146, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-20
  kidnapping for ransomidentification paradereasonable doubtadverse inferencerecoverysafe administration of justiceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, regarding the kidnapping for ransom of the complainant's son. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court. Upon reappraisal of the evidence, the Supreme Court identified several fatal flaws in the prosecution's case, including an unexplained two-day delay in FIR registration, the absence of Call Data Records (CDR) despite allegations of phone communication, and the failure to produce bank records for the alleged ransom payment. The Court further noted that the identification parade was legally defective as the abductee failed to assign a specific role to the petitioner. Applying the principle of safe administration of justice, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the petitioner was acquitted.

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• Abdul Hayee & Abdullah @ Ghazali, Saleem Zaman vs The State, etc2024 SCP 379, 2025 SCMR 281, PLJ 2025 SC (Cr.C.) 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-21
  chance witnessidentification paradebenefit of doubtcriminal appealterrorismSection 342 CrPCocular evidenceFIR delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the petitioners for murder and terrorism following a bomb blast at a police post. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the reliability of "chance" eye-witnesses and the validity of identification parades. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to meet this burden. The Court ruled that the eye-witnesses were unreliable chance witnesses who failed to justify their presence at the scene, and their testimony was contradicted by the complainant. Furthermore, the identification parades were procedurally flawed due to being conducted jointly without specific role attribution. The Court also emphasized that incriminating evidence, such as weapon recoveries, cannot be considered if not put to the accused during their Section 342 CrPC examination. Additionally, the FIR was found to be delayed and fabricated to show promptness. Consequently, the convictions were set aside, and the petitioners were acquitted, establishing that evidence must be scrutinized for inherent reliability regardless of the absence of witness enmity.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of a chance witness be relied upon without a convincing explanation for their presence at the crime scene?
  • Does the failure to put incriminating evidence to an accused during their statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render that evidence inadmissible?
  • Is a joint identification parade of multiple accused valid when no specific role is attributed to them?
  • Does the absence of enmity between a witness and an accused automatically render the witness's testimony credible?
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• Abdul Hameed and others vs The State and another2024 SCP 180, 2024 SCMR 1365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-20
  criminal breach of trustmens reasurety bondDefence Saving Certificatesanti-corruptionacquittalmisappropriation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and sentencing of the petitioners, a junior court clerk and a private individual, under Section 409 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners facilitated the unauthorized removal and subsequent encashment of two Defence Saving Certificates deposited as surety. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the actual beneficiary of the encashment, the surety, had already been acquitted by the High Court, and the accused in the underlying case had not jumped bail and was ultimately acquitted. Crucially, the Court found no evidence of mens rea or illegal consideration on the part of the court clerk, nor any evidence that the petitioners had dishonestly misappropriated or converted the certificates to their own use. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust were not established, allowed the appeals, and acquitted the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for criminal breach of trust under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained in the absence of proof of mens rea or dishonest misappropriation?
  • Whether the acquittal of the primary beneficiary of an alleged financial misappropriation affects the sustainability of the conviction of co-accused charged with facilitation?
  • Is a charge of criminal breach of trust established if the deposited surety documents were returned to the surety and no financial loss was caused to the state or the court proceedings?
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• Abdil Ali vs Additional District Judge, Gojra and others2024 SCP 294, 2024 SCMR 1862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-02
  specific performancesale agreementbalance sale considerationexecution proceedingstimely paymentsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent orders of the lower forums which maintained the dismissal of execution proceedings filed by the petitioner. The core legal question concerns the effect of failing to deposit the balance sale consideration within the time stipulated by the appellate court in a suit for specific performance, and whether courts can extend such time or execute a non-existing decree. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner failed to deposit the balance amount within the mandated fifteen days, the suit stood dismissed, leaving no executable decree, and that courts are not legally empowered to extend the time for depositing balance consideration contrary to the agreement terms. The key principle laid down is that a buyer must make timely payment, demonstrate readiness and willingness, or deposit the amount in court upon refusal, and courts cannot rewrite private agreements by unilaterally extending payment deadlines.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal consequence of failing to deposit the balance sale consideration within the period stipulated by the appellate court in a specific performance suit?
  • Are courts legally empowered to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration contrary to the terms of the agreement?
  • Can a party initiate execution proceedings when the underlying suit stands dismissed due to non-compliance with a conditional decree?
  • What steps must a buyer demonstrate to prove readiness and willingness to pay the balance consideration when the seller refuses to accept payment?
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• Aamir Afzal and another vs S. Akmal (deceased) through LRs and two2024 SCP 240, 2024 SCMR 1649, 2024 PLJ SC 702 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-17
  civil revisionconcurrent findingsfraud and misrepresentationoral giftburden of proofreappraisal of evidencepleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court whereby concurrent findings of two competent courts dismissing the respondents' suit for declaration, injunction, and cancellation of a memorandum of oral gift were set aside in revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The dispute concerned a residential property gifted orally in 1962 by the predecessor-in-interest to the appellants (who were minors at the time), followed by a registered memorandum of gift in 1974 and subsequent transfer of shares in a housing society. The respondents later challenged the memorandum alleging fraud and fabrication without pleading specific particulars. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court validly interfered with concurrent factual findings. Holding that general allegations of fraud without particulars are insufficient under Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and that the initial burden of proof was not discharged by the respondents, the Supreme Court ruled that the High Court exceeded its limited revisional jurisdiction under section 115 by reappraising evidence and overturning reasoned concurrent findings without establishing material irregularity, misreading, or perversity. The appeal is allowed and the High Court judgment is set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether general allegations of fraud in a plaint without specific particulars satisfy the requirements of Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact of subordinate courts while exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, in the absence of material irregularity or misreading of evidence?
  • Where an oral gift is made in favour of minors, who bears the initial burden of proof when a subsequent suit is filed to challenge the registered memorandum of such gift?
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• .D.O./A.M., Hasht Nagri Sub-Division, PESCO, Peshawar and others vs2023 PLD Supreme Court 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-06
  civil procedurecorporate litigationpleadingsprocedural irregularitycurable defectsinstitution of suitssigning and verification
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns the procedural requirements for instituting and defending suits by corporations under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court addressed whether the authority to sign and verify pleadings differs from the authority to institute or defend a suit, whether procedural rules for pleadings apply to appeals and revisions, and whether defects in such authority are curable. The Court held that signing/verifying a pleading (governed by Order VI, Rules 14-15 and Order XXIX, Rule 1) is distinct from the act of presenting/instituting a suit (governed by Order III, Rule 1, Order IV, Rule 1, and Order VIII, Rule 1). Furthermore, the Court clarified that rules regarding signing and verifying pleadings do not apply to memorandums of appeal or revision petitions. Emphasizing that procedural law should facilitate justice rather than thwart it, the Court ruled that any defect in the authority of a person to sign, verify, or present pleadings, appeals, or revisions is a curable irregularity that does not affect the merits or jurisdiction of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Is there a legal distinction between the authority to sign and verify a pleading and the authority to institute or defend a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Do the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding the signing and verification of pleadings apply to memorandums of appeal and revision petitions?
  • Can a defect in the authority of a person to sign, verify, or present a pleading, appeal, or revision petition be cured at a later stage of the proceedings?
  • Does the misjoinder of parties constitute a defect that can be cured under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
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