Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Secretary Finance, Finance Division, Pak. Secretariat Islamabad vs Muhammad Farooq Khan, Secondary School Teacher (BPS-18) Islamabad Model School for Boys, G-614, Islamabad and others2022 PSC 742 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-10
  time-scale promotionservice matterpremature incrementcivil servantup-gradationFederal Service TribunalOffice Memorandum
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter concerns whether the grant of a 'time-scale promotion' to a civil servant constitutes a regular promotion, thereby entitling the employee to a premature increment. The respondent, a Secondary School Teacher, sought a premature increment following his time-scale promotion from BPS-17 to BPS-18. The Supreme Court held that a time-scale promotion is a special financial dispensation rather than a regular promotion. It involves the grant of a higher pay scale without changing the designation, duties, or status of the post. The Court emphasized that the Establishment Division’s Office Memorandum dated 19.09.2011 explicitly clarifies that such time-scale formulas do not constitute up-gradation or regular promotion. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the respondent could not claim benefits contingent upon a 'promotion' while the underlying notification granting the time-scale remained unchallenged. The Court affirmed that time-scale promotion is not a promotion under the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, and set aside the Tribunal's judgment, denying the claim for a premature increment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of a time-scale promotion constitute a regular promotion in service for the purpose of claiming a premature increment?
  • Can a civil servant claim benefits contingent upon a 'promotion' without challenging the notification that grants the time-scale promotion?
  • Does the grant of a time-scale promotion involve a change in designation or higher responsibility under the relevant service rules?
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• Secretary Finance, Finance Division Pak Secretariat, Islamabad vs Muhammad Farooq Khan and others2022 SCMR 381, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 1008 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-14
  time-scale promotionpremature incrementcivil serviceup-gradationservice appealFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a Federal Service Tribunal decision that directed the appellant (Finance Division) to grant a premature increment to the respondent, a Secondary School Teacher. The respondent had received a time-scale promotion from BPS-17 to BPS-18 and claimed a premature increment on the basis that this constituted a regular promotion. The Supreme Court analyzed the underlying policy documents, specifically the Establishment Division's Office Memorandum dated 19 September 2011, which clarified that the time-scale formula merely grants a higher pay scale without changing the designation or status of the post and does not constitute a regular promotion or up-gradation. The Court held that since the respondent did not challenge the notification implementing this memorandum, the Tribunal could not grant the relief. Distinguishing prior precedents, the Court reaffirmed that time-scale promotion is a policy-based financial benefit rather than a regular promotion under the Civil Servants Act 1973. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the Tribunal's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the grant of a higher pay scale under a time-scale formula constitutes a regular promotion or up-gradation under the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Can a civil servant claim a premature increment associated with a promotion if the implementing notification explicitly states the time-scale grant is not a promotion, without first challenging the notification itself?
  • Does a time-scale promotion granted across the board to all eligible incumbents involve an element of selection or change in post designation?
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• SDO/Am, Hasht Nagri Sub Division, PESCO, Peshawar, etc vs Khawazan Zad2022 SCP 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-06
  corporate litigationprocedural irregularitysigning and verification of pleadingsinstitution of suitcurable defectcivil procedurerevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns the procedural requirements for corporate litigation under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court addressed whether the authority to sign and verify pleadings (plaint or written statement) is distinct from the authority to institute or defend a suit. The Court held that while Order XXIX, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 governs the signing and verification of pleadings by corporate officers, the actual institution or defense of a suit—the act of presentation—is governed by Order III, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which allows for representation by recognized agents or pleaders. Furthermore, the Court clarified that provisions regarding the signing and verification of pleadings do not apply to memorandums of appeal or revision petitions. Crucially, the Court established that any defect in the authority of a person to sign, verify, or present pleadings, appeals, or revision petitions is a curable procedural irregularity and should not be used to defeat substantive rights. Courts are directed to facilitate the correction of such defects rather than dismissing cases on technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Is there a legal difference between the authority to sign and verify a pleading and the authority to institute or defend a suit on behalf of a corporation?
  • Do the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the signing and verification of pleadings apply to memorandums of appeal and revision petitions?
  • Can a defect in the authority of a person to sign, verify, or present a pleading or appeal be cured at a later stage of the proceedings?
  • Does the misjoinder of parties constitute a defect that affects the merits of a case or the jurisdiction of the court?
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• SDO, PESCO Daudzai Sub-Division Ring Road, Peshawar Etc. vs Wadan Sher2022 SCP 396 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-25
  corporate litigationboard resolutionpersonal capacitylegal entitycivil revisioncurable defectpleadings ratification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil revision petition filed by officials of PESCO (SDO, XEN, and R.O.) challenging a High Court judgment that dismissed their revision for lack of a Board Resolution. The core legal question was whether officials of a corporation, when sued in their personal capacities, are required to produce a Board Resolution to defend legal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the lower fora erred in law and fact. The Court clarified that when an individual is sued in their personal capacity, rather than the corporation itself, the requirement for a Board Resolution authorizing the defense does not arise, as the corporation and its officials are distinct legal entities. Furthermore, even in cases involving corporations, the absence of a Board Resolution is a curable defect, not an incurable one. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the Petitioners, having been sued in their personal capacities, were not required to produce corporate authorization to contest the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Board Resolution required for an official of a company to defend a lawsuit filed against them in their personal capacity?
  • Does the absence of a Board Resolution in a suit involving a corporation constitute an incurable defect?
  • Can a corporation ratify the act of signing pleadings by its officers even in the absence of an initial Board Resolution?
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• Sardar Muhammad Kamal-ud-Din Khan vs Syed Munir Syed and others2022 SCP 24, 2022 SCMR 806, 2022 PSC 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-18
  revisional jurisdictionarbitration proceedingscivil suitdue processfair trialarbitration awardstay of arbitration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the High Court passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, whereby concurrent orders of the subordinate courts staying arbitration proceedings were set aside. The core legal questions involved were whether the High Court properly exercised revisional jurisdiction where the subordinate courts committed no jurisdictional error, illegality, or material irregularity, and whether a party who instituted a civil suit regarding the subject matter of an agreement could subsequently initiate unilateral arbitration proceedings after the dismissal and abandonment of that suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court erred in assuming revisional jurisdiction as the subordinate court acted within its lawful authority, and further held that a party cannot bypass statutory procedures or unilaterally resort to arbitration after abandoning civil litigation on the same subject matter. Additionally, the Court held that an arbitration award passed with undue haste and in violation of due process and fair trial principles guaranteed under the Constitution is legally unsustainable. The appeal was allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 where the subordinate court has acted within its jurisdiction without any material irregularity?
  • Whether a party who institutes a civil suit regarding the subject matter of an agreement and permits its dismissal can subsequently initiate unilateral arbitration proceedings disregarding statutory procedures?
  • Is an arbitration award rendered in undue haste and without affording a proper opportunity of hearing sustainable under the law?
  • Whether an application challenging the validity, effect, and existence of an arbitration agreement is maintainable under section 31 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
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• Sardar Ali Khan vs State Bank of Pakistan & others2022 SCP 72, 2022 SCMR 1454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-11
  pensionary benefitsestoppelapprobate and reprobatemaster and servantwrit jurisdictionprivate banksuperannuationStaff Circular
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the calculation of pensionary benefits of a retired United Bank Limited (UBL) employee. The petitioner, having retired in 2012, challenged the bank's calculation of his pension based on a 'frozen' basic pay from June 2001, as stipulated in Staff Circular No. 943/2001. The petitioner contended that benefits should be based on his last drawn pay. The Trial and Appellate Courts dismissed the suit, finding that the petitioner had accepted a 40% salary increase under the same circular for over a decade, thereby electing the benefit and its accompanying burden. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings, applying the doctrines of estoppel, acquiescence, and 'approbate and reprobate'. It held that a party cannot accept the benefits of an instrument while rejecting its burdens. Furthermore, the Court noted that the High Court correctly disposed of the matter in light of the Supreme Court's earlier Suo Motu Case No. 20 of 2016, which established a minimum pension floor for private bank retirees. Leave to appeal was declined.

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• Saqib Ali vs Government of Punjab and others2022 SCMR 2089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-19
  provisional appointmentcharacter verificationcompromise acquittalpolice departmentcondonation of delayres judicatasuccessive petitions
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed his Intra Court Appeal, thereby upholding the withdrawal of his provisional appointment letter as a Hardware and Network Technician in the Punjab Police. The petitioner was issued a provisional appointment letter subject to character verification, but before joining, he was nominated in a criminal case under Sections 324, 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Although he was later acquitted on the basis of a compromise, the department withdrew his appointment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the police department is a disciplined force requiring personnel of the highest moral standards and clean records. An acquittal based on a compromise, rather than on merits, does not wipe out the adverse character implications. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petition was barred by 552 days without sufficient justification, and that successive constitutional petitions filed by the petitioner on the same matter were barred by the principle of res judicata.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acquittal based on a compromise in a criminal case entitle a candidate to the restoration of a provisional appointment that was subject to character verification?
  • Can a petitioner seek condonation of delay on the ground of waiting for the outcome of an application sent to the Chief Justice instead of filing a formal petition within the prescribed period?
  • Are successive constitutional petitions on the same subject matter barred by the principle of res judicata?
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• Saqib Ali Khokhar, Director (Regional)/ Additional Director through2022 SCMR 374, 2022 PSC 690, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 899 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-08
  service appealpromotion of civil servantsterms and conditions of servicestatutory rulesdeputationjurisdiction of service tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises out of a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, Karachi, which allowed a service appeal and directed the Sindh Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (STEVTA) to grant promotions in accordance with the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 and its rules rather than under STEVTA's own rules. The core legal question was whether civil servants transferred to STEVTA continue to be governed by the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 regarding their terms and conditions, including promotions, or by the STEVTA Act and its rules. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that following the omission of subsections (4), (5), and (6) of section 15 of the STEVTA Act, transferred employees continue to be government servants unless absorbed by consent, and their service structure and promotion criteria cannot be altered except through an Act enacted under Article 240 of the Constitution. The key principle laid down is that the terms and conditions of civil servants, including seniority and promotion, remain governed by the parent civil servants act unless legally altered in accordance with Article 240 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civil servants transferred to the Sindh Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority continue to be governed by the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Can the terms and conditions of service of civil servants be altered by an authority's rules without an enactment under Article 240 of the Constitution?
  • What is the effect of the omission of subsections (4), (5), and (6) of section 15 of the Sindh Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority Act, 2009 on transferred employees?
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• Sana Jamali vs Mujeeb Qamar and another2022 SCP 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-05
  family court decreeex-parte decreewrit jurisdictionalternative remedyexhaustion of remediessubstituted serviceconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to a High Court judgment that set aside an ex-parte decree passed by a Family Court and remanded the case for fresh decision. The petitioner, having obtained an ex-parte decree for dissolution of marriage and maintenance, challenged the High Court's intervention via a Constitution Petition, arguing that the respondent had an adequate alternative remedy of appeal under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution when a statutory appeal mechanism exists. The Court held that the High Court erred in entertaining the Constitution Petition, as the 1964 Act provides a specific appellate forum (the District Court) for challenging Family Court decrees. The Court reaffirmed the principle that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass an equally efficacious, adequate statutory remedy. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Family Court's original decree, emphasizing that litigants must exhaust prescribed statutory remedies before seeking extraordinary relief.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party invoke the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 when an adequate statutory remedy of appeal is available under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to convert a Constitution Petition into an appeal when the statutory appellate forum is the District Court rather than the High Court?
  • Under what circumstances may a Family Court order substituted service of summons under Order V, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
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• Salman Khan vs The State2022 PSC CRI 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-13
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clauseqatlbis-sababqatl-i-amdEagle Squadcriminal leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court of Balochistan denying him post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a shooting incident involving law enforcement personnel that resulted in a death and injuries. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for post-arrest bail considering the applicability of offences falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order, and accepted the bail application. The Court held that under the facts and circumstances, offences such as qatl-bis-sabab or qatl-i-khata appeared to be made out rather than qatl-i-amd under Section 302 PPC, and since the applicable provisions fell outside the prohibitory clause and no exceptions justified continued detention, the petitioner was entitled to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offence under Section 322 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can post-arrest bail be granted when the tentative assessment of the record shows that an offence outside the prohibitory clause is made out rather than a capital charge?
  • Whether the detention of an accused pending trial can be justified without attracting recognized exceptions for withholding bail?
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• Salamat Ali and others vs Muhammad Din and others2022 PLD Supreme Court 353, 2022 PSC 622, KLR 2022 Supreme Court Cases · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-20
  Revisional JurisdictionInheritanceLimitationBona Fide PurchaserPreponderance of ProbabilityFraudConcurrent Findings of FactDeclaratory SuitActual Denial of RightApprehended Denial of Right
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment, rendered in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, which set aside concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts and dismissed the appellants' suit concerning inheritance and land alienations. The core legal questions involved the appellants' status as legal heirs, the revisional court's power to interfere with concurrent findings of fact, and the applicability of limitation to the suit. The Supreme Court held that the appellants had sufficiently proved their heirship under the standard of 'preponderance of probability', and the revisional court erred in overturning these concurrent findings without demonstrating misreading or perverse appraisal of evidence. However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the suit on grounds of limitation. It ruled that the benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908, regarding fraud, was unavailable against the respondents, who were bona fide purchasers. The right to sue accrued on 12.05.1960 when the co-sharer sold and transferred possession of the land, constituting an 'actual denial' of rights. Applying Article 120 of the Limitation Act, the suit filed in 1982 was time-barred.

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• Sakhi Jan and another vs Qamar Ali Khan2022 PLJ SC 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-28Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Hussain vs The State etc2022 SCP 116, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 424, 2022 SCMR 1540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-21
  murderocular accountbenefit of doubtabetmentcriminal conspiracyacquittalmedical evidencevicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction under Section 302(b) PPC involving a double murder and injuries caused during a firing incident. The petitioner was sentenced to death by the Trial Court, which the High Court later commuted to life imprisonment while acquitting several co-accused. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's conviction could be sustained on the same set of evidence that led to the acquittal of co-accused who were assigned similar roles. The Supreme Court observed that although the petitioner was assigned a specific role, the ocular account was inconsistent, and the medical evidence suggested injuries could have been caused by the acquitted co-accused. Furthermore, the police investigation initially found the petitioner only liable for abetment, yet no evidence of conspiracy under Section 107 PPC or recovery of the weapon was produced. Applying the principle of 'benefit of doubt,' the Court held that where prosecution evidence is unreliable or indistinguishable from that of acquitted co-accused, the accused is entitled to acquittal as a matter of right.

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• Sajid Mehmood vs Mst. Shazia Azad and others2022 SCP 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-07
  special oathfamily courtdowerdowry articlesconclusive proofestoppelbinding agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld a Family Court decree. The petitioner, in a suit for recovery of dower and dowry articles, had voluntarily offered to be bound by the respondent's special oath regarding the disputed items. The respondent accepted, took the oath, and the Family Court subsequently decreed the suit based on that evidence. The petitioner later sought to resile from this offer, arguing that the case should have been decided on merits rather than the special oath. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that once a party voluntarily offers to be bound by the special oath of the opposite party and that offer is accepted, a binding agreement is formed. Under the Oaths Act, 1873, such evidence constitutes conclusive proof of the matter stated. The Court affirmed that a party cannot unilaterally withdraw from such an offer absent sufficient cause, as the agreement creates a binding contract. The decision reinforces that special oath proceedings, when properly conducted, are valid and enforceable, precluding the party who made the offer from challenging the resulting judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who has voluntarily offered to be bound by the special oath of the opposite party resile from that offer after it has been accepted?
  • Does the Oaths Act, 1873 apply to proceedings before the Family Court?
  • Is a decision based on a special oath considered conclusive proof of the matter stated under the Oaths Act, 1873?
  • Does the exclusion of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 in Family Court proceedings invalidate the use of special oaths?
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• Saif Ur Rehman Khan vs Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Nab2022 CLD 413, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 409, 2022 PSC 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-22
  NAB jurisdictionPonzi schemedouble jeopardypre-arrest bailCompanies ActSECPcriminal breach of trustconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against the dismissal of writ petitions by the High Court, which challenged the initiation of proceedings by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) against the petitioner regarding an alleged Ponzi scheme. The petitioner argued that the matter fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and that NAB proceedings constituted double jeopardy. The Supreme Court held that the NAB's jurisdiction to investigate offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, is distinct from the regulatory jurisdiction of the SECP under the Companies Act, 2017. The Court clarified that the bar of double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution does not apply because the ingredients of offences under the NAB Ordinance differ from those under the Companies Act, and the SECP is not a court of law. Furthermore, the Court found the petitioner's request for pre-arrest bail meritless, citing substantial evidence of fraudulent financial activities in personal and company accounts, and affirmed the dismissal of the writ petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the initiation of proceedings by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) regarding financial fraud constitute double jeopardy when the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has already initiated regulatory proceedings?
  • Does the existence of regulatory jurisdiction under the Companies Act, 2017, bar the NAB from investigating offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Can a person claim the protection of Article 13 of the Constitution against NAB proceedings based on prior administrative or regulatory actions taken by the SECP?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to wait for detailed reasons from the High Court before deciding on a petition for leave to appeal against a short order in a bail matter?
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• Sahib Ullah vs State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and anotherPLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 70, 2022 SCMR 1806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-28
  post-arrest bailjuvenile justicestatutory interpretationdate of offencebailable offencebeneficial interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the denial of post-arrest bail to a juvenile petitioner accused under Sections 302, 324, 212, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was exactly sixteen years of age on the date of the occurrence, was entitled to the statutory benefit of Section 6(3) of the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018, or whether the exception under Section 6(4) applied based on his age at the time of arrest. The Supreme Court held that the date of the commission of the offence, rather than the date of arrest, is the material date for determining a juvenile's age and applicable statutory protections. Since the petitioner was exactly sixteen years of age on the date of occurrence, the exception for juveniles 'more than sixteen years of age' under Section 6(4) did not apply. The Court allowed the appeal, converted the petition, and granted bail, reiterating that any ambiguity in criminal law must be interpreted in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the age of a juvenile for the purposes of bail under the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 is to be determined from the date of the commission of the offence or the date of arrest?
  • Does the exception under Section 6(4) of the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 apply to a juvenile who is exactly sixteen years of age on the date of the occurrence?
  • How should a court interpret statutory provisions when there are two possible interpretations in a criminal matter involving a juvenile?
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• Saghir Ahmed vs The State etc2022 SCP 386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  benefit of the doubtsodomyforensic evidencemedical evidencecriminal appealacquittalocular account
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal jail petition arises from a judgment wherein the petitioner was convicted under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing sodomy and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, which was subsequently reduced by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in light of inconclusive medical and forensic evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the petitioner, holding that any ambiguity or inconclusive finding in the forensic report must be resolved in favour of the accused. The key principle laid down is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced, or if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right rather than grace.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inconclusive forensic science agency report can form the basis of a conviction in a criminal case?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right when a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  • How should conflicting interpretations of medical and forensic evidence be resolved in criminal trials?
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• Sabtain Haider vs The State2022 SCP 266, 2022 SCMR 2012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-21
  grave and sudden provocationhonour killingdiminished liabilitySection 302(c) PPCsentence mitigationcriminal appealocular evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition challenged a High Court judgment maintaining the petitioner's conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Altaf Saqib. The core legal question was whether the act, committed after the petitioner discovered the deceased in a compromising position with his sister, constituted premeditated murder or a killing under grave and sudden provocation attracting Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court held that the evidence established the murder occurred under the impulses of grave and sudden provocation, distinguishing this from premeditated honour killings. The Court clarified that the statutory phrase in the name or on the pretext of honour implies premeditation, whereas grave and sudden provocation involves a loss of self-control. Consequently, the Court converted the conviction to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone. The principle laid down is that the defence need only provide a glimpse of truth to support its version, and distinct legal provisions exist for honour-based premeditated killings versus spontaneous acts triggered by grave provocation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase in the name or on the pretext of honour in the first proviso to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply to killings committed under grave and sudden provocation?
  • What is the standard of proof required for the defence to establish a version of events in a criminal trial?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be converted to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the murder is committed under the impulse of grave and sudden provocation?
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• Sharafat Khan vs StatePLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-28
  narcotic drugsrepresentative samplechemical examinercontrol of narcotic substancesfair trialcriminal liabilitysentencing reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the alleged possession of 25,000 grams of charas, packaged in 25 packets containing 14 slabs each, and sentenced to life imprisonment, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether drawing a sample from each packet rather than from every individual slab constitutes a valid representative sample of the entire seized narcotic drug for the purpose of establishing criminal liability for the bulk quantity. By a majority of two to one, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, holding that a representative sample must be drawn from each and every physically independent and separate unit (every slab) of the recovered narcotic drug to satisfy the requirements of a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan and binding precedent. The Court laid down the principle that the prosecution can only burden an accused with criminal liability corresponding to the weight of the specific units actually sampled and tested by the Government Analyst.

  Questions settled

  • Must a representative sample of a narcotic drug be drawn from every physically separate and independent unit of the seized contraband to establish liability for the entire quantity?
  • Does the failure to draw samples from each individual slab within a larger packet limit the accused's criminal liability only to the quantity of the samples actually tested by the Government Analyst?
  • Does testing a sample from each packet rather than each individual slab violate the right to fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Sajid Mehmood vs The State2022 SCP 232, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 157, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 965, 2022 SCMR 1882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-31
  murderocular accountsummoning of material witnessunrecorded statementmedical evidencemotivesentence mitigationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court that maintained the appellant's conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but altered his death sentence to imprisonment for life. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot and killed the deceased following a previous dispute. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the ocular account, the admissibility and use of testimony from a witness whose statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was not recorded, the court's power to summon material witnesses under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the impact of unproved motive on the quantum of sentence. The Supreme Court held that trustworthy ocular testimony corroborated by medical and forensic evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction even if the motive is unproved, and that courts possess wide discretionary and mandatory powers under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to examine any witness essential for a just decision regardless of prior police recording under Section 161. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the basis of an ocular account when the prosecution's alleged motive remains unproved?
  • Whether the testimony of a witness whose statement was not recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be relied upon during trial?
  • What is the scope of the trial court's power under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon a witness whose name was omitted from police investigations?
  • Does a minor discrepancy between medical evidence and ocular testimony warrant the rejection of the prosecution's case?
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• Rohan Ahmad vs The State, etc2022 SCP 170, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 656, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 262, 2022 SCMR 1511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-29
  post-arrest bailblasphemycyber crimePrevention of Electronic Crimes Actbanned books
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged an order of the Lahore High Court refusing them bail in a case registered under section 11 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 and sections 295B, 298C, 120B, 34, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning allegations of sharing blasphemous content, desecrated translations of the Holy Quran, and banned books online via WhatsApp and Google Drive. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioners made out a case for post-arrest bail considering the evidentiary material available on record. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that at the bail stage, courts should not delve into deep scrutiny or appreciation of evidence, and since prima facie sufficient material existed connecting the petitioners to the alleged crime, they were not entitled to bail. The key principle laid down is that deeper appreciation of evidence and factual aspects must be left to the trial court, and bail should be refused where prima facie connection with the offense is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the court should delve into deep scrutiny of evidence at the bail stage?
  • Are petitioners entitled to post-arrest bail when prima facie material connects them to the dissemination of blasphemous content?
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• Riaz Ahmad vs The State, etc2022 PSC (Crl.) 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-25
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausecorruptioncriminal appealstatutory delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had refused post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question concerns the entitlement of the accused to post-arrest bail when the alleged offences fall outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and when the accused has been incarcerated for a considerable period with no further recoveries pending. The court held that since the offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause and nothing remains to be recovered, the case falls under the principle that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. Consequently, the court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and admitted the appellant to bail subject to furnishing requisite security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when the alleged offences fall outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the absence of any expected recovery from the accused justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Is the refusal of bail an exception in cases where offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause?
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• Re: Apprehension of Undermining the Criminal Justice System by Persons in Authority. Prima Facie Violation of Article 10a, 25 and 4 of the Constitution vs N/A2022 SCP 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-27
  criminal justice systemdue processrule of lawhigh profile casestransfer and postingExit Control ListFederal Investigation AgencyNational Accountability Bureau
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon an order initiating proceedings regarding the apprehension of undermining the criminal justice system by persons in authority, concerning potential prima facie violations of constitutional guarantees. The core legal question involves safeguarding the integrity, sanctity, and fairness of the criminal justice system in the investigation, prosecution, and trial of high-profile cases, particularly regarding the transfer, posting, and removal of investigating and prosecuting officers in the Federal Investigation Agency and National Accountability Bureau, as well as the removal of persons from the Exit Control List. The Court held that notices be issued to key federal and provincial functionaries, including the Secretary Ministry of Interior, Director General FIA, and Chairman NAB, to submit written statements and explanations on these matters. Furthermore, the Court ordered that status quo be maintained, no prosecution cases be withdrawn, and investigating and prosecuting officers in high-profile cases not be transferred, posted, or removed until the next date of hearing. The key principles laid down emphasize the enforcement of constitutional guarantees of the rule of law, due process, and equal protection under Articles 4, 10A, and 25 of the Constitution to protect the criminal justice system.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transfer, posting, and removal of investigating and prosecuting officers in high-profile cases can be restrained to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system?
  • What constitutional guarantees under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 ensure the fairness and sanctity of the criminal justice process?
  • Can prosecution cases be arbitrarily withdrawn while proceedings concerning the undermining of the criminal justice system are pending before the Supreme Court?
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• Reruling by the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly under Articl_e2e667652022 PLD Supreme Court 574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-07
  vote of no-confidencedissolution of assemblyjudicial reviewparliamentary proceedingsconstitutional supremacysuo motutrichotomy of powersdoctrine of necessitynational security
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan exercised its suo motu jurisdiction under Article 184(3) to review the constitutionality of a ruling by the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly. On April 3, 2022, the Deputy Speaker dismissed a resolution for a vote of no-confidence against the Prime Minister, citing national security concerns and alleged foreign interference under Article 5. Following this dismissal, the Prime Minister advised the President to dissolve the National Assembly, which was promptly executed. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Speaker's ruling was protected from judicial review by Article 69 and whether it violated the mandatory voting procedure prescribed in Article 95. The Court held that while procedural irregularities are immune from judicial scrutiny, substantive constitutional violations are not. The Court found the Deputy Speaker's ruling unconstitutional as it bypassed the mandatory vote required by Article 95(2). Consequently, the Prime Minister remained subject to the bar in Article 58(1), rendering his advice to dissolve the Assembly invalid. The Court set aside the dissolution, restored the National Assembly, and ordered the vote of no-confidence to proceed.

  Read full judgment →
• Rehman Medical College And Others vs Wafa Gul and others2022 SCMR 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-09
  house job stipendprivate medical collegesmedical graduatesstatutory interpretationelimination of exploitationequal treatmentmedical commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning the quantum of stipend payable to medical graduates doing house jobs in private medical colleges. The core legal question was whether private medical colleges are legally bound to pay house job stipends equivalent to those paid in public sector institutions under the governing legal framework, despite the repeal of earlier ordinances and the existence of private contracts. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that medical graduates are entitled to a reasonable stipend commensurate with their services and that private colleges must pay a stipend not less than the amounts applicable in public colleges, as mandated by statute. The Court ruled that disparity in stipends constitutes impermissible discrimination and that statutory provisions override private agreements, further noting that denial of a reasonable stipend violates the anti-exploitation command of Article 3 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether private medical colleges are legally bound to pay house job stipends equal to those paid in public sector institutions?
  • Does a disparity in the payment of stipends to medical internees of private colleges compared to public colleges constitute discrimination?
  • Can a mutually settled private agreement between medical graduates and private colleges override statutory arrangements regarding stipends?
  • Does the denial of a reasonable stipend for house jobs violate the constitutional command against exploitation under Article 3 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Regarding Poor Conditions Of Rcd Highway: In the matter of vs Not2022 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-13
  National Highway Authoritypublic safetyroad infrastructurehighway maintenancepolice deploymentharassment of travelersfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the poor condition of the RCD Highway (N-25) and the lack of essential infrastructure and safety measures on national highways in Pakistan. The Supreme Court examined a report submitted by the National Highway Authority (NHA), which revealed that a significant majority of the N-25 highway remains in poor or fair condition despite substantial maintenance expenditures. The Court held that the NHA's performance is unsatisfactory, noting the absence of proper road signage, reflectors, and roadside tree plantations, which poses a constant risk to public safety. Furthermore, the Court addressed the failure to deploy Highway Police on N-25 as required by law and directed the Inspector General of National Highways and Motorways Police to explain this omission. The Court also took cognizance of complaints regarding the harassment of travelers by the Frontier Constabulary and Coast Guard. The holding emphasizes the state's obligation to ensure safe travel, proper maintenance of infrastructure, and the professional conduct of security agencies, directing the NHA to ensure the highway reaches a 100% good condition standard.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Highway Authority have a legal obligation to ensure national highways are maintained in a safe and fully functional condition?
  • Is the failure to deploy Highway Police on national highways a violation of the National Highways and Safety Ordinance 2000?
  • Can security agencies like the Frontier Constabulary and Coast Guard be held accountable for harassing travelers during routine checks on national highways?
  Read full judgment →
• Reference by the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 vs Not2022 SCP 384, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-09
  presidential referencereko diq projectforeign investmentpublic assetsconstitutional advisory opinionmines and mineral developmentarbitration settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This presidential reference under Article 186 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, sought the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court regarding the constitutional and legal validity of the proposed implementation agreements for the reconstitution of the Reko Diq project and the enactment of the Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Bill, 2022. The core legal questions involved whether previous judgments, public policy, or the Constitution bar the federal and provincial governments from entering into negotiated agreements for public assets, and whether the proposed legislation would be constitutional. The Supreme Court held that the disposal of public assets through a negotiated agreement is permissible when supported by rational grounds and law, and that the agreements and the legislative measures do not violate the Constitution or previous rulings. The Court laid down that while a competitive process is the ordinary rule for disposing of public assets, it is not invariable, and the executive can enter into negotiated settlements backed by law, transparency, and expert due diligence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Constitution of Pakistan places any bar on the disposal of public assets through a negotiated agreement rather than a competitive process?
  • Whether the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) (Amendment) Act, 2022 is within the legislative competence of the Balochistan Assembly?
  • Whether the proposed Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Bill, 2022 would be valid and constitutional if enacted after provincial resolutions under Article 144?
  • Whether the agreements for the reconstitution of the Reko Diq project violate or conflict with the Supreme Court's earlier judgment in Abdul Haque Baloch's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashid Hussain vs Additional District Judge, Islamabad (East) and others2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 218, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 32, 2022 PSC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-02
  custody of minorswelfare of the minorguardianshippreferential right of fatherGuardians and Wards Actminor's preferencefamily law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment denying the petitioner-father custody of his three minor children, which had been granted to the maternal grandfather. The core legal question was whether the father’s preferential right to custody under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, is absolute or subject to the "welfare of the minor" principle. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the "welfare of the minor" is the paramount consideration and the ground norm of the Act. While the father possesses a preferential right, it is not absolute and may be bypassed when strong, compelling circumstances exist. The Court found that the petitioner had failed to discharge his moral and legal obligations toward his children, and that transferring custody would likely cause psychological harm, given the children's expressed preference and the circumstances surrounding their mother's death. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the welfare of the minors necessitates maintaining their current custody with the maternal grandfather, establishing that the father's right is subordinate to the minors' overall well-being.

  Questions settled

  • Is the father's preferential right to the custody of minor children absolute under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890?
  • What is the paramount consideration for a court when appointing a guardian for a minor?
  • Can a court deviate from the father's preferential right to custody based on the welfare of the minor?
  • Does the minor's expressed preference regarding their custodian constitute a relevant factor for the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashid Ahmad and others vs Nazar Hussain and others2022 SCMR 1842 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-03
  rejection of plaintcivil court jurisdictionconsolidation of holdingsouster of jurisdictionpartial rejection of plaintregistered sale deedspecial tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the dismissal of a civil revision by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the rejection of the plaintiffs' plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The core legal question concerned whether the civil court's jurisdiction was barred under Section 26 of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, when a suit challenges consolidation proceedings alongside a declaration of ownership based on a registered sale deed. The Supreme Court held that where a suit contains multiple prayers and the civil court's jurisdiction is barred as to some but not all reliefs—or where actions of special tribunals are challenged on grounds of jurisdiction, fraud, or mala fides—partial rejection of a plaint is not permissible and the civil court retains jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed and the suit remanded for trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred under Section 26 of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, in respect of matters within the purview of consolidation authorities?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when it contains multiple prayers and jurisdiction is barred for only some of them?
  • Under what circumstances can a civil court examine the validity of an order passed by an administrative authority or special tribunal despite an ouster clause?
  • Is partial rejection of a plaint permissible under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashad Imran vs The State and another2022 SCMR 1304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-26
  pre-arrest bailsubstandard meatpublic healthcognizable offensenon-bailable offensecriminal law procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for pre-arrest bail arises from a criminal case registered against the petitioner for the transportation of substandard meat on a meatless day. The petitioner, intercepted by a Veterinary Officer, was found in possession of 500 kg of beef and 60 kg of mutton that were unfit for human consumption and bore fake stamps. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the circumstances of the seizure and the nature of the alleged offense. The Court held that the seizure of a significant quantity of unhygienic meat, verified by inventories and the presence of a Magistrate, established a prima facie case. The Court found no evidence of mala fides or oblique motives on the part of the State functionary. Consequently, the Court declined to grant pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that the mechanics of criminal law, which mandate arrest in cognizable and non-bailable offenses, should not be suspended without compelling grounds. The judgment reaffirms that significant evidence of public health endangerment precludes the exercise of discretionary relief in pre-arrest bail matters.

  Questions settled

  • Is pre-arrest bail maintainable when there is substantial evidence of a cognizable and non-bailable offense involving public health?
  • Does the presence of a Magistrate during the seizure of evidence lend credibility to the procedure adopted by State functionaries?
  • Can the mechanics of criminal law requiring arrest be suspended in the absence of mala fides or oblique motives by the complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashad Imran vs State and anotherPLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-26
  pre-arrest bailmeatless daysubstandard foodcognizable offensenon-bailable offensecriminal lawmala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Rashad Imran, following the dismissal of his bail application by the High Court. The petitioner was apprehended by a Veterinary Officer while transporting 500 kg of beef and 60 kg of mutton on a meatless day. The confiscated meat was found to be unfit for human consumption, emitting a foul odor, and bearing fake stamps to simulate ante-mortem slaughter. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the circumstances of the seizure and the nature of the offense. The Supreme Court held that the seizure of substandard, hazardous meat on a restricted day, corroborated by official inventories and magisterial oversight, established a prima facie case. The Court found no evidence of mala fide intent by the State functionary. Consequently, the Court declined to grant pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that the mechanics of criminal law, which mandate arrest in cognizable and non-bailable offenses, should not be suspended without compelling grounds or evidence of oblique motives.

  Questions settled

  • Is pre-arrest bail available for offenses involving the transport of substandard meat on a meatless day?
  • Does the involvement of a Magistrate in the seizure process lend credibility to the criminal case against an accused?
  • Must an accused demonstrate mala fide intent on the part of the complainant to successfully obtain pre-arrest bail in a non-bailable case?
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• Rana Tahir Saleem, Muhammad Javaid vs Province of Punjab thr. Chief2022 SCP 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-23
  police tenurepolitical interferencefundamental rightspublic interest litigationpolice independenceadministrative transfersrule of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition challenging the frequent, premature transfers of senior police officials—specifically District Police Officers (DPOs) and the Inspector General of Police—within the Province of Punjab, allegedly driven by political influence. The petitioners contend that such practices violate the tenure protections mandated by the Police Order, 2002, undermine the independence and efficiency of the police force, and negatively impact the criminal justice system and the fundamental rights of citizens to life and liberty. The core legal question is whether the provincial government's failure to adhere to statutory tenure requirements constitutes a violation of fundamental rights and the rule of law. The Supreme Court, finding that the conditions of Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 were met, held that the police force must not be an instrument for vested interests and that integrity and independence are essential. The Court ordered the Provincial Police Officers and Home Secretaries of all provinces and the ICT administration to submit data regarding police tenures over the past eight years to assess compliance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the frequent, premature transfer of police officers violate the statutory tenure protections prescribed in the Police Order, 2002?
  • Can the failure of a provincial government to maintain the independence of the police force be addressed under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction pursuant to Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is the police force prohibited from being utilized as an instrument for the promotion of vested or elite interests?
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• Rana Muhammad Imran Nasrullah vs The State etc2022 SCP 234, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 947, 2022 SCMR 1946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-23
  pre-arrest bailcriminal intimidationcivil litigationfurther inquirylibertyproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court denying pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in a criminal case involving allegations of trespassing, property damage, and criminal intimidation. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the existence of parallel civil litigation regarding the disputed property and the nature of the alleged offences. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail, converting the petition into an appeal and confirming the bail. The Court reasoned that the existence of pending civil litigation regarding the property title raised the possibility of false implication to exert pressure, necessitating further inquiry into the petitioner's guilt under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court established that liberty is a precious constitutional right not to be curtailed on vague allegations, and that where criminal intimidation is accompanied by a specific overt act, the focus should remain on the overt act itself rather than the intimidation charge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of pending civil litigation regarding property title justify the grant of pre-arrest bail in a criminal case involving the same property?
  • When does the provision of Section 506(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 become inapplicable in cases of criminal intimidation?
  • Can a court consider the merits of a case when deciding on a pre-arrest bail application?
  • Does the addition of a non-bailable offence at a belated stage automatically preclude the grant of pre-arrest bail?
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• Rana Muhammad Hanif Khan (Deceased) through LRs vs Saddiq Khan2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-14
  jurisdictionimmovable propertyterritorial jurisdictionrendition of accountslimitationforeign propertysuit for recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for recovery of damages and compensation filed in Sahiwal, Pakistan, regarding income generated from an agricultural property situated in California, USA. The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the Lahore High Court reversed the decision, holding that Pakistani civil courts lacked jurisdiction and that the suit was time-barred. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether Pakistani courts could exercise jurisdiction under Sections 16 and 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the subject property was located abroad and the defendant was a permanent resident and citizen of the United States. The Supreme Court held that under Section 16(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, suits determining any right or interest in immovable property must be instituted where the property is situated. Since the income claimed was inextricably linked to foreign land and the defendant did not voluntarily reside in Pakistan at the commencement of the suit, the local courts lacked both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, the suit was filed twenty-eight years after the termination of the parties' financial relationship, making it grossly time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil court in Pakistan has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for recovery of income generated from immovable property situated outside Pakistan?
  • Does the occasional visit of a foreign citizen to Pakistan satisfy the requirement of voluntary residence under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to confer personal jurisdiction?
  • Can a suit for recovery of money and rendition of accounts be treated as a decree in personam to bypass the territorial restrictions of Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the claim is inextricably linked to foreign land?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Muhammad Hand Khan (Deceased) through LRs vs Saddiq Khan2022 PSC 1065 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-14
  territorial jurisdictionsubject-matter jurisdictionforeign propertylimitation periodrecovery suitrendition of accountscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a suit for recovery of money and rendition of accounts, ruling that Pakistani Civil Courts lacked jurisdiction and that the claim was time-barred. The appellants sought compensation for income allegedly generated from property situated in the United States, managed by the respondent. The core legal questions were whether Pakistani courts possessed territorial or subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute concerning foreign immovable property and whether the suit was filed within the limitation period. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that under Sections 16 and 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the suit regarding foreign property and involving a defendant residing abroad could not be entertained by Pakistani courts. The Court held that the mere occasional presence of a defendant in Pakistan does not confer jurisdiction when the subject matter and cause of action are situated outside the country. Furthermore, the Court noted the claim was filed decades after the financial relationship ended, rendering it time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Do Pakistani Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit concerning immovable property situated outside Pakistan?
  • Does the occasional presence of a defendant in Pakistan confer jurisdiction on Pakistani courts under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the cause of action arose abroad?
  • Can a suit for rendition of accounts and recovery of money regarding foreign property be maintained in Pakistan if the defendant resides permanently abroad?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Muhammad Asif Tauseef vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Chairman, Islamabad and others2022 SCMR 1344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-18
  nomination paperselection eligibilityasset disclosurecut-off dateconstitutional jurisdictionright to contest electionsbanking decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that disqualified the appellant from contesting general elections. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly rejected the appellant's nomination papers based on a banking decree passed against his spouse after the statutory cut-off date for asset disclosure. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misapplied the law. The Court clarified that under Section 60(2)(d) of the Elections Act, 2017, candidates are required to disclose assets and liabilities as of the preceding thirtieth day of June. Since the decree in question was issued after this cut-off date, it could not form the basis for disqualification. The Court emphasized that the right to participate in elections is a constitutional right under Article 17 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and that courts must exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction with caution to ensure no suitor suffers injury from judicial acts. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restoring the orders of the Returning Officer and the Election Tribunal which had accepted the appellant's nomination papers.

  Questions settled

  • Does a banking decree passed against a candidate's spouse after the statutory cut-off date for asset disclosure constitute valid grounds for rejecting nomination papers?
  • Is the right to participate in elections a constitutional right under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, reject a candidate's nomination papers based on a misinterpretation of the Elections Act 2017?
  • What is the scope of the duty of courts to ensure that judicial acts do not cause injury to suitors?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Zahoor Ahmed vs Capital Development Authority through its2022 SCP 184, 2022 SCMR 1411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-20
  Master PlanCapital Development Authorityland use conversionvested rightsdoctrine of locus poenitentiaeurban planningclimate change adaptationfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petitions and civil revisions challenging notices issued by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) regarding the non-conforming use of their residential properties. The core legal question concerns whether the CDA Board's initial decision to commercialize residential properties was taken with lawful authority and whether it created any vested rights, alongside examining the broader nexus between urban planning and climate change. The Supreme Court held that the CDA lacks the discretionary power to alter land use or deviate from the Islamabad Master Plan without the Federal Government's approval; hence, the initial commercialization decision was void ab initio, and no vested rights accrued to the petitioners. The Court laid down that maintaining adherence to the Master Plan and integrating climate resilience, adaptation, and sustainability into urban planning are constitutional necessities intrinsically linked to the fundamental rights to life, dignity, and property under Articles 9, 14, 18, and 23 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Capital Development Authority has the power to change the status or use of property in breach of the Islamabad Master Plan?
  • Does a decision taken by the Board of the Capital Development Authority in violation of the Master Plan create any vested rights in favour of property owners?
  • Can the doctrine of locus poenitentiae be invoked where a public authority's unlawful decision was never actually implemented?
  • Are adaptation, climate resilience, and sustainability integral to the fundamental rights to life, dignity, and property under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Muhammad Owais vs Mst. Nazia Jabeen and others2022 SCP 292, 2022 SCMR 2123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-05
  custody of minorshizanatremarriage of motherwelfare of the minorGuardians and Wards Actintelligent preferencebest interest of the childMohammadan Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a custody dispute between a father and a remarried mother concerning their four children. The Appellate Court had initially awarded custody to the father on the sole ground that the mother had remarried a person outside the prohibited degrees, purportedly forfeiting her right of hizanat under Mohammadan Law. The High Court subsequently set aside this decision, restoring the trial court's order in favor of the mother. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the petition, held that the mother's second marriage is not an absolute disqualification for custody. The Court emphasized that the paramount consideration remains the welfare of the minor, which encompasses physical, mental, and emotional well-being. Referring to Section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Court affirmed that the intelligent preference of the minors and the mother's capacity to provide a stable environment outweigh the general rule of forfeiture upon remarriage. The ratio establishes that a mother’s remarriage cannot be a standalone reason to deny custody if the child's best interests lie with her.

  Read full judgment →
• Raja Ehtisham Kiyani vs The State2022 SCP 5, 2022 SCMR 1248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-04
  heroin possessionControl of Narcotic Substances Actinvestigating officer as complainantpresumption of regularityrebuttal of statutory presumptionpolice animosityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the High Court judgment upholding the petitioner's conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The petitioner was sentenced to 6 years' rigorous imprisonment after being found in possession of 1500 grams of heroin. The core legal questions pertained to whether the investigation carried out entirely by the complainant/intercepting police officer rendered the prosecution doubtful due to alleged bias and previous animosity, and whether the failure to lead defense evidence or give testimony under oath impacted the defense's plea. The Supreme Court held that the prompt completion of investigative steps by the investigating officer was protected by a statutory presumption of regularity, and that allegations of animosity raised late without evidence constituted an afterthought. The Court further noted that the petitioner failed to enter the witness box under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C. to rebut the adverse presumption under Section 29 of the Act. Consequently, leave to appeal was declined and the conviction was affirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an investigating officer acting as the complainant per se vitiate the prosecution in a narcotics recovery case?
  • Whether an unproven allegation of prior animosity against police officials is sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can a defense plea raised without supporting record or departmental recourse be rejected as an afterthought in narcotic cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Ali Zaman (deed.) thr. LRs and another vs Evacuee Trust Property2022 PLJ SC 436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Evacuee Trust PropertyStatutory ProcedureVoid-ab-initioExecutive AuthorityProperty DisposalFederal GovernmentSale Deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside a sale deed regarding commercial property managed by the Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB). The core legal question concerned the validity of a property sale authorized by a Federal Minister via memorandum, bypassing the statutory framework established by the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975. The Supreme Court held that the sale was void-ab-initio. The Court determined that the ETPB acts as a custodian, and any disposal of property requires a rigorous, transparent process: a Board resolution followed by Federal Government approval, and subsequent authorization of an officer under Section 12 of the Act. The Court emphasized that executive authority under Article 173 of the Constitution is subject to legislative acts; thus, actions by a Minister that contravene the specific statutory scheme governing ETPB property are not valid executive acts. The principle laid down is that property managed by the ETPB cannot be sold through discretionary ministerial orders but must strictly adhere to the prescribed statutory procedure, failing which the transaction is legally ineffective.

  Questions settled

  • What is the statutory procedure for the disposal of property under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975?
  • Can a Federal Minister unilaterally authorize the sale of ETPB-managed property without following the statutory scheme?
  • Does a sale deed executed without the requisite Board resolution and Federal Government approval constitute a valid transfer of property?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Ali Zaman (decd.) thr. LRs and another vs Evacuee Trust Property2022 SCP 224, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 391, 2022 PSC 1371, PLD 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee trust propertysale deed cancellationpower to acquire property and make contractsexecutive authoritystatutory interpretationtransfer of propertyvoid ab initio
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside concurrent findings of the lower fora and decreed a suit for declaration and cancellation of a sale deed filed by the Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB). The core legal question revolved around the lawful authority and procedure required for the sale and transfer of evacuee trust property, specifically whether a Federal Minister could independently order the sale of property under the control of ETPB without a formal board resolution and approval of the Federal Government under the relevant statutory framework. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the sale of evacuee trust property must strictly follow the statutory mechanisms outlined in the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 and the applicable 1977 Scheme. The Court laid down the principle that executive acts regarding the disposal of government property must harmonize with the enabling legislation, and any transfer executed without the mandatory prior resolution of the ETPB Board and formal approval of the Federal Government is void ab initio and confers no legal title.

  Questions settled

  • Under what law or rules is the Evacuee Trust Property Board authorised to sell property under its ownership?
  • How can authorisation be granted for the sale of land under the management and control of the Evacuee Trust Property Board by either the Federal Government or by the Board itself?
  • What effect does a violation of law, rules, or procedure have on the rights of parties regarding the transfer of evacuee property?
  • Can a Federal Minister independently approve the sale of evacuee trust property without a resolution by the Evacuee Trust Property Board and approval of the Federal Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Rafaqat Ali vs The State2022 SCMR 1107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-14
  murdersupplementary statementSection 302 PPCSection 161 CrPCsuppression of injuriesbenefit of doubtacquittalappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal assailed the judgment of the High Court, which had altered the appellant's death sentence under Section 302(b) PPC to life imprisonment. The core legal questions pertained to the evidentiary weight of supplementary statements changing the original case, the effect of suppressing injuries on a co-accused, and whether conviction could stand on evidence disbelieved regarding identically placed acquitted co-accused. The Supreme Court held that a supplementary statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be read in continuation of an FIR, placing a heavy burden on the prosecution to explain the initial failure to nominate an accused. The Court observed that suppressing the co-accused's injuries, abandoning named witnesses while relying on un-named ones, and making major improvements severely compromised the prosecution's case. Finding multiple doubts deducible from the prosecution's own evidence, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant. The judgment establishes that conviction cannot rest on moral speculation where the original narrative is significantly altered and unexplained doubts exist.

  Questions settled

  • Can a supplementary statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. be treated as a continuation of the First Information Report?
  • What is the prosecution's burden when introducing new accused persons through supplementary statements after failing to nominate them in the initial crime report?
  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by a co-accused during the occurrence create reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution's version of events?
  Read full judgment →
• Qayyum Khan vs The State and others2022 SCMR 273, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-12
  post-arrest bailcriminal petitionfalsely implicatedinvestigation reportFIR nomination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail by the High Court in a criminal case where the petitioner and a co-accused were specifically nominated in the FIR for firing at and injuring the victim. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail on the ground that the investigating officer found him empty-handed at the scene of the occurrence. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner is specifically nominated in the FIR for causing injury and the investigating officer's opinion regarding him being empty-handed lacked credible evidentiary support—leading to disciplinary action and a recommendation for reinvestigation—the petitioner is not entitled to bail. The Court affirmed the High Court's order refusing bail, establishing that a flawed police opinion unsupported by evidence does not override specific nomination and role attribution in the FIR for the purpose of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused specifically nominated in the FIR for causing injury entitled to bail merely because the investigating officer opined he was empty-handed?
  • Can a flawed or unsupported opinion of an investigating officer override specific allegations of firing and injury in a criminal case for the purpose of granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Qausain Faisal vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M_o Interior, etc2022 SCP 190, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 675, 2022 PLJ SC 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-07-18
  Registrar's powersadministrative vs judicial functionsmaintainability of petitionSupreme Court Rules 1980constitutional petitionArticle 184(3)practice and procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, who refused to register a constitutional petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, citing various objections regarding maintainability, lack of public importance, and procedural defects. The core legal question was whether the Registrar possesses the authority to adjudicate upon the maintainability and merits of a constitutional petition or if such powers are exclusively reserved for the Court. The Supreme Court held that the Registrar’s powers are primarily administrative and ministerial, limited to ensuring compliance with the practice and procedure of the Court. The Court ruled that the Registrar cannot assume an adjudicatory role to determine the maintainability or merits of a petition, as these are justiciable issues reserved for the Court. Consequently, the Court overruled the Registrar’s objections concerning the petition's maintainability while upholding objections related to procedural form and presentation. The principle established is that the Registrar’s authority is strictly confined to administrative compliance, and any determination regarding the maintainability of a constitutional petition must be made by the Court on the judicial side.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Registrar of the Supreme Court have the authority to decide the maintainability of a constitutional petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Are the powers of the Registrar under the Supreme Court Rules 1980 administrative or adjudicatory in nature?
  • Can the Registrar decline to register a petition on grounds related to the merits or public importance of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Qaiser and another vs The State2022 SCMR 1641, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-02
  Narcotics offenseControl of Narcotic Substances ActSafe custody of samplesSafe transmission of samplesChain of custodyGovernment analyst reportConviction set asideAcquittalStare decisisStandard of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned petitions for leave to appeal and a suo motu review petition against convictions under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for drug-related offenses. The core legal questions revolved around the prosecution's burden to establish the safe custody and safe transmission of narcotic samples to the laboratory, and the binding nature of precedents set by benches of co-equal strength of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and the suo motu review petition, setting aside the convictions. The Court held that the prosecution's failure to establish the safe custody and safe transmission of representative samples from the point of recovery to the Government analyst's office casts doubt on the reliability and conclusiveness of the analyst's report, thereby vitiating the conviction. It was reiterated that the chain of custody is pivotal, and any break renders the chemical examiner's report unreliable. The Court also reaffirmed the principle that decisions of a bench of certain judges are binding on subsequent benches of the same strength, and any deviation requires a reference to a larger bench. Given the severity of punishment under the Act, a stricter standard of proof is required, extending the benefit of doubt to the accused for any defect in the prosecution's case.

  Read full judgment →
• Province of the Punjab through Deputy Commissioner/District Collector,Rawalpindi and another vs Muhammad Akram and others Muhammad Khalil Ahmad Abdullah and others2022 SCP 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-01
  land acquisitionterritorial jurisdictionboundary disputeinter-governmental disputeconsent orderdeletion of partiescivil petition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions for leave to appeal arose from a consolidated order of the Lahore High Court disposing of writ petitions concerning land acquisition and territorial boundary disputes in Mauza Ojri Kalan between the Province of Punjab and the Islamabad Capital Territory. The core legal question was whether the High Court's directions for initiating fresh proceedings regarding the acquisition or de-acquisition of land were sustainable, particularly when the Provincial Government's law officers had consented to the deletion of key revenue authorities from the array of respondents, and how inter-governmental territorial disputes must be resolved. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court's directions suffered from no illegality, perversity, or impropriety, noting that the petitioner Province of Punjab lacked grounds to challenge an order to which it had consented below, and reiterated that disputes regarding territorial boundaries between the Federal and Provincial Governments fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to the Constitution. The petitions were accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party that consented to the striking off of necessary respondents from the array of parties before the High Court can maintain a petition against the resulting order?
  • How is a territorial dispute between the Federal Government and a Provincial Government required to be settled under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does an order directing the authorities to initiate fresh proceedings regarding the acquisition or de-acquisition of land suffer from legal infirmity when based on prior settled boundary reports?
  Read full judgment →
• Province Of Sindh and others vs Shahzad Hussain Talpur2022 SCMR 439, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 659, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-30
  civil serviceillegal appointmentconflict of interestpublic service commissioncompetent authorityservice tribunalvoid order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed by the Province of Sindh challenging a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal which had set aside the dismissal of the respondent from the post of Special Auditor. The respondent had been appointed by the Secretary of the Cooperation Department, who was residing at the same address as the respondent. To facilitate the appointment, the Secretary had downgraded the post from BS-17 to BS-16 to assume appointing authority, concealed his identity and designation under the vague term 'competent authority', and omitted the respondent's full surname to hide their connection. No competitive testing or selection by the Sindh Public Service Commission was conducted as required by law. The Supreme Court held that the appointment was patently illegal and void ab initio. The Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, emphasizing that the use of the anonymous term 'competent authority' without disclosing the actual name and designation of the issuing official is against public policy, facilitates illegalities, and undermines accountability.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appointment to a civil post be sustained if it bypasses the mandatory competitive selection process of the Public Service Commission?
  • Does a conflict of interest arise when a departmental head appoints an individual residing at the same address without disclosing their connection?
  • Is the practice of issuing official notifications under the anonymous term 'competent authority' without disclosing the official's name and designation legally valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh and others vs Mir Shahzad Hussain Talpur2022 PSC 176, 2022 SCMR 439, 2022 PCTLR 584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-30
  civil service appointmentpublic service commissionservice tribunalcompetent authorityillegal appointmentaccountabilitylimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal which reinstated the respondent as a Special Auditor after his services were terminated. The core legal questions concerned whether the respondent’s appointment, made without the mandatory selection process by the Sindh Public Service Commission, was valid, and whether the Tribunal erred in condoning a time-barred departmental appeal by declaring the termination order void. The Supreme Court held that the appointment was patently illegal as it bypassed the requisite selection process by the Commission, regardless of whether the post was Grade 16 or 17. Furthermore, the Tribunal erred in condoning the delay in filing the departmental appeal. The Court emphasized that public functionaries must act transparently; the use of the vague term competent authority in official notifications without disclosing the specific name and designation of the official is against public policy and facilitates illegality. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the Tribunal's judgment was set aside, establishing that all official communications must clearly identify the issuing authority to ensure accountability.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be validly appointed to a post requiring Public Service Commission selection without such a process?
  • Does the use of the term 'competent authority' in official notifications without disclosing the official's name and designation satisfy legal requirements for accountability?
  • Can a Service Tribunal condone a time-barred departmental appeal by merely categorizing a termination order as a void order?
  Read full judgment →
• Province Of Punjab through Secretary to Government of Punjab Public2022 PLJ SC 31 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  defence counsel feepauper accusedunrepresented accusedindigent personPunjab Legal Aid Act 2018Lahore High Court Rules and Ordersconstitutional jurisdictionnon-payment of legal fees
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil petitions for leave to appeal were filed by the Province of Punjab against the High Court's judgment directing the payment of unpaid professional fees to advocate respondents who were appointed as defence counsel by the High Court in criminal matters. The core legal question concerned how the professional fees of court-appointed defence counsel in pauper and unrepresented accused cases ought to be determined and disbursed following the enactment of the Punjab Legal Aid Act 2018 alongside the Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court disposed of the petitions by holding that defence counsel appointed by the High Court are governed by the High Court Rules and Orders, whereas appointments by the government are covered by the 2018 Act. To avoid discrimination and maintain parity, the Court directed the Prosecution Department to disburse Rs. 25,000 per case for High Court appearances and Rs. 20,000 per case for Sessions Court appearances within two months based on judgment verification.

  Questions settled

  • How are professional fees for defence counsel appointed by the High Court in pauper or unrepresented accused cases regulated?
  • What is the effect of the Punjab Legal Aid Act 2018 on High Court Rules and Orders framed under Article 202 of the Constitution?
  • How should professional fee parity be maintained for defence counsel appointed in pauper accused cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Principal Public School Sangota, Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2022 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-11-26
  limitation periodadverse possessionrevenue recordJamabandiright to educationcivil suittime-barred suitfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a representative suit filed in 2002 by respondents challenging the ownership of land in District Swat, which had been in the possession of the Principal Public School, Sangota, since 1964. The plaintiffs alleged the land was village common land (shamilat), while the School and the Provincial Government maintained it was state property. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, a decision upheld by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the issue of limitation. The Court held that the suit was hopelessly time-barred, having been filed thirty-eight years after the School took possession and sixteen years after the initial revenue record entry. The Court rejected the argument that every updated Jamabandi creates a fresh cause of action in cases involving dispossession. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and dismissed the suit. The Court emphasized that the State's failure to file a timely appeal demonstrated incompetence, noting the vital importance of protecting educational institutions, particularly girls' schools in the Swat region, as guaranteed under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the periodic updating of a Jamabandi (revenue record) provide a fresh cause of action for a suit involving dispossession?
  • Is a suit for possession of land maintainable if filed decades after the defendant assumed possession?
  • Can a suit be maintained when the plaint fails to provide particulars regarding the accrual of the cause of action?
  • Does the failure of the government to file a timely appeal against a judgment affecting public property constitute negligence?
  Read full judgment →
• President, Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited, Head Office, Islamabad vs Kishwar2022 SCMR 1598 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-06
  master and servantrejection of plaintreturn of plaintnon-statutory service rulescivil court jurisdictionimposition of penaltyfair trialdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed against a Peshawar High Court judgment that upheld lower courts' orders rejecting applications under Order VII, Rules 10 and 11, C.P.C. The dispute arose when Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL) issued an office memorandum directing respondent employees to deposit monetary penalties following an inspection by the State Bank of Pakistan. The employees challenged the imposition and recovery of penalties in a civil suit, whereupon ZTBL argued that the civil court lacked jurisdiction because the relationship was governed by the master and servant rule and internal staff regulations provided an internal appeal mechanism. The Supreme Court held that since ZTBL's service regulations lack statutory backing and the employees are not covered by statutory service rules or labor laws, filing a civil suit under Section 9, C.P.C. is the only available legal remedy to challenge the penalty. Furthermore, principles of due process and fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution apply even within master and servant relationships. Finding no legal infirmity in the lower courts' concurrent decisions, the Supreme Court refused leave and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction under Section 9 C.P.C. to entertain a suit by an employee whose service is governed by non-statutory rules?
  • Can an internal service regulation without statutory backing operate as a bar to the jurisdiction of a civil court?
  • Does the principle of master and servant preclude an employee from filing a civil suit to challenge an illegal penalty or financial recovery?
  • Are the guarantees of fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution applicable in employment relationships governed by non-statutory rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Postmaster General, Karachi and another vs Arshad Ali2022 PLC (C.S.) 1407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-02
  service tribunalmisconductdepartmental inquirycriminal acquittalcivil servantsupervisory negligenceremoval from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which had reinstated the respondent, a former officiating Head Postmaster, into service with back benefits following his dismissal for misconduct, inefficiency, and corruption relating to a massive savings bank fraud at a post office. The core legal questions involved whether a supervisory government employee could escape disciplinary liability for gross financial embezzlement occurring under his command on the ground of lack of direct knowledge, and whether an acquittal in criminal accountability proceedings shields a civil servant from departmental action. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's judgment and upholding the dismissal. The Court held that a supervisory officer is personally responsible under official job descriptions and departmental manuals to maintain vigilance and keep track of accounts; failure to detect large-scale misappropriation constitutes gross negligence and misconduct. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that departmental disciplinary proceedings are distinct from criminal trials, and a civil servant cannot escape administrative consequences or dismissal for misconduct merely on account of an acquittal or exoneration in criminal charges.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant escape departmental disciplinary proceedings and dismissal solely on the ground of his acquittal in criminal charges arising from the same transaction?
  • Whether a head postmaster in charge of an office can be held liable for misconduct and supervisory negligence when massive financial fraud occurs under his command?
  • What is the distinct scope and object of departmental inquiries compared to criminal trials under penal statutes?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervez Khan & others vs Ali Asghar Khan & others2022 SCP 230, 2022 SCMR 1857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-07-13
  30-year-old documentpresumption of genuinenessdowerburden of proofspecific performanceinheritanceproper custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns a dispute over the ownership of a house, where respondents claimed title based on a 1972 dower agreement. The core legal question was whether the lower courts correctly presumed the genuineness of this document under Article 100 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and whether an unperformed agreement creates title. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred by relying on a photocopy without the original, failing to establish proper custody, and lacking evidence of execution. The Court clarified that the presumption of genuineness for a thirty-year-old document is discretionary and requires strict adherence to the parameters of Article 100, including the production of the original. Furthermore, the Court established that an unperformed agreement does not create legal title or ownership; consequently, the property devolved upon the legal heirs upon the owner's death. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the Appellate Court's decision in favor of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court presume the genuineness of a document under Article 100 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 without the production of the original document?
  • Does an unperformed agreement to transfer property create title or ownership rights in favor of the beneficiary?
  • What are the requirements for a court to establish the proper custody of a document for the purpose of evidentiary presumption?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when a document relied upon by a party is disputed by the opponent?
  Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Khan and another vs The State2022 SCMR 393, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-10
  murderbenefit of doubtocular evidenceacquittalmedical evidencedelayed FIRabscondencecorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a double murder case where the appellants were convicted under Section 302(b) PPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that seven accused persons, including the appellants, fired upon the deceased while they were in a car. The core legal question was whether the conviction of the appellants could be sustained on the same ocular evidence that was found unreliable and insufficient to convict three co-accused who were acquitted by the trial court. The Supreme Court observed that the role attributed to the acquitted accused was indistinguishable from that of the appellants and supported by medical evidence, yet they were granted the benefit of doubt. Furthermore, the Court identified several discrepancies: the presence of eye-witnesses on a tractor was doubtful, the source of light (tractor headlights) was unproven, there was an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and conducting post-mortems, and the time of death recorded by the doctor contradicted the ocular account. Applying the principle of consistency, the Court held that evidence disbelieved for co-accused cannot sustain a conviction for others without independent corroboration. Consequently, the appeals were allowed and the appellants were acquitted.

  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (Wapda), Wapda2022 PCTLR 1578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-26
  Income Tax Ordinancerevisional jurisdictionwrit petitionremandnon-resident agentquestions of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, concerning the assessment years 1991-1992, 1992-1993, and 1993-1994, where the petitioner was determined to be an agent of a non-resident consultant under section 78 of the Ordinance. The petitioner challenged the revisional order passed by the Commissioner under section 138 of the Ordinance through a writ petition before the High Court, which dismissed the petition. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition solely by rejecting the contention that the revisional order was a recycled version of an earlier order, without addressing other legal grounds and questions of law raised in the memo of the petition. The Supreme Court converted the leave petition into an appeal, held that the High Court ought to have considered all raised grounds and questions of law once the preliminary objection was resolved, and remanded the matter back to the High Court for fresh determination on the remaining grounds while upholding the finality of the finding regarding the nature of the revisional order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court is justified in dismissing a writ petition challenging a revisional order solely on the ground of rejecting one contention without addressing other substantial grounds and questions of law raised in the petition?
  • Is an order in revision passed by the Commissioner under the Income Tax Ordinance appealable before the Appellate Tribunal?
  • What is the appropriate legal recourse when a revisional order passed under the Income Tax Ordinance is non-appealable?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) through its Secretary General Mr. Farhatullah Babar and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Law and Justice Islamabad and others2022 SCP 46, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-07
  vote of no-confidencedissolution of assemblyDeputy Speaker rulingPrime Ministerconstitutional petitionrestoration of assembly
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions and proceedings arising from the ruling of the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly delivered on 03.04.2022, whereby a vote of no-confidence against the Prime Minister under Article 95 of the Constitution was dismissed, followed by the dissolution of the National Assembly by the President on the Prime Minister's advice. The core legal questions relate to the constitutionality of the Deputy Speaker's ruling, the validity of the dissolution of the Assembly, and the status of the no-confidence resolution. The Supreme Court declared the Deputy Speaker's ruling, the Prime Minister's advice to dissolve the Assembly, and the President's dissolution order to be contrary to the Constitution, setting them aside and restoring the National Assembly, the Prime Minister, and the federal cabinet to their positions as of 03.04.2022. The Court held that the no-confidence resolution remained pending and subsisting, and mandated the Speaker to immediately summon the Assembly to conduct the business of the House, including voting on the no-confidence resolution in accordance with the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the ruling of the Deputy Speaker rejecting a vote of no-confidence against the Prime Minister is constitutional?
  • Can the Prime Minister advise the dissolution of the National Assembly while a notice of a resolution for a vote of no-confidence is pending against him?
  • Whether the dissolution of the National Assembly by the President upon the advice of the Prime Minister is lawful?
  • What are the duties of the Speaker of the National Assembly regarding the convening of sessions for a pending no-confidence resolution?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through Managing Director vs Amna Fraz and others2022 SCMR 1852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-24
  maintainability of writ petitioncompensation packagedeceased employeevested rightassistance packagePakistan International Airlines Corporationlegal heirs
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising from a High Court order directing Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) to grant compensation to the widow of a deceased employee under Administrative Order No. 16/2014 dated 08.07.2014. The petitioner-Corporation challenged the maintainability of the writ petition, contending that it was a company and that the compensation package was non-statutory and had been held in abeyance by a subsequent notification dated 30.06.2015. The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was maintainable under the public function and control test, noting that the claim was made by legal heirs rather than impacting internal service structures. Furthermore, because the employee died while Administrative Order No. 16/2014 was actively in force, a vested right accrued to the respondent. The subsequent temporary abeyance did not permanently extinguish this right, particularly when a revised package introduced a later cut-off date. The Court disposed of the petition by directing the petitioner to decide the respondent's applications within two months and ensure proper apportionment of benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional writ petition maintainable against Pakistan International Airlines Corporation at the instance of legal heirs claiming compensation benefits of a deceased employee?
  • Does an employee's death during the validity of an administrative compensation scheme create a vested right in favour of their legal heirs?
  • Does the temporary suspension or placing in abeyance of an administrative assistance package extinguish accrued compensation rights of legal heirs when a subsequent revised package sets a later cut-off date?
  Read full judgment →
• Pak Leather Crafts Limited and others vs Al-Barka Bank Pakistan Limited2022 SCP 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-04Read full judgment →
• Pak Leather Crafts Limited and others vs Al-Baraka Bank Pakistan Limited2022 CLD 1296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-04
  limitation periodtime requisitecertified copiesfinancial institutions recoverydeeming provisionstatutory interpretationappellate procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Sindh High Court judgment dismissing an appeal under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the time consumed by a litigant in paying the requisite fees for certified copies of a judgment or decree constitutes "time requisite" for exclusion under Section 12(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that "time requisite" for obtaining certified copies does not include delays caused by the litigant's failure to pay fees promptly. The Court clarified that Section 12(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908, creates a legal fiction where the period between the application and the intimated delivery date is excluded, but this presupposes that the application is validly made upon payment of costs. A litigant cannot unilaterally extend the limitation period by delaying fee payment. The burden lies on the applicant to demonstrate diligence and produce the receipt indicating the delivery date. Consequently, the time spent by the appellants in paying fees was not excludable, rendering the appeal time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time consumed by a litigant in paying the cost for certified copies constitute 'time requisite' for exclusion under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Does the filing of an application for certified copies without payment of the prescribed fee stop the period of limitation?
  • What is the effect of the deeming provision in Section 12(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908, regarding the computation of limitation?
  • Is a litigant required to produce a receipt or chit from the copying agency to claim the benefit of Section 12(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Zaman vs The State2022 SCP 18, 2022 SCMR 1002, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 60, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-22
  triple homicideSection 342 Cr.P.C.ocular evidenceforensic reportpresumption of regularitycapital punishmentprocedural formality
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a conviction for triple homicide, where the petitioner was sentenced to death under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond doubt, specifically citing the absence of motive in the Section 342 Cr.P.C. examination and questioning the forensic evidence due to the timing of the casing dispatch. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the ocular evidence consistent with medical reports and the crime scene inspection. The Court held that the examination of an accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. is not a dogmatic ritual but a procedural tool to ensure the accused is aware of the evidence; since the petitioner was aware of the motive through cross-examination, the omission did not cause prejudice. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the presumption of regularity for official acts regarding forensic dispatch. Ultimately, the Court declined leave to appeal, ruling that procedural formalities cannot override the administration of justice in cases of callous, proven homicide.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to put the motive to an accused during examination under Section 342 Cr.P.C. automatically vitiate a conviction?
  • Can a delayed dispatch of crime scene casings to a forensic laboratory be viewed with suspicion in the absence of specific proof to the contrary?
  • Is the examination of an accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. a dogmatic ritual or a procedural tool to prevent surprise?
  • Does the presumption of genuineness attach to official acts under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-i-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Wali and another vs The State and another2022 SCP 38, 2022 SCMR 1153, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-16
  post-arrest bailsmugglingreasonable groundscriminal transgressionState functionaryleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioners were accused of running over a Customs official, Mian Irfan Ullah, who was performing his duty at a blockade set up to intercept a vehicle carrying smuggled contraband. The petitioners argued that the death was accidental. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting that the blockade was deliberately breached by the petitioners, resulting in the death of a State functionary, which constitutes a serious criminal transgression. The Court observed that the recovery of smuggled items following the incident provided credible support for the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Court held that the material collected by the prosecution established 'reasonable grounds' under the relevant criminal procedure law, creating an insurmountable impediment to the grant of bail. Finding that the lower courts had correctly assessed the situation and that no further probe was required, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the impugned order and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deliberate breaching of a Customs blockade resulting in the death of an official constitute reasonable grounds to deny bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a plea of accidental death be sustained when the accused deliberately runs over a State functionary performing official duties?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad (decd) through L.Rs. and others vs Muhammad Ashraf2022 SCP 26, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 324, PLD 2022 Supreme Court · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  revisional jurisdictionremand ordercivil procedurenecessary partyproperty disputecondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside an appellate court's remand order and restored a trial court's decree in a property dispute. The core legal question was whether the High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is restricted to either affirming or setting aside a remand order, or if it possesses the authority to decide the merits of the case itself. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction. It determined that the appellate court erred in remanding the matter for the impleadment of a party whose interests were already adequately represented by existing parties. The Supreme Court affirmed that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not restrict the High Court to merely remanding a case; rather, it empowers the Court to make such orders as it deems fit. The key principle laid down is that where evidence on record is sufficient for a final adjudication, a remand order is unnecessary and unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, have the jurisdiction to decide a case on its merits instead of remanding it to the appellate court?
  • Is a remand order justified when the record contains sufficient evidence to decide the controversy between the parties?
  • Can the High Court set aside an erroneous remand order and restore the trial court's judgment if the interests of the party seeking impleadment are already represented?
  Read full judgment →
• Niamatullah Khan Advocate and others vs Federation Of Pakistan and others2022 SCMR 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-16
  amenity plotsencroachmenturban planningpublic interest litigationK-IV water projectKarachi Development Authoritydemolition of illegal structures
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of civil miscellaneous applications and petitions regarding urban planning, encroachment on amenity plots, and infrastructure development in Karachi and Jacobabad. The core legal questions involve the unauthorized conversion of amenity plots for private or commercial use, the implementation of court-ordered demolition of illegal encroachments on public parks, and the facilitation of essential public infrastructure projects, specifically the K-IV water supply scheme. The Court held that amenity plots, such as those designated for hospitals or public use, cannot be diverted for private commercial purposes. Consequently, the Court ordered the issuance of show-cause notices to private entities occupying such plots and directed the Karachi Development Authority to submit comprehensive reports on the status, allotment, and master plan usage of all amenity plots. Furthermore, the Court mandated the removal of unauthorized encroachments from public parks, specifically Aladin Park, and directed relevant authorities to ensure the restoration of these spaces for their intended public use. The principle laid down is that public amenity land must be preserved for its designated purpose and cannot be alienated for private gain.

  Questions settled

  • Can amenity plots designated for public use in a master plan be legally converted for private or commercial purposes?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the demolition of unauthorized commercial structures built on public park land?
  • Are government authorities obligated to ensure the removal of encroachments on land designated for educational or public health purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Alias Bhaga vs The State and others2022 SCMR 1467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-31
  post-arrest bailSection 489-F PPCdishonour of chequenon-prohibitory clausefurther inquirycivil recoveryOrder XXXVII CPC
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against an order of the Lahore High Court denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner purchased six vehicles from the complainant and issued a cheque worth Rs. 10,000,000/- which dishonoured upon presentation. The petitioner disputed receiving the vehicles and issuing the cheque to the complainant. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted post-arrest bail. The Court held that Section 489-F PPC is not intended for the recovery of disputed amounts, for which civil remedies like Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 exist. As the offence carries a maximum punishment of three years, it falls outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C., making bail a rule and refusal an exception. Furthermore, the mere existence of another FIR does not disentitle an accused to bail if a case for further inquiry is made out under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Can Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be utilized as a tool for the recovery of an alleged business amount instead of pursuing civil remedies?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of rule when the alleged offence carries a maximum punishment of three years and falls outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the mere registration of other similar FIRs against an accused disentitle him to the grant of bail when he otherwise makes out a prima facie case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Hussain and another vs Syed Iqbal Ahmad Qadri (deceased)2022 SCP 34, 2022 SCMR 1216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-18
  Specific performanceAgreement to sellHousing schemePublic policyReadiness and willingnessBalance sale considerationSignature comparisonLeave to appealQanun-e-ShahadatContract Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell a plot. The petitioners had agreed to buy a plot from the deceased respondent, Mr. Qadri, which was to be allotted to him in a Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation Housing Scheme. The core legal questions revolved around whether the agreement's execution was established, whether the petitioners demonstrated readiness and willingness to pay the balance sale consideration, and if the agreement was void as being opposed to public policy. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings of three lower courts. The Court held that the execution of the agreement was not established, noting that Article 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, does not create a presumption if forensic examination of signatures was not conducted. Furthermore, the petitioners failed to fulfill their primary obligation to secure or tender the balance sale consideration. The Court also found the agreement to be opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872, as the housing scheme was exclusively for Federal Government employees, and allowing non-employees to benefit would negate its purpose.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for specific performance be decreed if the execution of the agreement to sell is not established?
  • Does Article 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, create a presumption regarding signatures if forensic examination was not conducted?
  • What is a buyer's primary obligation regarding payment of balance sale consideration in a contract of sale?
  • Can an agreement to sell a plot in a housing scheme meant exclusively for government employees to a non-government employee be considered opposed to public policy?
  • Is it unfair to decree a suit for specific performance after a significant delay, considering the depreciation of currency and increase in land prices?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab Siraj Ali & Nawab Sajjad Ali ,Ghulam Murtaza, Shahrukh Jatoi vs The State through A.G. Sindh2022 SCP 350, 2023 SCMR 16, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-18
  anti-terrorism lawpersonal vendettacompromiseforensic evidenceheinous offencecriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for the murder of Shahzaib under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Following a compromise between the parties regarding the murder charges, the High Court acquitted the appellants of the substantive offences but maintained their convictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The core legal question was whether a murder resulting from a personal dispute constitutes 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and whether the ATA conviction could be sustained despite the compromise. The Supreme Court held that the incident, rooted in a personal vendetta, lacked the requisite design or purpose—such as destabilizing the government or society—to qualify as terrorism. The Court reaffirmed that terrorism is a distinct legal species, and heinous offences do not ipso facto constitute terrorism. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellants of all charges, including the arms possession charge, noting that forensic evidence sent to the laboratory after the weapon's recovery lacks evidentiary value. The appeals were allowed, and the appellants were ordered released.

  Questions settled

  • Does a murder arising from a personal dispute constitute 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can a conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act be sustained when the substantive offence has been compromised between the parties?
  • Does the submission of crime empties to a forensic laboratory after the recovery of the weapon invalidate the forensic report?
  • Are all heinous offences automatically classified as 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Naveed Akhtar vs The State2022 SCMR 1784 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-22
  narcotics recoverydisclosure statementforensic reportwitness credibilitycriminal appealburden of proofSection 340(2) CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of 6150 grams of charas from his residence based on his disclosure during interrogation. The appellant argued that his acquittal in a related case, the non-production of a recovery witness, contradictions in prosecution testimony, and alleged non-compliance with forensic reporting standards warranted acquittal. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, noting that the recovery was corroborated by consistent testimony from the available recovery witness and the investigating officer. The Court held that the acquittal in a separate FIR did not impact the merits of the current case, the non-production of one witness did not create reasonable doubt, and the forensic report adhered to established legal principles. The appellant's failure to appear as his own witness under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 further weakened his defense. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and sentence, as the prosecution successfully established the recovery and the nature of the contraband.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of an accused in a separate FIR automatically impact the merits of a conviction in a subsequent narcotics case?
  • Does the non-production of one of several recovery witnesses necessarily create reasonable doubt in a narcotics prosecution?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when an accused fails to appear as his own witness under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after asserting a defense of false implication?
  Read full judgment →
• Nausher vs Province of Punjab through District Collector, Khanewal and another2022 PLD Supreme Court 699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-18
  judicial reviewadministrative tribunalcivil court jurisdictionfraudulent allotmentbona fide purchaserrevenue authoritiescolonization of government lands
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent decrees favoring the appellant regarding the cancellation of land allotment. The core legal question concerned the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to review orders of Revenue Authorities under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, and the extent of judicial review over administrative findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that while Civil Courts possess jurisdiction to examine whether administrative orders are passed in accordance with law, they cannot act as appellate courts to re-decide disputed facts if the administrative finding is supported by evidence. The Court affirmed that the Board of Revenue acted within its statutory authority under Section 30(2) of the Act in cancelling the allotment obtained through fraud. Furthermore, the Court established that a purchaser acquiring land through fraudulent mutations in the name of a deceased person cannot claim the status of a bona fide purchaser under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Do Civil Courts have jurisdiction to review orders passed by Revenue Authorities under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  • Can a Civil Court re-decide disputed facts determined by an administrative tribunal during judicial review?
  • Does the Board of Revenue have the statutory power to cancel land allotments obtained through fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Can a purchaser of land acquired through fraudulent mutations in the name of a deceased person claim protection as a bona fide purchaser?
  Read full judgment →
• Nausher vs Province of Punjab through District Collector, Khanewal &2022 SCP 212 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Nasir Ali vs Muhammad Asghar2022 SCP 7, 2022 SCMR 1054, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 311, 2022 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-02
  Civil PetitionLeave to AppealCivil RevisionConcurrent FindingsDeclaration SuitOral Sale MutationBurden of ProofRevisional JurisdictionSpecific Relief ActQanun-e-Shahadat OrderMaintainability of SuitConsequential ReliefMutation Challenge
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the Trial Court and Appellate Court, which had dismissed a suit for declaration. The original suit contested an oral sale mutation dated 31.05.1994, filed nearly eight years later. The core legal questions involved the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. to overturn concurrent findings, the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish fraud or forgery in the mutation, and the maintainability of a suit for mere declaration without seeking consequential relief. The Supreme Court converted the petition into a Civil Appeal and allowed it, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the decisions of the lower courts. The Court held that the High Court's interference was unjustified as the lower courts had not committed any jurisdictional error, misreading/non-reading of evidence, or perversity. It was established that the plaintiff (respondent) failed to prove his claim of non-appearance due to an accident, especially when another mutation was attested on the same day without challenge. The Court reiterated that a suit for mere declaration is not maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act if further relief, such as possession or cancellation of mutation, is available but not sought.

  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ahmed vs The State2022 SCP 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ocular testimonycapital chargemedical evidencecorroborationcriminal appealmurder convictionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner for the murder of Mst. Shehnaz Bibi and causing injuries to a minor, as maintained by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether a conviction on a capital charge can be sustained solely on ocular testimony when the defence alleges contradictions, lack of corroborative recovery, and conflicts with medical evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court affirmed that where ocular testimony is found trustworthy and confidence-inspiring, it is sufficient to sustain a conviction without further corroboration. The Court established that minor discrepancies in medical evidence or ocular accounts do not negate direct evidence, as witnesses are not expected to provide a perfect photographic account. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the relationship of prosecution witnesses to the deceased is not a ground to discard their testimony, particularly when their presence is natural. Finally, the Court held that while recovery of weapons is corroborative, its absence does not invalidate a case supported by reliable ocular evidence and proven motive.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on ocular testimony without corroborative evidence?
  • Does the relationship of prosecution witnesses to the deceased automatically invalidate their testimony?
  • Do minor discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular testimony necessitate the acquittal of an accused?
  • Is the recovery of the weapon of offence a mandatory requirement for sustaining a conviction in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseer Ahmed and others., Imdad Ali and another vs Returning Officer U/c2022 SCP 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  election petitionre-pollballot paper errorelection symbolmaterial effectElection Commission of Pakistanlocal government elections
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) declaring an election void and directing a re-poll for a local government constituency. The core dispute arose from a printing error on the ballot papers where the contesting respondents' allotted election symbol was replaced by an incorrect symbol. The appellants, who secured the highest number of votes, challenged the ECP's decision, arguing that the error did not materially affect the election outcome. The Supreme Court examined whether the ECP acted within its jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Elections Act, 2017. The Court held that the printing error constituted a violation of the Act and that, given the close margin of votes, the error was sufficient to have materially affected the result of the poll. The Court affirmed that the ECP possesses the authority to declare a poll void when such violations occur. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the ECP's order for a re-poll in the constituency.

  Questions settled

  • Does a printing error on a ballot paper regarding a candidate's election symbol constitute a violation of the Elections Act 2017?
  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan declare an election void if a printing error on ballot papers materially affects the result of the poll?
  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan under Section 9 of the Elections Act 2017?
  • What criteria determine whether an election irregularity has 'materially affected' the result of a poll?
  Read full judgment →
• Naeem Qadir Sheikh, Muhammad Zaigham Ali vs The State etc2022 SCP 274, 2022 SCMR 2068 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-30
  pre-arrest bailrule of consistencyfurther inquirybogus registrationcorruptionprevention of corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arose under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, wherein the petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, involving an alleged scam of bogus vehicle registrations. The petitioners argued that they had no nexus with the scam, which occurred prior to their postings, and that senior officers had been exonerated while a similarly placed co-accused was granted bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the investigating officer admitted to a lack of incriminating material against the petitioners and that the co-accused's bail had attained finality. The Court held that when a petitioner's role is indistinguishable from a co-accused who has been granted post-arrest bail, denying pre-arrest bail on technical distinctions would be futile as they would immediately qualify for post-arrest bail under the rule of consistency. Consequently, the Court converted the petitions into appeals, allowed them, and granted pre-arrest bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can the rule of consistency be applied to grant pre-arrest bail to an accused if a similarly placed co-accused has already been granted post-arrest bail?
  • Can the merits of a criminal case be touched upon by the court while deciding an application for pre-arrest bail?
  • Whether the absence of incriminating material and the exoneration of senior officers justify the grant of bail under the category of further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Naeem Khan vs The State and others2022 SCMR 419, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 108, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 747 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-28
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryabsconsionembezzlementcriminal misappropriationpublic exchequer
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner, a Treasury Clerk accused of embezzling public funds. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite allegations of embezzlement and a period of absconsion, given the lack of documentary evidence connecting him to the crime. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, converting the petition into an appeal and setting aside the High Court's order. The Court reasoned that the prosecution failed to produce documentary evidence linking the petitioner to the specific embezzled amount, and the recovery of a smaller sum did not conclusively establish guilt at the pre-trial stage. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that mere absconsion is not conclusive proof of guilt and does not automatically disentitle an accused to bail if a case for further inquiry is otherwise made out on merits under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the petitioner was admitted to bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere absconsion of an accused person automatically disentitle them to the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Can an accused be granted bail when the prosecution fails to provide documentary evidence connecting the accused to the alleged crime?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail under the principle of further inquiry when the investigation is complete and the accused is no longer required for further investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• NAB through its Chairman, Islamabad vs Brigadier (Retd.) Hamid Mehmood2022 SCP 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-22
  National Accountability Bureauleave to appealacquittalcorruption and corrupt practicesforged shipping documentsbanking transactionsloss to exchequerbailable warrants
  Summary & questions settled

  Criminal petitions for leave to appeal were filed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) challenging the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, which had acquitted the respondents of corruption and corrupt practices. The respondents had earlier been convicted and sentenced by an Accountability Court under Section 9(a)(iii), (iv), (vi), and (xii) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for their alleged involvement in a fraudulent coal supply contract causing significant financial loss to the public exchequer via forged documents and banking transactions. NAB contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court overlooked overwhelming documentary and banking evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and erred in acquitting the respondents based on inconsequential shortcomings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court's acquittal violated established principles of criminal justice and held in abeyance the High Court's direction regarding the refund of deposited bail amounts pending final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against an acquittal where documentary and banking transaction evidence allegedly establishes the guilt of the accused?
  • Whether the High Court's direction ordering the refund of funds deposited for bail should be held in abeyance pending final determination of an appeal against acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Kohinoor Spinning Mills Ltd vs Commissioner Inland RevenuePTCL 2022 CL. 883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-23
  tax deductiongratuity fundincome from businessunapproved fundtax referencenew question of lawstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a tax reference concerning the deductibility of contributions made by the petitioner to an unapproved gratuity fund under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether such contributions are allowable as deductions when computing income under the head 'income from business' pursuant to section 21(e) of the Ordinance. The petitioner also attempted to raise a new argument regarding an exemption under clause 33 of Part-II of the Second Schedule of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that contributions to an unapproved gratuity fund are expressly prohibited from deduction under section 21(e). The Court emphasized that the statutory requirement for an 'approved' fund would be rendered meaningless if taxpayers could claim deductions for unapproved funds. Furthermore, the Court held that new questions of law not raised before the Appellate Tribunal or the High Court cannot be agitated for the first time in the Supreme Court. The principle established is that tax deductions for gratuity fund contributions are strictly contingent upon the fund's approved status under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Are contributions made to an unapproved gratuity fund deductible when computing income under the head 'income from business'?
  • Can a party raise a new question of law before the Supreme Court that was not previously raised before the Appellate Tribunal or the High Court?
  • Does the exemption under clause 33 of Part-II of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 apply to a person making a contribution to a gratuity fund?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) vs M/s Noor CNG Filling2022 SCP 126, 2022 PLJ SC 288, 2022 PSC 1200, 2022 SCMR 1501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-05
  Board ResolutionPower of AttorneyOrder XXIX Rule 1 CPCjuristic personauthorization to file appealimplied barOGRA Ordinance 2002meter tamperinggas pilferage
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit filed by the respondent against SNGPL for declaration and injunction regarding gas billing issues, meter removal, and alleged gas pilferage. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent, finding that SNGPL failed to abide by prescribed inspection and laboratory procedures. The Appellate Court and High Court subsequently dismissed SNGPL's appeal and revision due to a lack of proper authorization, Board Resolution, or Power of Attorney empowering the filing officers or counsel. SNGPL contended before the Supreme Court that the suit was impliedly barred under the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) Ordinance, 2002. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decisions, holding that compliance with Order XXIX, Rule 1 and Order III, Rule 4 of C.P.C. is mandatory for juristic persons, and appeals or pleadings filed without valid authorization, power of attorney, or Board Resolution are invalid. It further held that the plea of an implied bar could not be entertained when raised for the first time without prior pleading or application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal filed on behalf of a public limited company maintainable without a valid Board Resolution or Power of Attorney authorizing the institution of the appeal or engagement of counsel?
  • Can a power of attorney executed after the date of filing an appeal retroactively validate the appeal proceedings if it was not produced before the appellate court?
  • Can a party raise the plea of an implied statutory bar to the jurisdiction of civil courts for the first time before the Supreme Court when no such plea was taken in the courts below?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashid Ramzan vs The State and others2022 SCMR 2111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-30
  post-arrest bailmurdercross-versionrule of consistencyspecific rolecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, was filed by the petitioner seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302, 324, 337-F(v), 337-F(iii), 337-F(i), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, relating to a murderous assault resulting in a murder. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail based on a cross-version, a rule of consistency with co-accused, and claims of mala fides. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was specifically nominated in the promptly lodged FIR with a fatal fire shot attribution to the deceased's head, supported by medical evidence and eyewitness testimonies, and that the cross-version did not exculpate him nor did the rule of consistency apply given his distinct, active role. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the High Court's order declining bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere existence of a cross-version is alone sufficient ground to grant post-arrest bail to an accused?
  • Does the rule of consistency apply when an accused is assigned a distinct and fatal role compared to co-accused who were granted bail?
  • Whether an accused nominated in a promptly lodged FIR with a specific role of firing a fatal shot at the deceased is entitled to bail?
  • When does a tentative assessment of the record justify the refusal of post-arrest bail in a capital charge case?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s Pakistan WAPDA Foundation vs The Collector of Customs, Sales Tax,2022 LHC 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  excise dutysales taxmanufacturereclamation of transformer oiltaxable supplybailmentconstitutional competenceFederal Legislative List
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed an appeal by M/s Pakistan WAPDA Foundation against a High Court judgment upholding tax and duty demands on the reclamation of waste transformer oil for WAPDA. The central issues were whether reclaiming transformer oil constituted 'manufacture' under the Central Excises Act 1944 and the Sales Tax Act 1990, and whether the appellant was liable to pay excise duty and sales tax on the activity. The Court held that prior to the 18th Constitutional Amendment, Parliament had full constitutional competence under Article 142 read with Entries 44 and 49 of the Federal Legislative List to legislate on excise duties and sales tax. On statutory interpretation, the Court determined that while oil reclamation falls under the broader definition of 'manufacture' in Section 2(25) of the Central Excises Act 1944 as repair/reconditioning, the appellant was a mere service provider under a bailment contract, not the 'manufacturer' liable for excise duty. Furthermore, under Section 2(16) of the Sales Tax Act 1990, oil reclamation does not transform goods into a new distinct article, so the appellant was not a 'manufacturer' making a 'taxable supply' under Section 3. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does the process of reclaiming used transformer oil constitute 'manufacture' within the meaning of Section 2(25) of the Central Excises Act 1944?
  • Is a service provider who reconditions goods owned by a third party under a contract of bailment liable to pay central excise duty as a 'manufacturer'?
  • Does the reclamation or repair of used transformer oil amount to 'manufacture' under Section 2(16) of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Can a entity providing repair services on goods owned by another person be charged to sales tax as a 'manufacturer' making a 'taxable supply' under Section 3 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. vs Collector of Customs,2022 SCP 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs dutyrefund claimconcessionary rateunjust enrichmentstatutory presumptiontelecommunication equipmentfiscal statute interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges the High Court of Sindh's order dismissing a reference application regarding a refund claim of overpaid customs duty. M/s Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited imported equipment for its wireless loop system, claiming a concessionary rate under SRO No. 457(I)/2004, which was initially denied by customs authorities who charged standard duty and invoked the doctrine of unjust enrichment and section 19A of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant fulfilled the conditions precedent under SRO No. 457(I)/2004 and whether the statutory presumption under section 19A regarding the passing of the incidence of duty applies to equipment used internally in providing services rather than being sold. The Supreme Court held that the appellant fulfilled all conditions precedent, including obtaining the necessary BOI certificate and PTA NOC. Furthermore, section 19A and the common law doctrine of unjust enrichment do not apply where imported capital goods are installed and utilized internally for rendering services rather than sold as goods to third parties. The appeal was allowed and refund claims were granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an importer who fails to produce exemption certificates at the initial stage of filing Goods Declarations is precluded from claiming a concessionary rate of customs duty under SRO No. 457(I)/2004 if such certificates are produced during adjudicatory proceedings?
  • Whether the presumption under section 19A of the Customs Act, 1969, that the incidence of paid customs duty has been passed on to the buyer applies to imported capital goods installed and utilized in an enterprise's own service projects rather than sold to third parties?
  • Whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment and common law principles regarding indirect taxes apply to the internal use of imported machinery in service sectors?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s Lucky Cement Ltd thr. its General Manager, Peshawar vs Khyber2022 SCP 258, 2022 SCMR 1994 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-09
  Property taxDiscriminationEquality before lawRight to tradeConstitutional lawStatutory powerUltra vires taxTax refundKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment, arguing discriminatory imposition of property tax on a cement manufacturer in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The appellant contended it was initially singled out for property tax and subsequently placed in a higher tax category ('B') compared to competitors ('C' or 'D'), violating Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court considered whether an intelligible differentia justified the disparate tax rates and if the provincial Government failed to exercise its powers under Section 42(5) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2013, to prevent discrimination. The Court held that the discriminatory imposition of property tax without justifiable criteria was illegal and ultra vires. It further ruled that the Government's failure to exercise its statutory power to rationalize matters, despite awareness of discrimination, was arbitrary and capricious. The Court directed that the appellant be treated equally to other cement manufacturers and that the excess property tax paid be refunded or adjusted within two months.

  Questions settled

  • Can a taxing authority impose different tax rates on similarly situated entities without an intelligible differentia?
  • Is the Government obligated to exercise its statutory power to prevent discrimination when aware of it?
  • Is money paid as tax pursuant to an ultra vires demand by a public authority recoverable by a citizen?
  • What constitutes reasonable classification under Article 25 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s A.J. Traders through its proprietor Muhammad Ilyas vs The Collector of2022 SCP 296, 2023 PLJ SC 49, 2022 PTD 1869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-12
  customs appealtime frame for decisionmandatory versus directory provisionstaxpayer rightscustoms duty exemptionstatutory interpretationdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants imported gold and silver under SRO No. 266(I)/2001 on the condition that jewellery manufactured from it would be exported within 180 days, but failed to export. The Collector of Customs passed adverse orders, which were upheld by the Customs Appellate Tribunal and the Peshawar High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on merits, holding that benefits availed under the SRO must be complied with. Additionally, the Court examined whether the Tribunal's failure to decide the appeal within the sixty-day timeframe prescribed under section 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969 rendered the appellate decision void and a nullity. The Supreme Court held that the time limit for deciding an appeal is directory rather than mandatory in respect of the taxpayer, and an appellate order passed beyond the stipulated period is not void, as the tardiness of a State functionary cannot be allowed to prejudice a taxpayer's right of appeal or violate fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4, 8, 10A, and the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the statutory time limit for deciding an appeal under section 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969 is mandatory or directory?
  • Does the failure of the Customs Appellate Tribunal to decide an appeal within the prescribed timeframe render its decision void or a nullity in law?
  • Can a taxpayer's appeal be negated or dismissed solely on the ground of delay by the appellate tribunal in deciding the matter?
  • Whether the tardiness or non-compliance of a State functionary in adhering to a statutory timeline can be visited upon or prejudice an appellant taxpayer?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaque Ahmed Memon.,Ali Akbar Abro vs Arshad Hussain2022 SCP 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-20
  civil serviceregularization of adhoc appointmentsseniorityretrospective amendmentvested rightsservice tribunalfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals challenge a common judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, Karachi, which had set aside certain notifications affecting the seniority of private respondents. The core legal question revolved around the scope, validity, and applicability of the Sindh Civil Servants (Regularization of Adhoc Appointments) Act, 1994 and the Sindh Civil Servants (Regularization of Adhoc Appointments) (Amendment) Act, 2014, specifically regarding whether retrospective seniority could be granted to regularized adhoc appointees to the detriment of civil servants selected through the public service commission. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that an amendment introduced twenty years after the original enactment to grant retrospective benefits and take away the vested constitutional rights and seniority of lawfully appointed civil servants is unconstitutional, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The key principle laid down is that deeming clauses or retrospective amendments cannot be used to undermine the established seniority and rights of regular civil servants or to go beyond the original scheme and object of regularization legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment introducing a retrospective deeming clause after twenty years can adversely affect the vested seniority rights of civil servants?
  • Can regularized adhoc employees claim seniority from the date of their initial adhoc appointment rather than the date of regularization under the Sindh Civil Servants (Regularization of Adhoc Appointments) Act, 1994?
  • Does granting retrospective seniority to regularized adhoc appointees at the expense of candidates selected through the Public Service Commission violate Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq-Ul-Aarifin and others vs Mumtaz Muhammad and others2022 PLJ SC 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-20
  burden of proofdeclaratory suitlimitation periodappellate court powersrevenue recordcivil appealrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had accepted a civil revision filed by the respondents, setting aside the Appellate Court's decision and restoring the trial court's decree in a suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and possession regarding immovable property. The core legal questions involved the burden of proof in civil suits, the scope of appellate powers under the Code of Civil Procedure regarding unappealed issues, and the limitation period for challenging revenue records. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that plaintiffs must succeed on the strength of their own case rather than the weaknesses of the defendants, and that an appellate court has the power to examine substantial questions of law such as limitation even if not formally cross-objected, as an appeal is a continuation of original proceedings. The Court established key principles regarding the initial burden of proof resting squarely on the plaintiff, the wide powers of appellate courts under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and the six-year limitation period for declaratory suits running from the accrual of the cause of action during revenue settlement proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff can succeed on the weaknesses of the defendant's case without discharging the initial burden of proof?
  • Does an appellate court have the jurisdiction to examine an issue of law or limitation when a party has failed to file a cross-objection against the trial court's finding?
  • What is the limitation period for filing a declaratory suit challenging revenue records prepared during settlement proceedings?
  • Can an appellate court pass an order in favour of a party that has not appealed or filed cross-objections to secure the ends of justice?
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• Mushtaq Ul Aarifin and others vs Mumtaz Muhammad and others2022 SCMR 55, 2022 PLJ SC 195, 2022 PSC 929 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-20
  civil appealdeclarationpermanent injunctionpossessionburden of prooflimitationappellate court jurisdictionsupervisory jurisdictioninheritancefraudulent mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that restored a trial court's decree for declaration, permanent injunction, and possession, setting aside the Appellate Court's decision. The core legal questions revolved around the plaintiffs' burden of proof regarding ownership, the suit's limitation period, and the appellate court's power to decide issues of law not specifically challenged. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to discharge their initial burden of proving ownership, as their witnesses did not confirm the plaint's contents and no evidence supported the predecessor's ownership. The Court further ruled that the suit, filed in 2012 to challenge revenue entries from 1977-78, was barred by the six-year limitation period for declaratory suits. It clarified that an appellate court, under Section 96 and Order XLI, Rule 33 C.P.C., can decide an issue of law like limitation even if not challenged by cross-objection, as an appeal is a continuation of original proceedings. The High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, erred by not rectifying the illegalities committed by the subordinate courts. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the trial court and High Court, and restoring the Appellate Court's judgment with modifications regarding the issue of limitation.

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• Munir Hussain, etc. vs Riffat Shamim, etc.2022 SCP 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-14
  paternitylegitimacynegative declarationlegal characterinheritanceSpecific Relief Actcivil petition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil petition for leave to appeal seeking to challenge the High Court's judgment regarding the paternity of respondent No. 2, whom the petitioners alleged was not the daughter of their deceased brother Azhar Hussain, but of Muhammad Zareef, in order to secure a larger share in the estate of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, as siblings of the deceased, could maintain a suit for a negative declaration challenging the paternity and legitimacy of another person under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that challenging another person's paternity does not constitute an assertion of one's own legal character under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, following the principle established in Laila Qayyum v. Fawad Qayum (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 449). The key principle laid down is that plaintiffs lack the requisite legal character under section 42 to maintain a suit seeking a negative declaration to deny the paternity of another individual.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for a negative declaration challenging another person's paternity is maintainable under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • Does challenging the paternity of another person amount to an assertion of one's own legal character?
  • Can siblings maintain a declaratory suit to question the paternity of a daughter acknowledged by the deceased father during his lifetime?
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• Muneer Malik and Nadeem Ahmed vs The State through P.G. Sindh2022 SCP 162, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 216, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 648, 2022 SCMR 1494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-11
  compromiseanti-terrorism actpersonal vendettajoint recoverydiyat shareminor legal heirsarms ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellants under Sections 302/324/34 PPC, Section 7 of the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA), and Section 13(e) of the Arms Ordinance. The incident involved the murder of two persons and injury to two others following a quarrel over children. During the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into a compromise, and the minor legal heirs' diyat shares were fully secured through land transfer and cash deposit. The core legal issues pertained to whether Section 7 ATA applied to a private dispute, whether the compromise was valid, and whether the joint weapon recovery was admissible. The Supreme Court held that Section 7 ATA was inapplicable because the offense stemmed from a private vendetta without any specific intent or motive to spread terror in society. The Court accepted the genuine compromise for the PPC offenses as minor rights were safeguarded, and set aside the Arms Ordinance conviction due to the inadmissibility of a joint recovery from an open place with delayed chemical examination. Consequently, the appellants were acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 7 of the Anti Terrorism Act applicable where an offense is the result of a private dispute or personal vendetta?
  • Can a murder conviction under Section 302 PPC be compounded on the basis of a compromise if minor legal heirs are involved?
  • Does a joint recovery of weapons from an open place while in police custody carry evidentiary value to sustain a conviction?
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• Mukhtiar Hussain vs Mst. Shafia Bibi2022 SCP 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-24
  ex-parte decreesetting aside ex-parte decreesufficient causecivil procedureconcurrent findingsrevisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of concurrent findings of the lower forums dismissing an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside an ex-parte judgment and decree. The petitioner sought to set aside the decree on the ground that an out-of-court compromise had been reached and he was under the impression that the respondent's suit had been withdrawn. The core legal question examined was whether reliance on an unsubstantiated verbal compromise without verifying the withdrawal of the suit from one's counsel constitutes sufficient cause for setting aside an ex-parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's vague plea, unsupported by any material particulars, deed, or instructions to his counsel, showed deliberate non-cooperation and negligence. The Court enunciated the principle that a litigant cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong or negligence, and accordingly dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unsubstantiated plea of a compromise and alleged withdrawal of a suit constitutes sufficient cause to set aside an ex-parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party who fails to verify the status of a suit from his counsel and deliberately abstains from proceedings be permitted to take advantage of his own negligence?
  • When can concurrent findings of lower courts refusing to set aside an ex-parte decree be interfered with in revisional or appellate jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Zahid and others vs Province Of Sindh through Chief2022 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-28
  illegal marriage hallsremoval of encroachmentsland use conversionresidential to commercialSindh Building Control AuthorityAdministrative Committee directionsregularization letter
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil Miscellaneous Applications were filed by owners of marriage halls in Karachi seeking to become parties to Constitution Petition No. 09 of 2010 and challenging administrative directives and demolition notices issued against their marriage halls situated on residential plots. The applicants contended that their halls were built to protect the land from encroachments, that they had deposited conversion fees under regularization policies, and that administrative directions issued during an Administrative Committee meeting could not operate as judicial orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the applications, holding that the Chief Justice's administrative directives merely supervised and enforced earlier judicial orders passed under Article 184(3) in accordance with Article 190 of the Constitution. The Court further held that mere payment of conversion fees or application submissions does not constitute automatic or deemed regularization. As the applicants failed to fulfill the mandatory minimum plot size requirements and lacked valid regularization letters under the applicable regulations, the commercial use of residential land was unlawful and the marriage halls remained liable to demolition.

  Questions settled

  • Can administrative directions issued by the Chief Justice in an Administrative Committee meeting be used to oversee and enforce existing judicial orders under Article 184(3) and Article 190 of the Constitution?
  • Does applying for conversion and depositing fees result in automatic or deemed regularization of residential land for commercial use without the issuance of a formal regularization letter?
  • Can structures constructed in violation of master planning laws and minimum plot size requirements be saved from demolition on the ground of protecting the land against land grabbers?
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• Muhammad Yousaf and another vs The State and another2022 PSC CRI 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-07
  post-arrest bailcontraband recoverycannabismultiple FIRsinvestigative disclosureControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking post-arrest bail in multiple criminal cases registered against the petitioners consequent upon a single transaction involving the interception of a mini truck and the recovery of a massive cache of cannabis. The core legal question concerns whether multiple First Information Reports and recoveries stemming from a single vehicle and transaction, executed through piecemeal disclosures and investigative efforts, can be deemed a sham exercise or grounds for granting bail. The Supreme Court held that the massive cache of 56.400 kilograms of cannabis concealed in various cavities of the vehicle was discovered through elaborate investigative efforts, making it humanly impossible to conclude the exercise in one go, and thus justified the registration of multiple cases. The Court laid down the principle that the recovery of a huge contraband cache through progressive disclosures and investigative measures attracts the mischief of section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, acting as an insurmountable impediment to releasing the accused on bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of multiple First Information Reports for recoveries made from a single vehicle through piecemeal investigative disclosures entitle the accused to post-arrest bail?
  • Whether the recovery of a huge cache of narcotics constitutes an insurmountable impediment to the release of an accused on bail under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can multiple recoveries from a single vehicle at different police stations be treated as a sham exercise during tentative assessment for bail?
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• Muhammad Usama vs The State2022 SCP 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-20
  murderSection 302(c) PPCjuvenile offenderspur of the momentsentence reductionocular evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and life sentence imposed on the petitioner for the murder of the complainant's brother. The core legal question was whether the conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was sustainable given the petitioner's minority at the time of the offense, the absence of premeditation, and the use of a non-conventional weapon during a spur-of-the-moment altercation. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the occurrence through consistent ocular and medical evidence; however, the circumstances—specifically the petitioner's age, the lack of preparation, and the trivial nature of the altercation—indicated that the act did not constitute premeditated murder. Consequently, the Court converted the conviction to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by the petitioner. The judgment establishes that where a killing occurs without premeditation, particularly involving a minor and a non-conventional weapon, the offense is appropriately categorized under Section 302(c) rather than Section 302(b).

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of a non-conventional weapon during a spur-of-the-moment altercation warrant a conviction under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be converted to Section 302(c) if the offense was committed without premeditation?
  • Is the age of the offender a relevant factor in determining the appropriate section of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for a murder conviction?
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• Muhammad Uneeb Ahmed, Abdul Rehman and others, Chenab College of Engineering and Technology vs Federation of Pakistan and others2022 PLD Supreme Court 345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-18
  Pakistan Engineering Counciladmission policyultra viresDiploma of Associate Engineeropen meritstatutory interpretationdiscriminatory practiceengineering education
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns the authority of the Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC) to restrict the admission of Diploma of Associate Engineer (DAE) holders to B.Sc. (Engineering) programs by reserving only 2% of seats for them, effectively barring them from competing on open merit alongside F.Sc. degree holders. The core legal question is whether the PEC, under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, possesses the statutory power to impose such a quota or reservation system for admissions. The Supreme Court held that the PEC lacks the authority under the Act to reserve admission seats. The Court found that while the PEC can set minimum qualifications for admission, it cannot restrict access through quotas. Consequently, the Court declared the PEC's decision dated 25.03.2015 and the corresponding provisions in the Regulations for Engineering Education in Pakistan regarding 'reserved seats' as ultra vires the Act, discriminatory, and without legal effect. The principle laid down is that in the absence of explicit statutory authority, a regulatory body cannot impose restrictive quotas that undermine open merit competition between equally eligible candidates.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Engineering Council have the statutory authority to reserve specific admission seats for DAE holders in B.Sc. (Engineering) programs?
  • Can a regulatory body impose admission restrictions that are not explicitly authorized by its enabling statute?
  • Is the imposition of a quota system for DAE holders in engineering admissions discriminatory when they are otherwise eligible for the program?
  • Does the power to set minimum qualifications for admission under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act 1976 include the power to reserve seats?
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• Muhammad Uneeb Ahmed and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2022 PSC 1248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Pakistan Engineering CouncilDiploma of Associate EngineersB.Sc. Engineering admissionreserved seatsultra viresopen meritstatutory powersdiscriminatory regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter addresses whether the Pakistan Engineering Council, constituted under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, is legally empowered to restrict candidates holding a Diploma of Associate Engineers to a maximum of 2% reserved seats for admission to the B.Sc. (Engineering) program, rather than allowing them to compete on open merit alongside F.Sc. degree holders. The core legal question revolves around the statutory competence of the Council and its Governing Body to reserve admission seats under the Act and its regulations. The Supreme Court held that neither Section 8 nor Section 25A of the Act confers any power upon the Council or its Governing Body to reserve admission seats or restrict DAE holders to a quota. The Court declared that the impugned decision of the PEC dated 25.03.2015 and the words "reserved seats" in Article 2(c) of the Regulations for Engineering Education in Pakistan are ultra vires the Act, discriminatory, and without legal effect, thereby establishing that admissions to the B.Sc. (Engineering) program must proceed on open merit and through open competition among eligible F.Sc. and DAE candidates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Pakistan Engineering Council has the statutory authority under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 to reserve admission seats for Diploma of Associate Engineer holders in B.Sc. (Engineering) programs?
  • Does Section 25A of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 empower the Governing Body to impose a quota on admissions rather than prescribing minimum qualifications?
  • Are regulations restricting Diploma of Associate Engineer holders to reserved seats discriminatory when both F.Sc. and DAE candidates are eligible for the engineering program?
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• Muhammad Tanveer etc vs The State and another2022 SCP 390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-arrest bailfurther inquirycivil disputedestruction of cropconstitutional petitionliberty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, assailing an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the petitioners' pre-arrest bail application in a case registered under Section 440 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly destroying a standing crop of mint. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail in view of the pending civil litigation regarding the ownership and possession of the disputed land. The Supreme Court held that since a civil suit concerning the property title was pending adjudication prior to the lodging of the FIR and the possibility of false implication to exert pressure could not be excluded, the case fell within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court laid down the principle that personal liberty is a precious right guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be curtailed on bald allegations, and that where civil disputes regarding property form the background of criminal proceedings, further inquiry into the guilt of the accused is warranted for granting bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted when a civil suit regarding the ownership of the disputed property is already pending between the parties?
  • Does a criminal case arising from a property dispute where mala fides or false implication is possible attract further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can personal liberty guaranteed under the Constitution be taken away on bald and vague criminal allegations?
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• Muhammad Tahir vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax2022 SCP 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-31
  Provincially Administered Tribal AreasIncome Tax OrdinanceConstitutional status of tribal areasPresidential OrderTax refundArticle 247PATA
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had set aside an Income Tax Appellate Tribunal decision regarding a tax refund claim. The appellant, a resident of a Provincially Administered Tribal Area adjoining Mansehra District, sought a refund of income tax deducted for the tax years 2011-2013, arguing that the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, had not been extended to his area under Article 247(3) of the Constitution. The core legal question was whether the President's order under Article 247(6) of the Constitution, declaring the area to have ceased to be a tribal area, automatically rendered the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, applicable. The Supreme Court held that the President's exercise of power under Article 247(6) effectively changed the status of the area from a tribal to a non-tribal area. Consequently, the Ordinance became applicable to the area by operation of law, rendering the tax levy valid. The Court affirmed that the power to change an area's status under Article 247(6) is distinct from the power to extend laws under Article 247(3), and the former renders the area subject to general laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order issued by the President under Article 247(6) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, declaring an area to cease to be a tribal area, automatically extend the application of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 to that area?
  • Is there a legal distinction between the President's power to change the status of a tribal area under Article 247(6) and the power to extend specific laws to such areas under Article 247(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a taxpayer claim a refund of income tax on the basis that a specific law was not extended to their area under Article 247(3) if the area has already ceased to be a tribal area via a Presidential Order under Article 247(6)?
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• Muhammad Shoaib and another vs The State2022 SCMR 1006, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 203, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-08
  NarcoticsControl of Narcotic Substances ActSafe custody of samplesSafe transmission of samplesBenefit of doubtAcquittalCriminal appealProsecution evidenceReasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved petitions for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Shoaib and Arshad Mehmood against their conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for which they were sentenced to life imprisonment by the Sessions Judge/Special Court (CNS) and whose appeal was dismissed by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question addressed was whether the prosecution had established the safe custody and safe transmission of the sample parcels to the Forensic Science Laboratory beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution failed to produce key witnesses, including the Moharrar Investigation who allegedly kept the samples in safe custody and the Constable who took them to the laboratory, thus failing to establish the integrity of the samples. The Court held that this defect went to the root of the case, creating serious doubt regarding the narcotics and their recovery. Consequently, the petitions were allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the petitioners were acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 be sustained if the prosecution fails to establish the safe custody of sample parcels?
  • Does the failure to produce witnesses responsible for the safe custody and transmission of sample parcels create reasonable doubt in a narcotics case?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt if the prosecution cannot prove the safe transmission of sample parcels to a forensic laboratory?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Mst. Niamat Bibi2022 PLJ SC 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-24
  inheritance mutationIslamic law of inheritanceresiduariespedigree tablecivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the High Court upholding the appellate court's decision, which decreed the respondent's suit regarding inheritance, reversing the trial court's dismissal. The respondent claimed inheritance as the daughter of Majeedan, the sole sister of the deceased Taj Din, asserting rights both as a sister and residuary. The appellant, Muhammad Sharif, claimed a share as a collateral consanguine male residuary based on a pedigree table and a fatwa. The core legal question was whether the appellant successfully established his pedigree linkage to the deceased and his entitlement to the estate as a residuary in preference to, or alongside, the sister under Islamic law. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to establish his connection to the deceased or that he fell within a category entitled to inherit in the presence of the sister. The Court affirmed the principle that a full sister takes her fixed share and, in the absence of higher-ranking residuaries, also takes the residue, excluding remote collaterals such as a consanguine paternal uncle's son.

  Questions settled

  • Does a consanguine paternal uncle's son exclude a full sister from inheriting the residuary estate under Sunni law?
  • Can a pedigree table referencing a different individual and tribe establish a valid lineage for inheritance claims?
  • Is a fatwa asserting facts regarding lineage admissible without producing its author as a witness?
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• Muhammad Shabbir and another vs Quaid-E-Azam University through Vice-Chancellor, Islamabad and others2022 PLC 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-20
  interregnum periodde facto doctrineLabour Court jurisdictionsunset lawcoram non judiceindustrial relationsretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to adjudicate grievance petitions during the interregnum period following the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 on April 30, 2010, and prior to the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The core legal questions addressed were whether judgments rendered by the Labour Court during this period are null and void, and whether such decisions can be protected under the de facto doctrine. The Supreme Court held that the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 was a temporary sunset law that expired on its own mandate, thereby abolishing the Labour Court. Consequently, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to pass judgments after April 30, 2010. The Court further determined that the de facto doctrine is inapplicable because the office itself ceased to exist; there was no holder of public office to whom the doctrine could apply. The Court affirmed that while procedural laws may apply retrospectively, the de facto doctrine cannot validate acts performed by a non-existent office. Accordingly, the Labour Court's judgments were declared coram non judice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to pass judgments after the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008?
  • Does the de facto doctrine apply to validate acts of a tribunal that has ceased to exist?
  • Is the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 a temporary or permanent legislation?
  • Does the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 apply retrospectively to grievance petitions pending during the interregnum period?
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• Muhammad Sarwar and others vs Mst. Razia Sultana and others2022 PLJ SC 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-02
  remand orderconsent orderleave to appealOrder XLI Rule 25 CPCadditional issuestrial court findingsrecall of leave granting order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arose from an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging a High Court remand order. Leave to appeal had initially been granted to consider whether the remand of the case was justified in light of an earlier remand order. The core legal questions before the Court were whether a petition for leave to appeal is maintainable against a consent order, and which of two successive consent remand orders should prevail when one conflicts with statutory procedure. The Supreme Court held that between two conflicting consent remand orders, the order conforming to the statutory provisions of law must be preferred. The earlier remand order had bypassed the requirement of Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by not requiring the trial court to record findings and reasons on additional issues, whereas the impugned remand order adhered to the statutory procedure. Furthermore, the Court established that no petition for leave to appeal lies against a consent order. Consequently, the Supreme Court recalled the leave granting order and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal is maintainable against a consent order?
  • Which remand order must be given effect when two successive conflicting remand orders are passed with the consent of parties?
  • Does Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require the trial court on remand to record its findings and reasons on additional issues?
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• Muhammad Sarwar and others vs Hashmal Khan and others2022 PLJ SC 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-17
  revisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingssale deedmisreading of evidencecivil petitionburden of proofconsideration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged a High Court order affirming concurrent judgments of lower courts regarding a disputed sale deed. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its revisional jurisdiction by upholding concurrent findings of fact despite allegations of misreading evidence and non-payment of consideration. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to prove the payment of the sale consideration, as evidence demonstrated that the alleged bank payment occurred after the registration of the sale deed. The Court affirmed that the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is limited. It established that the High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless there is a jurisdictional error, material irregularity, or a perverse conclusion. Mere disagreement with the lower courts' appraisal of evidence does not warrant interference in revisional jurisdiction. The concurrent findings of the lower courts were found to be based on a correct appreciation of evidence, and no grounds for interference were established.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding concurrent findings of fact?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts solely because it might take a different view of the evidence?
  • Does the failure to prove the payment of sale consideration invalidate a registered sale deed?
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