Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Nasir Shafique vs The State through Prosecutor General2021 SCP 384, 2021 PSC (Crl.) 1016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-23
  post-arrest baildishonouring a chequeprohibitory clauselibertycriminal appealSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the Lahore High Court order that declined post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dishonouring a cheque. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail where the maximum punishment for the alleged offence is three years and does not fall within the prohibitory clause, and where the mode of payment and financial transaction details remain disputed and uncorroborated at the pre-trial stage. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, granting post-arrest bail to the petitioner. The court held that liberty is a precious right, and for offences falling outside the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the rule while its refusal is an exception, particularly when the prosecution fails to satisfactorily establish financial transactions at the bail stage, leaving such determinations to the Trial Court after recording evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted when the offence carries a maximum punishment of three years and does not fall within the prohibitory clause?
  • Does a disputed financial transaction and lack of documentary proof for cash payments warrant the grant of bail pending trial?
  • Can the liberty of a person be curtailed without exceptional foundations in cases not falling within the prohibitory clause?
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• Muhammad Naeem vs President, National Bank Of Pakistan and others2021 PLJ SC 297, 2021 P SC 1345, 2021 SCMR 785, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 828 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-10
  disciplinary proceedingsbank employee misconductstatutory rulescompetent authoritysupervisory negligencebranch manager liabilityservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition filed by the Appellant, a former Assistant Vice President of the National Bank of Pakistan. The Appellant was demoted following disciplinary proceedings for negligence, failure to supervise branch affairs, and deliberate concealment of fraudulent activities involving pension payments. The core legal questions concerned whether the disciplinary proceedings were initiated by a competent authority under the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973, and whether the Appellant was denied due process or subjected to discriminatory treatment. The Supreme Court held that the charge sheet was issued by a competent authority in accordance with the delegation of powers under the 1973 Rules. The Court found that the Appellant, as Branch Manager, failed in his supervisory duties, ignored whistleblower reports, and actively facilitated the continuation of fraud. The Court affirmed that disciplinary penalties are commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and the seniority of the official. The principle laid down is that a Branch Manager bears primary responsibility for branch operations, and failure to exercise vigilance or report irregularities constitutes actionable misconduct, regardless of the involvement of subordinates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a charge sheet issued by an Executive Vice President constitutes a valid exercise of authority under the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973?
  • Does the failure of a Branch Manager to act upon whistleblower reports regarding fraud constitute actionable negligence?
  • Can a disciplinary penalty of demotion be upheld if the authority fails to specify an exact duration for the penalty?
  • Is a Branch Manager vicariously responsible for the fraudulent acts of subordinates if the manager failed to exercise proper supervision?
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• Muhammad Naeem Khan vs President, National Bank Of Pakistan and others2021 PLC (C.S.) 828, 2021 P SC 1345, 2021 SCMR 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-10
  disciplinary proceedingsbank employeestatutory rulesbranch managermisconductdemotiondue processNational Bank of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition against a disciplinary demotion imposed by the National Bank of Pakistan. The appellant, a former Branch Manager, contested the penalty, arguing that the charge sheet was issued by an incompetent authority under the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973, and that the proceedings were procedurally flawed and discriminatory. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the charge sheet was validly issued by a competent authority under the 1973 Rules. The Court found that the appellant, in his supervisory capacity, failed to exercise necessary vigilance, deliberately concealed ongoing fraud, and actively suppressed a whistleblower, resulting in significant financial loss to the exchequer. The Court affirmed that the appellant was afforded due process and that the penalty was proportionate to his dereliction of duty. The judgment establishes that disciplinary powers delegated under statutory rules remain valid despite changes in administrative nomenclature and that a Branch Manager is primarily accountable for the operational integrity and oversight of their branch.

  Questions settled

  • Does a change in administrative nomenclature invalidate disciplinary powers delegated under statutory rules?
  • Is a Branch Manager liable for the failure to exercise supervisory control over branch operations and the concealment of fraud?
  • Does the failure to specify the duration of a major penalty in a disciplinary order automatically nullify the entire proceedings?
  • Can a disciplinary charge sheet be issued by an officer other than the one explicitly named in a circular if the delegation of power is authorized under statutory rules?
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• Muhammad Multazam Raza vs Muhammad Ayub Khan and others2022 SCMR 979 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-08
  trademark infringementintellectual property tribunalexclusive jurisdictionpassing offco-ownership of trademarkmaster franchisereturn of plaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the Islamabad High Court's judgment, which dismissed the petitioner's First Appeal Against Order (FAO) upholding the Intellectual Property Tribunal's return of a plaint for lack of maintainability. The petitioner had filed a suit for perpetual injunction, damages, rendition of accounts, and passing off regarding the registered trademark "Ranchers". The core legal question concerned whether a suit involving the alleged unauthorized grant of master franchising rights by a co-owner and the incorporation of a company bearing the trademark name falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property Tribunal under intellectual property laws. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the acts complained of constitute trademark infringement under sections 24 and 40 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, and thus fall squarely within the exclusive jurisdictional ambit of the Intellectual Property Tribunal pursuant to the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012. The key principle laid down is that suits alleging trademark infringement—even when coupled with passing off allegations—must be exclusively instituted before and tried by the Intellectual Property Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit alleging trademark infringement coupled with passing off fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property Tribunal?
  • Whether the unauthorized grant of master franchise rights by a co-proprietor constitutes an infringement of a registered trademark under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the incorporation of a private limited company bearing a registered trademark name as part of its trade name amount to trademark infringement?
  • Is physical use of a trademark in the course of trade strictly required, or can use be demonstrated through preparatory steps and objective commitment to use?
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• Muhammad Mehboob vs The StatePLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 198, 2021 SCMR 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-26
  qatl-i-amdcriminal appealbenefit of the doubtmedical evidencecontradictory evidencemurder convictionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for the qatl-i-amd of Waris Ali, which resulted in a sentence of imprisonment for life. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, given significant contradictions in the ocular account, medical evidence regarding the firing distance, and the circumstances surrounding the fatal injury. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that discrepancies in the scaled site plan regarding the distance between the assailant and the deceased, the absence of pallet marks on the cart, the unnatural conduct of the deceased seeking refuge, and the investigative dichotomy casting doubt on the manner of the occurrence failed to meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, entitling the appellant to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the firing distance are sufficient to create reasonable doubt in a murder case?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused based on investigative conclusions cast doubt on the entire prosecution story against the remaining appellant?
  • Can a conviction under section 302(b) PPC be sustained when the prosecution fails to establish the manner of occurrence beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Muhammad Makki and another vs The State and others2021 SC MR 1672, 2021 PSC (Crl.) 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-11
  abductionacquittal reversalappellate scrutinycriminal justicepreponderance of evidenceprivate complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which overturned the acquittal of the petitioners by the trial court and convicted them for abduction. The petitioners were initially acquitted by a Special Judge under the Anti-Terrorism Act, but the High Court subsequently convicted them under Section 365 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, sentencing them to seven years of rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal based on the evidence presented. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had focused on peripheral issues and investigative lapses, while ignoring the preponderance of evidence provided by natural witnesses. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that an acquittal is not an immutable declaration and that appellate courts have a duty to perform meaningful scrutiny of evidence to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The principle laid down is that partial failure of the prosecution regarding specific charges does not necessarily invalidate the integrity of the entire case if the chain of circumstances remains consistent and confidence-inspiring.

  Questions settled

  • Does the partial failure of the prosecution on one charge necessarily invalidate the entire case?
  • Is an acquittal by a trial court an immutable declaration that precludes appellate interference?
  • What is the duty of an appellate court when reviewing an acquittal based on peripheral investigative lapses?
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• Muhammad Khan vs Iqbal Khan and another2021 SCMR 2017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-08
  post-arrest bailhomicideabsconsiontentative assessmentbail cancellationjoint criminal liabilityfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which granted post-arrest bail to the respondent accused of homicide. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in granting bail by presumptively separating the respondent's role from his co-accused, despite the respondent's prolonged absconsion and the allegation of joint participation in the crime. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's exercise of discretion exceeded the permissible scope of tentative assessment. The Supreme Court reasoned that the High Court improperly extricated the respondent from the prosecution's case without investigative analysis, effectively disregarding the respondent's absconsion and the joint nature of the alleged offense. The Court emphasized that while absconsion is not absolute proof of guilt, it is a significant circumstance that cannot be ignored. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and cancelled the bail granted to the respondent, establishing that courts must not prematurely dismantle a prosecution case under the guise of 'further inquiry' when the evidence suggests joint criminal participation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court grant bail by presumptively separating an accused's role from a co-accused in a case involving joint criminal participation?
  • Is the prolonged absconsion of an accused a relevant factor to be considered when deciding a post-arrest bail application?
  • Does the scope of 'tentative assessment' in bail matters allow a court to discard the entire prosecution case?
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• Muhammad Khan vs Iqbal Khan & another2021 PSC (Crl.) 1038, 2021 SCMR 2017, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 17 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-08
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationabsconsioncommon intentionhomicidetentative assessmentmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondent-accused, who was charged with homicide committed in furtherance of a common intention during an ongoing blood feud. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in granting bail on the ground of joint attribution and uncertainty as to whose shot proved fatal, while ignoring the accused's prolonged absconsion and active participation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded the scope of tentative assessment by prematurely extricating the accused from his indivisible role in the crime and disregarding his absconsion. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and cancelled the bail granted to the respondent. The key principle laid down is that where co-accused act in furtherance of a common intention with active participation in a heinous crime and remain absconders for years, tentative assessment does not permit a court to hypothetically absolve them by splitting individual overt acts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether absconsion of an accused is a relevant circumstance to be considered while deciding a bail petition in a case of homicide?
  • Can a court, within the restricted scope of tentative assessment, isolate and absolve an accused of his role when he is charged with active participation in a crime with a common intention?
  • Whether uncertainty as to whose specific shot proved fatal warrants the grant of post-arrest bail to an accused attributed with active participation alongside an absconding co-accused?
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• Muhammad Khan alias Kali and another vs The State and another2021 P SC (Crl.) 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-06
  murderreappraisal of evidencealteration of sentenceacquittalcriminal petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which maintained the conviction of Muhammad Khan alias Kali under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, while altering his death sentence to imprisonment for life, and acquitted a co-accused. The core legal question involves the appraisal of ocular and medical evidence where co-accused with similar or indivisible roles have been acquitted by the courts below, and whether such acquittals warrant reappraisal by the apex court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to both sides to re-examine the evidence in the interest of justice, issuing bailable warrants for the respondents. The key principle laid down is that where evidence against co-accused is indivisibly linked and points to inculpatory participation, the appellate court may re-examine the entire evidence to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conviction of an accused can be maintained when co-accused assigned similar roles are acquitted?
  • When is a reappraisal of evidence justified by the Supreme Court in a criminal appeal against conviction?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused necessitate the grant of a clean chit to the remaining convicted petitioner in the absence of independent corroboration?
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• Muhammad Khaliq Mandokhail vs Government Of Balochistan through Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat Quetta and another2021 P SC 889, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-16
  service recorddate of birth correctioncivil servantsuperannuationservice tribunalmala fideeducational boardstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Balochistan Service Tribunal judgment that dismissed the petitioner's request to alter his date of birth in his service record. The petitioner, having joined government service in 1992, sought to change his date of birth from 1959 to 1963 after twenty-two years of service, relying on a corrected secondary school certificate and NADRA record. The core legal question concerned the permissibility of altering a civil servant's date of birth long after initial entry into service. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the date of birth recorded at the time of joining is final and binding. The Court emphasized that under Rule 11 of the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009, alterations are restricted to clerical mistakes identified within two years. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an educational board lacks the authority to unilaterally alter a date of birth without a declaration from a competent civil court. The attempt was deemed mala fide, aimed solely at extending the petitioner's service tenure.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant alter their date of birth in the service record after the lapse of two years from the date of initial entry?
  • Does an educational board have the authority to alter a date of birth in an academic certificate without a declaration from a civil court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Is the date of birth recorded at the time of joining government service considered final under the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009?
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• Muhammad Kashif Iqbal vs The State and another2022 SCMR 821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-12
  Pre-arrest bailForgeryCheatingFraudConsistency in bailFurther inquiryJoint bank accountConstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution challenged a Lahore High Court order denying pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 420/468/471 PPC. The petitioner was accused of forging the complainant's signatures on a cheque from a joint bank account, which was dishonored due to insufficient funds and signature mismatch. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail, considering the lack of forensic examination on the alleged forged signatures and the fact that a co-accused had already been granted post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the High Court's order, and confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail. The Court held that the case fell within the purview of Section 497(2) Cr.P.C., requiring further inquiry into the petitioner's guilt, and emphasized the principle of consistency in bail matters, noting that no useful purpose would be served by denying pre-arrest bail only for the petitioner to seek post-arrest bail on similar grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted where a co-accused has already been granted post-arrest bail on similar grounds?
  • Does the absence of forensic evidence regarding alleged forged signatures impact the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • When does a case fall within the purview of Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. for further inquiry, entitling an accused to bail?
  • Is the principle of consistency applicable in granting pre-arrest bail when a similarly placed co-accused is on post-arrest bail?
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• Muhammad Kamran vs The State2021 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-30
  abduction for ransomcriminal appealevidentiary valuedelayed FIRbenefit of doubtacquittalwitness discrepancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the abduction of two minors for ransom. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the significant delays in reporting, discrepancies in witness testimony, and the absence of corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court held that the conviction could not be maintained due to the prosecution's failure to establish a reliable case. The Court noted that the complainant's two-year delay in naming the appellant, the lack of call data records to substantiate alleged ransom communications, and the contradictory statements regarding the ransom amount created insurmountable doubts. Furthermore, the complainant's inconsistent stance regarding the involvement of co-accused undermined the credibility of the entire prosecution narrative. The Court emphasized that when prosecution evidence is inherently flawed, contradictory, and lacks essential corroboration, it is unsafe to uphold a conviction. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, acquitted the appellant, and ordered his immediate release, ruling that the evidence failed to meet the required standard of proof for a criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant and unexplained delay in nominating an accused in a supplementary statement create reasonable doubt regarding their guilt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are fundamental discrepancies in witness testimony regarding the core facts of the crime, such as the ransom amount?
  • Is it safe to maintain a conviction where the prosecution fails to produce available technical evidence, such as call data records, to corroborate the alleged communication between the accused and the complainant?
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• Muhammad Javed vs The State2022 SCMR 2116, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 420, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 870 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-07
  murderbenefit of doubtsuppression of injuriesprosecution witnessesmutual contradictionacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a grocery vendor. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner targeted the deceased with a single gunshot on his back during a physical altercation. The petitioner contended that the prosecution suppressed the real facts, including multiple injuries sustained by him, his mother, and his sister, and that the deceased was accidentally shot by his own son. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the prosecution witnesses unanimously suppressed the injuries sustained by the petitioner's family, which were medically documented, and that the first informant's presence at the exact moment of the shot was highly coincidental. Furthermore, the investigating officer's testimony revealed that the petitioner and his mother were found confined in the complainant's house. Holding that the prosecution's case was fraught with doubts and mutually destructive witness statements, the Court extended the benefit of doubt to the petitioner, set aside his conviction, and ordered his acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • What is the effect of the prosecution's failure to explain or disclose injuries sustained by the accused party during the same occurrence?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the testimonies of key prosecution witnesses are mutually destructive and contradict the medical evidence?
  • Whether the suppression of a parallel version of events recorded by the investigating officer on day one entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt?
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• Shah Nawaz Khan vs The State2021 SCMR 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-02
  narcotics controlpossession of charasjudicial confessionexclusive culpabilitybenefit of the doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the appellant's conviction under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the transportation of a large quantity of cannabis concealed in a public vehicle registered in his name and driven by him. The core legal question was whether the appellant's exclusive culpability was established beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding his retraction of a judicial confession and the acquittal of his co-accused. The Supreme Court held that even excluding the judicial confession, overwhelming independent evidence, including the appellant's role as the owner and driver of the vehicle carrying the contraband in a secret cavity, alongside unimpeached police testimony and seizure of cash, firmly established his guilt. The Court ruled that the acquittal of co-accused does not enure to the benefit of the principal accused found in actual control of the contraband-laden vehicle. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused automatically entitles the principal accused to an acquittal?
  • Can a conviction for narcotics transportation be sustained on independent evidence when a judicial confession is retracted?
  • Does ownership and driving of a vehicle carrying concealed contraband establish exclusive possession and culpability?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs The State & others2021 SCP 398, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 83, 2022 SCMR 707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-17
  pre-arrest bailanticipatory bailbail cancellationprinciple of consistencycustodial investigationmala fidemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a petition challenging the grant of anticipatory bail to the respondents in a murder case. The deceased was found dead with multiple gunshot wounds, and the respondents were subsequently nominated as accomplices in a supplementary statement and implicated by witness statements. The Additional Sessions Judge granted pre-arrest bail to the respondents, a decision upheld by the Lahore High Court, primarily by invoking the principle of consistency based on the post-arrest bail granted to other co-accused. The Supreme Court set aside the bail orders, holding that pre-arrest bail and post-arrest bail are governed by entirely different legal regimes. The Court emphasized that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary equitable relief that can only be granted upon a clear demonstration of mala fide or sinister intent behind the contemplated arrest. The Court ruled that the principle of consistency cannot be misconceived to equate post-arrest bail with pre-arrest bail, as doing so prematurely forecloses the prosecution's opportunity to conduct a meaningful custodial investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the principle of consistency be invoked to grant pre-arrest bail to an accused solely because a co-accused has been granted post-arrest bail?
  • What are the essential legal requirements that an accused must demonstrate to qualify for the extraordinary relief of anticipatory bail?
  • Does the premature grant of pre-arrest bail impermissibly hinder the prosecution's ability to conduct an effective custodial investigation?
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• Muhammad Irfan Shabbir vs The State through P.G. Punjab and another2021 SCMR 2090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-12
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaydelay in conclusion of trialcheque dishonourcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from an order of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question addressed is whether the accused is entitled to bail on the statutory ground of delayed conclusion of trial where he has already undergone a significant period of incarceration and the delay is not attributable to him. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed bail to the appellant, noting that he had been behind bars for over one year and four months for an offense carrying a maximum punishment of three years, while the trial remained unconcluded due to absences of witnesses and the complainant. The Court laid down the principle that prolonged incarceration without material progress in the trial, absent any contributory delay by the accused, justifies the grant of post-arrest bail under statutory considerations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail on statutory grounds when the trial has not concluded and he has undergone a substantial period of incarceration for an offense punishable with three years imprisonment?
  • Can bail be granted where the delay in the trial is attributable to the absence of the complainant and witnesses rather than the conduct of the accused?
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• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State2021 SCP 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-15
  jail petitioncriminal appealimport and export controlcompensationrevolving fundfederal consolidated fundarrears of land revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition, converted into an appeal, arises from the conviction and sentence of Muhammad Iqbal under Section 5(1) of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950. The core legal question concerned the legality of the conviction and the associated conditions of payment and refund of compensation imposed on the convict for his release. The Supreme Court of Pakistan maintained the judgment of the High Court regarding the conviction and sentence under Section 5(1) of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950, but set aside the condition requiring the convict to pay or refund the compensation amount for his release, noting that he had already served his sentence. Furthermore, the Court directed the Federal Government under Section 5-B (5) of the Act to pay the foreign buyer compensation with interest from the Revolving Fund or the Federal Consolidated Fund, while granting the Federal Government the right to recover the compensation amount from the convict as arrears of land revenue pursuant to Section 5-B (6) and (7) of the said Act. The key principle laid down is that a convict who has fully served a substantive sentence of imprisonment should be released forthwith, separating the penal consequences from the recovery of financial compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the condition of payment of compensation can be made a prerequisite for the release of a convict who has already served his sentence?
  • Can the Federal Government be directed to pay compensation to a foreign buyer from the Revolving Fund or Federal Consolidated Fund under the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950?
  • How may the Federal Government recover compensation paid to a buyer from a convicted person under the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950?
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• Muhammad Iqbal vs Mati Ur Rehman and others2022 SCMR 859, 2022 PSC 1415, 2022 PLJ SC 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-09
  permanent injunctionsuit for possessionShamlat Dehdemarcation of landrevenue recordKhasra numberburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the concurrent judgments of the lower courts which decreed a suit for permanent injunction and possession filed by the respondents against the appellant. The appellant, who had constructed a house on the disputed land in 1981, contested the claim, asserting ownership through a registered sale deed. The core legal question was whether the respondents could maintain a suit for permanent injunction and possession without first establishing their title through a declaration suit, and whether the disputed property was adequately proven to be part of the 'Shamlat Deh' (common land) through proper demarcation. The Supreme Court held that the suit was not maintainable as the respondents failed to establish their title or prove that the appellant's property fell within the specific Khasra number in question. The Court emphasized that in cases involving disputed land boundaries, mere revenue records are insufficient without formal demarcation under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments, dismissing the respondents' suit for lack of evidence and failure to seek the appropriate legal remedy.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for permanent injunction and possession maintainable where the defendant is in admitted possession and the plaintiff's title is disputed?
  • Does a Local Commissioner's report based solely on the oral version of a Patwari constitute sufficient proof of land location under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967?
  • Can a party claim ownership of a specific Khasra number within 'Shamlat Deh' without formal demarcation of the property boundaries?
  • Is a mere reference to a mutation in the record of rights sufficient to establish title in a suit for possession?
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• Muhammad Iqbal Khan Noori vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB), etc2021 SCP 348, 2021 PSC 1610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-16
  constitutional jurisdictionbailfundamental rightsNAB Ordinancereasonable groundsfair trialhuman dignityjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against an Islamabad High Court order dismissing bail applications in a case involving alleged corruption and corrupt practices under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, can grant bail to an accused in a NAB case despite the restrictive provisions of Section 9(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Supreme Court held that the High Court possesses the power to grant bail under Article 199, independent of statutory limitations, to safeguard fundamental rights, including liberty, fair trial, and human dignity. The Court emphasized that pre-trial detention requires sufficient incriminating material connecting the accused to the offence, establishing 'reasonable grounds' for belief in guilt. Finding no such material against the petitioners, who were involved in a loan recovery dispute currently pending in civil courts, the Court allowed the appeals and granted bail, noting that detention without sufficient evidence violates constitutional guarantees.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court grant bail to an accused in a NAB case under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, notwithstanding the prohibition in Section 9(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • What constitutes 'reasonable grounds' for the purpose of justifying the arrest and detention of an accused under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the absence of sufficient incriminating material against an accused justify the grant of bail in a NAB case?
  • Should an objection regarding the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal be raised first before that same court or tribunal?
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• Muhammad Iqbal Khan Noori etc vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB), etcPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  NAB bailconstitutional jurisdictionfundamental rightsreasonable groundsfair trialhuman dignitypre-trial detention
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their bail applications by the Islamabad High Court in a corruption case initiated by the National Accountability Bureau. The core legal question was whether the statutory prohibition on bail under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, restricts the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction to grant bail. The Supreme Court held that the High Court possesses the power to grant bail under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, independent of statutory restrictions, to protect fundamental rights. The Court established that while Section 9(b) of the Ordinance prohibits bail, it is sub-constitutional legislation that cannot curtail constitutional jurisdiction. The ratio dictates that High Courts must examine if reasonable grounds exist to believe an accused committed an offence. Absent sufficient incriminating material, or in cases of inordinate trial delay, the Court must intervene to safeguard rights to liberty, fair trial, and human dignity. Finding no sufficient material connecting the petitioners to the alleged fraud, and noting the pendency of civil recovery proceedings, the Court granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory prohibition on bail under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, override the constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts to grant bail under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What criteria must a High Court consider when exercising its constitutional jurisdiction to grant bail in cases involving offences under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Is the existence of reasonable grounds to believe an accused committed an offence a prerequisite for lawful arrest and detention under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
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• Muhammad Iqbal Khan Noori and another vs National Accountability2021 PLD Supreme Court 916 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-16
  post-arrest bailNational Accountability OrdinanceArticle 199constitutional jurisdictionfundamental rightsreasonable groundspresumption of innocencehuman dignity
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed petitions for leave to appeal challenging an Islamabad High Court order that denied post-arrest bail to accused individuals in a NAB investigation under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question centered on whether statutory provisions under Section 9(b) of the Ordinance restricting bail apply to the constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 199. The Supreme Court held that statutory provisions under Section 497 Cr.P.C. do not govern NAB bail matters in High Courts; rather, High Courts exercise independent constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 based on constitutional guarantees, including the right to liberty, fair trial, human dignity, and the presumption of innocence. The Court ruled that bail in NAB cases can be granted under Article 199 where there is a lack of sufficient incriminating material, delay in trial, or life-threatening health issues. Finding no reasonable grounds or sufficient evidence connecting the petitioners to the alleged corruption, the Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals, set aside the impugned order, and granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 9(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 curtail the constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 199 to grant bail?
  • On what constitutional grounds can the High Court grant bail to a person accused of an offence under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • What standard of material must prosecution present to establish 'reasonable grounds' for denying bail under NAB jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Imran vs The State2021 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-29
  Qatl-i-amdcapital punishmentocular testimonychance witnessmatrimonial disputeweapon recoverycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for the Qatl-i-amd of his wife and two daughters, resulting in a sentence of death on three counts, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerns the reliability of the ocular testimony, the plausibility of the motive behind the matrimonial dispute, and the sufficiency of corroborative evidence including weapon recovery. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the eyewitnesses—comprising the father-in-law and a relative—were natural witnesses whose testimony remained unshaken, and that the gruesome brutality and corroborative forensic evidence conclusively established the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony from related witnesses is consistent, natural, and corroborated by medical and forensic evidence such as weapon recovery, and where substitution of the real culprit is inconceivable, the capital sentence is fully warranted for heinous multiple murders arising from domestic disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of close relatives can be relied upon as trustworthy ocular evidence in a murder trial?
  • Does a disproportionate and violent reaction in a domestic dispute constitute a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Is the recovery of a bloodstained weapon upon an accused's disclosure sufficient to provide corroboration for an ocular account?
  • Whether the defense of alibi must be affirmatively established by the accused when prosecution evidence has successfully proven the charge?
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• Muhammad Imran vs The State, etc2021 SCP 306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-05
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clauseproclaimed offenderrepetition of offenceabscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the Lahore High Court's denial of post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case involving an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning the dishonouring of cheques. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, despite the offence falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was entitled to bail given his history of multiple similar offences and his status as a proclaimed offender. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that while bail is a rule and refusal an exception for non-prohibitory offences, exceptions exist where there is a likelihood of abscondence, tampering with evidence, or repetition of the offence. The Court found that the petitioner's history of eight similar criminal cases and his prolonged status as a proclaimed offender justified the denial of bail, as these factors demonstrated a propensity to repeat the offence and a risk of avoiding trial. The judgment reaffirms that previous criminal records and abscondence are valid grounds to deny bail even in non-prohibitory offences.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 guarantee the grant of bail?
  • Can a history of multiple similar criminal cases justify the denial of bail for an offence outside the prohibitory clause?
  • Does the status of a proclaimed offender constitute a valid ground for refusing bail in non-prohibitory offences?
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• Muhammad Imran and others vs Muhammad Sajan Panhwar and others2021 SCMR 1883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-08
  CEO appointmentPublic sector companiesCorporate governanceQualification criteriaService matterLeave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Public Sector Generation Holding Company Limited (GHCL). The respondent, claiming to be a union representative, challenged the petitioner's appointment in the High Court, alleging that the petitioner lacked the requisite engineering qualifications to manage a power generation entity. The High Court set aside the petitioner's appointment, interpreting the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013 and the Public Sector Companies (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guidelines, 2015 to mandate an engineering degree for the position. The petitioner appealed, contending that neither the Rules nor the Guidelines require a degree in electrical or mechanical engineering for the CEO role and that the High Court misconstrued the applicable legal framework. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court's interpretation of the qualification criteria was legally sound and whether the appointment was valid under the governing Rules and Guidelines. Pending the final adjudication of the appeal, the Supreme Court suspended the operation of the High Court's impugned judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Public Sector Companies (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guidelines, 2015 mandate that a Chief Executive Officer of a power generation company must hold a degree in electrical or mechanical engineering?
  • Can a High Court set aside the appointment of a Chief Executive Officer of a public sector company based on a restrictive interpretation of qualification guidelines?
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• Muhammad Iftikhar vs The State2022 SCMR 973, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 300, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-01
  circumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder convictionsuicide theoryacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his friend, Syed Zulfiqar, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The prosecution's case relied on circumstantial evidence, specifically that the deceased lived with the appellant and that a weapon was recovered. The appellant consistently maintained that the deceased, a drug addict, committed suicide, and noted that he had transported the deceased to the hospital. The Supreme Court observed that there were no eyewitnesses to the occurrence and that the prosecution failed to provide conclusive evidence to rule out the possibility of suicide. The Court held that the conviction was based on an indiscreet suggestion by the defence counsel during cross-examination, which should not prejudice the appellant. Emphasizing that the totality of circumstances failed to sustain the capital charge and that the mystery of the occurrence was fraught with doubt, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments and acquitted the appellant, establishing that an unsafe conviction cannot be maintained based on mere suspicion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence when the prosecution fails to rule out the possibility of suicide?
  • Should an accused person suffer the consequences of an indiscreet suggestion made by their defence counsel during cross-examination?
  • Is it safe to maintain a conviction for murder when the prosecution case is based on suspicion rather than concrete proof?
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• Muhammad Idress vs The State, etc2021 PLJ SC (Cr.C. ) 216, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 433, 2021 SCMR 612, 2021 SCP 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-21
  murderpolice diaryinvestigating officer opinionadmissibility of evidenceocular accountmedical evidencereasonable doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arose from a murder case where the High Court maintained the conviction of the petitioner while acquitting a co-accused based on the same ocular evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the legality of the High Court's reliance on police diaries and the investigating officer's opinion to determine guilt. The Court held that under Section 172 Cr.P.C., police diaries are not substantive evidence and can only be used to aid the court in understanding the case or identifying further inquiry points. Furthermore, the opinion of an investigating officer regarding the guilt or innocence of an accused is inadmissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, as determining guilt is an exclusive judicial function. On the merits, the Court found that the ocular account was contradicted by independent medical testimony and lacked corroboration after the co-accused's acquittal. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the petitioner on the basis of reasonable doubt.

  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat and another vs The State2021 P S c (Crl.) 160, 2021 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-01
  test identification paradeidentification parade in police stationArticle 22 Qanun-e-Shahadat OrderRule 26.32 Police RulesQatl-i-amdrobberydeath penalty commutationjoint indiscriminate firingsource of light identification
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Shariat Appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which upheld the appellants' convictions under Sections 302(b) and 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, along with death sentences, for committed Qatl-i-amd of three persons during a robbery. The core legal questions pertained to the validity and evidentiary value of a test identification parade conducted at a police station rather than inside a jail, whether the non-mention of assailants' facial features in the First Information Report vitiates the identification parade, and whether the inability to attribute individual fatal shots in joint indiscriminate firing constitutes a mitigating circumstance to commute a death sentence into life imprisonment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Article 22 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, read with Rule 26.32 of the Police Rules, 1934, does not restrict identification parades to jail precincts. Furthermore, detailed facial features in the FIR are not mandatory, and ruthless cold-blooded murder during robbery warrants no reduction in sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Is a test identification parade legally invalid or inadmissible if it is conducted in a police station rather than within jail precincts?
  • Does the failure to mention the specific physical or facial features of unknown assailants in an FIR render a subsequent test identification parade inadmissible?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment merely because individual fatal shots cannot be attributed to specific assailants in a joint indiscriminate attack during a robbery?
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• Muhammad Farrukh Iqbal vs Mrs. Ayesha Iram, etc2021 PLJ SC 509, 2021 SCP 256, 2021 SCMR 1341, 2022 PSC 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-21
  inheritanceoral giftgift of immovable propertyregistration of gift documenttransfer of propertycivil petition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions assailing concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court, as well as subsequent execution proceedings, regarding a suit for inheritance of a residential house filed by a legal heir. The petitioner resisted the claim by asserting ownership of the house through a written document titled 'Declaration of Oral Gift'. The core legal questions centered on the validity of the gift document, whether it required registration under the relevant statutory provisions, and if an oral gift of immovable property under Muhammadan Law could be effected through an unregistered written instrument. The Supreme Court held that the contents of the document demonstrated the gift was made through the instrument itself rather than merely recording a prior oral gift, thereby requiring a registered instrument pursuant to statutory law. Consequently, the Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petitions, affirming that an unregistered written gift document failing to meet mandatory registration and statutory requirements cannot be used to transfer immovable property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a written document purporting to gift immovable property requires registration under the Registration Act, 1908?
  • Does a gift document that effects a transfer of immovable property fall under the requirements of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
  • Can an unregistered written instrument be used to transfer immovable property under the guise of an oral gift?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farooq and others vs Javed Khan and others2022 PLD Supreme Court 73, 2022 PSC 1321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-06
  mutual mistake of factvoid agreementrestitutionunjust enrichmentmoulding of relieflimitation periodfailed considerationdemarcation report
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from concurrent judgments of the lower fora dismissing a suit for possession and instead granting a money decree for deficient land due to a mutual mistake of fact regarding area measurements. The Supreme Court considered whether a mutual mistake of fact voided the transaction under the Contract Act 1872, whether a money decree could be granted without a specific prayer in the plaint, whether the local commission report justified it, and whether the claim was barred by limitation. The Court held that a mutual mistake regarding the area of land renders the agreement void to that extent under Section 20 of the Contract Act 1872, entitling the aggrieved party to restitution and compensation under Section 65. Furthermore, courts are empowered under Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to mould relief to meet the ends of justice. Finally, under Article 97 of the Limitation Act 1908, the period of limitation for recovery of money paid upon a failed consideration due to a mutual mistake commences from the date the mistake is discovered and made known via an official report, rendering the suit within time. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a mutual mistake of fact regarding the area of land sold renders the transaction void under the Contract Act 1872?
  • Can a court grant a money decree under Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when no specific prayer for the same was made in the plaint?
  • What is the starting point of limitation under Article 97 of the Limitation Act 1908 for the recovery of money paid on a consideration that fails due to a mutual mistake of fact?
  • Does a local commission report providing factual measurements serve to determine the legal entitlement of parties or merely establish factual positions?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farhan alias Irfan vs The StatePLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 167, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 468, 2021 SCMR 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-27
  criminal appealrobberymurderocular evidenceidentificationAnti-Terrorism Actwitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction for the murder of two individuals during a robbery, arguing that the assailants were masked and that the prosecution failed to prove his identity. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting that the witnesses were credible and that the prompt nomination of the appellant in the crime report supported the prosecution's account of the masks falling off during the struggle. The Court rejected the defense's arguments regarding minor improvements in witness statements and the lack of forensic evidence, finding that such narrative variations were inconsequential. While the Court affirmed the convictions under the Pakistan Penal Code, it set aside the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, following the precedent established in Ghulam Hussain v. The State. The Court held that minor narrative variations in testimony do not necessarily discredit witnesses and that convictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act must strictly adhere to statutory requirements. The appeal was thus partly allowed, maintaining the sentences for the remaining offenses while overturning the terrorism-related conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce medico-legal certificates for injured witnesses necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Are minor narrative variations in witness statements sufficient to discredit their testimony?
  • Can a conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 be sustained if the incident does not meet the criteria established in precedent?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ejaz vs The State and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 193, 2021 P S c (Crl.) 140, 2021 SCMR 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-07
  post-arrest bailmedical boardstatutory presumptionfresh ground for baildue process of lawnasal fracturecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's post-arrest bail application by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioner was accused of brutally assaulting a prosecution witness within court premises, causing multiple injuries including a nasal fracture. After his initial bail plea was withdrawn, the petitioner sought bail afresh on the ground that a subsequent medical board opined that the possibility of fabrication or a fall regarding one of the injuries could not be ruled out. The core legal question was whether a subsequent medical opinion of a hypothetical nature can override the initial medical examination and constitute a fresh ground for bail. The Supreme Court held that the initial medical examination carries a strong statutory presumption of genuineness, which cannot be dismantled on the whims of an accused without tangible grounds. The Court ruled that speculative or hypothetical medical opinions cannot dislodge positive findings recorded earlier. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with observations that the remarks would not prejudice the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent medical board's hypothetical opinion can constitute a fresh ground for post-arrest bail?
  • Can an initial medical examination protected by statutory presumption be dismantled on vague allegations by an accused?
  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to direct re-examination of an injured person without affording a meaningful opportunity of hearing to the prosecution and the injured?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ejaz vs Abid Hussain and another2021 SCMR 552 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-07
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationtheft of petroleumpipeline tamperingcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, converted into an appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arises from the grant of pre-arrest bail to respondent No.1 by the Lahore High Court in connection with FIR No.148 registered under Section 462-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for theft of diesel oil by tampering with a PARCO petroleum pipeline. The core legal question was whether respondent No.1 was entitled to the extraordinary concession of pre-arrest bail. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was found fully involved during investigation, failed to establish any mala fide for false implication, and faced an offence punishable for up to fourteen years, thereby disqualifying him from pre-arrest bail. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned High Court order, and recalled the pre-arrest bail, ordering that the respondent be taken into custody. The key principle laid down is that an accused involved in grave offences causing immense loss to national property without demonstrating mala fide on the part of the prosecution is not entitled to pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused involved in the theft of petroleum oil by tampering with a main pipeline is entitled to pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the absence of established mala fide for false implication preclude an accused from obtaining pre-arrest bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a criminal petition for leave to appeal into an appeal and recall pre-arrest bail?
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• Muhammad Daud and others vs Syed Abid Ali and another2021 SCMR 1470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-12
  acquittal appealreappraisal of evidenceleave to appealcriminal trialeye-witness testimonyforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent acquittal of the respondent by the trial court and the appellate court in a criminal case involving a shootout at an educational institution, which resulted in two deaths and injuries to others. The core legal question is whether the lower courts erred in their appreciation of evidence, particularly regarding the testimony of injured witnesses and other eye-witnesses, and whether the forensic evidence linking multiple weapons to the crime scene was adequately considered. The Supreme Court, upon examining the record, noted that while injured witnesses confirmed the incident, they did not visually identify the respondent due to their positioning. However, considering the presence of other eye-witnesses who named the respondent and the absconding of a co-accused, the Court held that the circumstances warranted a deeper review. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to reappraise the entire evidence to ensure the ends of justice, issuing bailable warrants for the respondent's appearance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of injured witnesses to visually identify an assailant preclude a conviction if other eye-witnesses identify them?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against a concurrent acquittal in a criminal case?
  • Is the presence of forensic evidence linking multiple weapons to a crime scene sufficient to warrant a reappraisal of evidence in an acquittal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Daniyal Farrukh Ansari vs The StatePLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 179, 2021 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-18
  post-arrest bailcyber crimeprohibitory clauseleave to appealbail as a rulePECA
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Islamabad High Court denying him post-arrest bail in case FIR No.20 dated 20.09.2020 registered under sections 11, 20, 21, and 22 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 read with sections 34 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station FIA Cyber Crime Reporting Center, Islamabad. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail where the alleged offenses fell outside the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court observed that the offenses fell outside the prohibitory clause, making the grant of bail the general rule and its refusal the exception, and no exceptional circumstances were shown to justify withholding bail. The criminal petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, granting the appellant bail subject to surety bonds. The key principle laid down is that in offenses falling outside the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, bail is the rule and refusal is the exception unless exceptional circumstances are established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when the alleged offenses fall outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the standard rule for granting bail in cases where the offenses do not fall within the prohibitory clause?
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• Muhammad Bilal vs The State & another2021 SCMR 1039, 2021 SCP 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-21
  murderjuvenile justiceretracted confessioncircumstantial evidencechain of custodyforensic reportminor accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and ten-year rigorous imprisonment sentence of the appellant, a minor, under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.) for murder, which was upheld by the Peshawar High Court. The prosecution's case rested on circumstantial evidence, including a retracted confession recorded on the final day of police custody, the recovery of a pistol, and a positive forensic report. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the appellant was a minor of impressionable age, and the recording Magistrate failed to exercise extra vigilance or provide counseling/consultation with a natural guardian. Furthermore, the confession was translated by a court stenographer whose statement was not recorded, and the chain of custody for the recovered weapon was compromised as the weapon and empty cartridge were sent to the forensic laboratory together. Holding that a retracted confession without independent corroboration is unsafe for conviction, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • What duty of care is cast upon a Judicial Magistrate when recording the confessional statement of a minor or juvenile accused?
  • Can a conviction be safely maintained solely on a retracted confession that lacks independent corroborative evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a positive forensic ballistics report when the weapon and the empty cartridge are sent to the laboratory together and the chain of custody is compromised?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Baqir vs The State and another2021 SCP 422, 2022 SCMR 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-06
  cancellation of bailpost-arrest bailabscondencecommon intentionvicarious liabilitymurderjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted by the Lahore High Court to the respondent, who was charged with murder and other offences under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion judicially in granting bail despite the respondent's abscondence, specific nomination in a promptly lodged FIR, and subsequent involvement in a separate murderous assault against the complainant. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was perverse, fanciful, and arbitrary, failing to account for the respondent's vicarious liability, shared common intention, and the medical evidence corroborating the ocular account. The Court emphasized that bail cancellation requires evaluating the totality of circumstances, including the accused's conduct post-incident. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and cancelled the respondent's bail, establishing that where an order granting bail ignores material facts and lacks justiciable reasoning under the criteria for further inquiry, it is unsustainable in law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that a firearm injury was inflicted on a non-vital part of the body automatically entitle an accused to bail in a murder case?
  • Can bail be cancelled if the accused absconded after the commission of the crime?
  • Is an order granting bail sustainable if it fails to consider the accused's vicarious liability and shared common intention?
  • Does the subsequent involvement of an accused in a separate criminal case against the complainant constitute a valid ground for bail cancellation?
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• Muhammad Aurangzeb vs Karim Khan alias Abdul Karim Khan and others2022 SCMR 849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-02
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationQatl-i-amdjudicial discretionreasonable groundsfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a petition filed by the complainant challenging the order of the Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench, which had granted post-arrest bail to respondents charged with Qatl-i-amd under a blood feud backdrop. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its judicial discretion under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when granting bail based on a factual premise contradicted by the record. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and set aside the High Court's order, cancelling the respondents' bail. The Supreme Court held that while the grant of bail is a discretionary relief, the exercise of such discretion must be structured upon sound judicial principles and statutory parameters. Where bail is granted based on factually incorrect premises or in disregard of settled legal principles, such an order itself constitutes valid grounds for cancellation, without requiring extra strong or compelling circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Can post-arrest bail be cancelled if granted on factually incorrect premises or in disregard of settled legal principles?
  • Whether discretion in granting bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 must be structured upon sound judicial principles?
  • Are strong and compelling grounds strictly required to recall a bail order if the original bail grant was contrary to the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asif Awan vs Dawood Khan, etc2021 P SC 1357, 2021 SCMR 1270, 2021 SCP 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-27
  specific performancebalance sale considerationreadiness and willingnessextension of timebona fideleave refusing orderprecedentcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that non-suited the appellant for failing to deposit the balance sale consideration within the timeframe initially stipulated by the trial court in a suit for specific performance. The core legal question was whether a vendee is mandatorily required to deposit the balance sale price at the time of filing a suit or first appearance, and whether failure to do so entails automatic dismissal. The Supreme Court held that unlike pre-emption laws, the Specific Relief Act, 1877, contains no express provision requiring such a deposit at the institution stage. However, courts may direct a deposit to test the vendee's bona fides and readiness under Section 24(b). The Court clarified that the precedent in Hamood Mehmood (2017 SCMR 2022) was a leave-refusing order and did not constitute a binding enunciation of law. It further ruled that where a trial court's deposit order lacks penal consequences and the lis remains pending, the court retains jurisdiction to extend time. Consequently, the High Court's dismissal under Order XVII Rule 3 CPC was deemed misconceived, and the suit was restored.

  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad vs The State2021 P S c (Crl.) 110, 2020 SCMR 2025, 2020 SCP 188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-07
  leave to appeallife imprisonmentinjured eyewitnessesprompt FIRsuppression of injuryappreciation of evidenceocular accountsingle accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the petitioner's conviction under Section 302(b) PPC but reduced his sentence from death to life imprisonment. The petitioner was convicted for a daylight murder and for causing severe injuries to two women with a hatchet. The core legal questions pertained to whether the prosecution suppressed an injury allegedly sustained by the petitioner, whether the evidence was properly appreciated, and whether the sentence should be reduced under Section 302(c) PPC. The Supreme Court held that the ocular account by injured eyewitnesses was prompt, credible, and corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of the weapon. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to prove any injury sustained during the occurrence, as no doctor was summoned and no counter-version was lodged. Finding no merit or substantial material warranting interference, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and declined leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an accused to produce medical evidence or lodge a counter-version invalidate a defense claim of suppressed injury?
  • Can conviction under Section 302(b) PPC be sustained based on prompt FIR, ocular account of injured witnesses, and corroborative medical evidence?
  • Whether the mere allegation of injury by an accused without supporting material justifies converting a conviction from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) PPC?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad Nadeem vs The State2021 SCP 346, 2021 PSC (Crl.) 964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-13
  post-arrest bailcondonation of delaysufficient causejail petitionprohibitory clausefundamental rightsright to fair trialmisappropriation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the High Court declining post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who faced corruption and forgery charges. The primary legal questions addressed were whether incarceration of a petitioner seeking post-arrest bail constitutes 'sufficient cause' for condoning delay in filing a petition under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing bail under the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the incarceration of an accused behind bars inherently creates disabilities amounting to 'sufficient cause' for condoning delay under a liberal and lenient approach aligned with fundamental rights to liberty, dignity, and fair trial under Articles 9, 10A, and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. On the merits, the Court held that the High Court's discretion in denying bail was neither arbitrary nor perverse given the strong incriminating material linking the petitioner to financial misappropriation falling within the prohibitory clause. The key principle laid down is that incarceration itself constitutes sufficient cause for condoning delay in criminal petitions involving liberty unless attributable to contumacious conduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the incarceration of an accused person behind bars constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail?
  • Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretion in declining post-arrest bail when no gross misreading of record or perversity is shown?
  • Is the refusal of bail for offenses falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a punitive measure or a preventive step?
  • How does the right to liberty, dignity, and fair trial under the Constitution of Pakistan influence the interpretation of 'sufficient cause' for imprisoned petitioners?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad Nadeem vs StatePLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-13
  post-arrest bailcondonation of delayjail petitionprohibitory clausefundamental rightsliberty and dignitypreventive detention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order declining post-arrest bail, accompanied by an application for condonation of a 72-day delay in filing. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner's incarceration constitutes "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay and whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing bail. The Court held that a liberal approach is required for jail petitions, as incarceration inherently restricts access to legal remedies, implicating fundamental rights to liberty, dignity, and fair trial under the Constitution. Consequently, the delay was condoned. Regarding the merits, the Court affirmed that while bail is not a punishment, refusal is a preventive measure for offences falling within the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Finding that the High Court’s order was neither arbitrary nor perverse and that incriminating material existed, the Court dismissed the petition. The key principle established is that incarceration of a petitioner seeking post-arrest bail generally constitutes "sufficient cause" for condoning delay in filing appeals, absent evidence of ulterior motive.

  Questions settled

  • Does the incarceration of a petitioner seeking post-arrest bail constitute 'sufficient cause' for condoning a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is the refusal of bail for offences falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, considered a punitive measure?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by a High Court in bail matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad Anjum vs Mst. Khurshid Begum and others2021 PSC 1430, 2021 SCMR 1145, 2022 PLJ SC 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-16
  Section 12(2) CPCfraud and misrepresentationFamily Court jurisdictioninherent powersdower decreebona fide purchaserprocedural exclusion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a challenge to a Family Court decree by a subsequent purchaser of land, who alleged that the decree for dower was obtained through collusion and fraud between the spouses. The petitioner filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which was dismissed along with subsequent appeals on the ground that general CPC provisions do not apply to Family Courts. The core legal question was whether the statutory exclusion of CPC provisions (except Sections 10 and 11) under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 precludes a Family Court from re-examining its decree on allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and directed the Additional District Judge to decide the Section 12(2) application on merits. The Court laid down that fraud vitiates solemn proceedings, and despite procedural exclusions, a Family Court possesses inherent jurisdiction to recall or rectify orders tainted by fraud to secure justice and prevent abuse of process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exclusion of general CPC provisions under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 bar a Family Court from entertaining an application alleging fraud and misrepresentation?
  • Does a Family Court possess inherent jurisdiction to set aside or recall a decree obtained by fraud?
  • Can a Family Court borrow procedures from civil law to secure the ends of justice in the absence of an express statutory prohibition?
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• Muhammad Arif Chattha and others vs Additional District Judge, Gujranwala and others2022 SCMR 958, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 300, 2022 PSC 1083 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-11
  execution of decreepre-emption decreelimitation periodsecond execution applicationdismissal for non-prosecutionconditional decreedelivery of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondents filed a suit for possession through pre-emption, which was decreed by the Lahore High Court and upheld by the Supreme Court. The respondents filed a first execution application which was dismissed for non-prosecution, followed by a second execution application. The petitioners objected that the second application was barred by limitation under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and was not maintainable due to the dismissal of the first application. The Executing Court, Revisional Court, and High Court rejected the petitioners' objections, leading to the petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that a pre-emption decree is conditional and imposes reciprocal obligations; where no specific date for delivery of possession is mentioned in the decree, the limitation period for execution is reckoned from the date of default in delivering possession rather than the date of the decree. Furthermore, a subsequent execution application is maintainable if the earlier application was dismissed for default rather than adjudicated on merits, provided it falls within the prescribed limitation period. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • From which date does the limitation period for filing an execution application of a pre-emption decree commence when no specific date for the delivery of possession is mentioned in the decree?
  • Is a second execution application maintainable if the first execution application was dismissed for non-prosecution rather than decided on merits?
  • What is the nature of a pre-emption decree regarding the obligations of the parties under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs Muhammad Aslam and others2021 SCMR 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-15
  pre-emptionTalab-i-Ishhadspecific performanceconcurrent findingsPunjab Pre-emption Act 1991interregnum period
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal challenging the Lahore High Court order upholding concurrent findings of dismissal of the petitioner's suit for pre-emption. The core legal question concerns the validity of the pre-emption suit regarding a sale effected through a civil court decree during the interregnum period when no statutory pre-emption law was in force, and the applicability of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings against the petitioner were unexceptionable as he failed to establish the performance of Talabs in accordance with law, and could not satisfy the mandatory requirements under section 6(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts in a pre-emption suit can be interfered with when the mandatory requirements of Talabs are not established?
  • How are pre-emption cases instituted during the interregnum period when no statutory pre-emption law was in force governed under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991?
  • Does section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 relax the strict requirements of section 6(2) of the said Act?
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• Muhammad Amjad vs The Director General, Quetta Development Authority2022 SCMR 797, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 594, 2022 PSC 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-27
  promotionupgradationvested rightlocus poenitentiaeservice lawantedated promotionavailability of postcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a challenge to a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the effective date of the appellant's promotion. The appellant, an employee of the Quetta Development Authority (QDA), claimed his promotion to Chief Accounts Officer (BPS-19) should take effect from December 3, 2004, based on a Governing Body recommendation, rather than the actual promotion date of September 20, 2012. The Supreme Court examined the Quetta Development Authority Ordinance, 1978, and the Service Regulations of 2010. The Court held that promotion is not a vested right and is contingent upon the availability of a sanctioned post within the service structure. It was determined that the post of Chief Accounts Officer was only created in the 2012-2013 budget; thus, no promotion could be granted retrospectively to a period when the post was non-existent. The Court further clarified the distinction between 'upgradation' and 'promotion', noting that upgradation is a policy-based monetary benefit to alleviate stagnation and cannot be used to bypass recruitment rules for specific individuals. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can claim promotion as a vested right from a date when the relevant post had not yet been created?
  • What is the legal distinction between 'promotion' and 'upgradation' in the context of service law?
  • Can the principle of locus poenitentiae be invoked to protect a promotion order issued without legal sanction or the existence of a sanctioned post?
  • Whether the Governing Body of a statutory authority is bound to accept the recommendations of a Selection Board if reasons for non-acceptance are recorded?
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• Muhammad Amjad Khan Afridi & others vs Shad Muhammad & others2021 SCP 392, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-17
  guardian ad litemminor litigantex parte decreeparens patriaecivil procedurepreemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether lower forums erred in refusing to set aside an ex parte decree against minor appellants whose court-appointed guardian ad litem failed to appear. The Supreme Court considered the obligations of courts and guardians under civil procedure regarding minor litigants. The court held that where a guardian ad litem fails to appear or otherwise neglects their duty to defend a minor, the court is bound under Order 32 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to remove the guardian and appoint a new one, and a minor defendant cannot lawfully be proceeded against ex parte without fulfilling these protective measures. The appeal was accordingly accepted in part to set aside the ex parte decree regarding the minor appellants, establishing that courts act as parens patriae to vigilantly protect the interests of vulnerable minor litigants.

  Questions settled

  • What is the duty of a court under Order 32 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a guardian ad litem fails to appear or perform their duty?
  • Can a minor defendant be validly proceeded against ex parte without the court first replacing a negligent guardian ad litem?
  • What are the constitutional responsibilities of the State and the courts regarding the protection of minor citizens in legal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ameer alias Kali and others vs The State and others2021 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-14
  murderocular evidencemedical evidenceballistic reportcriminal appealsafe administration of justiceconvictionacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a murder conviction involving multiple accused persons. The petitioners were convicted by the trial court for the murder of the deceased, with the High Court subsequently commuting their death sentences to life imprisonment. The core legal question concerned the reliability of the ocular account in light of alleged discrepancies with the medical evidence, specifically regarding the trajectory of firearm injuries and the role of individual assailants. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while the prosecution successfully established the guilt of one petitioner, Riaz Ahmed, based on recovered ballistic evidence and consistent ocular testimony, the case against the second petitioner, Muhammad Ameer alias Kali, was fraught with evidentiary doubt. The Court held that where ballistic evidence links a specific weapon to a single assailant, maintaining a conviction against a co-accused based on conflicting ocular testimony is unsafe. Consequently, the Court acquitted Muhammad Ameer alias Kali, while maintaining the conviction and sentence of Riaz Ahmed, emphasizing the principle that safe administration of criminal justice requires the exclusion of doubt in capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be maintained against a co-accused when ballistic evidence links the crime to a single assailant?
  • Does a discrepancy between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding injury trajectory necessarily dismantle the entire prosecution case?
  • Is it safe to maintain a conviction when the prosecution's evidence against one of multiple accused is found to be fraught with risk of error?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ajmal vs The State and another2022 SCMR 274, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-15
  post-arrest bailprinciple of consistencyelectronic crimesprohibitory clausefurther inquirycriminal justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's order denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was accused of offenses under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, involving the sharing of objectionable videos. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail based on the principle of consistency, given that a co-accused, to whom the primary instrument of the crime was attributed, had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court observed that the maximum punishment for the alleged offenses did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Furthermore, the Court noted that the co-accused had been released on bail and that the petitioner’s case was on better footing, as the device used for the offense belonged to the co-accused. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail on the principle of consistency and that the case warranted further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The appeal was allowed, and the petitioner was admitted to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail on the principle of consistency if a co-accused has already been granted bail?
  • Does the grant of bail depend on whether the offense falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • When does a case qualify for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Majoka & others vs The Registrar Lahore High Court, Lahore KPK thr. Chief Secretary, Peshawar & others2021 KLR Labour & Service Cases 1, 2021 P SC 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  judicial service rulesvested rightservice quotafundamental rightsreasonable classificationconstitutional petitionstatutory amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenging a notification dated 13.05.2015 which amended the Punjab Judicial Service Rules, 1994. The amendment effectively excluded serving Civil Judges and Senior Civil Judges from competing for the 40% quota reserved for the Bar for the position of Additional District and Sessions Judge, a right they had briefly enjoyed under a prior 2014 amendment. The core legal questions were whether this notification violated the petitioners' fundamental rights and whether the mere advertisement of vacancies under the previous criteria created a vested right for the petitioners. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the competent authority acted within its statutory powers under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Court ruled that no vested right exists to be governed by a specific set of rules, and the amendment constituted a reasonable classification. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the restoration of the original service structure did not infringe upon any constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights of the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Does the amendment of service rules that excludes a category of candidates from a recruitment quota violate fundamental rights?
  • Does the issuance of an advertisement for recruitment create a vested right in candidates to be governed by the criteria existing at the time of advertisement?
  • Can a competent authority amend service rules to restore a previous recruitment scheme without infringing upon the rights of serving civil servants?
  • Is the classification between members of the Bar and serving judicial officers for recruitment purposes a reasonable classification under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal & others vs The Secretary Establishment Division2021 PLJ SC 463, 2021 SCP 316, 2021 SCMR 1569 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-17
  ultra viresreinstatementcivil servicefundamental rightslegislative competencenon-obstante clausepast and closed transactionconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the constitutionality of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010, which mandated the reinstatement and regularization of dismissed employees across various government and autonomous bodies. The core legal questions were whether the Act, specifically its non-obstante clause, could override constitutional provisions, and whether the legislation violated fundamental rights and the constitutional framework governing civil service. The Supreme Court held that the Act was ultra vires of the Constitution. The Court ruled that the legislature cannot, through legal fiction or non-obstante clauses, override the Constitution, violate fundamental rights under Articles 4, 9, and 25, or circumvent the recruitment framework established under Articles 240 and 242. The Court established the principle that legislation cannot be person-specific or class-specific to confer undue favors, nor can it nullify judicial decisions. Consequently, beneficiaries still in service must revert to their pre-Act status, though monetary benefits received for service rendered remain intact. Cases involving retired or deceased beneficiaries were deemed past and closed transactions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a non-obstante clause in a statute override the provisions of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4, 9, and 25 of the Constitution?
  • Can the legislature, through a deeming clause, confer the status of a civil servant upon employees of corporations without complying with recruitment rules?
  • Are benefits conferred under an unconstitutional statute considered past and closed transactions if the beneficiaries are still in service?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Adnan and another vs The State and others2021 SCMR 16, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-24
  Criminal appealMurder convictionAcquittalBenefit of doubtWitness credibilityPost-mortem delayMotiveEnhancement of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a criminal appeal filed by Muhammad Adnan against his conviction under Section 302(b) PPC, initially sentenced to death by the trial court and later converted to life imprisonment by the High Court. A connected criminal petition sought enhancement of his sentence. The core legal question revolved around the sufficiency and credibility of evidence presented by the prosecution, including witness testimonies, the motive, and procedural aspects like the delay in post-mortem examination. The Supreme Court observed significant inconsistencies in the statements and conduct of the complainant and eye-witnesses, an unexplained nine-hour delay in conducting the post-mortem, and the appellate court's disbelief of the motive. Concluding that the prosecution's case was doubtful and did not appeal to common sense, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant. Consequently, the petition for enhancement of sentence was dismissed.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sughran and another vs The State2021 SCMR 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-27
  reduction of sentencecannabiscontraband carriersentence already undergonereformation and rehabilitationcriminal justice systemmitigating circumstancesmodification of fine
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the concurrent conviction of the appellant for carrying a cache of 10 kg of cannabis in a public vehicle. The appellant did not press the challenge against her conviction but sought a further reduction of sentence to the period already undergone along with a modification of the fine. The primary legal consideration was whether the sentence could be further mitigated based on mitigating circumstances and the reformative purpose of the criminal justice system. The Supreme Court observed that the contraband attributed to the appellant did not exceed 10 kg, placing her case outside the statutory barrier of a mandatory minimum sentence. Finding that the appellant was merely a hapless carrier rather than the principal controller of the narcotics, and having served over six years alongside the death of her co-accused in jail, the Court held that the primary objective of criminal justice is reformation and rehabilitation rather than vengeance. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to the period already undergone and modifying the fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the primary objective of the criminal justice system is offender reformation and rehabilitation rather than retribution or vengeance?
  • Can a convict's sentence be reduced to the period already undergone when the quantity of recovered contraband falls outside the statutory minimum sentence threshold?
  • Whether an accused person's status as a mere hapless carrier and the period of imprisonment already served constitute valid grounds for mitigation of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Samrana Nawaz, etc vs MCB Bank Ltd., etc2021 PLD Supreme Court 581, 2021 P SC 795, 2021 SCP 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-16
  Order XXI Rule 90 CPCAuction saleObjection petitionMandatory depositBinding precedentLarger BenchInterpretation of statuteCivil procedureExecution of decreeJudicial discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the interpretation of the second proviso to Rule 90 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), specifically whether an applicant objecting to an auction sale must deposit an amount not exceeding 20% of the sale sum or furnish security without a prior court direction. The Supreme Court noted a conflict with a previous three-member Bench decision in *Habib and Company v. MCB (PLD 2020 SC 227)*, which held the 20% deposit mandatory without a court order. The current two-member Bench disagreed with this interpretation, finding that the phrase "as the Court may direct" implies a prior judicial determination of the amount or security. However, bound by the doctrine of binding precedent, the two-member Bench could not overrule a decision of a co-equal or larger Bench. Consequently, the Court referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for the constitution of a Bench larger than a three-member Bench to reconsider the interpretation of the proviso and the earlier ruling, emphasizing the need for certainty and consistency in judicial decisions.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina Ramzan vs The StatePLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 80, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 253, 2021 SCMR 451, 2021 SCP 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-06
  narcoticschain of custodysafe transmissionchemical examiner reportbenefit of doubtcharascriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of 45 kilograms of charas concealed in electronic appliances. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment, a decision upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution successfully established a secure chain of custody for the seized narcotics. The Court observed significant gaps: the warehouse in-charge was not produced to testify to safe custody; the individual who delivered the samples to the laboratory was not clearly identified; and the testimony of the recovery officer contradicted the laboratory report regarding the mode of delivery. The Court held that the chain of custody—from seizure to laboratory analysis—must be transparent, recorded, and unbroken to ensure evidence integrity. Since the prosecution failed to prove safe transmission and custody, the Chemical Examiner's report was rendered unreliable. Consequently, the Court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant, set aside the conviction, and ordered her release.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Bano vs Home Department Govt. of Punjab through its Secretary and others2021 P SC 445, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 263, 2021 SCP 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  mental illnessschizophreniadeath sentencecompetence to stand trialunsound mindmitigating circumstancemedical boardconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This landmark judgment by a larger bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses crucial legal and medical questions regarding culpability under section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code, competence to face trial under Chapter XXXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the execution of death row convicts suffering from severe mental illness. Examining the cases of three condemned prisoners—Imdad Ali, Mst. Kaneezan Bibi, and Ghulam Abbas—the court held that while the burden of proving legal insanity at the time of the offence rests on the accused, trial courts must not form subjective views on an accused's mental competence without objective material and expert medical evaluation through a constituted Medical Board. Furthermore, the court ruled that executing a mentally ill condemned prisoner who lacks the capacity to comprehend the rationale and reasons behind their punishment violates principles of justice and human dignity. Consequently, the court converted the death sentences of the petitioners to imprisonment for life based on medical diagnoses of schizophrenia and intellectual impairment, alongside periods of prolonged incarceration, and issued extensive structural directives to governments and judicial academies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a mentally ill condemned prisoner should be executed?
  • How should the trial Court deal with the plea of an accused that he/she was suffering from mental illness at the time of commission of offence?
  • How should the trial Court deal with the claim that due to mental illness, an accused is incapable of making his/her defence?
  • Whether the trial Court can form a prima facie subjective view regarding the incapability of the accused to make his/her defence without seeking the opinion of the medical expert?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Bano and another vs Home Department Government Of Punjab through Secretary and others2021 PLD Supreme Court 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-07
  Mental illnessDeath penaltyCompetence to stand trialExecution of sentenceCriminal culpabilityUnsoundness of mindForensic mental healthMedical BoardPrison RulesConstitutional rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court addressed critical questions concerning the culpability, competence to face trial, and execution of sentence for accused persons and convicts suffering from mental illness, considering modern jurisprudential, legislative, and medical developments. The Court held that for a plea of mental illness at the time of offense (Section 84 PPC), the onus of proof lies with the accused, but all evidence must be considered. Regarding an accused's incapacity to make a defense due to mental illness (Sections 464, 465 Cr.P.C.), if the court forms an objective prima facie opinion, an inquiry involving a Medical Board's expert opinion is mandatory. Crucially, the Court ruled that a mentally ill condemned prisoner who is unable to comprehend the rationale behind their punishment should not be executed, provided a Medical Board certifies this condition. The judgment directed federal and provincial governments to amend relevant laws, substitute terms like "unsound mind" with "mental disorder/illness," establish forensic mental health facilities, and constitute specialized Medical Boards. Consequently, Imdad Ali's and Mst. Kaneezan Bibi's death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, and Ghulam Abbas's execution was stayed pending a fresh mercy petition considering his mental health.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukhsana vs Rehmanullah and another2021 SC MR 1544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-26
  criminal appealdouble murderappreciation of evidenceocular accountacquittalmiscarriage of justiceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a criminal appeal against a High Court judgment that overturned the conviction and death sentence of the respondent for the double murder of two individuals. The incident occurred in broad daylight following a dispute over fodder. The petitioner challenges the High Court's acquittal, arguing that the ocular account and investigative findings were consistent and established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner contends that the High Court erred by placing disproportionate reliance on peripheral issues, such as minor omissions by the investigating officer and the witnesses' inability to specify weapon calibers, rather than focusing on the substantive evidence. The core legal question is whether the High Court's appreciation of evidence was legally sound or if it resulted in a miscarriage of justice by ignoring the established norms of criminal evidence. The Supreme Court found that the contentions merited consideration, granted leave to appeal to reappraise the entire evidence, and issued bailable warrants for the respondent's appearance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court's reliance on minor investigative omissions and witness inconsistencies regarding weapon caliber constitute a valid ground for overturning a conviction based on ocular evidence?
  • What are the parameters for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal against an acquittal judgment in a murder case?
  • Does the failure to confront witnesses with site plan entries render their testimony unreliable in a criminal trial?
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• Mst. Rehmat and others vs Mst. Zubaida Begum and others2021 SCMR 1534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-19
  specific performanceagreement to sellreciprocal promisestime is not the essencebona fide purchaserlis pendenspart performanceadmitted facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a long-standing property dispute involving a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell executed in April 1973. The core legal question concerned whether time was the essence of the contract and whether a vendor who failed to perform reciprocal obligations could rescind the agreement and transfer the property to a subsequent purchaser. The Supreme Court held that time was not the essence of the contract, and since the vendor failed to perform her reciprocal obligations to procure necessary clearance documents under the agreement, she could not legally rescind or revoke the contract after accepting 80% of the sale consideration and handing over physical possession to the vendee. The Court affirmed that admitted facts need not be proved under Article 30 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and that a prior agreement coupled with possession in part performance ranks superior to a subsequent registered sale deed executed with notice. The appeal was dismissed, and the subsequent transactions were declared null and void as hit by lis pendens, subject to the vendee depositing the remaining balance based on the current valuation table.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time can be considered the essence of a contract to sell when no cutoff date is fixed and the agreement contains reciprocal obligations?
  • Can a vendor rescind an agreement to sell after receiving a substantial part of the consideration and handing over possession, when the vendor has failed to perform her own reciprocal obligations?
  • Does a prior agreement to sell accompanied by delivery of possession and part performance take precedence over a subsequent registered sale deed?
  • What is the effect of the dismissal of a prior suit for possession under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on a subsequent claim by a successor-in-interest?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehmat & others vs Mst. Zubaida Begum & others2021 P SC 1499, 2021 SCMR 1534, 2021 SCP 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-19
  specific performanceagreement to sellpart performancereciprocal promiseslis pendenstime is the essencebona fide purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the specific performance of an agreement to sell property executed in 1973. The core legal questions concerned whether time was of the essence in the contract, whether the vendor could unilaterally rescind the agreement, and the validity of a subsequent sale deed executed by the vendor in favor of a third party. The Supreme Court held that time was not the essence of the contract, as the vendor failed to perform necessary reciprocal obligations, such as obtaining required clearances. Consequently, the vendor could not legally rescind the agreement after accepting a substantial portion of the sale consideration and delivering possession to the vendee. The Court affirmed that admitted facts need not be proven and that the vendee’s possession, held in part performance, took precedence over the subsequent registered sale deed, which was further invalidated by the principle of lis pendens. The Court directed the vendee to pay the remaining balance of the sale consideration to finalize the specific performance, thereby upholding the lower appellate court's decree in favor of the original vendee.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendor rescind an agreement to sell where they have failed to perform their reciprocal obligations?
  • Does possession held in part performance of an agreement to sell take precedence over a subsequent registered sale deed?
  • Is a fresh suit barred under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if a previous suit for possession was dismissed under Order IX Rule 8?
  • Is time considered the essence of a contract when no specific cut-off date for payment is provided in the agreement?
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• Mst. Naseem vs Farhad Khan and another2021 SCMR 1532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-26
  filicidemurderreduction of sentenceconfessional statementleave to appealreappraisal of evidenceQatl-i-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, whereby the respondent's conviction under clause (b) of section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for the murder of his son was altered to clause (c) of the same section, reducing his sentence to the period already undergone. The core legal question concerns the propriety of reducing the conviction and sentence in a case of filicide supported by ocular testimony and a confessional statement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised merit consideration to reappraise the entire evidence and secure the ends of justice. The key principle laid down is that heinous offenses such as filicide require a meticulous reappraisal of evidence to ensure proportionate sentencing and prevent a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in converting a conviction under clause (b) of section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 to clause (c) in a case of filicide?
  • Does a retracted confessional statement coupled with ocular testimony warrant a sentence reduction to the period already undergone?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to reappraise evidence where the High Court has interfered with the quantum of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kulsoom Rasheed vs Noman Aslam2021 SCP 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-23
  transfer of family casesexecution of decreefamily courtinterprovincial transferfair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil miscellaneous application filed by the petitioner wife seeking the transfer of execution proceedings regarding an ex-parte judgment and decree for maintenance and dowry articles from Islamabad West to Karachi, where the respondent resides. The core legal question concerns the power of the Supreme Court of Pakistan under the Family Courts Act, 1964, to transfer family court proceedings from a court in one province to a court in another province to facilitate execution and ensure a fair trial. The Supreme Court held that under Section 25-A(2-B) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, read with Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, this Court has the authority to transfer proceedings from one province to another without notice to the opposing party when circumstances warrant, in order to prevent unnecessary travel costs and safeguard the right to a fair trial. The Court accordingly ordered the transfer of the execution proceedings from Islamabad to the District Judge, Karachi, for assignment to the competent Family Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court transfer a family court case from one province to another?
  • Whether notice to the respondent is mandatory before ordering the transfer of family court proceedings under Section 25-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964?
  • Does the power of inter-provincial transfer extend to execution proceedings under the Family Courts Act, 1964?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khairan Bibi vs Mst. Haseena Atta and others2021 PLD Supreme Court 937, 2022 PSC 1402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-14
  condonation of delaytime-barred petitiondirect appealjurisdictionvaluation of suitSupreme Court Ruleslimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal (CPLA) filed against a judgment of the High Court, which was found to be barred by three days. The core legal question concerned whether illness of the stenographer and extreme cold weather constitute sufficient grounds for condonation of delay under limitation principles, and whether a direct appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was competent given the valuation of the subject matter. The Supreme Court held that administrative or personal inconveniences such as staff illness or weather do not warrant condonation of delay, and since the valuation exceeded the statutory threshold and the High Court had reversed the lower appellate court findings, a direct appeal was competent. However, because the petition was barred by limitation and could not be converted into an appeal due to an unexplained delay of thirty-three days, the CPLA was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that inadequate explanations for delay, including reliance on ill-advice or clerical inconveniences, do not justify condonation of delay in filing appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the illness of a stenographer and extreme cold weather constitute a sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing a petition before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a direct appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when the valuation of the subject matter in the court of first instance and in appeal is not less than fifty thousand rupees and the High Court has reversed the judgment of the court immediately below?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal when the petition itself is barred by limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kalsoom Bibi and others vs Muhammad Amin Agha (Deceased)2022 SCMR 929 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-13
  suit for possessionallotmentadverse possessionsettlement lawsself-destructive pleasPermanent Transfer Deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for possession filed by the plaintiffs-respondents regarding a portion of property transferred to them via a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) in 1964. The defendants-appellants, who occupied a portion of the property, disputed that their occupied portion was part of the plaintiffs' allotted land, claiming they had applied for its allotment and, alternatively, had acquired ownership via adverse possession. The trial court and first appellate court dismissed the suit, but the High Court reversed these decisions in revision. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, holding that the appellants failed to establish any pending allotment claim before the settlement authorities prior to the repeal of settlement laws by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the appellants' dual claims of ownership via allotment and adverse possession were self-destructive. It reaffirmed that the plea of adverse possession is unavailable as it is contrary to Islamic injunctions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party simultaneously claim ownership of a property through allotment and through adverse possession?
  • Is the plea of ownership based on adverse possession legally sustainable in Pakistan in light of Islamic injunctions?
  • Can settlement authorities initiate proceedings for allotment or conferment of rights after the repeal of settlement laws under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
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• Mst. Kainat Bibi vs The State and another2022 SCMR 609, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-09
  post-arrest bailfemale accusedprohibitory clausestatutory concessionrecoverypolice custody
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a female domestic maid, sought post-arrest bail after being incarcerated since April 24, 2021, on allegations of stealing gold ornaments valued at Rs. 2.5 million, with a subsequent recovery allegedly made based on her disclosure. Her bail applications were previously dismissed by the lower courts, with the last refusal coming from the Islamabad High Court. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of a female accused to post-arrest bail where the alleged offence falls outside the prohibitory clause of the relevant procedural law and questions arise regarding the legality of a police recovery and prolonged detention. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and considering her status as a female with no criminal record, her continued detention served no useful purpose, particularly given potential procedural irregularities in the recovery conducted by a male police officer. The Court laid down the principle that statutory concessions for the release of female accused persons in non-prohibitory offences warrant a lenient approach toward post-arrest bail, and consequently converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it.

  Questions settled

  • Is a female accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the charged offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the statutory framework provide wider doors for the release of a female accused with no past criminal record?
  • What is the effect of conducting a recovery from a female accused in alleged violation of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 at the bail stage?
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• Mst. Jaiwanti Bai vs Messrs Amir Corporation and others2021 PLD Supreme Court 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-07-19
  specific performancelocus standilimitationassignment of contractreal estatesubleaseforward sale agreementproperty transferunregistered documentpart performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned a suit for specific performance of a contract for the execution of a sublease for an apartment. The original allottee entered into a forward sale agreement with the appellant's husband, who then nominated the appellant as the transferee. The builder (Respondent No.1) acknowledged the transfer and received payments for the sublease and utility meters but failed to execute the sublease. The trial court dismissed the suit as time-barred, and the first appellate court dismissed it for lack of locus standi, findings upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, as an assignee, had locus standi, stepping into the shoes of her husband and acquiring all contractual rights. It further ruled that the suit was not time-barred, as no date was fixed for performance, and the limitation period under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, commenced when the legal notice remained unanswered. The Court decreed the suit for specific performance against the builder.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Gulnaz vs Haji Muhammad Riaz and others2020 PLD Supreme Court 221, 2020 PLJ SC 268, 2020 P SC 206, 2021 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-23
  specific performancedirect appealcompetency of appealpetition for leave to appealvariation of judgmentconcurrent findingsconsent decree
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves appeals against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court arising from suits for specific performance of agreements to sell and a suit for possession based on a prior consent decree. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of a direct appeal under Article 185(2)(e) of the Constitution of Pakistan when a party challenges only the concurrently dismissed portion of a High Court judgment that partially varied the lower court's decision in their favor. The Supreme Court held that where a judgment is partially upheld and partially reversed, and an appellant challenges only the part that corresponds to concurrent findings against them, such a challenge does not constitute an appealable variation under Article 185(2)(e), rendering a direct appeal incompetent and necessitating a petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3). The Court laid down the principle that the term 'varied' under Article 185(2)(e) does not apply when the portion of the judgment altering the lower court's decree was in favor of the appellant and remained unchallenged, while the adverse concurrent findings alone are contested.

  Questions settled

  • Is a direct appeal under Article 185(2)(e) of the Constitution of Pakistan competent when a party challenges only that portion of a High Court judgment where their claim was concurrently dismissed, while the varied portion was in their favor?
  • How is the term 'varied' interpreted under Article 185(2)(e) of the Constitution of Pakistan in the context of partially modified judgments?
  • When is a petition for leave to appeal required under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan instead of a direct appeal?
  • What is the effect of a prior unchallanged consent decree on subsequent suits for specific performance involving the same property?
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• Mst. Fursan vs The State2022 SCP 244, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 430, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 937, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-26
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancesprohibitory clausewoman bail exceptionrepetition of offencemethamphetamine recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 11(c) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act 2019 for the alleged recovery of 1005 grams of methamphetamine. The core legal question was whether a female accused charged with an offense falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is entitled to bail under the first proviso to Section 497(1), notwithstanding the nature of the narcotic offense and the likelihood of its repetition. The Supreme Court held that while bail for a woman is generally a rule under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, it remains subject to settled exceptions, including the likelihood of repeating the offense. The Court ruled that offenses involving narcotic drugs inherently indicate a probability of repetition due to their commercial and systematic nature, bringing the petitioner's case within the exception. Consequently, the petition for bail was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Sections 497 and 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to non-bailable offenses under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act 2019?
  • Does the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 make the grant of bail to a woman an absolute right in offenses falling within the prohibitory clause?
  • Can the likelihood of repeating a narcotic offense serve as a valid exception to deny post-arrest bail to a female accused?
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• Mst. Asia Qaseem and others vs Alamzeb and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 190, 2021 SCMR 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-19
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurderforensic evidenceperverse orderappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the Peshawar High Court's order granting post-arrest bail to the respondent in a murder case registered under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion judicially when granting bail. The Supreme Court found that the High Court's decision was based on significant factual errors: it incorrectly stated the deceased suffered only two wounds, ignoring that injuries matched the number of accused, and erroneously concluded that forensic evidence was irrelevant because weapons were not sent to the laboratory, despite evidence that both empties and weapons were analyzed with positive matches. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was perverse and not supported by the record. Consequently, the Court set aside the bail-granting order and cancelled the respondent's bail, reaffirming the principle that while strong grounds are required for bail cancellation, an order based on a misreading of the record is liable to be set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bail-granting order be set aside if it is based on a factual misreading of the record?
  • Does the failure of a court to correctly appreciate forensic evidence in a bail application constitute a ground for cancellation of bail?
  • Is a bail order that ignores the number of injuries sustained by victims considered perverse?
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• Mst. Akhtar Sultana vs Major Muzaffar Khan Malik (deceased) through his2021 PLD Supreme Court 715, 2021 P SC 1278, 2021 SCP 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-12
  statutory presumption of deathpower of attorneysecondary evidenceadmissibility of foreign documentsinheritance rightslimitationOrder VII Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure 1908
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment maintaining concurrent findings regarding the inheritance of property. The core legal questions concerned the validity of a disputed Power of Attorney, the admissibility of foreign documents to rebut the statutory presumption of death, and the court's power to grant relief not explicitly prayed for. The Supreme Court held that the Petitioner failed to prove the execution or loss of the original Power of Attorney, rendering secondary evidence inadmissible. Furthermore, the Court ruled that foreign documents were inadmissible for failing to comply with the certification requirements of Article 89(5) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. Consequently, the statutory presumption of death under Article 124 was not rebutted, and the Respondents' suit was not time-barred. The Court affirmed that under Order VII, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, courts may grant effective relief based on the substance of the pleadings, even if not specifically prayed for. The principle established is that a Power of Attorney must be strictly construed, and secondary evidence of public documents requires strict adherence to statutory certification.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant relief not specifically prayed for in the plaint?
  • Does a registered Power of Attorney remain a public document if its execution is disputed?
  • What are the requirements for the admissibility of foreign public documents under the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984?
  • Does the presumption of death under Article 124 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 establish the specific date of death?
  • Can an objection regarding the mode of proof be raised at any stage of the proceedings?
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• Mst. Akhtar Sultana vs Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal2021 PLD Supreme Court 715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-12
  power of attorneypresumption of deathQanun-e-Shahadatsecondary evidencepublic documentinheritanceburden of proofforeign documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the dismissal of a revision petition concerning the inheritance of property. The core legal questions involved the validity of a power of attorney, the resulting sale and gift transactions, and the application of the statutory presumption of death regarding the property owner, Bashir Khan Malik. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the power of attorney was invalid as it lacked express authority to alienate property and was not properly proved. The Court held that when the execution of a registered document is disputed, it loses its status as a "public document" and must be proved as a private document. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that foreign documents are inadmissible without the specific certification required by Article 89(5) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. Finally, the Court clarified that while Article 124 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 creates a presumption of death for a missing person, it does not establish the date of death, which must be proved by positive evidence. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general power of attorney automatically confer the power to alienate or dispose of the principal's property?
  • When a registered document's execution is disputed, does it retain its status as a "public document" for evidentiary purposes?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for the admissibility of foreign public documents under the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984?
  • Does the statutory presumption of death under Article 124 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 establish the specific date of death of a missing person?
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• Mrs. Samina Mehr-Un-Nisa Mazari vs Public At Large and others2021 CLD 1217, 2021 PLD Supreme Court 913, 2022 PSC 477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-03
  insolvency petitionindividual debtorcorporate creditorsdebtor's insolvencyProvincial Insolvency Actorder of adjudication
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed an insolvency petition under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 to be declared insolvent, arraying her institutional creditors, which included corporate banks, as respondents. The trial court, lower appellate court, and the High Court dismissed the petition, interpreting Section 8 of the Act as a bar against any insolvency petition involving corporations or companies. The core legal question was whether Section 8 of the Act bars an insolvency petition filed by a debtor seeking her own insolvency by arraying corporate banks as creditors. The Supreme Court held that Section 8 only bars insolvency petitions presented against a corporation, association, or company, and does not prohibit an individual debtor from filing a petition to be adjudged insolvent merely because corporate creditors are arrayed as respondents. The orders of the lower courts were set aside and the petition was remanded for a decision on merits. The key principle laid down is that Section 8 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 does not restrict an individual debtor from seeking personal insolvency against institutional or corporate creditors.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 8 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 bars an insolvency petition filed by a debtor seeking her own insolvency by arraying corporate banks as creditors?
  • Does Section 8 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 exempt corporations and companies from being arrayed as respondents in an individual debtor's insolvency petition?
  • Can an individual debtor file an insolvency petition to be adjudged insolvent when the creditors are corporate entities?
  Read full judgment →
• Mr. Muhammad Junaid Farooq vs (1) Government of Sindh (2) Chairman &SCP 2017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-03
  Sindh Public Service Commissionconstitutional bodyeligibility criteriasuo motu jurisdictionpublic office appointmentstructuring discretionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These proceedings arose from an application submitted by a practicing lawyer under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, challenging the eligibility and qualifications of the Chairman and Members of the Sindh Public Service Commission, and alleging widespread corruption and mismanagement. The core legal questions pertained to whether the appointed Chairman and Members met the statutory eligibility criteria laid down in the Sindh Public Service Commission Act, 1989, and whether unguided governmental discretion in such appointments requires structuring through rules. The Supreme Court held that while certain members met the statutory requirements, the appointment of Muhammad Hanif Pathan was unlawful as he did not belong to the private sector and lacked the requisite eminence. The Court ruled that the Government must frame rules under Section 10 of the Act to establish a transparent, objective selection mechanism for public service commission appointments. The key principle laid down is that appointments to constitutional bodies like the Public Service Commission must be strictly scrutinized against objective statutory criteria, and unbridled executive discretion must be structured through clear rules to ensure utmost integrity, competence, and transparency.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appointee from a public sector organization qualifies as a member from the private sector under Section 3(4) of the Sindh Public Service Commission Act, 1989?
  • Does the unguided discretion of the Government in appointing the Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission require structuring through rules framed under Section 10 of the Sindh Public Service Commission Act, 1989?
  • Can the Supreme Court examine the eligibility and qualifications of members of a provincial public service commission under its original jurisdiction pursuant to Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
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• Mozammal Abbas vs The State and others2021 P SC (Crl.) 518, 2021 SCMR 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-01
  pre-arrest bailnon-prosecutionpolice laxityabsconding accusedlaw enforcement dutiesjudicial noticecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 sought pre-arrest bail for the petitioner in a criminal case involving murder charges. The petitioner failed to appear before the Supreme Court on multiple scheduled dates despite the rejection of his pre-arrest bail by the lower courts. The Court took judicial notice of the widespread failure of law enforcement to apprehend accused persons whose pre-arrest bail applications had been dismissed by the High Court and Sessions Courts, noting that hundreds of such individuals remained at large. The Court expressed concern over the apparent laxity or external pressure influencing police performance in executing lawful arrests. Emphasizing that the police must operate independently to maintain law and order and protect the community, the Court directed the Additional Inspector General of Police to ensure the apprehension of all such absconding accused and submit a progress report. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the petitioner's bail petition for non-prosecution due to his persistent absence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the persistent absence of a petitioner seeking pre-arrest bail warrant dismissal of the petition for non-prosecution?
  • What is the constitutional obligation of the police regarding the arrest of accused persons whose pre-arrest bail applications have been rejected by courts?
  • Can the Supreme Court take judicial notice of the failure of law enforcement agencies to apprehend accused persons whose bail has been refused?
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• Ministry Of Finance through Secretary and others vs Syed Afroz Akhtar Rizvi2021 SCMR 1546, 2021 PSC 1570, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-12
  pensionary benefitsqualifying servicecontractual serviceregularizationCivil Service Regulationspay protectionpension eligibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a Federal Service Tribunal judgment which directed that a respondent's contractual service (1992–2008) be counted toward his pensionary benefits following his regularization and subsequent retirement in 2016. The core legal question was whether contractual service can be aggregated with regular service to meet the ten-year 'qualifying service' threshold for pension eligibility under the Civil Service Regulations (CSR). The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's decision, holding that eligibility for pension is strictly contingent upon completing the mandatory qualifying period as a regular employee. The Court clarified that while Article 371-A of the CSR allows contractual service exceeding five years to be factored into the calculation of the pension's quantum, it cannot be used to bridge a deficiency in the qualifying service period required for initial eligibility. Since the respondent served only eight years post-regularization, he failed to meet the ten-year threshold. The Court reaffirmed that contractual and regular service periods cannot be aggregated to determine pension entitlement.

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• Mian Khalid Perviz vs The State through Special Prosecutor, ANF & anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 180, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 226, 2021 SCMR 522, 2021 SCP 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-26
  narcoticscharaselectronic evidencecall data recordvehicle tracking datare-appraisal of evidencelife imprisonmentQanun-e-Shahadat Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the recovery of 12 kilograms of charas from secret cavities in his vehicle. The Trial Court sentenced him to life imprisonment, a decision upheld by the Islamabad High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal primarily to re-appraise whether the defence evidence, including call data records (CDR) and vehicle tracking data, was properly evaluated. Upon review, the Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the recovery, safe custody, and chemical analysis of the narcotics beyond reasonable doubt. Regarding the electronic evidence, the Court observed that CDR data without transcripts or audio recordings lacks evidentiary value, and tracking data must clearly identify the specific vehicle and be free from signs of tampering. The Court emphasized that while modern technology is admissible under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, it must be proved in accordance with established procedures to prevent manipulation. Finding the defence evidence insufficient to rebut the prosecution's case, the appeal was dismissed.

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• Mian Khalid Mehmood vs Secretary to Govt. of the Punjab, Environment2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 51, 2021 P SC 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-03
  service lawproforma promotionperformance evaluation reportsadministrative delayservice tribunalseniority disputedepartmental promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal judgment that upheld the departmental decision denying the petitioner's promotion. The petitioner challenged his seniority relative to another employee and argued that he was unfairly denied promotion to a higher scale despite a vacancy existing. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's failure to be promoted, due to incomplete Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) and training requirements, was justified when the vacancy was available and the petitioner had completed the requisite training. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner's inability to secure promotion was attributed to administrative delays regarding his PERs, which were beyond his control. The Court held that administrative failures, such as the late arrival or incompleteness of PERs, cannot be penalized against an employee. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, directing that the petitioner's case for proforma promotion be considered based on his PER entries from the date he completed the mandatory training, thereby establishing the principle that an employee should not suffer adverse consequences for administrative lapses in processing their service records.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee be denied promotion due to incomplete Performance Evaluation Reports when the delay is not attributable to the employee?
  • Is a matter regarding seniority considered past and closed if it remains unchallenged for over two decades?
  • Should an employee be granted proforma promotion if they have completed the requisite training and a vacancy was available?
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• Mian Irfan Bashir vs The Deputy Commissioner (D.C.), Lahore, etc2021 SCP 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-27
  suo motu jurisdictionjudicial overreachconstitutional jurisdictionfundamental rightsseparation of powersjudicial reviewhelmet law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal against orders passed by the High Court, which, while deciding a petition concerning signboards and advertisements on Mall Road, Lahore, exercised suo motu powers to direct petrol pumps not to sell fuel to motorcyclists not wearing helmets. The core legal question was whether the High Court could issue directions on matters not forming part of the dispute before it, and whether it possessed suo motu constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199. The Supreme Court held that the High Court does not enjoy suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 and that a lis or dispute must exist before judicial power is exercised. The Court ruled that issuing directions without legal backing or connection to the proceedings constitutes judicial overreach, encroaching upon the legislative and executive domains while violating fundamental rights such as freedom of trade and right to mobility. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the impugned directions were set aside as unconstitutional and without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court possess suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What constitutes judicial overreach by a court in constitutional adjudication?
  • Can a court issue directions affecting fundamental rights without a pending dispute or legal backing?
  • Does a direction prohibiting petrol pump owners from selling fuel to helmetless motorcyclists violate fundamental rights?
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• Mian Irfan Bashir vs The Deputy Commissioner (D.C.), Lahore and others2021 PLD Supreme Court 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-27
  judicial overreachsuo motu jurisdictionseparation of powersjudicial activismconstitutional jurisdictionfundamental rightsjudicial reviewmotor vehicle ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court order issued during a constitutional petition concerning shop signboards on Mall Road, Lahore. The High Court, exercising suo motu powers, directed that petrol pumps must not sell fuel to motorcyclists not wearing helmets, threatening to seal non-compliant stations. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court possessed suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 and whether such a ban had legal backing. The Court held that Article 199 requires an application by an aggrieved party and does not confer suo motu jurisdiction. It further ruled that while Section 89-A of the Provincial Motor Vehicle Ordinance, 1965 mandates helmets, no law or policy authorizes a ban on fuel sales for non-compliance. The Court characterized the direction as 'judicial overreach' and 'judicial legislation' that encroached upon executive and legislative domains, violating the separation of powers and fundamental rights under Articles 9 and 18. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned directions as unconstitutional and without jurisdiction.

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• Mian Hikmatullah Jan vs Chairman And Members Of Selection2022 SCMR 687 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-22
  Additional District and Sessions Judgepracticing advocateRoll of Advocatesdisqualificationbar council
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld his disqualification from appointment to the post of Additional and District Sessions Judge. The core legal question was whether the petitioner fulfilled the eligibility requirement of being a practicing advocate given that his name had been struck off from the Roll of Advocates by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner's name was struck off the roll pursuant to an executive order, he was not a practicing advocate at the relevant time and thus failed to fulfill the mandatory criteria advertised for the post. The Court laid down the principle that a candidate whose name is removed from the roll of advocates lacks the requisite standing as a practicing advocate for judicial appointments requiring such experience, and unauthorized practice during such period warrants notice by the concerned bar council.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate whose name has been struck off the Roll of Advocates is eligible for appointment as an Additional District and Sessions Judge?
  • Does a person whose advocate license has been suspended or whose name is removed from the roll qualify as a practicing advocate?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Haroon Riaz Lucky and another vs The State and others2021 PLJ SC (Cr.C. ) 250, 2021 SCMR 56 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-30
  gas theftFIR quashmentpolice powerscognizable offenceGas Utility Courtcriminal investigationstatutory interpretationGas (Theft, Control and Recovery) Act 2016
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for the quashment of an FIR registered for gas theft, where the petitioners contended that the Gas (Theft, Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 superseded the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, thereby divesting the police of authority to register FIRs, conduct searches, or effect arrests. The core legal question was whether the Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to Gas Utility Courts to the exclusion of police investigative powers. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Act does not abolish the police's procedural powers to investigate and arrest suspects for gas theft, except for specific protections provided to domestic consumers. The Court clarified that the statutory requirement for a written complaint by an authorized person is a condition for the Gas Utility Court to take cognizance, not a bar to the initiation of criminal proceedings by the police. Consequently, the police retain their plenary powers to investigate cognizable offences, and factual disputes regarding liability must be resolved through trial rather than quashment proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Gas (Theft, Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 divest the police of the power to register an FIR for gas theft?
  • Is the requirement of a written complaint by an authorized person a bar to the police conducting an investigation into gas theft?
  • Can factual controversies regarding the liability of an accused be resolved through a petition for the quashment of an FIR?
  • Does the Gas (Theft, Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 grant exclusive jurisdiction to Gas Utility Courts to the exclusion of police investigative powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd vs Zeeshan Usmani and others2021 P C T L R 905, 2021 SCMR 609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-18
  master and servantcontractual employmentregularization of servicevested rightafflux of timeconstitutional jurisdictionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment directing the regularization of contract employees of Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. The core legal questions were whether contract employees governed by the principle of 'master and servant' possess a vested right to regularization, and whether the respondents were entitled to the same relief granted to their colleagues despite a significant delay in filing their petitions after the termination of their contracts. The Supreme Court held that contract employees have no vested right to regularization, particularly in the absence of statutory service rules. The Court distinguished the present case from the respondents' colleagues, noting that the colleagues were still in service when they sought relief, whereas the respondents filed their petitions eight months after their contracts had expired by afflux of time. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, establishing that courts cannot force an employer to reinstate or regularize contract employees whose employment has already ceased, especially when no continuity of service exists.

  Questions settled

  • Do contract employees governed by the principle of 'master and servant' have a vested right to claim regularization?
  • Can a court order the regularization of employees whose contracts have already expired by afflux of time?
  • Does the principle in Hameed Akhtar Niazi v. Secretary Establishment Division regarding the extension of benefits to non-litigating parties apply to contract employees whose service relationship has ceased?
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• Messrs Shahid Gul And Partners vs Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Audit-v, Rto, Peshawar2021 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-14
  income taxdeductible expensesdepreciationamortizationcapital expenditurerevenue expenditureimmovable propertystructural improvement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which had disallowed the appellant's claimed deductions and depreciation regarding the cost of land and construction of a multi-storey commercial building (Dean Trade Centre). The core legal questions were whether the cost of land is a capital or revenue expenditure when dealing with the sale of constructed immovable property, and whether depreciation can be claimed on improved land under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in rejecting the deductions as premature or barred under Section 21(n). The Court ruled that the cost of land sold with the shops is deductible under Section 20(1) as business expenditure. Furthermore, the appellant is entitled to depreciation under Section 22 on structural improvements made to the unsold portion of the land, but the cost of the land itself must be excluded from the depreciable value pursuant to Section 22(13)(b). Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the Appellate Tribunal, restoring the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cost of land purchased for constructing and selling shops can be deducted as a business expense under Section 20(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether the registration of sale deeds of individual shops is a mandatory prerequisite under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for a taxpayer to claim deductions for the cost of construction and land?
  • Can a taxpayer claim depreciation under Section 22 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on structural improvements made to unsold land used for business purposes?
  • Does the value of a 'building' for the purposes of depreciation under Section 22 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 include the cost of the land beneath the structure?
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• Messrs Nishat Mills Limited and another vs The Commissioner Of Income/2021 SCMR 1819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-30
  income tax assessmentrevision of assessmentadministrative guidancestatutory dutytax referenceInspecting Additional CommissionerIncome Tax Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns tax reference petitions filed by assessees against a High Court judgment regarding the revision of assessment orders. The core legal question was whether an Inspecting Additional Commissioner (IAC), having previously consulted on or approved an assessment order made by an Income Tax Officer (ITO), is legally precluded from subsequently revising that same order under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court held that the legal effect of such prior involvement depends on whether the assessment was made under Section 62(2) of the 1979 Ordinance, which creates a statutory duty of assistance and triggers an irrebuttable presumption of law precluding revision, or under the general administrative guidance provisions of Section 7, which requires a factual determination of the intensity of the IAC's involvement. The Court clarified that mere administrative consultation under Section 7 does not automatically preclude revision; rather, the degree of involvement must be sufficient to show the officer materially participated in the assessment. As the petitioners failed to establish authorization under Section 62(2) or sufficient intensity of involvement under Section 7, the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Inspecting Additional Commissioner's prior consultation on an assessment order under Section 7 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 automatically preclude them from revising that order under Section 66-A?
  • Does Section 62(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 create an irrebuttable presumption of law that precludes an assisting officer from revising an assessment order they participated in?
  • Is the determination of whether an officer's involvement in an assessment precludes their subsequent revision of that assessment a question of law or a question of fact under Section 7 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the mere fact of consultation or approval by a superior officer in the tax hierarchy render them functus officio regarding their revisionary powers under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
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• Messrs Cherat Cement Co. Ltd., Nowshera and others vs Federation Of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others2021 PLD Supreme Court 327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  review petitionGIDC Act 2015res judicataconstitutionality of statutejudgment in remFederal Consolidated FundPublic Accountsame bench rule
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of civil review petitions seeking review of the Supreme Court's prior judgment dated 13.08.2020, which upheld the constitutional validity of the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess Act, 2015 (GIDC Act, 2015). The petitioners argued multiple grounds including the misapplication of the doctrine of res judicata, non-utilization of collected funds, improper classification of rates, and procedural issues regarding the constitution of the review bench. By a majority of 2:1, the Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions. The majority held that where a statute is declared intra vires by the apex court, that determination operates in rem and applies uniformly, overriding conflicting lower court decisions on constitutionality and rendering the doctrine of res judicata inapplicable to preserve such conflicts. The court clarified that statutory benefits under Section 8(2) of the Act remain enforceable according to law and extended the time/installments for recovering accrued arrears. In dissent, Shah, J. maintained that review benches must preserve original numeric strength and composition, and voted to recall the direction to recover arrears, apply res judicata to decree-holders, and direct placement of funds in the Public Account.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of res judicata apply to prevent the uniform application of a statute across similarly placed entities when the apex court has declared the statute intra vires the Constitution?
  • Does an unchallenged judgment of a High Court declaring a law unconstitutional remain binding on the parties thereto after the Supreme Court subsequently declares the same law constitutionally valid in separate proceedings?
  • What is the scope and requirement of 'same bench' under Order XXVI Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 for hearing review petitions?
  • Whether Cess collected for a specific statutory purpose under a fee-levying enactment forms part of the Federal Consolidated Fund or the Public Account under Article 78 of the Constitution?
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• Meraj Din and another vs Muhammad Sharif and another2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-05
  pre-emptionlimitation periodregistered sale deeddate of execution versus date of registrationphysical possessionnotice of sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether the period of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit under Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908 commences from the date of execution of the sale deed or from the date of its registration. The respondents purchased the property via a sale deed executed on 8.5.1975 and registered on 26.5.1975. The appellants filed a pre-emption suit on 25.5.1976. The trial court and appellate court decreed the suit, but the High Court dismissed it as time-barred, relying on Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 to reckon limitation from the date of execution. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that Article 10 of the Limitation Act bifurcates into physical possession and registration, and where physical possession is not established, limitation starts from the date the instrument of sale is registered. The Court laid down that Section 47 of the Registration Act governs inter partes title transfer and does not curtail or advance a pre-emptor's statutory limitation period, which commences from registration to ensure proper notice of the sale.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period of limitation for a pre-emption suit under Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908 begin from the date of execution of the sale deed or the date of its registration?
  • Does Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 operate to curtail the limitation period available to a pre-emptor who is not a party to the sale transaction?
  • Is a mere recital of delivery of possession in a sale deed sufficient proof of physical possession for the purpose of computing limitation in a pre-emption suit?
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• Member (Administration), Federal Board of Revenue etc vs Mian Khan2021 PLJ SC 265, 2021 SCP 154, 2021 PSC 1426, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-26
  compulsory retirementreduction in rankCCTV footageforensic examinationregular inquirydepartmental proceedingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which set aside the major penalties of compulsory retirement and reduction in rank imposed on the respondent, a Customs Havaldar. The respondent had been departmentally proceeded against without a regular inquiry on allegations of receiving a bribe from passengers, based solely on CCTV footage. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the petitioner department dispensed with a regular inquiry and relied entirely on the CCTV footage without obtaining a forensic science laboratory report to verify its authenticity. Applying established precedent, the Court held that in the absence of a forensic examination, audit, or test, it is unsafe to rely on audio or video recordings as evidence due to the ease of tampering and editing. Furthermore, the passengers who allegedly paid the bribe were not associated with the proceedings. Finding no question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can unverified CCTV footage, without a forensic science laboratory report, serve as the sole legal basis to impose a major penalty in departmental proceedings?
  • Is the dispensation of a regular inquiry justified when the primary evidence consists of electronic media that has not undergone forensic audit or verification?
  • Can an audio or video recording be safely relied upon as evidence in a court of law without a forensic examination to rule out editing, doctoring, or tampering?
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• Member (Administration), Federal Board Of Revenue and others vs Mian2021 SCMR 1077 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-20
  service appealCCTV footageforensic examinationregular inquirycompulsory retirementdisciplinary proceedingspublic servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, was filed by the Federal Board of Revenue to assail the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which set aside the penalties of compulsory retirement and subsequent reduction in rank imposed on the respondent, a Customs official. The core legal question was whether a departmental penalty of compulsory retirement could be validly imposed based solely on CCTV footage without conducting a regular inquiry or obtaining a forensic report verifying the authenticity of the footage. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a forensic examination by a laboratory, unverified CCTV footage cannot be considered a legal basis for establishing guilt or dispensing with a regular inquiry, especially when modern technology permits tampering. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, dismissed the petition, and refused leave to appeal, laying down the principle that unverified electronic evidence such as CCTV footage requires forensic corroboration before it can be relied upon in disciplinary proceedings against a public servant.

  Questions settled

  • Can unverified CCTV footage serve as a sole legal basis for imposing a major penalty in departmental proceedings without a regular inquiry?
  • Is a forensic report necessary to establish the authenticity of video or CCTV evidence used against a public servant in disciplinary matters?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere under Article 212(3) of the Constitution with a well-reasoned judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal when no question of law of public importance is raised?
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• Mehmood Qaisar vs The State and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 159, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 459, 2021 SCMR 510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-17
  dishonoured chequehabitual offendercriminal convictionsentence reductiondocumentary evidencefinancial obligation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from a conviction under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, where the petitioner was sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment for issuing a dishonoured cheque. The core legal question concerned whether the conviction was sustainable given the reliance on photocopies of the impugned cheque and bank slip, and whether the petitioner was entitled to a reduction in sentence. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, noting that the bank manager had confirmed the issuance and presentation of the cheque, and the Investigating Officer had verified the documents. The Court rejected the petitioner's plea for leniency, emphasizing that the petitioner was a habitual offender with five other pending cases of an identical nature. The holding established that where the issuance of a cheque for a financial obligation is undisputed and verified by banking officials, the conviction is sound, and a history of habitual offending precludes the exercise of judicial discretion to reduce a lawfully awarded sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 be sustained when based on verified photocopies of a dishonoured cheque?
  • Does a history of habitual offending in similar financial crimes preclude the reduction of a sentence?
  • Is the testimony of a bank manager sufficient to establish the dishonour of a cheque in criminal proceedings?
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• Masveer Ahmed alias Aziz Armed vs Azhar Ali and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-17
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailtrial delayjudicial discretioncriminal procedureexpeditious trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal sought the cancellation of bail granted to Respondent No. 1 by the Peshawar High Court in a case involving offences under Sections 324 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged the bail grant, arguing that the High Court's reasoning was unsustainable given the specific evidence, including the recovery of different sets of bullet casings. The Respondent No. 1 contended that he had been on bail for over three years without abusing the concession, that the trial had been significantly delayed without fault on his part, and that the petition was motivated by a desire to pressure him into a compromise regarding a separate criminal matter. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion. The Court held that where an accused has remained on bail for a significant period without misusing the concession or being responsible for trial delays, cancellation of bail is not warranted. The petition was dismissed, with a directive to the Trial Court to ensure the expeditious disposal of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the cancellation of bail justified when an accused has remained on bail for a significant period without misusing the concession?
  • Should an appellate court interfere with the discretion exercised by a High Court in granting bail when there is no evidence of misuse of the concession?
  • Does the lack of progress in a trial, where the delay is not attributable to the accused, constitute a ground for refusing the cancellation of bail?
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• Masveer Ahmed alias Aziz Ahmed vs Azhar Ali and another2021 SC MR 1476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-17
  cancellation of bailpost-arrest bailtrial delayjudicial discretioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner seeking the cancellation of bail granted to respondent No. 1 by the Peshawar High Court in a criminal case registered under sections 324 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's discretion in granting bail to the respondent should be interfered with, given the petitioner's contention that the respondent's involvement was substantiated by evidence recovered from the crime scene. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's order, holding that the respondent had remained on bail for over three and a half years without any allegation of misuse of the concession or responsibility for trial delays. The Court emphasized that the cancellation of bail is an extraordinary measure and is not warranted where the accused has not abused the concession of bail and where the trial has been significantly delayed without fault on the part of the accused. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with a directive to the Trial Court to ensure expeditious disposal of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the discretion exercised by a High Court in granting bail when the accused has remained on bail for a significant period without abusing the concession?
  • Does the absence of trial delay attributable to the accused justify the refusal to cancel bail?
  • Is the cancellation of bail appropriate when there is no evidence that the accused has misused the concession of bail?
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• Maqbool Ahmed Mahessar & 2 others vs NAB through its Chairman and others2021 SCMR 1166, 2021 SCP 164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-05-04
  pre-arrest bailpost-arrest bailNAB referencedeposit of embezzled amountabuse of process of lawconsent orderbarter freedomremand
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard petitions challenging orders of the High Court of Sindh, Sukkur Bench, which granted pre-arrest and post-arrest bails to accused persons in various National Accountability Bureau (NAB) references based on consent and conditional upon depositing the amounts allegedly embezzled. The core issue before the Court was whether bail can be lawfully granted in NAB references in exchange for depositing the allegedly embezzled amounts. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them, setting aside the impugned orders and remitting the bail petitions back to the High Court for fresh decision on merits. The Court held that conditioning or granting bail in lieu of monetary deposits is ultra vires and amounts to bartering freedom. An accused seeking post-arrest bail must satisfy the legal parameters established in the Talat Ishaq case, while pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary equitable remedy strictly confined to protecting innocent citizens from harassment and abuse of process, as settled in Hidayat Ullah Khan's case, and cannot be granted routinely on consent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court lawfully grant pre-arrest or post-arrest bail to an accused in a NAB reference in lieu of depositing the allegedly embezzled amount?
  • Is a consent-based order directing the deposit of embezzled public funds valid for admitting an accused to bail in NAB proceedings?
  • Under what specific circumstances and legal principles can the extraordinary remedy of pre-arrest bail be extended to an accused facing a cognizable and non-bailable offence?
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• Manzuor Elahi vs President, UBL & others2021 P SC 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-18
  service tribunalabatement of proceedingsfinality of judgmentback benefitsgolden handshake schemejudicial implementationservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's miscellaneous petition for lack of jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had not been challenged before the Supreme Court, attained finality and remained executable despite the subsequent ruling in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam (PLD 2006 SC 602). The Court held that, based on the clarification provided in Muhammad Idrees v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 681), judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal that were never assailed before the Supreme Court attained finality and were not subject to abatement. Consequently, the Tribunal's judgment in the appellant's favor was valid and executable. The key principle laid down is that the abatement doctrine established in Mubeen-us-Salam applies only to proceedings pending before the Supreme Court; cases where the Tribunal's judgment was not challenged remain final and binding. Given the excessive delay and the appellant's superannuation, the Court directed the respondent-bank to pay the appellant's dues based on the bank's Golden Handshake/Voluntary Separation Scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Do judgments rendered by the Federal Service Tribunal that were never challenged before the Supreme Court attain finality?
  • Does the doctrine of abatement established in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam apply to cases where the Federal Service Tribunal's judgment was not challenged before the Supreme Court?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct the payment of dues under a voluntary separation scheme to an employee whose reinstatement judgment was not implemented?
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• Manzoor Elahi vs President, UBL and others2021 PLC (C.S.) 544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-18
  Section 2-Aabatement of proceedingsFederal Service Tribunalexecution of tribunal judgmentpast and closed transactionreinstatementVoluntary Separation Scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing an employee's application for implementation of a service judgment for lack of jurisdiction following the striking down of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam. The core legal question was whether a judgment of the Service Tribunal, rendered under Section 2-A before the Mubeen-us-Salam judgment and never challenged before the Supreme Court, abated or attained finality and remained executable. The Supreme Court held that as clarified in Muhammad Idrees, judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal based on Section 2-A that were never challenged before the Supreme Court attained finality, did not abate, and were required to be implemented by the concerned organizations without further litigation. To avoid subjecting the appellant to another round of litigation after years of delay, the Court exercised its jurisdiction to direct the respondent bank to pay the appellant financial dues under a Voluntary Separation Scheme as if he had remained in service.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal rendered under Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 abate if it was never challenged before the Supreme Court?
  • Are judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal that were not appealed before the Supreme Court binding and executable as final orders?
  • Which forum is appropriate for executing a final judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal where the Tribunal subsequently lost jurisdiction following the declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 2-A?
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• Manzoor Elahi vs President UBL and others2021 SCMR 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-18
  service appealabatement of proceedingsfinality of judgmentimplementation of tribunal orderservice tribunal jurisdictionback benefitsgolden handshake scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the Federal Service Tribunal's dismissal of the appellant's petition for implementation of a reinstatement order, citing lack of jurisdiction following the Supreme Court's judgment in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal's judgment, which the respondent-bank had not challenged, had abated or attained finality. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's judgment had attained finality because it was never challenged before the Supreme Court. Relying on the clarification provided in Muhammad Idrees v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, the Court affirmed that only cases pending before the Supreme Court at the time of the Mubeen-us-Salam ruling were subject to abatement. Consequently, the Court ruled that the Tribunal's judgment was executable. Given the significant delay and the appellant's superannuation, the Court directed the respondent-bank to pay the appellant's dues under its Golden Handshake/Voluntary Separation Scheme, treating him as if he were in service at the relevant time, thereby ensuring justice and preventing further litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal that was never challenged before the Supreme Court abate following the ruling in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan?
  • Are judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal rendered on the basis of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act 1973, which were not challenged before the Supreme Court, considered final and executable?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct the implementation of a Service Tribunal judgment through a financial settlement scheme when reinstatement is no longer practical due to the efflux of time?
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• Manzoor Ahmed and others vs The State2021 SCMR 2002, 2021 SCP 382, 2022 P SC (Crl.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-12
  abductionrapesexual assaultsentence reductioncorroborationmedical evidencefirst offenders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal petitions for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, which convicted the petitioners for abduction, causing hurt, and rape. The core legal questions involved whether the conviction for sexual assault could be sustained based on the prosecutrix's testimony without DNA analysis, and whether the sentences of certain petitioners could be reduced to the period already undergone. The Supreme Court held that the consistent testimony of the prosecutrix, corroborated by medical evidence of pregnancy and the injuries sustained by family members during the abduction, was sufficient to establish guilt, rendering DNA analysis unnecessary in the circumstances. The Court affirmed the conviction for rape. Regarding the other petitioners, the Court exercised discretion to reduce their sentences to the period already undergone, contingent upon the payment of compensation to the injured parties, noting their status as first offenders. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of a victim of sexual assault, when consistent and corroborated by medical evidence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even in the absence of DNA profiling.

  Questions settled

  • Is DNA analysis a mandatory requirement for sustaining a conviction in a rape case?
  • Can a conviction for sexual assault be sustained solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix if corroborated by medical evidence?
  • Does the court have the discretion to reduce sentences to the period already undergone for first-time offenders under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Manzoor Ahmed Akhtar vs The State2021 P S c (Crl.) 138, 2021 SCMR 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-09
  forgerycriminal breach of trustfraudulent reinstatementanticorruptionbenefit of doubtculpabilityfake judicial order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Secondary School Teacher, challenged his conviction for using a forged High Court judgment to secure reinstatement and financial benefits following his earlier criminal conviction. After being reinstated based on the fake acquittal order, he faced prosecution by the Anti-Corruption Department. While a Special Judge convicted him on multiple counts, the High Court modified the judgment, setting aside convictions under Sections 409, 420, and 467 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while maintaining others and adding a conviction under Section 466. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could escape criminal liability for using a forged document to secure employment benefits, particularly when a co-accused was acquitted. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's disclaimer regarding the fake judgment was meritless, as he was the sole beneficiary of the fraud. The Court affirmed that the acquittal of a co-accused does not automatically invalidate the case against the principal offender where evidence distinctly points to his culpability. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no grounds to interfere with the lower courts' findings regarding the petitioner's guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a beneficiary of a forged judicial order disclaim knowledge of the forgery to escape criminal liability?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused automatically invalidate the prosecution's case against the principal offender?
  • Is a public servant liable for criminal charges when using a fake acquittal order to secure reinstatement and service benefits?
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• Mamoon Wazir, etc. (in both cases) vs Abwa Knowledge Village (Pvt)2021 SCP 396, 2022 PSC 480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-27
  medical admissionMDCATPakistan Medical Commissionprivate medical collegesubordinate legislationstatutory interpretationadmission criteria
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions filed by newly enrolled medical and dental students whose admissions to a private medical college were cancelled because they failed to pass the mandatory Medical and Dental Colleges Admissions Test (MDCAT). The petitioners challenged the pre-admission requirement of MDCAT introduced under Section 18 of the Pakistan Medical Commission Act 2020, arguing that it violated the Admission Regulations (Amended) 2020-2021, as the college's prospectus did not mandate MDCAT. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the statutory provisions and regulations, holding that Section 18 of the Act clearly mandates MDCAT as a basic minimum requirement across the board for all public and private medical and dental colleges in Pakistan. The Court ruled that any criteria or entrance tests devised by private colleges are in addition to, and cannot substitute, the statutory minimum of MDCAT. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that subordinate regulations cannot dilute or dispense with mandatory statutory requirements. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Medical and Dental Colleges Admissions Test (MDCAT) is a mandatory statutory requirement for admission to private medical colleges under the Pakistan Medical Commission Act 2020?
  • Can a private medical college dispense with the statutory requirement of MDCAT through its own prospectus or admission criteria?
  • Can subordinate regulations dilute, override, or dispense with a mandatory requirement established by primary legislation?
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• Malik Munsif Awan, Advocate, Chairman, Pakistan Justice Party, Lahore vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law & Justice, Islamabad & others2021 PLD Supreme Court 379, 2021 P SC 638, 2021 SCP 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-18
  Special Assistants to the Prime MinisterRules of Business 1973Dual NationalityDisqualification of ParliamentariansTrichotomy of PowersJudicial RestraintExecutive DiscretionService of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the Islamabad High Court's judgment dismissing a Constitutional Petition that challenged the appointment of several Special Assistants to the Prime Minister (SAPMs). The appointments, made pursuant to Rule 4(6) of the Rules of Business, 1973, were challenged on grounds of alleged cronyism, arbitrariness, and ineligibility due to dual nationality under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. The core legal questions pertained to the constitutional validity of Rule 4(6), whether dual nationals are barred from appointment as SAPMs, and if conferring the status of Minister of State violates constitutional qualifications for parliamentarians. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing leave to appeal. The Court held that SAPMs are neither parliamentarians nor in the 'Service of Pakistan' under Article 260; thus, the disqualifications in Articles 62 and 63(1)(c) do not apply to them. Conferring the status of Minister of State on an SAPM does not make them a constitutional Minister. Consequently, the Prime Minister's discretion to appoint SAPMs is lawful, and judicial restraint governs unless blatant illegality or arbitrariness is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Are dual nationals disqualified under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution from being appointed as Special Assistants to the Prime Minister?
  • Is Rule 4(6) of the Rules of Business, 1973 constitutionally valid under Articles 90 and 99(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does conferring the status of a Minister of State upon a Special Assistant to the Prime Minister legally transform that person into a Minister of State or Cabinet member?
  • Does the office of Special Assistant to the Prime Minister fall within the definition of 'Service of Pakistan' under Article 260 of the Constitution?
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• Major (R) Muhammad Iftikhar Khan vs The State and another2022 SCMR 885, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-02
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayconclusion of trialattempted murderinterlocutory applicationsdelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an application under Order XXXIII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules 1980, seeking entertainment of a fresh criminal petition for post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay in a case involving Sections 324, 429, 148, 149, 337-D, and 337-F(v) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail on statutory delay grounds when the non-conclusion of trial within a stipulated timeframe is largely attributable to acts of the accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the application, holding that perusal of trial court records showed the delay was primarily caused by the applicant filing numerous interlocutory applications, including applications for acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, stay of proceedings, and re-examination of injured persons. The Court affirmed the settled principle that bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right on statutory grounds when the delay is attributable to the accused, particularly where prosecution evidence is nearly complete.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay if the delay in trial is attributable to the accused?
  • Can bail on statutory grounds be claimed as a matter of right where trial delay is caused by frequent interlocutory applications filed by the defence?
  • Whether post-arrest bail on statutory grounds should be granted when prosecution evidence is substantially complete?
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• Liaqat Ali and others vs The State and others2021 SCMR 455, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-26
  Criminal AppealAnti-Terrorism ActMurderAcquittalConvictionBenefit of DoubtOcular AccountIndependent CorroborationWitness ReliabilityFalse Implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved criminal appeals against convictions and sentences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for the murder of eight persons and injury to five others, alongside appeals against the acquittal of other co-accused. The core legal question revolved around the reappraisal of evidence, specifically the reliability of the ocular account and the necessity of independent corroboration, especially when co-accused attributed similar roles had been acquitted, or witnesses were found untruthful. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals of Liaqat Ali, Mian Khan, and Mehdi Khan, setting aside their convictions and sentences, and acquitted them by extending the benefit of doubt. The Court dismissed the appeals against the acquittal of other private respondents. The key principles established include that witnesses found false in material aspects should not be relied upon for other depositions, and independent corroboration is crucial when the ocular account is unreliable or witnesses have falsely implicated others. Motive based on long-standing enmity can lead to false implication, requiring careful scrutiny.

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