Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Shahbaz Ali Khalid and another vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 123, 2019 SCMR 2012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-02
  explosive substancessuicide vestbenefit of the doubtcriminal appealreappraisal of evidenceterrorismacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions filed against the concurrent convictions of the petitioners under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relating to the alleged recovery of a suicide vest and detonators. The core legal question is whether the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for heinous terrorist offences beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in the face of missing travel details, lack of independent corroboration, procedural flaws in the search, and absence of an expert report on the contraband. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the convictions, holding that slipshod, incoherent, and suspect evidence cannot sustain life imprisonment, and the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused. The key principle laid down is that even in cases with heinous contours, the prosecution must prove its case through unimpeachable evidence, and convictions cannot rest on doubtful investigative steps and non-expert testimony regarding explosive materials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conviction for possession of explosive substances can be sustained on slipshod and suspect evidence?
  • Is the absence of independent corroboration and travel documentation fatal to a prosecution case alleging apprehension from a public vehicle?
  • Can unverified testimony by a non-expert establish the lethal explosive potential of seized contraband?
  • Whether an accused is entitled to acquittal when the prosecution fails to eliminate reasonable doubts surrounding the genesis of the crime report?
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• Muhammad Rashid Bhatti vs The Director General FIA, Headquarters, Islamabad and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 126, 2018 SCMR 1995 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-21
  inter se senioritysupersessioncivil servantservice tribunaldepartmental promotion committeeproforma promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Muhammad Rashid Bhatti against the Director General FIA and others, challenging the dismissal of his service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal regarding his inter se seniority as an Inspector (BPS-16). The core legal questions involved the applicability of Fundamental Rule 17 (FR-17) regarding seniority upon promotion and supersession, and whether Rule 3(c) of the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993 is ultra vires the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was duly superseded by the Department Promotion Committee on multiple occasions and that FR-17 is inapplicable as the case did not involve a tenure post or wrongful prevention of promotion without fault. The Court further held that the constitutional challenge to Rule 3(c) could not be raised for the first time before the apex court when it was not agitated before the Tribunal, and no point of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution was made out. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Fundamental Rule 17 applies to a civil servant who was lawfully superseded rather than wrongfully prevented from rendering service?
  • Can a legal question regarding the vires of a rule be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court without being urged before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does a supersession approved by the Department Promotion Committee disentitle a civil servant from regaining inter se seniority under Rule 3(c) of the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993?
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• Muhammad Rafiullah etc vs Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd2019 SCP 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-22
  pensionary benefitsvoluntary golden handshake schemeterms and conditions of serviceunilateral alteration of termsdiscriminationpast and closed transactioncontractual statusemployee benefitsstatutory protection
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard petitions for leave to appeal concerning pensionary benefits for former employees of Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd (formerly Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan). The core legal question was whether employees who voluntarily opted for a Golden Handshake Scheme (2002) or the Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (Staff Regulations) 2005, and received benefits based on a revised pension factor of 1.15%, could subsequently claim pension calculated under the Agricultural Development Bank Employees Pension and Gratuity Regulations, 1981, which provided a 2.33% factor. The petitioners also contended that denying them the higher factor was discriminatory and that the Golden Handshake Scheme lacked Federal Government approval. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that employees who voluntarily accepted the terms and benefits of the schemes are bound by their choice, constituting a past and closed transaction. Such voluntary acceptance removes them from the protection against unilateral alteration of service terms. The Court found no discrimination as these employees formed a distinct class, and the challenge to the scheme's approval was not entertainable at this stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can employees who voluntarily opted for a Golden Handshake Scheme and received benefits based on revised pension factors later claim benefits under previous, more advantageous regulations?
  • Does the protection against unilateral alteration of service terms apply to employees who voluntarily accept altered terms and benefits?
  • Is it discriminatory to deny higher pensionary benefits to employees who voluntarily opted for a scheme, while granting them to employees who did not?
  • Can the validity of a voluntary separation scheme be challenged on grounds of lacking statutory approval after employees have voluntarily opted for and received benefits under it?
  • Do employees who voluntarily accept new terms and conditions of service form a distinct class from those who do not, for the purpose of claiming benefits?
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• Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa vs The State2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 611, 2019 SCMR 1068, 2019 SCP 258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-03
  MurderAppealAcquittalPost-mortem delayEyewitness testimonyDoubtful recoveryPolice custodyCriminal Procedure CodePakistan Penal CodeBenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns an appeal against the conviction and life imprisonment of Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa for murder under Section 302(b) PPC. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to reconsider the Lahore High Court's decision. The core legal questions revolved around the prosecution's failure to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, specifically concerning the suspicious presence of related and chance eyewitnesses at the occurrence, the unestablished motive of a cut watercourse, and significant procedural irregularities. The Court noted an unexplained delay of nearly 22 hours in conducting the post-mortem examination, which, in the absence of justification, suggested time was consumed in fabricating a story and planting witnesses. The Court also found the recovery of the weapon legally inconsequential due to a negative forensic report and doubted the recovery of a crime empty from a double-barrel gun without assertion of reloading. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that unexplained delays and doubtful evidence create a serious dent in the prosecution's case.

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• Muhammad Rafiq vs The State (NAB)PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 484, 2019 SCMR 846, 2019 SCP 268, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-12
  National Accountability Bureaustatutory delegationreferenceassets beyond known sources of incomeChairman NABAccountability Courtcorruption and corrupt practices
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the judgment of the Balochistan High Court, which upheld the conviction of the appellant, a Settlement Patwari, for corruption and corrupt practices under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for owning assets beyond known sources of income. The core legal question was whether a reference filed by a Regional Director of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) was valid and in accordance with the law when the post of Chairman, NAB was vacant at the time of filing. The Supreme Court held that the reference was valid, distinguishing the statutory power of the Chairman to delegate the filing of a reference under Section 18(g) read with Section 34-A from the power to file an appeal under Section 32 which cannot be so delegated. The Court laid down that statutory delegation does not terminate automatically upon a vacancy in the office of the delegator unless specified by law, and that principles of contractual principal-and-agent delegation do not apply to statutory delegations. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference filed by a Regional Director of NAB is valid when the office of the Chairman, NAB is vacant?
  • Does the power of the Chairman, NAB to delegate the filing of a reference under Section 18(g) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 terminate when the delegator leaves office?
  • Are the principles of principal and agent applicable to statutory delegation under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Is the authority to file a reference under Section 18(g) distinct from the authority to file an appeal under Section 32 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
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• Muhammad Rafiq vs State (NAB)2019 SCMR 846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-12
  National Accountability Ordinancestatutory delegationreference maintainabilityassets beyond known sources of incomeChairman NAB vacancydelegation of powerscorruption and corrupt practices
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Balochistan High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant, a Settlement Patwari, for corruption and corrupt practices under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for owning assets beyond his known sources of income. The core legal question was whether a reference filed by the Regional Director, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) was legally valid and maintainable when the post of Chairman, NAB was vacant at the time of filing. The Court held that the reference was validly filed, distinguishing the power to file a reference under Section 18(g) from the power to file an appeal under Section 32. The Court laid down the principle that the statutory delegation of powers by the Chairman, NAB under Section 34A does not lapse upon a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, as statutory delegation is distinct from contractual principal-agent relationships, and that the Director General, NAB was duly authorized by SRO to file references against government officials in BPS-16 and below.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a reference filed by an authorized officer of the National Accountability Bureau is maintainable when the office of the Chairman, NAB is vacant?
  • Does a statutory delegation of powers under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 lapse when the delegator vacates office?
  • Are the powers of the Chairman, NAB to file a reference under Section 18(g) and to file an appeal under Section 32 distinct functions under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Can principles of contractual principal and agent be applied to statutory delegations made under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
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• Muhammad Qasim vs The State2019 SCP 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-27
  double murdergrave and sudden provocationhonour killingreappraisal of evidencereduction of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court upholding the appellant's conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for double murder, while reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The core legal question was whether the murders were committed under grave and sudden provocation, attracting section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, or constituted honour killings under the proviso to the same section. The Supreme Court held that the evidence established the killings occurred under sudden and grave provocation when the appellant found the deceased in a compromising position, distinguishing it from premeditated honour killings. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the convictions under section 302(b) and substituting them with convictions under section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing the sentence to twenty years rigorous imprisonment on each count. The key principle laid down is that grave and sudden provocation resulting in a loss of self-control must be distinguished from calculated murders committed in the name or on the pretext of honour.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a murder committed under grave and sudden provocation falls under section 302(c) rather than section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a murder committed on the pretext of honour differ from a sudden act prompted by grave provocation?
  • Can the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be extended upon the conversion of a sentence?
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• Muhammad Pervaiz vs The State, etc2019 SCP 172, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-06
  qatl-e-amdbenefit of doubtappraisal of evidencesuspicious testimonyburden of proofcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a criminal appeal challenging the conviction of the appellant for the qatl-e-amd of his wife under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, which was upheld with modification of sentence by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether a conviction can be sustained on presumptions, implausible explanations by the accused, or suspicious testimony of ocular witnesses when co-accused identically placed have been acquitted. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution must prove its case through positive and reliable evidence, and suspicions or failure of the accused to establish innocence cannot substitute legal proof. The Court set aside the conviction, extending the benefit of the doubt to the appellant, and laid down the principle that a criminal case must be decided on the basis of credible prosecution evidence, and a suspect cannot be condemned on the basis of moral satisfaction or presumptions in the absence of evidentiary certainty.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on the basis of presumptions or the failure of the accused to provide a plausible explanation?
  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses found suspicious by the court can be relied upon to maintain a conviction?
  • Does the rejection of prosecution evidence against a co-accused weaken the case against the remaining accused whose role is intertwined?
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• Muhammad Pervaiz vs State, etc_PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  qatl-e-amdbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidencecriminal appealburden of proofwitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the qatl-e-amd of his wife, Kausar Bibi, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellant strangulated the deceased in the presence of witnesses who had arrived to take her back due to marital disputes. The trial court convicted the appellant, and the High Court maintained the conviction while commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven its case, particularly given that the High Court itself expressed suspicion regarding the presence of the witnesses at the scene. The Court held that the prosecution failed to provide positive proof of guilt, noting that the witnesses' presence was doubtful and their testimony regarding the co-accused had already been rejected. Emphasizing that suspicion cannot substitute for legal proof and that an accused cannot be convicted based on a failure to prove innocence, the Court set aside the conviction, extending the benefit of doubt to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted solely on the basis of an implausible explanation for the crime?
  • Does the failure of an accused to explain their presence at the scene of a crime shift the burden of proof to the prosecution?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution witnesses have been disbelieved regarding a co-accused whose role was intertwined with the appellant's?
  • Is suspicion or moral satisfaction sufficient to maintain a criminal conviction in the absence of evidentiary certainty?
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• Muhammad Naeem vs The State, etc2020 PSC (Crl.) 63, 2019 PLD Supreme Court 669, 2019 SCP 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-10
  Control of Narcotic Substances Actmorphine percentagechemical examiner reportadversarial systemfair trialremand of caseacquittal restored
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside the appellants' acquittal under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and remanded the case for fresh chemical analysis and retrial. The core legal question was whether the High Court could act as a prosecutor and order fresh sampling to fill gaps in the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court held that in an adversarial system, a court must act as a neutral umpire and cannot allow parties to fill lacunas or improve weak evidence, as doing so violates the fundamental right to a fair trial. The Court ruled that chemical examiner reports failing to specify the exact percentage of morphine in liquid mixtures cannot sustain a conviction under the Act. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's acquittal was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court can direct the collection of fresh samples and a fresh chemical examiner report to fill lacunas in the prosecution case?
  • Is it mandatory for a liquid preparation or mixture to contain more than 0.2 percent of morphine to qualify as opium or an opium derivative under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can a criminal court allow a party to improve the quality of evidence or fill gaps during trial or appeal in an adversarial system?
  • Does ordering a re-investigation or fresh examination at the appellate stage violate the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution?
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• Muhammad Khalil vs M/s Faisal M.B Corporation, etc2019 SCP 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-14
  auction saleconfirmation of saleexecution proceedingsthrowaway pricevested rightsbanking courtobjection petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order affirming the Banking Court's refusal to confirm a public auction sale. The petitioner, who was the highest bidder, contended that valuable rights had accrued to him after depositing the sale price and that mere inadequacy of price could not justify setting aside an otherwise valid sale. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether an unconfirmed auction sale creates vested rights in the auction purchaser and whether a court can set aside a sale based on a throwaway price and procedural irregularities. The Court held that an auction sale is always subject to confirmation by the court, and until such confirmation is granted, no vested rights accrue to the purchaser. It further ruled that under Order XXI Rules 89 and 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, courts retain the jurisdiction to set aside an auction sale if the property is sold at a throwaway price causing substantial injury, or if the auction process is tainted by material irregularities.

  Questions settled

  • Does an auction purchaser acquire any vested rights in the auctioned property prior to the confirmation of the sale by the court?
  • Can a court set aside an auction sale under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 solely on the ground of inadequacy of the sale price?
  • What is the scope and purpose of Order XXI Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in protecting the interests of a judgment debtor?
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• Muhammad Khalil vs Messrs Faisal M.B. Corporation and others2019 PCTLR 376, 2019 PLJ SC 280, 2019 P.S.C. 1100, 2019 SCMR 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-14
  civil petitionleave to appealauction saleexecution proceedingssetting aside saleinadequacy of priceirregular auctionvested rightsjudgment debtorauction purchaserconfirmation of sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court affirming the setting aside of an auction sale in execution proceedings. The core legal questions revolved around the court's power to set aside an auction due to irregularities or significant undervaluation, and whether an auction purchaser acquires vested rights before judicial confirmation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the land was sold for a paltry sum, substantially below both market value and DC rates, and that the auction proceedings were not conducted at the spot, casting serious doubts on its sanctity. The Court affirmed that it possesses the power to set aside an auction if conducted unlawfully, irregularly, or if the property is sold at a throwaway price, causing substantial injury to the judgment debtor. Inadequacy of sale price alone can justify setting aside a sale. Furthermore, no valuable rights accrue to an auction purchaser until the court confirms the sale, as an auction is always subject to judicial confirmation.

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• Muhammad Juman vs The State & others2019 SCP 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-23
  criminal sentencingreduction of sentenceimprisonment for lifemitigating circumstancesappellate court powersQatl-e-Amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Sindh, which maintained the conviction of the respondents under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 149, but reduced their sentence of life imprisonment to the period already undergone without recording mitigating circumstances or converting the conviction to Section 302(c). The core legal question is whether an appellate court can reduce a sentence below the prescribed statutory minimum for a specific penal clause without converting the conviction or recording valid legal reasons. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that once a conviction under Section 302(b) is maintained, the court must impose either death or imprisonment for life as Ta'zir, and reducing the sentence to 'already undergone' without altering the conviction or assigning reasons is legally flawed and amounts to a mechanical exercise of discretion. The Court laid down the principle that sentencing is a judicial responsibility requiring conscious application of mind, and any departure from statutory parameters or reduction of a sentence must be supported by proper reasoning and, where applicable, appropriate alteration of the conviction clause.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court reduce a sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to the period already undergone without converting the conviction to Section 302(c)?
  • Is it mandatory for a court to record reasons and mitigating circumstances when modifying a sentence?
  • What are the permissible quantum of sentences prescribed under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Muhammad Javed vs The State2019 SCMR 1920 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-25
  rapebenefit of doubtocular evidencecredibility of witnessescriminal appealmedical evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence of rape under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the inconsistencies in the ocular account and the absence of corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the alleged victim did not testify, the eye-witnesses significantly changed their stance from the initial FIR—which alleged only an attempt to commit rape—to claiming they witnessed the actual commission of rape, and the medical evidence failed to support the charge of rape. Furthermore, while a Chemical Examiner's report confirmed the presence of semen, there was no DNA or semen grouping evidence to link the appellant to the victim. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the perpetrator's identity or the non-consensual nature of the act. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and any material improvement or contradiction in witness testimony warrants the extension of the benefit of doubt to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a material improvement in the testimony of eye-witnesses from the initial FIR version undermine their credibility?
  • Can a conviction for rape be sustained solely on a Chemical Examiner's report confirming semen presence without DNA or semen grouping evidence linking the accused?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to establish the identity of the perpetrator or the non-consensual nature of the act through independent evidence?
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• Muhammad Ilyas and Others vs Khizar Hayat son of Hadait Ullah2019 SCP 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-04
  falsus in uno falsus in omnibusperjuryfalse testimonysifting grain from chaffappreciation of evidenceIslamic injunctionscriminal jurisprudencebenefit of the doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses an appeal against a criminal conviction for murder and examines the foundational applicability of the legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus within the Pakistani criminal justice system. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution witnesses had deposed falsely regarding crucial aspects of the occurrence, and thus set aside the appellant's conviction, extending him the benefit of the doubt, while initiating perjury proceedings against a false witness. The core legal question centered on whether the long-standing practice of discarding the rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus—whereby courts sift the grain from the chaff rather than rejecting tainted testimony entirely—should continue, or if it violates Islamic injunctions and statutory provisions penalizing perjury. The Court held that the rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus must henceforth be an integral part of Pakistani criminal jurisprudence, to be applied strictly by all courts, and that any witness found to have resorted to deliberate falsehood on a material aspect must invariably be prosecuted for perjury. The key principle laid down is that allowing deliberate falsehood in judicial proceedings undermines justice, and courts are bound to reject the testimony of a witness found to be deliberately false on material facts in accordance with Islamic principles and statute law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is applicable in criminal cases in Pakistan?
  • Does a witness who deliberately makes a false statement on a material aspect attract prosecution for perjury under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Is the practice of sifting the grain from the chaff in ocular testimony in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence and constitutional provisions?
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• Muhammad Faisal Abbas vs The StatePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 449, 2019 SCMR 1285, 2019 SCP 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-21
  criminal appealanti-terrorism acttest identification paradeforensic evidencesentence commutationco-accused acquittalrobberymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction and death sentence for murder, attempted murder, and robbery, which had been upheld by the Lahore High Court. The incident involved a robbery at a shop where the appellant allegedly shot and killed one person and injured another. The Supreme Court re-appraised the evidence, finding the prosecution's case against the appellant solid, supported by a test identification parade and forensic evidence linking the recovered weapon to the crime scene. The Court rejected the appellant's plea of false implication due to enmity. Regarding the co-accused's acquittal, the Court held that the principle of 'abundant caution' allowed for the acquittal of one accused without undermining the case against another when roles are distinct. However, the Court set aside the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, ruling that the crime, while violent, was a robbery without the necessary nexus to terrorism as defined in the Act. Consequently, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, maintaining the other convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused automatically invalidate the conviction of the remaining accused?
  • Does a robbery involving violence necessarily constitute an act of terrorism under the Anti Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment based on the totality of circumstances in a criminal appeal?
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• Muhammad Bilal vs The State, etc2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 443, 2019 SCMR 1362, 2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 446, 2019 SCP 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-15
  qatl-e-amdpersonal vendettaterrorismcourt premisescapital sentenceeyewitness testimonyballistic evidencemens rea
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for qatl-e-amd and terrorism where the appellant shot and killed a person within court precincts to avenge his brother's murder. The prosecution's case rested on the testimony of eyewitnesses, including police officials and the deceased's father, as well as the immediate apprehension of the appellant at the scene with the murder weapon. The core legal question concerned whether a targeted killing motivated by personal vendetta, despite occurring in a sensitive location like a court, constitutes 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, finding the evidence of guilt overwhelming. However, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Court laid down the principle that while an act of violence in court premises may be triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court, a personal vendetta does not automatically fall within the mischief of terrorism unless it possesses the specific nexus and intent contemplated by Section 6 of the Act.

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• Muhammad Azhar Hussain and another vs The State and another2019 PLD Supreme Court 595 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-02
  qatl-i-amdconfessional statementadmissibility of confessionvoluntariness of confessionbenefit of doubtcriminal appealMagistrate's dutycontradictory evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment concerns a criminal appeal and a jail petition challenging convictions for qatl-i-amd under Section 302 PPC, upheld by the High Court. The core legal question revolved around the reliability and admissibility of confessional statements made by the accused before a Judicial Magistrate, which formed the prosecution's mainstay. The Supreme Court held that the confessional statements were inherently flawed and unreliable due to multiple errors. These errors included remarkable similarity and exhaustive detail suggesting a "negotiated settlement" rather than voluntary disclosure, contradictions with a prosecution witness's testimony regarding the accused's presence, and discrepancies with the recovery memo concerning the weapon. The Court emphasized that confessional statements warrant the most careful scrutiny, especially given their irreversible consequences. It further ruled that Magistrates must personally communicate warnings as contemplated by Section 364 Cr.P.C., rather than relying on printed forms, to ensure voluntariness. Finding the confessional statements unreliable and in the absence of evidentiary certainty, the Court set aside the convictions, granting the accused the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can confessional statements be relied upon if they show remarkable similarity and exhaustive detail, suggesting a negotiated settlement rather than a voluntary disclosure?
  • Whether contradictions between confessional statements and other prosecution evidence, such as witness testimony or recovery memos, render the confessions unreliable?
  • Is it sufficient for a Magistrate to obtain an accused's signature on a printed form for administering warnings before recording a confessional statement, or must the warnings be personally communicated?
  • Can a conviction be maintained solely on moral satisfaction without legal proof, especially when confessional statements are found unreliable?
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• Muhammad Azhar Hussain and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-02
  capital punishmentjudicial confessionvoluntary confessionbenefit of the doubtcriminal jurisprudencerejection of confessionmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for the qatl-e-amad of a child, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether judicial confessions heavily relied upon by the prosecution were voluntary, reliable, and sufficient to sustain capital punishment in the presence of material contradictions and procedural flaws in recording. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the convictions, holding that confessional statements bearing striking similarities, inconsistency with ocular testimony, contradictions regarding weapon recovery, and mechanical use of printed forms for statutory warnings cannot form the basis of a safe conviction. The Court laid down that judicial confessions must be scrutinized with utmost care to exclude any possibility of inducement, and that the magistrate must personally and faithfully communicate all statutory warnings under Section 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, rather than relying on printed formats, to ensure evidentiary certainty before imposing capital punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judicial confession showing remarkable similarity and coordination between multiple accused can be considered voluntary and free from taints of inducement?
  • Is a conviction based on judicial confessions sustainable when they contradict the ocular testimony of the prosecution's own witness?
  • Does the use of a printed form to administer warnings vitiate the recording of a confessional statement under Section 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Whether material contradictions between the recovery of the weapon of offence and the narrative given in a confessional statement render the confession unreliable?
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• Muhammad Azam alias Ajju vs The State2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-29
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtmedical evidenceeyewitness credibilitydelayed FIRacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment passed by the High Court, which modified the death sentence initially imposed by the Trial Court for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, given significant discrepancies regarding the time of the FIR, medical evidence contradicting the eyewitness accounts of fasting, unexplained delays in sending bullet casings for forensic analysis, and an unsecured crime scene. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that multiple unresolved doubts and flaws in the prosecution's case vitiated the conviction. The key principle laid down is that cumulative discrepancies regarding eyewitness credibility, medical evidence, and delayed forensic analysis create sufficient doubt to warrant the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether discrepancies between eyewitness testimony and medical evidence regarding the victim having food while allegedly fasting are sufficient to create reasonable doubt?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending recovered bullet casings to the forensic laboratory weaken the prosecution case?
  • Whether serious flaws and contradictions in the prosecution evidence warrant the outright acquittal of an accused rather than a reduction of sentence from death to life imprisonment?
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• Muhammad Azad alias Javaid alias Jodi vs The State, etc2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 441, 2019 SCMR 1330, 2019 SCP 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-22
  qatal-e-Amdkidnapping for ransomcircumstantial evidencecapital punishmentrecoverycall data record
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of death awarded to the appellant for the kidnapping and qatal-e-Amd of a minor child for ransom. The core legal question concerns the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, including identification of the accused, call data records, and recoveries made pursuant to a disclosure under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Supreme Court held that the chain of circumstances was well-synchronized, intrinsically confidence-inspiring, and pointed unequivocally to the guilt of the appellant. The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, affirming the death sentence given the brutality of the offense. The key principle laid down is that a conviction based on a coherent and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence—supported by prompt reporting, trustworthy eyewitness identification, call data records, and successful discoveries under Article 40—remains unassailable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder and kidnapping for ransom can be sustained solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence?
  • Does a disclosure leading to the discovery of a corpse under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 constitute strong incriminating evidence?
  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt by the trial court and the High Court warrant interference when supported by confidence-inspiring evidence?
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• Muhammad Asim and others vs Mst. Samro Begum and others2019 SCP 56 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-15
  family lawmaintenancehaq mehrappellate powersnon-disclosure of earningsadverse inferenceinflationchild maintenance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a family dispute involving a suit for dissolution of marriage, maintenance, and recovery of mehr filed by Mst. Samro Begum against Muhammad Asim. The Family Court decreed the suit, which was subsequently modified by the Appellate Court to include an annual ten percent increase in maintenance and an award of gold as balance haq mehr. Cross-objections filed by the wife were held not maintainable by the Appellate Court. The High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petitions. The core legal questions pertained to the powers of an appellate court under family law to grant relief despite non-maintainable cross-objections, the justification for an annual increase in maintenance, and the legal consequences of a husband's willful non-disclosure of his earnings. The Supreme Court held that an appellate court can grant relief to a respondent to correct a failure of justice, that an annual increase in maintenance accounts for inflation, and that an adverse inference may be drawn against a husband who willfully conceals his salary. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court grant relief in favour of a respondent in family proceedings even if cross-objections were held to be not maintainable?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in increasing maintenance payments annually to cater for inflation?
  • What legal consequence follows when a husband willfully conceals his salary and earnings in maintenance proceedings?
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• Muhammad Ashraf and others vs U.B.L. and others2019 SCMR 1004 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-09
  execution proceedingscourt auctioncondonation of delaylimitationconfirmation of auctionOrder XXI Rule 90 CPCFinancial Institutions Ordinance 2001recovery of decretal amount
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from civil petitions for leave to appeal filed by judgment-debtors challenging the dismissal of their Execution First Appeals by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the dismissal of their objection petitions against court-ordered auctions for recovery of a bank decree. The core legal questions involved whether a petition barred by limitation should be heard on merits alongside connected timely petitions, and whether an Executing Court can mechanically confirm an auction exhibiting severe legal irregularities even where an objection petition lacks statutory deposit requirements under Order XXI, Rule 90, C.P.C. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them, setting aside the impugned judgments and auctions. The Court held that where multiple related petitions are filed, some of which are within time, all should be decided on merits if an order in the timely petition would apply to the time-barred one. Furthermore, an Executing Court cannot automatically confirm an auction without application of mind, and gross violations of auction procedure invalidate the sale regardless of objection maintainability.

  Questions settled

  • Should a time-barred petition be decided on merits alongside connected petitions filed within time where the decision in one applies to the other?
  • Can an Executing Court mechanically confirm an auction without applying its mind even if no valid objection petition is maintainable?
  • Does a physical impossibility in conducting multi-property site auctions simultaneously invalidate the auction proceedings?
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• Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu vs The StatePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 464, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 519, 2019 SCMR 652 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-07
  Criminal appealMurderAcquittalBenefit of doubtEyewitness testimonyPrivate complaintMedical evidenceFSL reportMotiveInconsistencies
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the appellant's conviction for murder under Section 302(b) PPC, initially sentenced to death and later converted to life imprisonment by the High Court. The case originated from a private complaint after the complainant was dissatisfied with the police investigation into the murder of his son. The core legal question revolved around the sufficiency and reliability of the prosecution evidence, particularly the eyewitness accounts, given the acquittal of a co-accused by the High Court based on the same evidence, and significant inconsistencies between the eyewitness statements and medical evidence regarding the deceased's injuries. The Court also noted doubts about the presence of eyewitnesses and the promptness of the FIR. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the appellant's conviction and sentence, and acquitted him. The key principle reiterated was that the benefit of the slightest doubt must go to the accused, and if eyewitnesses are found to be chance witnesses or the prosecution story is concocted, plain acquittal is warranted.

  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad and another vs The State through P.-G., Punjab and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 497, 2019 SCMR 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-06
  post-arrest bailplea of alibifurther inquiryconspiracy and abetmentcriminal appealevidentiary valueincarceration verification
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged an order of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioners in a case involving multiple charges, including murder and terrorism, registered at Police Station City District Mianwali. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given their plea of alibi, supported by evidence that they were incarcerated in Central Jail, Rawalpindi, at the time of the incident. The Supreme Court observed that the District Police Officer (DPO) Mianwali verified the petitioners' confinement in jail during the relevant period. Although the prosecution alleged the petitioners were involved via conspiracy or abetment, the Court noted that the prosecution failed to point to any evidence supporting this claim. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioners' case fell within the ambit of further inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the petitioners, establishing the principle that where a credible plea of alibi is verified by official records and the prosecution fails to substantiate allegations of conspiracy, a case for further inquiry is made out, warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the verification of a plea of alibi by police authorities constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is bail permissible when the prosecution fails to provide evidence of conspiracy or abetment against accused persons who were incarcerated at the time of the alleged offense?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal to grant bail in a criminal matter?
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• Muhammad Amin vs The State and another2020 PSC (Crl.) 386, 2019 SCMR 2057 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-12
  capital sentenceidentification paradeforensic evidence delaybenefit of doubtdiscrepancy in ageacquittalanti-terrorism act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a decision of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of appellant Muhammad Amin under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, along with an acquitted co-accused, fired at a police patrolling party, causing the death of a constable. The Supreme Court evaluated the evidence on record and identified significant contradictions, including a stark discrepancy between the ages of the unknown assailants recorded in the FIR and court statements and the actual age of the appellant. Additionally, the Court noted a substantial delay in sending the recovered empty cartridges to the forensic laboratory, which occurred only after the appellant's arrest. Finding that the evidence failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellant of all charges.

  Questions settled

  • Does a major discrepancy between the age of unknown accused mentioned in an FIR and the actual age of the suspect create reasonable doubt regarding identity?
  • Can a positive forensic science report be relied upon when recovered empty cartridges are dispatched to the laboratory after the arrest of the accused?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal when identification parade results are undermined by significant evidentiary contradictions?
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• Muhammad Akram alias Akrai vs The StatePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 479, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 532, 2019 SCMR 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-07
  murderocular accountmedical evidencemotivesentence commutationimprisonment for lifeidentificationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a criminal appeal against the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of Muhammad Riaz under Section 302(b) PPC. The prosecution case rested on the ocular testimony of the deceased's brother and a friend, supported by medical evidence. The appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of night-time occurrence and lack of light source. The Court found the eyewitness accounts to be confidence-inspiring and consistent, noting that the parties were closely related, making identification possible even in low light. While the Court upheld the conviction based on the ocular and medical evidence, it observed that the prosecution failed to prove the specific motive alleged in the FIR. Applying the principle that the failure to prove an alleged motive entitles the accused to a reduction in sentence, the Court partly allowed the appeal. The conviction was maintained, but the death sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life, with the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. extended to the appellant.

  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram (deceased) through L.Rs vs Mst. Near Begum2019 PLD Supreme Court 599, 2019 P.S.C. 1443, 2019 SCP 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-11
  declaratory suittenancy rightsproprietary rightsconsequential reliefcivil court jurisdictionmutationacquiescencespecific relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a declaratory suit filed in 1983, wherein the plaintiff sought to challenge long-standing tenancy and ownership mutations regarding government land, claiming exclusive rights to the detriment of a widow. The core legal question was whether such a suit was maintainable given the plaintiff’s prior acquiescence in the mutations, the acquisition of proprietary rights by the defendant, and the failure to seek consequential relief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment. The Court held that the suit was barred under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, as the plaintiff failed to seek further relief beyond a mere declaration. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts was barred under Section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, as the matter fell within the domain of designated authorities. The principle established is that a party cannot challenge decades-old transactions to which they were a consenting party, especially after proprietary rights have merged into absolute ownership.

  Questions settled

  • Is a declaratory suit maintainable if the plaintiff fails to seek further relief when such relief is available?
  • Does the jurisdiction of Civil Courts extend to matters where specific authorities are designated under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912?
  • Can a party challenge mutations and proprietary rights after decades of acquiescence and participation in the underlying transactions?
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• Muhammad Akbar alias Bhola and others vs The State and others2020 PSC (Crl.) 382, 2019 SCMR 2036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-23
  murderdeath sentencereappraisal of evidenceinjured witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction and death sentences of the appellants for the murder of two persons and causing injuries to another during an incident occurring inside the complainant's house. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had successfully proved the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt through consistent ocular testimony, medical evidence, prompt FIR registration, and corroborative recovery of blood-stained weapons. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the guilt of the appellants were well-founded, noting that the crime was committed in broad daylight by desperate persons over a petty dispute without any mitigating circumstances. The appeals were accordingly dismissed, and the convictions and sentences maintained, affirming the principles regarding the evaluation of natural and injured eyewitness accounts and the confirmation of guilt through corroborative forensic evidence in capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts can be disturbed upon reappraisal of evidence by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the testimony of natural and injured eyewitnesses provide sufficient basis for a capital conviction when supported by medical and forensic evidence?
  • Whether a petty motive justifies leniency in the matter of sentence for a brutal double murder committed with daggers?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal (decd.) through L.Rs. etc vs Muhammad Bashir and another2020 SCMR 197, 2019 SCP 364, 2020 P SC 745 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-20
  specific performancesale agreementattesting witnessesadmission of executionQanun-e-Shahadat Ordercivil appealdocumentary evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement regarding property comprising 29 kanals. The appellants challenged concurrent findings of the lower courts, arguing that the sale agreement was inadmissible because only one of the two required attesting witnesses was examined, despite the executant admitting the document's execution. The core legal question was whether the failure to examine all attesting witnesses renders a document inadmissible when the executant admits to its execution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were correct. The Court clarified that while documents required by law to be attested generally necessitate the examination of attesting witnesses, Article 81 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, provides a specific exception. The Court established that the admission of execution by the party to an attested document constitutes sufficient proof of its execution against them, rendering the examination of attesting witnesses unnecessary in such instances. Consequently, the sale agreement was validly admitted, and the concurrent findings were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to examine all attesting witnesses invalidate a document where the executant admits its execution?
  • Is the admission of execution by a party to an attested document sufficient proof of its execution under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Does Article 81 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 act as an exception to the general rule requiring the examination of attesting witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Adnan vs The State2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  juvenile offendernarcotics controlpoor investigationbenefit of doubtexpeditious trialchild protectioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by leave of the Court, assails the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant, a minor child at the relevant time, under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged transportation of a large quantity of narcotics, resulting in a sentence of imprisonment for life. The core legal questions revolved around the severe investigative flaws by the police, the failure of the Trial Court and the High Court to properly evaluate the capacity, age, and culpability of a juvenile offender under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, and the reliance on unreliable, contradictory testimony of prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt, noting that the inept investigation and judicial delays led to an innocent child spending over eleven years incarcerated. The Court set aside the conviction and sentence, laid down principles emphasizing the paramount protection of juveniles in the criminal justice system, and issued mandatory directions for the expeditious trial and prioritization of appeals involving juvenile convicts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conviction of a juvenile can be sustained when the prosecution relies on contradictory and uncorroborated testimonies of doubtful witnesses?
  • Does a Juvenile Court have a mandatory duty to determine the capacity, understanding, and points for determination concerning a child accused under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000?
  • What are the legal consequences under Section 10(7) of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, if a juvenile's trial is not concluded within a year?
  • Whether High Courts and Juvenile Courts are required to prioritize and expedite the trials and appeals of juvenile convicts?
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• Muhammad Abdullah vs The State, etc2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-22
  criminal appealrapebenefit of doubtdelay in FIRcontradictory evidencemedical evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the appellant's appeal against his conviction under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment, while maintaining the acquittal of his co-accused. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the prosecution's case in light of an unexplainable delay in lodging the FIR, major contradictions regarding material recoveries, lack of corroborative medical evidence for the charge of rape, and the absence of marks of violence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that serious discrepancies in ocular and medical evidence, coupled with unexplained delays in reporting the crime and failure to prove essential elements of the offense, entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt resulting in acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplainable delay in reporting a crime to the police render the prosecution story doubtful from its inception?
  • Can a conviction for rape be sustained when medical evidence reveals no marks of violence on the victim's person or private parts and serological reports are negative?
  • Whether material contradictions between the statements of the complainant and the investigating officer regarding recoveries are sufficient to create reasonable doubt in a criminal case?
  • Is an accused entitled to an acquittal when the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
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• Muhammad Aamir Khan vs Government of KPK through Senior Member2019 P.S.C 1324, 2019 SCP 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-24
  civil serviceage relaxationpatwariprecedentdiscriminationdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the Peshawar High Court's dismissal of his writ petition, which sought appointment as a Patwari. Despite passing the Patwar Examination in 2009, the petitioner was denied appointment for being overage. Under the relevant NWFP Revenue & Estate Department (Tehsildar, Naib-Tehsildar/Subordinate Revenue Service) Rules, 2008, as amended by a notification dated January 1, 2010, the upper age limit for Patwaris was extended to 35 years 'once for all' with an absolute bar on further relaxation. The petitioner argued that general provincial age relaxation rules should apply and cited subsequent High Court orders where other overage candidates were granted relief. The Supreme Court held that specific service rules govern the post of Patwari to the exclusion of general provincial rules. It further ruled that a court cannot relax statutory limits where the law expressly prohibits it, and a wrong precedent cannot justify a claim of discrimination, as two wrongs do not make a right. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can general provincial civil servant age relaxation rules override specific service rules that expressly prohibit any age relaxation beyond a set limit?
  • Can a petitioner claim equal treatment based on a prior court order that was passed in violation of express statutory provisions?
  • Is a subsequent bench of a High Court bound by an earlier decision of a coordinate bench on the same legal issue?
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• Muhammad Aamir Khan vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2019 PLC (C.S) 1014, 2020 PLJ Supreme Court 12, 2019 SCMR 1021 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-25
  age relaxationPatwari appointmentservice rulesnotificationjudicial precedentper incuriam
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an impugned judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition regarding his appointment as a Patwari. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner, who was over the maximum age limit of 35 years prescribed by the specific departmental rules and notification, could claim further upper age relaxation under general civil servant rules or precedents. The Supreme Court held that recruitment to the post of Patwari is strictly governed by the specific service rules and the notification dated 01.01.2010, which expressly barred any further age relaxation under any circumstances, and that general age relaxation rules do not apply. The ratio decidendi is that specific departmental rules and notifications governing recruitment prevail over general rules, and courts cannot grant age relaxation in contravention of express statutory bars. Furthermore, a wrong precedent or an earlier order passed per incuriam cannot be made the basis for claiming discriminatory relief, as two wrongs do not make a right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether general rules for the relaxation of upper age limit apply to the specific recruitment of Patwaris governed by departmental rules?
  • Can an authority grant upper age relaxation beyond the maximum limit expressly barred by a specific recruitment notification?
  • Does a wrong precedent or an order passed in disregard of existing judgments create a legally enforceable right to claim similar relief?
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• Mst. Razia Sultana vs The State and another2019 SCMR 1300, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-14
  Criminal appealNarcotic substancesControl of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997Chain of custodyChemical examiner's reportSafe transmission of evidenceAcquittalReasonable doubtConviction set aside
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the appellant's conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The appellant was initially booked under Section 9(e) and subsequently convicted under Section 9(c) of the Act, receiving a life sentence from the trial court, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had established the charge beyond reasonable doubt, particularly concerning the integrity of the evidence. The Court noted that the officer responsible for dispatching the narcotic drug sample to the Government Analyst for chemical examination was not produced to prove its safe transmission, thereby compromising the chain of custody. The Supreme Court held that a broken chain of custody renders the chemical examiner's report unreliable and unsafe to support a conviction. Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mukhtar Mai vs Abdul Khaliq & othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 548, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 141, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 918, 2019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-13
  criminal reviewscope of review jurisdictionre-appraisal of evidencejudicial fallibilitysupreme court review
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal review petitions were filed seeking review of a common judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising out of criminal appeals and a suo motu case concerning charges under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The petitioner's counsel raised various formulations regarding corroboration of testimony, evaluation of evidence, and legal implications of tribal jirgas. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court, while exercising its review jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution, can re-appraise evidence and re-examine the merits of the case to take a view different from the judgment under review. The Court held that review is not a synonym for an appeal, does not permit the re-appraisal of evidence or rehearing of the matter, and is strictly limited to correcting patent mistakes, glaring omissions, or manifest errors floating on the surface. The Supreme Court concluded that the grounds urged by the petitioner required re-appraisal of evidence and did not fall within the narrow scope of review jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the review petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can re-appraise evidence while exercising review jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution?
  • Is a review petition synonymous with an appeal or a rehearing of the matter in issue?
  • What are the exceptional circumstances and limits under which review jurisdiction can be exercised by the Supreme Court?
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• Mst. Laila Qayyum vs Fawad Qayum2019 PLJ SC 492, 2019 P. S. C. 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-18
  declaratory suitnegative declarationpaternity challengelegitimacyDNA testSpecific Relief ActQanun-e-Shahadatfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit filed by the respondent seeking negative declarations that the petitioner was not the biological daughter of his late father and had no right to his legacy, along with the cancellation of official educational and identification documents reflecting her parentage. The trial court allowed the respondent's application for a DNA test, an order ultimately restored by the High Court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a declaratory suit under Section 42 and a suit for cancellation under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, were maintainable by a sibling challenging a sister's paternity, and whether a DNA test could be ordered. The Court held that a plaintiff cannot invoke Section 42 to seek a negative declaration or challenge another person's legitimacy where no right or legal character of the plaintiff is infringed. Furthermore, under Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, only a putative father can challenge paternity within the prescribed time, and a sibling lacks standing. The Court also held that compelling a person to give a DNA sample violates fundamental rights to liberty, dignity, and privacy under Article 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment, dismissed the suit in its entirety by invoking its powers under Article 187 to do complete justice, and laid down principles regarding the strict scope of declaratory suits and the protection of family legitimacy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff can maintain a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, to seek a negative declaration regarding the paternity or legitimacy of another person without asserting an infringement of the plaintiff's own legal character or right to property?
  • Does Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, permit a putative brother or sibling to challenge the paternity or legitimacy of a child born during the continuance of a valid marriage?
  • Can a court order a person to undergo a DNA test for the purpose of determining paternity when doing so infringes upon guaranteed constitutional rights to liberty, dignity, and privacy?
  • Whether a suit seeking the cancellation of written instruments under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, is maintainable without establishing that the instruments cause serious injury to the plaintiff?
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• Mst. Laila Qayyum vs Fawad Qayum, etc2019 PLD Supreme Court 449, 2019 SCP 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-14
  paternityDNA testdeclaratory suitlegitimacy of birthSpecific Relief ActQanun-e-Shahadat Orderconstitutional privacyinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit filed by the respondent seeking a negative declaration that the petitioner was not the real daughter of his late father and was an 'abandoned infant' adopted in 1996. The respondent sought to cancel various educational and identity documents and requested a DNA test to determine paternity. The Supreme Court examined whether such a suit was maintainable under Sections 39 and 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Court held that Section 42 only permits declarations regarding a plaintiff's own legal character or property rights, not a negative declaration regarding a defendant's status that does not infringe upon the plaintiff's own title. Furthermore, Article 128 provides conclusive proof of legitimacy for children born during a valid marriage, and only the putative father may challenge paternity within the prescribed period. The Court ruled that compelling a DNA test violates the petitioner's constitutional rights to liberty, dignity, and privacy under Article 14. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order, dismissed the frivolous suit, and awarded costs to the petitioner.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kubra Amjad vs Mst. Yasmeen Tariq and others2019 PLD Supreme Court 704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-07
  specific performanceagreement to selllimitation periodreasonable timeejectment proceedingslandlord and tenantinordinate delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an alleged agreement to sell property, filed by a tenant against the heirs of her deceased landlord. The core legal question was whether the suit, filed over eight years after the alleged agreement, was maintainable or time-barred, given the plaintiff's prolonged inaction and the fact that the suit was initiated only after the respondents filed ejectment proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' dismissal of the suit. The Court held that while limitation generally runs from the date of refusal, a plaintiff cannot remain indolent for an unreasonable period. Even where time is not of the essence, a party must perform their contractual obligations within a reasonable time. The Court emphasized that "reasonable time" cannot be stretched to cover years of silence or indefinite delays. Consequently, a plaintiff who fails to act with dispatch and only initiates litigation as a reactive measure to eviction proceedings cannot seek the equitable remedy of specific performance, as such delay is fatal to the claim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff maintain a suit for specific performance if they have remained indolent for an unreasonable period after the execution of an agreement to sell?
  • Does the limitation period for a suit for specific performance start from the date of refusal if the plaintiff has failed to act within a reasonable time?
  • Can a suit for specific performance be dismissed for inordinate delay even if time was not originally of the essence in the contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Shah Ban vs Land Acquisition Collector, A.C., Mardan, etc2019 SCP 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-04
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompulsory acquisitioncompensationeminent domaindelay in awardfundamental rightsproperty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the adequacy of compensation for land compulsorily acquired by the government for the expansion of a public college. The core legal question was whether the compensation awarded by the Collector, and subsequently maintained by the High Court, reflected the true market value of the land at the time of acquisition, considering the significant delay in the award process and the exclusion of land used for access pathways. The Supreme Court held that the lower forums failed to properly evaluate the evidence of market value and the impact of the delay. The Court enhanced the compensation rate based on proven market transactions, awarded compensation for the diminished value of land used for approach roads, and revalued the structures on the land. The key principle laid down is that authorities must determine compensation based on the actual market value at the time of acquisition, and where land is rendered unusable due to acquisition-related infrastructure, the owner is entitled to compensation for that diminution in value.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to make an award within one year of a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 automatically entitle a landowner to additional compensation under Section 48-A?
  • Is a landowner entitled to compensation for land rendered unusable or diminished in value due to the creation of approach roads during the acquisition process?
  • Does the constitutional right to property under Article 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 mandate prompt compensation at market value for compulsorily acquired land?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Shah Ban (Deceased) through L.Rs, etc vs Land Acquisition2019 KLR Supreme Court 400, 2019 SCMR 599, 2019 P.S.C. 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-04
  land acquisitioncompensationmarket valuecompulsory acquisitionfundamental rightsproperty rightsaward delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals regarding the determination of compensation for land compulsorily acquired by the government for the expansion of a college. The core legal question was whether the compensation awarded by the Collector and subsequently maintained by the High Court was adequate, given the prevailing market value of the land, the significant delay in the award, and the exclusion of land used for approach roads from the compensation package. The Supreme Court allowed the private appellants' appeal in part, enhancing the compensation rate to Rs. 10,000 per marla, awarding compensation for land used for approach roads, and re-evaluating the value of structures on the land. The Court affirmed that compensation must reflect the fair market value at the time of acquisition, considering evidence of comparable transactions, and that authorities cannot arbitrarily exclude land from compensation if its utility is diminished by the acquisition process. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that while delay in making an award is unjustifiable, additional compensation under Section 48-A requires proof of specific damages suffered due to that delay.

  Questions settled

  • Is an owner entitled to compensation for land rendered unusable due to the creation of approach roads during compulsory acquisition?
  • Does a delay in making an award under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 automatically entitle the landowner to additional compensation under Section 48-A?
  • What is the standard for determining the market value of land when evidence of comparable sales is available?
  • Can a court enhance compensation for compulsorily acquired land based on evidence of market value that was disregarded by lower forums?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst, Bibi Shah Ban (Deceased) through L.Rs. and others vs Land2019 SCMR 599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-04
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensationcompulsory acquisition chargesdelay in awardapproach roadsfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute regarding the determination of compensation for private land compulsorily acquired for the expansion of Fazle Haq College Mardan under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal questions involved the adequacy of the market value awarded for the acquired land, compensation for structures, diminution of value for land utilized for approach roads, and entitlement to additional compensation for delayed awards under section 48-A of the Act. The Supreme Court partly allowed the private appellants' appeal and dismissed the official appeals. The Court held that the market value of the land at the relevant time was established at Rs. 10,000 per marla based on un-rebutted evidence, and revised the compensation accordingly alongside 15 percent compulsory acquisition charges and 6 percent annual interest. The Court laid down that landowners are entitled to realistic market-based compensation reflecting the potential and location of the land, compensation for diminished value of land restricted to approach roads, and proper assessment of structures rather than arbitrary reliance on patwari estimates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the market value of compulsorily acquired land must be determined based on un-rebutted evidence of contemporaneous sale transactions?
  • Are landowners entitled to additional compensation for diminished value when portions of their land are restricted to serve as approach roads?
  • Whether landowners are entitled to additional compensation under section 48-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 when an award is delayed beyond one year without establishing specific damages?
  • Does the constitutional right to property under Article 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan mandate prompt and fair compensation for compulsorily acquired land?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Shazia Akbar Ghalzai vs Khurram Mehboob and others2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 36, 2019 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-14
  habeas corpuscustody of minorsuckling babyterritorial jurisdictionguardian courtchild custody
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a habeas corpus application under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the Islamabad High Court for the production and custody of her minor child, which was dismissed on the ground that the respondent had removed the minor beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in refusing jurisdiction where the minor was forcibly removed from the petitioner's custody within Islamabad. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in law, as the initial wrongful removal occurred within its territorial limits. The Court set aside the impugned order, converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and maintained the custody of the suckling infant with the mother, while reserving the respondent's right to approach the Guardian Court for visitation and custody determination. The key principle laid down is that the High Court maintains jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. to entertain matters concerning the illegal removal of a minor when such removal originates within its territorial jurisdiction, and that the welfare of a suckling child is best served in the mother's custody.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Islamabad High Court has jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a minor is forcibly removed from its territorial limits?
  • Does a mother have a prima facie right to the custody of a suckling baby?
  • Can custody of a minor be granted to the mother in habeas corpus proceedings when the welfare of the minor points towards her?
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• Mrs. Shagufta Shaheen and others vs The State through D.G. NAB, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and anotherPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 583, 2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 600, 2019 SCMR 1106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-29
  freezing of propertyNational Accountability Ordinanceconfirmation of freezing ordercorruption and corrupt practicesfair trialdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses appeals arising from an order passed by the Chairman NAB freezing the appellants' properties under Section 12 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question was whether a freezing order passed by the Chairman NAB lapses if not confirmed by the Accountability Court within 15 days, and whether delay by the court in deciding the confirmation application and objections affects the validity of the order. The Supreme Court held that once the prosecution files an application for confirmation within the initial 15 days, the freezing order continues to subsist until the court adjudicates upon the matter, as the statute prescribes no specific timeframe for the court's decision, though expeditious disposal is mandated. The Court ruled that delay by the judiciary does not invalidate the Chairman's order, but cautioned that inordinate delays violate the fundamental right to fair trial and due process under Article 10A of the Constitution. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a freezing order passed by the Chairman NAB lapses if the Accountability Court fails to confirm it within 15 days?
  • Does a delay by the Accountability Court in deciding a confirmation application affect the validity of the freezing order passed by the Chairman NAB?
  • Can objections against a freezing order be filed during the initial 15-day period before confirmation?
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• Mrs. Asma Hassan and another vs Askari Bank Limited2019 SCMR 1873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-08
  running finance facilityrecovery suitmarkupcost of fundsbanking courtconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the concurrent findings of the lower courts in a recovery suit instituted by a financial institution for a markup-based running finance facility. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the bank to markup beyond the stipulated date of repayment and the liability of the borrower based on admitted financial facilities and statements of accounts. The Supreme Court held that where the financial facility agreement specified a repayment date, the Banking Court and the High Court rightly limited the grant of contractual markup up to that date, awarding only the cost of funds for the subsequent period during which the amount remained outstanding. The key principle laid down is that where the availment of a financial facility is admitted and no calculation errors or specific objections to the statement of accounts are raised, concurrent findings regarding financial liability will not be interfered with, and cost of funds is appropriately awarded for the period beyond the contractual maturity date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a financial institution is entitled to contractual markup beyond the date stipulated in the running finance facility agreement?
  • Can a borrower challenge a recovery suit based on alleged forged documents when there is a clear admission of availing the financial facility and no specific denial of the quantum?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding financial liability where no calculation errors in the statement of accounts are pointed out?
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• Mr. Kanwar Anwaar Ali vs The State2019 SCP 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-22
  test identification paradecircumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtabduction for ransomjoint identificationlast-seen evidencecriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for abduction for ransom and murder, where the appellant challenged his sentence based on circumstantial evidence. The core legal question concerned the evidentiary value and proper procedure of test identification parades, alongside the assessment of circumstantial evidence including last-seen testimony and medical reports. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to lack of proximity in last-seen evidence, flawed joint identification parades, and fabricated recoveries, thereby setting aside the conviction and extending the benefit of the doubt to the appellant. Furthermore, the Court consolidated comprehensive guidelines and safeguards for conducting valid test identification parades, emphasizing that separate parades must be held for each accused person, that identification is merely corroborative rather than substantive evidence, and that strict adherence to established legal precedents and rules is mandatory for all judicial officers.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of a test identification parade in criminal proceedings?
  • Can a joint test identification parade involving multiple accused persons be considered legally valid?
  • What precautions and standards must a magistrate observe while conducting a test identification parade?
  • Is the failure to hold a test identification parade always fatal to the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mr. Justice Muhammad Farrukh Irfan Khan, Judge, Lahore High Court, Lahore vs The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan, Civil Secretariat, Islamabad and 4 others2019 SCP 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-18
  inter se seniorityHigh Court Judgesoath of officeappointment notificationconstitutional petitionestoppel against lawjudicial seniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitution Petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 challenged an order re-fixing the inter se seniority of High Court Judges. The Petitioner, appointed as an Additional Judge, argued that seniority should be reckoned from the date of the appointment notification, despite taking the oath one day after the other appointees. The core legal question was whether the appointment of a High Court Judge is complete upon notification or upon the administration of the oath. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appointment of a High Court Judge is not completed until the final stage of taking the oath as prescribed by Article 194. Consequently, the Court affirmed that seniority must be determined from the date the oath is administered, as the office remains vacant until that point. The judgment established that there can be no estoppel against the Constitution, and that administrative rosters or seniority lists issued in violation of the law cannot confer permanent rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appointment of a High Court Judge take effect from the date of the notification or the date of the oath?
  • Can a seniority list issued in violation of the law confer permanent rights upon a judge?
  • Is there any estoppel against the Constitution or the law regarding the determination of seniority?
  • Does a person become a judge for all purposes upon appointment, or only after taking the oath of office?
  Read full judgment →
• Mr. Justice Muhammad Farrukh Irfan Khan, Judge, Lahore High Court, L_65892dfa2019 P.S.C. 578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  seniority of judgesadditional judgeoath of officeconstitutional petitionestoppel against constitutionappointment of judgesHigh Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order of the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court regarding the inter se seniority of High Court Judges. The petitioner and respondents were appointed as Additional Judges via the same notification but took the oath of office on different dates, with the respondents taking it earlier. The core legal question was whether seniority should be reckoned from the date of the appointment notification or the date of taking the oath of office. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appointment of a High Court Judge is not complete until the oath is administered in accordance with Article 194 of the Constitution. Consequently, the seniority of an Additional Judge must be determined from the date they enter upon their office by taking the oath. The Court further affirmed that there can be no estoppel against the Constitution, and administrative rosters reflecting incorrect seniority do not confer permanent rights. The judgment clarifies that the oath is the final stage of the appointment process, and until it is taken, the office remains vacant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the seniority of an Additional Judge of a High Court commence from the date of the appointment notification or the date of taking the oath of office?
  • Is the appointment of a High Court Judge complete upon the issuance of the notification or upon the administration of the oath of office?
  • Can a party claim seniority based on an administrative roster that contradicts the constitutional requirement for oath-taking?
  • Does the doctrine of estoppel apply against the provisions of the Constitution regarding the seniority of judges?
  Read full judgment →
• Moinuddin, etc vs The State, etc2019 PLD Supreme Court 749, 2020 PLJ SC 174, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 317, 2019 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-11
  Anti-Terrorism Actcompoundable offencenon-compoundable offencesentence reductioncompromisemitigating circumstancemercy petitionjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter before a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether a compromise in a compoundable offence (e.g., murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860) allows for the acquittal or sentence reduction of a non-compoundable offence (e.g., terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997) committed in the same transaction. The Court held that a non-compoundable offence remains non-compoundable despite any compromise in a coordinate offence, prohibiting acquittal on that basis. However, the Court ruled that such a compromise may be considered as a mitigating circumstance for reducing the sentence for the non-compoundable offence, subject to the court's discretion. The judgment established that this reduction is not automatic. Furthermore, the Court delineated the procedural stages for seeking such relief: by the trial court at sentencing, by appellate or revisional courts during pending proceedings, via a review petition if a final order exists, or through a Mercy Petition to the President of Pakistan if all judicial remedies are exhausted. This judgment consolidates scattered precedents to clarify the legal position regarding the interplay between compounding and non-compoundable offences.

  Questions settled

  • Can a non-compoundable offence be treated as a compoundable offence for the purpose of recording an acquittal if a coordinate compoundable offence has been compounded?
  • Can the sentence passed in a non-compoundable offence be reduced on the ground that a coordinate compoundable offence committed in the same case has been compounded?
  • At what stage and by which forum can a reduction in the sentence for a non-compoundable offence be ordered if a coordinate compoundable offence is compounded?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Imran, etc vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others2019 P.S.C. 1607 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  freedom of trade and businessprivate school feesreasonable restrictionsArticle 18regulatory frameworkfundamental rightseducation policy
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant matters concern appeals against High Court judgments regarding the regulation of private school fees in the Provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The core legal question was whether statutory caps on annual fee increases (5% in Sindh, 8% in Punjab) and the regulatory frameworks governing private educational institutions violate the fundamental right to trade and business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court held that the regulatory frameworks, including the fee caps, are intra vires the Constitution. The Court affirmed that private educational services constitute a "business" or "trade" subject to regulation under Article 18. The state has a legitimate interest in preventing profiteering and ensuring affordable education, particularly given the scarcity of quality public education. The Court determined that the caps are reasonable restrictions rather than arbitrary prohibitions. The key principle laid down is that the right to conduct business under Article 18 is not absolute; it is subject to reasonable regulation by the state, especially concerning essential services, to balance individual business rights with public welfare and the fundamental right to education.

  Questions settled

  • Does the regulation of private school fees by the state violate the fundamental right to conduct business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are statutory caps on annual fee increases for private educational institutions considered reasonable restrictions under the Constitution?
  • Can the state regulate the salaries of teachers in private educational institutions as part of a fee regulatory framework?
  • Does the right to trade and business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 include the right to earn unlimited profits from private educational services?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Imran vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others2019 P.S.C. 1419, 2019 SCMR 1132, 2019 SCMR 1753, 2019 SCP 318, 2019 SCP 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-12
  private educational institutionsschool fee regulationintra viresfee capfreedom of tradedelegated legislationrecalculation of fees
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals and petitions arose from High Court judgments in Punjab and Sindh concerning the legal validity of statutory provisions and rules regulating fee increases in private educational institutions. The primary legal questions centered on whether Section 7-A of the Punjab Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Ordinance, 1984 (as amended in 2017) and Rules 7(3), 7-A, and 10 of the Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2005 were intra vires the parent statutes and fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 18, 23, 24, and 25-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Supreme Court unanimously declared Section 7-A of the Punjab Ordinance and Rule 10 of the Sindh Rules intra vires the Constitution and relevant enactments. By a majority of two to one, the Court upheld Rule 7(3) of the Sindh Rules, setting aside the High Court judgments to the extent of declaring Rule 7-A invalid. The Court ruled that interim fee reduction orders ceased to operate, directing fee recalculations based on 2017 baseline rates, while barring private schools from recovering interim fee reduction arrears.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 7-A of the Punjab Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Ordinance, 1984 intra vires Articles 18, 23, 24, and 25-A of the Constitution?
  • Is Rule 10 of the Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2005 intra vires its parent statute and the Constitution?
  • Does statutory regulation and capping of tuition fees of private educational institutions violate the right to conduct lawful trade or business under Article 18 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Nusrat Yasmin vs The Registrar, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar & others2019 PLD Supreme Court 719, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 25, 2019 SCP 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-02
  judicial stricturesjudicial ethicssubordinate judiciaryadministrative controljudicial proprietyexpungementprofessional misconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an Additional District and Sessions Judge, challenged judicial strictures recorded against her by the High Court in an appellate judgment. The High Court had criticized her professional competence, knowledge of law, and judicial ethics, directing disciplinary proceedings against her. The Supreme Court addressed whether it is appropriate for a High Court to record such strictures in a judgment or summon a subordinate judge for public reprimand. The Court held that while High Courts possess appellate and revisional jurisdiction to correct legal errors, they must maintain judicial propriety and avoid personal remarks or public censure of subordinate judges. The Court ruled that strictures are not a reformative tool and cause irreparable damage to a judge's reputation. Instead, the High Court should address concerns regarding a judge's conduct or competence through administrative channels, such as confidential notes to the Chief Justice or administrative memoranda, rather than through public judgments. Consequently, the Court expunged the strictures against the appellant, emphasizing that the High Court's role is to correct legal reasoning, not to act as a critic of a judge's personal attributes.

  Questions settled

  • Is it legally permissible for a High Court to record personal strictures against a judge of the District Judiciary within an appellate judgment?
  • Can a High Court summon a judge of the District Judiciary to appear in open court for a public reprimand regarding their judicial performance?
  • What is the appropriate mechanism for a High Court to address perceived incompetence or misconduct of a subordinate judge?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate judge through remarks made in a judicial judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Moiz Abbas vs Mrs. Latifa and others2019 PLJ SC 29, 2019 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-18
  oral agreement to sellspecific performancepower of attorneystrict constructionpleadingsevidence beyond pleadingsdeclarationmesne profits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute over the alleged oral sale of a residential property in Karachi. The appellant, residing abroad, had executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPOA) in favor of his sister for property management and rental purposes. The respondents claimed they purchased the property via an oral agreement and paid consideration to the SPOA holder. The High Court's Division Bench had decreed the respondents' suit for specific performance, reversing the Single Judge's decision. The Supreme Court examined whether the SPOA authorized the sale and whether the oral agreement was proved. The Court held that a Power of Attorney must be strictly construed; since the SPOA only authorized renting, any sale based on it was void. Furthermore, the respondents failed to plead essential details of the oral agreement—date, time, place, and witnesses—at the earliest stage. The Court ruled that evidence beyond pleadings cannot be considered and that oral agreements require stringent proof to prevent fraud. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appellant's suit was decreed with costs.

  Read full judgment →
• Mir Muhammad & another vs NAB through its chairman & others2020 P SC (Crl.) 588, 2020 SCMR 168, 2019 SCP 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-26
  pre-arrest bailmisappropriation of fundsNAB referenceextraordinary remedymala fidesaccountabilitycriminal prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioners, who are contractors and officials of the Irrigation Department, facing allegations of misappropriation of funds regarding the Annual Development Plan of Irrigation (E&W) Khairpur for the years 2013-14 and 2014-15. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to the extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail in the face of allegations supported by technical and documentary evidence of non-execution or partial completion of project works, resulting in a significant loss to the exchequer. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that in the absence of demonstrated mala fides, the petitioners could not claim judicial protection against prosecution. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, noting that the investigation was initiated following a court-directed probe into embezzlement. The key principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary equitable remedy designed to protect innocent individuals from the abuse of legal process in cases tainted by mala fides; it is not a routine relief to be granted based on bald denials or parallel narratives in ordinary criminal cases.

  Questions settled

  • Is pre-arrest bail a routine remedy available in all criminal prosecutions?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted in the absence of demonstrated mala fides?
  • Does the existence of technical and documentary evidence supporting a charge preclude the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Bat Khan vs Mst. Sherin Bibi and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 175, 2019 SCP 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-08
  child custodywelfare of minorhizanatjirga decisionmaternal custodyguardian and wards
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which had set aside the order of the District Judge, Hangu, and restored the Family Judge's decision granting custody of a minor girl to her mother. The petitioner father argued that the child did not recognize her mother and relied on a jirga decision that had conditioned the mother's divorce on relinquishing custody. The Supreme Court examined whether custody could be denied based on the child's lack of recognition, maternal poverty, or a jirga verdict. Dismissing the petition, the Court held that the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration in custody matters, poverty of a mother is no ground to deny her custody, and a jirga has no legal authority to determine child custody or use children to bargain for divorce. The principle laid down emphasizes that maternal hizanat must be protected in accordance with law and precedents, prioritizing the welfare and best interests of the minor above all else.

  Questions settled

  • Whether poverty on the part of a mother is a valid ground to disentitle her from the custody of a minor?
  • Does a jirga have the legal authority to decide the custody of children or compel a mother to barter her right to custody to secure a divorce?
  • Is the lack of recognition of a mother by a minor child a sufficient ground to deprive the mother of custody?
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• Minhaj Khan vs The State2019 SCP 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-14
  narcotics possessioncharaschemical analyst reporttesting protocolscontradictory testimonybenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner was convicted under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for possession of narcotics, and his appeal was dismissed by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the reliability of the narcotics analysis report for omitting testing protocols pursuant to Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, while the State defended the report and questioned the correctness of precedent. The core legal question revolved around the reliability of the chemical analyst report and the appreciation of inconsistent prosecution evidence. The Supreme Court did not reach the technical question regarding testing protocols, instead holding that numerous material discrepancies, contradictions, and inexplicable conduct of police witnesses rendered the prosecution's case doubtful. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that when key eyewitness and recovery testimonies suffer from major, unmitigated contradictions and suspicious delays, the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, warranting the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-mentioning of testing protocols in a Government Analyst report renders it unreliable under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Does a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 stand when material discrepancies exist in the testimonies of key police witnesses?
  • Whether inconsistencies regarding the distance of the place of occurrence and unexplained delays in lodging the FIR vitiate the prosecution case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Zia Ur Rehman and others vs Syed Nadir Ali Shah and others2019 P.S.C. 1058, 2019 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-18
  quo warrantofalse declarationeducational qualificationArticle 62(1)(f)disqualificationnomination papersfake degree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that allowed a writ of quo warranto, setting aside the election of the petitioner due to a false declaration regarding his educational qualifications. The petitioner had previously declared himself a graduate in 2008 but claimed to be a matriculate in 2013, leading to allegations of dishonesty and the use of fake academic credentials. The core legal question was whether a candidate who provides false information in nomination papers regarding their educational background is disqualified from holding public office under the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a candidate who procures or relies upon fake educational documents lacks the requisite honesty and integrity to hold public office. The Court affirmed that making a false declaration on solemn affirmation in nomination papers constitutes a disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional requirement for a candidate to be honest and Ameen is strictly enforced, and any candidate found to have submitted false declarations regarding their credentials is ineligible to serve in legislative assemblies.

  Questions settled

  • Does the submission of a false declaration regarding educational qualifications in nomination papers render a candidate disqualified under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a candidate who uses fake educational documents be considered an honest and Ameen person for the purposes of contesting elections?
  • Is a candidate liable to be de-notified retrospectively if the declaration provided in their nomination papers regarding Article 62 and 63 compliance is found to be incorrect?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Sohail Ahmed vs The State, etc2019 SCMR 956, 2019 SCP 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-24
  Eyewitness identificationTest Identification ParadeReliability of evidenceEstimator variablesJudicial noticeBenefit of doubtAcquittalMurderRobberyCriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involved appeals against convictions and sentences for murder and robbery. The Supreme Court examined the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence, particularly the Test Identification Parade (TIP). The core legal question was how to assess the credibility of eyewitness testimony, especially in light of scientific research on memory and perception. The Court acquitted the appellants, granting them the benefit of the doubt, finding the prosecution's case and the TIP unreliable due to multiple infirmities, including inconsistencies between ocular accounts, medical evidence, and the site plan, as well as police suggestiveness. The Court laid down a two-step process for identification: first, the TIP, and second, an independent assessment of the eyewitness's credibility using "estimator variables" derived from scientific research. These variables include stress, weapon focus, duration of observation, distance, lighting, and memory decay. The Court held that judicial notice of credible scientific developments under Article 112, Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, is permissible to enhance the quality of identification evidence and justice.

  Read full judgment →
• Mian Sohail Ahmed and 2 others vs State, etcPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-20
  test identification paradeeyewitness reliabilityestimator variablesbenefit of the doubtwrongful convictioncriminal evidencejudicial notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for murder and robbery. The core legal question concerns the reliability of eyewitness identification and the evidentiary value of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) conducted in the absence of proper procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case suffered from significant infirmities, including an unreliable ocular account, a flawed TIP, and impermissible suggestiveness by the police. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellants, extending them the benefit of the doubt. The judgment establishes that eyewitness identification is a two-step process: first, the conduct of a formal TIP; and second, an independent judicial assessment of the witness's credibility using "estimator variables"—scientific factors such as stress, weapon focus, duration, distance, and lighting conditions. The Court emphasized that judges should take judicial notice of credible scientific research regarding memory and perception to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions. By integrating these scientific principles into the appreciation of evidence, the Court aims to enhance the reliability of criminal justice outcomes and prevent misidentification.

  Questions settled

  • What are the legal consequences of conducting a joint identification parade for multiple suspects?
  • Does the failure to match a suspect's description in a Test Identification Parade with the First Information Report render the identification evidence unreliable?
  • How should courts assess the credibility of eyewitness testimony using scientific estimator variables?
  • Is it permissible for police to expose suspects to witnesses prior to a formal Test Identification Parade?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Shaukat Ali vs Punjab Public Service Commission, etc2021 SCP 264, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 365, 2019 SCMR 118, 2022 PSC 1555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-14
  rounding off markspsychological assessmentpublic service commissioncompetitive examinationinterview marksexpressio unius est exclusio alteriusstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether marks obtained in a psychological assessment during a competitive examination for the post of Deputy Prosecutor General (BS-18) can be rounded off to the next whole number under the Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) Policy Decisions. The appellant, who missed selection by a narrow margin, argued that psychological assessment forms part of the interview and should benefit from the rounding-off rule applicable to interview marks. The Supreme Court held that the PPSC Policy Decisions explicitly provide for rounding off average marks awarded in the viva voce interview by specific committees, but deliberately omit any such provision for the five marks allocated to psychological assessment. Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court ruled that rounding off cannot be extended to psychological assessment where a 0.5 variation constitutes a substantial ten percent change in marks. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, and leave to appeal was declined.

  Questions settled

  • Whether marks obtained in a psychological assessment by a candidate in a competitive examination can be rounded off to the next whole number?
  • Does the definition of interview under Regulation 3(o) of the Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2000 include psychological assessment for the purpose of rounding off marks?
  • Whether the omission of a rounding-off provision for psychological assessment in the PPSC Policy Decisions implies its exclusion under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Shaukat Ali and another vs Punjab Public Service Commission and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 365, 2019 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-14
  public service commissionrounding off markspsychological assessmentcompetitive examinationinterview marksinterpretation of policyexpressio unius est exclusio alterius
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether marks obtained in a psychological assessment during competitive examinations for the post of Deputy Prosecutor General (BS-18) can be rounded off to the next whole number, similar to interview marks under the Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) Policy Decisions. The appellant missed selection by a narrow margin and contended that rounding off his psychological assessment marks would tie him with the last selected candidate. The Supreme Court held that the policy explicitly provides for rounding off average interview scores but does not extend this concession to psychological assessments. Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court noted that the omission is intentional, and further reasoned that rounding off a 5-mark component would cause a significant 10% variance, undermining the credibility of competitive evaluations. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, dismissed the petition, and declined to interfere with the selection process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether marks obtained in the psychological assessment by a candidate in a competitive examination can be rounded off to the next whole number under the Punjab Public Service Commission Policy Decisions?
  • Does the definition of 'interview' under Regulation 3(o) of the Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2000 include psychological assessment for the purpose of rounding off marks?
  • What is the impact of applying rounding off to a small-scale scoring component like a five-mark psychological assessment in public service examinations?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs The State and others2019 PLJ SC 297, 2019 SCMR 734 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-26
  suspension of sentencebail on medical groundsconvicted prisonerNational Accountability Ordinancecardiac complications
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Islamabad High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition for suspension of sentence and release on bail pending criminal appeal against his conviction under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question was whether a convicted prisoner suffering from serious medical conditions could be released on bail for a limited period for medical treatment of his choice. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, suspending the petitioner's sentence and releasing him on bail for a period of six weeks specifically for medical treatment within Pakistan, subject to furnishing surety bonds and a strict condition not to leave the country, with the explicit stipulation that the bail would automatically stand cancelled upon the expiry of the stipulated period, requiring voluntary surrender. The key principle laid down is that where medical reports and expert opinions recommend specialized cardiac and other medical management for a convict with severe comorbidities, the court may exercise discretion to grant bail upon suspension of sentence for a limited, defined period to enable the convict to receive proper medical treatment of choice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a convicted prisoner be released on bail upon suspension of sentence for medical treatment?
  • Whether bail on medical grounds can be granted for a limited fixed period with a condition of automatic cancellation?
  • Does a convict released on bail for medical treatment have the liberty to choose medical practitioners and facilities within the country?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Super Engineering and another vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi2019 PCRLJ 480, 2020 PLJ Supreme Court 1, 2019 PTD 1912, PTCL 2020 CL. 51, · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  presumptive tax regimenormal tax regimeretrospective operationvested rightsassociation of personswithholding taxstatutory interpretationtax appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses direct appeals filed by two associations of persons (AOPs) engaged in manufacturing auto parts, challenging a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh that set aside the Appellate Tribunal's orders in favor of the taxpayers. The core legal question was whether the amendment introduced to section 153(6A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by the Finance Act, 2008—which substituted 'any person' with 'a company' to restrict exceptions from the presumptive tax regime—applied retrospectively to the tax year 2008, thereby compelling the appellant AOPs to be taxed under the presumptive tax regime instead of the normal tax regime. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that fiscal amendments affecting substantive or vested rights cannot be applied retrospectively unless the legislature explicitly so commands. The Court established that since the tax year 2008 had concluded on 30.06.2008 and the Finance Act, 2008 came into force on 1st July 2008, valuable rights had accrued to the appellants under the unamended law, and prospective application must be favored to protect vested rights in taxing statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment substituting 'any person' with 'a company' in section 153(6A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 applies retrospectively to the tax year 2008?
  • Do amendments to assessment and procedural provisions in fiscal statutes have retrospective effect when they affect accrued or vested rights?
  • Are associations of persons (AOPs) manufacturing goods entitled to file their income tax returns under the normal tax regime prior to the commencement of the Finance Act, 2008?
  • How are charging provisions distinguished from assessment and collection provisions in fiscal statutes for the purpose of statutory interpretation?
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• Messrs Pakistan Television Corporation Limited vs Commissioner2019 P.C.T.L.R. 293, 2019 P.S.C. 366, PTCL 2019 CL. 187, 2019 PTD 484, 2019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-23
  Federal Excise Dutytelecommunication servicestelevision license feePakistan Customs Tarifffiscal statute interpretationWireless Telegraphy Acttax exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from tax proceedings initiated against the appellant, Pakistan Television Corporation Limited, for the recovery of Federal Excise Duty (FED) on the receipt of television license fees collected through electricity bills. The core legal questions involved whether television license fees and TV telecasts fall within the definition of "services" subject to FED under Section 3 of the Federal Excise Act 2005 read with Chapter 98 of the First Schedule to the Customs Act 1969, and how headings and sub-headings of the Pakistan Customs Tariff are to be interpreted. The Supreme Court held that the TV license fee is levied for the mere possession of a television set under the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1933 and the Television Receiving Apparatus (Possession and Licensing) Rules 1970, and is not a service provided by the appellant under the Federal Excise Act 2005. Furthermore, since neither telecasts nor TV license fees are specified under any sub-heading of PCT Heading 98.12, they fall outside the charging provisions and are exempt. The appeal was consequently allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, laying down principles regarding strict interpretation of fiscal statutes and the application of specific tariff sub-headings over broad general headings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether television license fees collected for the possession of a television set constitute a service subject to Federal Excise Duty under the Federal Excise Act 2005?
  • How are the headings and sub-headings of Chapter 98 of the First Schedule to the Customs Act 1969 to be interpreted for the levy of Federal Excise Duty?
  • Can a general heading in the Pakistan Customs Tariff override specific sub-headings for the purpose of taxation without clear statutory inclusion?
  • What are the established principles for interpreting taxing statutes and exemptions in Pakistan?
  • Whether delegated legislation such as a Statutory Regulatory Order can expand the scope of a charging provision in a fiscal statute?
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• Messrs Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd vs Customs2019 PCTLR 1091, 2020 P SC 117, 2019 PTCL CL. 555, 2019 SCMR 1735, 2019 PTD 1961 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-25
  Customs Actadjudicationlimitation periodshow cause noticeorder-in-originalmandatory time limit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether an order-in-original issued by the Deputy Collector (Adjudication) under the Customs Act, 1969 was rendered within the mandatory statutory limitation period. The core legal question was whether the limitation period of 120 days for deciding a show cause notice concludes on the date a hearing is reserved or when the final order is actually recorded and communicated to the parties. The Supreme Court held that a case cannot be considered "decided" merely upon the conclusion of a hearing or reservation of judgment without verbal announcement, recording, or communication of the decision to the parties within the prescribed period. The Court laid down the principle that under section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, an adjudicatory decision must be recorded and duly communicated within 120 days (or within a validly extended period not exceeding 180 days in total), failing which the decision is time-barred and invalid. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the impugned judgment set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether under section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 an order-in-original is decided on the date the hearing concludes or when the written order is issued and communicated?
  • Can a case be said to be decided without the announcement or communication of the decision to the parties?
  • What is the maximum permissible period including extensions for rendering a decision under section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969?
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• Messrs Habib and Company and others vs Muslim Commercial Bank2019 SCMR 1453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-21
  auction saleexecution proceedingsstatutory depositthird party interestconfirmation of salerecovery suitobjection petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a challenge to an auction sale conducted during execution proceedings of a bank's recovery suit. The petitioners' objection petition under Order XXI, Rule 90, C.P.C. was dismissed for non-prosecution, and the auction was confirmed. Although the underlying decree was later set aside in a Regular First Appeal (R.F.A.), the High Court dismissed the petitioners' appeal against the auction confirmation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, clarifying two major legal principles. First, the Court held that the statutory deposit of 20% of the highest bid is a mandatory prerequisite for maintaining an objection under Order XXI, Rule 90, C.P.C.; failure to make this deposit renders the application non-maintainable. Second, the Court ruled that once an auction sale becomes absolute and a sale certificate is issued, the intervention of third-party interests protects the auction purchaser. Consequently, a valid sale in execution does not become invalid simply because the underlying decree is subsequently reversed or set aside.

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• Messrs Al-Khair Gadoon Ltd vs The Appellate Tribunal and others2020 PLJ SC 72, 2020 P SC 168, PTCL 2020 CL. 180, 2020 PTD 18, 2019 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-21
  central excise dutyshow cause noticewrong provision of lawad valorem assessmentretail price assessmenttax appealremand of matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from leave to appeal granted against the Islamabad High Court's decision in tax appeals, which had declined the appellant's challenge regarding show-cause notices issued for alleged central excise duty evasion under section 4(2) of the Central Excises Act, 1944. The core legal questions concerned whether the citation of a wrong statutory provision in a show-cause notice vitiates recovery proceedings, and how appellate forums should handle mixed questions of law and fact not initially addressed. The Supreme Court held that the mere mention of a wrong provision of law or an incorrect legal label in a show-cause notice does not automatically vitiate proceedings, provided the notice contains necessary facts and causes no prejudice to the recipient in preparing a defense. The Court laid down the principle that substantial compliance and the absence of prejudice to the assessee are paramount, and matters involving mixed questions of fact and law must be remanded to the competent specialized tribunal for adjudication rather than decided prematurely by superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the citing of a wrong provision of law in a show-cause notice vitiate the entire recovery proceedings under the Central Excises Act, 1944?
  • What are the essential distinctions between ad valorem assessment under subsection (1) and retail price assessment under subsection (2) of section 4 of the Central Excises Act, 1944?
  • Whether the non-mentioning of a specific section in a show-cause notice causes prejudice to an assessee when substantial compliance and necessary facts are stated?
  • Should an appellate court decide mixed questions of law and fact for the first time or remand the matter to the Appellate Tribunal?
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• Messrs Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. Karachi vs Collector of Customs, Sales Tax and Central Excise (Adjudication) Karachi-III, Karachi2019 PLD Supreme Court 583 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-31
  central excise dutyexcess duty collectionunjust enrichmentlimitation periodgovernment debtexpress trustretrospective operationinsurance premium
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the recovery of excess central excise duty collected by an insurance company under the Central Excises Act, 1944, prior to the omission of the proviso to Rule 96ZZF(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The core legal questions involved the retrospective applicability of Section 3-D of the 1944 Act (added via Finance Act, 1993), the limitation period for recovering such excess collections, and the applicability of penalties and additional duty. The Supreme Court held that Section 3-D has retrospective reach covering past collections by virtue of the phrase "has collected", and that amounts deemed to be arrears of duty under Section 3-D are recoverable as a debt by the Government through a civil suit, attracting a sixty-year limitation period under Article 149 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, rather than being held in an express trust under Section 10 of the Limitation Act. The key principle laid down is that taxes or duties uncollected or excess amounts recoverable under statutory deeming clauses lacking specific summary machinery may be recovered as a debt by the State under common law within the extended limitation period provided for Government suits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 has retrospective application to excess duty collected prior to its enactment?
  • Does an amount deemed to be an arrear of duty under Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 constitute a trust for a specific purpose under Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • What is the applicable period of limitation for the recovery of excess duty collected and retained under Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 when the statute provides no specific recovery mechanism?
  • Can the Government recover tax arrears or statutory debts by way of a civil suit under common law independent of summary departmental procedures?
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• Member (Taxes), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore, etc vs Qaiser Abbas2019 KLR Supreme Court 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  agricultural income taxretrospective operationnon-obstante clausetax assessmentrecovery noticestatutory interpretationtax liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the recovery of agricultural income tax under the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997. The core legal questions addressed were whether Section 3B of the Act, introduced by the Punjab Finance Act, 2013, operates retrospectively to allow tax recovery for assessment years prior to its enforcement on July 1, 2013, and whether the tax authorities must follow standard assessment procedures or may issue direct recovery notices when tax is based on income declared under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Court held that while tax statutes generally operate prospectively, Section 4(4) of the Act and Rule 14(3) of the Rules permit the recovery of tax for the two years preceding the assessment year in which income was first assessable. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Section 3B acts as a non-obstante clause, dispensing with the requirement for a formal assessment order when an assessee has declared agricultural income in their income tax return. However, where no such return is filed or agricultural income is not disclosed, authorities must adhere to the standard assessment and collection procedures prescribed by the Act and Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997, have retrospective effect to allow recovery of tax for assessment years prior to its enactment?
  • Does the non-obstante clause in Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997, dispense with the requirement for a formal assessment order when agricultural income is declared in an income tax return?
  • Are tax authorities required to follow standard assessment procedures under the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997, if an assessee has not filed an income tax return or has failed to disclose agricultural income therein?
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• Member (Taxes) Board of Revenue Punjab,Lahore,etc vs Qaiser Abbas2019 KLR Supreme Court 264, 2019 P.C.T.L.R. 136, 2019 PLJ SC 286, 2019 P.S.C. · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-08
  agricultural income taxnon-obstante clauseretrospectivity of tax statutesassessment orderrecovery noticesincome tax return
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions and appeals filed by tax authorities against judgments of the High Court that allowed constitutional petitions filed by respondents challenging recovery notices for agricultural income tax. The core legal questions relate to whether Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 operates retrospectively to permit recovery for assessment years prior to its enactment, and whether the tax authority must follow the standard assessment and collection procedure or can directly issue recovery notices based on income tax returns filed under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Supreme Court held that Section 3B, being a non-obstante clause, overrides Section 3 and acts as a self-contained provision allowing direct recovery notices based on self-declared agricultural income without a separate assessment order, provided the assessee declared such income. Furthermore, read with Section 4(4) and Rule 14(3), recovery is permissible for the two years prior to the assessment year when the income was first assessable. The appeal was partly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 has an overriding effect on Section 3 of the Act?
  • Does Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 apply retrospectively to allow recovery of agricultural income tax for assessment years prior to its enforcement?
  • Is the tax authority required to follow the formal assessment procedure before issuing recovery notices when agricultural income is declared under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether the failure to pass an assessment order deprives the assessee of the right to challenge the tax under Section 7 of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997?
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• Meera Shafi (Meesha Shafi) vs Additional District Judge, Lahore and another2019 SCMR 1104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-14
  civil procedureexamination-in-chiefcross-examinationaffidavit-in-evidencetrial managementconsent orderexpeditious disposal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld a trial court order rejecting the petitioner's request to record the examination-in-chief of all witnesses before commencing cross-examination. The core legal question concerned the procedural management of witness testimony and the sequence of examination in a civil suit. Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the parties reached a consensus to resolve the procedural impasse. The Supreme Court, exercising its jurisdiction, converted the petition into an appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court. The Court held that the proceedings should continue based on the mutual consent of the parties, which stipulated specific timelines for filing affidavits-in-evidence and conducting cross-examinations. The key principle laid down is that parties in civil litigation may, by mutual consent, streamline procedural aspects of trial management, such as the sequence and timing of witness examination, provided such arrangements align with the overarching judicial mandate for the expeditious disposal of cases and avoid unnecessary delays.

  Questions settled

  • Can parties to a civil suit reach a consent agreement regarding the sequence and timing of witness examination-in-chief and cross-examination?
  • Does the court have the authority to set aside a High Court order based on a mutual consent agreement reached between parties during appellate proceedings?
  • Is the filing of an affidavit-in-evidence a recognized procedural step under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Maula Bux Shaikh & others vs Chief Minister Sindh & others2019 SCP 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-03
  service tribunalpromotion quotadiploma holdersprofessional engineeraccredited engineering qualificationpakistan engineering council actcivil servants promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenged a notification issued by the Works and Services Department, Government of Sindh, providing promotion quotas for diploma holders and B.Tech degree holders to the post of Executive Engineer (BS-18), on the ground that it was ultra vires the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 restricts the Government's executive power to prescribe academic qualifications and promotion quotas for civil servants in engineering departments. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that it is the exclusive domain of the Government to determine service qualifications and promotion policies for its employees, whereas the Pakistan Engineering Council regulates the engineering profession and professional engineering work. The Court laid down the principle that while the Government enjoys unfettered powers to structure service promotion rules, no person who is not a registered professional engineer possessing an accredited engineering qualification may be permitted to perform professional engineering work as defined under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 restrict the Government's power to prescribe qualifications for the promotion of civil servants?
  • Can diploma holders and B.Tech degree holders be appointed or promoted to posts in government engineering departments?
  • What constitutes professional engineering work under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976?
  • Are non-registered engineers permitted to perform professional engineering work under the law?
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• Manzoor Hussain and anothe vs Khalid Aziz and others2019 SCMR 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-22
  revenue record tamperingburden of prooforal sale transactionevacuee landfraudulent entriescivil declarationland title dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the ownership of agricultural land, originally granted as evacuee property to the respondents' parents. The appellants claimed title through subsequent sales, while the respondents, as legal heirs, sought a declaration of ownership, cancellation of documents, and possession, alleging the revenue records were fraudulent. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, finding the alleged sales unproven. The Appellate Court reversed this decision, but the High Court restored the Trial Court's judgment, citing a lack of evidence regarding the sale transactions and irregularities in the revenue records. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision. The Court found that the appellants failed to prove the alleged oral sale transactions, noting the absence of credible witnesses, lack of identification documents, and clear evidence of tampering in the revenue registers, specifically the insertion of a fabricated page. The Court affirmed that the burden of proving a sale transaction lies on the party asserting it, and fraudulent revenue entries cannot confer title or defeat a legitimate claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving an alleged oral sale transaction lie with the party asserting it?
  • Can revenue entries based on fabricated or tampered records be relied upon to establish title?
  • Is the absence of identification details and witnesses in an alleged oral sale transaction sufficient to invalidate the claim?
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• Manzoor Hussain alias Babo vs The StatePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 452, 2019 SCMR 1325, 2019 SCP 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-17
  criminal appealmurder convictionaccidental dischargeballistic evidencelife imprisonmentappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a criminal appeal and a cross-petition arising from a murder conviction. The appellant was convicted for the murder of the deceased during a marriage ceremony, with the prosecution alleging intentional firing motivated by prior acrimony and land disputes. The appellant raised a defense of accidental discharge, claiming a stuck bullet fired unintentionally during aerial firing. The trial court convicted the appellant and imposed a death sentence, which the High Court later commuted to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the appellant's plea of accidental discharge could be sustained against the medical and ballistic evidence presented. The Supreme Court rejected the defense of accidental fire, finding the mechanics of the weapon and the bullet's trajectory inconsistent with an accidental discharge. The Court held that the evidence, including the trajectory and the face-to-face positioning of the parties, conclusively established intentional firing. Consequently, the Court dismissed both the appellant's appeal against the conviction and the complainant's petition for the restoration of the death penalty, affirming the life sentence as appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of accidental discharge be sustained when the trajectory of the bullet and the mechanics of the weapon contradict such a theory?
  • Does the presence of a motive and consistent eyewitness testimony outweigh a defense of accidental firing in a murder case?
  • Is a sentence of life imprisonment appropriate when the evidence establishes intentional firing but the circumstances of the incident involve a marriage ceremony?
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• Manzoor Ahmed Shah and others vs The State and others2019 SCMR 2000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-12
  criminal appealcompromise in murder casesection 34 PPCcommon intentionvicarious liabilityabatement of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from convictions under Sections 302(b), 324, 334, 336, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, concerning a multi-victim shooting incident. The core legal questions pertained to the effect of a partial compromise among legal heirs and whether vicarious liability under Section 34 PPC applies when common intention is unproven in a sudden occurrence. Upon the death of one appellant, his appeal abated. For the remaining appellants, a compromise was verified and accepted regarding one deceased victim and two injured victims. Concerning the second deceased victim, where the compromise was incomplete, the court evaluated the merits and found that the appellants had not inflicted any injuries on her, the motive was unproved, and no crime-empties connected their firearms to the scene. The Supreme Court held that without proof of common intention, each participant in a sudden event is liable only for their individual acts. Consequently, the court accepted the compromise for part of the charges and acquitted the appellants on merits for the remaining murder charge.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal abate with respect to an appellant who dies during its pendency?
  • Whether convictions based on vicarious liability under Section 34 PPC can be sustained when sharing of common intention is not proved?
  • Can accused persons be acquitted on merits regarding a deceased victim when a compromise is incomplete but individual participation is unproven?
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• Mansab Ali vs The State2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 401, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 546, 2019 SCMR 1306, 2019 SCP 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-10
  Section 302(b) PPCmurderocular evidencemedical evidence conflictbenefit of doubtacquittalcontradiction in testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, wherein the trial court sentenced him to death and the High Court subsequently altered the sentence to imprisonment for life, while co-accused were acquitted. The central legal question pertained to whether the conviction could be sustained on the basis of ocular account when substantial contradictions existed between the crime report, witness testimonies, and medical evidence. The Supreme Court observed that eyewitness testimonies materially deviated from the initial crime report regarding the number and location of firearm injuries, and were further contradicted by the medical officer's findings showing exit wounds rather than entry wounds on the targeted body parts. Furthermore, co-accused were acquitted on the same set of evidence without challenge. Holding that the prosecution case was fraught with serious doubts, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 302 PPC be sustained when ocular evidence directly contradicts both the initial crime report and the medical evidence regarding the nature and entry points of firearm injuries?
  • What is the effect on the prosecution's case when eyewitnesses make material departures during trial from their previous statements without justification?
  • Whether the unchallenged en bloc acquittal of co-accused upon the same evidence creates sufficient doubt to render unsafe the conviction of the principal accused?
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• Malik Din vs Chairman National Accountability Bureau and anotherPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 170, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 13, 2019 SCMR 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-06
  criminal petition for leave to appealmisuse of authorityNational Accountability Ordinancecorruption and corrupt practicesjurisdictiondiscriminationillegal allotmentplot conversionsentence reductionAccountability Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal challenged the Islamabad High Court's dismissal of an appeal against the petitioner's conviction by an Accountability Court. The petitioner, a former Administrator of a housing society, was convicted under Sections 9(a)(vi) and 10 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for misusing authority by illegally allotting and converting plots. The Supreme Court addressed contentions regarding NAB's jurisdiction, alleged discrimination, and the necessity of personal financial gain or actual financial loss for conviction. The Court held that NAB's initiation of a reference based on a Standing Committee's letter constituted a valid 'complaint' under Section 18(b)(ii) of the Ordinance. It further ruled that challenging prosecution on grounds of discrimination is not a valid defence, and that Section 9(a)(vi) does not require personal financial gain by the accused or actual financial loss to the society, as it covers benefiting any other person. The conviction was maintained, but the sentence of rigorous imprisonment was reduced from five years to four years, while the fine, disability, and disqualifications remained intact.

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• Major (R) Pervaiz Iqbal vs Munir Ahmad & others2019 SCP 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-15
  specific performancelimitation periodcause of actionagreement to sellpremature suitmutually destructive pleas
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against concurrent judgments of the lower courts which decreed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell executed on July 10, 1986. The core legal question concerned whether the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, given that it was filed in 1996 based on an agreement where the seller had not yet acquired title to the property. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action for specific performance remained inchoate and suspended until the petitioner formally acquired title to the property on March 2, 2000, rendering the suit neither premature nor time-barred. The Court laid down the principle that a plea of limitation cannot succeed where the defendant himself successfully maintained that the suit was premature, as the pleas are mutually destructive, and that limitation under Article 113 does not run until the vendor is legally competent to perform the contract and convey title.

  Questions settled

  • When does the period of limitation begin to run for filing a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell immovable property where the vendor's own title is pending finalization?
  • Can a defendant simultaneously plead that a suit for specific performance is both premature and barred by limitation?
  • Does the pendency of litigation regarding a vendor's title suspend the cause of action for a subsequent vendee seeking specific performance?
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• Majeed alias Majeedi and others vs The State and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 508, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 59, 2019 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-06
  robberymurdertest identification paradebenefit of doubtmuffled facesidentification in courtcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a robbery incident where one person was killed and three others were injured. The appellant was convicted by the trial court under Sections 302(b), 392, and 394 PPC, with the High Court later modifying the convictions to Section 302(b) and four counts under Section 397 PPC. The Supreme Court examined the reliability of the identification evidence, noting that the incident occurred at night in dense fog and that the culprits had muffled faces. The Court found the test identification parade conducted after a two-month delay to be highly suspect due to interpolations in the record and conflicting testimonies between the Magistrate and eye-witnesses regarding its authenticity. Furthermore, the Court observed that identification before the trial court is generally unsafe. As the recoveries of cash and a pistol were already ruled out by the High Court for lack of evidentiary links, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

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• Maj. (Retd.) Syed Muhammad Tanveer Abbas and another vs Federation2019 SCMR 984 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-13
  contractual employmentstatutory bodynon-statutory ruleswrit jurisdictiontermination of serviceregularizationconstitutional petitionmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  These two appeals arose from the termination of contract-based employees of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). The appellants had opted for 'Option I' under a 2012 regularization scheme, which provided for an open-ended contract until superannuation but included a clause allowing termination upon three months' notice without assigning reasons. Their services were subsequently terminated under this clause, leading to constitutional petitions in the High Court, which were dismissed for lack of maintainability. The Supreme Court examined whether the NADRA Employees (Service) Regulations, 2002, were statutory and whether the principle in the 'DHA case' (2017 SCMR 2010) applied. The Court held that while NADRA is a 'person' under Article 199, the 2002 Regulations are non-statutory. It distinguished the DHA case, noting that the appellants remained contractual employees by choosing Option I, unlike the regularized employees in the cited precedent. Consequently, the Court ruled that contractual employees of a statutory body cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge termination based on valid contract terms. The appeals were dismissed.

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• Liaquat National Hospital vs Province of Sindh and others2019 KLR Supreme Court 411, 2019 P.S.C. 615, 2019 SCP 278, 2019 SCMR 865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-21
  property tax exemptioncharitable institutionexclusive usetax statute interpretationpublic charityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the appellant hospital's constitutional petition regarding property tax exemption. The core legal question was whether a hospital that charges fees to paying patients while offering subsidized services to the needy qualifies for property tax exemption under section 4(f) of the Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, which requires buildings and lands to be used exclusively for public charity. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the appellant's premises and funds were not used exclusively for charitable purposes, it failed to meet the strict statutory threshold for exemption. The Court laid down the key principle that exemption clauses in tax statutes must be construed strictly, and an institution claiming exemption must prove that it falls squarely within the four corners of the provision by establishing exclusive charitable use of the property and its income.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a hospital charging fees to paying patients while offering subsidized services to needy patients qualifies for property tax exemption under Section 4(f) of the Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958?
  • Does the mere fact that an organization's profits are reinvested and not distributed among its members establish that it is a charitable organization for tax exemption purposes?
  • What is the standard of proof required for an institution claiming an exemption under a tax statute?
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• Lahore High Court Bar Association, etc vs General (R) Pervez Musharraf, etc2019 SCP 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-14
  high treasonproclaimed offenderfugitive from justicetrial in absentiaright of audiencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition concerning the stalled trial of General (Rtd.) Pervez Musharraf before a Special Court for high treason under the Criminal Law (Special Court) Act 1976. The trial had been delayed for years due to the persistent absence of the accused, who was declared a proclaimed offender in 2016. The core legal question was whether the Special Court could proceed with and conclude the trial in the absence of an accused who deliberately absents himself. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Section 9 of the Criminal Law (Special Court) Act 1976, the Special Court is empowered to proceed with the trial in the absence of the accused if his absence is self-created or designed to impede justice. The Court laid down the principle that a fugitive from law and proclaimed offender loses their right of audience and forfeits the right to have an advocate appointed to defend them or to record a statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, unless and until they surrender to the court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Special Court proceed with a high treason trial in the absence of the accused under the Criminal Law (Special Court) Act 1976?
  • Does a proclaimed offender who is a fugitive from law retain the right of audience and the right to have counsel defend them in their absence?
  • Does the voluntary absence of an accused from a trial violate the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the effect of an accused's failure to appear on their right to record a statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Lahore High Court Bar Association and others vs General (Retd.)2020 PSC (Crl.) 7, 2019 SCMR 1029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-01
  high treasonspecial courtproclaimed offenderright of audienceabsconding accusedtrial in absentiacriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition concerning the stalled trial of General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf before the Special Court for high treason under the Criminal Law (Special Court) Act, 1976, due to his persistent absence and status as a proclaimed offender. The core legal question was whether the Special Court could proceed with the trial in the absence of the accused and how Section 9 of the Act applied to prevent delays caused by an absconding accused. The Supreme Court held that under Section 9 of the Act, if an accused voluntarily absents himself or impedes justice, the Special Court must proceed with the trial. The Court laid down the key principles that an accused who is a proclaimed offender and a fugitive from law loses the right of audience and forfeiture of defense, and that an accused who voluntarily chooses not to appear waives the opportunity for a Section 342 Cr.P.C. examination, ensuring that control over the trial proceedings does not rest with the absconder.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Special Court proceed with a high treason trial in the absence of an accused who is a proclaimed offender?
  • Does an accused who is a fugitive from law lose the right of audience and the right to put up a defence?
  • What is the effect of Section 9 of the Criminal Law (Special Court) Act, 1976 regarding the restriction of adjournments due to the absence of an accused?
  • Does an accused who voluntarily chooses not to appear lose the right to record a statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Khurram vs The State, etc2019 SCMR 1317, 2019 SCP 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-15
  criminal appealmurderabduction for ransomlast-seen evidencebenefit of doubtacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a criminal appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Khurram, for abduction for ransom, homicide, and screening of evidence, while acquitting his co-accused. The core legal question involves the reliability of circumstantial evidence, including last-seen evidence, the credibility of belated disclosures regarding ransom, the propriety of summoning a court witness mid-trial to establish tenancy, and the certainty of corpse identification without DNA profiling in advanced putrefaction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that when the prosecution case against the appellant rests on the same shaky testimony that led to the acquittal of identically placed co-accused, and suffers from uncorroborated last-seen evidence, doubtful corpse identification, and improper mid-trial introduction of court witnesses, the conviction cannot be sustained. The key principles laid down are that parity in treatment must be extended to co-accused facing identical evidence, and that powers to summon court witnesses must not be exercised to the detriment of the accused's adversarial balance without solid proof.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for a capital crime be sustained on last-seen evidence that lacks temporal specificity and corroboration?
  • Does the acquittal of identically placed co-accused entitle the remaining appellant to an acquittal on the principle of parity?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the identity of the recovered dead body is doubtful due to advanced putrefaction and lack of DNA analysis?
  • To what extent can a trial court summon a witness mid-trial without disturbing the adversarial balance of the case?
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• Khan Muhammad vs The Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan, Quetta and others2019 SCP 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-22
  service lawposting and transfercivil servantrules of businessseparation of powersultra virestenure of postingown pay and scale
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter arose from a challenge to a notification transferring the petitioner, an Acting Divisional Director of Education, and replacing him with a junior officer. The core legal question was whether a provincial Minister possesses the authority to order the posting or transfer of civil servants, and whether such delegation of power via administrative notification is consistent with the Constitution and the Balochistan Government Rules of Business, 2012. The Supreme Court held that the notification delegating transfer powers to the Minister was ultra vires the Rules of Business and the constitutional scheme of governance, which bifurcates policy-making in the political domain from administrative implementation in the bureaucratic domain. The Court ruled that Ministers lack the authority to post or transfer civil servants, as such powers undermine the Secretary's role in maintaining discipline and efficient administration. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that arbitrary transfers, particularly those requiring a senior to serve under a junior or those made on an own pay and scale basis, are legally impermissible and violate established principles of good governance and tenure security.

  Questions settled

  • Does a provincial Minister have the legal authority to order the posting or transfer of civil servants under the Balochistan Government Rules of Business, 2012?
  • Is a notification delegating the power of posting and transfer of civil servants to a provincial Minister consistent with the constitutional scheme of governance?
  • Can a civil servant be transferred to serve under a subordinate officer without cogent reasons?
  • Is the appointment of a civil servant on an own pay and scale basis legally permissible?
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• Khan Muhammad (decd.) through L.Rs. etc vs Mst. Khatoon Bibi and others2019 SCP 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-01
  inheritancepre-deceased sonlimited estateMuslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961co-sharerlimitationsuccessionShariat
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the inheritance rights of the daughter and widows of a pre-deceased son (Rajada) of the last male owner (Ahmad), who died in 1944. The core legal question was whether the daughter and widows of the pre-deceased son were entitled to inherit from the propositus's legacy, given the timing of the succession and the subsequent enactment of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Court held that because the widows held a limited estate that terminated after the promulgation of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, the provisions of Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, became applicable at the time of the termination of that limited estate. Consequently, the legal heirs of the pre-deceased son were entitled to their respective Shari shares. The Court affirmed that inheritance rights of co-sharers are not barred by limitation, as possession by one co-sharer is deemed possession of all, and wrong revenue entries provide a fresh cause of action. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 apply to the inheritance of a pre-deceased son's heirs when the limited estate of the widows terminates after the Act's promulgation?
  • Does the law of limitation bar a suit for inheritance filed by a co-sharer who has been denied their share in the legacy?
  • Are the heirs of a pre-deceased son entitled to inherit from the original propositus if the succession opened prior to the enactment of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, but the limited estate terminated after its enactment?
  • Does a wrong entry in the revenue record regarding inheritance provide a fresh cause of action for a co-sharer?
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• Khair-Ul-Bashar vs The StatePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 372, 2019 SCP 132, 2019 SCMR 930 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-08
  NarcoticsHeroinControl of Narcotic Substances ActGovernment Analyst ReportForensic analysisTest protocolsEvidentiary valueMandatory provisionsPurposive interpretationBenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of heroin. The core legal question concerned the mandatory nature of information required in the Report of the Government Analyst under Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, specifically regarding the inclusion of individual test results and test protocols. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, holding that the Report of the Government Analyst in the present case was deficient as it failed to provide results for each test (only a consolidated result) and did not signify the test protocols applied, thus non-complying with Rule 6. The Court reiterated that Rule 6 is mandatory, requiring the Report to specify all tests, the result of each test, and the name of all protocols applied. Non-compliance diminishes the reliability and evidentiary value of the Report, and re-testing for deficient reports is impermissible. The Court emphasized purposive interpretation to ensure convictions are based on reliable reports and to protect fundamental rights.

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• Khair-ul-Bashar son of Sajawal Khan vs The State2019 SCP 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-08
  Government Analyst reporttest protocolsnarcotic substancesmandatory rulespurposive interpretationbenefit of the doubtchemical examiner
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for possessing heroin, and his conviction was upheld by the High Court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the report of the Government Analyst complied with Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001. The core legal question was whether the requirements of Rule 6—specifically detailing the tests, results, and test protocols applied—are mandatory and whether a deficient report vitiates the conviction. The Court held that Rule 6 is mandatory, and a Government Analyst's report must explicitly state the tests performed, individual results, and the specific test protocols applied to ensure reliability and evidentiary value. The Court reiterated that non-compliance diminishes the report's credibility, and flaws in prosecution evidence must benefit the accused. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was granted the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Are the requirements under Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 regarding test results and protocols mandatory?
  • Does a Government Analyst report lacking specific test protocols and individual test results possess sufficient evidentiary value to sustain a narcotics conviction?
  • Can the prosecution be permitted to resend samples for re-testing when the original chemical examiner's report is found to be deficient in material particulars?
  • What are the essential elements required for a valid report prepared by a Government Analyst under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
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• Khadija Siddiqui vs Shah Hussain, etc2019 PLD Supreme Court 261, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 597, 2019 SCP 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-23
  criminal appealacquittalrevisional jurisdictionmisreading of evidenceinjured eyewitnessperversityconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent of charges involving a murderous assault on two victims. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s acquittal, predicated on alleged misreading and non-reading of evidence, was legally sustainable and whether the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s judgment was perverse, as it ignored critical evidence, including the testimony of injured eyewitnesses, and misconstrued the record regarding medical evidence and procedural history. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the acquittal, and restored the conviction and sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The Court laid down the principle that an acquittal judgment suffering from serious misreading or non-reading of evidence that materially affects the final outcome is perverse and subject to judicial interference. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that in exercising revisional jurisdiction, the High Court must confine itself to the legality and propriety of lower court proceedings rather than conducting a full-fledged reappraisal of evidence, particularly when concurrent findings of fact exist.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment that suffers from serious misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Does the High Court exceed its revisional jurisdiction by conducting a full-fledged reappraisal of evidence?
  • Is an acquittal judgment that ignores critical evidence considered perverse and subject to interference?
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• Khadija Siddiqui and another vs Shah Hussain and anotherPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 57, 2019 PLD Supreme Court 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-23
  criminal appealacquittalmisreading of evidencenon-reading of evidencerevisional jurisdictioninjured witnessattempt to commit qatl-i-amdperverse judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arose from a high-profile Lahore incident where two sisters, Khadija Siddiqui and Sofia Siddiqui, were attacked in broad daylight with multiple knife blows, sustaining severe injuries. The trial court convicted the assailant, Shah Hussain, under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the appellate court partly modified the sentences. However, the High Court accepted the accused's revision petition and acquitted him of all charges. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the record and held that the High Court's judgment of acquittal suffered from grave misreading and non-reading of material evidence, including eyewitness accounts, medical evidence, and critical documents, rendering the acquittal perverse. The Supreme Court reiterated that revisional jurisdiction should not entail a full-fledged reappraisal of evidence concurrent findings of fact by lower courts without legal error. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the trial court's conviction and sentencing of the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment of acquittal passed by a High Court in revision can be interfered with by the Supreme Court when it suffers from serious misreading and non-reading of evidence?
  • Can a High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction embark upon a full-fledged reappraisal of evidence in the presence of concurrent findings of fact by the courts below?
  • Does the failure of an injured victim to immediately name the assailant due to critical medical condition and unconsciousness vitiate the prosecution case?
  • What is the legal scope of interference by a higher court with concurrent findings of fact recorded by trial and appellate courts?
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• Kareem Nawaz Khan vs The State2019 SCP 312, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 231, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 12, 2019 SCMR 1741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-21
  criminal reviewmurdercompromisedeath sentence commutationanti-terrorismprovocation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal review petition arises from the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner for triple murder and terrorist charges following an incident stemming from an ancestral property dispute. The core legal question concerns whether a valid compromise between the parties regarding the murder charges under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code can serve as a ground to reduce the petitioner's death sentence for the offence under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 to imprisonment for life, alongside considerations of recent provocation. The Supreme Court held that a valid and accepted compromise in a coordinate compoundable offence is a valid mitigating ground for reducing a sentence of death to imprisonment for life under the Anti-Terrorism Act, particularly when combined with circumstances of recent provocation. The Court laid down the principle that while terrorism charges are non-compoundable, a genuine compromise between the heirs and the convict in related murder charges can be utilized judicially to commute the death penalty to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise reached between the parties in murder charges under Section 302(b) PPC be used as a ground to reduce a death sentence under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether recent provocation in the absence of ongoing enmity warrants the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Can a criminal review petition be converted into an appeal and partly allowed based on subsequent developments such as a compromise?
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• Kamran Shah and others vs The State and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 565, 2019 SCMR 1217 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-21
  narcoticsconscious possessionsafe custodychain of custodybenefit of doubtchemical examiner reportlife imprisonmentacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of three appellants for the possession of 20 kilograms of charas recovered from secret cavities of a bus in which they were travelling as passengers. The trial court and High Court had sentenced them to life imprisonment under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Supreme Court, upon reappraisal of evidence, observed that the prosecution failed to establish 'conscious possession' of the contraband by the passengers, as the vehicle was being driven by a co-convict. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to prove the safe custody of the recovered substance at the police station and its safe transmission to the Chemical Examiner, as the relevant Moharrir and the Constable who delivered the samples were not produced or failed to testify to these facts. Following the precedent in 'The State v. Imam Bakhsh', the Court held that gaps in the chain of custody are fatal to the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and acquitted the appellants by extending the benefit of doubt.

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• Justice Qazi Faez Isa vs The President of Pakistan and others2019 PLD Supreme Court 743, 2019 SCP 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-24
  Presidential Referenceconstitutional petitionjudicial reviewArticle 211 bar of jurisdictionArticle 248 constitutional immunityOrder XXVII-A noticemala fide in lawmala fide in fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises out of Constitution Petition No. 17 of 2019 along with nine connected petitions filed by a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court, Bar Associations, Bar Councils, and senior advocates. The petitions challenged a Presidential Reference dated 20.05.2019 initiated against the Petitioner-Judge, primarily alleging mala fides in fact and in law pursuant to the principles laid down in Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 61). The core legal matters raised included the maintainability of the petitions in light of the constitutional bar of jurisdiction under Article 211, the immunity of the President and Prime Minister under Article 248, and constitutional interpretation requiring notice to the Attorney General. The Supreme Court observed that the points raised warranted consideration, issued notice to the respondents, directed notice to the Attorney General under Order XXVII-A CPC, noted that the retention of the President and Prime Minister as parties would be examined during hearings, and adjourned the proceedings for detailed legal submissions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether notice under Order XXVII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 must be issued to the Attorney General for Pakistan in proceedings involving the interpretation of constitutional provisions?
  • Whether the retention of the President of Pakistan and Prime Minister of Pakistan as respondents in a constitutional petition must be examined in light of Article 248 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether petitions challenging a Presidential Reference on grounds of mala fides raise substantial legal questions requiring consideration despite the jurisdictional bar under Article 211 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Justice Muhammad Farrukh Irfan Khan, Judge, Lahore High Court, Lahore vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Division Government of Pakistan,Islamabad and 4 others2019 PLD Supreme Court 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-18
  inter se seniorityAdditional Judgesoath of officeconstitutional petitionjudicial appointmentestoppel against lawentering upon officeseniority list
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitution Petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, was filed by a sitting Judge of the Lahore High Court challenging an order that re-fixed his inter se seniority. The petitioner and respondents were appointed as Additional Judges via the same notification on 17.02.2010. However, the respondents took their oath on 19.02.2010, while the petitioner, being abroad, took his oath on 20.02.2010. The core legal question was whether seniority is reckoned from the date of the appointment notification or the date of making the oath of office. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that under Articles 193, 194, and 197, an appointment is only completed and effective when the appointee makes the prescribed oath. The Court clarified that making the oath is the 'final stage' of appointment and the point at which a person 'enters upon office.' Consequently, the respondents, having taken their oath earlier, were legally senior to the petitioner. The Court also ruled that principles of estoppel or acquiescence cannot override constitutional provisions regarding the commencement of judicial office.

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• Javed Khan vs Ali Gohar Shah & others2019 SCP 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-30
  quashing of FIRcriminal investigationimmovable property disputejudicial scrutinycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had quashed First Information Report No. 5 dated 6.11.2011, registered at Police Station Anti-Corruption Establishment, Charsada, concerning a dispute over immovable property. The appellant, acting as an attorney for the property owner, contended that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR, as the allegations and evidence presented necessitated proper investigative and judicial scrutiny rather than premature termination of proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, upon reviewing the matter and noting the lack of strong opposition from the respondents, allowed the appeal. The Court held that the High Court's decision to quash the FIR was unjustified because the case required a full investigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment, thereby restoring the FIR, while preserving the respondents' right to pursue other legal remedies if advised, and maintaining the bail previously granted to them.

  Questions settled

  • Does an FIR concerning an immovable property dispute warrant investigative and judicial scrutiny rather than summary quashing?
  • Can a High Court quash an FIR when the allegations require further investigation?
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• Izzat Ullah and another vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 130, 2019 SCMR 1975 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-27
  narcoticsconfessional statementretracted confessionsafe custody of samplespublic witnessescriminal petitionheroin recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions challenging the conviction and sentencing of the petitioners for narcotics transportation. The core legal questions involve the validity of retracted confessional statements, the prosecution's proof of safe custody and transmission of samples, and the effect of the absence of public witnesses on recovery. The Supreme Court held that the retracted confessional statements were voluntary, natural, and truthful, supported by a brief interregnum, and that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent witness testimony and a positive forensic report. The Court reaffirmed that police officials are reliable witnesses if found trustworthy, public recusal does not vitiate recovery, and concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts warrant no interference. The petitions were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are retracted confessional statements admissible and reliable when made voluntarily shortly after arrest?
  • Does the absence of public witnesses invalidate a narcotics recovery attested by police officials?
  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts in a narcotics case warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2019 P.S.C 1227, 2019 SCP 306, 2019 PLD Supreme Court 675, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-23
  video scandaladmissibility of evidenceadditional evidencejudicial conductforensic examinationAccountability Courtblackmailappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These Constitution Petitions were filed following a public media briefing where a video was released allegedly showing an Accountability Court Judge admitting to convicting a former Prime Minister under external pressure and blackmail. The Judge subsequently issued a press release and an affidavit denying the allegations of pressure but admitting to various private meetings with the accused's associates and the accused himself. The Supreme Court addressed the legal status of the video and the conduct of the Judge. The Court held that since an appeal against the conviction is currently pending before the Islamabad High Court, that forum alone has the jurisdiction to consider the video as additional evidence under Section 428 Cr.P.C. The Court laid down stringent criteria for the admissibility of audio-visual evidence, including requirements for forensic authentication, proof of genuineness, and the identification of voices and sources. Regarding the Judge, the Court found his admitted conduct to be abhorrent and directed his repatriation to the Lahore High Court for disciplinary proceedings. The petitions were disposed of, leaving the evidentiary determination to the appellate court.

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• Ishaq Khan Khakwani and another vs Railway Board through its Chairman2019 PLD Supreme Court 602, 2019 P.S.C 1372, 2019 SCP 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-11
  public interest litigationjudicial reviewpublic propertylease agreementtransparencyvoid ab initioconstitutional petitionbidding process
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitution petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution challenged the lease of the Royal Palm Golf and Country Club by Pakistan Railways. The core legal question concerned whether the lease agreement was executed through a transparent, lawful process or was tainted by mala fides, nepotism, and material departures from advertised terms, causing significant loss to the national exchequer. The Supreme Court held that the entire process was non-transparent and unlawful, as the terms of the lease were materially altered after the bidding process to benefit the lessee, thereby denying a level playing field. Consequently, the Court declared the lease agreement non est, null, and void ab initio. The judgment reaffirms that public functionaries must exercise authority over public property fairly, transparently, and reasonably. It establishes that contracts involving public assets are subject to judicial review when they fail the test of fairness or involve procedural impropriety. Furthermore, the Court held that it possesses the jurisdiction to declare such contracts void while simultaneously referring matters of criminal liability to the National Accountability Bureau for independent adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contract involving public assets can be subjected to judicial review under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Does a material departure from advertised terms in a public contract vitiate the bidding process?
  • Can the Supreme Court declare a contract void ab initio while simultaneously referring the matter to the National Accountability Bureau for criminal investigation?
  • Are public functionaries required to act with transparency and fairness when dealing with public property even in the absence of specific statutory provisions?
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• In the matter regarding deduction of high Tax/other charges by Mobile2019 SCP 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-27
  original jurisdictionfundamental rightsadvance income taxsales tax on servicesfederal excise dutycellular mobile operatorstaxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legality of the levy and imposition of advance income tax, Federal Excise Duty, and provincial Sales Tax on Services, alongside service and maintenance charges collected by Cellular Mobile Operators. The core legal question is whether the Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to adjudicate this matter, specifically whether it involves the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Additionally, the Court seeks to determine the validity of the tax regimes applied to mobile consumers, including the scope of advance tax collection from non-taxpayers and the authority of the Federation and Provinces to impose these specific levies. The Court, noting that the previous interim order was passed by a three-member Bench, directed that the matter be referred to the Chief Justice of Pakistan for the constitution of a new three-member Bench to address these jurisdictional and substantive tax questions. The Federation, Provinces, and Cellular Mobile Operators were directed to submit written responses and relevant data regarding tax recovery for the specified period.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan regarding the imposition of taxes and service charges by Cellular Mobile Operators?
  • Can advance tax under section 236 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 be legally levied or recovered from non-taxpayers?
  • Is the imposition of Sales Tax by the Provinces on consumers under their respective regimes legally permissible?
  • Can Federal Excise Duty be imposed on services provided by Cellular Mobile Operators?
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• Imtiaz @ Taji and another vs State etc_PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 221, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 454, 2020 SCMR 287, PLJ 2019 SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-03
  murderdeath sentence conversionmitigating circumstancessingle fireunproven motivecriminal appealsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court maintaining the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a sentence of death for murder. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction was sustainable based on the ocular and medical evidence, and whether mitigating circumstances warranted the reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent ocular accounts and medical evidence. However, considering mitigating factors such as a single fire attributed to the appellant without repetition, unproven motive, inconsequential forensic reports, and the compromise leading to the acquittal of co-accused, the Court partly allowed the appeal by upholding the conviction but converting the death sentence into imprisonment for life, alongside extending the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that mitigating circumstances, including a single unrepeated gunshot and an unproven motive, can constitute sufficient grounds to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment in murder cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a single unrepeated fire attributed to an accused can serve as a mitigating circumstance for converting a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Does an unproven motive weaken the prosecution's case regarding the quantum of sentence in a capital charge?
  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused on the basis of a compromise can be considered a mitigating factor for the remaining convict?
  • Can a criminal petition against acquittal be dismissed on grounds of being barred by time when the explanation for delay is not legally plausible?
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