Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Shahida Bibi and others vs Habib Bank Limited and others2016 CLD 2025, 2016 SCP 85, 2016 PLD Supreme Court 995 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-29
  execution of decreemortgaged propertyprivate salepublic auctionbanking lawsstatutory interpretationrepealed lawretrospective applicationjudicial discretionproportionality analysisdue processjudgment debtor rightsauction purchaser rightsconflicting judgments
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addressed the legality of a private sale of mortgaged property during execution proceedings and sought to reconcile conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court regarding the mode of sale. The core legal questions involved determining the applicable law among the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Ordinance, 1997, and the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, and whether an executing court could deviate from an initially adopted mode of sale. The Court held that the 1997 Act was the applicable law at the time of the private sale and its confirmation, and under its provisions, sale by private treaty was not permissible, only public auction or sealed tenders. Furthermore, even under the repealed 1984 Ordinance, the sale was illegal due to the failure to provide the judgment debtor with the statutory option to purchase or redeem the property. The Court clarified that while an executing court can deviate from an adopted mode of execution, it must do so with a conscious application of mind and by assigning justifiable reasons, rejecting the concept of mere "tacit consent." The judgment in Muhammad Attique v. Jami Limited was affirmed as correct law, while Mst. Asma Zafarul Hassan v. M/s. United Bank Ltd. and National Bank of Pakistan v. Paradise Trading Company were deemed incorrect or per incuriam on this point. Consequently, the private sale in favour of the auction purchaser was set aside, and the property was directed to be put to open auction, with provisions for refund and compensation to the appellants.

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• Shahid Perwaiz vs Messrs Galaxo Klin Pakistan Ltd. and others2016 PLC 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-10-22
  habitual late comingmisconductindustrial relationsdismissal from servicelabour lawstanding ordersreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had reinstated an employee dismissed for habitual late attendance. The appellant had been dismissed by the respondent company after 223 recorded instances of late arrival over a decade, despite receiving 26 advisory letters. The core legal question was whether such conduct constituted "habitual" late coming amounting to misconduct under the relevant labour laws, justifying dismissal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the appellant’s persistent failure to improve punctuality despite numerous warnings established a pattern of habitual late coming. The court affirmed that such conduct constitutes misconduct under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The principle laid down is that an employee’s repeated, documented failure to adhere to attendance requirements, notwithstanding repeated warnings, demonstrates a habitual disregard for employment obligations, thereby justifying disciplinary action, including dismissal, for misconduct. The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, though it noted the employer's offer to convert the dismissal into termination simpliciter.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pattern of 223 instances of late attendance over ten years, despite 26 prior warnings, constitute habitual late coming amounting to misconduct?
  • Can an employer dismiss an employee for habitual late attendance under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Is a High Court empowered under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 to set aside concurrent findings of Labour Courts regarding employee misconduct?
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• Shahid Pervaiz and 23 others vs Ejaz Ahmad and 23 others2016 SCP 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  out of turn promotionbackdated senioritycivil servantssports policypast and closed transactionconstitutional violationfundamental rightspolice service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from review petitions filed against the Supreme Court's earlier directives concerning the undoing of out-of-turn promotions and back-dated seniority in the police service. The core legal questions involved whether out-of-turn promotions granted under Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, and under the Punjab Police Sports Policy, 1982, are constitutional, whether the judgments striking down out-of-turn promotions apply to the Punjab province, and whether such promotions constitute past and closed transactions. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions by majority, holding that the concept of out-of-turn promotion is inherently violative of the Constitution and fundamental rights, renders service structures discriminatory, and is void ab initio. The Court held that unconstitutional statutes or actions cannot create vested rights under the doctrine of past and closed transactions, and that the principles enunciated against out-of-turn promotions apply uniformly across provinces. The Court also held that accelerated promotions under the Sports Policy, insofar as they confer out-of-turn advancements, are unconstitutional, while clarifying that past benefits secured through final judgments of superior courts are protected.

  Questions settled

  • Whether out-of-turn promotions granted to civil servants under Section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, violate the Constitution and fundamental rights?
  • Can rights acquired through an unconstitutional statutory provision be protected under the doctrine of past and closed transactions?
  • Whether the principles declaring out-of-turn promotions unconstitutional in Sindh apply equally to the Province of Punjab?
  • Are accelerated promotions granted under the Police Sports Policy, 1982, sustainable under the civil service laws and the Constitution?
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• Shahbaz vs The State2016 SCMR 1763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-06-02
  Criminal AppealMurderAcquittal of co-accusedBenefit of doubtIndependent corroborationEye-witness testimonySuppression of evidenceProsecution caseReasonable doubtFalse implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of Shahbaz appellant for stabbing Aftab Akhtar deceased. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly considering the acquittal of co-accused Muhammad Abbas, who had an identical role and against whom the motive was more relevant. The Supreme Court observed that the eye-witnesses, having been disbelieved against the co-accused whose acquittal was unchallenged, were capable of falsehood. Furthermore, the prosecution suppressed the fact that the appellant also sustained injuries, a version corroborated by medical evidence. The Court reiterated the principle that eye-witnesses disbelieved against one accused cannot be relied upon for others without independent corroboration. Finding no independent corroboration, and noting issues like a delayed post-mortem and the unreliability of the motive and recovery evidence, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

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• Shahbaz Khan alias Tippu and others vs Special Judge Anti-Terrorism2016 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-15
  anti-terrorism jurisdictionmens reaindiscriminate firingprivate disputenatural consequences of acttransfer of caseterrorist act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether the High Court correctly interfered with an order of the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) that had transferred a criminal case for trial before an ordinary Sessions Court, and whether the principles regarding terrorism jurisdiction laid down in prior precedents were adhered to. The core legal question concerned how to determine the presence of 'design', intention, or mens rea under Section 6(1)(b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, when a crime is triggered by a private property dispute but involves extreme, indiscriminate violence in a public place. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in setting aside the ATC's order, ruling that while a private family dispute sparked the incident, the wanton and ruthless manner of the multiple killings on a public street demonstrated an objective intent to create fear and insecurity. The Court laid down the key principle that the natural and inevitable consequences of an accused's overt acts and surrounding circumstances must be considered to ascertain mens rea, and that a motive stated in an FIR is not solely decisive when the scale of violence far exceeds the private grievance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offence arising from a private property dispute can fall within the definition of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • How is the design, intention, or mens rea for an act of terrorism to be ascertained by a court of law?
  • Does the motive disclosed in the First Information Report (FIR) conclusively determine the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Does the transfer of a case from an Anti-Terrorism Court to an ordinary criminal court result in a de novo trial violating constitutional protections against double jeopardy?
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• Shahbaz Khan Alias Tippu and Others vs Learned Special Judge Atc No.2016 PLD Supreme Court 1, 2016 PLJ SC 41, 2016 NLR Criminal 447 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-15
  Anti-Terrorism Actjurisdiction of ATCterrorism definitionmens rea in terrorismprivate dispute and terrorismindiscriminate firingnatural and inevitable consequencestransfer of case
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's judgment that reversed an Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) order returning a case for trial by the ordinary Sessions Court. The prosecution case arose from a domestic property dispute where hired gunmen opened indiscriminate fire on a public residential street, killing five persons and injuring two. The central issue was whether the incident fell under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 given that the FIR stated a private motive. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that jurisdiction under the ATA is assessed tentatively from police reports and surrounding circumstances rather than solely from the motive in the FIR. The Court laid down that mens rea, design, or intention under Section 6(1)(b) of the ATA is to be gathered from overt acts, the manner of execution, weapons used, and surrounding circumstances; offenders are presumed to intend the natural and inevitable consequences of their actions. The Court also clarified that transfer under Section 23 ATA does not entail double jeopardy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court is determined solely by the private motive stated in the FIR or by looking at the overt acts and surrounding circumstances?
  • Can an accused person be presumed to intend the natural and inevitable consequences of their actions to establish the 'design' required under Section 6(1)(b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Does the transfer of a criminal case from an Anti-Terrorism Court to an ordinary Sessions Court under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 violate the protection against double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution?
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• Shahbaz Khan alias Tippu and others vs Learned Special Judge Atc No. 32016 PLJ SC 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  anti-terrorism courtjurisdictionnexus with ATAmens reaprivate motiveindiscriminate firingtransfer of casepublic streetnatural and inevitable consequences
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether the High Court correctly interfered with an Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) order that had transferred a murder case to an ordinary Sessions Court on the ground that the underlying cause was a private property dispute. The core legal question concerned how to determine whether an offence falls within the statutory definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, particularly when a private dispute results in multiple killings on a public street. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while a private motive or family dispute may spark an occurrence, the manner of its commission, the lack of personal grouse by the hired gunmen, the public location, and the indiscriminate firing create an inevitable inference of a design to cause fear and insecurity in society. The Court laid down the principle that an accused is deemed to intend the natural and inevitable consequences of their actions, and courts must look beyond the bare motive alleged in the FIR to the surrounding circumstances, overt acts, and scale of violence when ascertaining the mens rea of terrorism.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction could interfere with the order of the Anti-Terrorism Court returning a case for trial before an ordinary court?
  • How is the design, intention, or mens rea for an act of terrorism to be ascertained when a private motive or family dispute is disclosed in the First Information Report?
  • Does a crime triggered by a private property dispute automatically fall outside the statutory definition of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Whether a retrial is necessitated when a case is transferred from an Anti-Terrorism Court to a court exercising ordinary criminal jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Shafique Ahmed Khan and others vs Nescom through Chairman, Islamabad and others2016 PLD Supreme Court 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-21
  statutory rulesNational Command Authorityrule making powerFederal Government approvalconstitutional jurisdictionArticle 199per incuriamsub silentioterms and conditions of serviceautonomy of institution
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court addressed the controversy regarding the statutory status of Rules framed under Section 15 of the National Command Authority Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether these Rules, which do not explicitly require approval by the Federal Government, are statutory or merely administrative instructions, and consequently, whether their violation is amenable to constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court held that the Rules framed under Sections 7, 9, and 15 of the National Command Authority Act, 2010, are statutory. The decision emphasized that the statutory nature of rules is determined by their intrinsic character, scope, and efficacy, particularly when they deal with matters of crucial importance and are complementary to the parent statute, rather than solely by the requirement of Federal Government approval or gazette notification. The Court reasoned that the Authority itself, composed of high-ranking government and military officials, acts as the Federal Government incarnate, rendering separate approval unnecessary. Statutory rules were deemed essential for the Authority's autonomy, independence, and efficacy, and for safeguarding employees' terms and conditions of service.

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• Shafique Ahmad Khan, etc. vs Nescom through its Chairman, Islamabad, etc2016 P.S.C. 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  National Command Authority Act 2010statutory rulesservice conditionswrit jurisdictionconstitutional petitionadministrative lawinterpretation of statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legal status of service rules framed by the National Command Authority under the National Command Authority Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether these rules are 'statutory' in nature, thereby rendering them amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, despite lacking explicit approval from the Federal Government. The Supreme Court held that the rules framed under Sections 7, 9, and 15 of the Act are indeed statutory. The Court established that the statutory status of rules is determined by their nature and area of efficacy rather than mere form or the requirement of government approval. Because the Act empowers the Authority—comprising high-level state officials—to prescribe terms and conditions of service for employees in sensitive strategic organizations, these rules are complementary to the parent statute and essential for its operation. The Court rejected the argument that the absence of Federal Government approval renders them non-statutory, noting that the legislature did not mandate such approval, and the Authority itself functions with high-level representation, making the rules statutory by attribute.

  Questions settled

  • Are the rules framed under Section 15 of the National Command Authority Act, 2010, statutory in nature?
  • Does the absence of explicit Federal Government approval render rules framed by a statutory authority non-statutory?
  • What is the primary criterion for determining whether rules framed by a statutory body possess statutory force?
  • Are the terms and conditions of service for employees of the National Command Authority governed by statutory rules?
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• Shafique Ahmad Khan, etc vs Nescom through its Chairman, Islamabad, etc2016 P.S.C. 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  statutory rulesNational Command Authorityjudicial reviewterms and conditions of servicewrit jurisdictionsubordinate legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns the legal status of the Rules framed under Section 15 of the National Command Authority Act, 2010, specifically whether they are statutory in nature despite lacking explicit approval from the Federal Government. The core legal question was whether the absence of such approval renders the Rules non-statutory and thus immune from judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court held that the Rules framed under Sections 7, 9, and 15 of the Act are indeed statutory. The Court established the principle that the statutory status of rules is determined by their nature and area of efficacy rather than the mere requirement of external approval. Rules that address matters of crucial importance, such as the terms and conditions of service for employees of a strategic organization, and which are complementary to the parent statute, possess statutory force. Because the Authority itself comprises high-level officials, the legislature did not intend for external approval, and the Rules are therefore binding and enforceable, rendering them amenable to constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Are the Rules framed under Section 15 of the National Command Authority Act, 2010, statutory in nature?
  • Does the absence of Federal Government approval render rules framed by a statutory authority non-statutory?
  • What is the determining factor for whether subordinate legislation possesses statutory force?
  • Are the terms and conditions of service for employees of the National Command Authority regulated by statutory rules?
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• Shabbir Hussain Khan vs Ajmal Asif and others2016 KLR S.C. 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-02
  election disputeremand of caseinadequacy of evidenceElection Tribunalconsent order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning an election dispute. The core legal question was whether the Election Tribunal could properly resolve the issues involved in the case despite an inadequacy of evidence on the record. Upon agreement of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court held that the Election Tribunal failed to give findings on key issues dependent upon evidence due to such inadequacy. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal by consent, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the matter back to the Election Tribunal for a fresh decision after allowing the parties to lead evidence. The key principle laid down is that an election matter involving disputed issues dependent upon evidence must be remanded for a fresh decision when the record lacks adequate evidence, ensuring parties are provided the opportunity to substantiate their cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can an election appeal be remanded to the Election Tribunal for a fresh decision when the record suffers from an inadequacy of evidence?
  • May the Supreme Court set aside an impugned judgment of an Election Tribunal upon the agreement and consent of the parties?
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• Senate through its Chairman vs Shahiq Ahmed Khan2016 PLJ SC 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-11-17
  void notificationlocus poenitentiaepensionary benefitsseniorityservice lawcompetent authorityfraudulent order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal concerns a dispute over the validity of a notification dated 20.10.2004, which purportedly granted seniority benefits to the respondent, a former Director in National Construction Limited, upon his absorption into the Senate Secretariat. The core legal question was whether this notification, issued without the approval of the competent authority (the Chairman Senate), was valid and whether the respondent was entitled to pensionary benefits based on it. The Supreme Court held that the notification was void ab initio, as it lacked the requisite approval of the competent authority and was manipulated by the respondent while he held the position of Acting Secretary. The Court further observed that the respondent had already been compensated with premature increments, rendering the claim for pensionary benefits untenable. The principle laid down is that the doctrine of locus poenitentiae cannot be invoked to protect or benefit from a fraudulent or void order. Consequently, the Court set aside the Federal Service Tribunal's judgment and remanded the matter for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a notification issued without the approval of the competent authority be considered valid?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae apply to protect benefits derived from a fraudulent or void order?
  • Can service rendered in a non-pensionable statutory body be counted towards pensionary benefits in a civil post?
  • Is there a limitation period for challenging a void order or notification?
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• Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Communication and Works2016 NLR Service 117, 2016 SCMR 2125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-11
  officiating promotionregularizationcivil servicereversionDepartmental Promotion Committeestopgap arrangementservice lawPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a Punjab Service Tribunal judgment which set aside the reversion of several civil servants from the rank of Executive Engineer to Assistant Engineer. The respondents had been promoted 'on officiating basis' against regular vacancies and served in those positions for periods ranging from 7 to 21 years before being reverted due to pending inquiries and incomplete service records. The core legal question was whether such long-term officiating promotions against permanent posts, cleared by a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC), should be treated as regular promotions. The Supreme Court held that under Rule 13 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, officiating promotion is a temporary stopgap arrangement only for specific contingencies (e.g., leave or suspension of the incumbent). Since the respondents were eligible and promoted against regular vacancies, the 'officiating' prefix was redundant. The Court ruled that government departments cannot use officiating status indefinitely to retain extra-disciplinary powers or bypass constitutional guarantees. The reversion was declared unlawful, and the Tribunal's decision to treat the promotions as regular was upheld.

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• Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Communication & Works2016 NLR Service 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service lawofficiating promotioncivil servantreversion in rankregularization of serviceDepartmental Promotion Committeeadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter concerns appeals against a Punjab Service Tribunal judgment that set aside the reversion of several Assistant Engineers to their original rank. The respondents, having served as Executive Engineers for years, were reverted by the Department on the pretext of incomplete service records and pending inquiries. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by deleting the 'on officiating basis' condition from their promotion orders and whether such long-term officiating appointments were legally valid. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, ruling that the 'officiating' label was redundant and unlawful. The Court held that officiating promotion is a temporary stopgap arrangement intended only for specific vacancies, not a tool for indefinite administrative control. Since the respondents were qualified and promoted against regular vacancies, their promotions possessed a permanent character. The Court affirmed that government departments cannot use 'officiating' status to bypass legal promotion procedures or maintain arbitrary disciplinary power over civil servants, emphasizing that such practices undermine good governance and create unnecessary uncertainty for employees.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government department indefinitely keep a civil servant on an 'officiating' promotion basis against a regular vacancy?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to delete the condition of 'officiating basis' from a promotion order if the promotion was otherwise regular?
  • Under what circumstances can a civil servant be validly promoted on an 'officiating basis' according to the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules 1974?
  • Can a civil servant be reverted to a lower rank based on inquiries or incomplete records if they have already been promoted to a higher rank after fulfilling all legal requirements?
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• Sarfraz Ahmad vs The State2016 SCMR 1635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-06-27
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtcircumstantial evidenceacquittaldisappearance of evidencestandard of proofmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arose from the conviction of the petitioner for the kidnapping, sodomy, and murder of a minor child, Mst. Fatima, under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The trial court and the Federal Shariat Court had upheld the convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the prosecution relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, as there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged crimes. The Court found the prosecution's narrative regarding the disposal of the body to be inherently unbelievable and fantastic. Furthermore, the Court determined that the evidence presented did not satisfy the requirements for a conviction under Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as the alleged act did not constitute the disappearance of evidence. Concluding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the petitioner by extending the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of moving a dead body in public view constitute the offence of causing disappearance of evidence under Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction for murder and Zina-bil-Jabr be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence that is found to be inherently unbelievable?
  • What is the standard of proof required to sustain a conviction when the prosecution relies entirely on circumstantial evidence?
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• Saleha Hassan vs Federal Public Service Commission through Chairman2016 SCMR 1136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-07
  competitive examinationage relaxationdomicilecut-off datecivil servicesFederal Public Service Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the Federal Public Service Commission's rejection of her candidature for the Competitive Examination (CSS) 2013. The petitioner sought a two-year relaxation of the upper age limit under Rule 4(ii)(c) of the Rules for Competitive Examination (CSS) 2013 on the ground of being a permanent resident of Azad Kashmir, a status she claimed through her marriage. The Commission rejected her application because she had previously declared her domicile as Punjab in multiple examinations, and Rule 6(iv)(d) of the Rules makes a declared domicile final. Furthermore, the petitioner obtained her Azad Kashmir resident certificate nearly two years after the prescribed cut-off date of December 31, 2012. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that eligibility criteria, including age and domicile, must be satisfied by the cut-off date. A certificate obtained after the cut-off date cannot be used to claim age relaxation retrospectively.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate claim age relaxation on the basis of a domicile certificate obtained after the prescribed cut-off date for a competitive examination?
  • Is a candidate bound by the domicile declared and accepted in previous competitive examinations under the Rules for Competitive Examination (CSS) 2013?
  • Does a subsequent change in marital status allow a candidate to retrospectively alter their domicile status for an examination whose cut-off date has already passed?
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• Sajjad Ikramsikandar Hayat and Anothershahid Iqbal vs Sikandar2016 NLR Criminal 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  concurrent sentencespre-sentence detentionlife imprisonmentcriminal appealsentencing discretionmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment that convicted the appellants for the murder of three individuals, sentencing them to life imprisonment on three counts. The appellants did not challenge their convictions but sought relief regarding the sentencing structure and the benefit of pre-sentence detention. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution's case was shrouded in mystery, noting that the motive remained unproved, the prosecution witnesses failed to narrate the true story, and the occurrence likely took place in the appellants' guava garden under circumstances suggesting the appellants acted while guarding their lives, albeit exceeding legal limits. The Court held that in such peculiar circumstances, where the High Court had inadvertently omitted to order the running of sentences concurrently, the ends of justice required that the sentences of life imprisonment on three counts and the sentence under Section 148, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, run concurrently. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the mandatory nature of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, extending the benefit of pre-sentence detention to the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court has the discretion to order sentences of life imprisonment on multiple counts to run concurrently?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory for a convict whose death sentence has been converted to life imprisonment?
  • Can a court direct sentences to run concurrently even where the High Court failed to pass such an order in its judgment?
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• Sajjad Ikram vs Sikandar Hayat, etc2016 PSC Crl. 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-12-09
  concurrent sentencesimprisonment for lifemurderbenefit of section 382-Bcriminal appealsentencing discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment resolves criminal appeals arising from a High Court decision which had converted the appellants' death sentences on three counts to imprisonment for life under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while maintaining their convictions. The core legal questions addressed by the Supreme Court were whether the sentences of imprisonment for life on multiple counts could be directed to run concurrently in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and whether the appellants were entitled to the mandatory benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the pre-sentence period spent in detention. The Supreme Court held that given the mysterious circumstances of the occurrence, the lack of previous enmity, and the omission by the High Court, the multiple sentences of life imprisonment and other substantive sentences should run concurrently, and extended the statutory benefit of Section 382-B. The key principle laid down is that courts possess wide discretionary power under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to direct sentences on multiple counts to run concurrently in appropriate cases, and that the consideration of pre-sentence detention under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is mandatory upon conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sentences of imprisonment for life on multiple counts can be directed to run concurrently under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the consideration of pre-sentence detention under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory for an accused whose death sentence is converted to life imprisonment?
  • Does a court have the discretion under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to order sentences from the same trial to run concurrently?
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• Sajjad Ikram and others vs Sikandar Hayat and others2016 SCMR 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-12-09
  concurrent sentenceslife imprisonmentpre-sentence detentionSection 382-B Cr.P.C.criminal appealsentencing discretionmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment that convicted the appellants for triple murder but failed to specify whether the multiple life sentences should run concurrently or consecutively, and omitted the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions were whether the court has the discretion to order multiple life sentences to run concurrently and whether the benefit of pre-sentence detention under Section 382-B is mandatory when a death sentence is converted to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that given the mysterious circumstances of the occurrence and the absence of prior enmity, the sentences of imprisonment for life on three counts and the sentence under Section 148, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, should run concurrently. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is mandatory and must be extended to convicts whose death sentences are converted to life imprisonment. The principle established is that courts possess wide discretion to order concurrent sentences to meet the ends of justice, and statutory provisions regarding pre-sentence detention must be applied.

  Questions settled

  • Does the court have the discretion to order multiple sentences of life imprisonment to run concurrently?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory when a death sentence is converted to life imprisonment?
  • Can a court direct that sentences of imprisonment from a single trial run concurrently?
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• Sajjad Ikram & others vs Sikandar Hayat, etc.2016 NLR Criminal 333, 2016 PSC Crl. 218, 2016 SCMR 467, 2016 PLJ SC 255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-12-09
  concurrent sentencespre-sentence detentionlife imprisonmentSection 382-B Cr.P.C.sentencing discretiontriple murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment that convicted the appellants for triple murder, sentencing them to life imprisonment on three counts. The appellants did not challenge their convictions but sought relief regarding the sentencing structure and the benefit of pre-sentence detention. The core legal question was whether the sentences of life imprisonment on multiple counts should run concurrently and whether the appellants were entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that given the mysterious circumstances surrounding the incident, the lack of proven motive, and the High Court's inadvertent omission to address the sentencing structure, the interests of justice required the sentences to run concurrently. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. is mandatory and applies even when death sentences are converted to life imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that courts possess the discretion to order concurrent sentences for multiple counts of life imprisonment, and the application of Section 382-B is a mandatory duty to account for pre-sentence detention.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court direct that sentences of life imprisonment on multiple counts run concurrently?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory for a convict whose death sentence has been converted to life imprisonment?
  • Does the court have the discretion under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to order concurrent sentences for multiple offenses?
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• Sajjad Hussain vs The State and others2016 SCMR 1311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-25
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationfurther enquiryrule of consistencyitlaf-i-udw
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arose from a case registered under Sections 334, 354, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the petitioner was accused of biting off the complainant's right ear during an altercation. Although the petitioner was initially granted bail by the Additional Sessions Judge, the High Court recalled it upon a cancellation petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail on the grounds of consistency and further inquiry. The Court observed that the petitioner's co-accused, who were armed with weapons and assigned specific roles of injuring the complainant, had already been enlarged on bail, whereas the petitioner was unarmed. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner's case fell within the purview of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court emphasized that the grounds for granting bail are distinct from those for its cancellation, and reinstated the bail as the initial exercise of discretion was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unarmed accused who allegedly bit the complainant's ear can be granted bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when armed co-accused have already been released on bail?
  • Are the legal grounds for the grant of bail and the cancellation of bail distinct from one another?
  • Can a High Court recall a bail order granted by a lower court if the lower court's exercise of discretion was not arbitrary or capricious?
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• Sajid alias Chitta vs The State and others2016 SCMR 2089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-03
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirydelayed FIRcontradictory medical reportexculpatory statementcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Sajid alias Chitta against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had refused post-arrest bail to the petitioner in case FIR No. 520 registered under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code at Police Station Saraye Mughal, District Kasur. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail in light of the evidentiary discrepancies and statements of witnesses. The Supreme Court observed that the FIR was lodged with a delay of ten days, the specific firearm injury attributed to the petitioner was absent from the post-mortem examination report, and both an injured witness and the complainant had stated on oath that the petitioner was not present at the scene of the crime. The Court held that these factors rendered the case one of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail, establishing the principle that material contradictions, delayed FIRs, and statements by key witnesses or complainants exculpating an accused justify the grant of bail under the further inquiry rule.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delayed FIR and discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence justify grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Does a statement by an injured witness and complainant exculpating the accused bring the case within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a petitioner be admitted to bail when firearm injuries attributed to him are missing from the post-mortem examination report?
  Read full judgment →
• Saif Ullah vs Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services, Faisalabad2016 SCMR 1430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-08
  compulsory retirementservice lawproportionality of punishmentmisconductinefficiencydepartmental inquiryreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Postmaster, challenged his compulsory retirement from service following allegations of negligence and misconduct regarding cash remittance procedures. While the appellant was initially dismissed for facilitating fraud and dishonesty, the appellate authority converted this to compulsory retirement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the penalty was commensurate with the proved allegations. Upon review, the Court noted that there was no evidence of embezzlement or collusion by the appellant, and the primary co-accused had admitted sole guilt. The Court held that the appellant's failure to obtain required signatures in the cash book constituted a procedural lapse or inefficiency rather than fraud or dishonesty. Emphasizing the principle that punishment must be commensurate with the proved guilt, the Court set aside the penalty of compulsory retirement. Instead, the Court ordered the appellant's reinstatement in service, substituting the penalty with the stoppage of five years of increments, while denying back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a penalty of compulsory retirement is commensurate with a finding of mere procedural negligence?
  • Can a public servant be penalized for collusion in the absence of substantial evidence linking them to the fraud committed by a co-accused?
  • Does the principle of proportionality in disciplinary proceedings require that punishment be adjusted to reflect the gravity of the proven misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Said Zaman Khan and 15 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan Superintendent HSP, Sahiwal and other2016 SCP 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Field General Court Martialjudicial reviewcoram non judicemala fidesconstitutional jurisdictionfair trialPakistan Army Actdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions for leave to appeal challenge various High Court judgments that dismissed constitutional petitions against convictions and death sentences awarded by Field General Court Martials (FGCMs). The core legal question concerns the extent of the High Court's power of judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution over proceedings conducted under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, as amended by the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act, 2015. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s jurisdiction is strictly limited to cases involving coram non judice, lack of jurisdiction, or mala fides (including malice in law). The Court affirmed that it cannot act as an appellate court to re-evaluate evidence or merits. It held that the 21st Amendment and the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act, 2015, are valid and constitutional. The Court concluded that the FGCMs were properly constituted, the trials were fair, and no specific mala fides or jurisdictional defects were established. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, affirming that procedural irregularities do not vitiate trials where no prejudice is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to sit as an appellate court over the findings of a Field General Court Martial?
  • What are the specific grounds upon which a conviction by a Field General Court Martial can be challenged in a constitutional petition?
  • Is a trial by a Field General Court Martial vitiated if the accused was not defended by a legal practitioner of their own choice?
  • Does the bar in Article 199(3) of the Constitution prevent judicial review of proceedings conducted under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952?
  Read full judgment →
• Sahabzadi Maharunisa vs Mst. Ghulam Sughran and another2016 P SC 1131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-19
  doctrine of mergerSection 12(2) CPCfinal judgmentfraud and misrepresentationappellate jurisdictionleave to appealforum jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed the proper forum for filing an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to challenge a judgment, decree, or order on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or want of jurisdiction, particularly where the matter had been subjected to appellate, revisional, or constitutional scrutiny, or carried to the apex court. The core legal question concerned the application and limits of the 'doctrine of merger'—specifically, whether a lower court decision merges into that of a higher forum when the higher forum merely affirms the decision without modification or reversal, or when leave to appeal is refused. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of merger applies to decisions of affirmation, reversal, or modification on merits by appellate, revisional, or constitutional courts, making the higher forum's decision the final one for the purpose of a Section 12(2) CPC application, subject to specified exceptions (such as dismissal for time-bar, non-prosecution, or where leave to appeal is simply declined). The Court clarified that where leave to appeal is refused without a decision on merits, the final judgment remains that of the lower forum, but where leave is granted and the appeal is decided on merits, or detailed reasons are recorded, the Supreme Court becomes the appropriate forum.

  Questions settled

  • What constitutes the 'Court which passed the final judgment, decree or order' under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when the lower court's decision is affirmed on appeal or revision?
  • Does the doctrine of merger apply when a higher forum simply affirms a judgment without modification or reversal?
  • Which court has jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when a petition for leave to appeal is declined by the Supreme Court?
  • What are the exceptions to the doctrine of merger in the context of disposal of appeals or petitions by higher forums?
  Read full judgment →
• Sahabzadi Maharunisa and another vs Mst. Ghulam Sughran and others2016 PSC 1131, 2016 PLJ SC 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-19
  Section 12(2) CPCdoctrine of mergerfinal judgmentfraud and misrepresentationappellate jurisdictionleave to appealSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core legal question of determining which court constitutes the "Court which passed the final judgment, decree or order" under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for filing an application seeking to set aside a judgment on the grounds of fraud or misrepresentation. The Court examined the doctrine of merger in relation to appeals, revisions, constitutional petitions, and orders passed by higher judicial forums. The ratio decidendi established by the Court is that where an appellate, revisional, or constitutional forum hears and decides a matter on merits, affirming, reversing, or modifying the lower forum's decision, the lower decision merges into the superior decision, making the superior forum the appropriate venue for a Section 12(2) CPC application. However, where the Supreme Court refuses leave to appeal, the judgment of the lower forum remains intact and does not merge, meaning the application must generally be filed before the High Court or lower forum, subject to specific exceptions where detailed reasons are recorded by the apex court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Which court is considered the final court for filing an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when an appeal or revision has been decided by a higher forum?
  • Does the doctrine of merger apply when a judgment of a lower court is simply affirmed by a higher forum?
  • Where should a Section 12(2) CPC application be filed if the Supreme Court refuses leave to appeal against a High Court judgment?
  • What are the recognized exceptions to the doctrine of merger regarding the executability and finality of decrees and orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Sahabzadi Maharunisa and another vs Mst. Ghulam Sughran and another2016 PLD Supreme Court 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  doctrine of mergerfraud and misrepresentationfinal judgmentappellate jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionleave to appeallimitationjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan to determine the 'Court which passed the final judgment, decree or order' under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.) for the purpose of filing applications challenging judgments on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction. The appellants contended that the doctrine of merger does not apply where a higher forum simply affirms a lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of merger applies whenever an appellate, revisional, or constitutional forum decides a matter on merits, regardless of whether the lower court's decision is reversed, modified, or affirmed. Consequently, the application under Section 12(2) must be filed before the forum whose decision is operative in law. However, the Court established exceptions: the doctrine of merger does not apply where a petition for leave to appeal is simply declined, or where an appeal is dismissed on technical grounds such as non-prosecution, limitation, or lack of jurisdiction. In such cases, the last forum to decide on merits remains the competent venue.

  Read full judgment →
• Sagheer Ahmed vs The State and otherss2016 SCMR 1754 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-04
  Anti-Terrorism Actdemand of Bhattajurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Courtprivate vendettapersonal enmityact of terrorismextortion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment concerning the transfer or jurisdiction of a criminal trial from an Anti-Terrorism Court to an ordinary court. The core legal question was whether mere vague allegations of demanding Bhatta (extortion) and aerial firing in a murder case arising out of personal enmity attract the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, holding that in the absence of tangible material showing the financial status/income of the complainant, specific details of extortion demands, or evidence that the act created a sense of fear, panic, terror, and insecurity among the public at large, the offence remains a simple case of murder motivated by private vendetta. The Supreme Court affirmed that every heinous crime or murder does not automatically fall within the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court unless the peculiar circumstances defined under Sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are strictly established. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Do vague allegations of demanding Bhatta without specific details attract Section 6(2)(k) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Is an offence of murder motivated solely by personal enmity and private vendetta triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • What essential conditions must be satisfied for a crime to fall under the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed and Qazi Faez Isa, JJ..Habib Safe Deposit Vault (Private) Ltd. vs The Province of Sindh through Secretary Finance andothers2016 PLJ Sc 207, 2016 P.S.C. 292, 2016 P.C.T.L.R. 42 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Sabir Hussain vs N/A2016 P.S.C. 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  land acquisitionmarket value determinationcompensation assessmentpotential land usecompulsory acquisitionsale deed evidenceMangla Dam Raising Project
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding the determination of compensation for land acquired for the Mangla Dam Raising Project. The core legal question was whether the compensation assessment, based strictly on Rule 10 of the Land Acquisition Rules, 1994, and excluding other relevant evidence, was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred by failing to consider all available evidence, including potential future use and sale deeds registered after the Section 4 notification but before the award. The Court allowed the appeals, enhancing the compensation to Rs. 1,000,000 per kanal. The key principles laid down are that Rule 10 is not the sole criterion for market value determination; compensation must be assessed under Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which require considering the land's potential for future residential or commercial use. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that sale instances from adjacent villages and post-notification sale deeds constitute valid evidence for determining fair market value when local data is unavailable.

  Questions settled

  • Is Rule 10 of the Land Acquisition Rules, 1994, the sole criterion for determining the market value of acquired land?
  • Should sale deeds registered after the issuance of a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, be considered when determining market value?
  • Does the potential future use of land for residential or commercial purposes constitute a valid factor in assessing compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Can compensation be assessed based on sale deeds from adjacent villages when no sale deeds exist for the acquired village within the relevant period?
  Read full judgment →
• Rizwan Javed and others vs Secretary Agriculture Livestock, etc.2016 SCMR 1443, 2016 SCP 23, 2016 P.S.C. 1514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-24
  contract employeesregularization of servicesproject employeesdiscriminatory terminationreinstatementback benefitsservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition filed by contract employees seeking regularization of their services. The appellants were appointed on a contract basis in the Provincial Agri Business Coordination Cell, a project of the Agriculture Department, KPK, in 2007. Their contracts were extended multiple times until their services were terminated in 2011, despite the project being taken over by the provincial government. The core legal question was whether project employees, whose contracts were extended and whose project was absorbed by the government, were entitled to regularization and protection against discriminatory termination. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were discriminated against, as they were similarly placed to other project employees who had been regularized. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ordered the reinstatement of the appellants, and granted them back benefits and pensionary credit for the intervening period. The key principle established is that project employees cannot be subjected to discriminatory treatment when their project is absorbed by the government, particularly when others in similar circumstances have been granted regularization.

  Questions settled

  • Are project employees entitled to regularization if their project is taken over by the provincial government?
  • Can the government discriminate against specific project employees by terminating them while retaining others in similar positions?
  • Are project employees entitled to back benefits and pensionary credit upon reinstatement following wrongful termination?
  Read full judgment →
• Rizwan Javed and others vs Secretary Agriculture Livestock etc2016 SCP 23 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-24
  contractual employmentregularization of servicesproject employeesdiscriminatory terminationservice lawreinstatementback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Peshawar High Court's dismissal of a writ petition filed by contract employees seeking regularization of their services. The appellants, initially appointed on a contract basis to a project under the Agriculture Department, KPK, had their services terminated despite the project being absorbed by the provincial government. The core legal question was whether project employees, whose project was subsequently taken over by the government, were entitled to regularization and whether their termination constituted discrimination compared to similarly situated employees. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were discriminated against, as they were similarly placed to other project employees whose services had been regularized under established precedents. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ordering the reinstatement of the appellants with back benefits and directing that the period from termination to reinstatement be counted towards pensionary benefits. The key principle laid down is that the government cannot selectively terminate project employees when the project is absorbed, particularly when such action results in discriminatory treatment compared to other similarly situated employees who were granted regularization.

  Questions settled

  • Are project employees whose project is absorbed by the government entitled to regularization?
  • Does the selective termination of project employees while others are regularized constitute discrimination?
  • Are reinstated employees entitled to back benefits and the counting of the intervening period for pensionary benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• Rizwan Javed and others vs Secretary Agriculture Livestock and others2016 SCMR 1443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-24
  contract employeesregularization of servicesproject employeesdiscrimination in public employmentreinstatementback benefitsservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which dismissed the appellants' writ petition seeking regularization of their services. The appellants were initially appointed on a contract basis in 2007 within a project-based cell under the Agriculture Department of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Following multiple contract extensions, their services were terminated in 2011 upon the project's transition to the regular government budget. The core legal question was whether the appellants, as project employees, were entitled to regularization despite the specific exclusion of project employees from the relevant regularization statute. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were discriminated against, as they were similarly placed to other project employees who had been granted relief in previous judgments. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ordered the reinstatement of the appellants, and granted them back benefits and pensionary credit for the intervening period. The key principle established is that the government cannot selectively terminate project employees and replace them with new appointees when those employees are otherwise similarly situated to others who have been granted regularization by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Are project employees who were appointed on a contract basis entitled to regularization under the North West Frontier Province (now KPK) Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009?
  • Can the government selectively terminate project employees and appoint new persons in their place after a project is taken over by the government?
  • Are project employees entitled to back benefits and pensionary credit upon reinstatement following wrongful termination?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehman-Ud-Din and Others vs Mst. Noor Jahan (Deceased) through L.RS. and Others2016 PLJ SC 616, 2016 SCMR 986, 2016 SCP 1, 2016 NLR Revenue 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-02
  inheritance disputerevisional jurisdictionproof of documentsattesting witnessesbona fide purchaserQanun-e-Shahadatgift validity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding an inheritance dispute where the appellants claimed ownership of property through alleged gifts and mutations from the deceased. The core legal question was whether these transfers were validly executed and proved in accordance with law. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to satisfy the mandatory evidentiary requirements of Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, as they did not produce the necessary attesting witnesses to prove the execution of the documents. Consequently, the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction to set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which were based on a misreading of the evidence. The Court affirmed that a document requiring attestation is inadmissible without the requisite witnesses. However, the Court protected the rights of bona fide purchasers for value without notice under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, ruling that their acquired title should not be disturbed, with their share adjusted against the sellers' inheritance.

  Questions settled

  • Does a document requiring attestation become inadmissible if the requisite number of attesting witnesses are not produced?
  • Can a High Court set aside concurrent findings of lower courts in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Are bona fide purchasers for value without notice protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, even if the seller's title is defective?
  • Does a gift deed purporting to transfer immovable property in praesenti require registration?
  Read full judgment →
• Regional Police Officer Gujranwala and another vs Ejaz Ahmad and others2016 SCMR 1525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-26
  out of turn promotionante dated senioritypolice personnelcivil servantsgallantry awardfundamental rightscontempt of courtre-fixation of seniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appellate matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a challenge by the Regional Police Officer against an order granting ante-dated seniority to the respondents. The core legal questions pertained to the legality of granting out-of-turn promotions—whether on the basis of gallantry awards or otherwise—and assigning ante-dated seniority to police personnel and civil servants. Relying on settled precedents, the Supreme Court held that no civil servant or police official is entitled to out-of-turn promotion or ante-dated seniority, reiterating that such practices are illegal, unconstitutional, and violative of the fundamental rights of other civil servants. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and allowed the appeal. The Supreme Court directed the Punjab Government, through the Inspector General of Police, Home Secretary, and Chief Secretary, to reverse all out-of-turn promotions from the rank of Constable to gazetted officers within four weeks, re-fix their seniority with their batch mates, and submit a compliance report, warning that non-compliance would attract contempt proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether police personnel or civil servants are legally entitled to out-of-turn promotions on account of gallantry awards or otherwise?
  • Whether the grant of ante-dated seniority to a civil servant violates the law and the fundamental rights of other civil servants?
  • Whether out-of-turn promotions granted across ranks from Constable to gazetted officers must be reversed to re-fix seniority with batch mates?
  Read full judgment →
• Regional Commissioner Income Tax, Northern Region, Islamabad and another vs Syed Munawar Ali and others2016 SCMR 859, 2016 PLJ Sc 438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-17
  up-gradationterms and conditions of servicejurisdiction of High CourtService Tribunalconstitutional petitioncivil servantspromotion
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the Court challenged a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court which disposed of writ petitions filed by respondents seeking up-gradation of their posts from BS-13 to BS-16. The core legal question was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional petition relating to the up-gradation of civil servants' posts, or whether such a matter was barred under Article 212 of the Constitution as relating to the terms and conditions of service. The Supreme Court held that up-gradation is distinct from promotion, relates to the post rather than the individual, and can be granted through policy. Reaffirming prior jurisprudence, the Court held that the issue of up-gradation does not form part of the terms and conditions of service, that Service Tribunals lack jurisdiction over it, and that High Courts retain constitutional jurisdiction to decide such matters. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional petition relating to the up-gradation of civil servants' posts?
  • Is the issue of up-gradation covered by the expression terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  • Do Service Tribunals have jurisdiction to entertain appeals involving the issue of up-gradation of civil servants?
  • What are the pre-conditions required for the Government to justify the up-gradation of a post?
  Read full judgment →
• Regional Commissioner Income Tax, Northern Region, Islamabad and another vs Syed Muna War Ali and others2016 SCMR 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-17
  upgradation of poststerms and conditions of serviceconstitutional jurisdictionService Tribunal jurisdictioncivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the court are directed against a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court disposing of writ petitions filed by respondents seeking upgradation of their posts from BS-13 to BS-16. The core legal questions involved whether the bar under Article 212(3) of the Constitution ousted the High Court's jurisdiction in matters of post upgradation, and whether upgradation forms part of the terms and conditions of service of civil servants. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that upgradation is restricted to the post rather than the person, is distinct from promotion, and does not form part of the terms and conditions of service of civil servants. Consequently, the Service Tribunals lack jurisdiction over upgradation matters, and High Courts can competently exercise constitutional jurisdiction in such disputes without attracting the bar under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar contained under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 oust the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional petition relating to the upgradation of posts?
  • Whether the issue of upgradation of a post falls within the expression 'terms and conditions of service' of a civil servant?
  • Do Service Tribunals have jurisdiction to entertain any appeal involving the issue of upgradation of civil servants?
  • Is upgradation synonymous with promotion under civil service law?
  Read full judgment →
• Regarding Enormous Increase in the Price of Flour vs Not2016 NLR Civil 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-12-02
  price hikeflour priceshoarding and profiteeringfundamental rightssocial welfarefood securityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These proceedings were initiated upon a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of Pakistan concerning the enormous increase in the price of flour and wheat, which was registered as a Constitution Petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The core legal question revolved around the failure of federal and provincial governments to check unprecedented price hikes, hoarding, and profiteering of essential food commodities, thereby failing to ensure the well-being of citizens under Article 38 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the federal and provincial governments are duty-bound to control prices and ensure the availability of wheat and flour at subsidized rates in terms of the Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 1977 and the Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958. The Court allowed the petition with directions to the federal and provincial authorities to take immediate, stringent measures to curb hoarding and profiteering, ensure the supply of foodstuffs at controlled rates, and implement the social welfare mandates of Article 38 of the Constitution in letter and spirit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the federal and provincial governments are duty-bound to control the prices of essential foodstuffs under the relevant control laws?
  • Does the failure of the government to check price hikes and profiteering violate the principles of social well-being enshrined in Article 38 of the Constitution?
  • What are the statutory responsibilities of the provincial governments regarding the control of prices and prevention of hoarding of foodstuffs?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Ashiq vs The State, etc2016 PSC Crl. 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-27
  post-arrest bailtax evasionprohibitory clausestatutory grounds for bailSales Tax Actremand of assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by an accused charged with massive tax evasion under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the duration of his incarceration and the nature of the alleged offences. The Supreme Court observed that the assessment of tax evasion, which formed the basis of the charges, had been set aside by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, with the matter remanded for fresh adjudication. Furthermore, the Court noted that the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the maximum sentence for the relevant provisions was five years. Additionally, despite the framing of charges, no prosecution witnesses had been examined. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner had made out a case for bail on statutory grounds. The principle laid down is that where offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the accused has been incarcerated for a significant period without trial progress, bail is warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under the Sales Tax Act 1990 with a maximum sentence of five years fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the underlying tax assessment has been set aside and remanded by the Appellate Tribunal?
  • Can bail be granted on statutory grounds when no prosecution witnesses have been examined despite the passage of over one year in custody?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Abdul Aleem Khan vs Idara National Industrial Co-Operative2016 SCMR 2067 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-09
  Pre-emption suitTalb-e-IshhadAdditional evidenceRemand orderAppellate Court discretionOrder XLI Rule 27 CPCCivil Procedure CodeLacuna in evidenceProof of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a pre-emption suit where the petitioner sought to pre-empt a sale. The central legal question concerned the scope of an appellate court's discretion to allow additional evidence and remand a case under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the C.P.C. The petitioner's suit was dismissed for failing to prove Talb-e-Ishhad, specifically by not examining the Postman. An Additional District Judge accepted the petitioner's appeal, remanding the case for additional evidence to facilitate the Postman's examination. This remand order was subsequently challenged and set aside. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's petition, affirming that the power to allow additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27 C.P.C. is not unfettered. The Court held that this discretion is limited to specific circumstances, such as when the trial court refused admissible evidence or when the appellate court requires evidence to pronounce judgment, and cannot be exercised to allow a delinquent litigant to fill lacunas, particularly when no prior application for additional evidence was made or grounds set out in the appeal.

  Read full judgment →
• Ramzan and others vs The State and others2016 SCMR 1415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-16
  pre-arrest bailmala fideland disputecriminal intimidationdelay in FIRcivil nature of dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioners in relation to FIR No. 597/2015, registered under sections 440, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of land encroachment, assault, and criminal intimidation. The core legal question was whether, given the circumstances of the case, the petitioners were entitled to the grant of pre-arrest bail. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed a significant delay of over five months in lodging the FIR, the absence of a Medical Legal Report (MLR) to substantiate the alleged assault, the lack of specific roles attributed to the petitioners, and the prima facie civil nature of the underlying land dispute. The Court held that these factors indicated potential mala fide intent on the part of the complainant to falsely implicate the petitioners. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, converted it into an appeal, and granted pre-arrest bail to the petitioners, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds, establishing that unexplained delay and lack of corroborative evidence in criminal complaints involving civil disputes justify pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR constitute grounds for the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted when the underlying dispute appears to be of a civil nature rather than criminal?
  • Is the absence of a Medical Legal Report (MLR) a relevant factor in determining the entitlement to pre-arrest bail in cases of alleged assault?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Ghous Bux Bijarani vs Sardar Ghulam Abid Khan etc.2016-SCP-112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-07
  election petitionbogus votesNADRA verificationcounterfoilselection resultfingerprint authenticationmaterially affected
  Summary & questions settled

  This election appeal arose from a dispute over the results of the election for PS-17 Kashmore-I, where the appellant, the runner-up, challenged the victory of the respondent. The appellant alleged that bogus votes were cast at ten specific polling stations and sought verification of counterfoils by NADRA. Following a NADRA report indicating that a significant number of votes could not be verified due to fingerprint quality or technical issues, the Election Tribunal declined to declare these votes bogus or invalidate the election result. The core legal question was whether unverified votes, merely by virtue of failing fingerprint authentication, should be excluded from the total count and whether such exclusion would materially affect the election result under the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that the mere inability of NADRA to verify fingerprints does not automatically render votes bogus. The Court established that to invalidate votes, there must be positive evidence of illegality, such as missing NICs, mismatched thumb impressions, or evidence of multiple impressions by a single person, rather than a failure of verification alone.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of NADRA to authenticate fingerprints on counterfoils automatically render those votes bogus?
  • What specific evidence is required to establish that votes are bogus in an election petition?
  • Can an election result be declared materially affected under Section 70(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 based solely on unverified counterfoils?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Ghous Bux Bijarani vs Sardar Ghulam Abid Khan and others2016 SCMR 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-07
  election petitionNADRA verificationbogus votescounterfoilsfingerprint matchingreturned candidatematerial effect on election result
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an election petition filed by the appellant, the runner-up in the election for PS-17 Kashmore-I, challenging the victory of the respondent returned candidate. The core legal question was whether unverified votes resulting from NADRA counterfoil reports that failed fingerprint matching or had bad quality fingerprints could automatically be presumed bogus and excluded from the total count under Section 70(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, thereby materially affecting the election result. The Supreme Court held that unverified votes cannot simply be presumed bogus and excluded from the count without positive evidence showing that thumb impressions were missing, mismatched, or that ballot papers were fraudulently issued. The court upheld the Election Tribunal's judgment and dismissed the appeal. The key principle laid down is that failure of NADRA to verify counterfoils due to quality issues or matching inability does not ipso facto render those votes bogus or warrant their exclusion from the election count without substantive proof of illegal or corrupt practices.

  Questions settled

  • Can unverified votes due to failure of fingerprint matching by NADRA be automatically excluded from the total count as bogus votes?
  • Whether non-verification of counterfoils by NADRA alone is sufficient to prove that an election result has been materially affected under Section 70(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • What evidentiary threshold is required to declare votes as bogus based on a NADRA counterfoil report?
  Read full judgment →
• Rai Hassan Nawaz vs Haji Muhammad Ayub & others2016 SCP 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-25Read full judgment →
• Rafiq Haji Usman vs Chairman, NAB and anotherK.L.R 2016 S.C. 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-26
  post-arrest bailNAB referencecriminal breach of trustcivil disputecontractual breachentrustment of propertywhite-collar crime
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail by an accused in a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) reference involving allegations of cheating and fraud related to a real estate project. The core legal question is whether a contractual dispute regarding the failure to deliver possession of residential units constitutes "criminal breach of trust" under Section 405, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as incorporated into Section 9(x), National Accountability Ordinance 1999. The Supreme Court held that the dispute was essentially civil in nature, arising from a sale agreement rather than an entrustment of property. The Court ruled that the NAB Ordinance is not intended to settle civil contractual disputes where no criminal intent is established. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the payment of money for property development does not equate to "entrustment" under Section 405. The Court emphasized that bail should not be withheld as punishment and granted the petitioner bail, subject to the condition of depositing the disputed amount as security. The judgment establishes that civil contractual breaches do not automatically attract criminal liability under the NAB Ordinance without clear evidence of misappropriation or criminal intent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a dispute arising from a contract for the sale of immovable property constitute criminal breach of trust under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 be invoked to settle civil disputes between individuals?
  • Does the term public-at-large in Section 9(x) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 include a small group of complainants?
  • Is the payment of money for the purchase of property equivalent to the entrustment of property required for a criminal breach of trust charge?
  Read full judgment →
• Rafaqat Ali, Younas & Shehzad cr Saju vs The State2016 NLR Criminal 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealidentification paradeinjured witnessocular testimonyextra-judicial confessionmurderdacoitydeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the conviction of the appellants under various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for house trespass, dacoity, murder, and murderous assault. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony from injured witnesses, the necessity of identification parades when accused persons are identified in court, and the evidentiary value of extra-judicial confessions and weapon recoveries. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions, holding that the testimony of natural and injured eyewitnesses who identified the accused in court inspires full confidence, rendering an identification parade unnecessary, particularly when those witnesses were hospitalized at the time the parade was held. The Court established that the absence of an identification parade is not fatal to the prosecution's case if the in-court identification is reliable and corroborated by medical evidence and positive forensic reports.

  Questions settled

  • Is holding an identification parade mandatory when accused persons are subsequently identified by injured eyewitnesses during trial?
  • Does the absence of an accused from an identification parade render their in-court identification inadmissible or fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Can the uncorroborated extra-judicial confession made to a relative be solely relied upon to convict co-accused persons?
  • Whether positive forensic science laboratory reports matching recovered weapons with crime scene empties sufficiently corroborate ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Rafaqat Ali and otherss vs The State2016 NLR Criminal 530, 2016 PLJ SC 731, 2016 PSC Crl. 685, 2016 SCMR 1766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-06-02
  identification paradein-court identificationinjured eyewitnessextra judicial confessionFSL reporthouse trespassmurder referencedacoity
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by leave of the court, arose from a Lahore High Court judgment confirming the death sentence of Appellant No. 1 (Rafaqat Ali) while commuting the death sentences of Appellants Nos. 2 and 3 (Younas and Shahzad) to life imprisonment in a case involving an armed night-time house intrusion resulting in three deaths and multiple injuries. The core legal issues centered on whether the absence of two injured eyewitnesses from the identification parade was fatal to the prosecution, whether identification of the accused for the first time in court was reliable, and whether corroborative evidence supported the convictions. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court's judgment. The Court held that holding an identification parade is not mandatory in all cases. Where injured eyewitnesses are hospitalized during the parade, their subsequent natural, consistent, and confidence-inspiring in-court identification specifying the roles of the accused, corroborated by medical evidence and positive FSL reports on recovered crime weapons, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Is holding an identification parade mandatory for the prosecution in all criminal cases?
  • Can the absence of injured eyewitnesses from an identification parade be excused due to their hospitalization?
  • Is an in-court identification of the accused by injured eyewitnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction without a prior identification parade?
  • Can forensic recovery of weapons matched with empties corroborate ocular evidence from natural family witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Rafaqat Ali and 2 others vs State2016 PLJ SC 731 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-06-02
  identification paradeocular evidenceinjured witnessesmurdercriminal appealforensic evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the Lahore High Court’s judgment regarding convictions for murder and related offenses. The core legal question was whether the prosecution’s case was fatally defective because two of the three appellants were not identified during an identification parade, and whether in-court identification by injured witnesses could sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the convictions. The Court held that an identification parade is not a mandatory legal requirement but serves as a corroborative evidentiary tool. Where injured witnesses provide confidence-inspiring testimony in court, identifying the accused and detailing their specific roles, the absence of an identification parade does not invalidate the prosecution's case. The Court emphasized that ocular evidence, when corroborated by medical reports and positive forensic analysis of recovered weapons, is sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, even in nighttime occurrences, provided there was sufficient lighting. The Court affirmed that the trial court’s reliance on such consistent, natural, and corroborated testimony was legally sound, thereby rejecting the appellants' contentions regarding mistaken identity and lack of incriminating evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is an identification parade a mandatory requirement for the prosecution to prove the identity of the accused?
  • Can the testimony of injured witnesses be relied upon to convict an accused who was not identified in an identification parade?
  • Does the absence of an identification parade render the prosecution's case fatally defective?
  • Is ocular evidence corroborated by medical evidence and forensic reports sufficient to establish guilt in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Qayyum Khan vs Divisional Forest Officer, Mardan Wildlife Division, Mardan and otherss2016 SCMR 1602, 2016 SCP 16, 2016 PLJ SC 722 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-25
  contract employeeregularization of servicestermination of servicediscriminationreinstatementback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court challenges the order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the review petition filed against the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the termination of the appellant's service. The core legal question concerns whether a contract employee whose project was converted into permanent posts is entitled to regularization and protection against discriminatory termination. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was discriminated against by the government through selective replacement and that his case was covered by settled principles where similarly placed employees were regularized. The Court laid down the principle that contract employees in projects taken over and regularized by the government cannot be arbitrarily terminated and replaced through cherry-picking, and are entitled to reinstatement and associated benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contract employee whose project post is converted into a permanent post is entitled to regularization?
  • Can the government terminate a contract employee and appoint another person through selective replacement after taking over a project?
  • Is an employee discriminated against when similarly placed project employees are allowed induction on a regular basis while his services are terminated?
  Read full judgment →
• Qayyum Khan vs Divisional Forest Officer, Mardan Wildlife Division, Mardan2016 SCP 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  contract employmentregularization of servicesdiscriminatory terminationservice lawback benefitspensionary benefitsproject employees
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the Peshawar High Court's dismissal of a review petition concerning the termination of the appellant's employment as a Wildlife Watcher. The appellant was initially appointed on a contract basis, and subsequently, the project was converted into permanent posts by the provincial government. While other similarly situated employees were regularized, the appellant's services were terminated, and another individual was appointed in his place. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to regularization and continuation of service following the conversion of project posts into permanent ones, given the principle of non-discrimination. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was discriminated against, as his situation was materially indistinguishable from other employees who were regularized. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgments, ordered the appellant's reinstatement from the date of termination, and granted him back benefits and pensionary credit for the intervening period. The key principle laid down is that the government cannot arbitrarily terminate contract employees and 'cherry-pick' replacements when project posts are converted to permanent status, as this violates the principle of non-discrimination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conversion of project posts into permanent posts entitle existing contract employees to regularization?
  • Can the government arbitrarily terminate contract employees and appoint others when project posts are regularized?
  • Is a contract employee entitled to back benefits and pensionary credit upon reinstatement following discriminatory termination?
  Read full judgment →
• Qayyum Khan vs Divisional Forest Officer, Mardan and others2016 SCMR 1602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-25
  contract employeeregularization of servicestermination of servicediscriminationwildlife watcherback benefitspensionary benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a review petition filed against the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the termination of the appellant's services as a Wildlife Watcher. The core legal question concerns whether a contract employee whose project post is converted to a permanent post can be arbitrarily terminated and discriminated against while similarly placed employees are regularized. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was discriminated against by being denied continuation or regularization while others were allowed induction, rendering his termination unlawful. The Court laid down the principle that contract employees whose project posts are converted or taken over by the government cannot be subjected to arbitrary termination and cherry-picking, and are entitled to equal treatment and reinstatement along with back benefits and pensionary counting for the intervening period when similarly placed persons are regularized.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contract employee whose project post is converted into a permanent post is entitled to regularization on parity with similarly placed employees?
  • Can the government terminate a contract employee upon taking over a project and appoint another person in their place through cherry-picking?
  • Whether an employee unlawfully terminated from a project taken over by the government is entitled to reinstatement and back benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of the Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura, etc vs (1) Syed2016 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-25
  evacuee landallotment of evacuee propertyRehabilitation Settlement SchemeForest Departmentmode of proof of documentsQanun-e-Shahadat Ordersuit for possessionbonafide purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a High Court judgment upholding the decree of a suit for possession of evacuee land filed by respondents against the Forest Department. The core issues concerned whether confirmation of evacuee land allotment after the Chief Settlement Commissioner's Memorandum dated 27.02.1965 banning allotment of land in possession of the Forest Department was valid, and whether unproven documents can form the basis of a judgment if admitted without objection. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the decrees. The Court held that under paragraph 4-A of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, the Memorandum banning allotment of evacuee land in possession of the Forest Department was validly issued and binding on subordinate authorities. Any allotment confirmed after 27.02.1965 in derogation of this Memorandum confers no title or vested right. Furthermore, mere production or exhibition of documents without proving them in accordance with the mandatory rules of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not constitute legal proof, and the absence of an objection by the opposing party does not dispense with statutory requirements of proof.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allotment of evacuee land confirmed after the issuance of a Chief Settlement Commissioner Memorandum banning such allotments confer valid title?
  • Does the failure of a party to object to the exhibition of a document dispense with the statutory requirements of proving that document under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Can a suit for possession be decreed without seeking a declaration of title where the plaintiff's title is disputed by the defendant?
  • Can a transferee claiming to be a bonafide purchaser under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 protect their title if the vendor's underlying allotment is invalid?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh through Its Chiefsecretary & 8 OTHERSs vs Syed2016 NLR Civil 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  amenity plotcommercial allotmentKDA Orderrefund of occupancy valueequitable compensationillegal allotmentpublic land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legality of the cancellation of allotment orders for two kiosks in Karachi, originally granted by the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) in 1976. The core legal questions were whether amenity plots could be legally allotted for commercial use and whether the cancellation of such allotments after twenty-nine years was valid, particularly when the respondent had paid the occupancy value. The Supreme Court held that the allotment of amenity plots for commercial use was illegal and in direct conflict with the KDA Order, 1957. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s judgment that had upheld the allotments. The Court established the principle that while public functionaries cannot legally convert amenity land for commercial exploitation, the government is bound by principles of equity to act fairly toward citizens who paid for such allotments. Therefore, the Court ordered the appellants to refund the respondent’s original occupancy payments along with an 18% annual mark-up, rejecting the respondent's claim for market-value compensation based on speculative future commercial use.

  Questions settled

  • Can an amenity plot be legally allotted for commercial use by the Karachi Development Authority?
  • Is a citizen entitled to market-value compensation when an illegal allotment of an amenity plot is cancelled?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a citizen who paid for an illegal allotment of an amenity plot?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh through its Chief Secretary and 8 others vs Syed Kabir2016 PLJ SC 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  amenity plotcancellation of allotmentcommercial usepublic parkingrefund of occupancy valueequity and fairnessKarachi Development Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the legality of the 2005 cancellation of plots allotted in 1976 by the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) for kiosks, which were subsequently found to be carved out of amenity land meant for public parking. The core legal question was whether an illegal allotment of an amenity plot for commercial use could be sustained after decades, and what relief an innocent auction-purchaser is entitled to upon cancellation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the allotment was ab initio void and in direct conflict with the governing law, as amenity plots cannot be converted or used for commercial purposes. Consequently, the High Court's judgment directing the execution of a lease deed was set aside. However, applying principles of equity and fairness, the Court held that the allottee, having paid the full occupancy value and remained out of title due to official malfeasance, was entitled to the refund of the principal amount along with an 18 percent per annum markup from the date of receipt until actual payment. The key principle laid down is that while illegal allotments of amenity land must be cancelled to protect public spaces, citizens misled by public functionaries must be fairly compensated by the refund of their funds with markup.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allotment of an amenity plot for commercial use made in violation of the Karachi Development Authority Order 1957 can be sustained after a lapse of twenty-nine years?
  • Can a citizen acquire valid proprietary rights through an illegal allotment of land originally earmarked for public use or amenities?
  • What is the appropriate measure of relief for an allottee whose plot allotment is cancelled due to the unlawful conduct of municipal officials when the allottee has paid the full occupancy value?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh through Chief Secretaryand 8 others vs Syed Kabir2016 PLJ SC 74, 2016 SCMR 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-11
  amenity plotskiosk allotmentcommercial conversioncancellation of allotmentpublic parkingequitable compensationrefund of occupancy valuemaster plan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the cancellation of two kiosk plots (Plot Nos. 1 and 2, Scheme No. 5, Kehkashan, Clifton) allotted to the respondent by the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) in 1976. After 29 years, the City District Government Karachi (CDGK) cancelled the allotments on the grounds that the plots were illegally carved out of amenity land meant for public use and the respondent failed to raise construction. The High Court of Sindh had set aside the cancellation and ordered the execution of lease deeds. The Supreme Court observed that the plots were indeed part of an amenity parking lot and their conversion for commercial use violated Article 52-A of the KDA Order, 1957. While the respondent could not claim title to amenity land, the Court held that the government must act fairly and compensate citizens for losses caused by the illegal conduct of officials. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment but directed the appellants to refund the full occupancy value to the respondent with 18% interest per annum.

  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others vs Imran Badar2016 SCMR 2178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-26
  competitive examinationgrace markspublic service commissionmerit-based appointmentadministrative discretioncivil service recruitmentjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that directed the Sindh Public Service Commission to award grace marks to a candidate who failed the Combined Competitive Examination by one mark. The core legal question was whether the Commission possessed the authority to grant such grace marks in the absence of enabling provisions. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, holding that the power to award grace marks, previously contained in the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964, was explicitly deleted by a 1999 notification. Furthermore, the Recruitment Management Regulations, 2006, and the examination syllabus expressly prohibit the award of grace marks. The Court emphasized that administrative bodies cannot exercise discretionary powers that have been repealed, and courts should not interfere with the strict observance of merit in competitive examinations. The principle established is that in the absence of statutory or regulatory authorization, no legal right exists for candidates to claim grace marks, and judicial interference to create such concessions undermines the standards of civil service recruitment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sindh Public Service Commission possess the legal authority to award grace marks to candidates in the Combined Competitive Examination?
  • Can a court direct an administrative body to grant concessions in an examination when such power has been explicitly deleted from the governing rules?
  • Does the absence of a provision for grace marks in the Recruitment Management Regulations, 2006, preclude the awarding of such marks to candidates?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh and others vs Lal Khan Chandio and others2016 SCMR 48 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-19
  Houbara Bustardwildlife protectionpublic interest litigationexecutive discretionCITESConvention on Migratory Speciesfundamental rightsenvironmental law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan involved a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Province of Sindh against a High Court judgment and a constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution challenging the hunting permissions and permits granted to foreign dignitaries to hunt the endangered and vulnerable Houbara Bustard, as well as a Provincial notification removing the bird from protected status. The core legal questions centered on whether the Federal or Provincial Governments possessed unfettered administrative discretion under wildlife legislation to alter the protected status of endangered migratory birds, allow foreign dignitaries to hunt them, and bypass Pakistan's international treaty obligations under CITES and CMS. The Supreme Court dismissed the Sindh Government's petition and allowed the public interest petition, holding that executive discretion under wildlife protection statutes must be exercised reasonably, fairly, and in furtherance of the statutory object of conservation. The Court laid down that environmental stewardship is protected under fundamental rights including Articles 9, 14, and 20, and that neither the Federation nor Provinces can issue permits to hunt species threatened with extinction or designated as vulnerable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the government possess unfettered statutory discretion under wildlife protection laws to remove endangered species from protected schedules?
  • Can the Federal or Provincial Governments grant special permits to foreign dignitaries to hunt species classified as threatened or vulnerable under international conventions binding on Pakistan?
  • Does public interest litigation challenging environmental degradation and destruction of protected species invoke fundamental rights under Articles 9, 14, and 20 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh and another vs Muhammad Ilyas and others2016 NLR Service 30, 2016 PLC (C.S.) 682, 2015 P.S.C. 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-30
  service lawlimitation perioddismissal from servicepolice constablesinefficiencyservice tribunalappointment orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed by the Province of Sindh challenging the reinstatement of police constables by the Sindh Service Tribunal. The respondents were appointed as constables but were dismissed for allegedly joining service belatedly. The respondents contended they were never formally notified of their appointment letters or dismissal orders, only discovering them through personal inquiry. The core legal questions were whether the dismissal for 'inefficiency' due to late joining was justified given the lack of formal notification, and whether the respondents' appeal to the Service Tribunal was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that since the authorities failed to prove that appointment or dismissal orders were ever dispatched or communicated to the respondents, the respondents' version of events must be accepted. Consequently, the court found no evidence of inefficiency to justify dismissal and ruled that the appeal was filed within the limitation period, as it was initiated shortly after the respondents obtained their dismissal orders. The court affirmed the reinstatement of the respondents, establishing that an employer cannot penalize employees for delays caused by the employer's own failure to communicate official orders.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be dismissed for late joining if the employer failed to formally communicate the appointment order?
  • Does the limitation period for filing an appeal against a dismissal order commence from the date of the order or the date of receipt of the order by the employee?
  • Is a police constable's dismissal for inefficiency valid when the alleged inefficiency stems from the employer's failure to notify the employee of their appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Sindh and Another vs Muhammad Ilyas & Others2016 NLR Service 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-30
  police constableservice tribunallimitationdismissal from servicedischarge from servicedelayed joining
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from the dismissal of respondents who were appointed as Constables (BS-5) for a period of three years under the Police Rules, 1934 and subsequently discharged on the ground of delayed joining and alleged inefficiency. The respondents challenged their dismissal by filing a constitutional petition before the High Court, which was later transferred to the Sindh Service Tribunal, where they were reinstated. The core legal questions involved the limitation period for approaching the service tribunal under the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and whether the discharge of temporary constables under Rule 12.21 of the Police Rules, 1934 was justified without proof of communication of appointment and dismissal orders. The Supreme Court held that since the authorities failed to prove that appointment and dismissal orders were ever communicated or dispatched to the respondents by registered post, the respondents' version regarding the date of knowledge must be accepted, rendering the appeal within time. The Court dismissed the petition, ruling that belated joining caused by lack of notice does not constitute inefficiency warranting discharge under Rule 12.21.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Sindh Service Tribunal runs from the date of actual communication of the dismissal order when dispatch cannot be established?
  • Can a temporary constable be discharged for delayed joining under Rule 12.21 of the Police Rules, 1934 when the appointment letter was never formally communicated or dispatched to him?
  • Whether an order of dismissal passed without proof of proper communication to the civil servant is sustainable in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab through Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Communication & Works Department, Lahore and another vs M_s Muhammad Tufail & Co. through Muhammad Tufail (deceased) through Legal Heirs2016 SCP 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  territorial jurisdictionarbitration awardcommercial activities of governmentRule of the CourtCode of Civil ProcedureArbitration Actforum non-conveniens
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the territorial jurisdiction of courts under the Arbitration Act, 1940, specifically regarding where an arbitration award may be filed to be made a Rule of the Court. The dispute arose from a construction contract executed in Toba Tek Singh, with arbitration proceedings held in Lahore. The core legal question was whether the Civil Courts at Lahore possessed jurisdiction to entertain an application to make the award a Rule of the Court, given that the contract was executed and the work performed in Toba Tek Singh. The Supreme Court held that when the government engages in commercial activities, it is not exercising sovereign power and must be treated as a private entity subject to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Consequently, the Court ruled that jurisdiction under Section 2(c) and Section 31(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, is concurrent where the defendant carries on business or where the cause of action arises. Since the government's principal office was in Lahore, the Lahore courts had jurisdiction, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the government, when engaged in commercial activities, enjoy immunity from the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Which court has jurisdiction to make an arbitration award a Rule of the Court under the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Is the government to be treated as a corporation for the purposes of determining jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when it enters into commercial contracts?
  • Does the location where an arbitration award is made determine the territorial jurisdiction of the court for filing the award?
  Read full judgment →
• Professor Dr. Razia Sultana, Govt. of K.P. through Chief Secretary, Peshawar, etc. vs Professor Dr. Ghazala Yasmeen Nizam, etc2016 P.S.C. 1506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-03
  Vice Chancellor appointmentjudicial reviewadministrative discretionSearch Committeeservice matterexecutive policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that set aside the appointment of a Vice Chancellor for Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University, Peshawar. The core legal question was whether the Chancellor/Governor’s appointment of a candidate, who did not hold the highest marks on an initial short-listing evaluation, was unlawful or required specific reasons for superseding higher-scoring candidates. The Supreme Court held that the appointment process, conducted under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012, was valid. The Court reasoned that the Search Committee’s role was to recommend a panel of candidates based on professional and academic merit, and the Chancellor/Governor possessed the discretion under Section 12(1) to select any candidate from that recommended panel. The Court affirmed that judicial review does not permit courts to interfere in executive policy-making or administrative appointments absent proof of malice or illegality. The key principle laid down is that where a statute grants the executive discretion to select from a panel of qualified candidates recommended by a specialized committee, the selection is not invalidated merely because the appointee did not hold the highest preliminary short-listing marks.

  Questions settled

  • Does the selection of a candidate for Vice Chancellor from a panel recommended by a Search Committee require the appointing authority to provide reasons for not selecting the candidate with the highest preliminary marks?
  • Can a High Court interfere with an executive appointment of a Vice Chancellor where the statutory procedure for selection has been followed?
  • Is the exercise of discretion by the Chancellor/Governor under Section 12(1) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012, subject to judicial review absent evidence of malice?
  Read full judgment →
• Professor Dr. Razia Sultana etc. vs Professor Dr. Ghazala Yasmeen Nizam2016 PLJ SC 570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-03
  appointment of Vice-Chancellorjudicial reviewadministrative discretionSearch Committeeexecutive policy-makingmala fidestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor for Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University, Peshawar. The core legal question was whether the Chancellor/Governor, acting on the Chief Minister's advice, is legally obligated to provide reasons for selecting a candidate from a Search Committee's recommended list who did not secure the highest marks in the initial shortlisting process. The Peshawar High Court had previously set aside the appointment, requiring a fresh consideration. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that the discretion vested in the Chancellor/Governor under Section 12(1) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012, to appoint a Vice-Chancellor from the recommended candidates is absolute within the statutory framework and does not require justification based on initial shortlisting scores. The Court affirmed that judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to checking abuse of power and ensuring impartial determination, and courts must not intrude into the policy-making domain of the executive or assume the role of a policy-maker. Absent evidence of malice, the executive's selection from a validly recommended panel is lawful.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chancellor/Governor have the discretion to appoint a Vice-Chancellor from a list of candidates recommended by a Search Committee without providing reasons for bypassing candidates with higher initial shortlisting marks?
  • Can a High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, interfere in the policy-making domain of the executive regarding the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor?
  • Is the selection of a candidate for the position of Vice-Chancellor by the Chancellor/Governor, based on the advice of the Chief Minister, subject to judicial interference absent proof of malice?
  Read full judgment →
• Professor Dr. Razia Sultana and others vs Professor Dr. Ghazala Yasmeen2016 PLJ SC 570, 2016 P.S.C. 1506, 2016 P.S.C. 798, 2016 SCMR 992 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-03
  appointment of Vice ChancellorSearch Committeejudicial reviewexecutive discretionshortlisting marksremand orderadministrative decision
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from a Peshawar High Court judgment setting aside the appointment of appellant Dr. Razia Sultana as Vice Chancellor of Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University, Peshawar, and remanding the matter to the Chief Minister. The core legal question was whether the High Court appropriately exercised judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution when setting aside an executive decision appointing a candidate recommended by a Search Committee under Section 12 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that marks assigned for short-listing do not govern the interview process conducted by the Search Committee, which unanimously recommended three candidates without preference. Section 12(1) confers discretion upon the Chancellor/Governor, acting on the Chief Minister's advice, to appoint any recommended candidate without requiring additional reasons or personal interviews, provided no mala fide or lack of qualification is established. Courts cannot usurp policy-making or executive discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the allocation of short-listing marks restrict the discretion of a Search Committee or executive authority during final selection?
  • Is the Governor or Chief Minister required to record specific reasons for choosing one candidate over another from an unranked panel recommended by a statutory Search Committee under Section 12 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012?
  • Can a High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction interfere with lawful administrative discretion in the absence of proven mala fides or disqualification?
  Read full judgment →
• Professor Dr. Razia Sultana and another vs Professor Dr. Ghazala Yasmeen2016 P.S.C. 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-03
  Vice Chancellor appointmentadministrative discretionjudicial reviewSearch CommitteeKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act 2012mala fidepolicy making
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the appointment of the Vice Chancellor of Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University, Peshawar. The respondent challenged the appointment of the appellant, arguing that despite having secured higher marks in the initial evaluation proforma, she was superseded by the appellant. The Peshawar High Court had set aside the appointment, directing a fresh consideration. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Chancellor/Governor is legally bound to appoint the candidate with the highest evaluation marks or if they possess discretion to select from the panel recommended by the Search Committee. The Supreme Court held that the Search Committee’s function was to shortlist candidates, and under Section 12(1) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012, the Chancellor/Governor retains the discretion to appoint any candidate from the recommended list. The Court emphasized that judicial review should not interfere with executive policy-making or administrative discretion absent proof of malice. Finding no evidence of mala fide, the Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment, upholding the appointment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chancellor or Governor have the discretion to appoint a Vice Chancellor from a panel of candidates recommended by a Search Committee under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012?
  • Is an appointing authority legally bound to select the candidate with the highest marks from an initial evaluation proforma for a Vice Chancellor position?
  • To what extent can the High Court interfere with administrative appointments and executive policy-making under its writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Phul Peer Shah vs Hafeez Fatima2016 NLR Civil 561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-05-16
  Parda NasheenHiba-bil-Iwazburden of proofrevisional jurisdictionfraudmutationconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts, which had upheld a land transaction involving an elderly, illiterate, Parda Nasheen lady. The core legal question concerns the validity of a purported 'Hiba-bil-Iwaz' transaction and whether the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the transaction was fraudulent, noting that the beneficiary failed to discharge the heavy burden of proof required when dealing with a vulnerable, Parda Nasheen woman. The Court emphasized that a mutation alone is insufficient to prove a transaction, especially when the original record is missing and the beneficiary occupies a position of dominance. The key principles laid down are: (i) the burden of proof lies heavily on the beneficiary to prove the transaction was legitimate, transparent, and understood by the Parda Nasheen lady; (ii) courts must apply rigorous caution in protecting the rights of women in a male-dominated society; and (iii) concurrent findings are amenable to revisional interference when based on gross misreading of evidence or illegalities.

  Questions settled

  • What is the burden of proof when a transaction involves an illiterate Parda Nasheen lady?
  • Can a mutation entry alone be considered sufficient proof of a land transaction?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does the definition of 'sale' under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 include Hiba-bil-Iwaz?
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• Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. vs Wafaqi Mohtasib2016 SCP 94, 2016 PLD Supreme Court 940 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-25
  Wafaqi Mohtasibmal-administrationalternate remedyconstitutional jurisdictionrecruitment policyexecutive functionsservice mattersquota appointments
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves a challenge by the Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) against a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed its writ petition on the grounds of non-exhaustion of an alternate remedy. The dispute arose when the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) recommended the appointment of certain individuals under a 20% quota for children of deceased or retired employees, including directions to relax age limits. The Supreme Court examined whether the Ombudsman's jurisdiction under Article 9 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib Order, 1983, extends to executive functions such as recruitment and appointments. The Court held that recruitment is an executive function and the Ombudsman lacks the authority to order or recommend appointments or relax prescribed conditions. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while Article 32 provides an alternate remedy via representation to the President, the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction remains available where an order is ex-facie without jurisdiction or violates the statutory limits of Article 9. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment was set aside.

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• Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd vs Wafaqi Mohtasib2016 PLJ SC 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Wafaqi MohtasibMal-administrationConstitutional jurisdictionAlternate remedyExecutive functionRecruitment policyPublic sector company
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition challenging the Wafaqi Mohtasib's recommendations for appointments within the Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO). The core legal question was whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib possesses the jurisdiction to recommend appointments or relax recruitment conditions, such as age limits, within a public sector company, and whether the High Court can exercise constitutional jurisdiction despite the availability of an alternate remedy under the Wafaqi Mohtasib's governing law. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that recruitment and appointments are executive functions outside the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. The Court clarified that the Ombudsman's jurisdiction is limited by Article 9 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib Order 1983, which excludes matters of personal grievances of public servants and executive recruitment functions. Furthermore, the Court established that the availability of an alternate remedy under Article 32 does not bar the High Court from exercising constitutional jurisdiction when an order of the Ombudsman is patently without jurisdiction or contrary to the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Wafaqi Mohtasib have the jurisdiction to recommend appointments or relax recruitment conditions in a public sector company?
  • Can the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction against an order of the Wafaqi Mohtasib despite the availability of an alternate remedy under Article 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib Order 1983?
  • Does the term 'mal-administration' under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib Order 1983 extend to the recruitment and appointment processes of public sector companies?
  • Is a public sector company considered an 'Agency' under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib Order 1983, thereby excluding the Ombudsman's jurisdiction over its employees' service matters?
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• Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd vs Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman)2016 SCP 94 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• People Unity of PIA Employees Cba,Karachi vs The Registrar of Trade2016 NLR Labour 56 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  collective bargaining agenttrade unionindustrial relationsreferendumstatutory interpretationCBA term
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing a writ petition filed by a trade union seeking to extend its term as a Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) to three years. The core legal question was whether a trade union, meeting the criteria of having over 5,000 members and presence in more than one province, is automatically entitled to a three-year term under the proviso to section 19(11) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, or if it must assert this right at the time of certification. The Supreme Court held that the three-year term is not automatic; the union must establish its eligibility and request the extended term from the Registrar at the time of the referendum or certification. The Court ruled that the petitioner, having failed to agitate this claim for nearly 20 months until after its two-year term had expired and a new referendum was announced, could not retrospectively claim the benefit of the proviso. The petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Is the three-year term for a Collective Bargaining Agent under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, automatic for unions with over 5,000 members?
  • Must a trade union assert its eligibility for a three-year term at the time of the referendum or certification?
  • Can a trade union claim an extended term as a Collective Bargaining Agent after the expiry of its initial two-year term and the announcement of a new referendum?
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• Peer Baksh through LRs and others vs Mst. Khanzadi and others2016 SCMR 1417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-25
  suit for declarationgift mutationinheritance rightsvoid transactionlimitationburden of proofLand Revenue Acttamleeq
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves a challenge by two sisters against gift mutations (Nos. 1036 and 918) executed in 1974 by their father, Ghulam Muhammad, in favor of their brother, Pir Bakhsh, to their exclusion. The trial, appellate, and High Courts concurrently decreed the suit in favor of the sisters, declaring the mutations void. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in its revisional jurisdiction, examined whether the petitioner (the son) successfully proved the gift. The Court held that the petitioner failed to provide particulars regarding the time, date, place, and witnesses of the gift's declaration in his pleadings or evidence, which is fatal to a claim of gift. Furthermore, the Court noted that the donor was 85 years old and paralyzed at the time, yet the identifying witnesses did not meet the requirements of Section 42 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967. The Court reaffirmed that limitation does not run against a void transaction and that a mutation is not proof of title; the beneficiary must prove the original transaction. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed.

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• Pakisthn Telecommunication Company Limited vs Employees Old Age2016 P.S.C. 1062 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  statutory bodyEmployees' Old-Age Benefitscorporate statusstatutory interpretationCompanies Ordinancere-organizationemployer contribution
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited, challenged the demand for contributions under the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, arguing it was a statutory body exempt from the Act's application under Section 47(f). The core legal question was whether the appellant, incorporated as a company limited by shares under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, qualifies as a 'statutory body' merely because it was formed pursuant to the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant is not a statutory body. The Court established the principle that for an entity to be classified as a 'statutory body,' its existence must be created directly by a special statute, not merely incorporated under the provisions of an existing general statute like the Companies Ordinance, 1984. Since the appellant was incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, it does not enjoy the exemption provided under Section 47(f) of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, and is liable to pay the required contributions from the date of its incorporation.

  Questions settled

  • Does an entity incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, qualify as a statutory body?
  • What is the defining characteristic of a statutory body for the purposes of statutory exemption?
  • Is a company created under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, exempt from the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976?
  • Does the ownership of shares by the Federal Government in a limited company render that company a statutory body?
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• Pakistan WAPDA Employees Pegham Union vs Member, National2016 NLR Labour 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  trade union registrationindustrial relationscollective bargaining agentconstitutional jurisdictionfactual controversiesreferendum
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Islamabad High Court, which had upheld the registration of respondent No. 3 as an industry-wise trade union by the Registrar Trade Unions under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The core legal questions involved whether the registration was granted in violation of sections 7 and 8 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, and whether factual controversies regarding trade union registration and alleged irregularities could be resolved in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's allegations of corruption, fraud, and procedural lapses were bald assertions involving factual disputes not amenable to writ jurisdiction, and that the Registrar had lawfully complied with the statutory requirements under sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Court further noted that the respondent union had subsequently won the Collective Bargaining Agent referendum with an overwhelming majority. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether factual controversies regarding the registration of a trade union can be resolved in constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for the registration of a trade union under sections 7 and 8 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Does the law envisage a full-fledged inquiry by the Registrar of Trade Unions prior to the registration of a trade union?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Employees' Old Age2016 P.S.C. 1062, 2016 SCMR 1220, 2016 SCP 31, 2016 PLC 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-25
  statutory bodyEmployees' Old-Age Benefits Actcorporate statusstatutory interpretationcontribution liabilityPakistan Telecommunication Company Limited
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) qualifies as a 'statutory body' under Section 47(f) of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, thereby exempting it from mandatory contributions. The appellant argued that as it was created under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, it should be considered a statutory body. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was incorporated as a company limited by shares under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, not directly by a special statute. The Court clarified that for an entity to be a 'statutory body,' its existence must be created directly by a special statute, rather than being incorporated under the provisions of an existing general law like the Companies Ordinance. The mere fact that the Federal Government initially held the shares does not alter the company's legal status. Consequently, the Court ruled that PTCL is not a statutory body and is liable to pay contributions under the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, from the date of its incorporation. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an entity incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, qualify as a 'statutory body' simply because it was formed pursuant to a reorganization statute?
  • What is the defining characteristic of a 'statutory body' under the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976?
  • Is a company limited by shares, even if government-owned, exempt from paying contributions under the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, on the basis of being a statutory body?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Employees Old Age2016 SCMR 1220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-25
  statutory bodycompany incorporationEmployees Old-Age Benefits ActPTCLtelecommunication re-organizationexemptions
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, qualifies as a 'statutory body' exempt from paying contributions under the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976. The core legal question was whether an entity incorporated under general company law pursuant to a re-organization statute acquires the status of a statutory body. The Supreme Court held that PTCL is not a statutory body, ruling that an entity only qualifies as a statutory body if its birth is directly caused by a special statute rather than being incorporated under an existing general law like the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The Court established the principle that entities incorporated under general statutes cannot claim statutory body exemptions, and the mode of incorporation at inception—rather than government shareholding or subsequent transfer of management—determines its legal character. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an entity incorporated as a company limited by shares under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 pursuant to a re-organization statute qualifies as a statutory body?
  • Does Section 47(f) of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 exempt companies incorporated under the Companies Ordinance from paying contributions?
  • What is the decisive factor for determining whether an entity is a statutory body or a non-statutory company?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), Islamabad through its2016 P.S.C. 811 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ultra viresstatutory interpretationtelecommunication regulationpecuniary penaltyfine vs penaltyregulatory authoritylicense conditions
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a High Court judgment that declared Regulation 18(2) of the Number Allocation & Administration Regulations, 2005, ultra vires the Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority possessed the statutory power to impose a 10% penalty for late payment of annual numbering charges, given that the Act specifically mentions 'fines' but not 'penalties' in this context. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the regulation is valid. The Court reasoned that 'penalty' and 'fine' are often used interchangeably, and a fine is essentially a pecuniary penalty. Since Section 23 of the Act of 1996 explicitly authorizes the Authority to levy fines for contraventions of license conditions or regulations, the impugned regulation falls within the Authority's statutory mandate. The Court reaffirmed the principle that courts should lean in favor of the validity of statutory instruments and avoid interpretations that render them nullities, provided the legislative intent is clear.

  Questions settled

  • Is Regulation 18(2) of the Number Allocation & Administration Regulations, 2005, ultra vires the Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996?
  • Does the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority have the power to impose a penalty for late payment of annual numbering charges?
  • Are the terms 'penalty' and 'fine' mutually exclusive in the context of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996?
  • Should courts lean in favor of the validity of a statutory instrument when interpreting its constitutionality?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), Islamabad through Chairman vs Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited, Islamabad2016 CLD 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-10-26
  telecommunication regulationultra viresstatutory interpretationpenalty vs finenumber allocation feeslicense enforcementregulatory authority powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of Regulation 18(2) of the Number Allocation and Administration Regulations, 2005, which imposed a 10% penalty on telecommunication licensees for late payment of annual numbering charges. The Islamabad High Court had previously declared this regulation ultra vires the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, reasoning that the Act did not authorize such penalties. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the term "penalty" in the regulation conflicted with the "fine" authorized under Section 23 of the Act. The Court held that "penalty" and "fine" are often used interchangeably in statutory construction and that the regulation constituted a valid exercise of the Authority's power to enforce license conditions. Emphasizing the principle that courts should lean in favor of the validity of statutory instruments, the Court ruled that the regulation was not ultra vires. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and upheld the imposition of the penalty for late payment of numbering fees.

  Questions settled

  • Is Regulation 18(2) of the Number Allocation and Administration Regulations, 2005, ultra vires the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996?
  • Are the terms 'penalty' and 'fine' mutually exclusive concepts in the context of statutory interpretation?
  • Does the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority have the power to impose a penalty for late payment of numbering charges under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996?
  • Should courts adopt an interpretation that preserves the validity of a statutory instrument over one that renders it void?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), Islamabad through Chairman vs Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited, Headquarters, G-8 Markaz, Islamabad2016 CLD 362, 2016 P.S.C. 811, 2016 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-10-26
  ultra viressubordinate legislationnumber allocation feetelecommunication systempenalty vs finestatutory interpretationshow cause noticeenforcement order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court allowing an appeal under Section 7(1) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, setting aside a penalty order issued by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) against Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), and declaring Regulation 18(2) of the Number Allocation and Administration Regulations, 2005 ultra vires the 1996 Act. The legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the PTA was authorized to impose a 10% penalty for delayed payment of annual numbering charges, and whether Regulation 18(2) was void for stipulating a 'penalty' when the parent Act explicitly mentions 'fine' under Section 23. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that a fine is merely a pecuniary penalty and all fines are penalties. The Court established that statutory regulations should be interpreted in favor of validity, and where the parent statute authorizes levying fines up to a maximum limit, subordinate regulations imposing a percentage-based late payment penalty constitute a valid fine under Section 23.

  Questions settled

  • Are the legal concepts of 'penalty' and 'fine' mutually exclusive in statutory construction?
  • Whether a subordinate regulation imposing a percentage penalty for late payment of fee is ultra vires a parent statute that provides for the imposition of fines?
  • Does a regulatory authority have jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 to levy a pecuniary penalty for breach of licensing terms?
  • How should courts apply the principle of presumption of constitutionality and validity when evaluating subordinate legislation?
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• Pakistan Railways,-through Agm (Traffic), Pakistan Railways, Lahore vs M/s.2016 P.S.C. 748 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  arbitrationinterim injunctioncontractual obligationspublic-private partnershiprecovery of duesbalance of convenienceprima facie caseirreparable loss
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions challenging a High Court judgment that upheld an interim injunction restraining Pakistan Railways from recovering outstanding dues from a private contractor operating a train service. The core legal question was whether the contractor could avoid contractual payment obligations by claiming the agreement was 'assumption-based' and whether the lower courts erred in granting an injunction against the recovery of these dues pending arbitration. The Supreme Court held that the injunction was unsustainable. It found that the contractor could not unilaterally rescind or alter financial commitments based on alleged 'assumption-based' terms. The Court emphasized that the lower courts failed to apply the necessary legal tests for granting an injunction—specifically, establishing a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss. The Court laid down that contractual financial obligations are binding and cannot be diluted by external reports or unilateral claims of miscalculation. Furthermore, an injunction restraining the recovery of dues cannot be granted without satisfying the three fundamental ingredients required for such relief, even where arbitration proceedings are initiated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party to a contract unilaterally avoid financial obligations by claiming terms were assumption-based?
  • Is an injunction restraining the recovery of contractual dues sustainable when the three ingredients for an injunction (prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss) are not satisfied?
  • Does the existence of an arbitration clause automatically justify an interim injunction against the recovery of outstanding contractual payments?
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• Pakistan Railways through Agm(Trafic), Lahore vs Messrs Four Brothers2016 PLD Supreme Court 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-10-27
  arbitrationinterim injunctionpublic-private partnershipcontractual defaultprima facie casebalance of convenienceirreparable loss
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision and first appeal against a trial court order that referred a contractual dispute to arbitration under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 and granted an interim injunction under Section 41(b) restraining Pakistan Railways from recovering outstanding dues. Pakistan Railways challenged the grant of the interim injunction. The core legal question was whether an interim injunction restraining recovery of contractual dues could be sustained when the party seeking it had admittedly defaulted on payment obligations and the lower courts failed to evaluate the essential ingredients for granting an injunction. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and held that while the reference to arbitration was proper, the lower courts erred in granting an interim injunction without establishing a prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable loss, especially where the respondent continued to operate the business train while accumulating massive arrears. The Court laid down the principle that a party cannot avoid financial commitments under a binding agreement by claiming the contract was assumption-based, and that interim injunctions restraining financial recoveries in arbitration proceedings cannot be issued mechanically without satisfying the foundational legal criteria for injunctive relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interim injunction restraining the recovery of contractual dues under Section 41(b) of the Arbitration Act 1940 can be granted without satisfying the three essential ingredients of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss?
  • Can a party to a commercial agreement wriggle out of its financial commitments by claiming that the contract terms were assumption-based due to lower actual occupancy rates?
  • Does the appointment of an arbitrator and reference of a dispute to arbitration automatically justify restraining a statutory body from recovering undisputed arrears while the defaulting party continues to benefit from the contract?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Aziz-Ur-Rehman2016 SCMR 14, 2016 PLC (C.S.) 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-07
  constitutional petitionmaster and servantlachesres judicatapast and closed transactionre-employmentback benefitsservice matterdiscriminationretirement benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that allowed a constitutional petition, directing Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) to treat a re-employed respondent, affected by MLR-52, at par with other employees who received back benefits. The respondent's services were dispensed with under MLR-52 in 1981, and he was re-employed in 1990 on fresh terms, retiring in 2003 after accepting all benefits. He filed a petition in 2009, alleging discrimination for not receiving back benefits like certain other employees. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that a constitutional petition is not maintainable against PIAC for service matters, as the relationship with its employees is that of master and servant, not governed by statutory rules. Furthermore, the petition suffered from laches, as the terms were challenged 19 years after re-employment and after retirement. The claim was also barred by the doctrine of past and closed transaction, having accepted re-employment terms and retirement benefits. Crucially, the principle of res judicata applied, as the respondent's similar claim for back benefits had been previously rejected by the Supreme Court in 2002, a fact concealed from the High Court.

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• Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority vs Independent Media2016 SCP 10 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-04
  electronic mediaregulatory authoritylive broadcast censorshiptime delaying mechanismshow cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning regulatory actions initiated by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority against a television channel. The core legal questions involve the validity of program suspensions, pending inquiries into remaining charges by the Council of Complaints, and the mandatory installation of censoring and time-delaying mechanisms on live broadcasts. The Court held that the challenge to the three-day suspension had become infructuous due to the passage of time and pending proceedings before the High Court of Sindh, while directing the competent authority to proceed with the remaining charges within a stipulated timeframe after considering a public apology. The key principle laid down is that regulatory bodies must adhere strictly to statutory rules and procedures while ensuring that broadcast licensees implement necessary time-delay mechanisms to censor offending live content.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition challenging a short-term suspension of a television program becomes infructuous due to efflux of time and concurrent proceedings?
  • How should regulatory authorities handle pending charges and inquiries against media channels in light of public apologies?
  • Is it mandatory for television channels to install time-delaying mechanisms to censor live broadcasts under PEMRA regulations?
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• Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others vs Pakistan2016 PLD Supreme Court 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-06-13
  freedom of expressioncommercial speechPEMRA Rulesadvertisement restrictionsconstitutional rightsregulatory powerslachesalternative remedypublic interestviewers' rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed an appeal challenging the vires of Rule 15(3) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Rules, 2009, and clause 10.4 of licenses issued to satellite TV channels, which imposed restrictions on the duration and spacing of advertisement breaks. The appellants contended these restrictions violated their freedom of expression under Article 19 and right to conduct business under Article 18 of the Constitution, arguing they were excessive and arbitrary. The Court held that commercial speech receives a lesser degree of constitutional protection than core free speech and is subject to a higher degree of regulation. It found the quantitative restrictions on advertisements to be reasonable, serving the legitimate state interest of protecting time for core free speech, public discourse, and safeguarding viewers' right to an optimum viewing experience. The Court affirmed that statutory requirements and contractual obligations cannot be made subservient to commercial interests. The petition was also deemed liable for dismissal due to laches and non-exhaustion of statutory remedies.

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• P.T.C.L. and others vs Masood Ahmed Bhatti and others2016 SCMR 1362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-19
  civil review petitionsstatutory terms and conditionsmaster and servantwrit jurisdictioncivil servantstransferred employeespensionary benefitsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil review petitions arose from a judgment concerning the employment status and legal remedies available to employees of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL). The core legal question was whether PTCL employees, specifically those transferred from the erstwhile Telegraph and Telephone Department, could invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. The petitioners argued that PTCL is governed by the principle of 'master and servant' and is not a 'person' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation. The Supreme Court held that while transferred employees are no longer civil servants, their terms and conditions of service are protected by Section 9 of the Act of 1991 and Sections 35 and 36 of the Act of 1996, rendering them statutory in nature. The Court further clarified that since the Federal Government retains majority shares, PTCL remains a 'person' under Article 199(5). Consequently, any violation of statutory terms is amenable to writ jurisdiction, distinguishing these employees from contract workers governed by the master and servant rule.

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• N/A vs N/A2016 P.S.C. 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-03
  access to justicelegal publicationstatutory interpretationrule of lawpublic accountabilitytranslation of lawsregulatory framework
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the systemic failure in the publication and dissemination of accurate, up-to-date, and accessible legal materials in Pakistan. The Supreme Court addressed the proliferation of erroneous law books and the lack of reliable, timely legal databases for citizens and practitioners. The core legal question involved the state's obligation to ensure the availability of verified, authoritative, and accessible versions of laws, both in hard copy and online, and the necessity of establishing a regulatory framework to curb the publication of defective legal materials. The Court held that the Federal and Provincial Governments must implement specific timelines for the recruitment of monitoring and evaluation experts, the establishment of a regulatory framework for law publications, the translation of laws into the national language, and the creation of accessible online repositories. The key principle laid down is that the State has a mandatory duty to ensure that laws are published accurately, verified for correctness, and made easily accessible to the public, and that the government must establish mechanisms to hold publishers accountable for erroneous legal materials.

  Questions settled

  • Does the State have a legal obligation to ensure the accuracy and accessibility of published laws?
  • Can the government be directed to establish a regulatory framework for the publication of law books?
  • Is the government required to provide verified and authoritative online versions of statutes?
  • Does the Court have the authority to mandate timelines for the recruitment of experts and the translation of laws by government departments?
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• Not vs State2016 SCP 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-24
  voluntary returnNAB Ordinancemisconductdisciplinary proceedingspublic officecorruptionaccountability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from the Supreme Court's examination of the vires of Section 25(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, specifically concerning the unbridled discretion of the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to accept voluntary returns from accused persons. The Court observed that the NAB was misusing this provision to grant 'clean chits' to public servants involved in corruption, allowing them to retain their positions despite admitting to illegal gains. The core legal question concerned whether the NAB's practice of accepting voluntary returns, which effectively shielded accused individuals from departmental disciplinary action, defeated the object of the Ordinance and usurped judicial functions. The Court held that a voluntary return constitutes an admission of misconduct, necessitating immediate departmental disciplinary proceedings. Consequently, the Court restrained the Chairman of the NAB from accepting any further offers of voluntary return under Section 25(a) and mandated that all relevant government authorities initiate disciplinary proceedings against employees who had previously utilized this provision to avoid accountability.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of offering a voluntary return under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, constitute misconduct sufficient to warrant disciplinary action against a public servant?
  • Can the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau accept offers of voluntary return without subjecting the accused to departmental proceedings?
  • Is the National Accountability Bureau authorized to retain portions of recovered voluntary return amounts for distribution as awards to its officers?
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• Noor Ahmed through L.Rs, and others vs Province of Punjab and others2016 SCMR 2174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-07
  specific performancerevisional jurisdictionremand orderhierarchy of courtspetitory appealsupervisory jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' revision petition. The petitioners had filed a suit for specific performance that was initially dismissed by the trial court, remanded in appeal by the District Judge, and subsequently dismissed again upon remand. Instead of filing an appeal against the final dismissal decree, the petitioners directly approached the High Court through a revision petition, primarily challenging the earlier remand order and bypassing the appellate hierarchy. The core legal questions involve the maintainability of a revision petition against a final decree when an appellate remedy was available, and the finality of an un-assailed remand order. The Supreme Court held that the revision petition was incompetent because the remand order had attained finality, the appropriate remedy of appeal against the final decree was not availed, and the revision forum, if any, lay before the District Judge based on pecuniary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court laid down that revisional or supervisory jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a substitute for an omitted appeal in inappropriate cases where statutory remedies are bypassed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revision petition be maintained before the High Court against a trial court decree when the statutory remedy of appeal was not availed?
  • Whether an order of remand that has attained finality can be challenged through a subsequent revision petition?
  • Does a revision petition lie directly before the High Court when pecuniary jurisdiction dictates it should be filed before the District Judge?
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• Nisar Ahmed vs The State, etc.PL D 2016 Supreme Court 11, 2016 PLJ SC 12, 2016 P.S.C. Crl. 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-08
  post-arrest bailsuccessive bail applicationsexpeditious trialdirect complaintfresh groundsqatl-i-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of the petitioner's fourth post-arrest bail application in a murder case. The petitioner, accused of committing qatl-i-amd and causing injuries under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, argued that he was entitled to bail due to the trial court's failure to comply with previous High Court directions for the expeditious disposal of his trial, and because the complainant had filed a direct complaint, which allegedly constituted a fresh ground. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether non-compliance with trial-expediting directions or the filing of a direct complaint could serve as valid grounds for bail. The Court held that non-compliance with directions to conclude a trial expeditiously is alien to the provisions of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and does not constitute a valid ground for bail. Furthermore, the filing of a direct complaint does not affect earlier final bail-refusal orders unless a genuine fresh ground is established. Consequently, the Court refused leave and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a trial court to comply with directions for the expeditious disposal of a trial constitutes a valid ground for the grant of bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the filing of a direct complaint by a complainant constitute a fresh ground for re-evaluating successive bail applications that have already been dismissed on merits?
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• Nisar Ahmed vs The State and othersPL D 2016 Supreme Court 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-08
  post-arrest bailexpeditious trialdirect complaintbail refusalqatl-i-amdcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's fourth post-arrest bail application by the Lahore High Court in a criminal case involving charges of murder and causing injuries. The petitioner, accused of qatl-i-amd and other offenses, sought bail primarily on the grounds of the trial court's failure to comply with previous High Court directions for expeditious disposal of the case and the subsequent filing of a direct complaint by the complainant. The core legal question was whether the delay in trial or the filing of a direct complaint constituted sufficient grounds for granting bail after previous bail applications had been dismissed. The Supreme Court held that neither the non-compliance with directions for an expeditious trial nor the filing of a direct complaint provides a valid legal basis for bail under the statutory framework. The Court affirmed that such grounds are alien to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and dismissed the petition, emphasizing that bail cannot be granted absent a fresh, valid ground when previous refusals have attained finality.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to conclude a trial within a specified timeframe constitute a valid ground for the grant of bail?
  • Can the filing of a direct complaint serve as a fresh ground to reconsider a bail application that has previously been dismissed?
  • Is non-compliance with directions for expeditious trial a recognized ground for bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Nisar Ahmed vs State, etc.2016 PLJ SC 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-08
  post-arrest bailbail refusalexpeditious trialdirect complaintfinality of bail ordersqatl-i-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a fourth post-arrest bail application by the High Court in a case involving charges of murder and causing injuries. The petitioner, accused of qatl-i-amd and other offenses, sought bail primarily on the grounds of the trial court's failure to comply with previous directions for expeditious disposal of the case and the subsequent filing of a direct complaint by the complainant. The Supreme Court addressed the core legal question of whether delays in trial or the filing of a direct complaint constitute valid grounds for granting bail when previous bail applications have been dismissed. The Court held that neither the failure to conclude a trial within a specified timeframe nor the filing of a direct complaint provides a valid legal basis for bail under the statutory framework. The ratio established is that bail cannot be granted on such grounds as they are alien to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and previous bail-refusing orders maintain finality unless a genuine fresh ground is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to conclude a trial within a specified time frame constitute a valid ground for the grant of bail?
  • Does the filing of a direct complaint by a complainant provide a fresh ground for bail after previous bail applications have been dismissed?
  • Can bail be granted on grounds that are not recognized under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Niaz Ahmed vs Hasrat Mahmood, Etc.2016 NLR Criminal 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-11-04
  acquittalcircumstantial evidencejoint trialprivate complaintchallan caseprocedural irregularityfailure of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent acquittal of respondents in a murder case. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of circumstantial evidence in a criminal trial and whether the consolidation of a challan case and a private complaint for a joint trial vitiates the proceedings where no failure of justice is occasioned. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of acquittal by the lower courts based on weak circumstantial evidence—comprising last-seen evidence, motive, and an extra-judicial confession—were well-founded and warranted no interference. The Court further held that although consolidating a challan case and a private complaint is procedurally irregular, such an irregularity is cured under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 unless it occasions a failure of justice, particularly when no objection was raised at the earlier stages of the trial. The key principle laid down is that procedural irregularities in the mode of trial do not invalidate a judgment unless prejudice or a failure of justice is affirmatively demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the consolidation of a challan case and a private complaint for a joint trial vitiates the proceedings in the absence of a failure of justice?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal based on circumstantial evidence without proof of legal error?
  • Does an irregularity in the mode of trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 warrant the reversal of a sentence or order if no objection was raised at an earlier stage?
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• Niaz Ahmed vs Hasrat Mahmood and others2016 PLD Supreme Court 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-11-04
  private complaintChallan caseconsolidated trialprocedural irregularityfailure of justiceacquittalcircumstantial evidenceextrajudicial confession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a murder case where the petitioner, dissatisfied with the police investigation, filed a private complaint mirroring the allegations in his initial FIR. The trial court conducted a consolidated trial of both the Challan case and the private complaint, resulting in the acquittal of the respondents. The Supreme Court addressed the procedural irregularity of consolidating such cases, noting that where a party files both an FIR and a private complaint against the same accused with identical allegations, the complaint case must be tried first while the Challan case remains dormant. However, the Court held that under Section 537 of the Cr.P.C., a procedural error or irregularity in the mode of trial does not warrant reversal of a judgment unless it has occasioned a failure of justice. Since the petitioner failed to object to the consolidation during the trial and the evidence (circumstantial, last-seen, and extrajudicial confession) was insufficient to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt regardless of the trial mode, the acquittals were upheld.

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• Nematullah (in C.A.1109/2013) and 7 others vs Chairman Govt. Body2016 SCP 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-09
  adjournmentprocedural ordercivil appealcourt practicecase management
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a request for an adjournment in a civil appeal pending before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The respondent's counsel sought an adjournment due to a bereavement in his family, specifically the death of his aunt, necessitating his attendance at her funeral. The Court, considering the request, granted the adjournment. Consequently, the proceedings were stayed, and the matter was rescheduled for hearing after a period of two weeks. No substantive legal questions were addressed, nor were any legal principles laid down, as the order was purely procedural in nature, facilitating the temporary postponement of the case to accommodate the personal circumstances of the legal representative involved.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant an adjournment based on the bereavement of a counsel's family member?
  • Is a request for adjournment due to personal exigencies of counsel generally entertained by the Supreme Court?
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• Nemat Ullah Naseeb Ullah Faridullah Miss Shiren Miss Zar Afshan Johr2016 SCMR 1299, 2016 NLR Labour 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-04-14
  Workers' Welfare BoardStatutory rulesService tenureConstitutional devolutionCaretaker governmentContractual employmentEighteenth Amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil appeals regarding the service status of employees of the Workers' Welfare Board, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The core legal question was whether these employees were governed by statutory rules—specifically the Workers' Welfare Fund (Employees Service) Rules, 1997—and whether their employment was permanent or merely contractual. The Supreme Court held that the 1997 Rules were validly adopted by the Provincial Board with Federal Government approval and possess full statutory force. Consequently, the employees' services are regulated by these rules, and the High Court erred in concluding otherwise. The Court affirmed that statutory rules adopted by a provincial entity under federal direction remain binding unless repealed or amended. Furthermore, it established that caretaker governments are restricted to day-to-day administration and should not make policy decisions with far-reaching consequences. The appeals were allowed, and the cases were remanded to the High Court for adjudication on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Are the Workers' Welfare Fund (Employees Service) Rules, 1997, applicable to employees of the Provincial Workers' Welfare Boards?
  • Does the adoption of federal service rules by a provincial board grant those rules statutory force?
  • Can a caretaker government make policy decisions that have far-reaching effects on the service tenure of public employees?
  • Does the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, preserve the validity of existing statutory rules governing provincial employees?
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• Nemat Ullah and others vs Chairman Governing Body, Worker Welfare2016 SCMR 1299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-04-14
  statutory rulesWorkers Welfare Boardconstitutional devolutionEighteenth Amendmentcontractual employmentright to educationcaretaker government
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court which held that the employees of the Workers' Welfare Board, KPK were not regulated by statutory service rules. The core legal question revolves around whether the Workers' Welfare Fund Employees Service Rules, 1997, framed by the Federal Government, applied with statutory force to the provincial Workers' Welfare Board employees, and how the subsequent Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment affected their status. The Supreme Court held that the Rules of 1997 were validly adopted by the provincial Workers' Welfare Board with the approval of the Federal Government, possessing full statutory force, and were further protected under Article 270-AA of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 following the devolution under the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010. The Court ruled that the employees' services are governed by these statutory rules, precluding arbitrary termination or indefinite contractual status, particularly in light of the fundamental right to education under Article 25-A. The appeals are allowed and remanded to the High Court for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Workers' Welfare Fund Employees Service Rules, 1997 apply with statutory force to the employees of the provincial Workers' Welfare Boards?
  • What is the effect of the omission of the Concurrent Legislative List via the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 on existing federal rules and statutory instruments?
  • Can an employer keep employees on a contractual basis for an unreasonably long period against permanent sanctioned posts under statutory service rules?
  • What are the legal limitations on the powers of a Caretaker Government regarding policy decisions and termination of public sector employees?
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• Nazim-Ud-Din and others vs Sheikh Zia-Ul-Qamar and others2016 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-10-07
  Partition suitCo-ownershipRevisional jurisdictionConcurrent findings of factMisreading of evidenceNon-reading of evidenceEstoppelAcquiescenceWaiverDocumentary evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns a suit for partition of a house, where respondents claimed co-ownership as successors-in-interest. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, could interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts that had dismissed the partition suit. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, which found that the respondents were co-sharers to the extent of 17/24. The High Court's interference was justified because the lower courts had conspicuously misread and non-read crucial documentary evidence, including a 1946 decree and a 1952 registered instrument where the appellants' predecessor-in-interest acknowledged limited co-ownership. The Court reiterated that revisional courts can upset concurrent findings where there is conspicuous misreading or non-reading of evidence, or an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the principles of acquiescence, waiver, and estoppel were attracted against the appellants for not challenging the registered document.

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• Nazeer Ahmed vs The State2016 P.S.C. 495, 2016 SCMR 1628, 2016 P.S.C. Crl. 495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-06-01
  Criminal appealMurderReappraisal of evidenceBenefit of doubtAcquittalProsecution caseEye-witnessesMotiveMedical evidenceOnus of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a criminal appeal against the conviction of Nazeer Ahmed for an offence under Section 302(b) PPC read with Section 34 PPC, for the murder of his sister-in-law. The core legal question involved a reappraisal of the evidence, particularly the credibility of the prosecution's narrative, the reliability of chance eye-witnesses, the weakness of the alleged motive, issues with forensic evidence collection, and contradictions between ocular and medical evidence. The Supreme Court found the prosecution's story unbelievable, noting the improbability of the complainant party witnessing the murder and the strong motive for the complainant party to implicate the accused. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It was emphasized that while close relatives might have an onus to explain an unnatural death within a house, an accused cannot be convicted if the prosecution utterly fails to establish its own case. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

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• Nayyab Hassan Gardezi, learned Standing Counsel vs Dr. Waqar Aftab2016 SCP 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-18
  summoning of officialsrequisition of recordSupreme Court proceedingspending litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon an application filed by the learned Standing Counsel along with replies filed by the concerned individuals. Upon consideration of the submissions and earlier orders, the Court finds it expedient to summon the Secretary of C.A.D. and a high-ranking official from the Federal Investigation Agency (F.I.A.) to appear before the Court on the following day. Additionally, the Court directs that the original record of a pending civil case titled M/s Business Developers Versus Executive Director Federal Government Poly Clinic Hospital, Islamabad etc., currently before the Additional District Judge, Islamabad (West), be requisitioned through a special messenger. The case is re-listed for hearing on a specified future date.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court summon high officials such as the Secretary of C.A.D. and an official from the F.I.A. during proceedings?
  • Is the Supreme Court empowered to requisition the original record of a case pending adjudication before an Additional District Judge through a special messenger?
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• National Electric Power Regulatory Authority vs Faisalabad Electric2016 SCMR 550, 2016 PLJ Sc 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-12-08
  NEPRAtariff determinationstatutory interpretationquorumfull strengthreview motiondelegated legislationultra viresquasi-judicial functions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court was filed by the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) against a High Court judgment which set aside a review order on the grounds that it was not heard by the 'full strength' of the Authority as required by Rule 16(6) of the NEPRA (Tariff Standards Procedure) Rules, 1998. The core legal question was whether 'full strength' in the Rules meant the total statutory composition of five members or the functional quorum of three members as defined in the parent statute, the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997. The Supreme Court held that rules must be interpreted in harmony with their parent statute and cannot transgress its parameters. Since Section 5(2) of the Act prescribes a quorum of three members for decisions and Section 3(6) protects proceedings from invalidity due to vacancies, the Court determined that 'full strength' under the Rules refers to the statutory quorum. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that a three-member decision is legally competent.

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• Nasir Javaid and another vs The State2016 P.S.C. 400, 2016 SCMR 1144, 2016 SCP 44, 2016 P.S.C. Crl. 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-15
  circumstantial evidencemurderlast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionrecoverycapital sentenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which confirmed the death sentences of the appellants for the kidnapping and murder of a four-year-old child. The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including motive, 'last seen' testimony, extra-judicial confessions, and recoveries. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the motive unproven and insufficient to drive such a crime. The 'last seen' evidence was deemed concocted due to the witnesses' unexplained three-day silence and inconsistencies regarding their presence at the scene. The extra-judicial confessions were rejected as they were allegedly made to persons closely related to the complainant who held no authority. Furthermore, the Court noted that recoveries made during a second raid of the appellants' house appeared contrived. Applying the principle that circumstantial evidence must form an unbreakable chain incompatible with any hypothesis of innocence, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants.

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• Nasir Iqbal @ Nasra and anothers vs The State2016 SCMR 2152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-14
  murdercommon intentioneye-witness credibilitymitigating circumstancesdeath sentencelife imprisonmentanti-terrorismproclaimed offender
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arose from a daylight attack where five individuals were killed by indiscriminate firing while traveling to a court hearing. The prosecution alleged the motive was to coerce a compromise in a separate pending murder case. The Supreme Court re-evaluated the ocular testimony of two eye-witnesses, finding their presence at the scene natural and their testimony credible despite their relationship to the deceased. The court held that in a high-stress, rapid occurrence, the inability to assign specific roles to each assailant does not invalidate the testimony but rather reflects human limitations, ruling out false implication. Regarding Muhammad Ashraf, his conviction and death sentence were upheld due to established direct motive and participation. However, for Nasir Iqbal, the court found mitigating circumstances: he was not a nominated accused in the previous murder case, the trial court found no direct motive against him, and the recovery of the weapon was deemed doubtful. Consequently, while maintaining his conviction, the court converted Nasir Iqbal's death sentence to life imprisonment.

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