Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Pearl Continental Hotel vs Collector1998 P.C.T.L.R. 930 · Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1997-04-14Read full judgment →
• Parvaiz Khan vs The StateK.L.R 1998 Criminal Cases 500 · Lahore High Court · 1997-08-19Read full judgment →
• Pardeep Kumar vs Province of Sindh through Secretary to Government1998 PLD Karachi 433 · Sindh High Court · 1998-01-24Read full judgment →
• Sajid and anothers vs The State and anothers1998 P Cr. L J 114 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-04-02
  Qatl-e-Amddeath sentence commutationocular evidencechance witnessesprocedural irregularitiescriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of two appellants for Qatl-e-Amd under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned whether the prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite defense arguments regarding a delayed FIR, the status of witnesses as chance witnesses, the absence of motive, and alleged procedural irregularities in the investigation. The Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent ocular testimony, which remained credible despite the witnesses' relationship to the deceased. The Court affirmed that procedural defects in an investigation do not automatically invalidate a prosecution case if the direct evidence is reliable. While rejecting the argument that youth alone warrants a lesser sentence for such a heinous crime, the Court held that the absence of previous enmity and the ambiguity surrounding the immediate cause of the fatal altercation justified commuting the death sentences to life imprisonment. The judgment reinforces that conviction stands on the strength of direct testimony, and minor procedural lapses do not undermine the core evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of procedural irregularities or illegalities in a police investigation automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment solely due to the absence of previous enmity and uncertainty regarding the immediate cause of the attack?
  • Is youth a sufficient ground for awarding a lesser sentence in a case of Qatl-e-Amd?
  • Does the failure to name an eye-witness in the FIR necessarily render their testimony unreliable?
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• Pandhi Khan vs Superintendent of Police, Jacobabad and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 950 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1995-03-22Read full judgment →
• Panchamahal Steel Ltd. vs U.A. Joshi, I.T.O. and another1998 PTD 105 · Supreme Court of India · 1996-09-24Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman1998 PLC (C.S.) 1306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-22
  pensionary benefitsvested rightsretrospective operationservice tribunalremoval from serviceWAPDA Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) challenged the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which directed the settlement of the respondent's pensionary claims. The respondent had been removed from service under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, and subsequently applied for pensionary benefits. WAPDA contended that an amendment to Rule 7(iv) of the WAPDA Pension Rules, 1977, disentitled employees removed under section 17(1-A) from receiving pension benefits. The core legal question was whether an amendment to pension rules could be applied retrospectively to take away accrued vested rights of an employee removed from service. The Supreme Court held that executive or rule-making authorities cannot give retrospective operation to rules so as to rob employees of vested rights already accrued in their favour, unless expressly authorized by the legislature. The Court concluded that the respondent had acquired a vested right to pensionary benefits prior to the rule amendment, dismissing the appeal and upholding the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment to the WAPDA Pension Rules can be applied retrospectively to deprive an employee of accrued pensionary rights?
  • Does Section 18 of the WAPDA Act grant authority to alter service rules with retrospective operation?
  • Whether an employee removed from service under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act is entitled to pensionary benefits under unamended rules?
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• Pakistan Tobacco Company, Ltd. Saudi-Pak. Towers, Blue, Area, Islamabad through Its Chairman vs Pakistan Chest Federation And 2 OtherK.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 175 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. vs Pakistan Chest Foundation1998 PLD Lahore 100 · Lahore High Court · 1997-09-16
  short orderdetailed judgmentfunctus officioretirement of judgereasons for decisionconstitutional petitionintra court appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Lahore High Court resolves a batch of Intra Court Appeals arising from a writ petition that challenged the telecasting and broadcasting of cigarette advertisements and sponsorship of programs by tobacco manufacturers on electronic media. The core legal questions examined were whether a short order devoid of reasons constitutes a valid judgment in the eye of law, and whether a retired judge can validly record and sign a detailed judgment after relinquishing office. The Court held that a short order lacking reasons does not qualify as a judgment under the Civil Procedure Code, and that a judge becomes functus officio upon retirement and cannot subsequently author or sign a valid judgment. Consequently, both the short order and the subsequent detailed judgment were set aside as nullities, and the original constitutional petition was deemed pending for a fresh decision. The key principle laid down is that a judicial pronouncement must contain explicit reasons based on law and evidence to be a valid judgment, and any order or judgment written or signed by a judge after retirement is a nullity in the eye of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a short order lacking reasons for the decision constitutes a valid judgment in the eye of law?
  • Can a judge who has retired from service validly record and sign a detailed judgment after relinquishing office?
  • Are the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does a judgment without reasoning rendered by a Court render the final decision a nullity?
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• Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. and others vs N.-W.F.P. through Secretary1998 SCMR 1546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-11
  freedom of traderegulatory rulestobacco marketingconstitutional petitionleave to appealfinancial burdenreasonable classification
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the validity of sub-rule (3) of rule 6 of the Tobacco Marketing Control Rules, 1993, before the Peshawar High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, alleging violation of fundamental rights relating to trade, property, and equality under Articles 18, 23, and 25 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions, leading to the petitioners seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether requiring tobacco companies to issue additional copies of payment vouchers to the Pakistan Tobacco Board and the concerned bank places an unconstitutional financial burden or unreasonable restriction on the freedom of trade. The Supreme Court held that the impugned sub-rule is merely regulatory in nature, applies uniformly to all tobacco purchasers as a reasonable classification, and does not restrict lawful trade or violate constitutional guarantees. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a regulatory rule requiring tobacco purchasers to submit additional payment vouchers violates the freedom of trade guaranteed under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the requirement to prepare extra copies of payment vouchers constitute a discriminatory measure under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Can a regulatory provision prescribing the mode of payment for tobacco growers be struck down merely because it entails extra administrative or financial expenditure for the purchasers?
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• Pakistan through Director, Works and Chief Engineer (Army), G.H.Q., Q.M.G.1998 CLC 1817 · Lahore High Court · 1998-07-09
  civil revisionexecution of decreegovernment litigationmandatory preconditionsprovincial government reportstay of execution
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application calls in question an order passed by the executing court dismissing the objection petition filed by the Federation of Pakistan against the execution of a money decree. The core legal question for determination was whether an executing court could proceed with the execution of a decree against the Government or a public officer without complying with the mandatory preconditions embodied in section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Lahore High Court held that the provisions of section 82 are mandatory in nature, requiring the executing court to first specify a time in the decree for its satisfaction, and upon non-satisfaction, to report the matter to the Provincial Government, withholding the issuance of execution processes for a period of three months from the date of such report. The court concluded that a decree against the Government remains incomplete and unexecutable until these statutory preconditions are fully satisfied. Consequently, the revision was allowed, the executing court's order was set aside, and the executing court was directed to report the matter to the Provincial Government.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is mandatory in nature regarding decrees against the Government?
  • Can an executing court proceed with the execution of a decree against the Government without reporting the non-satisfaction of the decree to the Provincial Government?
  • What are the legal consequences of failing to specify a time for satisfaction in a decree passed against the Government?
  • Does an interim stay order passed during a regular first appeal dispense with the statutory preconditions of Section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation through General Manager1998 PLC 236 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-11-12Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal1998 PLC 485 · Sindh High Court · 1998-05-12Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Ltd., Karachi through Deputy General1998 PLC 137 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-04-09Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Ltd., Karachi through Deputy General1998 PLC 136 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-03-03Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Services, Limited vs Collector Central Excise & Sales Tax, Lahore1998 P.C.T.L.R. 1069 · Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1997-05-05Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways vs Muhammad Ala-Ud-Din Babri and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 1081 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-26
  pro forma promotionarrears of payWafaqi Mohtasibservice benefitssubstantial justiceleave to appealwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a former Wardkeeper at Pakistan Railways, was granted pro forma promotion for pensionary benefits only, conditional upon an undertaking that he would not claim arrears. Despite this, he sought payment of arrears, leading to protracted litigation involving the High Court, the Wafaqi Mohtasib, and the President of Pakistan. The Wafaqi Mohtasib ruled in the respondent's favor, and the Lahore High Court subsequently directed the petitioner to either secure a stay or pay the arrears. The petitioner challenged this, arguing the respondent had no legal entitlement to the arrears. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner's representation against the Wafaqi Mohtasib's order was still pending before the President of Pakistan. Finding the High Court's order to be fair, equitable, and aimed at substantial justice, the Supreme Court held that the direction to pay arrears or secure a stay was legally warranted. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, refusing leave to appeal, as the High Court's order did not warrant interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's direction to pay arrears or secure a stay is legally sustainable when a representation against the Wafaqi Mohtasib's order is pending?
  • Does a pro forma promotion granted for pensionary benefits only preclude a claim for arrears of pay?
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• Pakistan Railways vs Muhammad Ala-U-Din Babri and anothers1998 SCMR 1605 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-26
  pro forma promotionpensionary benefitsWafaqi Mohtasibdepartmental representationwrit petitionleave to appealsubstantial justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed by Pakistan Railways against orders of the Lahore High Court concerning a dispute over the payment of arrears following a pro forma promotion granted to respondent Muhammad Ala-ud-Din Babri. The respondent had undertaken not to claim arrears, but later pursued claims through a writ petition, an Intra-Court Appeal, and subsequently before the Wafaqi Mohtasib, who ruled in his favor. When the High Court directed Pakistan Railways either to secure a stay order or make payment to the respondent—noting that the department's representation before the President of Pakistan had remained pending since 1991—Pakistan Railways sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question involved whether the High Court was justified in directing payment or securing a stay given the pending departmental representation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order achieved substantial justice and was fully warranted under the circumstances. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petitions, establishing that interim relief or conditional timelines ordered by the High Court to meet the ends of justice during pending administrative representations will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can direct a department to either secure a stay or make payment when a representation against an order of the Wafaqi Mohtasib is pending before the President?
  • Is an employee entitled to arrears of pay after accepting a pro forma promotion subject to an undertaking that no arrears would be claimed?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order that achieves substantial justice in service matters?
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• Pakistan Railways through General Manager, Lahore and another vs Abdul Hakim1998 PLC 132 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-03-14Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railway through Chairman, Pakistan Railway Headquarters1998 CLC 1229 · Lahore High Court · 1998-02-02Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines, Karachi through Chairman and 2 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 893 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-31
  back benefitsservice lawsuspension periodreinstatementservice regulationsPIAC employeesintervening period
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which granted a Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) employee full pay for the period he remained suspended following his reinstatement. The respondent, a Captain, had been removed from service after being charged with smuggling but was subsequently acquitted by a competent court and reinstated. While the PIAC restored his seniority, it denied him back benefits for the intervening period, treating it as leave without pay. The core legal question was whether an employee, upon reinstatement following exoneration, is entitled to full pay for the period of suspension under the applicable service regulations. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that since the employee was not dismissed or demoted, the period of suspension must be treated as duty under the governing regulations. The Court affirmed that an employee exonerated on merits and reinstated is entitled to full salary for the intervening period, subject to adjustments for amounts already drawn, as the denial of such benefits lacked legal justification.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee who is reinstated in service after acquittal entitled to full pay for the period of suspension?
  • Does the treatment of a suspension period as 'duty' under service regulations mandate the payment of back benefits upon reinstatement?
  • Can an employer deny back benefits to an employee who was removed from service but subsequently reinstated with full seniority?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi vs Wafaqi1998 SCMR 841 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-21
  Wafaqi Mohtasibjurisdictionservice grievanceconstitutional petitionmaster and servantjudicial reviewmaladministration
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition regarding the Wafaqi Mohtasib's jurisdiction. The core legal question concerned whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib could entertain a complaint from a former employee of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) regarding a service grievance, and the validity of an oral decision by a Review Board. The Supreme Court held that the Wafaqi Mohtasib lacks jurisdiction under Article 9(2) of President's Order No. 1 of 1983 to investigate personal service grievances of public servants, as this provision acts as an absolute bar. The Court further ruled that the Review Board acted without jurisdiction, as the termination was not based on political grounds, and no valid written recommendation was ever issued to the Federal Government. The Court established that while the Mohtasib's orders generally enjoy immunity from judicial review, they remain subject to interference under Article 199 of the Constitution if they suffer from a patent lack of jurisdiction or are repugnant to the law. The appeal was allowed, and the Mohtasib's order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Wafaqi Mohtasib have jurisdiction to investigate a personal service grievance of a public servant under P.O. No. 1 of 1983?
  • Can an order of the Wafaqi Mohtasib be challenged under Article 199 of the Constitution despite statutory bars on judicial review?
  • Does Article 11 of P.O. No. 1 of 1983 override the jurisdictional bar contained in Article 9(2) of the same Order?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi vs Mubarik Ali1998 PLC 348 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1997-11-29Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through Managing1998 PLC 524 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1997-11-25Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Industrial Gases Limited through Mian Zahid Samad, Managing1998 PLC 71 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-10
  Constitutional petitionPayment of wagesJurisdiction of AuthorityFactory definitionInterlocutory orderLabour lawPiecemeal litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional petition challenged the jurisdiction of the Authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, to adjudicate a claim for delayed wages filed by employees. The petitioner management argued that because the establishment had ceased manufacturing processes, it no longer qualified as a "factory" under the Factories Act, 1934, thereby divesting the Authority of jurisdiction. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the mere cessation of production did not terminate the employment relationship or the Authority's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court held that the petition was misconceived because it sought to challenge an interlocutory order via Constitutional jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the spirit of labour legislation is to ensure the expeditious regulation of wages and harmonious industrial relations. Consequently, the Court deprecated the practice of challenging interim jurisdictional objections through Constitutional petitions, as such piecemeal litigation defeats the legislative intent of avoiding delays. The petition was dismissed, affirming that jurisdictional challenges should be addressed through the statutory process rather than by invoking extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction to disrupt ongoing proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the cessation of manufacturing processes in an establishment automatically divest the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, of its jurisdiction to adjudicate wage claims?
  • Is a Constitutional petition maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
  • Can a party invoke Constitutional jurisdiction to challenge a preliminary jurisdictional objection before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, has rendered a final decision?
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• Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment vs Messrs Bawany1998 PLD Karachi 400 · Sindh High Court · 1998-04-28
  foreign currency loanequitable mortgagepenal interestcompound interestrecovery suitbanker-customer relationshippreliminary decree for accounts
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit concerns a recovery claim filed by the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) against the defendant for outstanding foreign currency loans. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of the suit, the authority of the person filing the plaint, the applicable exchange rate for loan repayment, the legality of charging compound interest and penal interest, and the validity of the equitable mortgage. The Court held that the suit was maintainable as the plaintiff had recalled the loan following default. It ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to claim repayment at the exchange rate prevalent on the date of actual payment, though it was limited by the specific amount claimed in the plaint. Crucially, the Court held that the plaintiff could not charge penal interest or interest on interest (compounding) without proving actual damages sustained, citing Section 73 of the Contract Act. Consequently, the Court passed a preliminary decree for accounts, appointing a Commissioner to determine the precise amount due, while dismissing the suit against the second defendant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a creditor charge penal interest or compound interest on a loan without proving actual damages sustained?
  • Does the non-production of a notice of demand in evidence invalidate a suit for recovery if the defendant admits the loan recall?
  • Is a suit for recovery of a loan premature if filed before the final installment date, provided the creditor has recalled the entire loan due to default?
  • Can a plaintiff claim a higher amount than the specific sum quantified in the prayer clause of the plaint?
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• Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. vs Bawany Industries Ltd1998 P.C.T.L.R. 619 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Herald Publications (Private) Ltd. and 23 otherss vs Federation of Pakistan and 21 others1998 CLC 65 · Lahore High Court · 1997-09-12
  Wage BoardNewspaper EmployeesConstitutional PetitionPoint-to-point formulaRetrospective awardFundamental rightsJurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, printers and publishers of various newspapers, challenged the award made by the 6th Wage Board under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The core legal questions involved whether a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court could be appointed as Chairman of the Wage Board under section 9(2) of the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973, whether the award could have retrospective application, whether the point-to-point fitment formula was illegal, and whether treating non-journalist employees at par with working journalists violated Article 25 of the Constitution. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that section 9(2) does not bar a sitting Supreme Court Judge who has previously been a High Court Judge from serving as Chairman, that the Board acted within its statutory powers in applying the point-to-point formula and setting a retrospective date of operation, and that the classification of both journalists and non-journalists under the Act is reasonable and does not violate fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court who has previously served as a High Court Judge can be appointed as Chairman of the Wage Board under section 9(2) of the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
  • Can a Wage Board award be made applicable retrospectively from a date prior to its announcement under the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
  • Whether the inclusion of non-journalist employees alongside working journalists under the Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 violates Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Is the role of members of the Wage Board advisory in nature, leaving the final decision on contentious issues to the Chairman?
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• Pakistan Engineering Council, Islamabad vs Registrar of TradeK.L.R. 1998 Labour & Service Cases 139 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Engineering Council vs Registrar, Trade Unions and another1998 PLC 477 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-04
  trade union registrationindustry definitionestablishment definitionPakistan Engineering CouncilIndustrial Relations Ordinanceprinciple of natural justiceaudi alteram partemconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was brought by the Pakistan Engineering Council challenging the registration of its employees' union as a trade union by the Registrar of Trade Unions under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The core legal questions were whether the Pakistan Engineering Council constituted an 'industry' or 'establishment' under the Ordinance, and whether the registration of a trade union without prior notice to the employer violates the principles of natural justice. The Lahore High Court held that the primary function of the Pakistan Engineering Council is to regulate the engineering profession and maintain its standards rather than engage in any business, trade, or commercial activity for profit, and therefore it is neither an 'establishment' nor an 'industry' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Court further held that registering a trade union without issuing notice to the employer violates the principle of audi alteram partem, and the availability of a remedy under section 10 does not bar a constitutional petition where the Registrar defends the illegal registration. The registration certificate was declared illegal and without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Pakistan Engineering Council constitutes an industry or establishment within the meaning of section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does the registration of a trade union without giving prior notice and opportunity of hearing to the employer violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Can an aggrieved employer maintain a constitutional petition against the registration of a trade union when the Registrar of Trade Unions actively defends the registration?
  • Whether the definition of commercial establishment under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, applies to cases under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
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• Pakistan Engineering Council through Registrar, Islamabad and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-02-27
  Professional EngineerPakistan Engineering CouncilDiploma-holderService RulesPromotionEngineering work
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals challenging a Federal Service Tribunal judgment regarding the promotion of a diploma-holder engineer to the post of Deputy Director (Engineering). The core legal question was whether a government employee, not registered as a 'Professional Engineer' under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, is legally barred from holding a post that involves engineering duties. The Supreme Court held that the promotion of the respondent was valid, as he fulfilled the prescribed service rules and seniority requirements. The Court clarified that the registration requirements under the Act do not automatically disqualify a person from holding an engineering post. Instead, the penal provisions of the Act are only triggered if an unregistered person actually undertakes 'professional engineering work' as defined by the statute. Since the record did not establish that the respondent was required to perform such specific work in his capacity as Deputy Director, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that registration is not a prerequisite for holding a post unless the specific duties performed constitute professional engineering work.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 prohibit the promotion of a non-registered diploma-holder to a government engineering post?
  • Is registration as a 'Professional Engineer' under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 mandatory for all government employees holding engineering designations?
  • Under what circumstances do the penal provisions of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 apply to government employees performing engineering duties?
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• Pakistan Burmah Shell Limited And Another. vs Federation Of PakistanPTCL 1998 CL. 690 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Burmah Shell Limited and another vs Federation of Pakistan1998 PTD 1804 · Sindh High Court · 1997-06-13
  presumptive taxationlegislative competenceincome taxconstitutional validitygross receiptstax evasionfiscal policydeeming provision
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the vires of sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, introduced by the Finance Acts of 1991 and 1992, which imposed presumptive income tax on gross receipts, turnover, and export proceeds. The core legal question was whether the Federal Legislature exceeded its constitutional competence under Entry No. 47 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, by deeming gross receipts as "income" and whether these provisions were confiscatory or discriminatory. The majority of the Court upheld the validity of the impugned provisions, holding that the term "income" in the Constitution is not to be interpreted in a narrow or pedantic sense but must be given the widest possible connotation to include presumptive or deemed income. The Court ruled that presumptive taxation is a legitimate fiscal tool for broadening the tax base and preventing tax evasion. It further held that the legislature possesses wide latitude in fiscal policy, and such provisions are not unconstitutional unless they are clearly arbitrary or lack a rational nexus to the legislative object.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'income' in Entry 47 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 permit the legislature to impose tax on gross receipts or turnover?
  • Can the legislature validly enact a deeming provision to treat amounts as income for tax purposes even if they do not constitute income in the traditional sense?
  • Is a presumptive tax provision that applies to a specific class of taxpayers discriminatory under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the imposition of a minimum tax on turnover, regardless of actual profit or loss, constitute an unconstitutional confiscatory measure?
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• Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation through Director-General, P.B.C., Headquarters Islamabad vs Subedar Major (Reid.) Abdul Razzaq1998 SCMR 602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-26
  service recorddate of birth correctionburden of proofdeclaratory suitcivil revisionevidentiary valuebinding nature of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the correction of a date of birth in the service record of the respondent, a retired Army officer employed by the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation. The respondent sought a declaration from a Civil Court that his date of birth was 16-4-1929, relying on a birth certificate obtained via a 1971 decree. The trial court decreed the suit, but the Additional District Judge reversed this, finding the evidence contradictory and the 1971 decree non-binding. The Lahore High Court subsequently restored the trial court's decree. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, noting the respondent's inconsistent claims regarding his birth date across various documents, including his school leaving certificate, National Identity Card, and Army service records. The Court held that the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof regarding his actual date of birth. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the 1971 decree, obtained without impleading the relevant authorities, was not binding on the appellant. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the decision of the Additional District Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a declaratory decree regarding a date of birth obtained without impleading the relevant authorities is binding on a third-party employer?
  • Can a High Court in civil revision proceedings re-evaluate evidence in a manner equivalent to an appellate court?
  • Does the burden of proof lie on an employee seeking to alter their date of birth in official service records?
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• Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation through Director-General, P.B.C.1998 PLC (C.S.) 462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-26
  date of birthservice recordburden of proofcivil suitdeclaratory decreeservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the date of birth of a retired military officer employed by the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation. The respondent sought a declaration from a Civil Court that his date of birth was 16-4-1929, relying on a birth certificate obtained in 1971, which contradicted his service records and other documents. The trial court decreed the suit, but the Additional District Judge reversed this decision, finding the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof. The Lahore High Court subsequently set aside the appellate decision and restored the trial court's decree. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined the evidence, noting that the respondent's birth certificate entry pertained to another individual and that the 1971 decree was obtained without impleading necessary authorities. Furthermore, the Court observed that the respondent's own documentary evidence, including school records and military service records, presented conflicting dates of birth. The Supreme Court held that the respondent failed to prove his claimed date of birth, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the appellate court's decision dismissing the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a declaratory decree regarding a date of birth obtained without impleading the relevant authorities be considered binding on an employer?
  • Does a party seeking a declaration of a specific date of birth bear the burden of proof to reconcile conflicting documentary evidence?
  • Is a High Court in civil revision proceedings empowered to re-evaluate evidence in a manner equivalent to an appellate court?
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• Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation Ltd. vs Port Qasim Authority through Chairman, PQA, Bin Qasim, Karachi-48 and 3 others1998 CLC 1862 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-13Read full judgment →
• P.Mes Iqbal vs Messrs Park Davis & Co. Ltd. and others1998 PLC 15 · Sindh High Court · 1997-08-12
  retirement agecollective bargaining agentindustrial disputesettlementsuperannuationbinding effectlabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the dismissal of the petitioner’s application for reinstatement following his retirement at age 60. The petitioner contended that a settlement between the employer and the Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) fixing the retirement age could not apply retrospectively to him, and that his age record was erroneous. The core legal questions were whether a CBA settlement binds existing employees and whether the age determination mechanism within that settlement is conclusive. The Court held that, unlike unilateral employer resolutions, settlements negotiated with a CBA are binding on all workmen by statutory mandate under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. Consequently, the settlement’s provisions regarding retirement age and the method for determining it—specifically relying on the employee's personal file—were binding on the petitioner. The Court affirmed that extraneous evidence regarding age is inadmissible when the settlement provides a specific mechanism for determination. Finding no misreading of evidence or legal error in the concurrent findings of the lower forums, the Court dismissed the petition, upholding the retirement order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a settlement between an employer and a Collective Bargaining Agent regarding retirement age apply to employees already in service?
  • Is a retirement age fixed by a negotiated settlement binding on all workmen under the Industrial Relations Ordinance?
  • Can an employee challenge the age of retirement determined by the employer's personal file when a settlement explicitly mandates that method?
  • Does the rule against retrospective application of service regulations apply to settlements negotiated with a Collective Bargaining Agent?
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• P.J. George vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 3575 · Kerala High Court · 1997-06-05Read full judgment →
• P. Milan Trading Corporation vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 1681 · Gujarat High Court · 1996-11-28Read full judgment →
• P. Krishna Murthy vs Commissioner of Income-Tax and another1998 PTD 1555 · karnataka High Court · 1994-01-13Read full judgment →
• Omer Saeed vs Habib-Ur-Rehman1998 SCMR 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-06
  ejectment petitionlandlord-tenant relationshipdefault in rentburden of prooftenancy disputerent control
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an ejectment petition filed by a landlord against a tenant regarding a shop in Keamari, Karachi. The core legal question was whether a landlord-tenant relationship existed and whether the tenant had defaulted on rent payments, given the tenant's denial of the relationship and assertion of independent possession. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the ejectment application, but the High Court reversed this decision, finding in favor of the landlord. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment. The Court held that the landlord successfully established the relationship through consistent oral testimony and documentary evidence, including historical records of tenancy and rent collection, whereas the tenant offered only a bare denial without substantiating his claim of independent title or occupation. The key principle laid down is that where a landlord provides substantial, credible evidence regarding the history of the property and the existence of a tenancy, a tenant’s mere denial of the relationship, unsupported by evidence of title or alternative legal possession, is insufficient to defeat an ejectment claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's bare denial of a landlord-tenant relationship constitute sufficient evidence to rebut a landlord's claim supported by documentary and oral testimony?
  • Is a landlord required to prove absolute ownership to maintain an ejectment petition against a tenant?
  • Can an appellate court set aside a Rent Controller's order if the evidence was not properly evaluated?
  Read full judgment →
• Om Prakash Gattani vs Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax and others1998 PTD 3011 · Gauhati High Court · 1996-08-02Read full judgment →
• Oba Idu Llah Khan vs Inayatullah Khan and 10 others1998 MLD 1718 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-04-17Read full judgment →
• N/A vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 381 · Lahore High Court · 1997-03-26Read full judgment →
• N/A vs N/A1998 P.C.T.L.R. 5 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1997-03-28Read full judgment →
• N/A vs Not1998 P.C.T.L.R. 1446 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1998-02-21Read full judgment →
• Nowroz Khan and another vs Chief Secretary and others1998 MLD 1753 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-02-27Read full judgment →
• Not vs Not1998 PTD (Trib.) 3191 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1998-06-18Read full judgment →
• North Bengal Sugar Mills Co. (P.) Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 1450 · Supreme Court of India · 1995-11-08Read full judgment →
• Nooruddin Zahid QAYYtJM vs Secretary, Ministry of Food, Agriculture1998 PLC (C.S.) 990 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1997-02-26Read full judgment →
• Noor Zaman vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 476 · Federal Shariat Court · 1997-02-17Read full judgment →
• Noor Mustafa Khuhro and others vs The Federation of Pakistan and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1263 · Sindh High Court · 1998-06-05
  service tribunalcivil servantjurisdiction oustercontractual employeesinterim injunctionterms and conditions of servicemala fide termination
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of multiple civil miscellaneous applications seeking interim injunctions in suits filed by management trainees whose employment on a contract basis was terminated by the defendant company without a show-cause notice. The core legal questions involve whether the contractual employees of an autonomous body controlled by the Federation fall within the definition of civil servants under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and whether the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred under Article 212 of the Constitution in matters relating to terms and conditions of service. The court held that by virtue of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, such employees are deemed civil servants and their grievances fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal, thereby completely ousting the jurisdiction of civil and high courts, even for challenges alleging mala fide, ultra vires, or discriminatory actions. The key principle laid down is that the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Service Tribunal is mutually exclusive in respect of terms and conditions of service, and allegations of malafide or violation of natural justice do not bypass the constitutional ouster under Article 212.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contractual employees of a corporation controlled by the Federation are deemed civil servants under Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Does the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in service matters?
  • Can a High Court entertain a suit regarding the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant if the impugned order is alleged to be mala fide or in violation of natural justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad, Lineman-I vs The Superintending Engineer and anothers1998 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-18
  civil servicecompulsory retirementreinstatementback benefitsextraordinary leavedepartmental appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Lineman-I in WAPDA, was compulsorily retired from service and subsequently reinstated by the departmental appellate authority. However, the appellate authority treated the intervening period between his retirement and reinstatement as extraordinary leave without pay and back benefits. The petitioner's appeal against this denial of back benefits was dismissed by the Federal Service Tribunal. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, contending that the delay in deciding his departmental appeal was entirely attributable to the departmental authority, which required the petitioner to file a writ petition and contempt proceedings in the High Court to obtain a decision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider whether the withholding of pay and back benefits for the period during which the appeal remained pending was legally justified, and whether the petitioner was entitled to full back benefits upon his reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant reinstated in service after compulsory retirement is entitled to back benefits and pay for the intervening period when the delay in deciding the departmental appeal is attributable to the department?
  • Whether the departmental appellate authority is legally justified in treating the intervening period between compulsory retirement and reinstatement as extraordinary leave without pay?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad, Etc. vs (Mst.) Sheran Bibi, Etc.K.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 502 · Lahore High Court · 1997-12-12Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Special Judge, Anti Terrorism Court, Bahawalpur1998 MLD 888 · Lahore High Court · 1998-01-14Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Muhammad Azam and 5 others1998 SCMR 1350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-16
  leave to appealoffence of zinaabductionnikahappraisal of evidenceacquittalcontradictory statements
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which acquitted respondent No. 1 of charges under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and dismissed the petitioner's appeals and revisions concerning co-accused. The trial court had initially convicted respondent No. 1 under section 11 of the Ordinance based on civil pleadings regarding a disputed marriage, while acquitting him and others of Zina-bil-Jabr. The Federal Shariat Court set aside the conviction, finding material contradictions in the victim's statements across different forums and holding that failure to prove a valid marriage does not automatically establish sexual intercourse under the law. The Supreme Court evaluated the evidence and concurred that the prosecutrix's testimony lacked credibility and that the Federal Shariat Court's appraisal was sound. The Supreme Court held that an unproven marriage in civil proceedings does not by itself constitute proof of sexual intercourse for a criminal conviction under the Ordinance, and accordingly dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an accused to prove a valid Nikah in a civil suit automatically furnish proof of sexual intercourse for a criminal charge under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can a prosecutrix's testimony be relied upon for conviction when she has taken divergent and conflicting stands before the police, magistrates, and higher courts?
  • Whether the findings of the Federal Shariat Court based on an elaborate appraisal of evidence warrant interference by the Supreme Court when no misreading or non-reading of evidence is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad Haleem vs Prime Minister of Pakistan1998 PLC (C.S.) 986 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-08-01Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad and 8 others vs Mst. Sheran Bibi and anothers1998 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-12
  inheritance disputeconcurrent findings of factrevisional jurisdictionadditional evidencefinality of proceedingscivil revisionappellate discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an inheritance dispute where the respondents, claiming to be the widow and daughter of the deceased, sought their share in the estate. The petitioners, claiming to be the legal heirs of the deceased's brother, contested the respondents' status. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently held in favor of the respondents, declaring them the rightful heirs. The petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, primarily arguing that the appellate court erred in refusing to admit additional documentary evidence during the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' challenge regarding the admissibility of additional evidence had already attained finality in a previous round of litigation and could not be re-agitated. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is intended to correct jurisdictional errors rather than discretionary ones, unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or fancifully. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings of fact regarding the respondents' status as the legal heirs of the deceased.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party re-agitate an issue regarding the admissibility of additional evidence if that issue has already attained finality in a prior revision petition?
  • Is the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 intended to correct discretionary errors of subordinate courts?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court admit additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Bibi and 6 others vs Fazal Hussain and others1998 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-03-04
  declaratory suitfraudulent transactionlimitation periodconcurrent findingshearsay evidencelanded propertyburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that affirmed the dismissal of a declaratory suit concerning landed property. The petitioners sought to invalidate a series of sale transactions dating back to 1933, alleging that an original mortgage transaction had been fraudulently converted into a sale. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency of evidence to prove fraud in a transaction of significant antiquity and whether the suit was barred by the law of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to provide adequate evidence to rebut the documentary proof of sale, noting that the oral testimony presented was largely hearsay and inadmissible. Furthermore, the Court observed that the challenge to the transactions was initiated after nearly sixty years without a plausible explanation for the delay. Affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of patent illegality, material irregularity, or perversity, concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed. The petition was dismissed, confirming the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be disturbed by the Supreme Court in the absence of patent illegality or perversity?
  • Is oral testimony regarding the nature of a transaction admissible when it constitutes hearsay and contradicts established documentary evidence?
  • Does a delay of sixty years in challenging a property transaction render a suit barred by limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Ali Khan vs The Secretary, Establishment Division, Government1998 SCMR 1052 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-20
  seniority listdepartmental examinationsupersessiondeferment of promotioncivil servantgradation listservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding his placement at a lower number in the seniority (gradation) list of the District Management Group. The appellant, appointed in Grade-17 in 1981, failed to pass the required departmental examination within the specified period, resulting in the deferment and subsequent supersession of his promotion while his juniors were promoted. The core legal question was whether a civil servant whose promotion is deferred or who is superseded due to failure to qualify a departmental examination can claim his old seniority against colleagues cleared for promotion. The Supreme Court held that a civil servant who is superseded cannot regain seniority over those promoted earlier, and under Section 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, seniority upon promotion takes effect from the date of regular appointment, with batchmates retaining inter se seniority only if selected together. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant who fails to qualify the departmental examination and is superseded can claim his old seniority over colleagues who were promoted earlier?
  • Does the deferment or supersession of a civil servant for failing departmental examinations disturb his inter se seniority with respondents?
  • When does seniority in a grade to which a civil servant is promoted take effect under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Nizam-Ud-Din, Etc. vs (Mst.) Madal, Etc.K.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 353 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-20Read full judgment →
• Nizam Din and 6 others vs Faiz Muhammad and 14 others1998 PLD Lahore 321 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-20Read full judgment →
• Niti Trust and others vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 1008 · Gujarat High Court · 1996-06-28Read full judgment →
• Nisarul Haq vs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 1034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-31
  service tribunalsleave to appealstatus quoservice mattersinterpretation of statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon petitions relating to the interpretation of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The core legal question involves determining the scope and application of the newly inserted Section 2-A concerning service matters. The court granted leave to appeal on the same terms as in connected civil petitions and ordered that status quo be maintained regarding the service of the petitioners until the disposal of the appeals, directing that the cases be heard together.

  Questions settled

  • What is the interpretation and scope of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Whether status quo regarding service should be maintained during the pendency of appeals involving Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisarul Haq and anothers vs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation and anothers1998 SCMR 2741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-31
  Service Tribunals Actleave to appealstatus quoservice mattersstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the interpretation of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, which had been newly inserted into the statute. The core legal question presented to the Court pertains to the scope and application of this specific provision concerning service matters. In its order, the Court granted leave to appeal, aligning the case with other pending Civil Petitions (Nos. 1240 to 1263 of 1997) that raised identical legal issues. Consequently, the Court directed that the instant appeal be heard alongside those connected matters. Furthermore, the Court issued an interim directive stipulating that if the petitioners remained in service at the time of the order, the status quo regarding their employment must be maintained until the final disposal of the appeals. This decision serves to consolidate the legal determination of the newly introduced statutory provision across multiple similar service-related disputes, ensuring consistent adjudication by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the insertion of Section 2-A into the Service Tribunals Act 1973 require a uniform interpretation across pending service-related appeals?
  • Can the Supreme Court order the maintenance of status quo regarding employment pending the disposal of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Hussain Rizvi and 3_others vs Mst. Aisha and 5 others1998 CLC 349 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-09
  ejectmentpersonal bona fide requirementlandlord and tenantgift of propertyulterior motiveSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 challenges an order dismissing an ejectment application filed by the appellants against the respondents on the grounds of wilful default in payment of rent and personal bona fide use. The appellants, who acquired the shop via a gift from their uncle, sought eviction of the legal representatives of the original tenant. During the hearing, the appellants' counsel did not press the default ground, confining the case solely to personal requirement. The core legal question was whether the appellants established their requirement for the shop in good faith and with clean hands. The Sindh High Court held that the appellants' requirement was not bona fide, noting that the gift and subsequent eviction proceedings appeared to be a device to restart litigation while an earlier appeal regarding the same property was still pending, and that concealing material facts demonstrated ulterior motives and a lack of good faith. The court laid down the principle that a landlord seeking to evict an old tenant must come to court with clean hands and prove absolute good faith, as mere desire, wish, or a clever device to restart litigation does not satisfy the requirement of personal use.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord seeking ejectment on the ground of personal requirement must establish their need in perfect good faith and with clean hands?
  • Does the concealment of prior ongoing litigation regarding the demised premises give rise to a legitimate inference that the landlord's personal requirement is not genuine?
  • Is a landlord legally required to disclose the specific nature of the business to be commenced in the premises to establish personal requirement?
  • Can a gift of property made during the pendency of earlier rent litigation be considered a device to restart a second round of litigation affecting the bona fides of the claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad vs Javed Iqbal and 2 others1998 MLD 1293 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-11-12Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad Khan vs Abdul Sattar KhanK.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 696 · Lahore High Court · 1997-09-03Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad Chaudhry vs Suleman Spinning Mills Ltd. through Chief1998 P.C.T.L.R. 758 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Nisar Ahm Ad Khan vs Abdul Sattar KhanK.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 325 · Other · 1997-09-03Read full judgment →
• Nihal Rashid Farooqi and 2 others vs P.S.O. and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 62 · Sindh High Court · 1997-06-28Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad vs Mst. Naziran Bibi and another1998 CLC 1927 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-05-17Read full judgment →
• Niaz Ali vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Industries &1998 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-13
  mining leasewrit jurisdictionconcession of counselres judicatacancellation of leaseconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over a mining lease granted to the petitioner for excavating stone at Sangla Hill. The lease was cancelled by the authorities on the grounds that the site was of historical significance, specifically associated with Alexander the Great. After the petitioner's civil suit challenging the cancellation was dismissed, the petitioner sought relief through successive writ petitions. In a prior writ petition, the petitioner's counsel explicitly abandoned the challenge to the lease cancellation, confining the claim to the removal of already excavated stone. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a new writ petition seeking to complete the lease tenure. The High Court dismissed this petition, noting the petitioner's prior waiver of the lease challenge and the finality of the civil court's dismissal. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, holding that a party cannot retract a clear concession made before a court, especially when no review application was filed to correct the record. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to relitigate matters already decided by a competent civil court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge a matter already decided against them by a civil court?
  • Is a party bound by a statement or concession made by their counsel before a court if no review application is filed to challenge the record?
  • Can a petitioner seek to revive a claim regarding the validity of a lease after explicitly abandoning that issue in previous litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Ahmad alias Mitho vs The State1998 MLD 1924 · Federal Shariat Court · 1998-06-02Read full judgment →
• Niamat Ali vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 311 · Lahore High Court · 1997-12-11Read full judgment →
• Niamat Ali vs The State and others1998 P Cr. L J 1530 · Lahore High Court · 1997-05-20Read full judgment →
• Nek Alam and 5 others vs Abdul Rashid and another1998 CLC 1760 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1998-01-18Read full judgment →
• Neela Productions vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 3308 · Kerala High Court · 1996-03-20Read full judgment →
• Nazir Hussain vs Abdul Manna N through Legal Heirs1998 MLD 678 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-15Read full judgment →
• Nazir Akhtar and another vs The State and others1998 MLD 919 · Federal Shariat Court · 1997-05-12Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmed Rana vs Chairman, Board of Intermediate & Secondary1998 SCMR 1172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-28
  deputationpermanent absorptionstatutory appointmentBoard of Intermediate and Secondary Educationservice lawadministrative authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the dismissal of the petitioner’s writ petition and intra-court appeal regarding his failed permanent absorption into the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad. The petitioner, previously on deputation, relied on an order from the Education Secretary granting permission for his absorption and a subsequent order from the Board Chairman. The core legal questions were whether the Secretary’s permission constituted a valid appointment under the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976, and whether the Chairman possessed the authority to finalize such absorption without Board approval. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary’s permission was merely an authorization, not an appointment order under the Act. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Board, not the Chairman, holds the statutory power to appoint staff. Since the Chairman’s order was conditional upon Board approval, which was subsequently denied, the petitioner lacked a legal right to permanent absorption. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order granting permission for permanent absorption constitute an order of appointment under the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976?
  • Does the Chairman of a Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education have the unilateral power to permanently absorb an employee without the Board's approval?
  • Under the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976, which authority is empowered to appoint officers and staff to the Board?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmed Khan and 3 others vs State through Advocate General1998 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 43 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1997-11-18Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmed and another vs Messrs Korangi Feeds, Karachi and another1998 PLC 24 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-12-23Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 70 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-09Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs The Chief Engineer (Admn.) (Water), WAPDA and 431998 SCMR 2026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  pro forma promotionwork-charge employeedeputationrepatriationWAPDAseniorityservice benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment denying the appellant pro forma promotion on the basis that his initial appointment was on a work-charge basis. The core legal question was whether an employee, initially hired on a work-charge basis but who subsequently served on deputation and was later repatriated to the parent organization, remains barred from claiming pro forma promotion due to their initial employment status. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the lower tribunal's order. The Court held that the appellant's continuous service from 1972, including his tenure on deputation, negated his status as a work-charge employee, creating a presumption of absorption into regular service. The Court established the principle that long-term continuous service following an initial work-charge appointment, particularly where the employee is transferred and repatriated, effectively transforms the nature of employment, rendering the initial work-charge classification inapplicable for the purpose of denying service benefits such as pro forma promotion. The respondent-Authority was directed to reconsider the appellant's case for pro forma promotion.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee initially appointed on a work-charge basis be denied pro forma promotion after years of continuous service?
  • Does the transfer of a work-charge employee to a different organization on deputation and subsequent repatriation imply absorption into regular service?
  • Is an employee who has served continuously since their initial appointment entitled to be considered for pro forma promotion despite an initial work-charge designation?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs The Chief Engineer (Admn)(Water), WAPDA and 431998 PLC (C.S.) 1221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  work-charge employeepro forma promotionWAPDAdeputationrepatriationservice seniorityregularization of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the denial of pro forma promotion to an employee of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) who was initially appointed on a work-charge basis. The core legal question was whether an employee, initially hired on a work-charge basis but who continued in service through deputation and subsequent repatriation, remained a work-charge employee or had attained regular status, thereby qualifying for pro forma promotion under WAPDA's repatriation policy. The Supreme Court held that the continuous service of the appellant from 1972, spanning his tenure at the Mechanised Construction of Pakistan Ltd. and his subsequent repatriation, effectively negated his status as a work-charge employee. The Court ruled that the appellant must be presumed to have been absorbed into the regular service of the Authority. Consequently, the Court set aside the decision of the Federal Service Tribunal and directed WAPDA to reconsider the appellant's case for pro forma promotion. The key principle laid down is that long-term, continuous service beyond the duration of a specific project, particularly involving deputation, creates a presumption of absorption into regular service, overriding an initial work-charge appointment.

  Questions settled

  • Does continuous service beyond the duration of a specific project negate an initial work-charge appointment?
  • Is an employee who is repatriated from deputation to a parent organization entitled to be considered for pro forma promotion if they have been effectively absorbed into regular service?
  • Can an authority deny pro forma promotion to an employee on the sole ground of their initial appointment being on a work-charge basis when their subsequent service history indicates absorption?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Muhammad Ishaque and anothers1998 P Cr. L J 1563 · Federal Shariat Court · 1997-12-04Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Aziz Ahmad1998 MLD 253 · Lahore High Court · 1995-10-17Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Shaikh vs Government of Sindh through Secretary, Services1998 PLC (C.S.) 607 · Sindh High Court · 1997-07-01
  service lawout-of-turn promotionshow-cause noticeService Tribunalconstitutional petitionpremature petitioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of constitutional petitions filed by police and medical officers challenging show-cause notices issued by the Government of Sindh regarding the potential reversal of their out-of-turn promotions, which had been granted under Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973. The core legal questions addressed whether these petitions were premature given that no final adverse order had been passed, and whether the High Court should intervene due to the alleged non-functionality of the Sindh Service Tribunal. The Court held that the petitions were premature because mere show-cause notices do not constitute a final order affecting terms and conditions of service, and the petitioners must await final adjudication before the Service Tribunal. The Court affirmed that the Service Tribunal is the exclusive forum for such grievances. Furthermore, while the Court acknowledged that the Tribunal was currently non-functional due to a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, it directed the Government to fill the vacancy within one month rather than assuming jurisdiction itself. The principle established is that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass statutory tribunals before a final order is issued.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a show-cause notice regarding the reversal of a promotion constitute a final order that allows for the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can the High Court assume jurisdiction in service matters when the Service Tribunal is non-functional due to a vacancy in the office of the Chairman?
  • Does Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, allow the government to grant promotions that arbitrarily harm the rights of other civil servants?
  • Is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman of the Service Tribunal considered a 'casual vacancy' under Rule 27 of the Sindh Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974, if it persists for an extended period?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Khan and anothers vs Sheraz Attaullah Khan and anothers1998 SCMR 2714 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-03
  pre-emptionco-plaintiff withdrawaldeposit of pre-emption moneyfunctus officioreview jurisdictionact of the courtsuperior right of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court that accepted a civil revision and decreed a pre-emption suit in favour of the respondent. The core legal questions involved whether a pre-emption suit abates in its entirety if one co-plaintiff withdraws, whether a pre-emptor can be penalized for non-deposit of pre-emption money when the delay is attributable to a pending court review, and whether the remaining co-plaintiff can obtain a decree for the entire suit land on the basis of an independent superior right. The Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption is a right of substitution rather than a purchase, and the withdrawal of one co-plaintiff does not defeat the suit of the remaining co-plaintiff who possesses an independent superior right. Furthermore, a litigant cannot be prejudiced by an act or delay of the court, particularly when the pre-emptor was willing to deposit the full amount but was prevented by court orders. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of one co-plaintiff from a pre-emption suit result in the dismissal of the entire suit?
  • Can a pre-emptor be penalized for failing to deposit the total pre-emption money within the originally fixed time when a review application seeking permission to deposit the balance is pending before the court?
  • Is a pre-emptor with an independent superior right entitled to a decree for the entire suit land if the co-plaintiff opts to withdraw?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Abbasi vs WAPDA1998 PLC (C.S.) 1007 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-06-12
  service appeallimitationpro forma promotioncondonation of delaytime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a retired Assistant Accountant of WAPDA, filed an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal seeking pro forma promotion, seniority, and related financial benefits on the analogy of his colleagues who were promoted in 1983. The core legal question was whether the appeal, filed in 1996 against a grievance originating in 1983 and after an unsuccessful writ petition in the High Court, was barred by limitation. The Tribunal held that the appeal was hopelessly time-barred by approximately thirteen years, as the appellant had slept over his rights and failed to provide any cogent reasons for the inordinate delay in his application for condonation. The key principle laid down is that after the prescribed period of limitation has elapsed, pleas of injustice, hardship, or ignorance are of no avail unless the delay is properly explained and accounted for.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed before the Service Tribunal after a delay of thirteen years is maintainable without a cogent explanation for the delay?
  • Does the filing of writ petitions and departmental representations extend the prescribed period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir A. Khan Swati vs Ministry of Law & Justice and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 372 · Sindh High Court · 1996-08-05
  constitutional petitionvested rightFederal Public Service Commissionappointmentadvisory bodyservice recordjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the withdrawal of his nomination for the post of Judicial Member, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, BPS-21, after he had been initially recommended by the Federal Public Service Commission. The core legal question was whether the recommendation of the Federal Public Service Commission creates a vested right in a candidate to demand appointment, thereby compelling the department to finalize the selection. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the Federal Public Service Commission acts merely in an advisory capacity. Consequently, the appointing authority is not bound to accept the Commission's advice, and a candidate does not acquire a vested right to appointment based solely on a recommendation, especially when that recommendation is conditional or subsequently withdrawn upon review of service records. The court relied on the principle that a recommendation by the Commission does not constitute an enforceable right to employment, as the appointing authority retains the discretion to accept or reject such advice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recommendation of the Federal Public Service Commission create a vested right in a candidate for appointment?
  • Is the appointing authority legally bound to accept the advice tendered by the Federal Public Service Commission?
  • Can a candidate challenge the withdrawal of a nomination for a government post by the Federal Public Service Commission?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazeer vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 114 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-05Read full judgment →
• Nazeer Ahmad vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1726 · Lahore High Court · 1998-01-15Read full judgment →
• Nazeer Ahmad alias Nazeera vs The State1998 SCMR 1768 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-08
  murderfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusinterested witnessesabscondencemedical evidenceocular accountcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court maintaining the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, while converting his death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involved the reliability of interested witnesses, the applicability of the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus regarding co-accused acquitted in separate trials, the necessity of corroboration, and alleged discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the rule of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is obsolete and that evidence must be sifted to separate chaff from grain. Furthermore, evidence given in separate trials of co-accused cannot be imported into the present trial, the testimony of interested witnesses is admissible if found truthful upon scrutiny of its intrinsic worth, and prolonged unexplained abscondence of the accused serves as strong corroboration. The court established that minor discrepancies in site plans and medical evidence do not discredit a truthful ocular account.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is applicable in criminal trials in Pakistan?
  • Can evidence recorded against co-accused in separate trials be used in the trial of the appellant without being brought on record in accordance with law?
  • Is the testimony of interested witnesses to be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship with the deceased?
  • Does the evidence of a truthful eyewitness invariably require corroboration for a conviction?
  • Whether prolonged unexplained abscondence of an accused constitutes valid corroboration of guilt?
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• Nazar Dastgir alias Kaka vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 517 · Federal Shariat Court · 1997-08-28Read full judgment →
• Nazan Shah vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1540 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-13
  post-arrest bailnarcotics recoverychemical examiner reportprohibitory clausefurther inquirypolice enmitycharas
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant sought post-arrest bail in respect of a case registered under section 6/9 of the Anti-Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, concerning the alleged recovery of 2 kilograms of Charas. The core legal question revolved around whether the discrepancy in the weight of the contraband sent to and tested by the Chemical Examiner, coupled with the lack of private mashirs and allegations of police enmity due to a delayed challan in a previous case, brought the matter within the scope of further inquiry under section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that the case fell within the ambit of further inquiry, noting that only 500 grams was sent to the Chemical Examiner (which yielded 245 grams), attracting section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Ordinance/Act, carrying a maximum sentence of 7 years, thus falling outside the prohibitory clause. The court laid down the principle that where discrepancies exist in the weight of the narcotic sample tested, combined with circumstances indicative of police enmity and failure to associate private witnesses, the case becomes one of further inquiry warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a lesser quantity of narcotics upon chemical analysis than initially dispatched entitle an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • Whether failure to associate private mashirs in recovery proceedings under narcotics laws constitutes a ground for further inquiry?
  • Does an offense carrying a maximum sentence of seven years fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can proven police enmity and delayed submission of challans in previous matters form a valid basis for granting bail?
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• Nazam Hussain vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 164 · Lahore High Court · 1997-01-12Read full judgment →
• Nawaz Khan vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 245 · Lahore High Court · 1997-08-19Read full judgment →
• Nawaz Abbasi and Ch. Ijaz Ahmed, if Abdul Qadoos vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 948 · Lahore High Court · 1997-08-27
  bail cancellationspecial court jurisdictionscheduled offencessuppression of terrorist activitiescoram non judicecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for bail before the High Court following the cancellation of the petitioner's bail by a Special Judge, Suppression of Terrorist Activities. The petitioner, accused under Section 324/34 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, was initially granted bail by a Magistrate. The Special Judge subsequently cancelled this bail, asserting that the weapon involved (a .30 bore pistol) rendered the offence triable exclusively by the Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. The core legal question was whether a Special Court, prior to the submission of a challan or the case being formally entrusted to it, possesses the jurisdiction to cancel bail granted by a Magistrate under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the Special Court acted without jurisdiction, as it cannot interfere with bail orders passed by other courts in cases not yet pending before it. The principle laid down is that a Special Court's power to cancel bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is limited to cases pending before it, and it cannot exercise such authority over orders passed by Magistrates in non-scheduled or un-transferred cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 have jurisdiction to cancel bail granted by a Magistrate in a case where the challan has not yet been submitted to the Special Court?
  • Can a Special Court exercise the power of bail cancellation under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case not pending before it?
  • Is a Special Court authorized to interfere with bail orders passed by a Magistrate in cases that are not yet determined to be scheduled offences triable by the Special Court?
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