Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Mrs. Zaibun Nisa through Attorney vs Karachi Development Authority1998 PLD Karachi 348 · Sindh High Court · 1998-04-24
  constitutional jurisdictioncancellation of leaseregistered sale deeddue processpublic dutyproperty rightsunilateral cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the unilateral cancellation of the petitioner's leasehold rights over a plot of land by the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) and the subsequent restoration of that plot to the original allottee. The core legal question is whether a statutory body can unilaterally cancel a registered lease deed without following the prescribed contractual procedure or obtaining a judicial declaration. The Court held that the KDA acted without lawful authority. It determined that the lease deed, being a registered instrument, could not be cancelled unilaterally by the respondent authority, especially without adhering to the specific notice and breach-of-condition requirements stipulated in the lease agreement. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the cancellation of such a registered document requires a formal declaration from a court of competent jurisdiction under the relevant statutory framework. The key principle laid down is that public authorities must strictly adhere to the terms of a registered lease and due process of law; they cannot bypass judicial intervention to cancel vested property rights, and any subsequent transfers based on an illegal cancellation are themselves void ab initio.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory authority unilaterally cancel a registered lease deed without a judicial declaration?
  • Does the cancellation of a registered lease deed require compliance with the specific notice provisions contained within the lease agreement?
  • Are subsequent transfers of property valid if the initial cancellation of the predecessor's title is declared illegal?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to declare a cancellation of a lease deed illegal when the authority failed to follow the procedure stipulated in the lease?
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• Mrs. Tayuba Farooqi and anothers vs Prime Minister of Pakistan and others1998 SCMR 967 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-13
  service tribunalsenioritypromotionleave to appealresearch officer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals claiming seniority over respondents Nos. 4 and 5 regarding promotions to the post of Research Officer (B-17). The core legal question concerns whether respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were lawfully promoted under the applicable rules and whether the Tribunal erred in declining to interfere with their promotions. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were qualified for promotion under the rules notified on 12-12-1989 and were senior to the petitioners in grade, thereby justifying the Tribunal's decision. The Court established the principle that promotions made in accordance with prevailing statutory rules by eligible and senior candidates will be sustained, while observations regarding structural anomalies in departmental rules do not invalidate past lawful promotions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees promoted in accordance with notified rules and possessing seniority can be denied promotion based on separate cadres?
  • Do observations by a Service Tribunal regarding administrative anomalies in departmental rules nullify prior promotions made according to law?
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• Mrs. Surayya Farman vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 958 · Lahore High Court · 1997-06-18
  quashment of criminal proceedingsEmigration OrdinanceFederal Investigating Agencycognizance of offencecomplaint requirementforeign employment fraudabuse of process of courtinherent powers of high court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of a criminal case registered under section 18/22 of the Emigration Ordinance 1979, pending before the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Central), Rawalpindi. The core legal questions involved whether the Special Court could take cognizance of an offence under the Emigration Ordinance 1979 upon a police report or challan submitted by the Federal Investigating Agency without a proper written complaint by an authorized person under section 24(6) of the Emigration Ordinance 1979, and whether oral testimony alone without documentary evidence is sufficient to sustain a charge under section 22 of the said Ordinance. The Lahore High Court held that a report submitted by the Federal Investigating Agency under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 cannot be treated as a complaint, and the Special Court is barred from taking cognizance except upon a written complaint accompanied by the previous sanction of the Federal Government pursuant to section 24(6) of the Emigration Ordinance 1979. Furthermore, the Court held that mere oral assertions of receiving money for foreign employment without supporting documentary evidence are insufficient to establish an offence under section 22 of the Emigration Ordinance 1979, and continuing proceedings based on a civil contract dispute constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Consequently, the criminal proceedings against the petitioner were quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Special Court take cognizance of an offence under the Emigration Ordinance 1979 upon a police challan or report submitted by the Federal Investigating Agency without a formal complaint under section 24(6) of the Ordinance?
  • Is oral evidence alone, in the absence of documentary proof, sufficient to substantiate a charge of receiving money for foreign employment under section 22 of the Emigration Ordinance 1979?
  • Does a failure to fulfill a commitment or contract to provide foreign employment automatically constitute a criminal offence under section 22 of the Emigration Ordinance 1979 rather than a civil breach of contract?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings directly without first requiring the petitioner to approach the trial court under section 265-K or 249-A?
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• Mrs. Shireen Nawaz vs The University of Peshawar, through the Vice-1998 CLC 308 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-10-03Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Shahida Saadullah vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others1998 SCMR 2372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-02
  service tribunalseniority disputegrade-18promotionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning her claim of seniority over respondents Nos. 4 and 6. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Programmer and subsequently promoted as Programmer in Grade-18, and later posted as System Analyst in Grade-18. Respondents Nos. 4 and 6 were appointed as System Analysts in Grade-18 against direct recruitment quotas after the petitioner's promotion date. In a circulated seniority list, the petitioner was placed below the respondents. Her claim before the Tribunal was that since the posts of Programmer and System Analyst were in the same Grade-18 and were subsequently merged, her seniority should be counted from the date of her regular promotion to Grade-18, making her senior to the respondents. The Tribunal dismissed her appeal, leading to the present petition. The core legal question is whether an official's seniority in Grade-18 should be reckoned from the date of regular promotion to that grade when posts are subsequently merged. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions raised, holding that the arguments require detailed consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether seniority in Grade-18 is to be reckoned from the date of regular promotion when posts within the same grade are subsequently merged?
  • Does a civil servant acquire seniority over direct recruits appointed to the same grade at a later date following promotion to that grade?
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• Muhammad Asif vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 237 · Sindh High Court · 1997-04-01Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Shahida Sa(Dullah vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1045 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-02
  service lawseniority disputegrade-18merger of postspromotionFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding her seniority claim over respondents Nos. 4 and 6. The petitioner, an Assistant Programmer promoted to Grade-18 as a Programmer in 1982, contended that because the posts of Programmer and System Analyst were in the same Grade-18 and were subsequently merged by the department, her seniority should be reckoned from her initial promotion to Grade-18 on January 20, 1982. She argued that this date preceded the appointments of the respondents as System Analysts in Grade-18 in May and December 1982, respectively. The Federal Service Tribunal rejected this claim, placing the petitioner below the respondents in the seniority list. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the contentions raised by the petitioner regarding the calculation of seniority following the merger of posts in the same grade required deeper judicial consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the merits of the seniority dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the merger of two posts within the same grade entitle an employee to claim seniority from the date of their initial promotion to that grade?
  • Is seniority in Grade-18 to be reckoned from the date of regular promotion or the date of appointment to a specific post?
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• Mrs. Rubina Naeem vs Mst. Noor Bai1998 CLC 1016 · Sindh High Court · 1997-09-07Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Rasheeda Qudrat vs Malik Muhammad Qudratullah Khan and 21998 MLD 171 · Sindh High Court · 1996-08-29Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Naseem Rashid Mirza vs Municipal Committee, Okara through Chairman and another1998 MLD 167 · Lahore High Court · 1997-02-13Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Naila Masood and 2 others vs The Secretary, Food and Cooperation, Government of Sindh and others1998 CLC 1532 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-24
  cooperative societiesarbitrationpast memberlegal heirsrejection of plaintallotment cancellationcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves applications under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, along with preliminary legal objections concerning the maintainability of a civil suit for declaration, possession, cancellation of documents, and injunction. The core legal questions revolved around whether a suit filed by the legal heirs of a deceased member of a cooperative housing society is barred by sections 54, 70, and 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, and whether the term 'past member' under section 54 encompasses the legal heirs or representatives of a deceased member. The court held that the term 'past member' under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 does not include a deceased member or their legal heirs, and therefore disputes between a cooperative society and the legal representatives of a deceased member are not subject to compulsory arbitration under section 54. Consequently, the suit is not barred by sections 54, 70, or 70-A of the said Act. The key principles laid down are that statutory arbitration provisions relating to past members of cooperative societies do not extend to deceased members or their legal heirs, and plaints involving such claims are maintainable before civil courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the term 'past member' under section 54 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 includes the legal heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member?
  • Is a civil suit filed by the legal heirs of a deceased member against a cooperative society barred by sections 54 and 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925?
  • Does section 17-B of the Sindh Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 apply retrospectively to a member who died prior to its enactment?
  • Whether a cooperative society can cancel an allotment of property without issuing a prior show-cause notice to the allottee or legal heirs?
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• Mrs. Mukhtiar Yasin vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 107 · Sindh High Court · 1997-08-13Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Mahmood Hassan vs Ch. Muhammad Ismail and others1998 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-10-21
  habeas corpusillegal detentionnarcotics smugglingremandchallanleave to appealControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the wife of a detenu challenging the Lahore High Court's dismissal of her habeas corpus petition. The detenu had been arrested in connection with an F.I.R. registered under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, regarding the smuggling of 400 kilograms of hashish. The petitioner contended that the detention was illegal due to violations of various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, specifically alleging the absence of a valid remand order and failure to submit a challan. The Supreme Court observed that a challan had indeed been submitted and the substantive case was pending before the Sessions Court. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, empowers the Special Court to grant remand. Holding that the detention was not without lawful authority and that the appropriate legal remedies lay within the framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a habeas corpus petition lie when a challan has been submitted and the case is pending before a competent court?
  • Does the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 empower a Special Court to grant remand?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained to challenge detention when alternative remedies under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are available?
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• Mrs. Kehkashan Najmi Attorney vs Administrator, Abandoned1998 CLC 1233 · Sindh High Court · 1996-10-14Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Inamulhaq vs Director, Anti-Corruption, Lahore and anothers1998 P Cr. L J 1117 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-06Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Hafeeza Begum through her husband and attorney vs Abdul Ghaffar1998 CLC 1505 · Sindh High Court · 1998-03-23Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Farida Manzoor vs Wing Commander (Rtd.) Makhdoom Mohiuddin1998 CLC 226 · Sindh High Court · 1997-09-29Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Fakhera T. Abbasi, S.O. Finance Division, Islamabad and 2 others vs The Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 63 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-03
  service tribunalsenioritydeputationOffice Management GroupSection Officerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed against the consolidated judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed the appeals of the petitioners concerning their seniority and promotion as Section Officers in the Office Management Group. The core legal question revolves around whether civil servants transferred on deputation and subsequently appointed by transfer to the Office Management Group are entitled to seniority from the initial date of joining on deputation. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held, based on established precedent, that officers who joined the Federal Secretariat as Section Officers on deputation and were subsequently appointed by transfer in the same scale are to be given seniority from the date they joined on deputation, rather than a later cut-off date. The key principle laid down is that in the absence of specific statutory rules framed under the Civil Servants Act for determining seniority, reliance is placed on applicable official memorandums governing deputation and transfer within the Office Management Group.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civil servants appointed by transfer to the Office Management Group after initial deputation are entitled to seniority from the date of joining on deputation?
  • Can promotion in a parent department be treated as a cut-off date for determining seniority in the Office Management Group?
  • How is seniority determined in the absence of specific rules framed under the Civil Servants Act?
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• Mrs. Banoo E. Cowasji vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 1353 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1996-02-28Read full judgment →
• Mr. Salman Safdar R/O Lalazar, Rawalpindi. vs Collector Of Customs,PTCL 1998 CL. 252 · Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Moulvi Muhammad Mushtaq vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 679 · Federal Shariat Court · 1997-09-15Read full judgment →
• Moinuddin Ahmad vs The Chairman, F.P.S.C., Islamabad and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-13
  service lawseniority disputeinter se seniorityEstablishment ManualFederal Service Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the determination of seniority among Assistants (B-11) in the Federal Public Service Commission. The petitioner challenged the Federal Service Tribunal's decision, which had favored respondent No. 4, Muhammad Moazzam Mirza, in a seniority dispute. The core legal question was whether the seniority rules applicable to a specific batch of recruits, as outlined in the Establishment Manual, could be extended to an employee who was transferred into the department from a different organization and did not belong to that same recruitment batch. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Establishment Manual relied upon by the petitioner were inapplicable to respondent No. 4 because he was not part of the petitioner's recruitment batch. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's judgment, finding it unexceptional, and refused leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that seniority rules governing inter se seniority based on batch recruitment and nomination dates cannot be applied to employees transferred from other departments who do not share the same recruitment batch or origin.

  Questions settled

  • Can seniority rules applicable to a specific recruitment batch be applied to an employee transferred from a different department who does not belong to that batch?
  • Does the date of joining service determine seniority for employees recruited through different processes and batches?
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• Mohsin Atta vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 634 · Lahore High Court · 1997-12-22Read full judgment →
• Mohib Shah, Etc. vs (Mst.) Janna T Bibi And AnotherK.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 68 · Lahore High Court · 1996-07-23Read full judgment →
• Mohbat Khan vs Province of Sindh and 14 others1998 MLD 362 · Sindh High Court · 1997-09-02
  ad interim injunctionrevisional jurisdictionrecord of rightsprima facie casebalance of convenienceunclean handsforged documentsillegal possession
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant filed a revision application against the concurrent orders of the lower courts dismissing his application for an ad interim injunction in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction concerning agricultural land. The plaintiff claimed a share in the property based on a record of rights and challenged its allotment to private respondents. The trial court and the appellate court both found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case, noting that the revenue record relied upon by the plaintiff was allegedly forged and fabricated, that the private respondents were in actual cultivating possession, and that the balance of convenience did not lie in favor of the plaintiff. The High Court upheld these concurrent findings, reiterating that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is limited and cannot interfere with findings of fact based on solid material. The Court held that illegal possession without title cannot be protected by interim relief, and a party relying on forged documents approaches the court with unclean hands and is disentitled to equitable relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether illegal possession without title can be protected through an interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party relying on a disputed or allegedly forged record of rights establish a prima facie case for the grant of temporary injunction?
  • Does the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 permit interference with concurrent findings of fact based on cogent reasons?
  • Whether a plaintiff who approaches the court with unclean hands by utilizing fabricated documents is entitled to equitable interim relief?
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• Modi Rubber Ltd vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 2522 · Delhi High Court · 1995-11-21Read full judgment →
• Modern Textiles Finishing Mills vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 1198 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1996-07-16Read full judgment →
• Miss Shamaila Mahmood vs Mukhtar Ahmad and 6 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 51 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1997-05-22
  relaxation of rulescivil servantssub-judge recruitmentjudicial reviewjust and equitablead hoc appointmentbinding precedentaggrieved person
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a writ petition challenging a Government notification that relaxed the prescribed legal experience requirement in favour of the appellant to enable her to sit for a competitive examination for the post of Sub-Judge. The High Court allowed the writ petition by relying solely on its previous judgment in a related matter. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir were whether the Supreme Court's dismissal of an appeal ipso facto approves the High Court's reasoning, and whether discretionary powers to relax service rules can be exercised without just and equitable grounds. The Supreme Court held that an appellate dismissal does not automatically validate all reasoning of the lower court; only the Supreme Court's own reasoning is binding. It further held that overriding discretionary powers under service rules must be exercised strictly to advance justice and equity and are subject to judicial review. Since no reasons were brought on record showing just and equitable considerations, the Supreme Court declared the relaxation notification illegal and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of an appeal by the Supreme Court ipso facto constitute approval of all the reasons recorded by the High Court?
  • Can the Government exercise discretionary powers to relax departmental service rules without demonstrating just and equitable considerations?
  • Does a candidate who is required to submit proof of legal experience possess standing as an aggrieved person to challenge a rule relaxation order granted to another candidate?
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• Miss Shahida Bano vs Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 5 others1998 CLC 534 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1997-11-04
  domicile of origindomicile of choicemedical college admissionreserved quotastatutory interpretationPrivate International Lawwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was directed against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant's writ petition concerning her non-selection for a medical institution seat reserved for Azad Jammu and Kashmir nationals. The appellant, whose parents had migrated to Rawalpindi and who had previously obtained a Pakistan domicile certificate for admission in Punjab before cancelling it and obtaining a Muzaffarabad domicile, claimed entitlement based on her domicile of origin. The core legal question was whether common law principles of Private International Law regarding the automatic revival of a domicile of origin override the express statutory requirements for obtaining a domicile certificate under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir laws. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the appeal lacks merit and dismissed it, ruling that principles of Private International Law apply only where the statutory law of the land is silent. The Court laid down the key principle that statutory requirements—such as continuous residence and the intention to live permanently—must be satisfied under the relevant legislation, and the common law doctrine of revival of domicile of origin cannot override or bypass express statutory provisions governing domicile certificates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether principles of Private International Law regarding domicile can override express statutory requirements for the issuance of a domicile certificate?
  • Does the common law doctrine of the revival of a domicile of origin apply when specific statutory conditions regarding residence and permanent settlement are prescribed by law?
  • Can a person obtain a domicile certificate in Azad Jammu and Kashmir without fulfilling the continuous residence requirement stipulated under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir State Subjects Act, 1980?
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• Miss Sajida Parveen vs Principal Dean, Khyber Medical College.1998 SCMR 1183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-18
  admission cancellationforged documentsinterim relieffraudulent admissionmedical college admissioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a review petition by the Peshawar High Court, which had earlier dismissed a civil revision application upholding the cancellation of the petitioner's admission to the M.B.,B.S. class at Khyber Medical College. The petitioner initially secured admission by submitting a forged detailed marks sheet showing 791 marks instead of the actual 691 marks. When the college authorities cancelled her admission upon discovering the forgery, she initiated civil litigation and obtained interim orders that allowed her to continue her studies for several years. The core legal question was whether a student who gained admission through a forged document is entitled to interim relief or regularization of studies based on the passage of time and interim court orders. The Supreme Court held that interim orders and the passage of time during litigation cannot legalize an admission obtained through fraud or forgery, and the petitioner must bear the consequences. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the continuation of studies under interim court orders regularize an initial admission obtained through a forged document?
  • Can a student who secured medical college admission on the basis of a forged marks sheet claim equitable relief based on the passage of time?
  • Whether interim relief should be granted to a petitioner whose initial claim is founded upon a fictitious document?
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• Miss Saima Batool vs Rawalpindi Medical College, Rawalpindi through Principal and 4 others1998 SCMR 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-12
  medical educationPMDC regulationsacademic eligibilityuniversity autonomyretrospective effectleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a medical student, challenged her removal from a medical college after failing to clear the 1st Professional M.B.,B.S. Examination in four attempts. The college relied on University orders and Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC) regulations mandating that students failing to clear the examination within four chances cease to be eligible for further medical education. The petitioner's writ petition was dismissed in limine by the High Court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the PMDC possessed the legal competency to frame regulations debarring students from pursuing medical education and whether such regulations required formal adoption by the University to be enforceable. Furthermore, the Court noted that the University's orders were passed in anticipation of approval under the Punjab University Act, 1973, with no evidence that such approval was ever obtained, and questioned the retrospective application of these orders. Finding that these contentions raised substantial legal questions regarding the authority of the PMDC and the validity of the University's actions, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council competent to frame regulations that debar students from pursuing medical education in Pakistan?
  • Can regulations framed by the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council be enforced without formal adoption by the respective Universities?
  • Can an order passed by a Vice-Chancellor in anticipation of approval under the Punjab University Act, 1973, be enforced if such approval is never obtained?
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• Miss P. Sarada vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 2118 · Supreme Court of India · 1997-12-09Read full judgment →
• Miss Mobeen Sheikh and others vs The Federation of Pakistan and others1998 SCMR 2701 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-01
  equivalence certificatemedical college admissionInter-Board Committee of ChairmenFederal Supervision of Curricula ActA-Level conversion formulaeducational standardsprospectus status
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses the competency to issue equivalence certificates and convert foreign educational qualifications (such as G.C.S.E., G.C.E., and A-Levels) into marks for admission to medical colleges. The core legal question was whether the Inter-Board Committee of Chairmen (I.B.C.C.), constituted under the Federal Supervision of Curricula, Textbooks and Maintenance of Standards of Education Act, 1976, has the exclusive authority to issue equivalence certificates and determine conversion formulas, or if Provincial Admission Boards of Medical Colleges can prescribe their own formulas via admission prospectuses. The Court held that the I.B.C.C. is the sole competent authority under the 1976 Act and relevant notifications to issue equivalence certificates and conversion formulas for secondary and higher secondary qualifications, and that federal statutory provisions prevail over inconsistent provisions in provincial medical college prospectuses. The key principle laid down is that ensuring uniform academic evaluation and standards through a designated federal authority prevents conflicting admission criteria and promotes national educational consistency.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Inter-Board Committee of Chairmen is competent to issue equivalence certificates and conversion formulas for foreign qualifications for medical college admissions?
  • Do rules and regulations embodied in a medical college prospectus possess statutory force superior to a federal enactment?
  • Does the Federal Supervision of Curricula, Textbooks and Maintenance of Standards of Education Act 1976 prevail over provincial rules regarding educational equivalence standards?
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• Miss Huma Naseeb, S.I. vs Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore1998 PLC (C.S.) 385 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1996-05-08Read full judgment →
• Miss Hina Javed and others vs Government of N.-W.F.P. and others1998 SCMR 1469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-13
  medical college admissionentry testmerit-based selectionprovincial government authorityeducational standardsPMDC regulationsprofessional education
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of an entry test introduced by the Government of N.-W.F.P. for admission to M.B.,B.S. classes in public medical colleges, which appellants challenged as discriminatory and lacking legal authority. The core legal question was whether the provincial government could mandate an entry test for medical college admissions when the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC) regulations did not explicitly mandate such a test, and whether this requirement was arbitrary or discriminatory. The Supreme Court held that the introduction of the entry test was constitutionally valid and legally permissible. The Court reasoned that the PMDC regulations, specifically those effective from 1987, allowed for examinations to improve selection processes. Furthermore, the provincial government had the authority to implement such measures to ensure merit-based selection, particularly given the declining reliability of standard board examination results. The Court established that an entry test is a recognized, objective, and fair method for selecting candidates for professional institutions, provided it is conducted transparently and with sufficient notice, and does not violate higher statutory standards.

  Questions settled

  • Can a provincial government introduce an entry test for admission to public medical colleges?
  • Does the requirement of an entry test for medical college admission violate the regulations of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council?
  • Is the introduction of an entry test for professional college admissions considered discriminatory if not implemented uniformly across all provinces?
  • Can a court declare a prospectus provision for an entry test unconstitutional if it was widely publicized and applied to all candidates?
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• Miss Hadia Awan, Advocate vs Chairman, Punjab Public Service1998 PLD Lahore 207 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-20Read full judgment →
• Miss Ghazala Quader vs Joint Admission Committee for Admission to 1ST Year M.B.,B.S. in Khyber Medical College Ayub Medical College and 3 others1998 MLD 1238 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-06-03Read full judgment →
• Miss Aisha Rahman vs Government of Sindh through Secretary, Ministry1998 CLC 1625 · Sindh High Court · 1997-12-16Read full judgment →
• Miss Afroze Begum vs Dr. Akhtar Hasan Khan, Secretary, Ministry of Education, Islamabad and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 1016 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-08-17Read full judgment →
• Mirza Wahid Beg vs The Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Training and Personnel) Naval Headquarters, Islamabad and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-22
  service appealdisciplinary proceedingsmisconductlimitation periodcivil servantcompetent authorityremoval from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the removal of a civilian Inspector (B-16) from the Pakistan Navy following charges of misappropriation of government funds. The appellant challenged his removal, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings were repetitive, the "Authority" who issued the removal order lacked competence, and his appeal was wrongly dismissed by the Federal Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court examined whether the second charge-sheet was legally permissible, whether the designated "Authority" under the 1976 Notification was valid, and whether the appeal was time-barred. The Court held that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and the "Authority" was competent under the relevant government notification. The appellant’s reliance on an expired Fleet Order was rejected. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the appeal was time-barred, as the appellant failed to file within the statutory period, and correspondence seeking clarification from the department did not extend the limitation period. The Court concluded that the removal was justified, and the Tribunal’s decision was legally sound, dismissing the appeals accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does correspondence seeking clarification from a department extend the statutory limitation period for filing a service appeal?
  • Can an expired Fleet Order be relied upon to challenge the competency of an 'Authority' designated under valid government notifications?
  • Is a second disciplinary inquiry permissible when based on distinct allegations of misconduct?
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• Mirza Mushtaq Ahmad vs Jafar Hussain, S.I. P.S. Millat Park, Lahore and others1998 SCMR 1280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-11-27
  contempt of courtnon-complianceF.I.R. registrationpolice dutyjudicial order compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a contempt of court application alleging that the respondent, a Sub-Inspector, failed to comply with a court order dated 24-4-1996, which directed the recording of the petitioner's statement and the registration of an F.I.R. The respondent denied the allegations, asserting that the petitioner failed to appear at the police station to record his statement and further contended that an F.I.R. (No. 105 of 1996) had subsequently been registered at the relevant police station based on the petitioner's written complaint. The core legal question was whether the respondent's actions constituted contempt of court due to non-compliance with the judicial directive. The Court found that the F.I.R. had indeed been registered and a copy was placed on the record, thereby satisfying the requirements of the previous order. Consequently, the Court held that the contempt application was devoid of substance and dismissed it, establishing the principle that where a court order has been substantially complied with, a contempt application based on alleged non-compliance becomes frivolous and unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of an F.I.R. subsequent to a contempt application render the application for contempt of court devoid of substance?
  • Can a contempt of court application be dismissed if the underlying court order has been complied with?
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• Mirza Muhammad Anwar Baig vs Farkhanda Nasreen And 2 OtherK.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 157 · Lahore High Court · 1997-09-30Read full judgment →
• Mirza Maqsood Baig vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 123 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-05Read full judgment →
• Mirza Maqbool Elahi through Legal Heirs and 8 others vs Capital1998 SCMR 1074 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-02
  land acquisitionconstitutional petitionlachesacquiescencesuccessive petitionscompensationcapital development authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' constitutional petition and civil reference regarding the acquisition of their land by the Capital Development Authority under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioners could challenge the legality of the land acquisition after decades of litigation wherein they had previously only contested the quantum of compensation, and whether subsequent constitutional petitions on the same cause of action were competent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a party who omits to raise a plea or seek relief in respect of the same cause of action in earlier proceedings cannot subsequently raise it to the prejudice of the other party, especially after immense delay and laches. The Court affirmed that successive petitions on the same cause of action are not competent, and the issue of legality of acquisition had already been settled in prior final litigation. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, noting that the pending appeals concerning compensation provided the appropriate avenue for relief.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who previously challenged only the quantum of compensation subsequently challenge the legality of land acquisition after a lapse of decades?
  • Whether successive constitutional petitions on the same cause of action are maintainable?
  • Does a constitutional petition suffer from a bar of laches and acquiescence when filed years after the final determination of the legality of an acquisition in prior litigation?
  • Is a civil reference under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure competent when filed during the pendency of departmental appeals?
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• Mirza Khan Talpur and others vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 9 · Lahore High Court · 1994-09-27Read full judgment →
• Mir Zakam vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 665 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-08-29Read full judgment →
• Mir Dittal vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1641 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-20Read full judgment →
• Mir Aimal Kansi vs The State and 5 others1998 P Cr. L J 1097 · Lahore High Court · 1998-01-28Read full judgment →
• Mir Afzal Khan and 21 others vs Karachi Development Authority through DirectorGeneral and 4 others1998 PLD Karachi 283 · Sindh High Court · 1997-09-12
  unauthorized constructionregularization of landKarachi Development AuthorityKarachi Building Control Authorityencroachmentconstitutional petitionmarket value
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions concern unauthorized occupants of land in Karachi who sought regularization of their possession against the Karachi Development Authority (KDA). The core legal questions involved the legitimacy of the petitioners' claims to the land and the scope of the Karachi Building Control Authority's (KBCA) duty to address unauthorized construction. The Court held that while the petitioners were unauthorized occupants, the KDA could potentially regularize their possession, provided they pay the current market value of the land rather than a lower cost, to avoid rewarding illegal encroachment. The Court emphasized that illegalities cannot be cured by the mere passage of time or official inaction. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that the KBCA has a mandatory statutory duty to prevent, demolish, or seal unauthorized constructions within its jurisdiction, irrespective of land title disputes. Consequently, the Court directed the relevant authorities to process the regularization summary within six weeks, during which the petitioners would not be evicted, while mandating that no further encroachments occur on the disputed land.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Karachi Building Control Authority have a duty to prevent unauthorized construction regardless of the land's ownership status?
  • Can unauthorized occupants of land claim regularization as a matter of right?
  • Should regularization of encroached land be based on the original cost or the current market value?
  • Does the mere passage of time or official inaction cure illegalities regarding unauthorized construction?
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• Muhammad Bachal vs Ahmad and 2 others1998 P Cr. L J 1149 · Sindh High Court · 1997-11-25Read full judgment →
• Mian Waris Ali vs Registrar of Trade Unions, Lahore Region (North1998 PLC 260 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-12-22Read full judgment →
• Mian Tahir Shah and anothers vs Additional District Judge, Swabi and others1998 SCMR 858 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-02-11
  pre-emptionlis pendensexecution proceedingsconstitutional jurisdictioncollusiontalabsrestoration of suitlocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a pre-emption suit that was initially dismissed for non-prosecution but subsequently restored and decreed ex parte. During the pendency of the restoration proceedings, the first vendee transferred the subject land to the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the execution of the decree under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging the pre-emptor failed to perform the requisite 'Talabs'. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court. The core legal questions concerned whether the transfer was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and whether the petitioners had the standing to challenge the decree in execution proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the transfer was void under the doctrine of lis pendens, as the term 'proceeding' under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 includes applications for the restoration of a suit. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary and cannot be invoked by parties guilty of collusion to deprive others of their legal rights, nor can transferees raise pleas like the lack of 'Talabs' in execution proceedings if they were not parties to the original suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply to property transfers made during the pendency of an application for the restoration of a suit?
  • Can a transferee of property, who was not a party to the original pre-emption suit, raise the plea of lack of 'Talabs' during execution proceedings?
  • Is the grant of relief under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 discretionary when the petitioner is found to be guilty of collusion?
  • Does the term 'proceeding' under the doctrine of lis pendens include an application for the restoration of a suit?
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• Mian Nazir Sons Industries, Ltd. And Others vs Government of Pakistan And Others1998 P.C.T.L.R. 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs dutySection 31-A Customs Actpromissory estoppelconcession vs exemptionLetters of Creditfiscal policyvested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals concern the validity of the Central Board of Revenue's decision to rescind a notification issued under Section 21 of the Customs Act, 1969, which had granted customs duty concessions to manufacturers of woven polypropylene bags. The appellants argued that because they had already established irrevocable Letters of Credit and entered into contracts based on the initial concession, the subsequent withdrawal of this benefit was unlawful. The core legal question was whether the benefit provided under Section 21(b) constituted an exemption or a concession, and whether Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, empowered the government to recover duties despite the prior contractual commitments. The Supreme Court held that the benefit under Section 21(b) is a concession, not an exemption. Consequently, Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, applies, which explicitly validates the recovery of duties upon the withdrawal of a concession, regardless of whether contracts or Letters of Credit were previously established. The Court further affirmed that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against legislative actions or laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does the benefit granted under Section 21(b) of the Customs Act, 1969, constitute an exemption or a concession?
  • Can the doctrine of promissory estoppel be invoked against the legislature or laws framed by it?
  • Does Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, authorize the recovery of customs duties upon the withdrawal of a concession even after the opening of a Letter of Credit?
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• Mian Nasim Akhtar vs Mst. Amina Yaqoob and others1998 SCMR 1346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-03
  civil revisionleave to appealnon-suitingclerical mistakeparties to suittechnical ground
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision against concurrent judgments and decrees declaring the respondents' predecessor as the sole legal heir of the deceased. The High Court had declined the civil revision on the technical ground that one of the legal heirs, Mst. Azra Akhtar, was not impleaded in the title of the civil revision, rendering an effective decree impossible. The core legal question is whether a civil revision can be dismissed on a technical omission of a party's name in the memo of revision when that party was already a party in the proceedings before the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the omission appeared to be a clerical mistake or oversight resulting from discrepancies in the lower court's judgment title, and the petitioner should not have been non-suited on such technical grounds. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the justification of the High Court's order, establishing that procedural oversights regarding party titles, where parties are already on record below, do not warrant summary dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil revision can be dismissed on the ground that a legal heir was omitted from the title of the revision memo due to a clerical mistake?
  • Is a petitioner justified in omitting a party's name from a civil revision title when that party was duly impleaded before the courts below?
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• Mian Munir Ahmed vs United Bank Limited and 3 others1998 PLD Karachi 278 · Sindh High Court · 1997-08-26
  banking recoveryguarantor liabilitydeposit requirementwinding up proceedingsejusdem generisdecree in excess of jurisdictionpre-admission stage
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against a preliminary decree passed in a banking recovery suit, holding the appellant-guarantor jointly and severally liable for a substantial sum. The respondent bank raised preliminary objections, arguing first that the appellant failed to deposit the decretal amount or furnish security under section 12(5) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, and second that prior leave of the company court was required under section 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, due to liquidation proceedings against the principal debtor. The High Court dismissed the application to offer the principal debtor's mortgaged property as security by a guarantor. On the second objection, the Court held that the phrase 'other legal proceeding' in section 316 is ejusdem generis with 'suit', meaning it does not encompass appeals, and thus no leave was required to file the appeal. Addressing the quantum of liability, the Court noted that the decree exceeding the explicitly limited guarantee of Rs. 40 million appeared to be in excess of jurisdiction, but because of the non-compliance with the pre-admission deposit requirement, the appeal was dismissed while leaving the appellant to seek remedy under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Can a guarantor proffer the mortgaged property of the principal debtor as security for filing an appeal under section 12(5) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the requirement of obtaining leave under section 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, before initiating legal proceedings against a company in liquidation apply to the filing of an appeal?
  • Whether the phrase 'other legal proceeding' in section 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, is restricted by the preceding word 'suit' under the rule of ejusdem generis?
  • Does section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply to proceedings arising from a decree passed by a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Mukaram Shah and otherss vs Rahim Shah1998 CLC 1653 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-02-15Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif vs The State1998 SCMR 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-14
  Constitutional petitionoriginal jurisdictionbail applicationexhaustion of remediesspecial courtsjudicial bench constitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three Constitutional petitions filed directly under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking bail. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court because bail applications pending before the Lahore High Court were stalled due to the unavailability of a properly constituted bench following a previous Supreme Court judgment regarding judicial appointments. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should exercise its extraordinary original jurisdiction to grant bail when ordinary remedies remain available but are temporarily obstructed. The Court held that direct petitions under Article 184(3) are not maintainable when ordinary forums and remedies are available and have not been exhausted. The Court emphasized that litigants must exhaust ordinary legal channels before invoking the Supreme Court's extraordinary jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, dismissed the petitions, and directed the Acting Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court to constitute a proper bench as required by the Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance 1984 to dispose of the bail applications within three days, ensuring the petitioner's rights are addressed through the appropriate legal forum.

  Questions settled

  • Is a direct Constitutional petition under Article 184(3) maintainable when ordinary legal remedies are available?
  • Must a petitioner exhaust ordinary forums before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct the High Court to constitute a specific bench to hear pending bail applications?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs Special Court and others1998 P Cr. L J 162 · Lahore High Court · 1997-02-26Read full judgment →
• Mian Khizar Hayat vs Secretary Forest, Government of Punjab, Lahore1998 PLC (C.S.) 1423 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-26Read full judgment →
• Mian Iftikhar vs Province of Punjab and another1998 CLC 1508 · Lahore High Court · 1997-12-21Read full judgment →
• Mian Hamid-Ud-Din vs Gul Rehman1998 CLC 1829 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-04-19Read full judgment →
• Mian Ghulam Farid vs District Magistrate, Vehari and others1998 MLD 577 · Lahore High Court · 1997-03-20Read full judgment →
• Mian Ghulam Abbas Qureshi vs Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar and another1998 CLC 1261 · Election Tribunal · 1997-01-05Read full judgment →
• Mian Basharat Ahmed vs Rent Controller/Subjudge, Muzaffarabad1998 PLD Azad J&K 5 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1997-10-02Read full judgment →
• Mian Basharat Ahmad vs Rent Controller/Sub-Judge, MuzaffarabadK.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 370 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1996-05-06Read full judgment →
• Mian Aftab Saigol vs Mrs. Sehyr Saigol and 3 others1998 SCMR 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-14
  consent decreerejection of plaintamendment of pleadingscivil revisionleave to appealtrial court discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil petitions for leave to appeal arising from a suit for declaration and consequential relief. The petitioner sought to challenge orders passed by a learned Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court, which had clarified previous observations regarding the petitioner's attempt to reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the High Court's observations regarding the petitioner's right to agitate matters before the trial court constituted a binding direction to the trial court to allow subsequent applications for amendment of the written statement. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s observations were merely clarificatory and did not bind the trial court to decide the amendment application in any specific manner. The Court affirmed that such applications must be decided by the trial court on their own merits. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the petitioner's appropriate remedy against the trial court's subsequent dismissal of the amendment application was to challenge that specific order before the competent forum in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court's observation that a party may agitate a matter before the trial court constitute a binding direction to allow an amendment application?
  • Must an application for amendment of a written statement be decided by the trial court on its own merits?
  • Is a party required to challenge a trial court's order dismissing an amendment application before the competent forum rather than seeking relief through a pending appeal against a prior High Court order?
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• Mian Abuzar vs Naseer Ahmed Bhatti and others1998 P Cr. L J 145 · Lahore High Court · 1995-06-13Read full judgment →
• Metalex Corporation Workers' Union, C.B.A. through General Secretary1998 PLC 528 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1998-02-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Wyeth Laboratories Pakistan Limited, Lahore through Personnel1998 PLC 443 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-02-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Wilshire Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan1998 PTD 3061 · Lahore High Court · 1998-02-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Waheed Corporation (Regd.) vs Capital Development1998 PTD 3863 · Lahore High Court · 1998-09-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Wah Industries Limited, Wah Cantt., District Rawalpindi vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and 2 others1998 PLC 1 · Lahore High Court · 1997-07-30
  industrial relationsarmed forces exemptionordnance factorygrievance petitiondefinition of workmanjurisdiction of labour courtdismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from an order of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal setting aside a labour court's dismissal of a grievance petition and remanding the matter for fresh decision. The employee, dismissed for misconduct involving missing cartridges from the petitioner-company (Wah Industries Limited, functioning as a sales department for Pakistan Ordnance Factories), had challenged his dismissal under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The core legal questions concerned whether the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 applied to the petitioner-company's service in view of section 1(3)(a), and whether a dismissed employee whose removal was unrelated to an industrial dispute could maintain a grievance petition as a workman. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner-company, being connected with and incidental to the Armed Forces and Pakistan Ordnance Factories, falls squarely within the exclusion of section 1(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Furthermore, a dismissed employee whose dismissal is not connected with an industrial dispute does not qualify as a workman to maintain a grievance petition under section 25-A. The petition was accepted and the Appellate Tribunal's order was declared without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 applies to services connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces or an Ordnance Factory under section 1(3)(a)?
  • Does Wah Industries Limited, acting as a sales department for Pakistan Ordnance Factories, fall within the exclusion of section 1(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can a dismissed employee maintain a grievance petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 if their dismissal is unrelated to an industrial dispute?
  • Does the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal possess the inherent power to remand a case while exercising appellate jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs United Bank Limited vs Messrs Shafiq Hanif (Pvt.) Ltd1998 MLD 1734 · Sindh High Court · 1998-05-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Tripple Em (Pvt.) Limited through Managing Director vs The Central Board of Revenue through Chairman, Islamabad and 2 others1998 CLC 187 · Lahore High Court · 1997-07-10
  inbonding facilitycustoms dutyremission of dutyspeaking orderconstitutional petitionadministrative delayalternative remedyCustoms Act 1969
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the customs authorities' refusal to grant an inbonding facility for imported goods, which resulted in the goods remaining at the Dry Port for 27 days and sustaining damage due to exposure. The petitioner sought a refund of customs duties paid under protest on the damaged goods. The core legal questions concerned the legality of the refusal to inbond, the entitlement to duty remission for damage caused by administrative delay, and the maintainability of a constitutional petition despite the existence of an alternative appellate remedy. The Court held that the refusal to inbond without a written, speaking order was arbitrary and unlawful. Furthermore, because the damage occurred directly due to this unlawful administrative delay, the petitioner was entitled to a refund of duties paid on the damaged goods. The Court also established that where authorities have already expressed a negative view on the merits, rendering an appeal futile, a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is maintainable. The judgment emphasizes that statutory powers requiring recorded reasons must be exercised through speaking orders.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order refusing an inbonding facility under Section 84 of the Customs Act 1969 valid if it is not a speaking order with recorded reasons?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained when the alternative appellate remedy is rendered futile by the authorities' pre-determined stance?
  • Is an importer entitled to remission of customs duties for goods damaged due to an unlawful delay in granting inbonding facilities by customs authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Tri-Star Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director and 8 others vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Companies-I, Karachi and 5 others1998 PTD 3923 · Sindh High Court · 1998-07-31
  civil court jurisdictionincome tax raidsearch and seizurerejection of plaintmala fidescompany representationinterim injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was filed by nine companies of the Tri-Star Group seeking damages, declaration, and injunction against income tax authorities following a raid on their business premises and the seizure of records, books of accounts, computers, and valuables. The core legal questions involved whether a civil suit is barred under section 162 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 in cases of alleged mala fides and excess of jurisdiction, whether the search and seizure exceeded the powers under section 146 of the said Ordinance, and whether the suit was liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 due to lack of proper authorization under Order XXIX, Rule 1. The court held that where authorities act mala fide, in patent violation of law, or without jurisdiction, the civil court's jurisdiction is not ousted despite barring provisions. The court dismissed the application for rejection of the plaint, holding that the search exceeded statutory bounds and that procedural irregularities regarding company representation could be cured, while granting interim protections.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is barred under section 162 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 when the actions of income tax authorities are alleged to be mala fide and in excess of statutory powers?
  • Does the power to enter and search business premises under section 146 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 authorize income tax authorities to remove the entire business records, books of accounts, and computers of an assessee?
  • Whether a plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 read with Order XXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 if the suit is filed by a company without initially incorporating the board resolution in the body of the plaint?
  • Does a suit challenging the illegal seizure of documents and records by tax authorities fall foul of the bar against declaratory suits under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd vs Messrs Nidera1998 CLC 1610 · Sindh High Court · 1998-05-04
  interim injunctionarbitration agreementstay of arbitrationexistence of contractcivil suit maintainabilityArbitration Act 1940Code of Civil Procedure 1908
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Single Judge's order refusing an interim injunction to restrain arbitration proceedings before the Federation of Oil Seeds and Fats Association (FOSFA). The appellant, Trading Corporation of Pakistan, sought to halt arbitration by filing a civil suit, contending that no binding contract existed between the parties. The core legal question was whether a party can obtain an interim injunction to stay arbitration by filing a broad civil suit challenging the main contract, rather than specifically challenging the arbitration agreement under the Arbitration Act. The Court held that while a suit challenging the existence of a contract containing an arbitration clause is maintainable under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not automatically justify an interim injunction to stay arbitration. The Court laid down the principle that a party wishing to halt arbitration must specifically challenge the arbitration clause under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Absent such a specific challenge, arbitration proceedings should not be suspended, as the arbitration process should proceed while the main suit is adjudicated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party obtain an interim injunction to stay arbitration proceedings by filing a civil suit challenging the existence of the main contract?
  • Does Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a suit questioning the existence or validity of a contract that contains an arbitration clause?
  • Is it necessary to file an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 1940 to specifically challenge an arbitration agreement before seeking to halt arbitration proceedings?
  • Does the existence of a pending civil suit regarding the main contract automatically suspend arbitration proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Tawakkal Export Corporation vs Messrs Muslim Commercial1998 MLD 866 · Sindh High Court · 1997-06-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Taj Muhammad and 2 others vs Income-Tax and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 971 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-11-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs Tahseen (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore vs Additional Collector of Customs1998 PTD 2561 · Lahore High Court · 1998-04-28
  sales taximported goodsAzad Jammu and Kashmirtransit tradeconstitutional petitionstax exemptioncustoms
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of five constitutional petitions filed by M/s. Tahseen (Pvt.) Limited, challenging the levy of sales tax on diesel engine components imported from China through Pakistani ports for use in its manufacturing factory located in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The core legal question was whether goods imported into Pakistan but destined for and utilized in AJK are subject to sales tax under Section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and whether AJK can be treated similarly to Afghanistan under transit trade agreements. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that once goods are brought into the territorial limits of Pakistan, they constitute 'goods imported into Pakistan' under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, regardless of their ultimate destination. The Court laid down the principle that exemption from taxation cannot be claimed as a matter of right or by mere presumption, and unless the Federal Government grants a specific statutory exemption, goods imported through Pakistan for AJK remain liable to sales tax.

  Questions settled

  • Are goods imported through Pakistan but destined for Azad Jammu and Kashmir subject to sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can Azad Jammu and Kashmir be treated at par with an independent foreign country like Afghanistan for the purpose of tax-exempt transit trade?
  • Can exemption from the levy of sales tax be claimed as a matter of right without a specific statutory notification by the Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. vs Sardar Ali Chohan1998 PLC (C.S.) 346 · Sindh High Court · 1997-06-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Strong Built Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore vs Fauji Fertilizer1998 MLD 1628 · Lahore High Court · 1997-06-05
  arbitration agreementappointment of arbitratorouster of jurisdictionnatural justicepre-condition to arbitrationstatutory noticejoinder of contracts
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a first appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against the rejection of an application filed under Section 20 of the same Act for the appointment of an arbitrator. The core legal questions involved whether a contractual pre-condition requiring disputes to be referred to the owner for a final and binding decision is valid, whether a specified arbitration venue ousts the trial court's jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, whether a prior notice is mandatory under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, and whether a single application concerning multiple agreements between the same parties is maintainable. The Lahore High Court held that a party cannot be a judge in its own cause, rendering provisions making the owner's decision final and binding void as violating principles of natural justice. It further held that contractual venue clauses cannot oust statutory jurisdiction, that Section 20 of the Arbitration Act does not require a prior notice unlike Section 8, and that a single application covering multiple related contracts is maintainable under principles analogous to Order I Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the case remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contractual clause making the owner's decision final and binding on a dispute is valid under the principles of natural justice?
  • Does a contractual specification of an arbitration venue oust the territorial jurisdiction of a court under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Is a prior notice mandatory for filing an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Can a single application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 be maintained for multiple contracts between the same parties involving common questions of law and fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs State Cement Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. vs The Collector1998 SCMR 2207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-08
  sales taxshort levyrate of taxretrospective amendmentcasus omissusstatutory interpretationbill of entrycustoms duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the petitioner corporation's sales tax case regarding the rate of sales tax applicable to certain imported goods. The core legal questions involved whether successive tax demands are barred under section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and whether the 1996 amendment adding reference to section 104 of the Customs Act, 1969 in section 5 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 operated retrospectively as a remedial provision or cured a casus omissus. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that multiple demands are not prohibited under section 36 when distinct periods or short levies are involved, supported by section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and that clear, unambiguous statutory provisions cannot be interpreted retrospectively or have words interpolated through external aids or the doctrine of casus omissus. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple demands for short-levied sales tax can be raised by an officer under section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Whether the amendment made to the second proviso of section 5 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by the Finance Act, 1996 has retrospective effect?
  • Can a clear and unambiguous statutory provision be subjected to judicial interpolation under the doctrine of casus omissus?
  • Whether external aids such as Notes on Clauses can be used to interpret a statutory provision when the language of the statute is plain and clear?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs State Cement Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. vs Collector of Customs, Karachi and another1998 PTD 2999 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-08
  sales taxshort levychange in rate of taxretrospective amendmentstatutory interpretationbills of entrycustoms duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the petitioner corporation's sales tax case, which challenged a short-levy demand of sales tax on imported goods. The core legal questions involved whether successive demands for short-levied sales tax are barred under section 36 of the Sales Tax Act 1990, and whether the amendment introduced to the second proviso of section 5 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 by the Finance Act 1996 was retrospective and remedial in nature. The Supreme Court held that multiple demands under section 36 are permissible read with section 14 of the General Clauses Act 1897 unless resulting in manifest injustice, and that the 1996 amendment was clear, unambiguous, and prospective, rejecting the applicability of external aids or the doctrine of casus omissus. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple demands for short-levied sales tax can be raised under section 36 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Whether the amendment made to the second proviso of section 5 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 by the Finance Act 1996 has retrospective effect?
  • Can clear and unambiguous statutory provisions be interpreted using external aids such as notes on clauses?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs State Cement Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and another1998 PTD 3058 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs Spintex Limited and others vs Income-Tax Officer, Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Mirpur Circle, Mirpur and others1998 PTD 2567 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1998-05-20
  minimum taxturnover taxdelegation of legislative powersabdication of legislative powerreferential legislationincome taxconstitutional lawAzad Jammu and Kashmir
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves twenty-six appeals filed by nine limited companies challenging the validity of section 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, which introduced a minimum turnover tax in Azad Jammu and Kashmir through referential legislation and an automatic adaptation provision for future laws enacted by the Pakistan Parliament. The core legal questions include whether the turnover tax falls within the scope of income-tax, whether the automatic adaptation of future laws enacted by another legislature amounts to an unconstitutional abdication of legislative powers, and whether the tax is discriminatory or contrary to Islamic injunctions. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that while a turnover tax as a minimum tax constitutes a valid tax on income and is not discriminatory, the provision allowing future amendments enacted by the Pakistan Parliament to automatically apply to Azad Jammu and Kashmir represents an unconstitutional abdication of legislative powers. Consequently, the court declared section 80-D as applied through automatic legislation to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The key principle laid down is that a legislative body cannot validly enact that future laws framed by another legislature shall automatically stand enforced within its realm, as doing so constitutes self-effacement and abdication of essential legislative functions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the imposition of a turnover tax falls within the scope and framework of income-tax law?
  • Does the automatic adaptation of future laws enacted by another legislature amount to an unconstitutional abdication of legislative powers?
  • Is section 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 discriminatory and violative of the Fundamental Right to equality of state subjects?
  • Can a legislative body delegate its power to make laws to an external authority without violating the constitutional distribution of powers?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sindh Tech. Industries Ltd. vs Messrs Investment Corporation1998 SCMR 1533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-04-28
  winding upstatutory noticeregistered officebanking companyloan recoveryparticipation term certificateCompanies Ordinanceinsolvency
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a winding-up order issued by the Sindh High Court against the appellant company under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The core legal questions were whether the winding-up petition was maintainable despite an alleged lack of service of statutory notice under Section 306 of the Ordinance, whether the respondent qualified as a banking company entitled to seek winding-up, and whether the financial arrangement between the parties constituted a loan. The Supreme Court held that the appellant company failed to notify the respondent of its change of address, rendering service at the registered office address valid under the agreement and the General Clauses Act. The Court further held that the respondent was a recognized banking company under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, and that the financial facility provided, including participation term certificates, constituted a loan, making the winding-up petition maintainable. The Court affirmed that failure to discharge acknowledged financial liabilities justifies winding up on just and equitable grounds. The key principle established is that a company cannot evade statutory notice requirements by failing to update its address with creditors, and that participation-based financial facilities constitute loans for winding-up purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Does a company's failure to notify a creditor of a change in its registered office invalidate service of statutory notice at the previous address?
  • Is a financial facility based on participation in profit and loss considered a loan for the purposes of a winding-up petition?
  • Can a debenture holder maintain a petition for the winding up of a company?
  • Is the respondent in a winding-up petition entitled to rely on the presumption of service under the General Clauses Act when notice was sent to the last known registered office?
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• Messrs Siemens Pakistan Engineering Co. Ltd. through General Manager, Islamabad vs District Judge, Islamabad and 2 others1998 PLD Lahore 1 · Lahore High Court
  Constitutional petitionsupervisory jurisdictionexpeditious disposaladministrative ordernatural justiceduty to give reasonsconsolidation of suits
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the District Judge directing a subordinate court to decide a suit for possession within a specific timeframe. The petitioner contended that the order was passed without hearing them, lacked reasons, and was issued without jurisdiction. The High Court examined the District Judge's authority and held that while the District Judge possesses certain powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the issuance of such directions in this specific matter exceeded their jurisdiction, particularly without affording the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, authorities exercising executive powers are legally obligated to provide reasons for their orders. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside. However, invoking its own supervisory jurisdiction under Article 203 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, the High Court directed the trial court to consolidate and decide both pending suits between the parties expeditiously by a specified date, ensuring the right to a timely disposal of causes.

  Questions settled

  • Does a District Judge have the jurisdiction to issue directions for the expeditious disposal of a suit pending in a subordinate court where the appellate jurisdiction lies with the High Court?
  • Are authorities exercising executive powers legally obligated to provide reasons for their orders under the General Clauses Act 1897?
  • Can the High Court exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to direct the consolidation and expeditious disposal of suits pending before a subordinate court?
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• Messrs Shangrila Hotels/Resorts (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director1998 SCMR 2349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-13
  interim reliefinterim injunctiondispossessionlease agreementleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the refusal of interim relief. The petitioner, a lessee of the Pines Hotel, alleged illegal dispossession by the respondents, whereas the respondents contended that possession was retaken due to the petitioner's default in lease payments. The petitioner instituted a suit for possession, permanent injunction, damages, and recovery of money, alongside an application for an interim injunction seeking the restoration of possession. Both the trial court and the High Court dismissed the interim relief applications, holding that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case or irreparable loss. Upon hearing the petitioner's Managing Director and noting the statements made by the respondents' counsel and the Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P., the Supreme Court disposed of the petition on the agreed terms that the respondents would not lease the disputed property to any third party and would run the hotel themselves during the pendency of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interim injunction for restoration of possession can be granted without establishing a prima facie case and irreparable loss?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be disposed of on the basis of a statement made by the parties regarding the preservation of the disputed property pending suit?
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• Mian Yamin Ul Haque vs Municipal Committee, Abbottabad through Chairman, and 5 others1998 MLD 431 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-06-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shahmurad Sugar Mills Ltd. through Administrative Manager vs Ghulam Mustafa and another1998 PLC 83 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-01
  seasonal workerreinstatementgrievance petitionright of re-employmentlabour lawshow-cause noticeservice of notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal's order upholding the reinstatement of a seasonal worker by the petitioner Sugar Mills. The core legal questions were whether the respondent’s grievance petition was time-barred due to a prior termination notice and whether a seasonal worker possesses the legal standing to maintain a grievance petition against non-employment. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to prove proper service of the alleged termination letter, thereby rejecting the presumption of service under the General Clauses Act. Regarding the second issue, the Court affirmed that a seasonal worker holds an unconditional right to re-employment. The key principle laid down is that an employer cannot deny re-employment to a seasonal worker without issuing a show-cause notice and providing an opportunity for a hearing. The Court emphasized that such procedural fairness is mandatory, and the failure to follow these steps renders the refusal of re-employment illegal and unsustainable under labour laws.

  Questions settled

  • Can a seasonal worker maintain a grievance petition against an employer for refusal of re-employment?
  • Is an employer required to issue a show-cause notice before refusing to re-employ a seasonal worker?
  • Does the presumption of service under Section 26 of the General Clauses Act apply when the address on the notice is incorrect?
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• Messrs Shafiq Hanif (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Bank of Credit and Commerce1998 CLC 314 · Sindh High Court · 1996-05-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs Select Sports A.S. Company vs Messrs Tempo EnterprisesK.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 463 · Lahore High Court · 1997-03-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Saif Textile Mills Limited vs Pakistan through Secretary, Finance1998 PLD Peshawar 15 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-07-31
  Federal Education Feelegislative competenceprovincial subjectfee versus taxultra viresFinance ActConstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Peshawar High Court addresses a batch of writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of section 15 of the Finance Act, 1992, which levied a Federal Education Fee on industrial units with fixed assets exceeding fifty million rupees. The core legal questions involved whether education is a provincial subject falling outside the legislative competence of the Federal Legislature under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and whether the impugned levy constituted a fee or a tax. The Court held that education is not included in the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List and remains a provincial subject, rendering the federal legislation ultra vires the Constitution. The Court further held that the levy lacked the essential character of a fee as no quid pro quo or special service was rendered to the payers, and no parent law authorized such collection. Consequently, the Court accepted the petitions and declared section 15 of the Finance Act, 1992 to be unconstitutional, unlawful, and without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Government has the legislative competence to levy an educational fee under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does education fall within the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List?
  • What is the distinction between a tax and a fee in light of constitutional jurisprudence?
  • Can a fee be levied without a corresponding quid pro quo or special service rendered to the payers?
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• Messrs S.S. Industries through Partner, Karachi vs Collector of Customs1998 PLD Karachi 320 · Sindh High Court · 1998-04-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Rhone and Poulence Rorer Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited, Wah1998 PLC 111 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Razzle Dazzle (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies-I and others1998 PTD 243 · Sindh High Court · 1997-03-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ravi Spinning Limited vs The Additional Commissioner of Income-Tax_ Wealth Tax (S.O. II), Companies Zone-I, Lahore and 2 others1998 PTD 3947 · Lahore High Court · 1998-04-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Rahim K. Shaikh vs United Bank Limited1998 SCMR 1504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-08
  consent ordercompromisebanking tribunalwithdrawal of appealpower of counselleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the order of the Full Bench of the Sindh High Court disposing of a banking appeal by consent. The respondent bank had obtained a decree from the Banking Tribunal, against which the petitioners filed an appeal. During proceedings, the parties reached a compromise and disposed of the appeal by consent before the High Court. The petitioners subsequently challenged this order before the Supreme Court, contending inter alia that no consent was given, that written agreements cannot be modified orally, that a Full Bench could not finally dispose of the appeal, and that a compromise must strictly be in writing under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the record clearly established the presence and consent of the petitioners and their counsel, that parties can modify existing agreements by subsequent consent, that civil appeals can be disposed of by consent on any hearing date, and that counsel's statements made in court regarding compromises are binding. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can parties to a civil appeal modify an existing out-of-court agreement by a subsequent consent order in court?
  • Whether an appeal pending before the High Court can be disposed of by a Full Bench on the basis of a consent arrangement?
  • Is a compromise entered into by a counsel in court required to be in writing under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party subsequently challenge a consent order on the ground of lack of consent without raising the objection immediately before the rendering court?
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• Messrs Qasimabad Enterprises vs Province of Sindh through Secretary, Housing and Town Planning Department, Government of Sindh, Karachi and 4 others1998 CLC 441 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-27
  temporary injunctionspecific performancejoint venture schemebalance of convenienceirreparable lossprime facie casethird party interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against the order passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad, rejecting an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, whereby the appellants sought a temporary injunction restraining the respondents from confirming an auction and allotments of plots under a Joint Venture Scheme. The core legal question was whether the appellants made out a strong prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction against the unilateral cancellation of a contract and the creation of third-party rights. The Sindh High Court held that the appellants failed to establish a strong prima facie case, as the contract involved numerous details and supervision incapable of specific performance under Section 21(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877, barred by Section 56(f) thereof, and because damages were explicitly quantified in the plaint, precluding a finding of irreparable loss. Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured third parties who had acquired rights and raised constructions. The court laid down the principle that temporary injunctions in contract matters will be withheld where specific performance is barred and where quantifiable damages provide an adequate remedy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contract that runs into minute and numerous details can be specifically enforced under the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Can an interim injunction be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which cannot be specifically enforced?
  • Does the quantification of damages in a suit for breach of contract negate the element of irreparable loss required for a temporary injunction?
  • Whether third-party interests created prior to or during litigation affect the balance of convenience in granting injunctive relief?
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• Messrs Pfizer Laboratories Limited vs Federation of Pakistan and others1998 PLD Supreme Court 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-28
  customs dutysales taxexemption notificationrefund of taxlimitation periodmistake of lawmistake of factconstitutional petitionproperty rightsunjust enrichment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal against a Sindh High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition seeking a refund of customs duties and sales tax paid by the appellant, Pfizer Laboratories Limited, on imported salinomycin. The appellant contended that salinomycin was exempt from these taxes under S.R.O. 349(1)/85 and S.R.O. 1148(1)/89, issued under Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969, and Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The refund claim was rejected by customs authorities and the High Court on the ground of being time-barred under Section 33 of the Customs Act, 1969. The Supreme Court held that Section 33 does not apply when a duty or tax was not payable at all due to an exemption, as such payment is considered made under a mistake of law or fact, invoking Section 72 of the Contract Act, 1872. The Court emphasized that public authorities should not rely on technical pleas like limitation to defeat legitimate claims for illegally recovered amounts. The appeal was allowed, the impugned orders set aside, and the case remanded to the Collector of Customs to determine if the appellant had fulfilled the exemption conditions, directing a refund if conditions were met, as denial would violate Article 24(1) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period specified in Section 33 of the Customs Act, 1969, apply to claims for refund of duties or taxes paid on goods that were entirely exempt from such levies?
  • Can money paid to a government department under a mistake of fact or law, which was not legally due, be recovered under Section 72 of the Contract Act, 1872?
  • Is a government or public authority justified in relying on technical pleas like limitation to defeat a citizen's legitimate claim for a refund of illegally recovered amounts?
  • Can a High Court, in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, direct the refund of taxes or levies collected without lawful authority, provided no disputed questions of fact are involved?
  • Does the voluntary payment of a tax or levy preclude the right to claim a refund if the amount was not lawfully payable?
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