Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Messrs Petrocommodities (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan1998 P.C.T.L.R. 602 · Sindh High Court · 1996-12-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Parks Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance, Revenue and Economic Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and another1998 CLC 706 · Balochistan High Court · 1997-08-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Petroleum Limited through Chief Industrial Relations, Karachi vs Matloob Hussain and another1998 PLC 263 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1997-03-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pak-Arab Refinery Limited through General Manager vs Abdul1998 SCMR 2729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-11
  revisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsmisreading of evidenceleave to appealinterim reliefcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging a judgment delivered by the High Court. The core legal question presented for the Supreme Court's consideration is whether the High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, was legally justified in reversing the concurrent findings of fact previously established by both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. Furthermore, the Court sought to examine whether the High Court's judgment was vitiated by the misreading or non-reading of the evidence on record. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address these issues, thereby signaling a need to scrutinize the scope and limits of revisional interference with concurrent findings. Pending the final adjudication of the appeal, the Supreme Court ordered the continuation of an interim relief measure previously granted in Chambers, contingent upon the petitioner's compliance with a deposit requirement of Rs. 1,00,000, which the petitioner confirmed had been fulfilled. The case remains pending for final determination on the merits of the High Court's exercise of revisional power.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court justified in reversing concurrent findings of fact of the Trial Court and Appellate Court while exercising revisional powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the High Court's judgment suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Processing Company vs Mst. Hajyani Hawa1998 PLD Karachi 195 · Sindh High Court · 1996-03-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Munawar & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd vs Karachi Development Authority1998 MLD 1771 · Sindh High Court · 1998-06-14
  temporary injunctioncancellation of allotmentlease deedright in remnatural justiceaudi alteram partembuilding control
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil miscellaneous application in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction involves a dispute wherein the plaintiff sought to restrain the Karachi Development Authority (K.D.A.) and Karachi Building Control Authority (K.B.C.A.) from dealing with or allotting the suit plot to others and from demolishing the building constructed thereon. The core legal question concerned whether an allotment and registered lease executed in favor of an allottee after full payment of occupancy value could be unilaterally cancelled by the authority without a show-cause notice, due process, or intervention of a court of law. The Sindh High Court held that the execution of a lease creates a valuable right in rem which cannot be arbitrarily or unilaterally revoked by the authority without establishing a default, issuing a valid show-cause notice, and adhering to principles of natural justice. The court laid down the key principle that once a lease is executed and possession delivered, rights are created that necessitate due process, and state functionaries must act fairly, justly, and within the bounds of law rather than through arbitrary executive cancellation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a registered lease deed and allotment can be unilaterally cancelled by the Karachi Development Authority without a valid show-cause notice?
  • Does the execution of a lease deed and delivery of possession create a right in rem that prevents arbitrary revocation?
  • Is a statutory notice under Article 131 of the K.D.A. Order 1957 mandatory when the impugned action of the authority is prima facie illegal and without jurisdiction?
  • Whether an interim injunction can be granted to restrain authorities from demolishing construction raised pursuant to an approved building plan?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Muhammad Yasin & Co. vs Karachi Development Authority1998 CLC 1313 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Moon Industrial Chemical vs Secretary, Excise & Taxation and others1998 MLD 659 · Lahore High Court · 1997-05-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mona Lisa Fruit Juice Industries Ltd. through Managing Director1998 MLD 9 · Sindh High Court · 1996-11-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Moin Sons (Pvt.) Ltd., Rawalpindi through Sardar Alam, Director1998 PTD 2557 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Millat Bottle Store, Faisalabad vs Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 2555 · Lahore High Court · 1997-04-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mehran Traders vs Messrs Wellcome Pakistan Limited, Karachi1998 CLC 2023 · Sindh High Court · 1997-03-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mas Textiles and others vs Ghulam Abbas1998 MLD 2076 · Sindh High Court · 1996-02-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs M.Y. Electronics Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Manager and others vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others1998 PTD 2728 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-11
  promissory estoppelcustoms duty exemptionsales tax exemptionvested rightsSection 31-A Customs Actlegitimate expectationGadoon Amazai Industrial Estate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals challenging the withdrawal of tax and duty exemptions granted to industries in the Gadoon Amazai Industrial Estate. The core legal questions concern whether the government could unilaterally withdraw these exemptions despite claims of promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation, and vested rights, and whether Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, legally validated such withdrawals. The Court held that the government possessed the authority to withdraw the exemptions. It ruled that Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, effectively nullified the doctrine of vested rights regarding customs duty exemptions, even where letters of credit were opened prior to the withdrawal. However, the Court distinguished sales tax, holding that Section 31-A did not extend to the Sales Tax Act, 1951; therefore, sales tax exemptions could not be withdrawn retrospectively to affect vested rights established before the withdrawal notification. The key principle established is that while promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against statutory provisions, executive exemptions not time-bound are subject to withdrawal, provided that vested rights are protected where the law does not explicitly authorize retrospective deprivation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the doctrine of promissory estoppel be invoked against statutory provisions?
  • Does Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, apply to the withdrawal of sales tax exemptions?
  • Can the government retrospectively withdraw tax exemptions to affect vested rights established by the opening of letters of credit?
  • Does the power to grant an exemption include the power to withdraw it?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khan Brothers and Associates vs Director-General Food, Government of1998 CLC 1671 · Sindh High Court · 1998-05-12
  arbitration awardmisconduct of arbitratorenlargement of timedemurrageforce majeurewaiver and estoppelrule of the court
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves objections filed by the Director-General Food, Government of Pakistan against an arbitration award dated 27th July 1991, under sections 14(2), 30, and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The principal objections raised were that the arbitrator misconducted himself by accepting travelling expenses, that he ignored evidence regarding civil disturbances and slow discharge rates at Port Qasim, that the contractor had no direct contractual obligation with the respondent, and that the award was rendered beyond the statutory period of four months. The Sindh High Court held that the arbitrator did not commit legal misconduct, that the court cannot reappraise evidence as an appellate forum, that the carrier's use of a tanker instead of a bulker justified the discharge rate, and that the parties by their active participation and conduct beyond four months impliedly consented to the extension of time, invoking the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. Consequently, the court dismissed the objections and made the award a rule of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration award is vitiated solely because it is made after the expiry of the four-month statutory period when the parties continued to participate in the proceedings without objection?
  • Can a court hearing objections against an arbitration award undertake a reappraisal of the evidence recorded by the arbitrator?
  • Whether the receipt of travelling expenses by an arbitrator from a party constitutes legal misconduct invalidating the arbitration proceedings?
  • Does the principle of waiver and estoppel apply when parties submit themselves to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator after the expiration of the time fixed for making the award?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Jaycee Pipe Agencies vs Messrs Jahangir Chemicals and Plastic1998 MLD 115 · Lahore High Court · 1997-07-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs Inpaktech Industries (Pvt:) Ltd vs Government of Punjab1998 MLD 1383 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Huffaz Seamless Pipe Industries Ltd. vs Sui Northern Gas1998 CLC 1890 · Lahore High Court · 1998-05-29
  writ jurisdictionstate instrumentalitylifting of corporate veilcontractual obligationssales tax liabilitypublic functionarytender award
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves three Intra-Court Appeals arising from a writ petition concerning the award of a contract for the supply of steel line pipes by Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. (S.N.G.P.L.) and a controversial stipulation regarding sales tax liability. The core legal questions addressed whether S.N.G.P.L. is amenable to the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, whether contractual obligations can be enforced through a writ, and whether the stores supplied were exempt from sales tax or if the purchaser could legally assume the sales tax liability. The Lahore High Court held that although S.N.G.P.L. is incorporated under the Companies Ordinance 1984, the lifting of its corporate veil reveals that it is substantially controlled and funded by the Federal Government and performs public functions, making it a state instrumentality subject to judicial review under Article 199. Furthermore, the court held that the contract prices quoted by the supplier were inclusive of all taxes, that section 64-A of the Sale of Goods Act 1930 did not apply to shift the tax burden, and that the management's decision to shoulder the sales tax liability exceeded the Board of Directors' resolution and was unlawful. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a limited company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance is amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can contractual obligations and disputes arising from commercial contracts entered into by state-controlled corporations be enforced or examined through writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether section 64-A of the Sale of Goods Act 1930 permits a vendor to shift the burden of sales tax to the purchaser when the tax was already in existence at the time of contract finalization?
  • Whether the management of a corporate entity can alter the terms of a tender and assume tax liabilities without the express authorization of its Board of Directors?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hashoo Steel Industries Ltd., Karachi through Manager vs Abdul1998 PLC 152 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-03-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hakim and Sons Chemicals vs Registrar of Trade Marks1998 PLC 122 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-31
  Trade Union RegistrationRegistrar of Trade UnionsCollective Bargaining AgentTermination of EmploymentStanding Orders OrdinanceAlternate RemedyAggrieved PersonConstitutional Jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court Appeal was filed against a Single Judge's dismissal of a Constitutional Petition challenging the Registrar of Trade Unions' registration of respondent No. 2 as a trade union and the subsequent call for a Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) determination. The appellant employer claimed that the union's office-bearers were terminated daily-wage workers (outsiders) and that the registration was void because the employer was not associated with the Registrar's inquiry. The Division Bench affirmed the Single Judge's dismissal, holding that the statutory scheme of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 does not grant employers a right to participate in union registration inquiries. Furthermore, the employer violated Standing Orders 2-A and 12(3) by failing to issue written appointment and termination letters, thereby failing to prove the workers had ceased employment. The Court further ruled that the employer was not an 'aggrieved person' under Article 199, had not exhausted the alternate statutory remedy under Section 10 of the Ordinance for cancellation of registration, and could not use constitutional jurisdiction to substitute the Registrar's factual determinations.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer have a statutory right under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 to be associated with or participate in an inquiry conducted by the Registrar for registering a trade union?
  • Can an employer prove lawful termination of daily-wage or temporary workers without issuing written termination orders containing reasons under Standing Orders 2-A and 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 maintainable to challenge a trade union's registration when the statutory remedy under Section 10 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 has not been exhausted?
  • Does the mere registration of a trade union make an employer an 'aggrieved person' within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Haji Khuda Bux vs Karachi Building Control Authority and others1998 PLD Karachi 307 · Sindh High Court · 1998-03-04
  dangerous buildingdemolition noticenatural justiceopportunity of hearingtemporary injunctionbuilding control
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter before the Sindh High Court arose from a suit filed by a long-standing tenant challenging a demolition and vacation notice issued by the Karachi Building Control Authority (KBCA) regarding allegedly dangerous premises. The core legal question was whether a building control notice issued under Section 14 of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979, without affording an opportunity of a hearing to the affected occupant, is legal and sustainable. The court held that the impugned notice was issued in clear violation of the mandatory proviso to Section 14 and the fundamental principles of natural justice, as no show-cause notice or opportunity of being heard was granted to the tenant prior to taking adverse action. The court declared the notice illegal, without lawful authority, and of no legal effect, while clarifying that the KBCA remains at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings strictly in accordance with the prescribed statutory procedure. The key principle laid down is that the statutory requirement of a pre-decisional hearing under Section 14 is mandatory and mandatory principles of natural justice must be read into every statute affecting civil rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a notice for the demolition of a dangerous building issued under Section 14 of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979 is illegal if issued without affording an opportunity of being heard to the affected occupant?
  • Are the principles of natural justice to be read into every statute where an executive order adversely affects a person's interest?
  • Can the Karachi Building Control Authority take action for the demolition or vacation of a building without complying with the mandatory proviso of Section 14 of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Habib Bank Limited vs Naseer Ahmed and another1998 MLD 1765 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-10-27
  canned ejectmentpersonal bona fide needcommercial premiseslease agreement waiverburden of prooflandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 24 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 challenged an ejectment order passed by the Additional Controller of Rents against the appellant-tenant bank in favor of the landlords-respondents, who sought the premises for their bona fide personal use. The core legal questions involved whether a lease agreement covenant waiving statutory ejectment rights is enforceable, whether the failure to disclose the specific nature of an intended business vitiates a personal need claim, and whether business experience is a prerequisite for seeking eviction. The Peshawar High Court held that statutory provisions override inconsistent contract terms, that a landlord is not legally required to state the specific nature of the intended business or possess prior business experience, and that an assertion of personal need on oath, if unshakeable in cross-examination, suffices to establish bona fides. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming that covenants violative of rent restriction laws are void and that statutory protections sufficiently safeguard tenants.

  Questions settled

  • Does a covenant in a lease agreement waiving statutory rights of ejectment override the provisions of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Is it legally mandatory for a landlord seeking eviction on grounds of personal need to disclose the specific nature of the intended business in the ejectment application?
  • Must a landlord possess prior business experience to successfully claim commercial premises for personal and bona fide use?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a landlord's assertion on oath regarding personal requirement when unshakeable in cross-examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs H. B. Ltd. vs Messrs Karim Cotton Mills and others1998 CLC 1403 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-09
  leave to defendrecovery of loanslimitation periodmortgage suitacknowledgment of liabilityguarantors' liabilitybanking suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application for unconditional leave to defend a banking recovery suit filed under section 7(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 for the recovery of Rs. 25,60,09,486.14 based on multiple accounts and mortgage deeds. The core legal questions centered on whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 132 or Article 57 of the Limitation Act 1908, whether guarantors were absolved from liability due to subsequent variations or death, and whether interest claims violated Islamic injunctions. The court held that the mortgage money was payable on demand and that subsequent mortgage deeds acknowledging prior liabilities did not trigger limitation prematurely, that balance-sheet entries constitute valid acknowledgment of liability under section 19 of the Limitation Act 1908, and that no statutory variations discharged the guarantors. Consequently, the application for leave to defend was dismissed, and the suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff along with a final mortgage decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does the execution of subsequent mortgage deeds acknowledging prior liabilities amount to a demand for repayment that triggers the limitation period under Article 132 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Do entries in a company's balance-sheet and annual reports constitute a valid acknowledgment of liability under section 19 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Whether guarantors stand absolved from liability under section 133 of the Contract Act 1872 in the absence of proven material variations in the terms of the loan?
  • Does a banking recovery suit based on continuing letters of guarantee fall under Article 57 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Granulars (Pvt.) Limited. Karachi through Chief Executive and 21998 PLC 258 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-02-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bahadur vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1888 · Lahore High Court · 1998-01-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Gokal Shipping and Trading Corporation Limited, Karachi and 3 others vs Registrar of Trade Unions, Government of Sindh, Karachi and 3 others1998 PLD Karachi 127 · Sindh High Court · 1997-12-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ghazi Vegetables Ghee and Oil Mills Ltd vs Messrs Templan Orvy1998 SCMR 959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-13
  interim mandatory injunctionletter of creditbill of ladingperishable cargobank guaranteeinterlocutory orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from an order of the High Court of Sindh, which affirmed a Single Judge's interlocutory order concerning rival claims to a perishable cargo of imported R.B.D. Palm Oil. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner was entitled to an interim mandatory injunction for the delivery of the goods without furnishing a bank guarantee, and whether a prohibitory injunction could be issued to restrain a bank from honouring a letter of credit. The Supreme Court held that the rights and obligations under a letter of credit and a bill of lading are distinct, and the lower court's interlocutory arrangement—requiring a bank guarantee for delivery or otherwise selling the perishable cargo through a court-appointed receiver and depositing the proceeds—was fair and proper. The Court laid down that interim arrangements regarding perishable goods in commercial suits involving competing claims must balance equities and protect all potential rights without prejudging the merits, and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Are the rights and obligations under a letter of credit distinct from those under a bill of lading?
  • Can an interim mandatory injunction be granted for the delivery of imported goods without a bank guarantee when rival claims to the cargo exist?
  • Is an interlocutory order directing the sale of perishable cargo and deposit of proceeds pending suit subject to interference by the Supreme Court when deemed fair?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Essem Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director vs Capital Development1998 CLC 1453 · Lahore High Court · 1998-04-24
  constitutional petitionallotment of plotdelayed payment chargesphysical possessionbreach of contractencroachmentscapital development authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a Constitution petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging an order of the Capital Development Authority demanding payment of outstanding premium dues and delayed payment charges on a plot allotted for constructing a 5-Star Hotel in Islamabad, failing which the allotment would be cancelled. The core legal questions revolved around whether an allottee can be penalized with delayed payment charges when actual physical possession of the plot was not delivered and it remained embroiled in third-party litigation and encroachments, and whether reciprocal contractual obligations permit a party to demand performance while being in default. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner could not be burdened with financial liabilities or penalized for delays caused by litigation and encroachments, or for the inactions of the respondent-Authority in delivering a clear title and physical possession. The Court laid down the principle that a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong or the acts of others to penalize another, that contractual terms must be read harmoniously, and that a party failing to deliver possession free from encumbrances cannot lawfully demand delayed payment charges.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allottee of land be penalized with delayed payment charges when the respondent-Authority fails to deliver actual physical possession free from encroachments and litigation?
  • Whether the time spent on litigation initiated by third parties in respect of an allotted plot can be utilized by the allotting authority to the detriment of the allottee?
  • Does the principle that a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong apply to prevent a statutory authority from demanding premium instalments without fulfilling its obligation to deliver clear title?
  • Whether the non-delivery of physical possession of a plot justifies withholding balance premium payments without attracting penal surcharges?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Diloom Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Managing Director, Karachi vs Kaleemullah and another1998 PLC 313 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-03-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Crown Construction Services and anothers vs Mst. Nasreen1998 CLC 1964 · Sindh High Court · 1998-06-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Central Insurance Co. Ltd. and others vs Commissioner of Income Tax and others1998 SCMR 932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-03
  income taxreopening of assessmentdividend incomeinsurance companiesleave to appealdefinite information
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions directed against a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh which dismissed constitutional petitions filed against notices issued under sections 65 and 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, for reopening finalised assessments regarding dividend income of insurance companies. The core legal question concerns the correct interpretation of section 26(a) read with the Tax Rate Structure of the First Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, regarding dividend income, and whether notices under section 65(2) were based on 'definite information'. Following the rule of consistency based on earlier leave-granting orders passed by the Supreme Court in similar matters, the court held that leave to appeal should be granted to consider these questions, while declining to grant any stay order, and directed the appeals to be fixed together.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 26(a) read with the provisions relating to the Tax Rate Structure of the First Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 were correctly interpreted by the High Court regarding dividend income?
  • Whether a notice issued under section 65(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 was based on definite information as contemplated under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bawany Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Muhammad Sharif and others1998 PLC 389 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-12-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bashir Engineering Industries Limited and otherss vs Messrs1998 CLC 2065 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-26
  Constitutional jurisdictioninterim orderleave to defendequitable mortgagejudicial reviewbanking suitspecial judge banking
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two writ petitions challenging an interim order passed by the Special Judge Banking, which granted the petitioners conditional leave to defend a suit upon the deposit of the suit amount, while granting the respondent-Bank unconditional leave to defend a counter-suit. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise constitutional jurisdiction against an interim order and whether the trial court’s imposition of a deposit condition was legally sustainable. The High Court held that while judicial review is generally not exercised against interim orders, it is permissible where such orders are arbitrary, fanciful, oppressive, or passed in disregard of relevant factors. The court found that the Special Judge failed to consider that the loan was already secured by an equitable mortgage, rendering the condition of deposit oppressive. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside as being without lawful authority, and the leave applications were remanded for fresh determination in accordance with established legal principles regarding the grant of leave to defend.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction to set aside an interim order passed by a subordinate court?
  • Under what circumstances can an interim order be challenged as being arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive?
  • Is the existence of an equitable mortgage a relevant factor for a court to consider when deciding whether to grant conditional or unconditional leave to defend a suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Aslo Marines Limited vs M.T. "Magda" and another1998 CLC 279 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ashraf Sugar Mills vs Central Board of Revenue and others1998 PTD 3856 · Lahore High Court · 1998-04-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ampake Pipe Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Collector Customs and others1998 CLC 674 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-10-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Amin Fabrics Ltd., Kotri vs The Commissioner, Aiwan-E-1998 PLC (C.S.) 694 · Sindh High Court · 1998-01-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ama (Private) Ltd. vs Riaz Qasim1998 CLC 558 · Sindh High Court · 1996-11-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ali & Works vs Tax Recovery1998 PTD 3697 · Lahore High Court · 1998-04-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Al-Barkat Industrial Corporation Limited, Faisalabad through Sh. Abdus Salam, D i rector vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad, and others1998 SCMR 566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-16
  leave to appealtax recoveryinterim stayconstitutional interpretationIncome Tax OrdinanceAttorney-General notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the validity of Sections 80-C, 80-CC, and 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, which also necessitates the interpretation of the Constitution. The petitioner sought leave and a stay of recovery, noting that the Supreme Court had already granted leave and stay in several connected petitions involving the same legal questions. Finding merit in the request for consistency, the Court granted leave to appeal. Furthermore, the Court directed that notice be issued to the Attorney-General pursuant to the requirements of the Civil Procedure Code. Regarding the interim relief, the Court ordered that the recovery of the tax in question shall remain suspended during the pendency of the appeals, provided the petitioners furnish an undertaking to pay the tax as levied or leviable under the aforementioned sections, along with interest at a rate of 2% above the bank rate, should the appeals ultimately be dismissed. The Court also prioritized the hearing of the matter due to its impact on Federal Government finances.

  Questions settled

  • Can the recovery of tax be suspended pending the final adjudication of an appeal challenging the validity of tax provisions?
  • Is notice to the Attorney-General mandatory when a petition raises questions regarding the validity of statutory provisions and constitutional interpretation?
  • Under what conditions may a court grant a stay on the recovery of tax during the pendency of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Airport Support Services vs The Airport Manager, Quaid-E-1998 SCMR 2268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-23
  Constitutional petitioncontractual disputepublic functionarylicence terminationrecovery of possessionstatutory noticearbitration clausediscretionary reliefCivil Aviation Authorityjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned an appeal against the dismissal of a Constitutional petition challenging the Civil Aviation Authority's (CAA) termination of a licence agreement and recovery of premises. The core legal questions revolved around the applicability of Constitutional jurisdiction to contractual disputes involving public functionaries, the effect of an arbitration clause, and the legality of the CAA's action without prior notice under statutory provisions. The Supreme Court held that the CAA's termination and take-over were unlawful due to non-compliance with mandatory notice requirements under Section 3 of the Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965, read with Section 11(5) of the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance, 1982. However, the Court declined to grant relief to the appellant, exercising its discretionary Constitutional jurisdiction, citing the appellant's questionable conduct, including lack of transparency in contract acquisition, unauthorized changes in partnership, and alleged illegal activities on the premises. The judgment affirmed that Constitutional jurisdiction can extend to contractual breaches by public functionaries involving statutory obligations or public interest, and that arbitration clauses do not necessarily bar such remedies, but relief remains discretionary.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Constitutional Court exercise jurisdiction over contractual disputes involving public functionaries where statutory obligations are breached?
  • Does an arbitration clause in a contract bar the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is a public functionary required to provide prior notice before terminating a licence and recovering possession of premises under the Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965?
  • Can a Constitutional Court decline relief even if the actions of a public functionary are found unlawful, based on the petitioner's conduct?
  • How does Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, impact the exercise of power by authorities under enactments?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Agro Pack (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Collector of Customs, Peshawar1998 SCMR 2624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-01
  bank guarantee encashmentinterim injunctionconstitutional jurisdictioncustoms duty exemptioncivil suitwrit petitionpendency of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which refused to grant an interim injunction restraining the Customs Department from encashing bank guarantees. The petitioner, having previously failed in constitutional petitions challenging the withdrawal of customs duty exemptions, filed a civil suit seeking a declaration for compensation and an injunction against the encashment of guarantees furnished during the earlier writ proceedings. The core legal question was whether a civil court could restrain the encashment of bank guarantees provided in prior constitutional proceedings, and whether such a suit constituted a continuation of the earlier writ petitions. The Supreme Court held that the civil suit was an independent proceeding, not a continuation of the constitutional petitions. Consequently, the bank guarantees became encashable upon the dismissal of the writ petitions. The Court affirmed that interim orders passed under constitutional jurisdiction are subject to the limitations of Article 199(4-A) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which mandates the cessation of interim orders after six months. The petition was dismissed, upholding the lower courts' refusal to grant injunctive relief.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court restrain the encashment of bank guarantees furnished during earlier constitutional proceedings that have since been dismissed?
  • Does the filing of a civil suit after the withdrawal of a writ petition constitute a continuation of the earlier constitutional proceedings?
  • Do interim orders passed under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court lapse after six months pursuant to Article 199(4-A) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Memoona Ahmad vs A.C.I.T., Circle "a", Quett1998 PTD 2969 · Balochistan High Court · 1998-03-11Read full judgment →
• Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore vs Rafaqat Ali1998 SCMR 2596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-04-22
  evacuee propertydisplaced personsbuilding sitesagricultural landsettlement commissionerrepeal act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the entitlement of the respondent to certain land under the first proviso of section 3 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The core legal question concerns the effect of the notification dated 16th May 1973 issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, declaring available evacuee urban land as building sites, and whether urban agricultural land ceases to be available for agricultural adjustment after such notification. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that upon the issuance of the notification, unutilized urban agricultural land converted into building sites and was no longer available for agricultural claims or disposal as agricultural land under the Repeal Act of 1975. The key principle laid down is that a valid notification converting urban agricultural land into building sites renders such land unavailable for subsequent agricultural allotments or adjustments upon the repeal of evacuee laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notification declaring available evacuee urban land as building sites convert unutilized urban agricultural land into building sites?
  • Can unallotted urban agricultural land be claimed for agricultural adjustment after the promulgation of the notification dated 16th May 1973?
  • What is the effect of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 on unallotted evacuee properties?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehtab Ali vs The State1998 SCMR 2459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-04-06
  leave to appealbenefit of doubtocular evidencemedical evidence contradictioninterested witnesseschance witnessesconviction reliability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court which upheld the conviction of the petitioner, Mehtab Ali, for the murder of Ghulam Abbas, while converting his death sentence to life imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, along with several co-accused, murdered the deceased due to a prior abduction incident. The trial court convicted the petitioner under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting all other co-accused by granting them the benefit of the doubt. The petitioner contends that the High Court failed to properly evaluate the evidence, arguing that the eye-witnesses were interested and chance witnesses, and that the ocular account contradicted the medical evidence regarding the weapon used and the nature of the injuries. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal primarily to determine whether prosecution evidence that was rejected regarding the majority of the co-accused can legally be relied upon to sustain a conviction against the remaining petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can prosecution evidence that is disbelieved regarding the majority of co-accused be relied upon to sustain a conviction against the remaining accused?
  • Does a contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the weapon used warrant the rejection of the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehram Ali and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others1998 SCMR 1156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-15
  Anti-Terrorism ActIndependence of JudiciaryConstitutional ValidityFundamental RightsDue ProcessSpecial CourtsTrial in Absentia
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the constitutional validity of various provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal questions addressed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan involved determining whether specific sections of the Act infringed upon fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and the principle of the independence of the judiciary. The Court held that several provisions were invalid or required amendment to align with constitutional mandates. Specifically, the Court invalidated provisions authorizing the use of force without provocation, trials in absentia, and the admissibility of confessions made to police officers. Furthermore, the Court ruled that provisions creating appellate tribunals and granting rule-making powers to the executive were inconsistent with the independence of the judiciary, mandating that appellate jurisdiction be vested in the High Court and rule-making authority be transferred to the judiciary. The key principle established is that legislation creating special courts must ensure judicial independence, adhere to due process, and conform to fundamental rights, ensuring that executive powers do not encroach upon the judicial domain.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to open fire without being fired upon under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 violate constitutional protections?
  • Is the provision for trial in absentia under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 violative of Article 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the admissibility of confessions recorded by police officers under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 violate the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 that vest appellate and rule-making powers in executive-controlled bodies inconsistent with the independence of the judiciary?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehram Ali Alias Yawar Ali vs Federation of Pakistan And OtherK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 506 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-09Read full judgment →
• Mehram Ali alias Yawar Ali vs Federation of Pakistan and 4 others1998 PLD Lahore 347 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-09Read full judgment →
• Mehr Noman Khan vs Ghulam Abbas and 3 others1998 SCMR 464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-09
  pre-emptionleave to appealrejection of plaintTalabIslamic Lawco-sharerShafi Khaleet
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a suit for possession through pre-emption filed by the petitioner against the respondents regarding disputed land. The petitioner claimed a preferential right as a co-sharer and Shafi Khaleet. The trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, reasoning that no law of pre-emption existed between 1986 and 1990. This decision was upheld by the District Judge and subsequently by the Lahore High Court, which further noted that the petitioner failed to fulfill the requirements of Talab under Islamic Law. The core legal question is whether the absence of statutory pre-emption law precludes the exercise of such rights and whether the courts below erred in ignoring the petitioner's pleadings and evidence regarding the necessary Talabs. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether Islamic Law governs pre-emption in the absence of statutory provisions and whether the courts below failed to properly consider the petitioner's evidence regarding the performance of Talab-e-Muwathibat, Talab-e-Ishhad, and Talab-e-Khusumat.

  Questions settled

  • Does Islamic Law govern the right of pre-emption in the absence of a specific statutory law during the relevant period?
  • Did the courts below err in rejecting the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without considering the evidence regarding the performance of Talabs?
  • Is the philosophy of the removal of Zarar a pre-condition to the exercise of the right of pre-emption or merely an underlying principle?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Khan vs Executive Engineer, Electricity WAPDA, Mianwali and 31998 PLC (C.S.) 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-10
  superannuationrecovery of salarydate of birthservice lawbona fidelimitationWAPDA
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a service appeal by the Service Tribunal, which had rejected the petitioner's claim as time-barred. The petitioner, a former WAPDA employee, challenged his forced retirement and the subsequent recovery of salary paid to him for the period between his alleged superannuation date and his actual retirement date. The core legal question was whether the Department was justified in recovering salary for services rendered after the petitioner had technically reached the age of superannuation, given that the petitioner had continued to work despite knowing his correct date of birth. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit. The Court reasoned that the petitioner acted without bona fides by continuing in service past his superannuation age while aware of his correct date of birth. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the Department was entitled to recover the salary paid during the unauthorized period of service. The principle established is that an employee cannot claim remuneration for services performed beyond the age of superannuation when they have knowingly suppressed their correct date of birth to remain in service.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee claim salary for services rendered after the date of superannuation if the employee knowingly suppressed their correct date of birth?
  • Is a department entitled to recover salary paid to an employee who continued to work beyond their superannuation age due to a dispute over their date of birth?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Khan vs Executive Engineer, Electricity WAPDA, Mainwali and 31998 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-10
  superannuationrecovery of salarybona fideservice tribunallimitationWAPDA employee
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a WAPDA employee, challenged his forced retirement and the subsequent recovery of salary paid to him for the period he continued working beyond his superannuation age. The petitioner had initially declared his date of birth as 3-3-1932, but continued in service past the age of 60, eventually being retired on 1-4-1993. The Department subsequently recovered the salary paid to him for the period between his actual retirement date and his forced retirement date. The petitioner's appeal to the Service Tribunal was dismissed as time-barred. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the recovery of salary for services actually rendered was unjustified. The Court held that the petitioner did not act bona fide, as he was aware of his correct date of birth yet failed to inform the authorities or retire upon reaching superannuation. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, determining that the petitioner was not entitled to retain salary for the period he served beyond his superannuation age due to his lack of bona fide conduct.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to retain salary for services rendered after the date of superannuation if the employee knowingly failed to disclose their correct date of birth?
  • Can an employee who continues in service beyond the age of superannuation due to their own lack of bona fide conduct claim protection against the recovery of salary paid during that period?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Ali vs The Superintendent, Central Jail, Machh and anothers1998 P Cr. L J 893 · Balochistan High Court · 1997-10-22Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Sultan vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1769 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-02-27
  dying declarationocular testimonyabscondencecompensation to legal heirscriminal revisionenhancement of sentenceadmissibility of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a life imprisonment sentence, and a criminal revision petition seeking enhancement of the sentence to death and the imposition of compensation. The core legal questions involved the admissibility of a dying declaration recorded by a police officer in the absence of a magistrate, the evidentiary value of ocular testimony that was previously disbelieved against co-accused, and the legal requirement for awarding compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the dying declaration was admissible as it was corroborated by medical evidence and ocular testimony, and that the accused's long abscondence, coupled with other evidence, established guilt. The Court declined to enhance the sentence to death, citing the accused's age and the prosecution's tendency to implicate innocent family members. However, it allowed the revision petition to the extent of ordering compensation to the legal heirs, affirming that under Section 544-A, such compensation is mandatory upon conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration recorded by a police officer in the absence of a magistrate admissible if corroborated by medical evidence?
  • Does the principle of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' apply to the testimony of witnesses in criminal cases in Pakistan?
  • Is the awarding of compensation to legal heirs under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory upon conviction?
  • Can long abscondence without reasonable explanation be used as corroborative evidence of guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Sultan Afridi (Inspector Legal), F.I.A. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and anothers1998 SCMR 2482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-11
  service lawtransfervested rightF.I.A. rulesstatutory interpretationpromotioncadre
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of the appellant's service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal, which had rejected his request for transfer from the Legal Group to the Investigation Wing of the Federal Investigation Agency (F.I.A.). The appellant, an Inspector (Legal), contended that the various groups within the F.I.A. constituted a single cadre, making personnel inter-se transferable, and alleged discrimination regarding promotion opportunities. The core legal question was whether an employee appointed to a specific group under the F.I.A. (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975, possesses a vested right to be transferred to a different group for better promotion prospects. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the F.I.A. rules explicitly categorize posts into six distinct groups, each with peculiar eligibility requirements. The Court affirmed that the appellant, having applied for and accepted a position in the Legal Group, was bound by these statutory classifications. The key principle laid down is that civil servants have no vested right to claim transfer from one post or group to another, particularly when statutory rules establish distinct categories for administration and promotion purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to be transferred from one post or group to another?
  • Are the groups specified in Rule 12 of the F.I.A. (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975, considered a single cadre for the purpose of inter-se transferability?
  • Can an employee appointed to a specific group under the F.I.A. (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975, claim a right to be transferred to a different group for better promotion opportunities?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Sultan Afridi (Inspector Legal), F.I.A. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and another1998 PLC (C.S.) 1493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-11
  service tribunaltransferpromotioncivil servantfunctional groupsvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal with leave against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's appeal regarding his posting and transfer within the Federal Investigation Agency (F.I.A.). The appellant, appointed as an Inspector (Legal) in the F.I.A., sought a transfer to the Investigation Wing to secure equal promotion opportunities, alleging discrimination. The core legal question was whether an employee belonging to the Legal Group has a right to be transferred to the Investigation Wing or inter se across different functional groups specified under the relevant service rules. The Supreme Court held that the posts in the F.I.A. are categorized into distinct groups under Rule 12 of the F.I.A. (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975, with statutory force, each having peculiar eligibility requirements, and that no civil servant possesses a vested right to demand a transfer from one post or group to another. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to be transferred from one post to another?
  • Are the different groups specified under Rule 12 of the F.I.A. (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975 inter se transferable as a matter of right?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Elahi Farooqui vs Messrs United Bank Limited1998 PLD Karachi 133 · Sindh High Court · 1997-12-15
  ejectment orderexecution of ordersrent controllersubsequent lease deedlimitation periodcompromise or agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 arose from orders dismissing the appellant-landlord's execution application for an ejectment order and a subsequent application under the General Clauses Act. The core legal question was whether a subsequent lease agreement between the landlord and tenant invalidates or serves as a shield against the execution of an earlier ejectment order when made without the permission of the Rent Controller, and whether the execution application was barred by limitation under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Sindh High Court held that under the Explanation to section 22 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, no payment, compromise, or agreement in execution proceedings is valid unless made before or with the permission of the authority passing the order, and a subsequent lease deed cannot negate the validity of the ejectment order without such permission. The Court further held that limitation runs from the expiry of the time granted to vacate, rendering the execution application within time. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent lease agreement executed between a landlord and tenant without the permission of the Rent Controller renders an ejectment order unexecutable?
  • Does an agreement or compromise made during execution proceedings require the prior permission of the authority passing the ejectment order to be legally valid?
  • From which date does the period of limitation under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 begin to run for filing an execution application of an ejectment order that granted time to vacate?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Ahmed vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another1998 CLC 1987 · Sindh High Court · 1997-05-20
  constitutional petitioninterim orderrent proceedingscross-examinationmaintainabilityRent Controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was directed against an interim order passed by the Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, which dismissed the petitioner's application for permission to cross-examine a respondent's witness after multiple delays. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a constitutional petition against an interlocutory order of a Rent Controller in light of the statutory bar against appeals under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, and the validity of proceedings conducted by a Rent Controller whose qualifications were challenged for the first time in the constitutional petition. The Sindh High Court held that the constitutional petition was not maintainable against an interim order of the Rent Controller as it would defeat the legislative intent and purpose of section 21 of the Ordinance, and that objections regarding the qualifications of the Rent Controller cannot be raised for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction without having been raised before the Controller. The key principle laid down is that constitutional petitions are barred against interlocutory orders in rent proceedings, and procedural or jurisdictional objections not raised before the lower forum cannot be entertained for the first time.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against an interim order passed by a Rent Controller?
  • Whether an appeal lies against an interlocutory order under Section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance?
  • Can an objection regarding the qualifications of a Rent Controller be raised for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction without being raised before the Controller?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehfooz Ali vs Mst. Parveen Fatima1998 MLD 137 · Sindh High Court · 1997-05-02Read full judgment →
• Mehfooz Ali vs (Mst.) Parveen FatimaK.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 472 · Sindh High Court · 1997-05-02Read full judgment →
• Meherwan Cavasji Irani vs Khuda Baksh Marri1998 SCMR 537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-09
  adverse possessioncharitable trustunconditional withdrawal of suitremand of caseappellate powercivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter originated from a civil suit filed by the respondent seeking a declaration of title over specific property based on adverse possession. The petitioner contested the suit, asserting the property was part of a charitable trust and raising various legal objections, including the maintainability of the suit. The trial court decreed the suit under Order 17, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, after rejecting an application to reframe issues. On appeal, the High Court remanded the case for a fresh decision on preliminary issues. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court should have exercised its powers under Order 41, Rule 33, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, to decide the controversy finally rather than remanding the matter. During the Supreme Court proceedings, the respondent requested to withdraw the suit unconditionally. The Supreme Court allowed the withdrawal, dismissed the suit accordingly, and set aside the judgments and decrees of the courts below. The principle established is that an appellate court may permit the unconditional withdrawal of a suit, thereby rendering previous lower court judgments and decrees ineffective.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court allow the unconditional withdrawal of a suit after the matter has reached the Supreme Court?
  • Does the unconditional withdrawal of a suit by the plaintiff result in the setting aside of the judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Ali Chandio vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 757 · Sindh High Court · 1997-12-23Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Ali and another vs Fazal Yousaf Sadiq and others1998 MLD 1302 · Sindh High Court · 1998-01-14Read full judgment →
• Mehar Din vs Ghafooran BibiK.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 118 · Lahore High Court · 1997-06-04Read full judgment →
• Mazharuddin vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1035 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-17
  unlawful detentionhabeas corpusfundamental rightsmonetary compensationpublic law remedyconstitutional jurisdictionfalse imprisonmentpolice excesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses the illegal detention of a citizen by police officials and examines the scope of the court's constitutional powers to grant monetary compensation and costs for violations of fundamental rights. The core legal questions concerned whether a High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 can award monetary compensation and costs for unlawful and mala fide detention, and whether such liability falls upon the State, the delinquent official, or both. The court held that where a citizen's fundamental rights under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution are violated through unlawful and mala fide detention, the court can mould the relief to award substantial monetary compensation and deterrent costs as a public law remedy, independent of private law tort actions. The court laid down that the State and the responsible public official are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation, with the State retaining the right to recover the amount from the delinquent official, and that the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction is not fettered by English common law technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court can award monetary compensation for the violation of fundamental rights of liberty and dignity in habeas corpus proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is the liability to pay compensation for unlawful detention a public law duty distinct from private law tort remedies?
  • Whether the State is jointly and severally liable along with the erring public official to pay compensation for illegal detention?
  • Can the High Court award personal costs against a police officer for abuse of official powers in a constitutional petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Mehmood vs Basir And AnotherK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-14
  bailleave to appealpolice investigation reportColumn 2 of challandiscretionary jurisdictioncriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which granted bail to the respondent, Basit, in a criminal case involving charges under Sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondent, acting with others, caused injuries to the complainant. The High Court had granted bail primarily because the police investigation found the respondent innocent and placed his name in Column No. 2 of the challan, and because he had not caused any injury to the deceased. The Supreme Court, in its order, declined to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion. The Court emphasized that it functions primarily as a Constitutional Court and does not routinely review bail orders unless compelling reasons exist. Furthermore, the Court noted that the considerations for cancelling bail are distinct from those for granting it. Finding no sufficient grounds to disturb the High Court's order, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court routinely interfere with bail orders granted by the High Court?
  • Are the considerations for cancelling bail identical to those for granting bail?
  • Is a police finding of innocence in the challan binding upon the Court in bail proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Malik vs Muhammad Muslim1998 MLD 73 · Sindh High Court · 1997-07-24Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Iqbal vs State1998 MLD 204 · Lahore High Court · 1997-05-14Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Iqbal and another vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 858 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-04-04Read full judgment →
• Maulvi Abdul Samad and 2 otherss vs Shista Khan and 2 others1998 CLC 171 · Balochistan High Court · 1997-06-29Read full judgment →
• Maulvi Abdul Khaliq vs Government of N.-W.F.P. and others1998 MLD 165 · Peshawar High Court · 1996-04-07Read full judgment →
• Maulana Ghulam-Ud-Din vs Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government1998 PLC (C.S.) 1364 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1998-06-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh and otherss vs Mst. Jaindai and others1998 CLC 165 · Board of Revenue · 1997-06-29Read full judgment →
• Maula Bakhsh vs Muhammad Saleem and 9 others1998 MLD 567 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-20Read full judgment →
• Maula Bakhsh vs Amanullah and others1998 SCMR 665 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-13
  leave to appealcivil court jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsrevenue court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging a judgment rendered by the High Court. The core legal questions presented for consideration concern the jurisdictional competence of the Civil Court to entertain the subject suit and the propriety of the High Court's interference with concurrent findings of fact previously established by the Trial Courts and the Revenue Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court was legally justified in disturbing these concurrent findings under the specific facts and circumstances of the case. As this is an order granting leave to appeal, the final adjudication on the merits of the dispute, the scope of revisional powers, and the jurisdictional boundaries between Civil and Revenue Courts remains pending for the final hearing of the appeal. The Court's decision at this stage is limited to identifying these substantial questions of law for further deliberation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Civil Court have jurisdiction to entertain the suit in question?
  • Is the High Court justified in disturbing concurrent findings of the Trial Courts and the Revenue Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Masood Sarwar vs Pakistan Railway Police through I.-G., Pakistan1998 PLC (C.S.) 947 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1996-07-14Read full judgment →
• Marubeni Power Development Project, Karachi through Manager, Accounts and Commercial vs Gulzar Hussain Shah1998 PLC 249 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-11-21
  Labour lawproject-specific employmenttermination of servicesgrievance petitionStanding Orders Ordinancewritten termination order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the order of the 5th Sindh Labour Court, which reinstated an employee and awarded back benefits. The core legal question was whether the termination of the respondent, an office boy employed for a specific power project, was lawful and whether the employer had complied with the statutory requirements for a written termination order. The Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the Labour Court’s decision, holding that the termination was valid as it was necessitated by the completion of the specific project for which the respondent was hired. The Tribunal determined that the requirement for a written termination order was satisfied by the cumulative correspondence between the parties, which clearly communicated the reasons for termination. The key principle laid down is that where employment is project-specific, the completion of the project constitutes a valid ground for termination, and the statutory requirement for a written order is met if the totality of the correspondence between the employer and employee provides explicit reasons for the termination, thereby satisfying the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.

  Questions settled

  • Does the completion of a specific project constitute a valid ground for the termination of an employee hired for that project?
  • Can the requirement for a written order of termination be satisfied by the cumulative correspondence between the employer and the employee?
  • Is an employee entitled to reinstatement if they have already accepted all legal dues and signed a final payroll sheet upon project completion?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsud Ahmad vs The Accountant-General, Pakistan Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others1998 SCMR 2639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-28
  pension calculationcivil servicenotional revisionpensionersservice lawpay scale revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's claim for the recalculation of his pension. The appellant, a retired Audit Officer, contended that paragraph 4 of the Finance Division's Office Memorandum dated 3-10-1991, which stated that pension shall be calculated for all pensioners from time to time in accordance with the latest rules, entitled him to have his pension recomputed based on the salary and fringe benefits currently applicable to serving civil servants of his former grade. The core legal question was whether this memorandum allowed for the notional revision of pension amounts for already retired civil servants whenever pay scales for serving employees are revised. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal correctly interpreted the memorandum. Relying on the principle established in I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan, the Court held that retired civil servants and serving civil servants constitute separate classes. Consequently, pensioners cannot claim a right to the notional revision of their pension amounts based on subsequent pay scale revisions applicable to serving employees, as pension is computed according to the rules in force at the date of retirement.

  Questions settled

  • Are retired civil servants and serving civil servants considered the same class for the purpose of pension calculation?
  • Does the phrase 'from time to time' in pension rules entitle retired civil servants to the recalculation of their pension based on revised pay scales of serving employees?
  • Is a retired civil servant entitled to the notional revision of their pension amount when pay scales for serving civil servants are revised?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsooda Begum and 5 others vs Mst. Jan Begum and anothers1998 SCMR 2052 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-02
  leave to appealconcurrent findingsmutationcancellation of sale deedestoppelexcess of sharecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' civil revision. The respondent had filed a suit claiming ownership and possession of 1 Kanal of land purchased via a registered sale deed, asserting that the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest had sold land to his wife in excess of his share, making the subsequent mutation ineffective. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, which was upheld by the first appellate court and the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the suit was not maintainable because the respondent did not seek cancellation of the underlying sale deed, but only the mutation. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners failed to raise an issue or press this contention before the trial or first appellate courts, they were estopped from raising it. Finding that the concurrent findings of the three courts below were based on proper evaluation of evidence showing the alienation was beyond the vendor's entitlement, the Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea regarding the non-maintainability of a suit for not seeking cancellation of a sale deed for the first time before the Supreme Court if no such issue was claimed or pressed before the lower courts?
  • Whether a sale of land by a co-sharer in excess of their entitlement or share is valid and binding against other purchasers of the same land?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by three courts below can be interfered with by the Supreme Court in the absence of any misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmad and others vs The State and others1998 MLD 2036 · Lahore High Court · 1998-02-26Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmed vs Fareed Ahmed1998 CLC 890 · Sindh High Court · 1997-06-04Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmed and another vs The State1998 MLD 1580 · Lahore High Court · 1997-09-30Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmed and 2 others vs Muhammad Rafiq and 9 others1998 SCMR 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-28
  evacuee landmukhbari applicationfraud and misrepresentationSection 12(2) CPCleave to appealnecessary partiesallotment of land
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed their application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The underlying dispute concerns the allotment of evacuee land originally allotted to one Shukar Din, which was subsequently cancelled. Various parties filed 'Mukhbari' applications seeking the land. The High Court had previously directed the allotment of this land to the respondents (successors of an earlier Mukhbar). The petitioners, who claimed to be purchasers of the land from a subsequent allottee (respondent No. 10), challenged this High Court judgment, alleging it was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, and the deliberate omission of necessary parties. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the land should have been allotted to the first Mukhbar in preference to others, and whether the impugned judgment was procured through fraud and the failure to implead the petitioners. The Court ordered the maintenance of status quo regarding the disputed land pending the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cancellation of an original land allotment requires the land to be allotted to the first Mukhbar in preference to subsequent applicants?
  • Can a judgment be challenged on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation for failing to implead parties who derived interest in the disputed property?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmed alias Koola vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 72 · Lahore High Court · 1997-06-10Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs The State1998 PLD Lahore 239 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-25
  de facto doctrinedouble jeopardyacquittalcollateral attackquo warrantojurisdictionfunctus officio
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision was filed against the orders of the Special Judge Anti-Corruption, Lahore, which recalled a prior acquittal order passed in favor of the petitioner and summoned him to face a fresh trial. The petitioner had been acquitted under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by a predecessor judge whose appointment was subsequently declared invalid by the High Court in a separate, collateral proceeding. The core legal questions were whether the de facto doctrine protects the judicial acts of a judge whose appointment is subsequently found to be defective, and whether a final acquittal can be set aside for a fresh trial without violating the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Lahore High Court accepted the revision, holding that the de facto doctrine is a doctrine of necessity that validates the acts of officers acting under the colour of lawful authority to prevent public chaos. The Court further held that a final acquittal cannot be collaterally attacked or undone, as it is protected by Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Does the de facto doctrine validate the judgments and orders passed by a judge whose appointment is subsequently discovered to be defective or invalid?
  • Can the title or qualification of a presiding judge be challenged in collateral proceedings rather than through a direct proceeding like a writ of quo warranto?
  • Does the subsequent declaration of a trial judge's disqualification permit the retrial of an accused who was already acquitted by that judge before the declaration?
  • Is a trial court barred by Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 from recalling its own final order of acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Pakistan Tobacco Company through General1998 PLC 474 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-03-12Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Malkhan Khewat No.40 through Shukar Din and 31998 PLD Lahore 172 · Lahore High Court
  civil revisionamendment of plaintremand of caserevenue recordnecessary partyappellate court powersmechanical remand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the appellate court's remand order which set aside the trial court's dismissal of a declaration and injunction suit, allowed a plaint amendment, impleaded the District Collector as a party, and remanded the case for a fresh trial. The Lahore High Court examined the legality of amending plaints at the appellate stage, the necessity of adding revenue functionaries as parties in revenue record suits, and the proper procedure for remanding cases under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court held that while an appellate court is competent to allow a necessary plaint amendment at the appellate stage, the Collector is neither a necessary nor a proper party in a suit concerning entries in the revenue record between rival claimants. Furthermore, the Court held that a mechanical remand of a case under Order 41 Rule 23-A without reversing the trial court's findings on merits is illegal, and that appellate courts should instead utilize provisions like Order 41 Rule 25 or Rule 28 to record additional evidence or issues while keeping the appeal pending. The revision was partly allowed, upholding the amendment of the plaint while setting aside the impleadment of the Collector and the remand order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can allow an amendment to the plaint at the appellate stage?
  • Is the Collector or revenue functionary a necessary or proper party in a suit challenging entries in the revenue record?
  • Under what circumstances can a case be remanded under Order 41 Rule 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an appellate court remand a case without reversing the findings of the trial court on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Ghulam Akbar and 2 others1998 SCMR 490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-05
  pre-emptionTalabsrestoration of suitcounsel errorleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a pre-emption suit originally filed under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913. The suit was dismissed for failure to make the requisite Talabs (demands), a decision subsequently upheld in appeal and revision. Following the promulgation of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991, the petitioner sought restoration of the suit under Section 35(2) of the new Act, which was rejected by the Civil Judge, with subsequent appeals and revisions also being dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that his counsel in the Trial Court was under a bona fide misconception that Talabs were not required, and that he should not be penalized for his counsel's error. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting the lack of evidentiary support, such as an affidavit or certificate from the counsel, to substantiate the plea. Consequently, the Court held that the suit was rightly dismissed for want of Talabs in line with established precedent, and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption suit filed under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 be maintained or restored if the requirement of Talabs was not satisfied?
  • Can a party escape the consequences of failing to make Talabs in a pre-emption suit by pleading a bona fide misconception of law by their counsel without supporting evidence?
  • Is an affidavit or certificate from the concerned advocate necessary to substantiate a plea that the advocate was laboring under a misconception of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain and others vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others1998 PLC 99 · Lahore High Court · 1997-04-02Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain and others vs Pakistan Forest Institute and others1998 SCMR 727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-10-30
  forestry studentssupplementary examinationdropping outuniversity regulationsmandamus to amend rulesparent statutesupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed writ petitions filed by students of the Pakistan Forest Institute. The petitioners failed both their annual term examinations and supplementary examinations for B.Sc. and M.Sc. Forestry courses. Consequently, they were dropped out pursuant to Regulation No. 6(iv) of the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations of the University of Peshawar, which restricts failed students to only one chance in a supplementary examination. The petitioners challenged this regulation as inconsistent with the University of Peshawar Act, 1974, and sought directions for the authorities to amend the regulation and grant them further chances. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions while emphasizing the need for rule amendments. The Supreme Court heard the matter and held that no mandamus can be issued directing the authorities to amend subordinate legislation unless it is shown to be repugnant to the parent statute. Finding no such infringement, and noting that the University Syndicate was not bound to follow the recommendations of the Board of Studies, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court issue a direction to rule-making authorities to amend a regulation restricting examination chances unless it is shown to be violative of a parent statute?
  • Whether a university syndicate is bound to implement recommendations made by the Board of Studies regarding the amendment of examination regulations?
  • Does Regulation No. 6(iv) of the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations of the University of Peshawar for the Award of Degree in Forestry violate the University of Peshawar Act, 1974 by limiting supplementary examination chances?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain And Other vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 88 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-27Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ali vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 2042 · Balochistan High Court · 1998-05-22
  criminal breach of trustmisappropriationburden of proofbenefit of doubtpublic servantanti-corruptionentrustment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant, an Assistant Food Controller, under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, for the alleged misappropriation of wheat bags from a government godown. The core legal question was whether the mere shortage of entrusted property, coupled with the appellant's failure to maintain proper records, constitutes criminal breach of trust without proof of dishonest misappropriation. The High Court held that while the prosecution successfully established the entrustment of the wheat, it failed to prove dishonest misappropriation or conversion to the appellant's benefit. The Court emphasized that the appellant provided a plausible explanation supported by documentary evidence (bank challans) showing the wheat was issued to mill-owners and payments were deposited. The key principle laid down is that in cases of criminal breach of trust, the prosecution must prove dishonest misappropriation beyond a reasonable doubt; mere shortage or negligence does not suffice. If an accused provides a reasonable explanation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to disprove it, and the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere shortage of entrusted property, without proof of dishonest misappropriation, constitute an offence under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • When an accused provides a reasonable explanation for the shortage of entrusted property, does the burden shift to the prosecution to disprove that explanation?
  • Is a conviction for criminal breach of trust sustainable if the prosecution fails to rebut documentary evidence offered by the accused in support of their defense?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ali Ghaanghro vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1312 · Sindh High Court · 1997-12-18Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs Province of Punjab and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 4 · Lahore High Court · 1996-10-08Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs Mst. Salaman Bibi and others1998 SCMR 388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-10-20
  cooperative farming schemenominationlaw of successionmuslim personal lawstate grantinheritancecivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision filed by the petitioner. The dispute concerns agricultural land originally allotted under the Cooperative Farming Scheme to Muhammad Bakhsh, and subsequently to his son Abdul Razzaq, both of whom passed away. The Cooperative Society allotted the land afresh to Sher Muhammad, predecessor of the petitioner, based on a nomination. The plaintiff, a legal heir (daughter and sister of the deceased), challenged the allotment through a civil suit, which was concurrently decreed in her favour by the lower courts and upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a nomination or membership in a cooperative society can override the law of succession regarding state-granted land. The Supreme Court held that mere nomination or cooperative society membership does not defeat the law of succession or Muslim Personal Law (Shariat), and succession to such tenancies is governed by Section 19-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The principle laid down is that a nominee only collects or receives property rights and cannot deprive legal heirs of their entitlement under inheritance laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does a nomination in a cooperative society override the law of succession regarding state-granted land?
  • Whether the non-joinder of a Cooperative Society under Section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 is fatal to a suit filed by legal heirs claiming inheritance?
  • Can the allotment of land to a nominee defeat the rights of legal heirs entitled under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) pursuant to Section 19-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad Shad vs I. H. Qureshi Etc.K.L.R. 1998 Labour & Services Cases 127 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-15Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad And Other vs The State(K.L.R. 1998 Shariat Cases 27) · Lahore High Court · 1997-12-02Read full judgment →
• Mansoor Ahmed Khan and 2 others vs Mst. Sajida Begum and 2 others1998 MLD 1247 · Sindh High Court · 1997-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mandviwalla Mauser Plastic Industries Limited Pechs, Karachi And 41998 P.C.T.L.R. 855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  Banking Tribunal jurisdictionModaraba companySchedule inclusionStatutory interpretationLeave to appealPreamble and enacting parts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed constitutional petitions challenging the jurisdiction of the Banking Tribunal to entertain suits filed by Modaraba companies. The core legal question concerns whether the Federal Government is competent to include Modaraba companies in the Schedule to the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, under section 13 of the said Ordinance, and whether a Modaraba company falls within the definition of a banking company or company under the Ordinance of 1984, given the definitions and the preamble of the enactment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that an authoritative decision is necessary regarding the statutory interpretation of 'company' in the context of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, and the powers of the Federal Government to add Modarabas to its Schedule. The key principle highlighted is the need for authoritative judicial scrutiny on whether subordinate statutory inclusion can broaden the scope of a special tribunal's jurisdiction beyond the primary definitions and preamble of the governing statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Modaraba company defined by clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 2 of the Ordinance of 1980 can be covered by the words a company specified in the Schedule appearing in sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 2 of the Ordinance of 1984?
  • Whether the Federal Government was competent to incorporate in the Schedule below Ordinance of 1984 the First Prudential Modaraba, the Second Prudential Modaraba and the Third Prudential Modaraba?
  • Whether the word company mentioned in sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 2 of the Ordinance of 1984 was intended by the Legislature to be understood and interpreted in light of the preamble to said Ordinance and was to be influenced by the earlier sub-clauses of clause (a) of section 2 of the Ordinance of 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Managing Director/Employer, Jubilee Textile Industries (Pvt.) Limited,1998 PLC 232 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1996-12-10Read full judgment →
• Managing Director, PASSCO, Lahore and 3 others vs Sardar Ali, Ex-1998 PLC 400 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1997-07-01Read full judgment →