Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Mst. Kausar Parveen and another vs The State1995 P Cr. L J 256 · Lahore High Court · 1994-10-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaniz Fatima And 8 Others vs Mst. Zubaida Khatoon1995 MLD 870 · Sindh High Court · 1994-10-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaneez Fatima, Etc. vs The State, Etc.K.L.R. 1997 Shariat Cases 335 · Lahore High Court · 1995-03-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaneez Fatima vs S.H.O., Police Station Mughalpura, Lahore and 21995 P Cr. L J 1105 · Lahore High Court · 1994-12-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaneez Fatima vs S.H.O. Police Station Mughalpura, And OtherK.L.R. 1995 Criminal Cases 208 · Lahore High Court · 1994-12-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaneez Fatima And Another vs Hasan Mahmood And OtherK.L.R. 1997 Shariat Cases 262 · Lahore High Court · 1994-08-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaneez Fatima and 3 others vs The State and anothers1995 P Cr. L J 1672 · Lahore High Court · 1995-03-21
  quashment of FIRinherent powers of High Courtmalafide prosecutionmatrimonial disputeabuse of processharassment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a petition filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the quashment of F.I.R. No. 65 dated 12-2-1995 registered under Sections 451 and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 at Police Station Chunian, District Kasur. The core legal question concerns the competency of the High Court to quash a criminal case and interfere with police investigation at an interlocutory stage when the underlying dispute is purely civil in nature and stems from matrimonial litigation. The Court held that where an F.I.R. is mala fide, intended to harass a family, and the allegations even if accepted do not constitute a criminal offence, the High Court is fully competent to quash the proceedings to prevent abuse of process. The key principle laid down is that criminal proceedings arising out of a malafide conversion of a matrimonial and civil dispute into a criminal case to harass litigants will be quashed by the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is competent to quash criminal proceedings and interfere in an investigation at an interlocutory stage?
  • Can a purely family or civil dispute be permitted to continue as a criminal prosecution when allegations fail to constitute an offence?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 or Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR that is motivated by mala fides and intended to harass citizens?
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• Mst. Kalsoom Bibi vs The State1995 MLD 1294 · Lahore High Court · 1995-03-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jewani and 5 others vs Mst. Amir Begum and 11 others1995 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 75 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1995-05-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Janat Bibi vs Mst. Bhagan and others1995 MLD 110 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Janat Bibi vs Mst. Bhagan And Other1995 MLD 110 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jameela Begum vs Muhammad Ali and 5 others1995 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  leave to appealprivate partitioninheritanceconcurrent findingscivil revisionownership of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated May 19, 1993, which dismissed a civil revision petition. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner established her exclusive ownership of the suit property through a private partition and whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the lack of evidence were sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to produce reliable documentary or oral evidence to prove the alleged private partition among the legal heirs, and that the mere receipt of nominal rental amounts did not establish her exclusive ownership or entitlement. The court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, laying down the principle that assertions of private partition and exclusive ownership of inherited property must be substantiated by concrete documentary or reliable oral evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the lack of evidence for a private partition can be interfered with in civil revision?
  • Does the receipt of nominal rent by a co-heir establish exclusive ownership of inherited property through private partition?
  • What is the evidentiary requirement to prove a private partition of property among legal heirs?
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• Mst. Iqbal Bibi vs The State1995 P Cr. L J 1472 · Peshawar High Court · 1995-06-21
  post-arrest bailprohibition orderheroin recoveryprivate vehicle searchcognizable offenceillegal arrest
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition filed by Mst. Iqbal Bibi seeking post-arrest bail after being refused by the lower forums. The petitioner was apprehended along with another accused when a motorcar was intercepted by police and 100 grams of heroin was allegedly recovered from the rear seat. The core legal question addressed by the court is whether the recovery of contraband from a private vehicle constitutes a cognizable offence under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, requiring no warrant, and whether the consequent arrest was legally justified. The Peshawar High Court held that a vehicle is defined as a "place" and not a "public place" under the Order, and offences under Articles 3, 4, 8, and 11 are not cognizable unless committed at a public place. Since the search of a private vehicle was conducted without a warrant and the recovery was non-cognizable, the arrest was illegal. The court laid down the principle that the search of a private vehicle without a warrant for non-cognizable offences under the Prohibition Order renders the arrest unjustified, entitling the accused to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of contraband from a private vehicle constitutes a cognizable offence under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  • Is a private vehicle considered a public place under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  • Does the search of a private vehicle without a warrant render the subsequent arrest illegal and entitle the accused to bail?
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• Mst. Iqbal Begum vs Abdul Ghaffar and others1995 CLC 105 · Lahore High Court · 1994-07-13
  civil revisionconstruction of documentssale-deedinterpretation of contractpartition suitlocus standico-sharer
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition addresses the question of whether respondent No. 1, Abdul Ghaffar, had sold his entire share in a residential house to the petitioner, Mst. Iqbal Begum, by means of a registered sale-deed dated 27th July 1982, thereby losing his locus standi to file a partition suit. The lower courts had held that he only sold a portion of his share and remained a co-sharer entitled to partition. The Lahore High Court examined the well-settled principles of construction of documents, emphasizing that the whole context and plain language of an instrument must be considered to determine the intention of the parties, and clear words in the operative part cannot be controlled by recitals. The Court found that the operative part of the sale-deed unequivocally showed the transfer of the entire share ('Salem Hissa'). Consequently, the High Court held that respondent No. 1 had ceased to be an owner and lacked locus standi to institute the partition suit. The revision petition was accepted, and the judgments and decrees of the lower courts were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • How should a registered sale-deed be construed when determining the extent of property transferred?
  • Can clear and unequivocal words in the operative part of an instrument be controlled by its recitals?
  • Does a co-sharer who has sold his entire share in a property retain the locus standi to file a suit for partition?
  • What are the well-settled principles governing the construction and interpretation of legal documents and contracts?
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• Mst. Imtiaz Begum vs Tariq Mahmood and another1995 CLC 800 · Lahore High Court · 1994-12-06
  custody of minorHizanatRizaatwelfare of minorIslamic jurisprudenceconstitutional petitionparental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an appellate order granting custody of a minor son to his father solely based on the child attaining the age of seven years. The core legal question was whether the 'age of seven' rule for male children is an absolute Islamic injunction or a flexible principle subject to the welfare of the minor and contemporary circumstances. The Court held that while Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) provides guidance on custody (Hizanat), the attainment of a specific age like seven or nine years is not an absolute, rigid requirement of Shariah. Instead, the primary consideration is the welfare of the minor, the child's readiness for education, and the parents' respective capabilities to provide a stable, moral, and supportive environment. The Court affirmed that custody decisions must be dynamic, reflecting the needs of the time, and that the father’s role in providing sustenance and education becomes pivotal as the child matures. The petition was dismissed as the lower court's decision was found to be supported by the father's superior financial capacity and ability to provide for the child's upbringing.

  Questions settled

  • Is the attainment of seven years of age by a male child an absolute, rigid requirement under Islamic law for transferring custody to the father?
  • Does the right of Hizanat (custody) vest in the mother or the father during the period of Rizaat (suckling)?
  • Can a mother's right to custody be forfeited if she remarries a stranger to the minor?
  • Does the court have the authority to determine custody based on the child's readiness for formal education rather than a fixed chronological age?
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• Mst. Iffat Naheed and another vs The District Education Officer1995 PLC (C.S.) 199 · Lahore High Court · 1994-09-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hurmat Bibi and another vs The State1995 P Cr. L J 56 · Lahore High Court · 1994-07-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hook Bi and 5 others vs Krishna Kumar and 3 others1995 CLC 191 · Sindh High Court · 1994-10-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hifsa Malik vs The State1995 P Cr. L J 46 · Lahore High Court · 1993-06-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hanifan Begum and others vs I.A.R. Coop. and others1995 CLC 646 · Lahore High Court · 1993-11-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hamidan and 9 others vs Mst. Nathi1995 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02
  pre-emption suitconsent decreeSection 12(2) CPCtarget dateremandfresh decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning the sale of land. The trial court initially decreed the suit based on a consent offer accepted by the plaintiff's attorney. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside the decree, alleging lack of authority. The trial court set aside the consent decree and proceeded with the trial, ultimately dismissing the suit, citing a legal bar against passing fresh decrees in pre-emption cases after a specific target date, as established in Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287). The Appellate Court upheld this dismissal. However, the High Court, relying on subsequent Supreme Court precedents (Ghulam Rasool v. Faiz Bakhsh and Bahadur Khan v. Muhammad Yousuf), set aside the dismissal and remanded the case for a decision on all issues. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the alleged bar against passing fresh decrees in pre-emption suits after the target date was inapplicable, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is there a legal bar against passing a fresh decree in a pre-emption suit after the target date of 31-7-1986?
  • Can a consent decree be set aside under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the attorney lacked authority to accept the offer?
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• Mst. Hamida Akhtar vs Nazir Muhammad and 2 others1995 CLC 2020 · Peshawar High Court · 1995-07-06
  temporary injunctionstatus quo violationco-sharerjoint propertyinherent jurisdictionunlawful constructionrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner impugned the concurrent orders of the lower courts dismissing her application for a temporary injunction in a suit for declaration of ownership and possession over land based on a mutation. The petitioner contended she was a co-sharer and the respondents had encroached upon her land by exceeding their share and carrying out construction in flagrant violation of an ad interim status quo order. The Peshawar High Court held that a co-sharer has an interest in every inch of joint property and cannot be dealt with to their detriment, and that a party who violates a status quo order to its own advantage cannot be permitted to take benefit from its wrong. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the trial court erred in refusing the injunction and that the court possesses inherent jurisdiction to order the removal of unlawful construction raised in defiance of an injunction. The revision petition was accepted with costs, directing the respondents to restore the original position or face civil imprisonment and attachment of property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-sharer has an interest in every inch of joint property irrespective of the quantity of their share?
  • Can a court exercise inherent jurisdiction to order the demolition of structures raised in flagrant violation of a status quo order?
  • Does a party who disobeys an ad interim injunction disentitle itself to equitable relief?
  • What powers does a court possess to punish or reverse actions taken in breach of a temporary injunction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Mst. Haleema Bibi vs Ch. Manzoor Ahmed, Proprietor Pak News Agency, Bahawalnagar and another1995 PLC 517 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1986-05-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajani Khudeja Bibi through her Legal Heirs vs Hafiz Nawazish Ali1995 MLD 1725 · Lahore High Court · 1995-02-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajani Khudeja Bib1 Through Her Legal Heirs vs Hafiz Nawazish Ali1995 MLD 1725 · Lahore High Court · 1995-02-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hafeezan Bibi vs Muhammad Tufail and others1995 SCMR 256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-30
  leave to appealreduction of sentencedeath sentencelife imprisonmentmitigating circumstancespaternal influence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dated 28-2-1993, whereby the respondents' sentence of death under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was reduced to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life based on the mitigating circumstance that the convicts acted in obedience to their father's evil wish following a dispute over ancestral land. The Supreme Court held that the High Court advanced sound reasons and that there was no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The key principle laid down is that acting under paternal influence or obedience to a father's desire in the context of family land disputes can serve as a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether obedience to a father's wish in a family land dispute constitutes a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in sentencing when sound reasons have been advanced?
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• Mst. Hafeezan Bibi vs District Judge, Narowal and 2 others1995 MLD 136 · Lahore High Court · 1994-10-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hafeezan Bibi vs District Judge, Narowal And 2 Other1995 MLD 136 · Lahore High Court · 1994-10-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Gulzar Bibi vs Publicingeneral and 4 others1995 CLC 1550 · Peshawar High Court · 1994-01-16
  guardianshipcustody of minorterritorial jurisdictionordinarily resideswrit petitionconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, was filed by the paternal grandmother of a minor against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts, which had returned her application for the custody and guardianship of the minor for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the Family Court at D.I. Khan had jurisdiction to entertain the guardianship application when the minor was subsequently residing with her remarried mother in Mianwali. The Peshawar High Court held that under section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, an application for the guardianship of the person of a minor must be made to the District Court having jurisdiction where the minor ordinarily resides, and the word 'ordinarily' connotes more than a mere temporary residence. The Court ruled that the minor's ordinary place of residence followed that of her mother upon the mother's lawful remarriage and relocation to Mianwali. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed, affirming that the lower courts correctly returned the application for want of territorial jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Which court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for the guardianship of the person of a minor under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890?
  • Does temporary residence suffice to establish territorial jurisdiction for a guardianship petition under section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890?
  • What is the effect of a mother's second marriage and relocation on the ordinary residence of a minor child for the purpose of guardianship proceedings?
  • When can the High Court interfere in the concurrent findings of lower courts regarding territorial jurisdiction in guardianship matters under its constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Mst. Gul Begum and 17 others vs Mst. Rehmat Jan and 8 others1995 CLC 1643 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1995-05-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Goulbakhor vs Sohail ButtK.L.R. 1995 Criminal Cases 98 · Lahore High Court · 1994-12-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Fatima vs S.H.O. etc.s1995 P Cr. L J 43 · Lahore High Court · 1993-05-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Fatima And 5 Others vs S.H.O., Police Station Karianwala, District Gujrat And Another1995 MLD 1140 · Lahore High Court · 1995-01-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghazala Yasmeen vs Muhammad Rafique1995 PLD Karachi 171 · Sindh High Court · 1995-01-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghafooran vs Abdul Ghafoor and others1995 SCMR 486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-15
  leave to appealacquittalrevision petitionspeaking ordercriminal breach of trustappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court whereby the petitioner's revision petition against the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1 to 7—who had been initially convicted by the trial court under sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but acquitted in appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge—was dismissed. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in dismissing the revision petition through a non-speaking order without discussing the evidence on record. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to discuss the evidence and pass a speaking order despite the availability of sufficient evidence recorded by the trial court. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that an appellate or revisional court must examine the evidence and render a speaking order when evaluating concurrent or conflicting findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is required to pass a speaking order discussing the evidence while dismissing a revision petition against acquittal?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the High Court dismisses a revision petition without proper evaluation of the evidence on record?
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• Mst. Fouzia Durrani vs Ghulam Rasool1995 CLC 2006 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-06Read full judgment →
• Mst. Firdous vs Shaikh Muhammad Rafi1995 MLD 1027 · Sindh High Court · 1994-09-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fazlan Mai vs S.H.O. and 4 others1995 P Cr. L J 1000 · Lahore High Court · 1994-05-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fauzia vs The State1995 P Cr. L J 453 · Federal Shariat Court · 1994-11-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fatima vs Mst. Noorul Huda1995 MLD 1593 · Peshawar High Court · 1994-11-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fatima Bibi And 3 Others vs Mst. Rashidan Bibi1995 MLD 1841 · Lahore High Court · 1995-06-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farida Begum vs Muhammad Ashraf and others1995 CLC 440 · Lahore High Court · 1994-01-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farangeza vs The State1995 MLD 1439 · Peshawar High Court · 1995-03-16
  post-arrest bailoption of pubertydissolution of muslim marriageszina hudoodprinciple of consistencybail for women
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application arose from an order of the Sessions Judge, Battagram, whereby bail was refused to the petitioner, a woman charged under section 5/10 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for allegedly contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of an earlier Nikah. The core legal question was whether the female petitioner was entitled to bail after arrest, considering her prior exercise of the right of option of puberty, the principle of consistency with co-accused already granted bail, and her status as a female. The Peshawar High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail as a matter of right. The court reasoned that she had repudiated her first marriage by exercising her right of option of puberty under section 2(vii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 prior to her second marriage, for which a court order is not strictly essential; that co-accused had already been enlarged on bail, attracting the principle of consistency; and that her case fell squarely within the first proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 owing to her gender.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court order essential to validate the exercise of the right of option of puberty by a minor female under Muslim law?
  • Does the principle of consistency apply when co-accused in a criminal case have already been granted bail?
  • Does the case of a female accused fall under the first proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the grant of bail?
  • Does the mere institution of a suit or repudiation before consummation validate a subsequent marriage without a formal decree dissolving the first marriage?
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• Mst. Farah Naz vs Mst. Farah NazK.L.R. 1997 Civil Cases 154 · Lahore High Court · 1994-11-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farah Naz vs Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Multan through its Chairman and another1995 CLC 1150 · Lahore High Court · 1994-11-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fajri vs The State1997 MLD 124 · Lahore High Court · 1996-04-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Faiz Noor vs Dilawar Hussain and others1995 CLC 1319 · Lahore High Court · 1994-09-20
  ex parte decreemaintenance allowancecross-examinationFamily Courtremandright of rebuttalprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the orders of the Family Court, Lahore, which set aside an ex parte decree for maintenance allowance in favor of the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the Family Court acted lawfully in denying the petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine the respondent regarding his application to set aside the ex parte decree, particularly when the petitioner had produced evidence of service. The High Court held that the Family Court erred by failing to provide this essential opportunity for cross-examination, which prevented a judicious adjudication of the matter. The Court emphasized that while the Family Court has discretion in procedural matters, it is under a duty to ensure fairness, especially when determining whether to set aside an ex parte decree. Relying on the provisions of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, the High Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the case, directing the trial court to allow the petitioner to cross-examine the respondent's evidence before deciding the application afresh to ensure the interests of justice are served.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Family Court have a duty to allow cross-examination of a witness supporting an application to set aside an ex parte decree?
  • Can a Family Court permit the calling of witnesses at a later stage if it is considered expedient in the interest of justice?
  • Is an order denying the opportunity for cross-examination in a Family Court proceeding subject to constitutional review?
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• Mst. Faiz Begum vs The State1995 P Cr. L J 1601 · Lahore High Court · 1995-03-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dharan Bibi and others vs Khushi Muhammad and others1995 MLD 290 · Lahore High Court · 1992-05-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dharan Bibi And Others vs Khushi Muhammad And Other1995 MLD 290 · Lahore High Court · 1992-05-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Daulan vs Sardara and 5 others1995 SCMR 177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02
  gift deedleave to appealmisreading of evidencemutation of landvalidity of giftinheritance dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that invalidated a gift of land made by the late Nizamuddin in favor of his daughter, the petitioner. The gift was executed on April 25, 1977, registered on December 5, 1977, and mutated on June 11, 1978. Following the donor's death in 1983, the respondents, who were the donor's nephews, challenged the validity of the gift. While the trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, the lower appellate court set aside that decision. Subsequently, the High Court allowed the respondents' revision petition, reinstating the invalidation of the gift. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence, specifically the testimony of the Advocate who prepared and registered the gift deed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the High Court had potentially misread the evidence provided by the Advocate regarding the execution and registration of the gift, thereby necessitating a deeper review of the validity of the transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of an Advocate who prepared and registered a gift deed constitute sufficient evidence to establish the validity of the gift?
  • Can a High Court's decision in revision be challenged if it is based on a misreading of the evidence presented before the trial court?
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• Mst. Bushra vs The State1995 P Cr. L J 1368 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bushra Bibi vs S.H.O.1995 P Cr. L J 401 · Lahore High Court · 1994-11-15
  quashment of FIRconstitutional petitiondetermination of ageradiological agepuberty under Muhammadan LawHudood Ordinancefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  Mst. Bushra Bibi filed a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 seeking the quashment of F.I.R. No. 650 of 1994 registered under Section 10/16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 at Police Station Saddar, Jhang, on the complaint of her mother. The core legal question revolved around whether the FIR could be quashed when the petitioner claimed to be sui juris and lawfully married to her co-accused husband, while the complainant alleged minority and abduction for zina. The Lahore High Court held that medical and radiological evidence established the petitioner's age to be between 15 and 16-16.5 years at the time of marriage, which suffices for puberty under Muhammadan Law, and that continuation of proceedings would amount to unnecessary harassment with no prospect of conviction. The petition was accordingly allowed and the FIR quashed, laying down that constitutional petitions under Article 199 are competent against criminal investigations that encroach upon fundamental rights or are motivated by mala fides, and that radiological age assessments are to be preferred over conflicting school certificates.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be maintained against a criminal investigation or FIR?
  • Whether radiological evidence regarding age is to be preferred over a school leaving certificate and birth certificate?
  • Does the continuation of criminal proceedings under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 amount to harassment when evidence shows a valid marriage and age of puberty?
  • What is the evidentiary value of radiological reports versus school certificates in determining the age of an accused in Pakistan?
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• Mst. Bilquis Ismail vs Naeemuddin and 3 others1995 PLD Karachi 552 · Sindh High Court · 1995-05-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bilquees Parveen vs Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur and 3 others1995 MLD 722 · Lahore High Court · 1994-11-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bilquees Parveen vs Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur And 3 Other1995 MLD 722 · Lahore High Court · 1994-11-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Hussain Fatimah and others vs Muhammad Sharif Khan and 21995 CLC 557 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1994-12-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Gul And Another vs (Mst.) Khor Bibi And OtherK.L.R. 1997 Civil Cases 518 · Balochistan High Court · 1997-05-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bhagan vs The State and others1995 SCMR 1141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-19
  murdersentence mitigationlife imprisonmentdeath penaltyacquittalleave to appealcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Mst. Bhagan against the acquittal of a co-accused, Abdul Rahman, and the sentencing of the primary convict, Maqbool Ahmad, in a murder case. The trial court had convicted both individuals under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the petitioner's son, sentencing them to life imprisonment without providing reasons for withholding the death penalty. The High Court acquitted Abdul Rahman, finding his involvement doubtful, and upheld Maqbool Ahmad's conviction while also failing to justify the imposition of the lesser penalty. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal regarding Abdul Rahman's acquittal, finding no grounds to interfere with the High Court's assessment of the evidence. However, the Court granted leave to appeal concerning Maqbool Ahmad to determine whether the normal penalty of death should have been awarded, given the trial and appellate courts' failure to provide reasons for opting for life imprisonment instead of the capital sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for trial and appellate courts to provide reasons for awarding life imprisonment instead of the death penalty in a murder case?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal when the High Court has found the prosecution's case against a co-accused to be doubtful?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal solely to examine the adequacy of a sentence imposed by lower courts?
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• Mst. Batool Bibi vs Muhammad Hayat and another1995 CLC 724 · Lahore High Court · 1994-11-07
  jactitation of marriageoral talaqnotice of talaqMuslim Family Laws Ordinancerestitution of conjugal rightslegitimacy of childconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from a family dispute where the petitioner wife sought a decree for jactitation of marriage, claiming she was divorced orally by her first husband, respondent No. 1, and subsequently contracted a valid second marriage. The Family Court decreed the suit in her favour, but the Additional District Judge reversed the decision on appeal, holding the divorce ineffective for want of notice under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Lahore High Court examined the evidence and held that the oral divorce stood duly proved by reliable eyewitness testimony. The Court reaffirmed the legal principle that failure to send a notice of talaq to the Chairman of the Union Council under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 does not render a divorce ineffective in Shariah. Furthermore, the High Court emphasized that the law leans in favour of the validity of marriage and the legitimacy of an innocent child. Consequently, the appellate order was set aside as being without lawful authority, and the judgment of the Family Court was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to send a notice of talaq to the Chairman of the Union Council under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 render a divorce ineffective in Shariah?
  • Whether an oral divorce can be proved through the testimony of witnesses in a suit for jactitation of marriage?
  • Does the law lean in favour of the validity of marriage and the legitimacy of children in matrimonial disputes?
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• Mst. Bashiran Bibi vs Muhammad Kashif Khan and others1995 PLD Lahore 200 · Lahore High Court · 1994-12-01
  civil revisionpre-emptionrejection of plaintlimitation periodZaroorat and ZararPunjab Pre-emption Act 1991Islamic law of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 arose from concurrent decisions of the lower courts rejecting a pre-emption plaint on the grounds of limitation and the absence of averments regarding Zaroorat (necessity) or avoidance of Zarar (harm). The core legal question concerned the applicable limitation period during the legislative vacuum between August 1986 and March 1990 following the declaration of un-Islamic provisions in the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913, and whether pleading Zaroorat or avoidance of Zarar was mandatory in a pre-emption plaint. The Lahore High Court held that while the suit was within time under section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 (which applied prospectively until struck down on December 31, 1993), the plaint was fatally defective for failing to plead Zaroorat or avoidance of Zarar. The key principle laid down is that pleading the existence of Zaroorat or avoidance of Zarar is a mandatory requirement for exercising the Islamic right of pre-emption, without which a plaint is materially defective and cannot be sustained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the omission to plead Zaroorat or avoidance of Zarar in a pre-emption plaint is fatal to the suit?
  • What limitation period governs pre-emption suits instituted during the legislative vacuum between August 1986 and March 1990 in Punjab?
  • Can evidence be led on matters of Zaroorat or avoidance of Zarar if they are not expressly pleaded in the pre-emption plaint?
  • Whether section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 applied prospectively prior to being struck down as repugnant to Islam?
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• Mst. Bashir Begum vs Syed Ijaz Hussain1995 PLD Lahore 392 · Lahore High Court · 1995-05-03
  Writ petitionInterlocutory orderRent ControllerEjectment petitionClosing of evidenceConstitutional jurisdictionLandlord-tenant relationshipUrban Rent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an interlocutory order of a Rent Controller, which closed the petitioners' evidence in an ejectment petition filed under Section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The petitioners, who claimed possession under an agreement of sale rather than as tenants, sought an adjournment due to a witness's illness, which the Rent Controller refused, leading to the closure of their evidence. The core legal question before the High Court was whether a Constitutional petition was competent against such an interlocutory order. The Court, following a Division Bench precedent, held that a writ petition does not lie against an interlocutory order passed by a Rent Controller, especially when it does not cause tangible damage and the validity of such an order can be challenged in an appeal against a final ejectment order. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Constitutional petition be filed against an interlocutory order of a Rent Controller?
  • Does an interlocutory order of a Rent Controller that closes evidence cause tangible damage to a party?
  • Can the validity of an interlocutory order be challenged in an appeal against a final ejectment order?
  • Is a writ petition competent against an interlocutory order of a Rent Controller if it does not cause tangible damage?
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• Mst. Balqees Begum and 11 others vs Mehfooz Hussain and 9 others1995 PLD Lahore 113 · Lahore High Court · 1994-10-30
  revision petitiondeclaratory suitpleadingsland allotmentJammu and Kashmir refugeesamendment of plaintadmission contrary to record
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition arises out of a suit for declaration filed by the petitioners challenging concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts which dismissed their suit regarding land allotment. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioners could deviate from their pleadings regarding the date of allotment, whether an admission contrary to the record was binding, and whether the disputed land was lawfully allotted to their predecessor-in-interest as a Jammu and Kashmir refugee prior to confirmation in favor of the respondents' predecessor. The Lahore High Court dismissed the revision petition in limine, holding that a party cannot be allowed to set up a new case or deviate from the specific pleadings and date of allotment stated in the plaint. The Court laid down the principle that self-serving claims in review applications do not constitute proof of allotment, and pleadings restrict parties from introducing unpleaded factual stances at the appellate or revisional stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party be permitted to set up a new case or deviate from the specific date of allotment pleaded in the plaint?
  • Does a self-serving statement in a review application constitute substantive evidence of land allotment?
  • Whether an appellate court rightly rejects an application for amendment of the plaint seeking to incorporate the relief of possession when the foundational claim of allotment fails?
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• Mst. Bakhat Shada and anothers vs Mansab Dar1995 PLD Lahore 198 · Lahore High Court · 1995-01-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Azmat Mai vs Tanvir Iqbal and 2 others1995 MLD 985 · Lahore High Court · 1995-01-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Azmat Mai vs Tanvir Iqbal And 2 Other1995 MLD 985 · Lahore High Court · 1995-01-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Azizan Bibi and anothers vs District Judge, Badin and 2 others1995 CLC 614 · Sindh High Court · 1994-03-31
  guardianshipinterim custodyterritorial jurisdictionalternative remedyconstitutional petitionfamily appealminor
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Sindh High Court against an interim order passed by the District Judge, Badin under section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act regarding the custody of a minor. The primary legal questions involved were whether the District Court had territorial jurisdiction given the minor's residence, whether an interim order under section 12 could be passed without first determining the question of jurisdiction, and whether a constitutional petition was maintainable when an alternative remedy by way of appeal under section 14 of the W.P. Family Courts Act was available. The High Court held that the constitutional petition was not maintainable due to the availability of an alternative remedy of appeal, but opted to convert the petition into a family appeal. The Court ruled that the District Judge erred by failing to determine the preliminary issue of jurisdiction and the question of interim custody before passing the impugned order. The case was accordingly remanded to the District Judge for a fresh decision in accordance with the law, specifically considering section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act and relevant case-law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Court is bound to determine the question of territorial jurisdiction before passing an interim order under section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against an order passed under section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act when an alternative remedy of appeal is available under section 14 of the W.P. Family Courts Act?
  • How is the place where the minor ordinarily resides to be determined under section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act in cases involving the alleged removal of the minor?
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• Mst. Aziza Begum and 5 others vs Muhammad Hussain Khan and 4 others1995 CLC 1578 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1995-05-16
  second appealrevision petitionconversion of appeal into revisioninterim injunctiontechnicalitiesadjudication on meritsdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal, by leave of the Court, challenges the order of the High Court which dismissed the appellants' second appeal against an order confirming an interim injunction as being not maintainable. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the second appeal on technical grounds without exercising its discretion to treat the memo of appeal as a revision petition. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that although a second appeal against an order of confirmation of an injunction was incompetent, the High Court is vested with discretionary power, to be exercised liberally in the interest of justice, to convert a memo of appeal into a revision petition provided it is within limitation. The Court laid down the principle that courts should lean in favour of adjudication on merits rather than stifling proceedings on technicalities, and that the High Court ought to have treated the incompetent second appeal as a revision petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to examine the legality of the orders passed by the courts below.

  Questions settled

  • Can a second appeal against an order confirming an interim injunction be maintained?
  • Is the High Court empowered to treat an incompetent memo of appeal as a revision petition?
  • Should courts lean in favour of adjudication on merits rather than dismissing cases on technicalities?
  • Is the conversion of an appeal into a revision petition subject to the law of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aziz Fatima Through A.G. And Another vs The StateK.L.R. 1995 Criminal Cases 333 · Sindh High Court · 1994-07-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aziz Bibi vs Karam Din and others1995 MLD 1121 · Lahore High Court · 1994-08-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aziz Bibi vs Karam Din And Other1995 MLD 1121 · Lahore High Court · 1994-08-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Azeem Khatoon and others vs Muhammad Sadiq and others1995 MLD 1893 · Lahore High Court · 1995-03-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Azeem Khatoon And Others vs Muhammad Sadiq And Other1995 MLD 1893 · Lahore High Court · 1995-03-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ayesha Bibi vs Muhammad Sajid and another1995 SCMR 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-14
  pre-emptionrejection of plainttalabsco-sharercollateralpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the rejection of the petitioner's pre-emption suit for possession of land. The core legal question concerns whether a pre-emption suit filed in 1980 could be maintained and decreed on the basis of being a collateral or co-sharer without pleading Talabs under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, and absent a pre-emption decree before 31 July 1986. The Supreme Court held that the petition was liable to be dismissed because no decree for possession by pre-emption had been passed in favour of the petitioner before 31 July 1986, rendering it impossible to decree the suit on the basis of being a collateral of the vendor and co-sharer in the estate. The key principle laid down is that pre-emption suits filed prior to the relevant cutoff and lacking a decree by 31 July 1986 cannot be sustained on grounds no longer recognized by law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit can be decreed on the basis of being a collateral and co-sharer without a pre-emption decree having been passed in favour of the plaintiff before 31 July 1986?
  • Can a plaint be rejected for failure to disclose Talabs as envisaged by the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 in a suit filed in 1980?
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• Mst. Asia Iqbal vs Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Bahawalpur through Chairman and another1995 CLC 341 · Lahore High Court · 1994-10-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Anwar Bibi vs The State1995 P Cr. L J 1010 · Lahore High Court · 1994-04-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amira Bokhari vs Faqir Syed Jameelud Din Bokhari and 2 others1995 MLD 34 · Lahore High Court · 1994-10-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amira Bokhari vs Faqir Syed Jameelud Din Bokhari And 2 Other1995 MLD 34 · Lahore High Court · 1994-10-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amir Begum vs Manzoor AhmadK.L.R. 1997 Civil Cases 510 · Lahore High Court · 1996-01-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Allah Rakhi and anothers vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, Multan and 4 others1995 SCMR 1017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-16
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyagreement of associationSettlement Scheme No. VIIIDisplaced Persons Compensation Actleave to appealsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the disputed transfer of an evacuee shop in Multan. The core legal question concerns the validity of the subsequent transfer of the property to the first petitioner under Settlement Scheme No. VIII when the property had already been validly transferred to the third respondent under section 10(a) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, following an agreement of association. The Supreme Court held that once the property was lawfully transferred and the transferee had complied with the requirements through an agreement of association and adjustment of compensation, the property ceased to be available for subsequent transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. Consequently, the subsequent allotment orders in favour of the first petitioner were without lawful authority and jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that evacuee property already validly transferred and acted upon under the settlement laws cannot be re-allotted to a subsequent claimant under later schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether evacuee property validly transferred under section 10(a) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 is available for subsequent transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  • Does an agreement of association and adjustment of compensation finalize the transfer process for a lawful transferee under settlement laws?
  • Are subsequent allotment orders issued in ignorance of a prior valid transfer order deemed to be without lawful authority and jurisdiction?
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• Mst. Aksar Jan vs Rehmat Din and another1995 SCMR 1136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-21
  bail grantcancellation of bailmurderambushexercise of discretionleave to appealcriminal law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner (complainant) challenged the judgment of a Single Judge of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench, which granted bail to respondent No. 1 in a case registered under Sections 302, 324, 148, 149, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code involving a double murder. The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court improperly or illegally exercised its judicial discretion in granting bail to the accused. The Supreme Court observed that although the accused was named in the FIR, the factual allegations indicated that the assailants had ambushed themselves in shrubs during the actual firing and emerged only afterward firing in the air, at which point they were allegedly seen by the complainant and witnesses. Finding that the High Court had considered the overall circumstances of the case and that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any illegality or improper exercise of discretion, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court's discretionary order granting bail in the absence of improper or illegal exercise of discretion?
  • Whether bail may be granted where the accused is named in the FIR but the circumstances show that the assailants allegedly fired while hidden in shrubs and were seen only subsequent to the firing?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal challenging a grant of bail succeed without establishing that the discretion exercised by the High Court was arbitrary or contrary to law?
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• Mst. Akhtar Parveen vs The StateK.L.R. 1997 Shariat Cases 245 · Lahore High Court · 1997-03-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Afroz Qureshi and another vs Muhammad Ikram Siddiqui1995 CLC 735 · Sindh High Court · 1995-01-08
  malicious prosecutiondamagesacquittalreasonable and probable causeburden of proofrevision applicationcivil suits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two revision applications arising from the concurrent dismissal of civil suits for damages for malicious prosecution filed by the applicants against the respondent. The applicants had been prosecuted under section 341 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an FIR lodged by the respondent, and were later acquitted under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions centered on whether the applicants proved the essential elements of malicious prosecution, specifically malice and the absence of reasonable and probable cause. The Sindh High Court held that mere acquittal or an order under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. does not automatically establish malice or the lack of reasonable and probable cause, nor does it entitle a plaintiff to damages without affirmative proof of improper and indirect motives. The court laid down the principle that the plaintiff in a suit for malicious prosecution carries a heavy burden to independently prove all essential ingredients, including malice and absence of probable cause, and that prior acquittal alone—especially where based on technicalities or lack of evidence of the investigating officer—is insufficient to sustain a claim for damages.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of acquittal under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically establish that a criminal prosecution was malicious and without reasonable and probable cause?
  • What are the essential elements a plaintiff must prove to succeed in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution?
  • Is the existence of a prior acquittal sufficient to shift the burden of proof regarding malice to the defendant in a civil suit for damages?
  • Can the initiation of a criminal case regarding a bailable offence and subsequent acquittal form the sole basis for claiming general and special damages for malicious prosecution?
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• Mst. Aamna Bibi vs Kashifurrehman and another1995 P Cr. L J 730 · Balochistan High Court · 1994-11-10
  criminal revisionsummoning of witnessesmaterial witnessjust decision of the caseinvestigation lapsescourt's discretionary powerSection 540 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Quetta, which dismissed an application to summon and record the statements of four additional eye-witnesses in a murder trial. The petitioner, the mother of the deceased, argued that these witnesses were crucial but had been overlooked by the investigating agency. The core legal question was the scope and application of the court's power under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon witnesses not included in the initial prosecution schedule. The High Court held that the trial court's dismissal, based on the application being filed at a 'belated stage,' was legally unsustainable. The Court clarified that Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, empowers the court to summon witnesses at any stage of an inquiry or trial if their evidence is essential for a just decision. The principle laid down is that while courts should not act to fill gaps in the prosecution's case, they are not passive observers and must exercise their mandatory duty to summon material witnesses when necessary to uncover the truth and ensure justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power of a court under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon witnesses expire after the closure of prosecution evidence?
  • Is a trial court obligated to summon a witness not listed in the prosecution schedule if their evidence is essential for a just decision?
  • Can a trial court exercise its powers under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon witnesses even if the application is filed at a late stage of the trial?
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• Mst, Khatoon vs Sabir Ahmed and 7 others1995 PLD Karachi 593 · Sindh High Court · 1995-07-05Read full judgment →
• Ms. Afroz Ihsan Haq vs Federal Government of Pakistan1995 PLD Karachi 56 · Sindh High Court · 1993-11-10Read full judgment →
• MRS.Z.Shirazee vs Abdul QadirK.L.R. 1997 Civil Cases 127 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-19Read full judgment →
• Mrs.) Shamim Rizwan vs Province of Punjab Etc.K.L.R. 1997 Civil Cases 575 · Lahore High Court · 1997-05-16Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Zuhra Begum vs M/s. Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd.1995 PLD Karachi 237 · Sindh High Court · 1995-02-12Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Zeb Mazhar Ali Bhatti vs Government of Punjab through Department of Education, Lahore and 3 others1995 PLC (C.S.) 831 · Lahore High Court · 1994-11-06Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Tehmina Bashir vs Abdul Rauf and another1995 CLC 973 · Lahore High Court · 1994-11-22
  banking tribunalcriminal liabilitysuretyequitable mortgagequashment of proceedingsstatutory interpretationdelegation of authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the dismissal of an application under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which sought the acquittal of a surety in criminal proceedings initiated under Section 7 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 (referred to as Banking Tribunal Ordinance 1984 in the text). The petitioner, having provided an equitable mortgage as a surety for a loan, sold the mortgaged property without disclosing the encumbrance. The core legal question was whether a surety/guarantor falls within the ambit of criminal liability under Section 7 of the Ordinance, which penalizes the destruction, removal, or unauthorized transfer of mortgaged property. The Court held that Section 7 explicitly targets the 'loanee' and uses the pronoun 'him,' which cannot be judicially expanded to include a surety. The Court reasoned that the legislature intentionally excluded sureties to facilitate banking transactions. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the complaint was invalid due to improper delegation of authority. Consequently, the Court set aside the Banking Tribunal's order, quashed the criminal proceedings, and acquitted the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 7 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 impose criminal liability on a surety or guarantor?
  • Can a person holding delegated authority from a bank further delegate the power to initiate criminal prosecution against a third party?
  • Is a surety criminally liable under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 for the unauthorized sale of mortgaged property?
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• Mrs. Tahira Dilawar and 6 others vs Ghulam Samdani and 4 others1995 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-30
  acquittal appealdouble presumption of innocencefabrication of recordMashirnamasecondary evidencepolice misconductleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the High Court's acquittal of police officials charged under Section 218 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for fabricating a Mashirnama (recovery document). The trial court had initially convicted the respondents, but the High Court overturned this. The Supreme Court examined whether the charge of framing an incorrect record could be sustained without the production of the document itself. The Court held that the prosecution failed to produce the original Mashirnama or justify secondary evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984. Consequently, the Court could not verify the alleged fabrication. The Court emphasized that in cases of acquittal, the accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence, and interference is only warranted if the judgment is perverse or based on artificial reasoning. Finding no such infirmity, the Court upheld the acquittal, ruling that the failure to produce the document forming the subject matter of the charge was fatal to the prosecution's case. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 218 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained if the document alleged to be fabricated is not produced in court?
  • What are the evidentiary requirements for proving a document under the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 when the original is not produced?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Does the acquittal of an accused by a competent court create a double presumption of innocence?
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• Mrs. Syeda Habiba Rizvi vs Muhammad Yameenullah Parvez Malik1995 CLC 1121 · Sindh High Court · 1994-11-27Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Syed Nusrat Jaffery And Others vs Sham Ahmad1995 MLD 452 · Sindh High Court · 1987-03-26Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Syed Nusrat Jaffery and others vs Shafi Ahmad1995 MLD 452 · Sindh High Court · 1987-03-26Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Shaista Younus Khan and 3 others vs Mrs. Asia Khatoon and 31995 PLD Karachi 560 · Sindh High Court · 1995-05-31
  insurance policynomineeassignmentestate administrationinheritancetrusteemarried women's property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a suit for the administration, partition, possession, and accounts of the estate of a deceased person, specifically concerning the legal status of insurance policy proceeds collected by the widow as a nominee. The core legal question is whether a nominee of a life insurance policy is exclusively entitled to the insurance proceeds or merely receives them as a trustee for all legal heirs under the law of succession, and whether such nomination attracts the protective trust provisions of section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1874. The Court held, following the Supreme Court precedent in Mst. Amtul Habib v. Mst. Musarrat Parveen, that a mere nomination under section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 only confers a right to receive or collect the money on behalf of all legal heirs as a trustee, unlike an assignment under section 38 which transfers absolute title. The key principle laid down is that nomination does not operate as a gift or a will, does not override the law of succession, and requires the nominee to hold the proceeds for the benefit of all legal heirs unless a valid statutory assignment is established.

  Questions settled

  • Does a nominee of a life insurance policy become the exclusive owner of the policy proceeds upon the death of the assured?
  • What is the legal distinction between the nomination of an insurance policy under section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 and the assignment of a policy under section 38?
  • Does section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1874 apply automatically to a wife who is merely designated as a nominee in a life insurance policy?
  • Are the benefits arising out of insurance policies part of the estate of a deceased person liable to be shared among legal heirs according to the law of inheritance?
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• Mrs. Shahnaz Begum vs Mrs. Daulat Roshan Ali1995 SCMR 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-18
  ejectmentbona fide personal needlandlord and tenantburden of proofrented premiseseviction order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, whereby an order of eviction against the respondent tenant on the ground of bona fide personal need was set aside. The landlady sought eviction under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, stating she lived temporarily in her father-in-law's house, which was being sold, and required her own flat. The Rent Controller allowed eviction, but the High Court reversed it, holding that the landlady failed to prove the sale agreement of her father-in-law's house and thus lacked good faith. The Supreme Court held that the production of a formal written sale agreement of the father-in-law's house was unnecessary, as an owner or relative is under no legal obligation to accommodate a daughter-in-law indefinitely, and the landlady sufficiently established her temporary residence and the compulsion to vacate. Furthermore, the tenant failed to discharge the burden of proving that the landlady owned other vacant flats in the building. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Rent Controller's eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-production of a written sale agreement regarding a third party's house renders a landlady's claim of bona fide personal need for her own property mala fide?
  • Does a father-in-law have a legal obligation to accommodate his daughter-in-law so as to negate her personal need for eviction?
  • Where a tenant alleges that a landlady owns alternative accommodation in the same building, upon whom lies the burden to prove such ownership?
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• Mrs. Salal Akbar Bugti vs Khawand Bakhsh and 4 others1995 P Cr. L J 61 · Balochistan High Court · 1994-10-12Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Sajida Tahir vs Chairman, Governing Board, National Institute of Modern Languages, Islamabad and 2 others1995 PLC (C.S.) 1204 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1995-06-26Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Prem Shamsher Singh and others vs Commissioner of Wealth Tax1995 PTD 907 · Delhi High Court · 1994-07-22Read full judgment →