Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Messrs United Bank Limited vs Messrs International Commercial1993 MLD 607 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs TUFAlL Muhammad & Brothers vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi,1993 PTD 717 · Lahore High Court · 1993-02-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Super Automobile Tractor Dealers vs Allah Ditta and another1993 CLC 814 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-07Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shahkar Aarts vs Chief Eng. Pak. PWD. and another1993 CLC 615 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shafio Hanif (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs Bank of Credit and Commerce International, (Overseas) Limited, Karachi1993 PLD Karachi 107 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-23
  Banking Tribunals Ordinancejurisdiction of civil courtsouster of jurisdictionfinance and loan recoverytransfer of suitsres sub judiceset-off and counter-claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses multiple suits involving questions of law and fact regarding the jurisdiction of Banking Tribunals under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, vis-a-vis civil courts. The core legal questions revolve around the extent to which the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted by the 1984 Ordinance, the maintainability of set-offs and counter-claims, the handling of successive or counter-suits across different fora, and the proper procedure for suits instituted in civil courts when the Banking Tribunal was initially non-functional. The court held that the jurisdiction of Banking Tribunals is exclusive regarding claims filed by banking companies against customers in respect of finance, but civil courts retain stopgap jurisdiction when the tribunal is non-functional, and suits properly instituted must be transferred once the tribunal becomes functional. The key principles laid down include the nature of ouster of civil court jurisdiction under special banking laws, the conditional validity of proceedings during a tribunal's non-functionality, and the application of principles regarding successive suits and transfer of matters.

  Questions settled

  • To what extent does the Banking Tribunals Ordinance 1984 take away the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Whether a set-off or counter-claim can be entertained in a suit where an independent suit incorporating it may not have been maintainable?
  • How should successive or counter-suits filed in different fora covering the same subject-matter be managed to avoid conflicting decisions?
  • In what manner should a suit be dealt with if it was validly instituted in a civil court when a Banking Tribunal was non-functional, but subsequently becomes exclusively triable by the Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Searle Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan through Additional Secretary, Ministry of Finance and another1993 PLD Karachi 799 · Sindh High Court · 1993-07-13
  customs tariff classificationPCT headingaspartamesweetening agenttaxing statute interpretationredemption fineconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions challenged the assessment of imported consignments of Aspartame 18% to customs duty and sales tax under PCT heading 2106.9090 instead of PCT heading 2924.2900, as well as the levy of a redemption fine. The core legal questions involved the correct tariff classification of the imported chemical mixture under the Pakistan Customs Tariff and the legality of altering a past assessment practice. The Sindh High Court held that since the imported product contained deliberate additions of lactose (76%) making it suitable for use as a sweetening preparation, it stood excluded from Chapter 29 and was correctly classified under heading 2106.9090. The Court further held that administrative circulars such as Customs General Orders cannot override statutory assessment powers, but set aside the redemption fine as there was no concealment or restriction violation, only a bona fide classification dispute. The petitions were accordingly dismissed with the modification regarding the refund of the fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an imported chemical compound mixed with other substances to render it suitable as a sweetening agent falls under Chapter 29 or Chapter 21 of the Pakistan Customs Tariff?
  • Can administrative instructions like Customs General Orders override statutory assessment powers under the Customs Act?
  • Is a redemption fine justified in a bona fide tariff classification dispute where there is no violation of import restrictions or evasion of leviable duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Saudagar Ice FACTORYs vs Zulfiqar and others1993 CLC 1229 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sampak Paper and Board Mills Limited vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1445 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Riaz Bottlers (Pvt.) Limited vs Collector Appeals, Cenrtal1993 CLC 1405 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-10
  excise dutyright of appealpre-deposit of dutyundue hardshipdiscretionary powerquasi-judicial orderconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from an order passed by the Collector (Appeals) directing the petitioner to deposit a disputed amount of excise duty as a condition for hearing its appeal, failing which the appeal would be dismissed in limine. The core legal question is whether an appellate authority can mechanically or without a hearing impose a condition of pre-deposit of duty, and how the discretion to dispense with such deposit under the relevant statute must be exercised. The Lahore High Court held that the discretionary power to dispense with the deposit of duty in cases of undue hardship is quasi-judicial and must be exercised judiciously, fairly, and reasonably rather than arbitrarily or through cyclostyled orders. The Court laid down that an opinion on hardship requires a tentative consideration of the merits and facts of the case, which inherently necessitates granting the appellant an opportunity of being heard before any such pre-deposit condition is imposed. The impugned order was declared without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate authority can condition the hearing of an appeal on the pre-deposit of disputed excise duty without a speaking order?
  • Does the power to dispense with the deposit of duty in cases of undue hardship require affording an opportunity of being heard to the appellant?
  • How must an appellate authority exercise its discretion regarding the waiver of pre-deposit of duties under fiscal statutes?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Razak Mill Stores vs Messrs Mian Chambers, Sharah-E-Liaquat, Karachi through Mian Saifullah1993 MLD 1557 · Sindh High Court · 1993-04-13
  rent evictionstriking off defencerent depositjurisdictional issuewaiver of defaultSindh Rented Premises Ordinancemaintainability of rent case
  Summary & questions settled

  This First Rent Appeal challenged an order by the Rent Controller striking off the appellant-tenant's defence under Section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance for failure to deposit rent within the prescribed time. The appellant contended that the Controller should have first resolved preliminary jurisdictional issues regarding the landlord's authority and the maintainability of the eviction application. The appellant further argued that the eviction suit was premature as no default existed at the time of filing and that the mandatory notice under Section 18 of the Ordinance regarding change of ownership was not served. The High Court held that while jurisdictional issues must be addressed before substantive orders, the appellant had effectively abandoned this plea through its conduct. The Court further clarified that a rent case is maintainable even if no rent is currently outstanding, provided it is based on a prior default that has not been waived. Consequently, the Court found the tentative rent deposit order lawful and upheld the subsequent striking off of the defence for non-compliance, dismissing the appeal while granting the tenant time to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Must a Rent Controller determine a preliminary jurisdictional issue before passing a tentative order for rent deposit?
  • Can a landlord file an eviction application based on a prior default even if no rent is currently outstanding?
  • Does the receipt of arrears of rent in a lump sum constitute a waiver of default?
  • Is an order striking off a tenant's defence under Section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance sustainable if the underlying order for rent deposit was lawful?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs R.B. Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Habib Bank Limited1993 CLC 610 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Premier Machinery Works, Karachi vs Commissioner of Income1993 PTD 223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-03-15
  sales tax exemptionconduit pipestransmission gearcustoms notificationreference jurisdictionfinding of factmachinery and apparatus
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of three consolidated appeals arising from the decisions of the High Court of Sindh and the Lahore High Court regarding the taxability of conduit pipes under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The core legal question was whether conduit pipes, which encase electric wires and cables, qualify for sales tax exemption as 'mechanical and electrical control and transmission gear' under items (v) and (vi) of the Schedule to Customs Notification No. 14-C dated March 15, 1954, read with Sales Tax Notification No. 3-ST of the same date. The Supreme Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's unchallengeable finding of fact—that conduit pipes are necessary for the safe, secure, and proper transmission of electric power in conjunction with machinery—must be accepted in a reference under section 17 of the Sales Tax Act. The Court ruled that item (v) of the Notification covers conduit pipes when used for the transmission of power in conjunction with machinery. The appeals were accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conduit pipes qualify for sales tax exemption as transmission gear under Customs Notification No. 14-C read with Sales Tax Notification No. 3-ST?
  • Is a High Court exercising reference jurisdiction under section 17 of the Sales Tax Act permitted to disturb an unchallenged finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal?
  • Do conduit pipes used as protective covers for wires and cables fall within the meaning of mechanical and electrical control and transmission gear?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Premier Machinery Works, Karachi and otherss vs Commissioner of Income Tax1993 PLD Supreme Court 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-03
  sales tax exemptionconduit pipestransmission gearreference to high courtfinding of factcustoms notification
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of three consolidated appeals arising from conflicting views of the High Court of Sindh and the Lahore High Court regarding the exemption of conduit pipes from sales tax. The core legal question was whether conduit pipes, used to encase electric wires, fall within the scope of 'mechanical and electrical control and transmission gear' under item (v) of Customs Notification No. 14-C dated 15th March, 1954, read with Sales Tax Notification No. 3-ST of the same date, and are thus exempt from sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The Supreme Court held that the High Courts erred in disturbing the unappealed finding of fact recorded by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal that conduit pipes are necessary for the safe and proper transmission of electric energy in conjunction with machinery. The Court laid down the principle that in references under section 17 of the Sales Tax Act, the High Court must accept unchallenged findings of fact by the Tribunal, and that conduit pipes used for the safe and smooth transmission of power in conjunction with industrial machinery qualify for sales tax exemption under item (v) of the relevant Notification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court exercising jurisdiction under section 17 of the Sales Tax Act can set aside an unchalleged finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal?
  • Do conduit pipes manufactured for encasing electric wires fall within the meaning of mechanical and electrical transmission gear under item (v) of Customs Notification No. 14-C dated 15th March, 1954?
  • Are conduit pipes used in conjunction with machinery entitled to exemption from sales tax by virtue of Sales Tax Notification No. 3-ST dated 15th March, 1954?
  • What is the scope of review for a High Court when answering a question of law referred by the Appellate Tribunal under the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 3 others1993 SCMR 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-03
  income tax assessmentreopening of assessmentconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdictiondepartmental remediesperquisitesconscious application of mindunder-assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment dismissing Constitutional petitions filed by a public limited company challenging the reopening of income tax assessments. The core legal question was whether the Income Tax Officer was justified in invoking Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, to reopen assessments for alleged under-assessment, despite the assessee having previously submitted all relevant documentation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the High Court correctly declined to interfere in its Constitutional jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that while the principle established in Edulji Dinshaw Limited v. Income Tax Officer prohibits reopening assessments where the Income Tax Officer has consciously applied their mind to the facts, the present case involved factual disputes regarding perquisites and rebates that necessitated a detailed examination of accounts. Consequently, the Court ruled that such matters are best resolved through the statutory departmental appeal process provided under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, rather than through Constitutional petitions, as the departmental authorities are the appropriate forum for adjudicating these specific factual claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can an assessment be reopened under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 if the Income Tax Officer consciously applied their mind to the facts during the initial assessment?
  • Is a Constitutional petition the appropriate forum for challenging an assessment order when departmental remedies are available under the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to the reopening of income tax assessments?
  • Can an Income Tax Officer reopen an assessment on the ground of under-assessment if no new facts have been discovered?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan State Oil Limited vs Messrs Pakistan Burmah Shell1993 CLC 57 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-09Read full judgment →
• Mirza Imam Baig vs Syed Nasir Mian1993 CLC 1734 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Educational Society vs The Government of Pakistan1993 PTD 804 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-18
  Self-Assessment SchemeIncome tax auditAdministrative discretionArbitrary actionNatural justiceDetailed scrutinyMaterial evidenceIncome Tax Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the selection of their income tax returns for detailed scrutiny under Circular No. 22 of 1991, issued under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the tax authorities could select returns for audit without disclosing the 'definite information based on material evidence' required by the Circular, and whether this process violated natural justice. The Court held that while the Income-tax Officer is not required to issue a notice or provide a hearing prior to initiating scrutiny, the exercise of discretionary power must not be arbitrary or capricious. The Court determined that the Department’s mere assertion of possessing 'definite information' without substantiating it with material evidence renders the selection process discriminatory and invalid. Consequently, the Court quashed the impugned notices, ruling that administrative actions must be supported by evidence to withstand judicial scrutiny. The key principle established is that when administrative discretion is challenged, the burden rests on the authority to demonstrate that the action was taken fairly, in good faith, and strictly within the parameters of the governing statute and circulars.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Income-tax Officer required to provide a pre-notice hearing to an assessee before selecting a return for detailed scrutiny under the Self-Assessment Scheme?
  • Can the tax authorities select a case for detailed scrutiny based solely on an unsubstantiated assertion of 'definite information' without disclosing the underlying material evidence?
  • Does the failure of tax authorities to demonstrate that administrative action was based on relevant material evidence render such action arbitrary and liable to be quashed?
  • Is the power of the Central Board of Revenue to select cases for detailed scrutiny subject to judicial review regarding the parameters of its exercise?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pak1stan Tobacco Co. Ltd. vs Government of Pak1stan through Secretary, Min1stry of Finance and 3 others1993 PTD 697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-03
  income tax assessmentreopening of assessmentchange of opinionconstitutional petitiondepartmental remediesperquisitesexport rebate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment dismissing constitutional petitions filed by a public limited company. The company challenged the reopening of its income tax assessments under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, arguing that all relevant material regarding perquisites and export rebates was already available during the initial assessment, and thus, the reopening was merely a change of opinion. The core legal question was whether the Income Tax Officer could reopen an assessment under Section 65 when the relevant documents were previously disclosed and considered. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly dismissed the petitions, finding that the disputes regarding the calculation of perquisites and rebates required a detailed factual inquiry into accounts, which is best suited for the departmental appellate hierarchy established under the Ordinance. The Court affirmed that while assessments cannot be reopened based solely on a change of opinion where there was a conscious application of mind, the determination of whether such application occurred in this specific case was a matter for the departmental authorities to resolve through the statutory appeal process.

  Questions settled

  • Can an income tax assessment be reopened under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, solely on the basis of a change of opinion by the assessing officer?
  • Does the rule against reopening assessments based on a change of opinion apply if the Income Tax Officer did not consciously apply their mind to the facts during the initial assessment?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable when an alternative, adequate remedy is available under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the definition of 'perquisites' under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, allow for the inclusion of cost of living and dearness allowances within the salary calculation?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Packages LIMITEDs vs The Commissioner of Income Tax1993 SCMR 1224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-07
  income taxrevenue expenditurecapital expenditureinterest on loanpre-production stageadmissible deductionmachinery import
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an income tax reference concerning the assessment year 1973-74. The appellant, a running manufacturing company, had claimed a deduction under Section 10(2)(iii) of the repealed Income-tax Act, 1922 for interest paid on a loan borrowed from PICIC for importing additional machinery. The Income Tax Officer and subsequent appellate forums disallowed the deduction, capitalising the interest on the ground that it related to a "pre-production stage" and that the machinery was not commissioned during the previous year. The High Court of Sindh answered the reference against the assessee. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that since the appellant was already an established running business, the loan was obtained to improve the efficiency of existing production rather than to start a new business. Consequently, the interest paid on the loan constituted revenue expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business under Section 10(2)(xvi) and was an admissible deduction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interest paid on a loan borrowed by an already running business for importing additional machinery to improve efficiency is a deductible revenue expenditure or must be capitalised?
  • Can interest on capital borrowed for business expansion be classified as pre-production interest if the company is already in commercial production?
  • Whether an expenditure incurred on interest for a business loan qualifies as an integral part of the profit-earning process under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Packages Limited vs The Commissioner of Income Tax1993 PTD 758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-07
  income taxinterest on loanborrowed capitalrevenue expenditurecapitalization of interestpre-production stageadmissible deductionrunning business
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh answering a reference in favor of the revenue regarding the disallowance of interest on a loan taken for importing machinery under the repealed Income Tax Act, 1922. The appellant company, engaged in manufacturing paper and packing materials, claimed a deduction for interest paid on a loan borrowed from PICIC for importing additional machinery to improve the efficiency of its existing operations. The Income Tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and Income Tax Appellate Tribunal disallowed the claim, holding that the interest related to a pre-production stage and should be capitalized. The Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 10(2)(iii) and Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income Tax Act 1922, and considered its earlier ruling in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd. The Court held that since the assessee was already an established running business and the loan was obtained to add efficiency to existing machinery rather than for a new business, the interest paid was revenue expenditure and an integral part of the profit-earning process, fully deductible under the law. The impugned judgment was set aside and the reference was answered in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interest paid on a loan borrowed for importing machinery to improve the efficiency of an existing running business is an admissible deduction under section 10(2)(iii) of the Income Tax Act 1922?
  • Whether interest incurred on capital borrowed during the normal stage of production can be treated as pre-production expenditure and capitalized?
  • Whether interest paid on borrowed capital for business operations constitutes revenue expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business under the Income Tax Act 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nasir Traders through its Proprietor and 3 others vs Habib Bank1993 PLD Queeta 94 · Balochistan High Court · 1993-05-27
  banking tribunalrecovery of loansdeposit of decretal amountmandatory condition of appealinterpretation of statutesmortgaged propertyhigh court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Balochistan High Court addresses High Court Appeals Nos.13 to 16 of 1992, arising from separate orders and decrees passed by the Chairman/Judge Banking Tribunal in recovery suits filed by Habib Bank Limited against the appellants. The core legal question was whether an appeal against a decree passed by a Banking Tribunal could be entertained by the High Court under Section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, without the appellant depositing the claimed suit amount or decretal amount, and whether mortgaged properties could be treated as security to exempt the appellants from this deposit. The Court dismissed the appeals in limine, holding that the requirement under Section 9 to deposit the suit or decretal amount is mandatory, plenary, and a strict condition precedent for the entertainment of an appeal. The key principle laid down is that statutes providing for the expeditious recovery of money by financial institutions must be interpreted literally according to their plain and ordinary meaning, precluding any equitable construction or relaxation of the deposit requirement based on pre-existing mortgages.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal against a decree of a Banking Tribunal be entertained without depositing the suit amount or decretal amount as mandated by Section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984?
  • Does the High Court have the discretion to accept mortgaged property as security in lieu of the mandatory cash deposit required for filing an appeal under Section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984?
  • What is the scope of interpretation for fiscal statutes enacted for the expeditious recovery of money due to financial institutions?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Najib Zarab Limited vs Government of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 4 others1993 PLD Karachi 93 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-09
  Afghan transit tradetransit of goodscustoms clearancelandlocked Stateinternational law and municipal lawimport definitionsmuggling prevention
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged letters and orders issued by the Central Board of Revenue and Customs authorities discontinuing transit facilities for tyres destined for Afghanistan under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, 1965. The core legal question was whether the authorities could invoke domestic customs restrictions to deny transit facilities to goods intended for a landlocked country under the guise of preventing smuggling, and how international law interacts with municipal legislation. The Sindh High Court held that goods in transit across Pakistan to a foreign territory under Section 129 of the Customs Act, 1969 and the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, 1965 do not constitute 'imports' into Pakistan, and authorities cannot unlawfully curtail transit rights through executive instructions or letters to combat smuggling when specific remedies exist. The petition was allowed, and the impugned letters were quashed with directions to clear the transit goods.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rules of international law override municipal law in case of a conflict?
  • Do goods in transit across Pakistan to a foreign territory constitute imports under the Customs Act?
  • Can transit facilities granted under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement be unilaterally curtailed by executive instructions?
  • What are the legal remedies available to authorities when transit goods are surreptitiously diverted into the domestic market?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Nisar Rice Mills, Lahore1993 CLC 1627 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-07
  banking recoveryspecial court jurisdictionterritorial jurisdictionhigh court benchestransfer of suitreturn of plaintoriginal civil jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved a banking recovery suit filed at the main seat of the Sindh High Court at Karachi for a loan amount exceeding ten million rupees, where the cause of action, the defendant's business, and the mortgaged property were all located within the territorial jurisdiction of the Sukkur Bench. The core legal question concerned whether suits under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 could be instituted at provincial High Court benches rather than exclusively at the main seat, and how cases erroneously filed at the wrong bench or seat should be handled procedurally. The court held that each High Court and its respective benches constitute a Special Court under the Ordinance with co-extensive jurisdiction, and that suits can be instituted at appropriate benches based on territorial nexus. Concluding that the suit lacked a jurisdictional connection to Karachi, the court held that since the High Court as a whole possessed jurisdiction, the plaint could not be returned under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure; instead, the matter was referred to the Chief Justice under Rule 5 of the High Court of Sindh Benches Rules, 1987 for transfer to the Sukkur Bench.

  Questions settled

  • Whether suits under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 can be instituted at the provincial High Court benches as well as the main seat?
  • Does the conferment of Special Court jurisdiction upon a High Court create a new jurisdiction or rely on pre-existing Original Civil Jurisdiction?
  • Can a plaint be returned under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure when a suit is filed at the wrong bench of the same High Court that otherwise has jurisdiction?
  • What jurisdictional facts are necessary to attract the Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court in banking recovery matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mother Care Nursing & Maternity Home vs Mrs. Syeda Raisa1993 MLD 862 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Merkuria Sucden vs Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan Ltd.1993 CLC 714 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-30
  temporary injunctionmandatory injunctionestoppelsale of goodsbona fide purchaserwarehouse receiptsinterlocutory order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for a mandatory injunction, or alternatively a temporary injunction, to compel the defendant to deliver a specific quantity of rice or restrain its alienation. The core legal question is whether the plaintiff, a bona fide purchaser for value who relied on warehouse receipts and representations issued by the defendant, is entitled to delivery despite the defendant's claim that the property in the goods had not passed to the original buyer due to contract cancellation. The court held that the defendant is estopped from denying the plaintiff's right to delivery, as the defendant's conduct and representations induced the plaintiff to act to its detriment. However, the court declined to grant a mandatory injunction for immediate delivery, as such relief is generally limited to restoring the status quo ante rather than creating a new state of affairs. Consequently, the court granted a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the rice pending the suit's disposal. The key principle established is that a seller is estopped from asserting lack of property transfer against a third party when the seller's own representations have induced that party's reliance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a seller be estopped from denying a third-party purchaser's right to delivery of goods based on representations made in warehouse receipts, even if the property in the goods has not technically passed to the original buyer?
  • Is a mandatory injunction available at an interlocutory stage to create a new state of things, or is it limited to restoring the status quo ante?
  • Under what circumstances can a court grant a mandatory injunction under Order 39, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mehran Medical Complex (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others vs Abdul Hafeez1993 MLD 1843 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mehran Associates Limited vs The Commissioner of Incometax, Karachi1993 SCMR 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-21
  income taxownership of buildinglease agreementfiscal statutestrict constructionnon-adjustable paymenthouse property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a reference to the High Court of Sindh regarding whether a lessee of a property could be considered its 'owner' under Section 12(13) of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979. The appellant had leased a plot from the Auqaf Department, demolished the old structure, and constructed a new building. Under the lease agreement, the newly constructed building vested immediately in the lessor (the Auqaf Department), while the appellant retained leasehold rights. The Income-tax Officer sought to tax a non-refundable, non-adjustable payment received by the appellant from tenants under Section 12(13). The Supreme Court held that since the lease agreement explicitly vested the ownership of the structure in the Auqaf Department from its inception, the appellant was not the 'owner' of the building. Applying the strict rules of interpretation for fiscal statutes, the Court ruled that tax charges must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language, with any doubt resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a lessee be deemed the owner of a building under Section 12(13) of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, if the lease agreement explicitly vests ownership of the constructed structure in the lessor from inception?
  • How should ambiguous or doubtful provisions in a fiscal or taxing statute be interpreted by the courts?
  • Does the term 'owner' in Section 12(13) of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, extend to a person who merely holds leasehold rights and possesses no legal title to the building?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mehran Associates Limited vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Karachi1993 PTD 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-21
  income taxowner of a buildinglease agreementhouse property incomestatutory interpretationtaxing statute constructionnon-refundable payment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh regarding the taxability of a non-refundable amount received from tenants by a lessee. The core legal question was whether an assessee who holds land on lease and constructs a building thereon which immediately vests in the lessor (the Auqaf Department) under the lease agreement can be treated as the 'owner' of the building for the purpose of taxation under subsection (13) of section 12 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court held that since the structure vested in the lessor from its inception, the appellant-lessee was not the owner of the building and thus could not be taxed under subsection (13) of section 12. The Court laid down the principle that taxing statutes must be construed strictly and in favour of the taxpayer, and charges cannot be imposed without clear and unambiguous language; a lessee cannot be deemed an owner under subsection (13) where ownership of the constructed building vests contractually in the lessor from the very beginning.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an assessee holding a lease who constructs a building that vests in the lessor from its inception can be considered the owner of the building under subsection (13) of section 12 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the word 'owner' in taxation statutes include a lessee who does not hold legal or vested ownership of the structure?
  • How are fiscal statutes and provisions imposing pecuniary burdens to be interpreted in cases of ambiguity?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mazari & Co. through Proprietor vs Province of Sindh through Additional Chief Secretary and another1993 CLC 1768 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-19
  contract cancellationaudi alteram partemnatural justicevested rightsshow-cause noticelocal government contractwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges the unilateral cancellation of a contract for octroi and parking rights by the provincial government. The petitioner, having been awarded the contract and having commenced performance, was abruptly informed of its cancellation without prior notice. The core legal question is whether the government possesses the authority to cancel a valid, concluded contract with a private party without adhering to the principles of natural justice, specifically the requirement of a show-cause notice. The Court held that the impugned order was without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The ratio establishes that the principle of 'audi alteram partem' must be read into every statute unless expressly excluded. Once a valid contract is executed, it creates vested rights that cannot be extinguished unilaterally by the government without observing due process and providing an opportunity for a hearing. Consequently, the Court quashed the cancellation order, while noting that the respondents remain free to initiate lawful proceedings if they believe irregularities exist, provided they follow proper legal formalities.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government unilaterally cancel a valid contract with a private party without serving a show-cause notice?
  • Is the principle of audi alteram partem applicable to the cancellation of a government contract where the statute does not expressly exclude it?
  • Does the power of general supervision and control under Section 53 of the Sindh Local Government Ordinance 1979 authorize the government to cancel a contract without an opportunity of hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Malik Muhammad Azeem & Bros vs Pakistan through the Secretary, Pakistan P.W.D., Islamabad and another1993 PLD Queeta 99 · Balochistan High Court · 1993-05-01Read full judgment →
• Messrs Latif Trading Company vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 2 others1993 CLC 1663 · Sindh High Court · 1993-04-19
  constitutional petitioncustoms seizureshow-cause noticeconfiscation of conveyanceillegal detentionport clearance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, was filed by shipping agents challenging the seizure and detention of a launch by custom authorities without fulfilling statutory prerequisites. The core legal question was whether the detention and seizure of a conveyance without issuing a mandatory show-cause notice within the statutory period under the Customs Act, 1969, is legally sustainable. The Sindh High Court held that the provisions of sections 157, 168, and 180 of the Customs Act, 1969, are mandatory in nature and must be strictly followed. Since no show-cause notice containing the grounds for confiscation was served within two months of seizure as required by section 168(2) read with section 180, the seizure was declared to be of no legal effect. The Court laid down the principle that failure to issue a statutory show-cause notice within the stipulated timeframe invalidates the seizure of goods or conveyances, necessitating their release to the person from whom they were seized.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the seizure of a conveyance under the Customs Act, 1969 becomes illegal if no show-cause notice is issued within two months?
  • Are the provisions regarding the issuance of a show-cause notice under section 180 of the Customs Act, 1969 mandatory in nature?
  • What is the legal consequence under section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969 when authorities fail to issue a show-cause notice within the prescribed period following a seizure?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Karachi Tank Terminals (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Collector of Customs1993 MLD 1566 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Industrial. Development Bank of Pakistan vs Messrs Sarela1993 CLC 1540 · Balochistan High Court · 1993-04-04
  winding upcommercial insolvencystatutory noticeex parte proceedingsjust and equitablesubstratumCompanies Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a winding-up petition filed by the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan against Messrs Sarela under section 305 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, seeking to wind up the respondent-company on grounds of commercial insolvency and inability to pay outstanding loan dues. The core legal questions relate to the necessity of strict compliance regarding statutory notice service at a registered office, whether ex parte or summary proceedings permit winding up without supporting evidence, and the tests for determining commercial insolvency under the 'just and equitable' clause. The Balochistan High Court held that statutory notice requirements must be strictly fulfilled and proved with convincing evidence, and courts cannot issue a winding-up order mechanically in ex parte proceedings without active judicial evaluation and concrete proof of insolvency or closure. The court established that winding up requires clear evidence demonstrating that a company's substratum is gone, liabilities exceed assets, and no reasonable prospect of profitable business remains, dismissing the petition due to insufficient evidence and failure to properly serve the statutory notice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judicial order for winding up a company can be passed in summary or ex parte proceedings without recording evidence or strictly establishing the claims?
  • Is strict compliance with the service of statutory notice at a company's registered office mandatory before a winding-up petition can proceed?
  • What tests are to be applied to determine whether a company is commercially insolvent and whether it is just and equitable to order its winding up?
  • Whether a court is under a legal obligation to grant relief in ex parte proceedings merely on the basis of the pleadings and affidavits provided by the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Incom Services vs Messrs Sui Gas Transmission1993 PLD Karachi 429 · Sindh High Court · 1993-02-01
  arbitration awardscope of referencearbitrator jurisdictionmisconduct of arbitratorsetting aside awarddetention chargescontractual dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns objections filed under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, against an arbitral award. The dispute arose from a contract for the transportation of line pipes, where the plaintiff claimed damages for trailer detention and loss of trailers during civil riots. The defendant contended that the arbitration reference was strictly limited to the detention charges and that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by adjudicating the claim for lost trailers. The Court examined the scope of the reference, noting that the correspondence between the parties and the appointment letter explicitly confined the dispute to detention charges. The Court held that an arbitrator’s jurisdiction is strictly limited by the terms of the reference; adjudicating matters outside this scope constitutes misconduct. Consequently, the award regarding the lost trailers was set aside for lack of jurisdiction. However, the Court upheld the award concerning detention charges, finding it based on documentary evidence and within the arbitrator's domain, emphasizing that the Court cannot act as an appellate body to re-evaluate evidence or findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Can an arbitrator adjudicate claims that were not specifically included in the terms of reference?
  • Does an arbitrator's decision to consider matters outside the scope of reference constitute misconduct under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Is a court empowered to re-examine evidence or act as an appellate body when reviewing an arbitral award under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Does the failure to record oral evidence in arbitration proceedings automatically invalidate an award?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Ltd., Karachi vs Messrs Chaudhry1993 CLC 1892 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-14
  civil revisionrestoration of suitprocedural defaultdismissal for non-prosecutiondiscretionary powerbona fide mistaketransfer of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arose from the dismissal of a recovery suit by the trial court due to the plaintiff's failure to deposit proclamation charges for service of summons. The core legal question was whether the trial court exercised its discretion judiciously in dismissing the suit under Order 9, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and subsequently refusing to restore it under Order 9, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, despite the plaintiff's plea of a bona fide mistake. The High Court held that the trial court's dismissal was overly technical and punitive. The Court emphasized that procedural provisions like Order 9, Rule 2 are not imperative in nature and should not be applied to inflict extreme penalties for minor, non-contumacious lapses, especially when the party has otherwise pursued the litigation diligently. The Court established that where a party provides a plausible explanation for a procedural default, such as a bona fide mistake by counsel's clerk, and the default is not persistent or contumacious, the court should favor the restoration of the suit to ensure the matter is decided on its merits rather than on technical grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Is the dismissal of a suit under Order 9, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory or discretionary?
  • Can a court refuse to restore a suit under Order 9, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the failure to comply with a procedural order was due to a bona fide mistake?
  • Does a court have the authority to transfer a civil suit outside the territorial limits of a district for the interests of justice and administrative convenience?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hafiz Textile Mills Limited vs Commissioner for WorkmensK.L.K. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 266 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Hafiz Textile Mills Limited vs Commissioner for Workmen's1993 PLD Karachi 709 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-10
  Payment of Wages Actdelayed wagesdeduction from wagescompensation capalternate remedyconstitutional jurisdictionwithout lawful authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, which directed the employer to pay wages for the period employees were prevented from resuming duties, along with ten times compensation on each allowed amount. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petition due to the availability of an alternate remedy by way of appeal under Section 17 of the Act. The High Court overruled the preliminary objection, holding that the availability of an alternate remedy does not bar the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 where an order is passed without jurisdiction or contains an error apparent on the face of the record resulting in manifest injustice. On merits, the High Court held that the claim for wages for the period during which workers were not allowed to resume duty fell under the category of 'delayed wages' rather than 'deduction from wages' under Section 15 of the Act. Consequently, compensation under Section 15(3) was statutorily capped at Rs. 10 per worker, making the award of ten times compensation illegal and without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the availability of an alternate statutory appeal bar the High Court from exercising Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 where the impugned order contains an error apparent on the face of the record?
  • What is the statutory limit on compensation that can be awarded under Section 15(3) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 in cases involving delayed wages as opposed to deducted wages?
  • Do wages for a period during which employees were improperly restrained from resuming duties fall under the category of 'delayed wages' or 'deduction from wages' under the Payment of Wages Act 1936?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Habib Bank Limited and anothers vs Mst. Hameeda Begum and 61993 CLC 2146 · Lahore High Court · 1993-05-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs H.M. Abdullah vs The Income Tax Officer, Circle v, Karachi and 21993 SCMR 1195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-27
  Income Tax OrdinanceConstitutional petitionalternate statutory remedyreassessmentIncome Tax OfficerInspecting Assistant Commissioneradministrative and quasi-judicial functionssection 7 guidance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the assessee arose from a judgment of the Sindh High Court concerning income tax reassessment notices issued under section 65 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, and subsequent reassessment orders framed under directions of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner pursuant to section 7 of the Ordinance. The core legal question examined was whether an Income Tax Officer, having formulated a definite opinion against reopening an assessment, could frame fresh assessment orders under superior administrative directions, and whether the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court could be invoked despite an efficacious statutory remedy under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the Income Tax Ordinance is a complete code providing adequate statutory remedies including appeals and references, the appellant was not entitled to bypass these remedies and invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution once assessment orders had been passed. The Supreme Court further clarified the scope of administrative guidance under section 7 of the Ordinance, distinguishing between administrative and quasi-judicial functions of tax authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an assessee can invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge tax assessment orders when an alternate and efficacious remedy is available under the Income Tax Ordinance?
  • Can an Income Tax Officer frame reassessment orders under the directions of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner pursuant to section 7 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • What is the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial authorities under the Income Tax Ordinance?
  • Does section 7 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 permit superior administrative authorities to guide and instruct an Income Tax Officer during assessment proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Grosevenor Casino Ltd. vs Abdul Malik Badruddin1993 SCMR 1458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-05-04
  foreign decreeexecution of decreemoney decreeprocedural lawcivil proceduresecurity for decretal amount
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the execution of a foreign money decree. The petitioner, having obtained a money decree from the High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, England, sought execution in Pakistan under Section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question is whether the requirement under Order XXI, Rule 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908—which mandates the deposit of the decretal amount or the furnishing of security—applies to the execution of foreign decrees under Section 44-A. The High Court had held that Section 44-A operates independently, that Order XXI, Rule 23-A is inapplicable to foreign decrees, and that the executing court must inquire whether the decree falls under the exceptions in Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before proceeding. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to definitively determine the applicability of Order XXI, Rule 23-A to foreign decree executions, specifically examining whether the phrase 'as if' in Section 44-A incorporates the entire procedural scheme of Order XXI.

  Questions settled

  • Is Order XXI, Rule 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to the execution of a decree passed by a foreign court under Section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the phrase 'as if' in Section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 make the entire scheme of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to foreign decrees?
  • Is an appeal maintainable under Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 against an order dismissing objections to the execution of a foreign decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Grain Systems (Pvt.) Ltd. and 10 others vs Agricultural1993 SCMR 1996 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-23
  exclusive jurisdictionSpecial Banking CourtBanking Tribunalloan versus financeAgricultural Development Banktransfer of suitsbar of civil jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of eleven connected petitions arising from civil suits filed by the petitioners against the Agricultural Development Bank for rendition of accounts and permanent injunction. The Senior Civil Judge returned the plaints for lack of territorial jurisdiction, and the High Court dismissed the subsequent appeals, holding that the Special Banking Court possessed exclusive jurisdiction. The core legal question concerned the demarcation of jurisdiction between the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, particularly regarding claims involving the Agricultural Development Bank. The Supreme Court held that the Special Court constituted under the 1979 Ordinance has exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving loans, advances, credit, and finance concerning the Agricultural Development Bank, and that civil court jurisdiction is expressly barred in such matters. The Court further held that rather than returning plaints for presentation elsewhere, procedural technicalities should be avoided to do complete justice, and consequently ordered the transfer of the pending suits directly to the appropriate Special Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Special Court constituted under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 have exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan?
  • Can a customer file an independent suit before a Banking Tribunal under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984?
  • Does the jurisdiction of civil courts stand barred in respect of matters falling within the domain of the Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Whether an appellate court should transfer pending suits to the competent Special Court instead of returning plaints to avoid procedural technicalities?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Friends Corporation Pesticides Dealers and anothers vs Messrs1993 CLC 583 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Fazal Weaving Mills Limited, Multan vs Controller Imports &1993 CLC 550 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-12-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Everest Corporation vs Messrs Dacca Mercantile Company, Karachi and 4 others1993 MLD 1303 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Epsilon Engineering International Consulting Engineers vs MRs, Qamar Jahan1993 CLC 1197 · Lahore High Court · 1993-02-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Eckhardt & Co, Marine GmbH vs Muhammad Hanif1993 PLD Supreme Court 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-22
  Section 34 Arbitration Actforeign arbitration clausestay of suitdiscretion of courtbalance of convenienceinternational trade contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court judgment affirming the refusal of a Judge in Chamber to stay a suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The dispute stemmed from a contract for the purchase of a ship executed in Karachi between a Pakistani buyer and a foreign seller, containing a clause for foreign arbitration in London under English law. The foreign seller sought stay of the Pakistani buyer's suit for damages, arguing that the foreign arbitration agreement was binding. The core legal question was whether the court should exercise its discretion under Section 34 to refuse stay of legal proceedings despite the existence of a foreign arbitration clause. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the refusal to stay the suit. The Court laid down that while foreign arbitration clauses should generally be respected to honor contractual bargains, Section 34 confers discretionary power on courts. Where the entire evidence and facts, including unforeseen local circumstances like port strikes, are located in Pakistan, making foreign arbitration inconvenient and expensive, the court's discretionary refusal to grant stay will not be interfered with unless shown to be arbitrary or perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Is the court's power to grant or refuse stay of legal proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 discretionary when a contract contains a foreign arbitration clause?
  • Under what circumstances can a court refuse to stay a civil suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 despite a foreign arbitration agreement?
  • Will an appellate court interfere with the exercise of discretion by a trial judge refusing to stay a suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 if based on relevant considerations?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Eastern Poutry Services vs Government of Pakistan and others1993 PTD 1219 · Sindh High Court · 1993-07-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Eastern Automobiles (Private) Ltd., Karachi vs Pakistan1993 PLD Karachi 9 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-26
  fixation of fair rentSindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979similar premisessimilar circumstancescompromise deedremandnatural justicerent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This rent appeal before the Sindh High Court challenged the order of the Rent Controller fixing the fair rent of a 21,000-square-foot godown premises under Section 8 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal issues concerned whether all four factors enumerated under Section 8(1) must co-exist to determine fair rent, whether evidence concerning newly constructed office premises could be used as a comparator for godown premises under Section 8(1)(a), and whether the Rent Controller could rely on newly produced compromise documents submitted at the time of announcing judgment without prior notice to the opposing party. The High Court held that all four ingredients under Section 8(1) need not co-exist and that existence of any single factor may suffice. However, the Court found that the landlord failed to prove similarity of circumstances, as office premises are not comparable to a godown, and relying on compromise documents without giving notice violated principles of natural justice. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for fresh disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Must all four factors listed in Section 8(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 co-exist for the Rent Controller to determine fair rent?
  • Can newly constructed office premises with modern amenities be treated as 'similar premises' situated in 'similar circumstances' for fixing the fair rent of a godown under Section 8(1)(a) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a Rent Controller rely on compromise documents produced at the time of judgment announcement without providing notice and an opportunity of hearing to the opposing party?
  • Is mere oral testimony of a landlord's witness sufficient to prove the prevailing rent of comparable premises in the absence of tenancy agreements, rent receipts, or examination of the relevant tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs D.M. Brothers vs Collector of Customs and another1993 MLD 632 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Chas A. Mendoza vs Syed Tausif Ahmed Zaidi and 2 others1993 PLD Karachi 790 · Sindh High Court · 1993-07-12
  trade mark infringementtemporary injunctionpassing offdental creamdeceptive similarityprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction, mandatory injunction, accounts, and damages, alongside an application for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from manufacturing, selling, and advertising dental cream under the infringing trade mark "Medicare" and using a confusingly similar get-up and wrapper. The plaintiffs claimed exclusive proprietary rights based on their registered trade mark "Medicam" used since 1989. The defendants contested the application, asserting they had used the trade mark "Medicare" since 1979 and that the marks were visually and phonetically distinct. The Sindh High Court held that the competing trade marks and their packaging shared striking visual and structural similarities, particularly in their identical first syllables and color schemes, likely to cause deception and confusion among unwary purchasers. Establishing a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and potential irreparable loss in favor of the plaintiffs, the court allowed the application and granted the temporary injunction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the use of a competing trade mark with similar initial syllables and get-up constitutes infringement of a registered trade mark?
  • Does a plaintiff establish a prima facie case for a temporary injunction in a trade mark infringement suit by showing striking similarities in packaging and colour scheme?
  • Whether the likelihood of confusion for unwary purchasers is a decisive factor in granting interim injunctive relief in trade mark matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs CH. Muhammad Din vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Zone1993 PTD 623 · Lahore High Court · 1993-02-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Central Insurance Co. and others vs The Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others1993 SCMR 1232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-04
  Income tax assessmentInsurance businessDefinite informationReopening of assessmentCentral Board of Revenue CircularTax exemptionAdministrative interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These seven appeals arose from a judgment of the Sindh High Court dismissing Constitution Petitions filed by insurance companies challenging notices issued under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The Income Tax Officer sought to reopen concluded assessments to tax interest earned on Khas Deposit and Defence Savings Certificates based on Central Board of Revenue (CBR) Circular No. 4 of 1988. The primary questions were whether the special computation provisions for insurance businesses under Section 26 read with Rule 5 of the Fourth Schedule override the general exemption under Section 14 read with Item (72) of the Second Schedule, and whether the CBR circular constituted 'definite information' under Section 65(2) to justify reopening assessments. The Supreme Court held that while Section 26 and Rule 5 prevail regarding the computation of insurance income, the CBR circular is merely an administrative interpretation and does not constitute 'definite information' or a binding judicial pronouncement. A mere change of opinion on existing material cannot warrant reopening completed assessments. The appeals were allowed, and the notices were declared without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does an administrative circular issued by the Central Board of Revenue interpreting statutory provisions constitute 'definite information' under Section 65(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 for reopening a finalized assessment?
  • Can an Income Tax Officer reopen a completed assessment under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 based merely on a change of opinion on existing material without discovering new factual information or a binding judicial precedent?
  • Do the special computation provisions for insurance business under Section 26 read with the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 prevail over the general statutory exemptions contained in Section 14 read with the Second Schedule?
  • Does the Central Board of Revenue possess the jurisdiction to issue binding judicial or quasi-judicial interpretations of statutory provisions for the determination of tax liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bata Pakistan Limited vs Begum Ashraf Burney1993 MLD 697 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Atif Ltd. vs The Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. and another1993 MLD 587 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs Aswan Tentage and Canvas Mills Ltd., Lahore vs Messrs Ma.1993 MLD 243 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-10
  Arbitration agreementSection 20 applicationFraud and misrepresentationFraming of issuesArbitration Act 1940Reference to arbitration
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, challenged a trial court order directing the filing of an arbitration agreement. The appellant contended that the agreement was void due to fraud and misrepresentation, arguing the trial court should have framed issues and allowed evidence before referring the matter to arbitration. The core legal questions were whether the court must frame issues regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement when fraud is alleged, and whether the court or the arbitrator determines the validity of an agreement procured by fraud. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the existence of the agreement was not denied and the allegations of fraud were vague and lacked essential particulars. Relying on the precedent of Lahore Stock Exchange Limited v. Fredrick J. Whyte Group (Pakistan) Ltd., the Court affirmed that the question of whether consent was procured through fraud, coercion, or misrepresentation is to be decided by the arbitrator, not the court. Additionally, the Court reiterated that issues only arise when a material proposition of fact or law is asserted and denied.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the court or the arbitrator has the jurisdiction to decide if an arbitration agreement was procured through fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Is it mandatory for a court to frame issues regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement when the allegation of fraud is vague and lacks particulars?
  • Does an issue arise for the court to determine when a party fails to provide specific details of alleged fraud or misrepresentation in their pleadings?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Abdul Razzak & Company vs Assistant Collector of Customs1993 PLD Karachi 227 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-02
  customs auctionearnest moneyforfeiture of depositas is where ispublic policyvoid agreementrefund of depositunfit for human consumption
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was instituted by the plaintiff seeking a declaration and the recovery of Rs. 2,00,000 deposited as a 25% earnest money bid for 600 bags of betel-nuts at a customs auction. The plaintiff contended that the auction was conducted on the basis of a sample shown beforehand, which was fit for human consumption, but the actual goods delivered were rotten and unfit. The defendants argued that the auction was on an "as is where is" basis, that betel-nuts have industrial uses, and that the deposit was forfeited due to non-payment of the balance. The High Court of Sindh found that the defendants failed to prove any industrial use or that the auction was strictly on an "as is where is" basis. Although the court held that betel-nuts do not fall under the definition of "food" under the West Pakistan Pure Food Ordinance 1960, it ruled that selling goods unfit for human consumption by a government department is opposed to public policy. Consequently, the agreement was declared void under Section 23 of the Contract Act 1872, and the plaintiff was held entitled to a refund under Section 65 of the Contract Act 1872.

  Questions settled

  • Does the sale of goods unfit for human consumption by a government department violate public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Is a bidder entitled to a refund of their earnest money deposit under Section 65 of the Contract Act 1872 if the underlying auction agreement is void as being opposed to public policy?
  • Does the term 'food' as defined in the West Pakistan Pure Food Ordinance 1960 include betel-nuts?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Abdul Ghaffar Kasam - vs Messrs Adamjee Insurance Co. Ltd.1993 MLD 1324 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-09Read full judgment →
• Meraj Din and 3 others vs Additional District Judge, Gujranwala and 21993 CLC 1872 · Lahore High Court · 1993-05-29Read full judgment →
• Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab (Settlement and Rehabilitation1993 SCMR 732 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-02
  Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actpending proceedingsland allotmentinformerrepeal of lawsettlement of claims
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court judgment directing the Board of Revenue to satisfy the unsatisfied land claims of unsuccessful informers by allotting them available land anywhere in Punjab, despite the repeal of the relevant Act. The core legal question was whether unsuccessful proceedings under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, could be treated as 'pending proceedings' to entitle claimants to land allotment after the Act's repeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's direction was legally unsustainable. The Court clarified that the mere pendency of a claim does not constitute 'pending proceedings' under the law. An informer must be successful in their application under sections 10 and 11 to claim rights to resumed or available land. Since the respondents' applications were rejected on merits, they possessed no legal entitlement to further allotments. The Court established that an unsuccessful informer cannot invoke the repealing law or Act XXXVI of 1974 to seek benefits reserved for successful claimants, and a direction contrary to the law cannot be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere pendency of a claim constitute 'pending proceedings' under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Can an unsuccessful informer under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, claim rights to land allotment after the Act's repeal?
  • Is a claimant entitled to land allotment from available land if their application under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, was rejected on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Abdur Rashid vs Ch. Sher Ali1993 MLD 2149 · Election Tribunal · 1992-09-30Read full judgment →
• Mehmood vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 402 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-04Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Ahmed Khan vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2093 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-20Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Ahmad vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1330 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-27Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Ahmad Siddiqui vs Area Councillor, K.M.C., Karachi East and 6 others1993 PLD Karachi 414 · Sindh High Court · 1993-05-06Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Khan vs Sher Baz Khan and another1993 CLC 1939 · Lahore High Court · 1993-05-18
  pre-emptionTalb-e-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadpre-emption money depositZare-Soimcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's pre-emption suit. The core legal questions involved the mandatory requirements for making Talabs under the pre-emption law, specifically the proper pleading of Talb-e-Muwathibat and the attestation of the notice for Talb-i-Ishhad by two truthful witnesses, as well as the mandatory requirement of depositing one-third of the pre-emption money within thirty days under the relevant statutory provisions. The Lahore High Court dismissed the revision, holding that failure to properly plead Talb-e-Muwathibat and non-compliance with the statutory witness attestation requirement for the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad renders the suit not maintainable. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to extend the period for depositing one-third of the pre-emption money beyond thirty days from the filing of the suit, and failure to make such deposit entails dismissal of the suit. The key principles laid down are that a pre-emptor cannot acquire an enforceable cause of action without making Talb-e-Muwathibat, that statutory notice requirements regarding witness attestation are mandatory, and that the thirty-day time limit for depositing one-third of the pre-emption money is strict and unextendable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to plead Talb-e-Muwathibat in the plaint bar a pre-emption suit?
  • Is the attestation of the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad by two truthful witnesses under section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance 1990 mandatory?
  • Can a trial court extend the period for depositing one-third of the pre-emption money beyond thirty days from the filing of the suit?
  • What are the legal consequences of failing to deposit one-third of the pre-emption money within the stipulated thirty-day period?
  Read full judgment →
• Medipharm (Pvt). Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan and others1993 CLC 1958 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-14Read full judgment →
• Mazharul Islam vs Mst. Mafia1993 MLD 1829 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-21Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Masood And Other vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 283 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-02Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Iq Bal vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1698 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-08Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Hussain and others vs The State and others1993 P Cr. L J 576 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-02
  criminal revisionwithdrawal of complaintacquittalautrefois acquitbar to trialsummoning order
  Summary & questions settled

  The present criminal revision petition has been preferred against the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sialkot, whereby the petitioners were summoned in a complaint case. The core legal question raised was whether a fresh complaint for the same offences is maintainable after the withdrawal of an earlier complaint resulted in the acquittal of the accused under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court held that the withdrawal of the earlier complaint upon the satisfaction of the court operated as an acquittal of the accused under section 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Consequently, the court ruled that such an acquittal acts as a bar to a subsequent trial for the same offences pursuant to subsection (1) of section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The impugned summoning order was accordingly set aside and the petition allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of a criminal complaint result in the acquittal of the accused?
  • Whether an acquittal based on the withdrawal of a complaint bars a subsequent trial for the same offences?
  • Can a fresh complaint be filed on the same facts after the withdrawal of a previous complaint under section 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Master Majeed vs (Mst.) Mulmah And 2 OtherK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 41 · Balochistan High Court · 1991-08-26Read full judgment →
• Master Bilawal Ali Zardari vs K.Da. And others1992 PLD Karachi 67 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-25Read full judgment →
• Martin Burn Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income Tax , . (1993 PTD 915 · Supreme Court of India · 1992-10-08Read full judgment →
• Market Committee, Mandi Farooqabad vs Abdul Rashid1993 CLC 2327 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-27Read full judgment →
• Maratab Ali vs The State1993 MLD 281 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-06Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ali Khan vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2514 · Lahore High Court · 1993-08-30Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ali Butt vs Muhammad Bashir and another1993 CLC 1361 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-10Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmed vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1567 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1993-04-15Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmad vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2229 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-28Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmad alias Sooda vs The State1993 MLD 2361 · Federal Shariat Court · 1993-07-17Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Khan vs Muhammad Feroz KhanK.L.R. 1993 Revenue Cases 56 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-03Read full judgment →
• Maqbool and others vs Riasat Ali1993 CLC 741 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-05Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmed and anothers vs Military Accountantgeneral and 21993 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-11
  probationer accountantscivil servantsdepartmental examinationservice tribunalterms and conditions of serviceprobation periodstatutory rules
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal concern the discharge of probationer Accountants by the Pakistan Military Accounts Department for failing to pass mandatory departmental promotion examinations. The core legal questions were whether the departmental rules requiring such examinations were inconsistent with the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and whether the petitioners were bound by the terms of their appointment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the departmental rules were validly framed under the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Court determined that the petitioners, having accepted the terms and conditions of their appointment—which explicitly included the requirement to pass the Accountant Promotion Examination—could not subsequently challenge the validity of those rules. The judgment establishes the principle that a civil servant is bound by the terms and conditions of service accepted at the time of appointment, and that departmental rules framed under statutory authority are valid provided they do not conflict with the parent Act. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Section 6(3) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, expressly authorizes the discharge of probationers who fail to complete prescribed examinations.

  Questions settled

  • Are departmental rules requiring a probationer to pass a promotion examination inconsistent with the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Can a civil servant challenge the terms and conditions of service that they explicitly accepted at the time of their appointment?
  • Does Section 6(3) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, authorize the discharge of a probationer who fails to pass a prescribed departmental examination?
  • Can a probationer be restricted from applying for outside appointments during their period of probation?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmad vs The State1993 MLD 2265 · Federal Shariat Court · 1993-01-19Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmad vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1394 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-04Read full judgment →
• Manzoorulhaq and 3 others vs Mst. Kaneez Begum1993 CLC 109 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-30
  second appealinheritance mutationoral divorcelegitimacy of childburden of proofappellate court powersMuslim personal lawdeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts dismissing the appellants' declaratory suit. The appellants sought to cancel inheritance mutations, alleging that the first respondent was divorced by their predecessor-in-interest in 1936 and that the second respondent was not his daughter. The core legal questions involved whether the oral divorce was proven, whether the first appellate court failed to properly appraise the evidence, and the presumptions of Muslim law regarding marriage and legitimacy. The Lahore High Court held that although the first appellate court failed to independently assess the issues as required by law, the second appellate court possessed the power under section 100 to review the entire evidence on record. Upon a thorough review, the High Court found that the appellants miserably failed to prove the oral divorce through contradictory and partisan testimony, whereas Muslim law strongly leans in favor of marriage, legitimacy, and the presumption of paternity. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the second appellate court can review the entire evidence on record when the first appellate court fails to independently appraise the issues?
  • Does Muslim law lean in favour of legitimacy and raise a presumption of paternity from marriage?
  • Whether oral evidence of a divorce allegedly pronounced years prior without corroborative documentation is sufficient to discharge the heavy burden of proof?
  • Whether a finding of fact regarding family relationship recorded by the trial court can be interfered with under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 225 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-07Read full judgment →
• Manzoor vs The State1993 SCMR 1624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-18
  culpable homicideright of private defencesudden fightunexplained injuriescriminal appealsentence reductionpremeditation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased, originally upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellant was entitled to the right of private defence regarding his co-accused and whether the incident constituted a sudden fight, thereby mitigating the offence. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution failed to explain the injuries sustained by the co-accused, whose presence at the scene was admitted. The Court held that the appellant had a legal right to defend his nephew, the co-accused, under Section 97 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but exceeded this right, invoking Exception 2 to Section 300. Furthermore, the Court determined the incident arose from a sudden quarrel without premeditation, attracting Exception 4 to Section 300. Consequently, the Court set aside the murder conviction, altering it to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and reduced the sentence to ten years' rigorous imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person have a legal right to defend the body of another person under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 304 Part I if the incident occurred during a sudden fight?
  • What is the legal consequence when the prosecution fails to explain injuries sustained by an accused person?
  • Does exceeding the right of private defence bring a case under Exception 2 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1179 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-01Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain and anothers vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2406 · Lahore High Court · 1993-06-26Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain and 6 others vs Muhammad Shafait and another1993 CLC 2357 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1993-05-16Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain and 4 others vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2619 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-14Read full judgment →
• Manzoor and anothers vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 840 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-11Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmed and 3 others vs The State and 2 others1993 P Cr. L J 672 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-01Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1703 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-10Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs Muhammad Latif1993 CLC 785 · Lahore High Court · 1991-01-30Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs Administrator, Residual Properties and others1993 MLD 1685 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-31Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs Additional District Judge and others1993 CLC 2474 · Lahore High Court · 1993-02-17Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad and others vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 967 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-24Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad And Other vs The State And OtherK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 106 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-01Read full judgment →