Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- Kraft General Foods Inc. vs The Registrar of Trade Marks1993 MLD 236 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-08Read full judgment →
- Kishore Kumar and 3 others vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 55 · Balochistan High Court · 1992-08-05Read full judgment →
- Khushi Muhammad vs State and 3 others1993 SCMR 694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a revision petition challenging the acquittal of respondents in a murder case under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents killed the deceased, Zulfiqar, following a confrontation. The trial court acquitted the respondents, a decision subsequently upheld by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the lower courts failed to properly evaluate the eye-witness testimony and ignored an alleged admission of guilt made by the respondents in a prior bail application. The petitioner sought leave to appeal and permission to produce additional evidence regarding this admission. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the submissions regarding the alleged admission required further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal against two respondents, Muhammad Idrees and Muhammad Hussain, while dismissing the petition against the third respondent, Bashir Ahmad. The Court directed that the admissibility of the alleged admission made at the bail stage would be determined by the appellate bench.
Questions settled- Can an admission made by an accused in a bail application be considered as evidence in the main trial?
- Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an acquittal upheld by the High Court?
- Is it permissible to produce additional evidence at the appellate stage to prove an admission made by the accused during bail proceedings?
- Khushi Muhammad and 9 others vs The Chief Land Commissioner, Sindh1993 SCMR 878 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a dispute over the allotment of 237 acres of land in District Jacobabad, originally surrendered under Martial Law Regulation 64 of 1959. The appellants, displaced persons, claimed ownership based on regularisation by the Chief Land Commissioner, while respondents claimed entitlement as local persons or sitting tenants. The core legal question was whether the land, having been surrendered under MLR-64, remained vested in the Provincial Government or could be disposed of under Paragraph 18 of Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972 to sitting tenants. The Supreme Court, relying on established precedents including Talib Din v. The Chief Land Commissioner, held that proprietary interest in such surrendered land vests in the Provincial Government and cannot be transferred to sitting tenants by the Land Commission. The Court affirmed that authorities under MLR-115 lack jurisdiction over the Government's proprietary interest. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the matter was remanded to the Deputy Land Commissioner, Jacobabad, to determine the parties' entitlements in accordance with the legal principle that such land remains Government property.
Questions settled- Does land surrendered under Martial Law Regulation 64 of 1959 vest in the Provincial Government or become available for grant to sitting tenants under Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972?
- Can authorities established under Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972 exercise jurisdiction over the proprietary interest of the Government in surrendered land?
- Are sitting tenants of State land surrendered by grantees entitled to claim ownership rights from the Land Commission?
- Khurshid Khan and anothers vs Rahat Khan and others1993 SCMR 897 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a tenancy dispute where the tenants challenged their ejectment, arguing that the second round of proceedings initiated by the landlords was barred by the principle of res judicata based on a prior suit. The core legal questions were whether the subsequent ejectment suit was precluded by the earlier litigation and whether the tenants were in default of rent or produce payments. The Supreme Court held that res judicata did not apply because the default periods in the two proceedings were distinct and did not overlap. Regarding the merits, the Court determined that the evidence of payment produced by the tenants showed the deposits were made out of time, thereby confirming the default. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, concluding that the findings of fact regarding the default were properly established. While upholding the legal outcome, the Court observed that landlords should exercise moral magnanimity in their dealings with long-term tenants, even when the law favors the landlord's position.
Questions settled- Does a prior suit regarding tenancy default bar a subsequent suit for a different period of default under the principle of res judicata?
- Are findings of fact regarding rent default by lower courts conclusive in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
- Does the payment of rent after the due date constitute a default sufficient to warrant the ejectment of a tenant?
- Khurshid Ahmad Naz Faridi vs Bashir Ahmad and 3 others1993 SCMR 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that declared an FIA notice illegal and imposed personal costs on the appellant and an FIA official. The respondent had purchased plots in an auction, and the title was previously upheld by the Supreme Court. The appellant, alleging fraud, prompted the FIA to issue a notice restraining the respondent from construction. The High Court declared this notice illegal and awarded costs. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could restrain future proceedings and whether the personal costs were justified. The Court held that while the High Court correctly declared the FIA notice illegal for lack of jurisdiction, it erred in restraining future investigations, as that relief was not sought. However, the Court upheld the imposition of personal costs, affirming that costs are discretionary and intended to penalize officials who act arbitrarily or without lawful authority. The Court ruled that such discretionary orders, when based on sound judicial principles, should not be lightly interfered with on appeal.
Questions settled- Can a court impose personal costs on an official who issues an order without lawful authority?
- Is the imposition of costs by a High Court a discretionary matter that an appellate court should rarely interfere with?
- Can a court grant relief in a constitution petition that was not specifically prayed for by the petitioner?
- Khursheed Ahmad vs Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication1993 SCMR 2300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-08-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, an Assistant Engineer (B-16) in the T&T Department, who was compulsorily retired in 1984. Although the Federal Service Tribunal later converted this retirement into a penalty of stopped increments, the petitioner sought a move-over to the next grade effective from 1984, rather than 1989. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to a move-over during a period of forced retirement that was subsequently treated as extraordinary leave without pay. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal's previous judgment, which had been acted upon by the government, was final and unchallenged. The Court reasoned that the petitioner could not earn increments during a break in service treated as extraordinary leave without pay. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that move-over eligibility requires specific criteria, including consecutive favourable annual confidential reports, which could not be satisfied during the period the petitioner was not in active service. Consequently, the Court found no legal infirmity in the Tribunal's decision to deny the retrospective move-over.
Questions settled- Can a civil servant claim increments or move-over benefits during a period of service treated as extraordinary leave without pay?
- Does a break in service due to compulsory retirement, even if later converted to a lesser penalty, preclude the earning of increments during that specific period?
- Is a move-over to a higher grade automatically granted upon reaching the maximum of a previous grade, or does it require compliance with specific service criteria like favourable annual confidential reports?
- Khurram Ali vs Pakistan Railways and others1993 CLC 2344 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-05Read full judgment →
- Khuddu and others vs State of U.P.1993 SCMR 2233 · Supreme Court of India · 1993-04-22Read full judgment →
- Khuda Bux vs Secretary Forest, Fisheries & Livestock Department And AnotherK.L.R. 1993 Labour and Service Cases 88 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- Khuda Bux vs Secretary Forest, And AnotherK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 99 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1992-09-30Read full judgment →
- Khuda Bakhsh---Petitioncr vs Small Industries Corporation and others1993 MLD 2325 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-16Read full judgment →
- Khuda Bakhsh and others vs Mst. Niaz Bibi and another1993 SCMR 1547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court holding that the suit and subsequent proceedings had abated pursuant to section 2 of Ordinance XIII of 1983 in light of Ilam Din and others v. Muhammad Ashfaq. The underlying matter originated from a declaratory suit filed by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest challenging a gift of land made by a deceased person as being against custom and void against reversionary rights. The trial court decreed the suit, which was upheld in first appeal, and second appeal was subsequently filed. Meanwhile, the petitioners obtained delivery of possession in execution of the decree. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the ratio of Ilam Din's case was correctly applied where possession had already been obtained prior to the coming into force of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983, rendering it a past and closed transaction. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider this question.
Questions settled- Whether proceedings abate under section 2 of Ordinance XIII of 1983 when possession of land has already been obtained in execution of a decree prior to the enactment?
- Does obtaining possession of land prior to the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 constitute a past and closed transaction?
- Khawaja Akbar Waheed vs Karachi Development Authority1993 MLD 87 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-26Read full judgment →
- Khawaja Abdul Majeed vs The State1993 MLD 278 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-15Read full judgment →
- Khandad vs The State1993 PLD Peshawar 99 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-03-07Read full judgment →
- Khanan vs The State1993 PLD Karachi 347 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-06Read full judgment →
- Khanan and 2 others vs Feteh Sher through Ahmad and 15 others1993 SCMR 1578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-05-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing the appellants' suit for possession of Shamlat (common) land. The appellants, claiming to be Aala Malkan (superior owners), sought to eject the respondents, who were Adna Malkan (inferior owners), from the disputed land. The core legal question was whether the appellants were entitled to possession or ejectment of the Shamlat land and whether their claim remained enforceable following the enactment of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959. The Supreme Court observed that the appellants' claim was predicated on their status as Aala Malkan. However, the Court held that Paragraph 22 of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959, expressly abolished Aala Milkiyat and similar interests. Consequently, the Court ruled that any decree based on such abolished rights is rendered ineffective and inexecutable under the Regulation. The principle laid down is that the abolition of Aala Milkiyat rights under the Land Reforms Regulation precludes the enforcement of any judicial decree for possession or ejectment predicated upon such superior proprietary interests. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the abolition of Aala Milkiyat rights under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959, render decrees based on such rights inexecutable?
- Are Aala Malkan entitled to exclusive possession of Shamlat land against Adna Malkan without partition?
- Does the mention of 'Shamlat Deh' in revenue records imply ownership by the entire proprietary body of the village?
- Khan Muhammad vs Sh. Muhammad Akram1993 SCMR 1963 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's revision petition in a pre-emption matter. The trial court had decreed the appellant's pre-emption suit subject to depositing the purchase price of Rs. 1,28,250 by a specified date. During the pendency of appeals and revisions, the deposit requirement was modified or stayed at various stages, and the appellant ultimately failed to deposit the balance purchase amount within the time granted by the High Court. The core legal question was whether an appellate or revisional court is bound in every case to grant an extension of time to deposit the pre-emption money upon dismissing an appeal or petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while courts normally grant reasonable time to deposit the balance pre-emption amount upon dismissing an appeal, they possess the discretion to refuse such extension in exceptional cases where the litigant fails to comply with specific directions. The key principle laid down is that the extension of time for depositing pre-emption money is a discretionary power that may be withheld in exceptional circumstances where the pre-emptor fails to avail of prior opportunities or acts negligently.
Questions settled- Whether an appellate or revisional court is bound to grant reasonable time to a pre-emptor to deposit the balance pre-emption amount upon the dismissal of his appeal or petition?
- Can a court refuse to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money in exceptional cases where the pre-emptor fails to comply with previous court orders?
- Khan Muhammad vs Muhammad Sadiq and others1993 P Cr. L J 2146 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-10Read full judgment →
- Khan Muhammad vs Abdul Rashid and another1993 MLD 1474 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-06Read full judgment →
- Khan Muhammad and anothers vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2370 · Lahore High Court · 1993-08-17Read full judgment →
- Khan Muhammad and 40 others vs Muhammad Buta and 38 others1993 PLD Karachi 185 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-17Read full judgment →
- Khan Mohammad And Another vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 446 · Lahore High Court · 1993-08-17Read full judgment →
- Khan Bahadur vs Sher Ahmed and 3 others1993 PLD Peshawar 241 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-05-16Read full judgment →
- Khan Bahadur vs Rahimunnisa Begum and others1993 PLD Revenue 35 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1991-10-10Read full judgment →
- Khaliq Dad vs The State1993 MLD 2048 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-06Read full judgment →
- Khalilurrahman vs Mst. Nargis Begum1993 CLC 2461 · Sindh High Court · 1993-07-10Read full judgment →
- Khalilur Rehman vs MRs, Rashida1993 CLC 2237 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant-landlord sought the eviction of the respondent-tenant from a flat, initially alleging default in rent and later asserting a personal requirement for his grown-up children. Following a remand order directing the amendment of pleadings to specify the requirement, the appellant failed to amend his application but introduced new grounds in subsequent affidavits, including a claim that he required the premises to live separately from his wife. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, finding the landlord's claim lacked bona fides. On appeal, the High Court upheld the dismissal. The Court held that a landlord cannot prove a case different from that pleaded, and the failure to amend pleadings after a remand order is fatal. Furthermore, the Court determined that the landlord’s shifting stance regarding which family member required the premises, coupled with his simultaneous sale and re-letting of other vacant flats in the same building, demonstrated a lack of good faith. The principle established is that a landlord’s claim for personal requirement must be consistent, pleaded with sufficient particulars, and substantiated by evidence of genuine need, rather than being a pretext for eviction.
Questions settled- Can a landlord succeed in an eviction application if they fail to amend their pleadings following a court-ordered remand?
- Does the sale or re-letting of other vacant properties by a landlord during the pendency of an eviction suit negate the claim of bona fide personal requirement?
- Is a landlord permitted to shift the grounds of personal requirement from one family member to another during the course of litigation?
- Does the failure to disclose specific details of family members in an eviction application preclude a landlord from establishing a bona fide need?
- Khalilur Rehman vs Mohammad ShafiK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 903 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-16Read full judgment →
- Khalilur Rehma.N vs Muhammad Shafi1993 MLD 1144 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-16Read full judgment →
- Khalil-ur-Rehman Khan, Sardar Muhammad Dogar, Irshad Hasan Khan, Sh.1993 MLD 2152 · Lahore High Court · 1993-07-21Read full judgment →
- Khalil Ahmed Soomro vs Govt. of Sindhh & OtherK.L.R.1993 Labour & Service Cases 181 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1993-02-15Read full judgment →
- Khalil Ahmad and others vs The State1993 PLD Revenue 50 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1993-06-14Read full judgment →
- Khalid Textile Mills Ltd vs Government of Pakistan and others1993 CLC 199 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-05Read full judgment →
- Khalid Pervez vs Mohammad Hanif KianiK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 58 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-16Read full judgment →
- Khalid Nasim and others vs Asma Yousaf and anothers1993 CLC 127 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-22Read full judgment →
- Khalid Mirza vs Rana Zahid Mahmood, Additional District Judge, Lahore and 2 others1993 PLD Lahore 912 · Lahore High Court · 1993-09-25Read full judgment →
- Khalid Mahmud Durrani vs Messrs Galaxy Constructions (Pvt.) Ltd.1993 CLC 2261 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-16Read full judgment →
- Khalid Mahmood vs The University of the Punjab, Lahore1993 MLD 2360 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-01Read full judgment →
- Khalid Mahmood and anothers vs S.M. Ilyas Zaidi and others1993 SCMR 1119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two connected civil appeals regarding the determination of seniority in government service between employees appointed on a regular basis through the Public Service Commission and those initially appointed on temporary, ad hoc, or stopgap bases. The core legal question was whether seniority should be calculated from the date of continuous service, including periods of ad hoc or temporary employment, or strictly from the date of regular appointment. The Supreme Court held that seniority cannot be claimed from the date of a temporary or stopgap appointment. The Court reasoned that individuals appointed through a competitive process by the Public Service Commission hold a superior position to those who were merely provisionally adjusted or appointed on an ad hoc basis. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Service Tribunal, establishing the principle that seniority in government service commences only from the date of regular appointment, and ad hoc or stopgap service does not confer seniority rights over regular appointees who joined service earlier through proper competitive selection.
Questions settled- Does seniority in government service count from the date of initial ad hoc or temporary appointment?
- Can an employee regularized at a later date claim seniority over an employee appointed through the Public Service Commission at an earlier date?
- Does service rendered on a stopgap or leave vacancy basis confer seniority rights?
- Khalid Mahmood alias Khalid Moosa vs The State1993 MLD 1748 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-12Read full judgment →
- Khaista Khan and another vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 102 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-25Read full judgment →
- Khair Muhammad and 2 others vs Government of Sindh through Additional Chief Secretary, Local Government Department and 5 others1993 CLC 531 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-16Read full judgment →
- Khadim Hussain vs The State1993 MLD 384 · Lahore High Court · 1992-05-12Read full judgment →
- Khadim Hussain vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 2097 · Lahore High Court · 1993-04-04Read full judgment →
- Khadim Hussain vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 8 others1993 SCMR 1869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside a notification regularizing the petitioner's appointment to Grade-17 in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). The petitioner, initially appointed to a Grade-16 post, sought retrospective promotion and seniority in Grade-17, despite having been previously rejected for that grade by the Federal Public Service Commission. The core legal question was whether a prior Supreme Court order, obtained in proceedings where the petitioner's colleagues were not parties, operated as a judgment in rem to bar their subsequent challenge to the petitioner's seniority and promotion. The Court held that the prior judgment did not bind the colleagues who were not parties to those proceedings. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the government could not bypass the Federal Public Service Commission's recruitment rules to appoint the petitioner to Grade-17. The principle laid down is that judgments of the Supreme Court do not operate as judgments in rem regarding service seniority disputes and do not bind individuals who were not parties to the litigation.
Questions settled- Does a Supreme Court judgment in a service matter operate as a judgment in rem against persons who were not parties to the proceedings?
- Can the government appoint a civil servant to a Grade-17 post without the recommendation of the Federal Public Service Commission?
- Are service seniority claims valid if the underlying appointment to the grade was made in violation of recruitment rules?
- Kerala Publicity Bureau vs Commissioner of Income Tax , 5861993 PTD 1019 · Kerala High Court · 1993-01-21Read full judgment →
- Kedar Nath Modi vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1993 PTD 1492 · Delhi High Court · 1992-10-28Read full judgment →
- Kathi Odhabhai Bhimabhai and others vs State of Gujarat1993 SCMR 2405 · Supreme Court of India · 1992-08-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the High Court's judgment reversing an acquittal order passed by the trial court in a murder case. The appellants were charged with murder and causing injuries, with the prosecution relying primarily on the testimony of a single injured witness (P.W.1) and a hostile witness (P.W.2). The trial court acquitted the accused, finding P.W.1's testimony unreliable due to significant discrepancies between his account of the attack and the medical evidence, as well as an inordinate delay in reporting. The High Court reversed this acquittal, relying on the witness's presence and internal injuries found during the post-mortem. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the trial court's acquittal, as the trial court's assessment was reasonable. The Court emphasized that when the prosecution's case rests on the sole testimony of an interested witness, that testimony must be wholly reliable. Because P.W.1's version was in direct conflict with medical findings regarding the nature and number of injuries, it was unsafe to convict, and the trial court's acquittal should not have been disturbed.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court reverse an acquittal when the trial court's view is reasonable?
- Is it safe to convict an accused based on the sole testimony of an injured witness when that testimony conflicts with medical evidence?
- Does the presence of an injured witness at the scene of the crime automatically render their testimony reliable enough to sustain a conviction?
- Karjan Cooperative Cotton Sales Ginning and Pressing Society vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1993 PTD 871 · Calcutta High Court · 1992-01-28Read full judgment →
- Karimi Rahmatullah vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 733 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-14Read full judgment →
- Karim Khan and 130 others vs The Additional Settlement Commissioner1993 SCMR 2344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves two consolidated appeals arising from a common judgment of the High Court, concerning the cancellation of land allotments originally made to a displaced person. The core legal question is whether an allotment of land to a bona fide purchaser could be validly cancelled on the basis of a clerical discrepancy in the claim form number without proper inquiry or verification from the Central Record Office. The Supreme Court held that the Additional Settlement Commissioner acted under a misconception and failed to conduct a proper inquiry, as the verified claim of the original allottee was genuine and the confusion merely stemmed from an inadvertent clerical error in recording the claim form number. The Court laid down the principle that cancellation of land allotments based on a Mukhbari application requires careful examination of surrounding facts and verification from official records, and cannot be sustained when grounded on an unverified clerical mistake without affording proper notice and inquiry to affected bona fide purchasers.
Questions settled- Whether an allotment of land can be cancelled by the settlement authorities on the basis of a clerical error in the claim form number without proper inquiry?
- Does a bona fide purchaser's title stand protected when the original allotment is challenged through a Mukhbari application based on mistaken record entries?
- Is it incumbent upon the Additional Settlement Commissioner to summon affected parties and examine official records from the Central Record Office before declaring an allotment bogus?
- Karim Bux vs S.H.O., Khawaja Ajmer Nagri Police Station1993 P Cr. L J 221 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-05Read full judgment →
- Karim Bakhsh vs Additional District Judge, Khanewal and 5 others1993 MLD 2164 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-05Read full judgment →
- Karim Bakhsh and 4 others vs Riaz Hussain and another1993 SCMR 1667 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-05-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the respondents based on kinship. The appellants challenged the decrees, arguing they were nullities because they were passed after the cut-off date of 31-7-1986 established in Said Kamal's case. The appellants had failed to apply for certified copies of the trial court's judgment for one year, during which they withdrew the pre-emption money and surrendered possession of the land to the decree-holders. The High Court dismissed their revision, holding that the appellants' conduct disentitled them to discretionary relief and that even void orders require legal challenge to be set aside. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision. The Court held that while an order might be a nullity, a party who acts upon such an order, accepts its benefits, and fails to challenge it within a reasonable time, effectively legitimizes it. The Court emphasized that the distinction between void and voidable orders diminishes when a party's conduct treats a decree as a fait accompli, thereby precluding them from later seeking to set it aside.
Questions settled- Can a party who has acted upon and accepted the benefits of a decree later challenge it on the ground that it is a nullity?
- Does the distinction between a void and voidable order persist if the party affected by the order fails to challenge it and acts upon it?
- Is the exercise of revisional jurisdiction affected by the conduct of the petitioner?
- Karamchand Premchand P. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax (1993 PTD 993 · Supreme Court of India · 1992-12-01Read full judgment →
- Karamat Masih Alias Jagga And 2 Other vs The StateK.L.R.1993 Criminal Cases 355 · Lahore High Court · 1993-03-07Read full judgment →
- Karamat Ali vs Haji Muhammad Hussain and 4 others1993 P Cr. L J 2112 · Lahore High Court · 1993-07-14Read full judgment →
- Karam Hussain Shah and 3 others vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1228 · Lahore High Court · 1993-02-22Read full judgment →
- Karam Dad and anothers vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 251 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-28Read full judgment →
- Karam Ali through Legal Heirs and 3 others vs Muhammad Nawaz Minor1993 PLD Lahore 49 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-30Read full judgment →
- Karam (deceased) through Legal Heirs/Plaintiffs vs Ramzan and others1993 MLD 2118 · Lahore High Court · 1993-07-06Read full judgment →
- Karachi Transport Corporation vs Latifurrehman and others1993 SCMR 1149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a fatal accident claim filed by the parents of a deceased student against the Karachi Transport Corporation. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in their assessment of compensation, specifically whether the quantum of damages was based on speculative presumptions in violation of legal principles. The Supreme Court held that while appellate courts should not interfere with a trial court's assessment of damages merely due to a difference of opinion, they are bound to intervene if the trial court acts on wrong legal principles, misapprehends facts, or makes a wholly erroneous estimate. The Court affirmed that damages in fatal accident cases are inherently approximate and based on reasonable expectations of pecuniary advantage rather than speculative possibilities. However, the Court modified the lower court's decree, ruling that the cost of the deceased's future education and maintenance, which the parents would have incurred, must be deducted from the total projected earnings. The principle laid down is that while assessment involves guesswork, it must account for all relevant financial factors, including the cost of dependency and maintenance, to reach a just compensation figure.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances is an appellate court justified in interfering with a trial court's assessment of damages in a fatal accident case?
- Is the assessment of damages in a fatal accident case required to be based on exact calculations or can it be based on reasonable estimation?
- Should the projected cost of a deceased child's future education and maintenance be deducted from the compensation awarded to parents in a fatal accident claim?
- Karachi Transport Corporation through Its Secretary, MuhammadK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 17 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Limited and 5 others vs Muhammad Shakir Sheikh1993 CLC 330 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The respondent, an employee of Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Limited, filed a civil suit challenging the promotion procedure of fellow employees and seeking a declaration of entitlement to promotion and permanent injunctions. The trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground that the master and servant relationship barred such a suit and that promotion is not a vested right. On appeal, the District Judge set aside the rejection and remanded the matter for consideration of certain prayers. Upon revision, the Sindh High Court held that the relations between the company and its employee are governed by the principle of master and servant, where specific performance of a personal service contract cannot be granted, and the only available remedy for breach is damages. Consequently, the suit for declaration and injunction is barred under sections 21, 42, 54, and 56 of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The High Court allowed the revision and restored the rejection of the plaint.
Questions settled- Whether a suit for declaration and injunction filed by an employee against a master and servant relationship is maintainable under the Specific Relief Act 1877?
- Does an employee have a vested right to claim promotion that can be enforced through a civil court?
- What are the available remedies for a breach of a contract of personal service between a master and a servant?
- Can a civil court grant an injunction or specific performance in matters relating to promotions in private or corporate employment governed by master and servant?
- Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works Limited vs Abdul Ghaffar and 21993 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the dismissal of an assistant foreman by the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Limited. The core legal question was whether the respondent, whose primary duties were supervisory, qualified as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, thereby rendering his grievance application under Section 25-A competent. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was not a 'workman.' The Court reaffirmed that the test for determining 'workman' status is the nature of the duties performed, not the employee's designation. Where the pith and substance of employment is supervisory, the employee is excluded from the definition of 'workman,' even if they occasionally perform manual tasks for guidance or demonstration. The Court further held that the High Court erred by substituting its own findings of fact for those of the statutory forum while exercising constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the grievance application was deemed not maintainable, and the High Court’s judgment was set aside.
Questions settled- Does an employee whose primary duties are supervisory qualify as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
- Is the designation of an employee conclusive in determining their status as a 'workman' under labor laws?
- Can the High Court substitute its own findings of fact for those of a statutory forum while exercising constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does the occasional performance of manual work by a supervisor render them a 'workman' for the purposes of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968?
- Karachi Development Authority vs Ali Muhammad1993 MLD 1061 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-24Read full judgment →
- Karachi Development Authority through Secretary vs Muhammad1993 MLD 1838 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-27Read full judgment →
- Karachi Building Control Authority and anothers vs Saleem Akhtar1993 SCMR 1451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment directing the Karachi Building Control Authority to approve plans for six additional floors on the respondents' plot, based on the finding that denial of such approval was discriminatory under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The core legal question concerns whether the existence of other high-rise buildings in the vicinity mandates similar permission for the respondents, or if such permission can be denied based on civic and environmental considerations. The Supreme Court stayed the High Court's order, restraining the respondents from constructing beyond the previously approved basement, ground, and three floors. The Court highlighted that the application of Article 25 is not a matter of mathematical calculation but depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. It laid down the principle that if a conflict arises between a personal right to construction and the environment, the personal right must yield in favor of the environment, particularly regarding infrastructure pressure, air, light, and pollution.
Questions settled- Does the existence of high-rise buildings in a locality automatically entitle a landowner to similar construction permissions under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- When a conflict exists between a personal right to construction and environmental preservation, which interest prevails?
- Is the application of the principle of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of the case rather than mathematical parity?
- Karachi Building Control Authority and 3 others vs Hashwani Sales1993 PLD Supreme Court 210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns four appeals against a High Court judgment declaring two Regulations framed by the Karachi Building Control Authority (the Authority) as ultra vires. The Regulations mandated that the Authority would not approve building plans for reconstruction on plots occupied by tenants unless the landlord and tenant reached an agreement regarding alternate accommodation or compensation, and suspended existing permissions where such agreements were absent. The core legal question was whether the Authority possessed the statutory power under the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979, to impose such conditions. The Supreme Court held that the Regulations were ultra vires and unreasonable. The Court reasoned that the Authority's power to approve plans under the Ordinance did not extend to regulating private contractual disputes between landlords and tenants, which are governed by specific rent laws. Furthermore, the Regulations were deemed impracticable and unfair as they lacked a mechanism for resolution, effectively allowing tenants to coerce landlords. The Court affirmed that delegated legislation must have a rational nexus with the statute's objects and cannot be arbitrary or vague.
Questions settled- Does the Karachi Building Control Authority have the statutory power to mandate agreements between landlords and tenants as a condition for approving building reconstruction plans?
- Can a delegated legislative body frame regulations that are vague, lack an implementation mechanism, and place one party in a position to coerce another?
- Is a regulation that imposes conditions outside the scope of the parent statute considered ultra vires?
- Does the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979, empower the Authority to adjudicate or regulate private tenancy disputes during the reconstruction of buildings?
- Kanwar Khalid Younus vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 437 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This bail application concerns an accused detained in a murder case under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant's continued detention was lawful given that the police had failed to submit a challan (charge-sheet) within the statutory remand period prescribed under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the applicant's detention was illegal because the remand granted by the Magistrate after the expiry of the initial period without a challan was unauthorized, as powers under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require the submission of a challan to commence an inquiry. Furthermore, on merits, the Court found the prosecution's case suffered from significant delays in witness statements and improvements to the narrative, warranting further inquiry. Consequently, the Court granted bail, establishing the principle that detention beyond the statutory limit without a challan is illegal and that material improvements in prosecution evidence after significant delays justify bail under the 'further inquiry' provision of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
Questions settled- Can an accused be detained in custody beyond the fifteen-day limit prescribed by Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without the submission of a challan?
- Does a Magistrate have the power to grant remand under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before a challan has been submitted by the police?
- Does a significant delay in recording witness statements and subsequent improvements to the prosecution's story constitute grounds for bail under the 'further inquiry' clause of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Kankaria Textiles vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1993 PTD 1418 · Rajasthan High Court · 1991-11-19Read full judgment →
- Kamruddin Shalwani vs Ahmed Muneewnanawatty1993 MLD 1341 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-30Read full judgment →
- Kamal Khan vs The State1993 SCMR 1819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder under the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1990, where the appellant was sentenced to death. The core legal question was whether, given the evidence of a sudden altercation and grappling, the sentence of death should be commuted to life imprisonment, or if the circumstances warranted the extreme penalty. The appellant argued that the incident was a sudden flare-up, potentially falling under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and thus merited a lesser sentence. The Supreme Court held that the nature of the injuries—three dagger blows inflicted on an empty-handed victim—demonstrated a cruel manner of killing, ruling out any justification for leniency. The Court affirmed that once a murder charge is proven, death is the normal penalty, and appellate interference is not warranted where the violence is excessive and directed at vital parts of the body. The appeal was dismissed, maintaining the death sentence.
Questions settled- Is death the normal penalty for a proven charge of murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Does the infliction of multiple dagger blows on an empty-handed victim preclude the mitigation of a death sentence?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a death sentence awarded by a trial court and affirmed by the High Court?
- Kamal Khan vs Gulmat Khan1993 PLD Peshawar 43 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-09-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition arose from a civil suit concerning a breach of contract for the sale of land. The defendant-petitioner had entered into an agreement to sell 56 Kanals of land to the plaintiff-respondent but subsequently sold the land to a third party. The trial court decreed the recovery of earnest money but dismissed the claim for damages. On appeal, the District Judge reversed the decision, decreeing the damages as well. The core legal question was whether extrinsic oral evidence was admissible to identify the specific land subject to the agreement when the written contract was ambiguous regarding the property's description. The High Court held that the defendant committed a breach of contract. Relying on the principle that where a written contract is ambiguous or obscure, extrinsic evidence regarding surrounding circumstances and the parties' conduct is admissible to clarify the true intent and subject matter, the Court upheld the appellate decision. It affirmed that oral evidence was permissible to prove that the land sold to the third party was indeed the specific property intended for the plaintiff under the original agreement.
Questions settled- Is extrinsic oral evidence admissible to identify the subject matter of a contract when the written agreement is ambiguous?
- Can the conduct of parties be used to construe the meaning of an obscurely framed contract?
- Does the prohibition against varying the terms of a written document under Article 103 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 prevent the admission of evidence to clarify the intended subject matter of a contract?
- Kalu Khan vs Purdil Khan and 10 others1993 SCMR 1680 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a land dispute involving the validity of two mutations sanctioned in 1972 and 1973, which purportedly transferred the same land. The petitioner challenged the mutations on several grounds: he was never summoned during the attestation process; the mutations were not reflected in the Jamabandi for ten years; the transactions were absent from consolidation proceedings; and the alleged sale price was suspiciously low. The Supreme Court found these contentions raised significant, disturbing questions regarding the legitimacy of the transactions. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal. Furthermore, the Court addressed the petitioner's offer to resolve the long-standing dispute through a special oath in the Islamic spirit. The Court directed the Registrar to summon both parties, record their statements regarding the special oath, and administer the oath in accordance with the law, with the resulting proceedings to be placed before the Court at the final hearing of the appeal.
Questions settled- Can a court direct the Registrar to facilitate the administration of a special oath between parties during the pendency of an appeal?
- Does the absence of mutations in Jamabandi records and consolidation proceedings raise a triable issue regarding the validity of a land transfer?
- Is the grant of leave to appeal appropriate when there are disturbing allegations regarding the procedural fairness of mutation attestations?
- Kaleem Ahmed and others vs The State1993 PLD Karachi 13 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and 14-year sentence of four appellants under Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dacoity. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the validity of the identification parade, and the legality of the sentence imposed by the trial court. The High Court upheld the convictions, finding the eyewitnesses to be natural, independent, and credible, noting that their testimony remained largely unchallenged during cross-examination. The Court affirmed that there is no absolute legal requirement for an identification parade if the accused are identified by witnesses before the trial court, particularly when the incident occurred in daylight. Regarding the sentence, the Court held that the trial court erred in awarding 14 years of rigorous imprisonment, as Section 395 prescribes a maximum of 10 years unless life imprisonment is awarded. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals but modified the sentence to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment for each appellant, clarifying that contradictions in previous statements cannot be considered if the witness was not confronted with them under Article 140 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984.
Questions settled- Is an identification parade a mandatory legal requirement for the conviction of an accused in a dacoity case?
- Can a witness be contradicted by a previous statement if the witness was not confronted with that statement during cross-examination?
- What is the maximum term of imprisonment for dacoity under Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if life imprisonment is not awarded?
- Does the acquittal of co-accused on the same evidence automatically entitle the convicted appellants to acquittal?
- Kala Khan vs Ayyub Khan1993 SCMR 543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the defendant/vendee challenging the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which had maintained the decrees in favor of the pre-emptor in a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions involved the timing and proof requirements for making the second demand (Talb-i-Ishhad) under pre-emption law, and whether a pre-emptor with an equal right can claim a 50 percent share of the property under the new pre-emption law for a sale executed prior to its enactment. The Supreme Court held that both arguments raised by the petitioner lacked force and dismissed the petition. The Court ruled that the cited precedent regarding Talb-i-Ishhad was distinguishable and that the burden of proof to show delay in making Talb-i-Ishhad lay upon the defendant. Furthermore, under Section 20 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, alongside sections 6 and 7, the new law commands that properties be shared equally to the extent of 50 percent when a suit is filed under it.
Questions settled- Whether the burden of proof lies upon the defendant to establish that the plaintiff delayed making the second demand (Talb-i-Ishhad)?
- Can a pre-emptor with an equal right obtain a 50 percent share of the property under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 for a sale prior to its enactment?
- Do the provisions of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 compel the sharing of property to the extent of 50 percent each in a suit filed thereunder?
- Kala Khan through Legal Heirs vs Anjuman Musalmanane Mashraqui1993 CLC 250 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the order of the Rent Controller allowing an ejectment application filed by the respondent registered society against the appellant tenants on the grounds of default in rent payment and personal good faith requirement. The core legal questions concern whether the tenants committed a wilful default under the relevant rent legislation and whether the landlord society established a bona fide personal requirement for the premises. The Sindh High Court held that the tenants indeed committed wilful default by failing to tender rent properly and delaying deposits in court for nearly a year without utilizing authorized statutory modes like postal money orders. However, regarding personal requirement, the court held that the landlord failed to prove good faith as no resolution or authorization of the society was produced, no explanation was given for a twelve-year delay in filing the ejectment application, and the sole witness lacked competence. The appeal was partly allowed, setting aside the finding on personal requirement while maintaining the eviction order based on default.
Questions settled- Whether a tenant can be absolved of default by voluntarily depositing rent in court after a prolonged delay without first attempting proper statutory tender?
- Does a registered society seeking ejectment for personal use require a formal resolution or authorization to prove its bona fide requirement?
- Whether the mere ipse dixit of a landlord is sufficient to establish a good faith requirement for rented premises without supporting evidence and valid reasons?
- K.S. Noorullah vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1391 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-09Read full judgment →
- K. Tajjak vs Government of Balochistan and another1993 PLD Supreme Court 445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellants, members of minority communities and licensed vendors, challenged the summary cancellation of their liquor licenses by the Balochistan government. The core legal question was whether these licenses, granted under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, could be cancelled without a show-cause notice or hearing, and whether such cancellation was justiciable. The Supreme Court held that the cancellation was without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The Court established that while a license is a privilege, its issuance creates a vested right for the term of the grant, which cannot be revoked arbitrarily. Due process, including the right to a hearing, is mandatory for cancellation during the license's validity. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, and Article 37 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, expressly recognize the rights of non-Muslims to consume liquor for religious purposes. Consequently, the High Court erred in misapplying the collective good doctrine to deny relief, as upholding minority rights is in the larger public interest.
Questions settled- Can a government license be cancelled during its term without providing the licensee an opportunity to be heard?
- Does the grant of a liquor license to a member of a minority community create a vested right that is protected by law?
- Is the cancellation of a statutory license by the government justiciable under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
- Does the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979 permit the consumption of liquor by non-Muslims for religious purposes?
- Jyotendrasinhji vs S.I. Tripathi and others1993 PTD 1594 · Supreme Court of India · 1993-04-02Read full judgment →
- Jurio vs Nawab Nabi Buksh1993 CLC 187 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-10Read full judgment →
- Junejo Flour Mills vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore and others1993 PTD 27 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-17Read full judgment →
- Joseph Dean vs MRs, Miratur Ruqayya1993 CLC 896 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-12Read full judgment →
- Jonna Lla Narashimharao & Co. and others vs Commissioner of Income1993 PTD 986 · Supreme Court of India · 1993-02-17Read full judgment →
- Jonathan New House vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Tax & Custom Cases 37 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-08Read full judgment →
- Jonathan New House vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 823 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-19Read full judgment →
- Jind Wadda alias Bhattal vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 565 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-21Read full judgment →
- Jehangir Irmangan vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1113 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-20Read full judgment →
- Jeenda vs Palia1993 CLC 572 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-24Read full judgment →
- Jayed Iqbal Bokhari vs Deputy Registrar, Co-Operatives Deptt. LahoreK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 90 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-11Read full judgment →
- Jawaid Ahmed vs Province of Sindh through Additional Chief Secretary, Local Government Department and 2 others1993 CLC 1746 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-18Read full judgment →
- Jawad Ali vs State1993 P Cr. L J 255 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
- Javeed Zia vs Returning Officer/Assistant Commissioner, Ahmadpur1993 MLD 40 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-14Read full judgment →
- Javed Zafar Khan and others vs Additional Settlement Commissioner1993 CLC 1119 · Lahore High Court · 1992-07-29Read full judgment →
- Javed Iqbal vs Zila Council, Sialkot and others1993 CLC 900 · Lahore High Court · 1992-07-15Read full judgment →
- Javed Iqbal vs The State1993 MLD 1713 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-08Read full judgment →
- Javaid Iqbal vs The State1993 P Cr. L. J 303 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-26Read full judgment →