Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Iftikhar alias Gattu vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1847 · Federal Shariat Court · 1993-04-27Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Ahmad and 7 others vs Habib Bank Limited, Karachi and anothers1993 CLC 101 · Lahore High Court · 1992-07-07
  clerical erroramendment of decreemerger of decreesfuture interestBanking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinancelimitationappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed under sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking the correction of an appellate decree passed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court could amend a decree to rectify an accidental clerical error regarding the grant of future interest, and whether such an application was maintainable before the appellate court rather than the trial court. The Court held that the error in the decree was clerical and accidental, as the original judgment intended to grant interest as mandated by section 8(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The Court affirmed that the original decree merges into the appellate decree upon the dismissal of an appeal, making the application maintainable before the High Court. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that an act or omission of the Court should not prejudice any party, and clerical errors in decrees can be corrected at any time, as the doctrine of limitation does not apply to such judicial corrections.

  Questions settled

  • Does an original decree merge into an appellate decree upon the dismissal of an appeal?
  • Can a court correct a clerical error in a decree under sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the law of limitation apply to the correction of clerical errors committed by a court?
  • Is an application for the correction of a decree maintainable before the appellate court after the appeal has been decided?
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• Iftikhar Ahmad And 7 Other vs Habib Bank Limited, Habib Bank Plaza, Karachi And AnotherK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 155 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Idrees Anwar vs National Industrial Cooperative Finance1993 CLC 1207 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-29Read full judgment →
• Ibrahim Khan vs Zalib Khan and another1993 PLD Peshawar 79 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-03-06Read full judgment →
• I.C.I. Pakistan Ltd., Soda Ash Works, Khewra, District Jhelum vs Zila1993 MLD 32 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-04
  writ jurisdictionalternate remedyexhaustion of remediestax levyZila Councilexcavation taxconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged the levy and collection of excavation tax on limestone by the Zila Council, Chakwal, under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner contended that the tax was unauthorized, unsupported by a proper official gazette notification, and levied despite the payment of export tax, arguing that the act was totally void and that available statutory remedies were inadequate. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when an adequate alternate remedy by way of appeal and statutory revision was available under the local government laws. The Lahore High Court held that the presence of an alternate remedy is an important regulatory factor, and though not an absolute bar, the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies must be insisted upon in tax matters unless exceptional circumstances exist. The Court concluded that the remedies provided under sections 156 and 157 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, and the Punjab Local Councils (Appeal) Rules, 1980, were efficacious and dismissed the petition, directing the petitioner to first pursue its statutory remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the presence of an alternate statutory remedy bars the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are remedies provided under sections 156 and 157 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, adequate and efficacious for challenging the illegal levy of a tax by a Zila Council?
  • Does the delegation of powers under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, exhaust the supervisory source power of the Government?
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• Hussain Trading Co. vs M/s. Jalal Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd.1993 CLC 2391 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-12Read full judgment →
• Hussain Sugar Mills Ltd., Faisalabad vs The Government of the Punjab1993 MLD 1625 · Lahore High Court · 1993-05-04Read full judgment →
• Human Rights Cases_ In the matter of vs Not1993 SCMR 2001 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-22
  suo motuhuman rightsfundamental rightsgang rapewomen property rightspublic interest litigationin-camera trialjudicial restraint
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan took suo motu notice under its original jurisdiction to address the systemic violations of women's fundamental rights, specifically focusing on the eradication of gang rape and the protection of female property rights. The Court examined the constitutional framework, holding that Article 2A, the Objectives Resolution, Article 4, and the Fundamental Rights and Principles of Policy collectively provide a robust vehicle for the definition and enforcement of human rights. Through extensive Chamber processing and consultations with state functionaries, the Court approved comprehensive proposals and draft legislation. These include enhancing the punishment for gang rape to death, allowing in-camera testimonies for victims, confiscating convicts' property for victim compensation, establishing Special Investigation Teams, and creating a Speedy Distribution of Movable and Immovable Property of Muslims Act to protect female inheritance. The Court ruled that under Article 184(3) read with Article 199, it possesses wide powers to pass any appropriate order for the enforcement of fundamental rights, which can obviate legislative delays.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the power under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan to direct the enactment of legislation or issue executive guidelines for the enforcement of fundamental rights?
  • Can the Principles of Policy and the Objectives Resolution under Article 2A be combined with Fundamental Rights to interpret and enforce human rights in Pakistan?
  • What is the scope of 'appropriate orders' that the Supreme Court can pass under Article 184(3) read with Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can the rules of res judicata and limitation be bypassed or held inapplicable in cases concerning the devolution of property to Muslim female heirs?
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• Humair Associates- vs Dilshad Hussain Siddiqi and 9 others1993 MLD 1751 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-07Read full judgment →
• House Building Finance Corporation vs Mrs. Sarwar Jehan1993 PLD Karachi 21 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-23Read full judgment →
• House Building Finance Corporation vs (Mrs.) Sarwar JehanK.L.R 1993 Civil Cases 30 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-01Read full judgment →
• Hotel Midway House Ltd., Karachi vs Directorgeneral/Commissioner, Excise1993 SCMR 1712 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-17
  hotel taxtax assessmentrefund of taxSindh Finance Actexcess recoverystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the assessment and recovery of hotel tax under section 8 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1977, and the assessee's entitlement to a refund of excess tax paid. The appellants, a hotel company, charged varying rates for lodging units lower than the maximum statutory tariff, but the assessing authority applied a flat rate based on the maximum tariff. The High Court held that the tax must be assessed on rates actually charged, but declined to order a blanket refund of excess amounts without verification. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether an assessee is entitled to claim a refund of illegally collected tax. The Court held that hotel tax under the statute is a direct levy on the hotel owner and manager, distinct from indirect taxes where incidence is passed to identifiable customers, and that the Government has no legal justification to retain tax recovered in excess of the amount legally payable. The appeal was accepted, directing the departmental authorities to compute and refund any excess amount found due to the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether hotel tax under section 8 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1977, is to be assessed on the basis of rates actually charged by the hotel or on the maximum tariff rate?
  • Does an assessee have the right to claim a refund of tax paid in excess of what is legally due under the law?
  • Can the Government retain tax recovered in excess of the amount legally payable by an assessee without statutory backing?
  • Does the collection of hotel tax create an agency relationship between the hotel owner and the Government or the customers regarding tax incidence?
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• Hotel Amar vs Commissioner of Income-Tax and others1993 PTD 1507 · Orissa High Court · 1992-09-24Read full judgment →
• Hoshiar Ali vs Ghulam Sabir1993 CLC 2476 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-06
  res judicataconsolidated suitscivil revisionmaintainability of appealrival suitsproperty ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a dispute over the ownership of a shop, involving two consolidated suits: one filed by the petitioner claiming title through a registered sale-deed, and a rival suit filed by the respondent challenging the validity of a prior decree that transferred the property. The trial court consolidated the suits, dismissing the petitioner's suit and decreeing the respondent's suit. The petitioner filed an appeal only against the decree in his own suit, failing to challenge the decree in the rival suit. The core legal question was whether the failure to file a separate appeal against the connected decree in the rival suit renders the appeal against the other decree unsustainable due to the principle of res judicata. The High Court held that the failure to challenge the connected decree, which had become final, operated as res judicata, thereby barring the revision. The court affirmed that a decision in a rival suit, when not appealed, precludes the reopening of the issues decided therein, even if the objection was not raised before the lower appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to file a separate appeal against a decree passed in a consolidated rival suit render an appeal against the other decree unsustainable due to res judicata?
  • Can the objection of res judicata based on the failure to appeal a connected decree be raised for the first time in a revision petition before the High Court?
  • Does a decree in a rival suit operate as res judicata against a party who fails to challenge it through a separate appeal?
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• Hoshiar Ali Khan vs Ghulam Sabir and others1993 SCMR 2122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-31
  leave to appealconsolidated suitscivil revisiondeclaratory suitconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's civil revision against concurrent findings of the lower courts in consolidated suits. The core legal question concerns whether the failure to file a separate appeal or challenge a connected decree in a consolidated judgment warrants the dismissal of a revision petition. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had indeed challenged the judgment and decree affecting both suits in the lower appellate forum, as supported by the title and prayer of the appeal. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted to examine the matter further, and the interim order was directed to continue. The key principle laid down is that where suits are consolidated and disposed of by a single judgment, an appeal substantially challenging the outcome and seeking the dismissal of the opposing suit suffices to maintain subsequent proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to separately challenge each decree in a consolidated judgment warrant the dismissal of a revision petition?
  • Can a joint appeal seeking to set aside a consolidated judgment and decree suffice for maintaining subsequent legal proceedings?
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• Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Punjab1993 SCMR 1889 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-03
  workmanjurisdictional factwrit jurisdictionsupervisory dutiesreinstatementlabor dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed in limine a writ petition challenging the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal had reinstated the respondent, holding him to be a 'workman' under the relevant labor laws, whereas the employer contended he was a 'Junior Officer' performing supervisory and managerial duties. The High Court declined to interfere on the ground that whether the employee was a workman was a question of fact concluded by the Tribunal. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, could examine the jurisdictional fact of an employee's status as a workman. Relying on established precedent, the Court held that administrative or quasi-judicial tribunals are not the sole judges of facts constituting the foundation of their jurisdiction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case for a proper appraisal of the evidence to determine the employee's status.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in its writ jurisdiction examine whether an employee is a 'workman' when that status constitutes the foundation of the Labour Court's jurisdiction?
  • Is a finding of fact by a Labour Appellate Tribunal regarding an employee's status as a workman immune from judicial review under writ jurisdiction?
  • What is the primary test for determining whether an employee falls within the definition of a 'workman' under labor laws?
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• Hoechst Pakistan Limited and another vs Messrs Mian & Brothers and 41993 MLD 620 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-12Read full judgment →
• Hirjina & Co.s vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another1993 SCMR 1342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-07
  excise dutyexcisable serviceshotels and restaurantsconstitutional competencedouble taxationlegislative powerscentral excises and salt act
  Summary & questions settled

  These 11 appeals by special leave challenge a judgment of the Sindh High Court regarding the levy of excise duty on services rendered by hotels, liquor bars, and restaurants under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as amended by the Finance Ordinance, 1969. The core legal question was whether the Central Legislature was competent to bring excisable services—such as hotel rooms, catering, and refreshments—under the levy of excise duty, and whether certain inclusions in the computation of the duty base were lawful. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Central Legislature possessed the constitutional competence to levy excise duties on services under the applicable constitutional frameworks, and that double taxation by itself is not unconstitutional unless it trespasses upon an exclusive provincial field. The Court dismissed the appeals with specific modifications, ruling that the cost of alcoholic liquor and extra bed tax collected to meet provincial property tax liabilities must be excluded from the computation of excise duty under section 4(3) of the Act. The key principle laid down is that the federal legislature's power to levy excise duties is not strictly confined to the physical manufacture or production of goods and that federal taxing provisions must be construed to avoid encroaching upon provincial fiscal domains.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Central Legislature is competent to levy a duty of excise on services that do not entail the physical production or manufacture of goods?
  • Does double taxation render a tax levy illegal under the constitutional framework of Pakistan?
  • Can the cost of alcoholic liquor be included in the amount upon which federal excise duty on services is calculated?
  • Whether extra bed tax recovered by a hotel to meet provincial property tax liabilities forms part of the taxable base for calculating excise duty on services?
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• Hidayatullah vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1722 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-03Read full judgment →
• Hidayatullah and 10 others vs Shamimuddin and 14 others1993 MLD 993 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-22
  arbitration actstay of suitarbitration agreementconflict of decisionsbreach of contractshareholders dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application filed by the defendant No.1 under section 34 of the Arbitration Act for stay of proceedings in a suit arising out of share-sale agreements containing an arbitration clause. The plaintiffs instituted a suit seeking declarations, injunctions, and damages against multiple defendants, alleging breach of contract and failure of consideration regarding the sale of shares in Bahawalpur Textile Mills Limited, and challenging the election of certain directors. The core legal question was whether an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act filed by only one of several contracting defendants should be granted to stay the suit, given the presence of other defendants and distinct causes of action, and the potential for conflicting decisions. The court held that where an application under section 34 is made by a sole defendant and staying the suit would split the proceedings and create an obvious possibility of conflicting decisions between the arbitrator and the court regarding the same underlying issues, the court's discretion under section 34 ought not to be exercised in favor of the applicant. The key principle laid down is that stay of a suit under section 34 of the Arbitration Act will be refused when only one of multiple defendants applies for it and bifurcation of proceedings would lead to conflicting decisions and render the process futile.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit be stayed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act upon the application of only one of several defendants?
  • Should an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act be refused when there is a clear possibility of conflicting decisions between the court and the arbitrator?
  • Does the inclusion of multiple defendants and distinct causes of action affect the enforcement of an arbitration clause under section 34 of the Arbitration Act?
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• Hidayat Ullah vs Government of Sindh1993 PLD Karachi 807 · Sindh High Court · 1993-06-21Read full judgment →
• Hidayat Masih vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 250 · Lahore High Court · 1993-01-25Read full judgment →
• Hidayat Masih vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1518 · Lahore High Court · 1990-09-25Read full judgment →
• Hedayatullah and others vs Ghulam Sarwar and others1993 CLC 1524 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-22Read full judgment →
• Hazir (Pvt.) Limited vs Pakistan International Airlines Corporation1993 MLD 1308 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-28
  public procurementinterim injunctionstatutory bodynatural justicetender processmala fidescause of actionjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff, a catering contractor, filed a suit challenging the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation's (PIAC) decision to award a new catering contract to a competitor without adhering to established tender procedures, alleging mala fides and discriminatory treatment. The core legal questions concerned whether the PIAC, as a statutory body, is bound by its internal procurement manuals and whether the plaintiff possessed a valid cause of action to challenge the contract award process. The Court held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case, finding that the PIAC's deviation from its own procurement procedures and the lack of transparency warranted an interim injunction restraining the formalization of the contract with the competitor. The Court laid down the principle that statutory bodies, regardless of whether their internal procurement manuals possess strict statutory force, are obligated to act with fairness, transparency, and in accordance with natural justice. Arbitrary exercise of power in contract awards is subject to judicial review, as qualified contractors have a right to be considered fairly, and public bodies must avoid discriminatory practices to ensure compliance with the protection of law.

  Questions settled

  • Is a statutory body bound to follow its internal procurement manuals even if they lack strict statutory force?
  • Does a qualified contractor have a right to be considered fairly for a contract awarded by a statutory body?
  • Can a court grant an interim injunction against a statutory body if the tender process appears arbitrary or discriminatory?
  • Does a suit challenging a contract award process disclose a cause of action when the plaintiff alleges violation of established procurement procedures?
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• Hayat vs Mst. Bibi and others1993 MLD 1002 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-17Read full judgment →
• Hayat Khan vs Muhammad Farooq and 9 others1993 PLD Karachi 373 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-19
  criminal revisionexemption from personal appearanceaccused attendancecriminal trial procedureSection 540-A Cr.P.C.judicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Revision application challenges an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sanghar, which granted an accused person permanent exemption from personal appearance during a criminal trial. The applicant, the complainant in the case, argued that the exemption was improper, particularly as no medical evidence was provided to support the accused's claims of illness. The core legal question was whether a trial court possesses the authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to grant an accused a blanket exemption from personal attendance for the entire duration of a trial. The High Court held that while the trial court has the power to dispense with an accused's presence under Section 540-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, such exemption is intended for short-term absences due to incapacity, not for the entire course of the trial. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, establishing the principle that permanent exemption from personal appearance for the duration of a trial is not permissible under the law, and the accused must seek exemption on a case-by-case basis for specific hearings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court grant an accused person a permanent exemption from personal appearance for the entire duration of a criminal trial?
  • Does Section 540-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 allow for the dispensing of an accused's personal attendance for the whole course of a trial?
  • Is it legally permissible to grant an exemption from personal appearance to an accused without medical evidence supporting their incapacity?
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• Havaldar Army M. Younas vs Chairman, Border Area Committee1993 CLC 1134 · Lahore High Court · 1992-07-27Read full judgment →
• Hatimbhai vs Karimbhai1993 MLD 988 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-21
  mortgagepromissory notesmoney decreeexecution of decreeequitable mortgagesummary suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a common order passed by a learned Single Judge dismissing applications under Order 34, Rule 14(1) and section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in a suit for recovery of money based on promissory notes and an equitable mortgage. The core legal question was whether Order 34, Rule 14, C.P.C. bars the execution of a money decree against mortgaged property when the underlying claim involved a mortgage, even if the decree itself was passed strictly on promissory notes under Order 37. The court held that since the suit involved distinct and separate claims and the decree was passed exclusively as a simple money decree on the basis of the promissory notes rather than in enforcement of the mortgage, the bar under Order 34, Rule 14 was not attracted. Furthermore, the court upheld the dismissal of the application under section 12(2), finding no misrepresentation or lack of jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that Order 34, Rule 14 applies strictly where a mortgagee obtains a decree in satisfaction of a claim arising under the mortgage, and does not restrict execution where a simple money decree is granted on independent negotiable instruments.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order 34, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar the execution of a simple money decree against mortgaged property when the suit was originally framed on both promissory notes and a mortgage?
  • Whether a decree granted under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the basis of promissory notes constitutes a decree arising under a mortgage for the purposes of Order 34, Rule 14?
  • Can provisions of section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be invoked to challenge an order where there is no evidence of misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction?
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• Hassan Mehdi and 3 others vs The State and 3 others1993 P Cr. L J 175 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-01Read full judgment →
• Hashmat Ali through Legal Heirs vs Settlement1993 CLC 21 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-13Read full judgment →
• Hashmat Ali and anothers vs Mst. Jantan and 6 others1993 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-06
  limitationlimited estatecustomary lawco-sharersremoval of difficultiesmuslim personal lawevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court challenges the Lahore High Court's judgment dismissing a civil revision petition regarding a property dispute. The core legal question concerned whether the appellants' civil suit challenging the alienation and succession of property held by a Muslim refugee female limited owner was barred by limitation under the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court and High Court erred in dismissing the suit as time-barred without considering that the current suit was a continuation of an earlier properly withdrawn suit, and that the plaintiffs, as co-sharers, were not obliged to file a declaration suit against adverse revenue mutations. The Court laid down that special limitation periods under remedial statutes must be applied in conjunction with principles of continuation of proceedings through previously withdrawn suits, and that possession of one co-sharer operates on behalf of all co-sharers. The impugned judgments were set aside and the case was remanded to the appellate court for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit filed within the limitation period prescribed by the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1975 is saved from limitation when it is a continuation of an earlier suit withdrawn with permission to file a fresh one?
  • Does the possession of a limited owner or co-sharer operate on behalf of other co-sharers entitled to a share under Shariat?
  • Are co-sharers obliged to file a suit for declaration against an adverse revenue mutation within the general period of limitation?
  • How are the two categories of affected persons distinguished under sections 2 and 3 of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1975?
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• Hashmat Ali (Deceased) Through L.Rs. vs S.C._Administrator (R.P), Lahore Division, Lahore And AnotherK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 208 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Hasan Khan vs Shaikh Aziz Ahmed and another1993 SCMR 2367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-14
  ejectmentex parte orderdefault in payment of rentsublettingservice of summonsrent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment application filed against the petitioner and another under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, on the grounds of default in payment of rent and subletting. The Rent Controller proceeded ex parte and passed an ejectment order, which was subsequently challenged in a first rent appeal that was dismissed in limine. The petitioner then approached the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal questions concern whether an effective order of ejectment was actually passed against the petitioner by the Rent Controller and whether an ex parte ejectment order could lawfully be passed based on a defective notice reflecting an incorrect date of hearing. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions, noting that the wording of the Rent Controller's order lends support to the petitioner's contention that no specific ejectment order was passed against him, and highlighting the need to ascertain the true date of hearing from the original record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ejectment order was passed against the petitioner by the Rent Controller?
  • Can an ex parte ejectment order be sustained on the basis of a notice containing an incorrect date of hearing?
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• Hart vs Pepper (Inspector of Taxes)1993 SCMR 1019 · House of Lords
  statutory constructionHansardtaxation of benefits in kindin-house benefitsParliamentary privilegeBill of Rights 1688marginal cost
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the House of Lords addressed the proper basis for valuing 'in-house' benefits in kind—specifically concessionary school education provided to teachers' children—under the Finance Act 1976, and whether courts may relax the historic exclusionary rule to consult Hansard (Parliamentary debates) as an aid to statutory construction. The core legal questions were whether the cost of providing an in-house benefit is limited to the marginal/additional cost or includes a proportionate average cost of running the enterprise, and whether reference to Hansard is permissible to resolve statutory ambiguity without violating Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688. The House of Lords held by a majority that the exclusionary rule is relaxed to permit reference to Hansard in narrow circumstances where legislation is ambiguous, obscure, or leads to an absurdity, and where clear ministerial statements indicate the legislative intention. The court decided that concessionary in-house benefits must be assessed on marginal cost. The key principle laid down is that courts may consult Parliamentary materials containing clear ministerial statements of intent to resolve statutory ambiguity, without breaching Parliamentary privilege or Article 9.

  Questions settled

  • Can courts refer to Hansard and Parliamentary history as an aid to construing ambiguous or obscure statutory provisions?
  • Does the use of Hansard in judicial interpretation of statutes violate Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688?
  • What is the correct basis for calculating the cash equivalent of in-house benefits in kind under section 63 of the Finance Act 1976?
  • Does the cost of providing an in-house benefit refer to the marginal cost incurred or a proportionate share of the total average cost of the employer's business?
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• Haris Khan vs The State1993 PLD Peshawar 146 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-03-03
  rash and negligent drivingsimultaneous convictiongrievous hurtcontributory negligencecriminal revisionreduction of sentencecompromise
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments of the trial court and the appellate court convicting the petitioner under sections 279, 338, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code for rash and negligent driving resulting in injuries to two persons and damage to property. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was guilty of contributory negligence and whether an accused can be convicted and sentenced simultaneously under both section 279 and section 338 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the same transaction. The Peshawar High Court held that where rash or negligent driving results in grievous hurt, a separate conviction and sentence under section 279 cannot be sustained alongside section 338, as the minor offence merges into the major one arising from the same transaction. The court laid down the principle that separate sentences are not justified for acts constituting different offences forming part of the same transaction, setting aside the conviction under section 279 while maintaining the convictions under sections 338 and 427, and reducing the sentence to the period already undergone in view of a compromise between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted and sentenced simultaneously under both section 279 and section 338 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the same act of rash and negligent driving?
  • Does rash and negligent driving resulting in grievous hurt constitute an offence exclusively under section 338 of the Pakistan Penal Code excluding section 279?
  • Whether separate sentences are justified where acts constituting two different offences form part of the same transaction against the same accused?
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• Haq Nawaz vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Shariat Cases 45 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-04Read full judgment →
• Haq Nawaz and 2 others vs S.H.O., Police Station Lalian, District Jhang1993 P Cr. L J 1004 · Lahore High Court · 1993-02-28Read full judgment →
• Hanif Arif vs Secretary Health Government of the Punjab And 4 OtherK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 167 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-15Read full judgment →
• Hamid Fazal vs Vice-Chancellor, Karachi University, Karachi and 21993 MLD 1702 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-12Read full judgment →
• Hamid Ali Khan vs Jamil Ahmed Khan1993 MLD 1733 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-07Read full judgment →
• Hamdard Laboratories (Waqf) Pakistan vs Mohammad YousufK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 103 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-30Read full judgment →
• Hamand vs Member Board of Revenue (Consolidation) and others1993 MLD 267 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-12Read full judgment →
• Haliman Bi vs Muhammad Anwar1993 P Cr. L J 545 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1992-11-23Read full judgment →
• Hakim Textile Mills vs Pakistan1993 MLD 182 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-07Read full judgment →
• Hakim Khan vs The State1993 SCMR 1376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-14
  murderdeath sentencereduction of sentenceimprisonment for lifeocular accountcriminal petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Hakim Khan against the Lahore High Court judgment dated 8-9-1991, which altered his death sentence to imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a cross-petition by the complainant for enhancement of the sentence to death. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular evidence, motive, and the quantum of sentence for a conviction of murder. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of guilt based on credible eye-witness testimony and recoveries were well-founded, and that the High Court rightly reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment given that the true motive remained shrouded in mystery. The petitions for leave to appeal and enhancement were both dismissed, affirming the modified sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life when the alleged motive remained shrouded in mystery?
  • Does eye-witness testimony supported by recoveries provide a sufficient basis for a murder conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Hakim Khan and 4 others vs The State1993 PLD Supreme Court 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-24
  review petitioncriminal appealadditional evidenceex parte examinationprocedural irregularitySection 540 CrPCright to fair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged a Supreme Court judgment in a criminal appeal, primarily on the ground that the Court had improperly received additional evidence after reserving judgment. The petitioners contended that a member of the bench had summoned the Investigating Officer to his chamber for an ex parte examination, violating the procedural requirements of Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Acting Chief Justice, writing the primary opinion, held that while the procedure was irregular, it did not cause prejudice or a miscarriage of justice, as the Court possesses inherent powers to discover the truth. However, the majority of the bench disagreed, holding that any examination of a witness under Section 540 must occur in open court in the presence of the parties to ensure transparency and fairness. Consequently, the Court ruled that the ex parte procedure created a potential for prejudice, necessitating a rehearing of the matter. The Court ordered that notice be issued to the respondent-State and the complainant to show cause why the review petition should not be accepted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court examine a witness in chambers after reserving judgment in a criminal appeal?
  • Does the examination of a witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require the presence of the parties?
  • Does an ex parte examination of an investigating officer by a judge constitute sufficient grounds for a rehearing of a criminal appeal?
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• Hakim Inayat Ullah Khan vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-13
  illicit armsunlicensed weaponcriminal appealburden of proofstatutory deadlineacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant, Hakim Inayat Ullah Khan, by the Special Court for Speedy Trial No. II, Lahore, for the offense of possessing an unlicensed .12 bore gun and failing to surrender it. The appellant was apprehended on January 14, 1992, and subsequently convicted under Section 7(c) of the Surrender of Illicit Arms Act, 1991, receiving a sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question before the court was whether the prosecution successfully established the essential elements of the offense, specifically the failure to surrender the illicit weapon by the government-mandated deadline of July 31, 1991. Upon review, the court held that the prosecution failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that the weapon recovered from the appellant was the same illicit arm he was required to surrender by the specified date. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitting the appellant. The judgment establishes the principle that proof of the specific failure to surrender a weapon by the statutory deadline is a condition precedent for conviction under the Surrender of Illicit Arms Act, 1991.

  Questions settled

  • Is proof of failure to surrender an illicit weapon by the government-mandated deadline a condition precedent for conviction under the Surrender of Illicit Arms Act, 1991?
  • Must the prosecution prove that the weapon recovered is the same illicit arm the accused failed to surrender by the statutory date?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Ali vs Sakhi Muhammad and 16 others1993 SCMR 1977 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-14
  special leave to appealsecond appealregistered sale deedquestion of factinheritance dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a civil litigation regarding a registered sale deed of agricultural land executed by the deceased owner in favour of the petitioner. The core legal question concerns the scope and limits of the High Court's jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with concurrent or first appellate findings of fact, specifically regarding the validity and consideration of a registered sale deed, in light of admissions made by the deceased vendor during his lifetime. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the propriety of the High Court reopening a finding of fact—particularly while overlooking the direct statement of the vendor admitting the sale—merited detailed examination. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted to review the sustainability of the High Court's judgment setting aside the first appellate court's finding upholding the registered sale deed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court reopen a finding of fact regarding consideration in a second appeal?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a statement made by a deceased vendor in a previous suit regarding a disputed sale deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Tooti Bashar vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1448 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-07
  quashment of proceedingscognizance of offencepolice challanwritten complaintabuse of processsection 144criminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of proceedings pending against the applicant before the S.D.M. Orangi under section 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, registered vide F.I.R. No. 91/1992 at Police Station Manghopir. The core legal question was whether a trial Court can legally take cognizance of an offence under section 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 upon a police challan/report rather than a written complaint by the public servant concerned. The Sindh High Court held that under section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, no Court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 except upon a written complaint by the public servant concerned or their superior, and a police report submitted under section 173 cannot be treated as a complaint. Consequently, taking cognizance on a police challan violates the law, and the pending proceedings were quashed as an abuse of the court's process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court take cognizance of an offence under section 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code upon a police challan instead of a written complaint?
  • Whether a police report submitted under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be treated as a complaint under the law?
  • Does taking cognizance contrary to the bar contained in section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure render the proceedings an abuse of the process of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji TM Muhammad vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1544 · Federal Shariat Court · 1993-02-07Read full judgment →
• Haji Taj Muhammad vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Shariat Cases 27 · Federal Shariat Court · 1993-02-07Read full judgment →
• Haji Syed Abdul Haleem Shah vs Wali Dad and 6 others1993 PLD Supreme Court 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-17
  pre-emptionTalab-e-IshhadMuslim Law of Pre-emptionpre-emption suitappeal dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, granted through leave of the Court, challenged a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan which had dismissed a revision petition against a decision by the Majlis-e-Shoora, Kalat. The original matter was a pre-emption suit filed by the appellant under the Balochistan Civil Disputes Shariat Application Regulation, 1976. The core legal question was whether the appellant, as the pre-emptor, had fulfilled the essential requirements of 'Talab-e-Ishhad' under Muslim Law of Pre-emption. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Majlis-e-Shoora and the High Court, holding that the pre-emptor had failed to establish 'Talab-e-Ishhad'. The key principle reiterated was that 'Talab-e-Ishhad' must be made either in the presence of the buyer, or the seller (if still in possession), or on the subject premises, and crucially, in the presence of at least two witnesses. Failure to meet these specific requirements results in the loss of the right of pre-emption. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential requirements for establishing Talab-e-Ishhad under Muslim Law of Pre-emption?
  • Does failure to fulfill the requirements of Talab-e-Ishhad lead to the loss of the right of pre-emption?
  • Is it necessary for Talab-e-Ishhad to be made in the presence of the vendee or seller and two witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Rana Muhammad Shabhir Ahmad Khan vs Govt. of Punjab Province LahoreK.L.R. 1993 Revenue Cases 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-02
  pre-emptionIslamic injunctionsFederal Shariat Courttalab-i-muwathibattalab-i-ishhadtalab-i-khusumaturban property exemptionzaroorat and zarar
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals challenge a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court regarding the constitutional validity of various provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 under the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal questions involve determining whether exempting urban and cantonment properties, conditioning the right of pre-emption on proof of 'zaroorat' or 'zarar', allowing a sixty-day revocation period, mandating the three talabs, disregarding subsequent improvements in a vendee's status, requiring a one-third cash deposit of the sale price, and providing saving clauses for suits instituted during the interregnum period contravene Islamic law. The Supreme Court held that permanent exclusion of urban properties, making 'zaroorat/zarar' a pre-condition with onus of proof on the plaintiff, and exempting interregnum suits from talabs are repugnant to Islamic injunctions. Conversely, provisions mandating the three talabs, addressing post-institution improvements, requiring a one-third deposit, and permitting a sixty-day revocation period are not repugnant. The key principle laid down is that while the substantive requirements of pre-emption like the three talabs are mandatory under Shari'ah, procedural matters and specific regulatory conditions enacted to prevent frivolous litigation are permissible provided they do not conflict with explicit Qur'anic or Sunnah provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the permanent exclusion of all immovable properties situated in urban areas and cantonment limits from the application of pre-emption is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
  • Does making the exercise of the right of pre-emption conditional upon proving 'zaroorat' or 'zarar' violate Islamic injunctions?
  • Is the requirement of making three talabs in a pre-emption suit a substantive part of the Islamic law of pre-emption?
  • Whether the statutory requirement for a pre-emptor to deposit one-third of the sale price at the time of instituting the suit is repugnant to the Shari'ah?
  • Can improvements made in the status of a vendee-defendant after the institution of a pre-emption suit affect the right of the pre-emptor-plaintiff?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Noor Muhammad Jamote and another vs Osman and 3 others1993 PLD Karachi 26 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-30
  burden of prooffraudconcurrent findingsmisreading of evidencesale deedminor as transfereerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application challenged the concurrent judgments of the trial court and the appellate court, which had decreed the respondents' suit for declaration, injunction, and cancellation of a sale deed on grounds of fraud and lack of consideration. The core legal question was whether the respondents had successfully discharged the burden of proving fraud in the execution of the sale deed, and whether the courts below had misread the evidence. The High Court held that the respondents failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of fraud or mental incapacity of the deceased vendor, noting that the respondents' own witnesses admitted the vendor was actively managing his affairs and collecting rent until his death. The Court emphasized that the burden of proving fraud lies squarely on the party alleging it. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a minor is not legally incapacitated from being a transferee of property. Consequently, the revision application was accepted, the concurrent findings were set aside due to misreading of evidence, and the respondents' suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Revisional Court have the authority to interfere with concurrent findings of fact if they are based on a misreading of evidence?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when fraud is alleged in the execution of a registered sale deed?
  • Is a minor legally capable of being a transferee of property under the Contract Act 1872?
  • Does the registration of a document under the Registration Act 1908 raise a presumption of its genuineness?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad vs The StateK.L.R 1993 Criminal Cases 178 · Balochistan High Court · 1990-07-31Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Sulleman and another vs Ghulam Muhammad and 21993 CLC 1213 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-28Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Suleman and 2 others vs The Directorgeneral and Controller of Weights and Measures and 2 others1993 CLC 2041 · Sindh High Court · 1993-05-13Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Siddique and others vs The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore1993 MLD 1612 · Lahore High Court · 1992-11-18
  waqf propertylimitationauqaf departmentshrine managementdedication by userwrong forum
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Additional District Judge, Lahore, which dismissed a petition filed under section 11 of the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979, challenging the notification issued by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf taking over the control and management of the Mazar of Baba Rehmat Shah. The core legal questions involve whether the petition was barred by limitation and whether the disputed property constituted waqf property by user. The Lahore High Court held that the petition was time-barred, as agitating a matter in a wrong forum or under mistaken legal advice does not extend limitation, and that the appellant had sufficient constructive notice of the takeover. Furthermore, the Court held on merits that a waqf can be created not only by specific dedication but also through long-standing religious or charitable user, and that the surrounding land appurtenant to the shrine properly fell within the ambit of waqf property. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Does agitating a matter in the wrong forum or under wrong legal advice constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay under the law of limitation?
  • Can a waqf be created through long-standing public user for religious or charitable purposes in the absence of a specific dedication?
  • Whether a petition filed under section 11 of the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979, beyond the prescribed period of thirty days is maintainable?
  • Does the area of influence and land appurtenant to a shrine extend beyond the physical structure of the tomb and mosque?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Sharif vs Muhammad Khalid alias Khalu and another1993 PLD Lahore 808 · Lahore High Court · 1993-07-12Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Jawed vs Government of Sindh Local Government1993 MLD 617 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-25Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Ibrahim Jalalani vs Syed Iftikhar Hussain and another1993 PLD Karachi 296 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-03Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Ibrahim Hingorjo vs Youssouf Shaheen and 2 others1993 SCMR 1932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-29
  Senate electionElection petitionTechnocratProfessionalCandidate eligibilityElection TribunalDisqualification
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arose from an order of the Election Tribunal concerning the eligibility of candidates for a Senate seat reserved for technocrats and professionals. The core legal question was whether the appellants, Haji Muhammad Ibrahim Hingorjo and Youssouf Shaheen, possessed the requisite qualifications to contest the election for the specified reserved seat. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Haji Muhammad Ibrahim Hingorjo, affirming the Election Tribunal's finding that he was neither a technocrat nor a professional, and thus ineligible. Conversely, the Court accepted the appeal of Youssouf Shaheen, determining based on the evidence and material produced that he qualified as both a professional and a technocrat. Consequently, as the only other eligible contesting candidate, Youssouf Shaheen was declared the duly elected member for the seat vacated by the disqualification of the other candidate. The judgment establishes that eligibility for specialized legislative seats is a factual determination dependent on the evidence of professional or technical status presented by the candidate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate be disqualified from a Senate seat reserved for technocrats if they fail to prove their status as a professional or technocrat?
  • Is the determination of a candidate's status as a 'technocrat' or 'professional' a matter of evidence and material production?
  • What is the consequence for a candidate declared ineligible for a Senate seat when another contesting candidate is found eligible?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Hussain vs Station House Officer, Peoples Colony, Gujranwala1993 P Cr. L J 305 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-07Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Bashir vs Election Tribunal and others1993 CLC 830 · Lahore High Court · 1992-10-10Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad and another vs Noor Hussain Alwani and others1993 P Cr. L J 767 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-10
  quashing of proceedingscognizance of offencefalse information to public servantmandatory provisionsjurisdiction of magistratecomplaint by public servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 concerns the interpretation of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the initiation of proceedings for an offence under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The applicants were prosecuted for allegedly filing a false complaint to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate could take cognizance of an offence under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, based on a report filed by an S.H.O. rather than a complaint by the public servant to whom the false information was originally directed. The Court held that the provisions of Section 195(1)(a), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, are mandatory, requiring a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned or their superior. Since the complaint was filed by an S.H.O. instead of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, the proceedings were without jurisdiction. The Court quashed the pending proceedings, affirming that failure to comply with mandatory statutory conditions for cognizance renders subsequent proceedings illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate take cognizance of an offence under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based on a police report rather than a complaint by the public servant concerned?
  • Are the provisions of Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory for the initiation of prosecutions for offences under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the failure to fulfill a mandatory condition for the exercise of jurisdiction by a Court render the subsequent proceedings illegal?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Mubarik Ali and 4 others vs The State1993 MLD 1172 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-14Read full judgment →
• Haji Mubarik Ali & 4 Other vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 .Criminal Cases 174 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-14Read full judgment →
• Haji Mohd Siddique And Other vs The Chief Administrator of AuqafK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 315 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Haji Mohammad Saleem vs Sultan KhanK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 95 · Lahore High Court · 1992-05-27Read full judgment →
• Haji Mohammad Ibrahim Jalalandi vs Syed Iftikhar Hussain And AnotherK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 353 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Haji Malik Aman and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and another1993 SCMR 1837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  trade unionfundamental rightsarmed forcespublic orderindustrial relationsconstitutional petitionfreedom of association
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two matters involving employees of corporations established or controlled by the government—specifically the National Radio and Telecommunication Corporation and the Cantonment Board Sanitation Staff—whose trade unions' registrations were cancelled under Section 1(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, because their establishments were connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan. The appellants challenged this exclusion by filing petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, claiming that Section 1(3)(a) violated their fundamental right to form trade unions under Article 17(1). The core legal question was whether restricting employees of installations connected with the Armed Forces from forming trade unions under the Industrial Relations Ordinance is a reasonable restriction in the interest of public order and protected under Article 8(3) and Article 17(1). The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that establishments supplying essential goods and services directly to the Armed Forces fall squarely within the exemption of Section 1(3)(a), and that restricting unionization in such sensitive installations is a reasonable restriction directly connected to public order, security, and the uninterrupted supply of goods to the military, thus violating no fundamental rights. The appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of corporations and establishments connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan are barred from registering trade unions under Section 1(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does the restriction on forming trade unions under Section 1(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, violate the fundamental right to freedom of association guaranteed under Article 17(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Are Cantonment Board services and establishments connected with the Armed Forces for the purpose of exemption from trade union laws?
  • Is the restriction imposed by Section 1(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, a reasonable restriction in the interest of public order and the maintenance of discipline among forces charged with the maintenance of public order?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Khan Baz Khan and 8 others vs Abdur Rahim and 5 others1993 PLD Peshawar 36 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-09-13
  civil revisionadditional evidencepre-emption decreeburden of proofappellate stagelacunaownership dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a suit for declaration of ownership, possession, and recovery of rent regarding a house. The plaintiffs claimed title based on a 1924 pre-emption decree, while the defendants asserted ownership through a prior registered sale deed and adverse possession. Both the trial court and the appellate court dismissed the suit, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the deposit of pre-emption money or the execution of the 1924 decree, and failed to establish the defendants as tenants. In revision, the plaintiffs sought to introduce additional evidence to prove the deposit of pre-emption money. The High Court held that additional evidence cannot be allowed at the revisional stage to fill lacunae in a case, particularly when no such application was made before the appellate court. The Court affirmed that the lower courts correctly appreciated the evidence regarding ownership and tenancy. The revision petition was dismissed, establishing the principle that an unsuccessful litigant cannot use the revisional stage to patch up evidentiary omissions or produce additional evidence that should have been presented during the trial or appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party produce additional evidence at the revisional stage to fill gaps in their case?
  • Is an unsuccessful litigant entitled to produce additional evidence to patch up weak portions of their case?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court permit the production of additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Khan Baz Khan & 8 Other vs Abdur Rahim & 5 OtherK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 129 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-09-13Read full judgment →
• Haji Janat Gul Khan vs Haii Faqir Muhammad Khan and 4 others1993 PLD Supreme Court 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-14
  pre-emptiondeposit of sale pricebank guaranteeextension of timemandatory provisiondismissal of suitTalb-i-Khusumat
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals challenging an order of the Peshawar High Court which maintained the dismissal of the appellant's pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns the interpretation of Section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, specifically whether a court possesses the power or jurisdiction to extend the mandatory thirty-day statutory period fixed for depositing one-third of the sale price in cash and furnishing a bank guarantee for the remaining two-thirds. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the provisions of Section 24 are mandatory, and a court has no power, jurisdiction, or discretion to extend the time for deposit beyond the statutory thirty days, either upon the plaintiff's request or suo motu. The Court laid down the principle that failure to make the requisite deposit within the stipulated thirty-day period entails the dismissal of the pre-emption suit, which permanently extinguishes the right of pre-emption and bars the filing of a fresh suit, as the concept of a second Talb-i-Khusumat is impermissible under the statutory framework aligned with Islamic injunctions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have the power or jurisdiction to extend the thirty-day statutory period fixed under Section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, for depositing the pre-emption money?
  • What is the legal consequence under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, if a pre-emptor fails to deposit the required one-third cash and bank guarantee within the mandatory thirty-day period?
  • Can a pre-emptor file a fresh pre-emption suit after the dismissal of their initial suit for non-compliance with Section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
  • May a court extend the time for depositing pre-emption money suo motu under Section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ibrahim Ishaq Johri vs The Commissioner Of Income Tax (West), KarachiPTCL 1993 CL. 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income taxresidential statustribal areataxable territoryterritorial nexusfinding of factordinarily resident
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the taxability of income earned by the appellant in Swat State, a tribal area where the Income-tax Act, 1922, was not extended. The core legal questions were whether a resident of Pakistan is liable to tax on income derived from Swat State, and whether the High Court correctly upheld the Tribunal’s finding regarding the appellant's residential status based on his maintenance of a dwelling place in Karachi. The Supreme Court held that income tax is a tax on the person in relation to their income. Since the appellant was determined to be a resident and ordinarily resident of Pakistan, his total income, including earnings from Swat State, was subject to tax. The Court affirmed that sufficient territorial nexus exists when the assessee is a resident of the taxable territory. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Tribunal’s determination of residential status based on the maintenance of a dwelling place constituted a finding of fact, which the High Court correctly declined to disturb. The principle established is that a resident of the taxable territory is liable for tax on global income, regardless of whether the source is in a non-taxable area.

  Questions settled

  • Is an individual who is a resident of the taxable territory liable to pay income tax on income earned in a tribal area where the Income-tax Act, 1922, does not apply?
  • Does the maintenance of a dwelling place in the name of a spouse, with a telephone registered to the assessee, constitute a valid basis for determining residential status under the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Is the determination of an assessee's residential status based on proved facts a question of fact or a question of law?
  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the absence of a specific question of law regarding the lack of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ibrahim Ishaq Johri vs The Commissioner of Income Tax (West), Karachi1993 PTD 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-01
  income taxresidential statustribal areaSwat Stateextra-territorial incomedwelling housereference to high courtquestion of fact and law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a judgment of the Sindh High Court concerning the taxability of income earned by an ordinary resident of Pakistan from a business in Swat State, a tribal area where the Income-tax Act, 1922 had not been formally extended. The core legal questions examined were whether a resident of Pakistan is liable to income tax on income derived from Swat State despite the non-application of the Act to that area under the Constitution, and whether the finding that the appellant maintained a dwelling place in Pakistan for the requisite statutory period constitutes a proper inference of law. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that once an assessee's residential status as a 'resident and ordinary resident' in taxable Pakistan is established, their global or extra-territorial income—including income from Swat State—is subject to income tax under the charging and application provisions of the Act, provided a sufficient territorial nexus exists. Furthermore, findings of fact regarding the maintenance of a dwelling house made by the Tribunal are conclusive and cannot be disturbed in reference jurisdiction unless shown to be based on no evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a resident of Pakistan is liable to pay income tax under the Income-tax Act, 1922 in respect of income derived from business in Swat State despite the non-application of the Act to that area?
  • Does the maintenance of a dwelling house by an assessee's wife in Pakistan, with a telephone installed in the assessee's name, constitute sufficient evidence to establish residency under section 4-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Whether findings of fact regarding an assessee's residential status recorded by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal can be re-examined by the High Court in a reference under section 66 of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • What is the scope of taxability of foreign or extra-territorial income in the hands of a person determined to be a resident and ordinary resident of taxable Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ghulam Sabir Ansari vs Returning Officer1993 MLD 2508 · Election Tribunal · 1993-09-08Read full judgment →
• Haji Ghulam Muhammad Soomro vs Karachi Metropolitan1993 MLD 1112 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-27Read full judgment →
• Haji Ghulam Ahmad Lakhesar vs The State and another1993 P Cr. L J 468 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-09Read full judgment →
• Haji Fazal Haque vs Fazal Hussain1993 SCMR 1946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-06
  pre-emptionwaiverconcurrent findingsmisreading of evidencecivil appealquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a suit for pre-emption filed by the respondent against the appellant, which was resisted on the plea of waiver. The trial court, the District Judge, and the Lahore High Court concurrently found against the appellant, ruling that the plea of waiver was not proven. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the three courts below had misread or ignored material evidence regarding the alleged waiver. Upon reviewing the evidence recorded by the trial court, the Supreme Court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate any misreading of evidence that would justify interference with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the lower courts. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there was no merit in the appellant's contention. The appeal was dismissed, and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs, affirming the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless a clear case of misreading or non-reading of evidence is established.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the plea of waiver in a pre-emption suit?
  • What is the standard for challenging concurrent findings of fact in a pre-emption suit based on the alleged misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Behram Khan vs Akhtar Muhammad and 7 others1993 P Cr. L J 71 · Balochistan High Court · 1992-08-23
  bail cancellationlocus standiprivate complainantfurther inquirycriminal procedurerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arose from an order of the Additional Sessions Judge III, Quetta, which rejected the petitioner's application for the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent. The subordinate court had rejected the application on the threshold assumption that private parties could not move applications for the cancellation of bail, relying on precedent to discourage private grudges. The core legal questions before the High Court were whether an aggrieved private party has the locus standi to seek the cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the respondent's bail should be cancelled on merits. The Balochistan High Court held that Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not place any embargo on private persons pointing out grave improprieties committed by subordinate courts. Outright exclusion of an aggrieved person would be detrimental to the administration of justice, especially where public prosecutors show indifference. However, on the merits, the Court found the case fell under further inquiry under Section 497(2) and declined to interfere with the bail grant.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar a private complainant or aggrieved party from moving an application for the cancellation of bail?
  • Can the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court be invoked to cancel bail in the absence of patent improprieties or glaring irregularities that vitiate the subordinate court's decision?
  • Whether an outright exclusion of an aggrieved private person from pointing out gross illegalities in bail orders is detrimental to the effective administration of justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Wahid vs Hoechst Pakistan Limited and another1993 CLC 1291 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-15
  leave to defendsummary suitconditional leavenegotiable instrumentsdishonoured chequesrecovery of moneydiscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court Appeal by the defendant challenges an order passed by a learned Single Judge granting conditional leave to defend a recovery suit under Order XXXVII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, subject to furnishing security. The respondents filed the suit based on unpaid invoices and dishonoured cheques issued by the appellant. The core legal question concerns whether leave to defend a summary suit should be granted conditionally or unconditionally when a plausible defence is raised. The Sindh High Court held that once the court is satisfied that the defendant has raised a plausible or good defence requiring trial, leave to defend cannot be withheld, and imposing conditions such as furnishing security is unwarranted if the defence is not patently sham. The court established that the stage of proof arises only after leave to defend is granted, and the imposition of the condition requiring security was removed, allowing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to defend a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 should be granted conditionally or unconditionally?
  • Can a court impose the condition of furnishing security when a defendant raises a plausible defence in a summary suit?
  • At what stage must the truth and good faith of facts alleged by a defendant seeking leave to defend be tested?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Karim vs Builders Incorporated and others1993 MLD 269 · Sindh High Court · 1987-12-21Read full judgment →
• Haider Abbas Rizvi vs Chief Secretary, Government of Sindhh, KarachiK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 45 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Hafiz Pervaiz Akhtar vs Municipal Committee, Mirpur through its1993 CLC 426 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Hafiz Mustafa Khan and 9 others vs Haji Bundoo Khan and 2 others1993 PLD Karachi 805 · Sindh High Court · 1993-07-18
  civil revisionmosque managementWaqf by userMuhammadan Lawtrust creationnecessary partydeclaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application arose from a dispute regarding the management and ownership of a mosque and its properties. The respondents filed a suit seeking a declaration that a trust registered by the applicants in 1983 was illegal and unauthorized, as the mosque had been constructed in 1967 and its plot allotted directly to the mosque in 1971. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court reversed this decision. The applicants challenged the appellate court's judgment under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, arguing that the trust itself was a necessary party and had not been impleaded. The High Court dismissed the revision, holding that once a building is dedicated as a mosque and prayers are offered, it becomes a Waqf by user under Muhammadan Law, vesting ownership in Almighty Allah. Consequently, no individual can claim ownership to create a trust under the Trusts Act 1882, which requires an owner to dedicate property. The court ruled the trust ab initio void and held that failure to implead the trust was not fatal as the trustees were parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can a valid private trust be created over a mosque property that has already become Waqf by user under Muhammadan Law?
  • Does the failure to implead a trust as a formal party defeat a suit if all the trustees have been actively joined as defendants?
  • Can a trust be legally constituted under the Trusts Act 1882 without the creator having lawful ownership of the subject property?
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• Hafiz Muhammad Yousaf vs Muhammad Hussain And 4 OtherK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 86 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-05Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Muhamamd Abbas vs Returning Officer and 16 others1993 MLD 2509 · Election Tribunal · 1993-09-08
  election lawnomination papersReturning Officerseconderconstituencymandatory provisionselection petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the rejection of the appellant's nomination papers by the Returning Officer for an election, on the ground that the seconder was not a registered voter of the relevant constituency. The appellant argued that the nomination papers should not have been rejected without an objection being raised, that the requirement for a seconder was not mandatory, and that the defect was not substantial enough to warrant rejection, citing various precedents. The Election Tribunal held that the statutory requirement under the Representation of the People Act, 1976, mandating that a candidate must have a proposer and a seconder from the same constituency, is clear and unambiguous. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's contention that the provisions were merely directory, finding that a clear violation of a mandatory statutory requirement cannot be ignored or remedied. Distinguishing the cited precedents, the Tribunal affirmed that the absence of a qualified seconder constitutes a valid ground for rejection. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Returning Officer's order as legally sound and justified under the specific circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement for a proposer and seconder from the same constituency under the Representation of the People Act, 1976, mandatory?
  • Can nomination papers be rejected for the lack of a qualified seconder from the constituency?
  • Does the definition of 'candidate' in the Representation of the People Act, 1976, override the specific requirements for nomination papers?
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• Hafiz Khushi Muhammad and 4 others vs The State1993 MLD 2281 · Lahore High Court · 1992-12-14Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Abdul Majeed Shakir vs Mst. Batool Begum and 5 others1993 MLD 2171 · Lahore High Court · 1993-07-04Read full judgment →
• Hadi Bux vs Govt. of Slndh And AnotherKX.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 5 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1992-09-30Read full judgment →
• Habibur Rehman Khan vs Mehromal1993 SCMR 1163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-23
  rent evictionwilful defaultsublettingtender of rentlandlord and tenantpower of attorneycommercial tenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant on grounds of default in rent payment, subletting, nuisance, and impairing the value of the premises. The core legal questions were whether the tenant committed wilful default by failing to pay rent in advance as per the agreement and whether the premises were sublet. The Supreme Court held that there was no default, as the landlord unjustifiably refused to accept rent tendered by the tenant’s attorney, and the tenant subsequently adopted the prescribed legal mode of depositing rent in court. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence of subletting, noting that the business was operated by the tenant through an attorney, and the landlord failed to substantiate allegations of unauthorized transfer of possession. The Court affirmed the principle that a tenant cannot be evicted for default when the landlord refuses to accept rent without valid justification, and that the requirement to pay rent 'due' does not mandate payment in advance if the tenant attempts to pay within the statutory period.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant commit default under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 if they fail to pay rent in advance when the landlord unjustifiably refuses to accept the rent?
  • Is a tenant liable for eviction on the ground of subletting if the business on the premises is managed by an attorney on behalf of the tenant?
  • Can a landlord successfully seek eviction for default if the tenant deposits the rent in court after the landlord refuses to accept it?
  • Does the requirement to pay rent 'due' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 mandate payment in advance if the tenancy agreement specifies advance payment?
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• Habibullah vs The District Judge, D.I. Khan and 9 others1993 PLD Peshawar 259 · Peshawar High Court · 1993-09-28Read full judgment →
• Habibullah vs District Magistrate, D.G. Khan and others1993 MLD 821 · Lahore High Court · 1993-01-05Read full judgment →
• Habibullah vs District Magistrate D.G. Khan And 2 OtherK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 514 · Lahore High Court · 1993-01-05Read full judgment →
• Habib-Ur-Rehman and others vs State1993 MLD 1738 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-23Read full judgment →
• Habib-Ul-Haque vs The Sargodha Vegetable Ghee and General Mills, Faisalabad & AnotherK.L.R. 1993 Labour & Service Cases 67 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-15Read full judgment →
• Habib vs Abdul Ghani1993 MLD 396 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-19Read full judgment →