Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Wazir Muhammad vs The State1992 SCMR 1134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-24
  heroin recoveryprohibition orderburden of proofreasonable doubtdefence pleasentence enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which had maintained the appellant's conviction under Article 3 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, while enhancing his sentence, but set aside his conviction under Article 4. The prosecution alleged that the appellant was sitting in the front seat of a Suzuki vehicle from which eight kilograms of heroin were recovered. The core legal question was whether the appellant's defence created a reasonable doubt regarding his knowledge and possession of the recovered contraband. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the prosecution is duty-bound to prove its case against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt, no such heavy burden is cast upon the accused, who only needs to establish a plausible defence that creates a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case. Finding the appellant's explanation plausible—that the heroin may have belonged to passengers who fled the scene—the Court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and ordered his release.

  Questions settled

  • What is the nature of the burden of proof cast upon an accused person in a criminal trial as opposed to the prosecution?
  • Can an accused be convicted for possession of contraband if their plausible defence creates a reasonable doubt regarding ownership and knowledge of the recovered substance?
  • Whether the failure of an appellate court to consider a plausible defence plea raised by the accused invalidates a conviction under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
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• Water and Sanitation Authority,Quetta Through Managing Director And Another vs Niaz Muhammad And 7 Other1992 PLD Quetta 75 · Balochistan High Court · 1992-07-20
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensationpotential valueplus and minus factorsreference to courtaward modification
  Summary & questions settled

  These connected regular first appeals arise from a judgment of the District Judge (Ad hoc), Quetta, modifying a land acquisition award and fixing compensation for acquired land at Rs. 3 per square foot. The land measuring over 203 acres was acquired in Tehsil and District Quetta for establishing a waste water treatment plant through notifications issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The land owners sought higher compensation, while the Water and Sanitation Authority (WASA) contended that the market value was much lower. The core legal question concerned the correct determination of the market and potential value of the large tract of acquired land based on evidence of comparable sales and relevant plus and minus factors. The High Court held that the trial court's assessment was arbitrary and based on guesswork without proper reasoning. Re-evaluating the evidence, the Court determined that the compensation awarded by the trial court was excessive while the Collector's award was inadequate, and modified the judgment to fix the compensation at Rs. 1,12,000 per acre along with admissible compulsory acquisition charges, laying down that compensation must be anchored in tangible documentary evidence of market transactions rather than conjecture.

  Questions settled

  • How is the market value of a large tract of acquired land determined under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • What impact do plus and minus factors such as size, frontage, and remoteness have on the assessment of land compensation?
  • Can a court determine land compensation through arbitrary estimation without relying on the documentary evidence and sale exemplars brought on record?
  • Are small-piece sale transactions directly applicable for fixing the market value of a vast acreage of acquired land?
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• Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore vs Qamaruddin and aNother1992 CLC 258 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-09
  land acquisitionlocus standicompensation assessmentappellate jurisdictioncross-objectionsmarket valuepotentiality of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns regular first appeals filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) challenging an award rendered by the Administrative Civil Judge, Muzaffargarh, regarding compensation for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The core legal questions were whether WAPDA possessed the locus standi to file an appeal under Section 54 of the Act, and whether the compensation awarded by the reference Court was adequate. Relying on the precedent set in Pir Khan v. Military Estate Officer, the Court held that WAPDA lacked the locus standi to file the appeal, as the right of appeal under the Act is restricted and not expressly conferred upon such bodies. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an appellate court cannot disturb a decree or increase compensation in the absence of a cross-objection or appeal by the respondents. The key principle laid down is that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and cannot be assumed; additionally, appellate courts are precluded from varying a decree to the detriment of an appellant or in favor of a respondent without formal cross-objections.

  Questions settled

  • Does WAPDA have the locus standi to file an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Can an appellate court vary a decree or increase compensation in the absence of a cross-objection or appeal by the respondents?
  • Is the award of a reference court under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 considered a substitute order that precludes further appeals by parties not expressly granted such rights by statute?
  • Does the failure of a party to appear as a witness in court raise a presumption under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1872 that their claim is incorrect?
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• Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore vs Qamar Ud Din And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 193 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore through its Chairman1992 PLC 575 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1991-12-14Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority Through Superintending1992 PLD Supreme Court 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-14
  service tribunaldisciplinary actionsuspension periodforfeiture of paydereliction of dutyincrement stoppageWAPDA employees
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal concerning disciplinary action taken against WAPDA employees found absent during office hours. The respondents were penalized under the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, with forfeiture of pay for the suspension period and stoppage of annual increments. The Tribunal upheld the finding of dereliction of duty and the stoppage of increments, but set aside the forfeiture of pay, holding it to be outside the scope of Rule 4 of the said Rules. The core legal question is whether the forfeiture of pay during the suspension period is permissible as a penalty under Rule 4(1) of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, in the absence of any pecuniary loss caused to WAPDA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that in the absence of financial loss, Rule 4(1)(a) is not attracted to justify such forfeiture as a penalty, although noting that Fundamental Rule 54 governs matters of pay and allowances upon reinstatement. The Court emphasized that prosecuting appeals for meagre amounts at public expense is a waste of public resources and awarded costs to the appearing respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the forfeiture of pay during a suspension period falls within the scope of punishments enumerated under Rule 4 of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978?
  • Can a penalty of recovery for pecuniary loss under Rule 4(1)(a)(iv) of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, be invoked when no financial loss has been caused to WAPDA?
  • How does Fundamental Rule 54 regulate the grant of pay and allowances to a government servant upon reinstatement after suspension?
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• Water and Power Development Authority and others vs Commissioner, Hazara Division and others1992 SCMR 2102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-06
  writ jurisdictionalternative remedyWafaqi Mohtasibsupplementary awarddiscretionary reliefexhaustion of remediesland acquisition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the Peshawar High Court's dismissal of a writ petition filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The Authority challenged a supplementary award issued by the Commissioner, Hazara Division, regarding compensation for land acquired for the Tarbela Dam, which was initiated following a directive from the Wafaqi Mohtasib. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had failed to exhaust an alternative adequate remedy. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the petitioner had not availed itself of the representation process before the President of Pakistan as provided under the relevant law. The Court held that the grant of relief under writ jurisdiction is discretionary, and where an adequate statutory remedy exists—specifically the representation mechanism—the High Court is justified in refusing to interfere. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the availability of an alternative remedy precludes the invocation of extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition be dismissed if the petitioner fails to avail of an alternative statutory remedy?
  • Is the grant of relief under writ jurisdiction discretionary?
  • Does the existence of a representation mechanism before the President under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtsib (Ombudsman) Order 1983 constitute an adequate alternative remedy?
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• Water and Power Development Authority and another vs Messrs1992 CLC 771 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority And 2 Other vs Muhammad1992 PLD Supreme Court 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-12
  security depositelectricity connectionchange of consumerWAPDA Conditions of Supplytransfer of agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises out of a dispute regarding the demand for enhanced security deposit by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) from a new consumer who acquired premises from a previous consumer. The core legal question was whether a new consumer is entitled to the unadjusted security deposit of the predecessor-in-interest at the original rate, or whether WAPDA can demand an enhanced and balance amount of security based on the prevalent rate and the absence of WAPDA's privity to the transfer of security between private parties. The Supreme Court held that WAPDA is entitled to demand increased security from the transferee in accordance with the Electricity Act, 1910 and relevant supply conditions, unless WAPDA is a party to an agreement binding it otherwise. The key principle laid down is that a change of ownership or occupancy allows the licensee to require security at the prevalent rate, and private arrangements between consumers regarding security deposits do not bind the statutory authority without its consent.

  Questions settled

  • Can WAPDA demand an enhanced security deposit from a new consumer who acquires premises from a previous consumer?
  • Does a private agreement between a previous and new consumer regarding the transfer of a security deposit bind the electricity supplier without its consent?
  • Whether the licensee is entitled to require security at the prevalent rate upon a change of owner or occupier of the premises under the Electricity Act, 1910?
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• Washal vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 236 · Lahore High Court · 1991-08-05Read full judgment →
• Waris Khan vs Muhammad Sharif And 2 Others1992 P Cr. L J 369 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-10-23Read full judgment →
• Waqf Mohammad Meiir Elahi vs Abdul Ghani Suleman1992 CLC 1634 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-09Read full judgment →
• Waqar Hussain Etc. vs Shamim Hussain ShahK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 195 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-25Read full judgment →
• WAPDA Etc. vs Advisory Board, Punjab Lahore Etc.K.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 225 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-16Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad vs M/s. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation1992 PLC 858 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-04-22Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad vs Dr. Tajamul Hussain1992 CLC 2253 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-30Read full judgment →
• Wali Khan vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2208 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-22Read full judgment →
• Walayat Hussain Shah through his Legal Heirs vs Manga1992 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 7 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1991-11-26Read full judgment →
• Walayat Begum through her Legal Heirs vs Fazal Elahi and others1992 CLC 1685 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-08Read full judgment →
• Walayat Begum and others vs Wazir Begum and others1992 CLC 553 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-07
  partition suitco-sharersappellate judgmentadverse possessioncourt-feeredemption of mortgagecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of a suit for possession through partition of four houses left by the common predecessor-in-interest, Hafiz Din Muhammad. The trial court decreed the suit, concluding the plaintiffs were co-sharers to the extent of 57/224 share, and the lower appellate court dismissed the defendants' appeal. Before the Lahore High Court, the petitioners contended that the lower appellate court's judgment violated Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for failing to discuss evidence issue-wise, raised questions of limitation and adverse possession, and disputed the court-fee valuation. The High Court held that a brief appellate judgment that effectively addresses the points raised satisfies the law, that redemption of a mortgaged property by one co-sharer enures for the benefit of all co-sharers precluding adverse possession, and that a co-sharer's suit for partition falls under Article 17(vi) of the Court Fees Act 1870 requiring a fixed court-fee rather than ad valorem court-fee. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court judgment is vitiated if it fails to discuss the evidence and state pleadings in detail under Rule 31 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the possession of a mortgaged property redeemed by one co-sharer amount to adverse possession against other co-sharers?
  • What is the correct court-fee payable on a suit for partition filed by a co-sharer under the Court Fees Act 1870?
  • Can a pure question of limitation be raised for the first time in revision if it was covered by the issues framed and evidence led by the parties?
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• Walayat Ali vs Mst. Khalida Bibi and others1992 CLC 812 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-28
  custody of minorwelfare of minorguardianshipwrit jurisdictionpersonal lawvisitation rightsconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which granted the custody of a minor child to the mother. The core legal question concerned the welfare of the minor and whether the father, having remarried, or the mother, despite her limited financial means, was better suited for custody. The Court held that the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration in custody disputes, overriding other factors. It affirmed the lower courts' decisions, noting that while personal law is relevant, it is rebuttable by circumstances, such as the potential negative impact of a stepmother and the mother's superior capacity for care. The Court rejected the father's unsubstantiated allegations of immorality against the mother and held that a mother's lack of financial resources does not disqualify her from custody, especially when the father remains legally obligated to provide support. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no jurisdictional error in the lower courts' assessment of the minor's welfare, while granting the father visitation rights to prevent estrangement.

  Questions settled

  • Is the financial impecuniosity of a mother a sufficient ground to deny her the custody of her minor child?
  • Can a court interfere in writ jurisdiction with concurrent findings of fact regarding the welfare of a minor?
  • Does the presence of a stepmother constitute a relevant factor when determining the welfare of a minor in a custody dispute?
  • Are unsubstantiated allegations of immorality against a mother sufficient to deprive her of the custody of her minor child?
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• Wahid Bux And 2 Others vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 187 · Balochistan High Court · 1991-09-09Read full judgment →
• Wahid Bakhsh vs Judge, Family Court./Senior Civil Judge, Multan and1992 CLC 1241 · Lahore High Court
  Family Courtcross-examinationrecall of witnessesclosing of evidenceinterlocutory orderrestitution of conjugal rightsdissolution of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arose from a family court dispute involving consolidated suits for restitution of conjugal rights and dissolution of marriage. The petitioner's counsel was absent on a scheduled hearing date, leading the Family Court to record the respondent's evidence without cross-examination. The petitioner's subsequent application to recall the witnesses for cross-examination was dismissed by the Family Court on the ground that the previous order had not been challenged in revision. Additionally, the Family Court closed the petitioner's evidence under the principles of Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court held that a Family Court possesses ample jurisdiction to recall witnesses in the interest of justice and erred in refusing to exercise this jurisdiction based on the non-filing of a revision, especially since interlocutory orders are not revisable under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the penal provisions of Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 cannot be invoked unless the date on which the evidence was closed was specifically granted at the request of the defaulting party, rather than fixed in routine by the court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Family Court have the jurisdiction to recall witnesses for cross-examination in the interest of justice?
  • Can an interlocutory order of a Family Court be challenged through a revision petition under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964?
  • Can the penal principles of Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be applied to close a party's evidence if the hearing date was fixed by the court in routine rather than at the specific request of that party?
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• Waheed Tarto vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1449 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-08Read full judgment →
• Wadho Akhara Trust a Public Hindu Religious vs Fazal Shah DeceasedK.L.R 1992 Civil Cases 371 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Vivek Narain and others vs Commissioner of Income-Tax and another1992 PTD 769 · Allahabad High Court · 1990-05-07Read full judgment →
• Vincent and others vs Karachi Development Authority and others1992 CLC 518 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-12
  dangerous buildingnoticeright of hearingconstitutional petitionalternative remedytenants
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by tenants and occupants of outhouses situated on a specific plot in Karachi, impugning a public notice issued by the Karachi Development Authority declaring the structure dangerous. The core legal question revolved around whether the tenants were entitled to a notice and a right of hearing before the inspection committee surveyed the allegedly dangerous building. The Sindh High Court held that in the absence of express exclusion of the right of hearing in the governing law, the tenants were entitled to a notice from the inspection committee prior to inspection, as implementation of the report would adversely affect them. The Court further held that the availability of an alternative remedy such as an appeal does not oust the constitutional jurisdiction of the superior courts, especially when procedural fairness like the right of hearing has been violated. The petition was consequently accepted in terms of a companion judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Are tenants entitled to a notice and right of hearing from an inspection committee before a building is declared dangerous?
  • Does the availability of an alternative remedy like an appeal divest the superior courts of their constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does an inspection report of a committee hold legal validity if mandatory procedural safeguards are not followed?
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• Vijaya Laxmi Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1992 PTD 254 · Supreme Court of India · 1991-08-06Read full judgment →
• Vijaya Bank Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax (Addl.)1992 PTD 401 · Supreme Court of India · 1990-09-19Read full judgment →
• Vijaipat Singhania and others vs Commissioner of Income Tax1992 PTD 693 · Supreme Court of India · 1991-10-04Read full judgment →
• Victoria Technical Institute vs Commissioner of Income-Tax (Addl.)1992 PTD 420 · Supreme Court of India · 1990-11-16Read full judgment →
• Vice-President (Operations), Security and Management Services (Pvt.)1992 PLC 546 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-10-19Read full judgment →
• Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. vs Commissioner ofIncome Tax.PTCL 1992 FC. 157 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1989-11-10Read full judgment →
• Vania Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1992 PTD 234 · Supreme Court of India · 1991-08-14Read full judgment →
• Valerius Mughambi vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 845 · Lahore High Court · 1991-09-25Read full judgment →
• V.I.P. Industries Ltd. vs Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and another1992 PTD 910 · Bombay High Court · 1990-08-10Read full judgment →
• Usman And Another vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1960 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-30
  compoundable offencecompromisewaiver of Qisasacquittalcriminal appealmisreading of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants under Section 311, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a trial for murder. The appellants had previously moved an application before the trial court to compound the offence with the legal heirs of the deceased, which the trial court allowed. However, despite accepting the compromise, the trial court proceeded to convict the appellants under Section 311, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court, having permitted and accepted a compromise between the parties, retained the authority to convict the appellants under Section 311, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court erred in its application of the law. The court clarified that Section 311, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, only applies when there is no full compromise regarding the offence. Once a court grants permission to compound an offence under Section 345, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, it is legally obligated to acquit the accused under Section 345(6), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the High Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court have the authority to convict an accused under Section 311, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, after having already accepted a valid compromise between the parties?
  • What is the legal effect of a court accepting a compromise application under Section 345, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the compounding of an offence under Section 345, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, distinct from the compounding of Qisas under Section 310, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others vs Ch. Sardar Ali1992 SCMR 1093 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-13
  maintainability of constitutional petitionmaster and servantstatutory rules of servicetermination of probationerUniversity of the PunjabGovernor as Chancellornon-statutory employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of an appellate Bench of the Lahore High Court that had accepted a Constitution petition filed by a Lecturer in Law challenging the termination of his services by the University of the Punjab. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the service conditions of an employee of the Punjab University were governed by statutory rules so as to render a Constitution petition under Article 199 maintainable. Analyzing the University of the Punjab Act, 1973, particularly Sections 11 and 31, the Supreme Court addressed whether the insertion of Section 11(8)—which bound the Chancellor in the same manner as a Governor under Article 105 of the Constitution—converted non-statutory service into statutory service. The Court held that exercising powers as Chancellor under a University statute does not equate to acting qua Governor, and reference to a constitutional provision does not elevate statutory terms to constitutional or statutory status. Consequently, the respondent's employment was non-statutory, making the Constitution petition non-maintainable. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the appellate decision, and restored the Single Judge's order.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against the termination of service of a university employee where the terms and conditions of employment are non-statutory?
  • Does a provision requiring the Chancellor of a university to act under the advice of the Chief Minister convert the employment terms of university staff into statutory service?
  • Does exercising statutory powers as Chancellor of a university make those actions official acts of the Governor in his constitutional capacity?
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• United Bank Limited, Hyderabad and 2 others vs Muhammad Anwar1992 PLC 1146 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-08-04Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs The Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and others1992 PLC 554 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-22Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs P.I.C.I.C. and others1992 SCMR 1731 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-26
  liquidation proceedingssecured creditorpriority of debtspledgewinding upCompanies Ordinanceinsolvency law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment rejecting the appellant bank's claim to be treated as a secured creditor entitled to priority in the distribution of assets of a company under liquidation. The core legal question was whether a creditor holding a pledge over company assets is entitled to priority in distribution during winding-up proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while a pledge holder qualifies as a "secured creditor" under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, this status does not confer a right to priority in the distribution of assets under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The Court established that the statutory scheme allows secured creditors to independently realize their security or relinquish it, but does not grant them preferential payment status over other debts. Additionally, the Court clarified that a pledge does not require registration under Section 121 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, as it is explicitly excluded from the registration requirements applicable to mortgages and charges. The appellant’s claim for priority was therefore rejected as inconsistent with the established liquidation framework.

  Questions settled

  • Is a creditor holding a pledge over company assets entitled to priority in the distribution of assets during winding-up proceedings?
  • Does a pledge require registration under Section 121 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Does the status of a secured creditor under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, grant a right to priority in the distribution of assets of an insolvent company?
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• United Bank Limited vs Muhammad Moosa1992 PLC 354 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-09-04Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs Mian Tajammul Hussain1992 CLC 871 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-12Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs Bismillah Oil Mills and others1992 CLC 1390 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-02Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited and others vs Muhammad Islam Qureshi1992 PLC 1179 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-08-04Read full judgment →
• United Bakery vs Hassan Siddiqui1992 SCMR 1959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-20
  rent evictiondefault in rentcross-examinationaffidavit-in-evidenceremand of caseburden of prooflandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a rent eviction dispute where the landlord sought the tenant's eviction on grounds of default, unauthorized construction, and subletting. The Rent Controller ordered eviction based solely on the ground of default, a decision subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a positive finding of default is sustainable when the landlord fails to appear for cross-examination, rendering their affidavit-in-evidence incomplete. The Supreme Court observed that the landlord had failed to present himself for cross-examination, and the tenant had raised a defense regarding the deposit of rent in court due to the landlord's refusal to accept it. Given the procedural deficiency regarding the landlord's evidence and the parties' consent, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and the eviction order. The Court remanded the matter to the Rent Controller to allow the parties to produce evidence afresh on the issue of default. The key principle established is that an affidavit-in-evidence remains incomplete and legally insufficient if the deponent fails to subject themselves to cross-examination, necessitating a remand for proper adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Is a finding of default in rent sustainable if the landlord fails to appear for cross-examination?
  • Does an affidavit-in-evidence retain legal validity if the deponent refuses to undergo cross-examination?
  • Can a case be remanded for fresh evidence when the initial proceedings suffer from procedural deficiencies regarding the examination of witnesses?
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• Unison Limited and anothers vs Federal Government and another1992 CLC 921 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Union of India and another vs Romesh Chander1992 PTD 829 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1990-09-11Read full judgment →
• Union Cold Storage Company Ltd., Karachi vs Qalandar Khan1992 PLC 1092 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-08-08Read full judgment →
• Umer Gul vs Malik Abdul Manan And Other1992 PLD Peshawar 76 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-12-11
  temporary injunctioncivil revisionbalance of convenienceirreparable lossprima facie casepublic dutySpecific Relief Actinterlocutory order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged an appellate order that set aside a temporary injunction granted by a trial court regarding the relocation of a school project. The petitioner, having gifted land for a school in his village, sought to restrain the government from shifting the project site to another village. The core legal question was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the trial court's status quo order and whether the petitioner satisfied the requirements for a temporary injunction. The High Court held that the appellate court correctly exercised its jurisdiction, as the order was appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the injunction, ruling that a prima facie case alone is insufficient; a party must also demonstrate irreparable loss and balance of convenience. Additionally, the Court emphasized the statutory bar under Section 56(d) of the Specific Relief Act 1877, which generally prohibits injunctions that interfere with the public duties of government departments.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order of status quo passed by a trial court appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What are the essential requirements that must co-exist for the grant of a temporary injunction?
  • Does Section 56(d) of the Specific Relief Act 1877 prohibit the grant of an injunction that interferes with the public duty of a government department?
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• Umar Hayat through his Legal Heir vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner, I, Lahore1992 CLC 530 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-19Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat And Others vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2427 · Lahore High Court · 1992-04-27Read full judgment →
• Umar Draz vs The State1992 PLD Lahore 333 · Lahore High Court · 1992-05-10Read full judgment →
• Umar Din vs Rehmat Khan (deceased) through L.Rs,1992 CLC 2353 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-16Read full judgment →
• Umar Din vs Muhammad Ali And Others1992 P Cr. L J 804 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-13Read full judgment →
• Umar Din Etc vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 260 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-28Read full judgment →
• Ulfat Ali vs Abdul ShakoorK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 186 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-03Read full judgment →
• Ulfat Ali vs Abdul Shakoor1992 CLC 744 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-12
  rented premisesejectmentwilful defaulttenancy agreementstatutory grace periodpostal money orderattestation of agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller against a tenant on the grounds of default in rent payment. The core legal questions were whether the tenancy agreement was enforceable despite lacking statutory attestation, and whether the tenant had committed wilful default. The Court held that because the tenancy agreement was not attested as required by Section 5 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, it was unenforceable, and the tenancy was governed by an oral agreement. Consequently, the tenant was entitled to the statutory grace period for rent payment. The Court determined that the tenant had effectively tendered rent via money order within the grace period, and that such postal receipts constituted valid proof of payment under Section 10(4) of the Ordinance, rendering the examination of the postman unnecessary to prove refusal. The eviction order was set aside, establishing the principle that an unattested tenancy agreement reverts to an oral tenancy, and that postal receipts are sufficient evidence of rent tender, precluding claims of default when payment is attempted within statutory grace periods.

  Questions settled

  • Is a tenancy agreement enforceable if it is not attested by the Rent Controller or a competent magistrate as required by the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the failure to attest a tenancy agreement render the tenancy an oral one subject to statutory grace periods for rent payment?
  • Are postal money order receipts sufficient proof of rent tender under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, without the need to examine the postman?
  • Does the acceptance of rent arrears by a landlord constitute a waiver of the right to seek eviction on the ground of default?
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• Ulbrichts Wwe. Ges M.S.H. a-4690, Schwanenstadt_Kaufing,Austria vs Ulbrichts (Pakistan) (Private) LtdK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 559 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• ULBRICHT's Wwe. Ges M.B.H., Austria vs ULBRICHT's (Pakistan) (Private)1992 PLD Karachi 249 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-16
  winding upcompanies ordinancejust and equitable clauseinability to pay debtsprivate limited companypartnership principlesdisputed debt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a winding-up petition filed by a foreign company, a 49% shareholder and creditor, against a local joint venture private limited company under sections 305 and 309 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The core legal questions concern whether the private company is liable to be wound up under the 'just and equitable' clause due to alleged management deadlocks, exclusion of shareholders, and lack of confidence, and whether it is unable to pay its undisputed debts. The Sindh High Court held that the principles of partnership dissolution apply to private companies under the just and equitable clause only when strict conditions like even voting division, complete exclusion, or genuine deadlocks are established, which were absent here. The Court further held that a winding-up petition cannot be used as a substitute for a recovery suit or to exert pressure when the alleged debt is subject to a bona fide and substantial dispute. The petition was consequently dismissed with costs, affirming that mere disagreements or disputes over heavy cross-claims do not warrant winding up a solvent, profit-earning company engaged in vital defense production.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the principles for dissolving a partnership firm apply to the winding up of a private limited company under the just and equitable clause?
  • Does a mere disagreement between two groups of shareholders in a private limited company constitute a deadlock justifying a winding-up order?
  • Can a winding-up petition be maintained by a creditor when the alleged debt is subject to a bona fide and substantial dispute?
  • Is a winding-up petition a valid substitute for a regular suit for the recovery of commercial debts?
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• Ubaidullah vs Municipal Committee Chiniot District Jhang And AnotherK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 1 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Trustees of the Port of Karachi vs Appellate Sindh Labour Tribunal1992 PLC 660 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-28Read full judgment →
• Trustees of the Port of Karachi through Chairman vs Sultan1992 PLC 1282 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1992-05-10Read full judgment →
• Treet Corporation Limited - vs Government of Pakistan Through Its1992 PLD KARACHI 427 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-05
  constitutional petitionmarking feedelegated legislationsubordinate legislationultra vireslevy of feeexecutive power
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional Petition challenged a Notification dated 10-7-1981 issued by the Pakistan Standard Institution levying a marking fee on manufactured goods, as well as the demand raised against the petitioner under the said notification. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Standard Institution or the Federal Government possessed the statutory authority under the Pakistan Standard Institution (Certification Marks) Ordinance 1961 to levy a marking fee through rules or regulations in the absence of an express provision in the parent statute. The High Court of Sindh allowed the petition, declaring the impugned notification and demand of marking fee to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The Court laid down the principle that the power to levy any fee or charge must be specifically conferred on the executive by primary legislation. Where the parent Act does not empower the authority or executive to impose a specific fee, such a fee cannot be lawfully levied or created through subordinate legislation, rules, or regulations.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executive authority levy a fee or financial charge without express statutory authorization in the parent Act?
  • Can subordinate rules or regulations impose a fee where the governing statute does not specifically empower the authority to levy it?
  • Does general rule-making power under a statute enable the Federal Government to create and collect new levies not specified in the law?
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• Travel Agents Association of Pakistan vs M/s. Skyline (Pvt.) Travels1992 CLC 1644 · Sindh High Court · 1988-09-01
  attachment before judgmentcivil proceduretravel agentsrecovery of moneyimpounding passportsfurnishing security
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application under Order 38, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, filed by the Travel Agents Association of Pakistan seeking attachment of assets and office premises of the defendants along with the impounding of their passports to prevent them from leaving the country to delay or defeat the recovery of a claimed amount of Rs. 9,42,848.77. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff established sufficient grounds for attachment before judgment based on the defendants' alleged intention to leave the country. The Sindh High Court held that while attachment before judgment is not to be ordered lightly and requires satisfaction that the defendants are about to leave the country or dispose of property, such satisfaction can be deduced from affidavits and surrounding circumstances. The Court directed the defendants to furnish security for the claimed amount within one month, failing which attachment before judgment would issue against their assets and office premises and their passports would be impounded. The key principle laid down is that the requisite satisfaction for pre-judgment attachment can be derived from the surrounding circumstances and material on record without necessarily requiring direct evidence of intent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether attachment before judgment can be granted upon vague allegations of the defendant intending to leave the country?
  • Can the court's satisfaction regarding a defendant's intent to delay or defeat the execution of a decree be deduced from surrounding circumstances and affidavits?
  • What relief can a court grant under Order 38, Rule 5, C.P.C. if the defendant fails to furnish the security ordered by the court?
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• Trading Corporation of Pakistan Limited vs Messrs Amin Hayat1992 SCMR 783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-29
  cost pricequantum meruitSection 70 Contract Actacquiescencepast and closed transactionstatutory price controlimport of sugar
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a civil suit for recovery of money filed by respondent No. 1 against the appellant, Trading Corporation of Pakistan Limited. Pursuant to government notifications issued under statutory powers controlling foodstuff imports, imported sugar was required to be sold to the appellant at cost price plus a six percent profit. The appellant paid all customs duties, sales tax, and port clearance charges amounting to over two crore rupees directly, while respondent No. 1 accepted payment calculated on its actual incurred cost without objection for nearly three years. The learned Single Judge dismissed the suit, holding that the transaction was closed and acquiesced to, but the Division Bench of the High Court reversed this decree. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the Single Judge's decision, holding that expenses not actually incurred by the importer cannot be added to its cost price for profit calculation, and invoking the principles under Section 70 of the Contract Act 1872 regarding non-gratuitous benefit conferred by the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim profit on statutory cost price calculations for expenses that were actually paid by the buyer rather than the seller?
  • Does Section 70 of the Contract Act 1872 entitle a party to credit or compensation when it lawfully pays port charges and duties on behalf of another in a commercial transaction?
  • Whether an importer who voluntarily accepts a agreed cost calculation and payment without protest for several years is barred from re-opening the settled transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• To Government of N.-W.F.P. And Another vs Dr. Muhammad Akhtar And Another1992 PLD Supreme Court 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-04
  civil serviceregularization of servicespreferential right of appointmentad hoc appointmentPublic Service Commissionreview petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition concerns the interpretation of Section 3 of the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act, 1988, specifically regarding the conditions for claiming a preferential right of appointment over a civil servant regularized under the Act. The core legal question was whether the respondent, Dr. Muhammad Saleem, possessed a preferential right of appointment over the petitioner, Dr. Muhammad Akhtar, based on his selection by the Public Service Commission prior to the commencement of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for such a preferential right. The Court determined that the respondent's selection by the Public Service Commission was merely provisional, as the critical assessment of Annual Confidential Reports (A.C.Rs) occurred after the target date of January 23, 1988. Consequently, the Court dismissed the review petition, affirming that a claim of preferential right under the Act requires strict adherence to the conditions of selection by the Public Service Commission before the Act's commencement, which was not established in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Does a provisional selection by the Public Service Commission satisfy the requirement of 'selection' under Section 3 of the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act, 1988?
  • Can a preferential right of appointment be established under the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regularization of Services) Act, 1988, if the final selection process was completed after the commencement of the Act?
  • Is the grading by the Public Service Commission a statutory standard for determining preferential rights in civil service appointments?
  Read full judgment →
• The Union of India and others. vs M/s. Playworld Electronics Pvt. Ltd.andPTCL 1992 FC. 47 · Supreme Court of IndiaRead full judgment →
• The Trustees of Port of Karachi vs Norwhich Union Fire Insurance1992 CLC 2412 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-27Read full judgment →
• The State vs Yunis and another-1992 P Cr. L J 1408 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-25Read full judgment →
• The State vs Syed Qaim Ali Shah1992 SCMR 2192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-11
  post-arrest bailmedical groundsscheduled offenceSuppression of Terrorist Activities Act 1975Section 497 CrPC provisosstatutory delaySpecial Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals were filed by the State challenging High Court orders that granted post-arrest bail on medical grounds to respondents facing trial before a Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 for scheduled offences. The core legal question was whether an undertrial accused facing prosecution before a Special Court under the Act can seek bail on medical grounds or statutory delay under the provisos to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), given the earlier precedent in the Allied Bank case (1991 SCMR 599). The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeals and modified its earlier stance in the Allied Bank case. The Court held that Section 5-A(8) of the Act does not completely oust Section 497 Cr.P.C. during trial. The first and third provisos to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. remain fully available to both the Special Court and the High Court, as restrictions on subject rights in penal statutes must be strictly interpreted and humane statutory exceptions preserved absent explicit legislative exclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person facing trial before a Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 seek post-arrest bail on medical grounds under the first proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C.?
  • Does Section 5-A(8) of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 completely exclude the operation of the provisos to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C.?
  • Can the High Court invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to grant bail to a convict during appeal under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 in cases of unconscionable delay or life-threatening illness?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Syed Gulzar Hussain Shah1992 P Cr. L J 364 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-11-27Read full judgment →
• The State vs Sultan1992 SCMR 2034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-01
  acquittal appealinterference with acquittalappellate reviewocular evidencebenefit of doubtmurderacid attack
  Summary & questions settled

  The State appealed against the acquittal of the respondent, Sultan, who was charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Saifullah by throwing acid on him. The prosecution alleged that the motive was the deceased's refusal to continue a friendship with the respondent. The Special Court for Speedy Trials had acquitted the respondent, finding the motive unproven, the ocular evidence unreliable due to enmity, and the defence version plausible. The Supreme Court reviewed the appeal, reiterating the established principles for interfering with an acquittal, specifically that appellate courts should not interfere unless the trial court's conclusion is artificial, shocking, or ridiculous, or if no reasonable person could have reached it. Upon scrutinizing the evidence, the Court found that the complainant's testimony was uninspiring, the eyewitness was inimical, and independent corroboration was lacking. Consequently, the Court held that the trial court's decision was not unreasonable and dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Is an acquittal liable to be set aside if the ocular evidence is found to be inimical and lacking independent corroboration?
  • Does the failure to prove motive in a murder case necessarily lead to an acquittal?
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• The State vs Rafiullah alias Gul---1992 P Cr. L J 435 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-25Read full judgment →
• The State vs Noor Muhammad And 2 Other1992 PLD Lahore 171 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-02Read full judgment →
• The State vs Nawaiwaqt and Daily Jang1992 MLD 364 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-11Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muijammad Khalil1992 P Cr. L J 2528 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-08Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Younas1992 P Cr. L J 1640 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-12Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Siddique1992 P Cr. L J 1697 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-28Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Ramzan And 3 Others1992 P Cr. L J 423 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-04-04Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Aslam And Others1992 P Cr. L J 1194 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-14Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Akhtar1992 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-19
  acquittal appealoutraging modestycredibility of witnessesdelayed FIRspecial courtappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondent who was tried under Section 354-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by a Special Court. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt regarding the outraging of the modesty of the complainant and tearing of her clothes. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's evaluation of evidence—highlighting contradictions between the statements of the complainant and her son, the doubtful nature of the independent witness's testimony, the unstitched rather than torn condition of the shirt, and the delayed reporting of the incident—was sound and free from misreading or non-consideration of material evidence. The Court affirmed the acquittal and dismissed the appeal, laying down that findings of a trial court regarding witness credibility and physical evidence will not be interfered with unless suffering from patent infirmities or misreading.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with an order of acquittal when the trial court's judgment suffers from no misreading or non-consideration of evidence?
  • Does a delay of over twenty hours in lodging the FIR adversely affect the prosecution case in charges of outraging modesty?
  • Can unstitched portions of clothing be treated as torn fabric to corroborate allegations of assault under Section 354-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• The State vs Malik Muhammad Siddiq And Others1992 P Cr. L J 1355 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-04Read full judgment →
• The State vs Lal Khan1992 P Cr. L J 483 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-29Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ismail alias MOTAAccused1992 MLD 182 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-29Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ismail Alias MotaK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 383 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-21Read full judgment →
• The State vs Imran Faisal1992 PLD Lahore 248 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-16Read full judgment →
• The State vs Imran FaisalK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 515 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-16Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ghulam Muhammad And Others1992 P Cr. L J 1350 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-18Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ghulam Akbar Lasi1992 SCMR 964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-02
  election offenceremand for retrialdiscretionary jurisdictionexpunction of observationsright to appealbail compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the State against a judgment of the Balochistan High Court, which had set aside the respondent's conviction for an election offence regarding the submission of return of expenses and remanded the case for retrial. The High Court's decision was influenced by the fact that the respondent remained in custody despite being granted bail. The Supreme Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal, noting that the High Court's order regarding the respondent's release should have been respected by the authorities. The Supreme Court emphasized that all litigants, including the State, must show due respect to orders passed by superior courts. Additionally, the Supreme Court addressed a specific observation in the High Court's judgment that criticized the filing of a petition for special leave to appeal as a violation of court orders. The Supreme Court held that this observation was improper as it could be misunderstood regarding a party's right to seek legal remedies, and consequently ordered that the specific observation be expunged from the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal when the High Court has remanded a case for retrial?
  • Is it proper for a High Court to characterize the filing of a petition for special leave to appeal as a violation of its orders?
  • What is the obligation of the State and litigants regarding compliance with orders issued by superior courts?
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• The State vs District Magistrate And Other1992 PLD Lahore 339 · Lahore High Court · 1992-04-28Read full judgment →
• The State vs Daniel Boyd (Muslim Name Saifullah) And Another1992 PLD Peshawar 56 · Special Court · 1991-09-25Read full judgment →
• The State vs Bashir Ahmad Alias Bashira And Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-13
  dacoityleave to appealsentence enhancementidentification of accusedcriminal justicecondonation of delayacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal petitions filed by the State seeking leave to appeal against the sentence awarded to two convicts and the acquittal of other co-accused in a case involving dacoity and murder. The core legal questions addressed whether there was sufficient justification for awarding a lesser penalty to the convicts and whether the acquittal of the majority of the accused was legally sound, particularly regarding the identification of unknown accused persons. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions, holding that the delay in filing the petitions was condonable in the interest of justice. The Court further determined that the identification of the acquitted accused required deeper examination, specifically whether the credibility established by witnesses regarding the convicted accused could extend to the identification of the acquitted accused in the absence of independent corroboration. The Court emphasized that the administration of criminal justice allows for the condonation of delay in appropriate circumstances and that the credibility of eye-witnesses, once established regarding some accused, necessitates a thorough review of their testimony concerning other accused persons.

  Questions settled

  • Can the State file a time-barred petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal or sentence in a criminal case?
  • Does the credibility of eye-witnesses regarding convicted accused persons extend to the identification of acquitted co-accused?
  • Can an accused withdraw an appeal for leave to appeal after the State files a cross-petition for enhancement of sentence?
  • What principles govern the identification of unknown accused persons in a dacoity case?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Aziz Khan1992 PLD Lahore 91 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-15Read full judgment →
• The State vs Abdul Qayyum and 24 others1992 SCMR 1877 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-11
  gamblingcommon gaming-housestatutory presumptioninstruments of gamingsearch and seizurecriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by the State challenges the Lahore High Court's judgment which acquitted the respondents of charges under section 4 of the Punjab Prevention of Gambling Ordinance, 1978. The core legal question concerns the interpretation and purview of sections 8 and 9 of the Ordinance regarding the presumption of a common gaming-house and the presence of accused persons therein for gambling. The Supreme Court held that direct evidence of profit-making is not a strict prerequisite to invoke the statutory presumption under section 9 when a search is lawfully conducted by a competent Magistrate under section 8, and that persons found in a premises where instruments of gaming are recovered are presumed to be gaming unless the contrary is proved. The Court laid down that the Punjab Prevention of Gambling Ordinance, 1978 is an independent and improved statute compared to prior legislation, allowing magistrates to search premises and draw statutory presumptions against persons found gaming even if the owner is acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether direct evidence of profit or gain is essential to raise a presumption under section 9 of the Punjab Prevention of Gambling Ordinance, 1978 that a premises is used as a common gaming-house?
  • Can persons found in a searched premises be convicted under section 4 of the Punjab Prevention of Gambling Ordinance, 1978 when the alleged owners of the premises have been acquitted?
  • What is the scope and effect of the powers of entry and search conferred upon a District Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class under section 8 of the Punjab Prevention of Gambling Ordinance, 1978?
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• The State vs Abdul Karim1992 SCMR 1445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-24
  acquittal appealocular evidencecommon intentionSection 342 statementcriminal conspiracywitness credibilitymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the acquittal of the respondent, Abdul Karim, by the High Court of Sindh in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the respondent and his co-accused, Muhammad Fazil, murdered the deceased, Jamroz Khan, due to union-related rivalries. Following the death of the co-accused, the respondent was tried alone. The trial court convicted him, but the High Court acquitted him, leading to the State's appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the ocular evidence, noting significant discrepancies and improvements made by witnesses after the case was remanded for further cross-examination, particularly regarding the respondent's alleged role of instigation. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a common intention or pre-concert between the accused, especially given the lack of evidence explaining their arrival at the scene. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the failure to put specific incriminating questions regarding the recovery of the respondent's scooter to the accused under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, prejudiced the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding the ocular testimony unreliable and uncorroborated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on ocular testimony that has been significantly improved upon after a remand for cross-examination?
  • Does the failure to put a specific incriminating question regarding a piece of evidence to an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 invalidate the prosecution's reliance on that evidence?
  • Is medical evidence sufficient to corroborate the identity of an accused in a murder case when the injuries are not attributed to that specific individual?
  • Does the absence of evidence proving a pre-concert between two accused persons preclude a conviction based on common intention?
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• The State vs Aamer And Others1992 P Cr. L J 267 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-13Read full judgment →
• The State the State Through Collector Of Central Excise And Land1992 PLD Supreme Court 393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-17
  burden of proofsmugglingcustoms actnarcoticscharasheroinseizurecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These two criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the circumstances under which the burden of proof shifts to the accused in cases involving smuggling under the Customs Act. The core legal questions centered on whether the prosecution must prove the foreign origin of notified goods like narcotics to establish smuggling, and how sections 156(1)(89), 156(2), and 187 of the Customs Act operate regarding the shift of the evidentiary burden. The Supreme Court held that once the prosecution discharges its initial burden by proving the seizure of goods under a reasonable belief that an offence has been committed, the burden shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption and prove lawful possession or that the goods are not smuggled. The Court clarified that under the applicable notifications, narcotics such as charas and heroin are included in the definition of smuggled goods, rendering proof of foreign origin unnecessary. Consequently, the Court allowed the first appeal by restoring the conviction and set aside the acquittal in the second appeal, remanding the narcotics portion for retrial while maintaining the acquittal regarding the shotgun.

  Questions settled

  • When does the burden of proof shift to the accused under the Customs Act 1969 in smuggling cases?
  • Is it mandatory for the prosecution to prove the foreign origin of narcotics to establish an offence under section 156(1)(89) of the Customs Act 1969?
  • What are the ingredients required to be proved by the prosecution to draw a presumption against the accused under section 187 of the Customs Act 1969?
  • Does the definition of smuggling under the Customs Act 1969 encompass narcotic and psychotropic substances added via notification?
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• The Regional Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Region, Lahore1992 PLD Supreme Court 869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-21
  ad hoc appointmentservice tribunal jurisdictionwrit jurisdictioncare-taker cabinettermination of serviceconstitutional petitiondepartmental authorityequal protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves 41 petitions for leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court, which granted relief to ad hoc civil servants whose services were terminated following a policy decision by a Care-taker Cabinet. The High Court had exercised its writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, reasoning that the termination orders were not passed by a competent departmental authority but were merely administrative implementations of a policy, and that the petitioners were subjected to discriminatory treatment. The Supreme Court, by a majority view, granted leave to appeal to address significant questions of law and constitutional importance. The core issues to be determined include whether the High Court’s jurisdiction was barred by Article 212 of the Constitution, whether the termination orders constituted actions by a departmental authority under the Service Tribunals Act, and whether ad hoc appointees possess a vested right to continued service or regularization. The Court also seeks to examine whether the recruitment process and subsequent terminations violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process, and the permissible scope of a Care-taker Cabinet's administrative authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Constitution petitions by ad hoc appointees challenging the termination of their appointment are barred by Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Does an ad hoc appointee possess a vested right to continue in service or to insist on regularization under the law?
  • Is an order passed by a departmental authority merely to implement a Cabinet policy decision considered an order of a departmental authority for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act?
  • Whether the classification of government servants by pay grades and the differential treatment of recruits based on such grades constitutes a reasonable classification under the Constitution?
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• The Pakistan National Produce Company Ltd. vs Workers Union P.N.P.1992 PLC 1000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-07-17
  cost of living allowancewage increaseset-offlabour lawindustrial relationspay scale revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The Pakistan National Produce Company Ltd. challenged a High Court judgment that restored a Labour Court order directing the company to pay a 13.5 per cent wage increase to its employees under the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973, as amended by Act XIV of 1985. The core legal question was whether the company could 'set off' this statutory wage increase against a pay scale revision agreed upon with the Workers Union on 27-4-1985, pursuant to the proviso (a) of the newly inserted subsection (6) of section 3 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the proviso (a) only permits a set-off when the prior agreement or settlement specifically grants relief due to a rise in the cost of living. In this case, the agreement of 27-4-1985 was intended to bring the employees' pay scales at par with another establishment, not to provide cost-of-living relief. Consequently, the set-off provision was inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that statutory cost-of-living increases cannot be offset by wage revisions unrelated to cost-of-living adjustments.

  Questions settled

  • Does a wage revision aimed at achieving parity with other establishments qualify as cost-of-living relief under the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973?
  • Can an employer set off a statutory wage increase against a prior agreement that did not specifically address cost-of-living relief?
  • What is the scope of the set-off provision in section 3(6) of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973?
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