Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• The Pakistan National Produce Company Ltd. vs Workers Union P.N.P.1992 SCMR 1137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-07-17
  cost of living allowanceset-offwage increasepay scale revisionindustrial disputeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute regarding the applicability of a set-off under the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973. The core legal question was whether a wage increase granted under an inter-party agreement aimed at parity of pay scales with another establishment could be set off against the statutory 13.5 percent cost of living increase introduced by Act XIV of 1985 under proviso (a) to section 3(6) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in allowing the set-off, affirming the High Court's view that proviso (a) applies strictly to relief granted specifically on account of a rise in the cost of living, whereas the agreement in question was intended to revise pay scales for parity. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that wage revisions unconnected to cost of living adjustments cannot be utilized for statutory set-offs under the provision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a wage increase resulting from a settlement to bring pay scales at par with another establishment falls within the scope of proviso (a) to section 3(6) of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973?
  • Can an employer set off a statutory increase in wages against pay revisions that were not granted on account of a rise in the cost of living?
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• The Pakistan General Insurance Company Limited vs Mst. Bakhtan Bibi1992 CLC 1960 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-31Read full judgment →
• The National Security Insurance Company Ltd. vs Pak Oriental1992 CLC 853 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-11Read full judgment →
• The National Security Insurance Company Ltd. vs Messrs Pak Oriental1992 MLD 215 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-11Read full judgment →
• The Ismailia Garden Cooperative Housing Society Limited and 2 others1992 CLC 2088 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-12Read full judgment →
• The Income Tax Officer, Central Circle III, Karachi. vs Eruck Maneckji and othersPTCL 1992 CL. 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  advance income taxconstitutional petitionmaintainability of writtax penaltyarbitrary ordersuccessor in interestincome tax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside a penalty imposed by the Income-tax Officer on the respondents for failure to pay advance income tax. The core legal question was whether advance tax payments made by a predecessor company (Dalmia) during a transitional business period could be credited to the respondents, and whether the Constitutional petition was maintainable despite alternative remedies. The Supreme Court held that since the Department had accepted that Dalmia operated the business on behalf of the respondents and taxed the resulting income in the respondents' hands, it was arbitrary and perverse to deny that the advance tax payments were made on the respondents' behalf. The Court affirmed that where tax authorities accept the underlying business arrangement for income assessment, they cannot inconsistently reject the associated tax payments. Additionally, the Court ruled that a Constitutional petition is maintainable against an arbitrary and oppressive order where no statutory appeal lies, notwithstanding the availability of revision. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can tax authorities accept a business arrangement for income assessment while simultaneously rejecting the associated advance tax payments made by the operator?
  • Is a Constitutional petition maintainable against an arbitrary tax order when no statutory appeal lies, even if a revision remedy exists?
  • Does the payment of advance tax by a predecessor company on behalf of a successor company satisfy the statutory requirement for advance tax payment?
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• The General Tyres and Rubber Company vs Waheed Gul1992 PLC 1168 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-08-20Read full judgment →
• The Engineers Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. vs The Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Punjab and another1992 CLC 547 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-27Read full judgment →
• The Cooperative Insurance Society of Pakistan Ltd. And Other vs State1992 PLD Supreme Court 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-20
  Leave to appealCooperative societiesStatutory interpretationMaintainability of proceedingsInsurance lawNotice requirementLife Insurance (Nationalization) Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court order concerning proceedings initiated by the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan under Article 22 of the Life Insurance (Nationalization) Order, 1972. The core legal question is whether an application filed under Article 22 constitutes a 'suit' within the meaning of Section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, which mandates a two-month notice period before instituting a suit against a society. The Tribunal initially held that such applications were 'suits,' rendering them non-maintainable for lack of notice. However, the High Court reversed this, distinguishing between 'applications' and 'suits' based on the specific terminology used within the Order. The Supreme Court, observing that the issue was one of first impression with no existing precedent, granted leave to appeal to resolve the interpretation of these statutory provisions. The judgment highlights the necessity of strictly interpreting procedural requirements when special legislation employs distinct terminology for legal proceedings, distinguishing between administrative applications and formal suits in the context of cooperative society litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does an application filed under Article 22 of the Life Insurance (Nationalization) Order, 1972, constitute a 'suit' under Section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925?
  • Is the requirement of a two-month notice under Section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, applicable to proceedings initiated by the State Life Insurance Corporation?
  • Does the use of the terms 'application' and 'suit' in the same legislative instrument imply distinct procedural requirements?
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• The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore. The Commissioner of Sales Tax_d490ae20PTCL 1992 CL. 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales taxpartly manufactured goodstax exemptionraw materialfiscal statute interpretationtax liabilityintermediate goods
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns fourteen appeals filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax against High Court judgments that exempted ginned cotton and yarn from sales tax when used in the manufacture of yarn and cloth, which were themselves exempt from tax. The core legal question was whether "partly manufactured goods" remain taxable under the Sales Tax Act, 1951, when the final products are exempt from sales tax. The Supreme Court held that ginned cotton and yarn constitute raw materials or "partly manufactured goods" that are liable to sales tax when the end product is exempt. The Court reasoned that the scheme of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, is designed to ensure that sales tax is paid at at least one stage of production. Consequently, if the final product is exempt, the intermediate goods used in its manufacture become chargeable to tax to maintain this fiscal scheme. The Court affirmed that "subject to tax" in the Act implies that tax is ultimately payable, and where no tax is recoverable on the end product, the intermediate goods are taxable.

  Questions settled

  • Are ginned cotton and yarn considered 'partly manufactured goods' under the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  • Does the exemption of an end product from sales tax render the 'partly manufactured goods' used in its production liable to sales tax?
  • What is the underlying scheme of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, regarding the stage at which sales tax is to be paid?
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• The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Lahore Textile and General Mills Ltd1992 PTD 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-02
  sales taxpartly manufactured goodstax exemptionraw materialtax liabilitystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns fourteen appeals filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax against High Court judgments regarding the taxability of "partly manufactured goods," specifically ginned cotton and yarn, used in the production of yarn and cloth. The core legal questions were whether these items constitute raw material for the end products and whether they remain liable to sales tax when the final products are exempt from such tax. The Supreme Court held that ginned cotton and yarn are indeed "partly manufactured goods" under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. Affirming the principle established in Abbasi Textile Mills Ltd. and Noorani Cotton Corporation, the Court ruled that where the end product is exempt from sales tax, the partly manufactured goods incorporated into them are chargeable to tax. This ensures the legislative scheme of the Act, which mandates that sales tax is paid at one stage. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeals, confirming that the tax authorities correctly levied tax on the partly manufactured goods despite the exemption of the final products.

  Questions settled

  • Do ginned cotton and yarn constitute 'partly manufactured goods' for the production of yarn and cloth under the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  • Are partly manufactured goods liable to sales tax when the final end product is exempt from sales tax?
  • Does the scheme of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 require that sales tax be paid at only one stage of production?
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• The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore the Commissioner of Sales Tax,_cd6689bb1992 PLD Supreme Court 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-02
  sales taxpartly manufactured goodsexemption notificationraw materialstax liabilitysingle-stage taxationginned cotton
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax against High Court decisions regarding the taxability of ginned cotton and yarn used in the manufacture of yarn and cloth. The core legal question was whether ginned cotton and yarn, utilized as raw materials for producing yarn and cloth, remain liable to sales tax when the final products are exempt from tax, and whether these materials qualify as "partly manufactured goods" under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The Supreme Court held that ginned cotton and yarn constitute "partly manufactured goods" and are subject to sales tax when the end products are exempt. The Court affirmed that the scheme of the Act is designed to ensure sales tax is paid at one stage; consequently, if the final product is exempt, the raw materials incorporated into it become chargeable to tax. The Court relied on established precedents to conclude that the levy was valid, thereby reversing the High Court's contrary view and upholding the tax liability on the intermediate goods.

  Questions settled

  • Are ginned cotton and yarn considered 'partly manufactured goods' under the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  • Does the exemption of an end product from sales tax render the 'partly manufactured goods' used in its production liable to sales tax?
  • Can the delay in filing appeals be condoned when the appellant acted bona fide in pursuing certificates of fitness under the previous legal procedure?
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• The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Central Zone "a", Karach vs M/s. Packagesi.PTCL 1992 CL. 426 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Incometax; West Zone, Karachi vs Anwer Ali Haji Noor Mohammad1992 SCMR 458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-02
  income taxpenal interestregistered firmtotal incomenotice of demandassessment orderadvance taxreference to high court
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan resolves appeals arising from a reference under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, addressing two main legal questions concerning income tax assessments. The first question relates to whether the computation of tax under the relevant Finance Act's proviso regarding partner shares in a registered firm requires linking to section 16(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, restricting the meaning of a partner's share. The second question addresses whether a specific order demonstrating the application of mind is a pre-requisite under section 29 for levying and demanding penal interest under section 18-A(8) of the Income-tax Act, or if mere entry in an assessment form is sufficient. The Supreme Court held that the expression "his share" under the Finance Act cannot be artificially restricted by section 16(1)(b), and affirmed that an explicit order reflecting the application of mind by the Income-tax Officer is a mandatory pre-requisite under section 29 before penal interest can be levied and a notice of demand issued. Consequently, the appeals by the Commissioner of Income-tax were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the computation of tax under the relevant Finance Act's proviso regarding a partner's share in a registered firm is to be restricted by the provisions of section 16(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act?
  • Is an explicit order demonstrating the application of mind by the Income-tax Officer a pre-requisite for the levy and demand of penal interest under section 18-A(8) of the Income-tax Act?
  • Does the mere mention of penal interest in an assessment form or notice of demand satisfy the requirement of an order under section 29 of the Income-tax Act?
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• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Zone, Karachi vs Anweraly Haji Noor Mohammad1992 PTD 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-02
  income taxregistered firmpartner share of incomepenal interestadvance taxnotice of demandapplication of mindassessment order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Commissioner of Income-Tax challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh arising from a reference under section 66 of the Income-tax Act. The core legal questions involved were whether the computation of tax for the purpose of the Finance Act's ceiling provisions concerning a partner's share of income from a registered firm should be made without regard to section 16(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, and whether a separate determinative order demonstrating the application of mind is a pre-requisite for the levy and demand of penal interest under section 18-A(8) read with section 29 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the expression 'his share' in the Finance Act's proviso does not carry the restrictive meaning assigned by section 16(1)(b) of the Act, and that the departmental view curtailing it was erroneous. Furthermore, the Court held that a valid order showing conscious application of mind by the Income-tax Officer is a mandatory condition precedent under section 29 for the levy and recovery of penal interest, and mere inclusion in an assessment form or notice of demand is insufficient. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the computation of tax under the relevant Finance Act for a partner's share of income from a firm is subject to the restrictions of section 16(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act?
  • Is an explicit order demonstrating the application of mind by the Income-tax Officer a pre-requisite for the levy and demand of penal interest under section 18-A(8) of the Income-tax Act?
  • Does the mere inclusion of penal interest in an assessment form or notice of demand satisfy the requirement of an order under section 29 of the Income-tax Act?
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• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone "B" Karachi vs Messrs1992 PTD 330 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-16Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone 'C', Karachi vs M/s. M.1992 PTD 30 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-02Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ali And 2 Others vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2130 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-23Read full judgment →
• Waqar Yousuf vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 764 · Sindh High Court · 1982-10-03Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone 'C', Karachi vs Messrs1992 PTD 43 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-02Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone 'B', Karachi vs Messrs1992 PTD 37 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-30Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone 'A', Karachi vs Messrs1992 PTD 35 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-24Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, East Zone. vs M/s. Universal Impex.PTCL 1992 CL. 278 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-16Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone 'B', Karachi. vs M/s.PTCL 1992 CL. 247 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs Messrs Universal Impex1992 PTD 42 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-16Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax South Zone, Shahrah E- KamalK.L.R. 1992 Tax & Custom Cases 93 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Commisioner of Income Tax, Central 'B', Karachi. vs M/s. PhilipsPTCL 1992 CL. 416 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Central Bank of India, Ltd., Lahore vs Messrs Tajuddin Abdur Rauf1992 SCMR 846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-22
  power of attorneyinstitution of suitboard resolutionArticles of Associationdelegation of powersrecovery suitcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal filed by the Central Bank of India Limited against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing its suit for recovery of money on the ground that the suit was not competently instituted by its attorney, Mr. S.K. Shikari, due to the lack of formal proof of a board resolution granting the power of attorney. The core legal question is whether it is necessary to formally prove a resolution of the board of directors authorizing the execution of a power of attorney when the power of attorney itself and the relevant Articles of Association enabling the directors to delegate their powers have been duly established. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that once a power of attorney is proved along with the relevant articles empowering the directors to delegate authority to institute legal proceedings, a separate proof of the internal board resolution granting the power of attorney is not required. The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the trial court, and remanded the matter for disposal on remaining merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether formal proof of a board resolution is necessary when a power of attorney and the relevant Articles of Association empowering directors to delegate authority are proved?
  • Can a trial judge review and re-decide preliminary issues already concluded and decided in favour of a party?
  • Does an attorney have the competence to institute a suit on behalf of a bank in the absence of a separate board resolution authorizing the specific suit, where the general power of attorney and articles permit it?
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• The Burmah Oil PLC and another vs Pakistan State Oil Company Limited1992 CLC 1028 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-18Read full judgment →
• The Bank of Oman Ltd. Employees' Union (Cba) vs Bank of Oman Limited, Karachi1992 PLC 330 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-12-19Read full judgment →
• The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi vs Messrs Lakson1992 SCMR 2323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-16
  Trade Marks Act 1940registration of trade markadvertisement of applicationpreliminary refusalRegistrar discretiondeceptive similarityinviting oppositionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks against a High Court judgment that set aside the Registrar's order refusing the respondent's trade mark registration application and remitted the matter for decision after publication and inviting objections. The respondent had applied to register the mark 'LAKSON CLIPPER', which the Assistant Registrar refused under Sections 8(a) and 10(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, because marks containing 'CLIPPER' were already registered by two separate proprietors. The core legal issue was whether the Registrar properly exercised discretion in prematurely refusing the application at the initial stage without advertising and inviting opposition where identical or similar marks already stood registered in the names of multiple owners. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court established that although the Registrar possesses discretion to refuse an application ex facie, where a mark is already registered by more than one owner, it is inappropriate to reject a subsequent application at the preliminary stage; rather, the application should be advertised to invite objections, thereby preventing multiplicity of litigation and ensuring decisions are made on proper material.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Registrar of Trade Marks refuse an application for registration of a trade mark at the preliminary stage without advertising it for opposition?
  • Whether an application for registration of a trade mark should be advertised and notices issued to existing proprietors when the mark is already registered in the names of two different owners?
  • How must the statutory discretion vested in the Registrar of Trade Marks under the Trade Marks Act, 1940 be exercised when considering ex facie prohibitions at the initial stage?
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• Textile Agents vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1992 PTD 842 · Allahabad High Court · 1990-07-10Read full judgment →
• Terni S.Pa. vs Peco (Pakistan Engineering Company) Ltd.1992 SCMR 2238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-30
  review petitionforeign currency debtrate of exchangeforeign exchange regulationsinterest on decretal amountsubstantive rightscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition filed by an Italian company, Terni S.P.A., seeking review of a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the recovery of dues in US dollars from the respondent, Pakistan Engineering Company Limited. The core legal questions addressed involve whether Pakistani courts can grant a decree in foreign currency or its rupee equivalent calculated at the exchange rate prevailing on the date of actual payment, and the appropriate rate of interest. The majority of the court held that Pakistani courts can grant a judgment for a sum in foreign currency or its Pakistani rupee equivalent. However, regarding the conversion date, the majority held that since the petitioner claimed the rupee equivalent as on the date of the institution of the suit and did not amend the plaint, the conversion rate applicable should be that of the date of the suit. The key principle laid down is that Pakistani courts may award decrees in foreign currency or the rupee equivalent thereof, and procedural rules should not obstruct substantive rights arising from commercial contracts involving foreign currency.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Pakistani courts can grant a money decree expressed in a foreign currency or its Pakistani rupee equivalent?
  • At what point in time should the rate of exchange be calculated for converting a foreign currency debt into Pakistani rupees?
  • Can a decree-holder recover past interest from the date the debt became due to the date of the institution of the suit under the Interest Act, 1839?
  • Do procedural constraints under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, bar the passing of a decree in foreign currency?
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• Tawakkal General Export Corporation Karachi And Other vs Collector of Customs And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 105 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Tawakkal General Export Corporation And Another vs The Collector1992 PLD Karachi 199 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-20
  constitutional petitioncustoms detentionexport quality controlultra viresstatutory interpretationofficial gazette notificationSchedule V commodities
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the detention of export consignments by Customs authorities. The petitioners alleged that the detention of their textile goods for being substandard was mala fide and without jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the respondents possessed the authority to detain these goods under the Export (Quality Control) Order, 1973, and related standards. The Court held that the action taken by the respondents was without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The ratio decidendi is that while the 1973 Order generally prohibited the export of inferior goods, subsequent government notifications, including the 1990 notification, restricted quality control requirements to specific commodities listed in Schedule V. As the petitioners' goods were not included in this Schedule, the respondents lacked the legal basis to initiate detention proceedings. Furthermore, the Court noted that the standards relied upon by the respondents were not properly published in the official Gazette as required by law. Consequently, the petition was allowed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does the general prohibition on exporting inferior goods under the Export (Quality Control) Order, 1973, apply to goods not listed in the subsequent Schedule V notifications?
  • Is a detention of goods by Customs authorities lawful if the standards relied upon for classifying goods as substandard were not published in the official Gazette?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained against an administrative action that is patently without jurisdiction, despite the existence of alternative remedies under the Customs Act, 1969?
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• Tauqeer Akhtar Malik And 2 Other vs The University of the Punjab, Lahore Through Vice Chancellor And 2 Other1992 PLD Lahore 408 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-01Read full judgment →
• Tata Chemicals Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1992 PTD 1529 · Bombay High Court · 1991-04-26Read full judgment →
• Tat Din vs Returning Officer/Assistant Commissioner, Sheikhupura1992 CLC 1009 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-25Read full judgment →
• Tariq Pervaiz vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 955 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-07
  judicial confessionpolice custodyadministration of oathinadmissible evidencemurderacquittalcircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 304, Part I, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, by the trial court, arising from the strangulation death of the deceased. The core legal questions involved the admissibility and voluntariness of the appellant's judicial confession, compliance with mandatory procedural provisions for recording confessions, and the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence connecting the appellant to the crime. The Sindh High Court held that the judicial confession was inadmissible and unreliable because the accused was administered an oath in violation of Section 5 of the Oaths Act 1873, was kept in police custody contrary to law when the confession was recorded, and the Magistrate failed to follow mandatory statutory requirements under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Finding no ocular or incriminating circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the offense, the court laid down that administration of an oath to an accused person rendering a confession is a statutory illegality making the confession inadmissible, and that confessions obtained while the accused remains improperly detained in police custody without adequate reflection time must be rejected. The appeal was accepted and the appellant acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Is a judicial confession rendered inadmissible if an oath is administered to the accused person?
  • Can a judicial confession be relied upon when the accused is kept in police custody at the time of its recording?
  • Does the failure of a Magistrate to comply with mandatory statutory provisions for recording confessions vitiate the confessional statement?
  • Whether information regarding a crime reported by an accused to a police station is sufficient to connect them to the commission of the offense without further corroborative evidence?
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• Tariq Mehmood vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1747 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-31Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood And Another vs The State1992 PLD LAHORE 75 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-10Read full judgment →
• Tariq Ma Hood. vs Muhammad Saleem Qureshi, Additional District1992 CLC 1432 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-19Read full judgment →
• Tariq Alias Baboo vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1575 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-13Read full judgment →
• Tariq Afzal vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1692 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Tariq Adrees vs Syed Rizwan Hussain Bokhari1992 CLC 1731 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-11Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Jamshed and anothers vs Raja Ghulam Haider1992 SCMR 917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-19
  section 12(2) CPCthird party dispossessionrent execution proceedingslimitation act section 14alternative remediesSindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a judgment of the Sindh High Court dismissing an appeal against the refusal of an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. read with Order XXI, Rule 100, C.P.C. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of section 12(2) applications by a third-party intervenor in rent proceedings, the applicability of limitation periods and section 14 of the Limitation Act for prosecuting remedies in wrong forums, and the effect of a pending separate civil suit. The Supreme Court held that while a third party dispossessed in execution of a rent order has a choice of remedies either through a section 12(2) application before the Controller or via a separate civil suit, they can only pursue the one initiated first in point of time, thereby forfeiting the other. Furthermore, the Court held that the High Court appeal was time-barred as the time spent prosecuting an appeal before the District Judge could not be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act due to the absence of a supporting affidavit from counsel detailing a bona fide mistake. The appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation while preserving the intervenor's pending civil suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. is competent by a third party who was not a party to the original rent proceedings?
  • What is the effect of instituting multiple concurrent remedies such as a section 12(2) application and a civil suit by a third party claiming dispossession?
  • Can the time spent prosecuting an appeal before the District Judge instead of the High Court be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act based solely on a generalized plea of legal advice without the counsel's supporting affidavit?
  • What limitation article applies to an application filed under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure?
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• Talib Ali vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 640 · Federal Shariat Court · 1991-12-15Read full judgment →
• Taleh Muhammad vs Fateh Muhammad Khan1992 PLC 396 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-09-05Read full judgment →
• Tajamul Hussain vs Messrs Afghan Carpets (Pvt). Ltd. and others1992 CLC 1646 · Sindh High Court · 1987-02-18Read full judgment →
• Tajamal Hussain and others vs The State and others1992 CLC 1611 · Board of Revenue · 1991-11-05Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad Khan vs Messrs Gul Ahmad Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and another1992 PLC 1149 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-08-12Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad And Another vs Major Abdul Malik And 38 OtherK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 255 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-12Read full judgment →
• Taj Mohammed Alias Tajoo vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 58 · Sindh High Court · 1991-07-01Read full judgment →
• Taj Din vs Lal Din and others1992 CLC 624 · Board of Revenue · 1990-02-28Read full judgment →
• Taj Din vs L.M.C. and others1992 CLC 1256 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-23Read full judgment →
• Tahir Hussain vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 478 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-26Read full judgment →
• Tahir Alias Tahira vs The- State1992 P Cr. L J 1459 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-14Read full judgment →
• T. Stanes and Co. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1992P T D 428 · Supreme Court of India · 1990-12-04Read full judgment →
• Syed Zakaullah Shah vs Mst. Zohra And 3 Others1992 P Cr. L J 360 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-09-28Read full judgment →
• Syed Zafar Ali Shah vs Hamid Khan and 46 others1992 CLC 665 · Bar Council · 1991-10-16
  election petitionPakistan Bar Councilsingle transferable votede facto doctrineelectoral irregularitiesballot secrecystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an election petition challenging the 1990 elections to the Pakistan Bar Council. The petitioner alleged various irregularities, including the improper inclusion of voters, non-compliance with counting procedures, invalid ballot papers due to improper marking, and a misinterpretation of Section 11 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 regarding the electoral system. Additionally, the petitioner challenged the authority of the Returning Officer, the Attorney-General, citing his alleged disqualification. The court held that the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the law. It ruled that minor irregularities in ballot marking did not invalidate the election in the absence of evidence of collusion or breach of secrecy. Regarding Section 11, the court affirmed the practice of an all-Pakistan franchise with provincial seat allocation. Furthermore, the court applied the de facto doctrine to reject the collateral challenge against the Returning Officer’s appointment. The petition was dismissed, establishing that technical deviations that do not undermine the integrity of the electoral process or the secrecy of the ballot do not warrant setting aside an election.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of non-prescribed numerals or additional markings on a ballot paper automatically invalidate the vote in a professional body election?
  • Can the validity of an official's appointment be challenged collaterally in an election petition?
  • Does Section 11 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act 1973 require that votes be counted strictly on a provincial basis rather than an all-Pakistan basis?
  • Are voters who are notified as members of a Provincial Bar Council after the election programme is announced entitled to vote?
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• Syed Umar Daraz Shah vs Director, L.Da. and others1992 CLC 1698 · Lahore High Court · 1991-08-26Read full judgment →
• Syed Syed Ahmad vs The State and another-1992 P Cr. L J 2577 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-22Read full judgment →
• Syed Si ABIfi Abbas Zaidi vs The State1992 CLC 1364 · Board of Revenue · 1991-05-11Read full judgment →
• Syed Shaukat Hussain Gillani vs Abdul Rehman Abbasi and 2 others1992 SCMR 369 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1991-12-14
  civil servicepromotionlocus standiaggrieved personservice tribunalquota exhaustion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, by leave of the Court, was directed against a Service Tribunal judgment that set aside an order of the Secretary Revenue and restored the promotion of respondent No. 1 as Naib-Tehsildar. The appellant, a Qanoongo, challenged the promotion on the ground that it was made without the recommendation of a Departmental Committee and in violation of the applicable service rules. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir observed that the quota for both the Ministerial staff and the Field staff had already been exhausted at the relevant time, meaning neither party could claim promotion as of right. The Court held that under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1975, a civil servant is only competent to prefer an appeal if they are an 'aggrieved person'. To challenge another's appointment, the appellant must prima facie show they had a right or chance to be considered for the post. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant has the locus standi to challenge the promotion of another civil servant if they themselves do not possess a right or qualification to be considered for the post?
  • What constitutes an 'aggrieved person' for the purpose of filing an appeal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1975?
  • Can a civil servant challenge an appointment on the ground of the appointee's disqualification if the challenger is also disqualified or ineligible for the same post?
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• Syed Shahid Hussain Naqvi vs Messrs Fauji Foundation1992 PLC 613 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-03-11Read full judgment →
• Syed Shabih Abbas Zaidi vs Member (Residual Property), Board of Revenue, Punjab and 2 others1992 CLC 535 · Lahore High Court · 1990-10-16Read full judgment →
• Syed Sajid Hussain vs Ch. Muhammad Latif and others1992 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1991-12-12
  civil service promotionframing of rulesaggrieved personlocus standiSelection BoardService Tribunal jurisdictionregular promotionmandatory rules
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals were filed in the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir challenging a decision of the Service Tribunal, which had set aside the promotion of a civil servant to Grade-20 Secretary to the Government on the ground that mandatory departmental service rules setting out qualifications and conditions had not been framed. The core legal questions involved whether a civil servant holding a post outside a specific cadre has locus standi to challenge a promotion to an un-cadred higher post as an aggrieved person, and whether promotions to higher posts can be made without framing statutory recruitment and promotion rules under the governing civil service framework. The Supreme Court, by a majority decision, upheld the Service Tribunal's judgment, declaring that under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules 1977, framing of statutory rules defining qualifications is mandatory before regular promotions can be made. The Court further ruled that where a higher post such as Secretary is not borne on a specific cadre, senior eligible officers considered for the role possess locus standi to challenge non-consideration or defective promotion procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be promoted on a regular basis to a higher post before rules prescribing qualifications and conditions for promotion to that post are framed?
  • Does a civil servant possess locus standi as an aggrieved person to challenge a promotion if their name was excluded from consideration despite eligibility?
  • Does the statutory bar under proviso (b) to Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act apply when an officer's fitness for promotion was never evaluated by the Selection Board?
  • Can administrative instructions issued by a competent authority bind statutory Selection Boards in the absence or supplementation of service rules?
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• Syed Saghir Ahmed Naqvi vs Zia-Ud-Din & AnotherK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 337 · Sindh High Court · 1991-06-25Read full judgment →
• Syed Saghir Ahmad Naqvi vs Zia-Ud-Din and another-1992 P Cr. L J 72 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-10Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ali vs The State-1992 P Cr. L J 828 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-26Read full judgment →
• Syed Saadi Jafri Zainabi vs Land Acouisttion Collector and Assistant1992 PLD Supreme Court 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-15
  land acquisitionadditional compensationamendment of decreeaccidental slip or omissionmandatory provisionexecution of decreecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh which dismissed the appellant's application for the amendment of a decree. The appellant's land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and compensation was ultimately determined by the Additional District Judge. During execution, the appellant sought additional compensation under section 28-A of the Act (added via the Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1984), which was refused as it was not part of the original decree. An application under sections 151 and 152 of the C.P.C. to amend the decree was initially allowed by the District Judge but set aside by the High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether section 28-A is mandatory and whether the omission to grant it constitutes an accidental slip curable under section 152, C.P.C. The Supreme Court held that section 28-A is mandatory in nature and designed to prevent delays in compensation payments, and that where a court unintentionally or inadvertently omits to grant a relief it is bound to award, such an accidental omission can be corrected under section 152, C.P.C. The appeal was consequently allowed and the District Judge's order granting additional compensation was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provision for additional compensation under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act is mandatory in nature?
  • Can an unintentional omission by a court to grant a statutory relief be corrected under section 152 of the C.P.C. as an accidental slip or omission?
  • Whether a party should be allowed to suffer due to the inadvertent mistake or omission of the court in granting a relief it was bound to award?
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• Syed Rashid Ahmed vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 676 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-06Read full judgment →
• Syed Qaim Ali Shah vs The State1992 P Cr.L J 242 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-06Read full judgment →
• Syed Qaim Ali Shah vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 106 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-21Read full judgment →
• Syed Pir Wajayat Shah. vs The State.PTCL 1992 CL. 138 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-04Read full judgment →
• Syed Pir Farooq Shah vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1509 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-10-22Read full judgment →
• Syed Nasir Abbas And 2 Others vs Malik Noor Hussain And Another1992 P Cr. L J 670 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-24Read full judgment →
• Syed Mustafa Kamal Shah and others vs Syed Feroze Shah and others1992 CLC 355 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-06-08
  giftMuslim Lawdelivery of possessionoffer and acceptancetenant attornmentKhasra Girdawarioral giftcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision challenges the appellate judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Charsadda, which set aside the trial court's dismissal of three suits and decreed the plaintiffs' claim for the annulment of oral gift transactions of landed property and joint possession of a one-fourth share. The core legal questions involve whether the essential prerequisites of a valid gift under Muslim Law—specifically offer by the donor, acceptance by the donees, and delivery of possession (actual or constructive, particularly where land is in the occupation of tenants)—were duly fulfilled and proved. The Peshawar High Court held that the ingredients of offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession were not satisfactorily established, noting discrepancies in evidence, lack of personal appearance by one of the donees, and failure to record changes in cultivating possession in the daily diary as required by law. The court affirmed the appellate judgment, dismissing the civil revisions and holding that oral gifts of immovable property require strict proof of declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential requisites for a valid gift inter vivos under Muslim Law?
  • Whether mere entries in the Khasra Girdawari are sufficient to prove constructive delivery of possession of gifted lands in the occupation of tenants without proper attornment and daily diary entries?
  • Can a respondent support an appellate judgment on issues decided against them without filing a cross-appeal or cross-objections?
  • Does the failure of a donee to appear in the witness-wise to support a gift transaction weaken the defense of the said gift?
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• Syed Mustafa Haider vs Provincial Government of PunjabK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 268 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-05Read full judgment →
• Syed Mustafa Haider vs Provincial Government and others1992 CLC 1329 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-05
  constitutional petitionrevenue recordmutationcivil court decreebona fide purchaserreview of mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court seeking to declare certain revenue orders without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The petitioner claimed title to the land in dispute as a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration through a registered sale deed, supported by an ex parte civil court decree. The core legal question was whether revenue authorities could review and cancel a mutation sanctioned on the basis of a binding civil court decree without having the decree itself set aside. The Lahore High Court held that as long as the civil court decree subsists and remains unchallenged, revenue authorities cannot ignore it or nullify its effect through mutation review proceedings. The court laid down the principle that revenue officers are bound by competent civil court decrees and cannot act in derogation of judicial determinations regarding title.

  Questions settled

  • Whether revenue authorities can cancel a mutation sanctioned on the basis of a civil court decree without getting the decree set aside?
  • Is a revenue officer competent to review and nullify the effect of a subsisting civil court judgment and decree?
  • Does a bona fide purchaser acquiring title through a registered sale deed and a civil court decree retain protection against administrative cancellation of revenue entries?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mustafa Haider vs Provincial Government And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 8 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-05Read full judgment →
• Syed Munawwar Ali Zaidi vs Mst. Qaiser Jehan And Another1992 PLD Supreme Court 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-07
  Section 145 Cr.P.C.inherent powers of High Courtpossession disputerevisional jurisdictionmiscarriage of justiceSection 561-A Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the possession of a plot, initially adjudicated by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Following a series of revisional proceedings, the Third Additional District Judge reversed the Magistrate's finding, concluding that the respondent was in possession and had been forcibly dispossessed. The petitioner challenged this decision in the High Court under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the High Court should interfere with the revisional court's findings regarding possession. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court possesses inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, such powers are to be exercised sparingly. The Court affirmed that interference is only warranted when there is a patent illegality or gross miscarriage of justice, not merely because the High Court might reach a different conclusion upon re-appraising evidence. The Court established that in Section 145 proceedings, the criminal court determines possession, while title disputes remain the exclusive domain of civil courts. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 maintainable in the High Court after the remedy of revision under Section 439-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 has been exhausted?
  • Under what circumstances should the High Court interfere with the appreciation of evidence by lower courts in proceedings under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a criminal court have the jurisdiction to determine questions of title in proceedings initiated under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Syed Munawar Ali Zaidi- vs Mst. Qaisar Jahan And Another1992 PLD Karachi 104 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-12
  inherent powerscriminal procedurepossessory disputerevisional jurisdictionappraisement of evidenceabuse of process
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenging an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge reversing the final order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under section 145(6), which had directed restoration of possession to the applicant. The core legal question concerned the maintainability and scope of inherent powers of the High Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. to interfere with concurrent or revisional findings involving the assessment of evidence in possessory disputes under section 145, Cr.P.C. The Sindh High Court held that while the powers under section 561-A are not curtailed by revisional provisions and can be invoked, the High Court as a matter of practice will not interfere with or substitute its own appraisement of evidence unless the finding is patently illegal, results in a miscarriage of justice, or is necessary to prevent an abuse of the process of the court. The court concluded that the primary object of proceedings under section 145 is merely to preserve peace as a stopgap arrangement pending civil adjudication, and dismissed the application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the revisional powers under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 limit the inherent powers of the High Court under section 561-A?
  • Can the High Court reassess or substitute its own appraisement of evidence in an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the primary object of proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Under what circumstances will the High Court interfere with a revisional order under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Syed Munawar Ali Zaidi vs Mst. Qaiser Jahan And AnotherK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 192 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-27Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Ali Hashmi vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1178 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-20Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Abid vs Collector, Lahore and others1992 CLC 2086 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-21Read full judgment →
• Syed Mazhar Hussain vs S.H.O:-1992 P Cr. L J 439 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-30Read full judgment →
• Syed Matloob Hasssan vs Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited, Lahore(K.L.R. 1992 Labour & Service Cases 276) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-23
  workmansalesmanindustrial relationsStanding Orders Ordinanceindividual grievancemaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition which maintained the concurrent findings of the Punjab Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal that the appellant, employed as a salesman by the respondent-company, was not a workman under section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and thus could not maintain a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The core legal question was whether a salesman qualifies as a workman entitled to invoke section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in light of differing precedents. In a split decision, the majority held that because the appellant sought relief for violation of the Standing Orders, he had to satisfy the definition of a workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance, and under the precedent of Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Pakistan Tobacco Company Employees Union, a salesman whose duties are promotion of sales and meeting customers is not a workman. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a salesman employed by a commercial establishment falls within the definition of a workman under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does a worker seeking redress under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, for a violation of the Standing Orders also need to satisfy the definition of a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Whether the duties of a company salesman predominantly involve manual or clerical work so as to qualify as a workman?
  • Does a concurrent finding of fact by the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal regarding the nature of an employee's duties warrant interference by the superior courts?
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• Syed Matloob Hassan vs Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited Lahore1992 SCMR 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-23
  workmansalesmanindustrial relationsstanding ordersindividual grievance petitionmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arose from the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's writ petition, which had maintained concurrent orders of the Punjab Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissing the appellant's grievance petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The appellant, employed as a salesman by the respondent company, was dismissed following a domestic inquiry regarding the loss of company cash during a robbery. The core legal question was whether a salesman qualifies as a 'workman' under the relevant labor statutes so as to maintain a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and whether the ratio of the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Pakistan Tobacco Company Employees' Union or its later decision in Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Conciliator appointed by the Government of Sindh governed the case. By a majority decision, the Supreme Court held that the appellant's duties as a salesman did not predominantly involve manual or clerical work under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and thus he was not a workman entitled to invoke section 25-A for alleged violations of the Standing Orders. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a salesman employed by a commercial company qualifies as a workman under section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can a worker who seeks to enforce rights under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 satisfy the definition of workman solely under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does the definition of workman under section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 supersede or alter the specific manual and clerical work requirements prescribed under the Standing Orders Ordinance for certain remedies?
  • Whether the concurrent findings of fact by labor courts regarding the nature of a specific employee's duties are open to interference in constitutional or appellate jurisdiction?
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• Syed Khurshid Hyder vs Labour Court No: III Karachi Block-6 And 2(K.L.R. 1992 Labour & Service Cases 170) · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-27Read full judgment →
• Syed Khurshid Hyder Rizvi vs Messrs Urdu Academy, Sindh1992 PLC 310 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-11-25Read full judgment →
• Syed Khursheed Haider vs Sindh Labour Court No. III and 2 others1992 PLC 562 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-27Read full judgment →
• Syed Khursheed Haider vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi1992 PLC 654 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-20Read full judgment →
• Syed Khursheed Haider vs Allauddin Khalid1992 PLC 672 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-02-21Read full judgment →
• Syed Kamaluddin Ahmad vs Federal Service Tribunal and others1992 SCMR 1348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-05
  back benefitsservice tribunalcompulsory retirementcivil servantarrears of paydiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the legality of an order passed by the Federal Service Tribunal denying back benefits to an appellant-inspector upon setting aside his compulsory retirement from service. The appellant had been penalized under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 for alleged corruption and misconduct, but the Tribunal allowed his service appeal and reinstated him because direct evidence was missing due to the foreign witness leaving the country. However, the Tribunal withheld his back benefits. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal, upon setting aside a dismissal or removal order, possesses the discretion under Section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 to wholly refuse back benefits or arrears of salary. The Supreme Court held that the power to determine arrears of pay under the second proviso to Section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 is discretionary and includes the authority to completely deny back benefits in appropriate circumstances, particularly where exoneration results from technical grounds or lack of direct evidence rather than a conclusive finding of innocence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal has the power to wholly refuse back benefits when setting aside an order of removal or retirement of a civil servant?
  • Does the second proviso to Section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 authorize the withholding of arrears of pay entirely in appropriate cases?
  • Is a civil servant automatically entitled to back benefits upon being reinstated in service after an impugned departmental penalty is set aside?
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• Syed Izharulhassan Rizvi vs Mian Abdur Rahman and others1992 SCMR 1352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-09
  ejectment petitionlandlord tenant relationshipco-sharerpartition suitestoppelpossessionwrit petitiontitle dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of a writ petition, which originated from an ejectment petition where the tenant subsequently purchased a 7/16th share in the demised property from one of the joint owners and obtained a preliminary decree for partition. The core legal question was whether a tenant, having become a co-sharer, could be ejected by the original landlord, and the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act in such a scenario. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that a co-sharer in possession of joint property cannot be evicted without a final decision in a partition suit determining their claim to the property. It further clarified that the doctrine of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is not exhaustive, and a tenant can plead that the landlord's title has ended or been extinguished subsequent to the commencement of the tenancy.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant who purchases a share in the demised property and becomes a co-sharer be ejected by the original landlord?
  • Does the doctrine of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act prevent a tenant from challenging the landlord's title if it has ended or been extinguished subsequent to the commencement of tenancy?
  • Can a co-sharer in possession of joint property be evicted without a final decision in a partition suit?
  • Is the relationship of landlord and tenant automatically terminated when a tenant acquires a share in the disputed property?
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• Syed Israr Hussain vs Habib Bank Ltd.1992 PLC 1248 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-10-07Read full judgment →
• Syed Iqbal Hussain Shah vs The Revenue Employees Cooperative1992 CLC 1548 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-04Read full judgment →
• Syed Imam vs The District Manager, Karachi Transport1992 PLC 1231 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1992-03-31Read full judgment →
• Syed Ikramuddin Bulki vs Mg. Ishrat Warsi1992 CLC 366 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-19Read full judgment →