Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- Messrs Sindh Small Industries Corporation, Hyderabad vs Muhammad1992 PLC 1061 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-01-31Read full judgment →
- Messrs Service Industries Limited vs Mst. Kulsoom Bai1992 CLC 2165 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against an interlocutory order passed by the VIth Additional District Judge, Karachi, in a pending contempt application. The respondent had filed an application under Order 39, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging that the appellant had disobeyed court orders regarding the inspection of a disputed shop. The trial court, while seized of the contempt application, directed a further inspection of the premises by engineers. The appellant challenged this order, arguing it was extraneous to the contempt proceedings. The High Court examined the maintainability of the appeal and the potential for conversion into a revision petition. The Court held that the impugned order was not appealable as it did not constitute a final decision, and a second appeal is barred under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, the Court determined that the order did not qualify as a 'case decided' under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, thus precluding the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.
Questions settled- Is an order directing a further inspection of property during pending contempt proceedings appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does an interlocutory order that does not finally dispose of the matter in controversy constitute a 'case decided' under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a second appeal be maintained against an order passed in a civil miscellaneous appeal?
- Under what circumstances can the High Court convert a non-maintainable appeal into a revision petition?
- Messrs Sandoz (Pak.) Limited, Karachi vs Bakht Rawan1992 PLC 367 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-09-15Read full judgment →
- Messrs Safura Textile Mills Limited, S.I.T.E., Kotri, District Jamshoro vs Naik Muhammad and another1992 PLC 348 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-08-18Read full judgment →
- Messrs S. Abdulla & Co. vs Collector of Customs (Appraisement), Karachi And 2 Other1992 PLD Karachi 258 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition before the Sindh High Court challenged the customs assessment of imported glazed wall tiles under a Central Board of Revenue notification issued pursuant to Section 25-B of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the notification, which specified a valuation for tiles falling under a particular Pakistan Customs Tariff sub-heading for smaller tiles, applied to the larger tiles imported by the petitioners under a different sub-heading. The Court held that when fixing import values under Section 25-B, the description and specific tariff sub-heading mentioned in the notification govern its applicability, and it cannot be stretched to cover goods falling under distinct tariff sub-headings not specified therein. Consequently, the Court declared the assessment under the said notification to be without lawful authority and directed the customs authorities to assess the value of the imported goods under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969. The key principle laid down is that statutory valuation notifications under Section 25-B must be strictly construed according to the specific tariff headings and descriptions cited.
Questions settled- Does a customs valuation notification issued under Section 25-B of the Customs Act, 1969 apply to goods falling outside the specific tariff sub-heading mentioned in the notification?
- When is the normal price under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969 required to be applied for assessing imported goods instead of a fixed value notification?
- Can a constitutional petition be entertained despite the availability of alternate remedies of appeal and revision when pursuing such remedies would be a futile effort?
- Messrs Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan Ltd., Karachi vs Mehboob Elahi1992 PLC 453 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-03-12Read full judgment →
- Messrs Reliance Corporation, Octroi Contractors vs Messrs United1992 SCMR 2423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Sindh High Court judgment declaring the imposition of octroi duty on electrical compressors by the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation as unlawful. The petitioner, an octroi contractor, argued that item No. 84 of the corporation's Octroi Schedule 'A'—titled "Boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof"—should be interpreted by reference to Chapter 84 of the Harmonized Pakistan Customs Tariff, which includes electrical compressors. The core legal question was whether a municipal octroi notification, which did not explicitly incorporate the Harmonized Customs Import Tariff, could be interpreted by reading the tariff's broad headings into the municipal schedule. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly determined that octroi schedules must be strictly construed. The Court reasoned that because neither the public notice nor the final resolution explicitly linked the octroi schedule to the Harmonized Customs Import Tariff, such external references could not be imported to expand the scope of the tax. Consequently, the Court affirmed that legislation by reference cannot be stretched to include items not clearly specified in the municipal notification, and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Can a municipal octroi schedule be interpreted by incorporating headings from the Harmonized Customs Import Tariff if the notification does not explicitly reference it?
- Does the principle of strict construction apply to the interpretation of items listed in an octroi schedule?
- Can legislation by reference be used to expand the scope of taxable items in a municipal octroi notification?
- Messrs Rehmania Glass Bangle Industries, Hyderabad vs Baboo1992 PLC 785 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-01-31Read full judgment →
- Messrs Rajput Builders and others vs National Security Insurance Co1992 CLC 818 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-17Read full judgment →
- Messrs Pakland Scientific Production vs M/s. Pioneer InsuranceK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 95 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Messrs Pakistan Press International Limited, Karachi vs Mahmood1992 PLC 823 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-10-17Read full judgment →
- Messrs Pakistan National Shipping Corporation vs Messrs United1992 CLC 1071 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-08Read full judgment →
- Messrs Pakistan Machine Tool Factory (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi vs Mirza1992 PLC 868 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-04-29Read full judgment →
- Messrs Pak United Housing Enterprise vs Ramzan and 7 others1992 CLC 1678 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the dismissal of a suit for specific performance of a land sale agreement. The core legal questions concerned whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1908 and whether the subsequent purchasers were bona fide transferees for value without notice under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The Court held that the suit was not time-barred, finding that the respondents failed to prove service of the alleged notice of refusal; newspaper publication alone did not constitute valid service. However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the suit, finding that the subsequent purchaser was a bona fide transferee for value without notice, thus protected under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877. Additionally, the Court observed that the plaintiff’s prolonged inaction demonstrated a lukewarm attitude, noting that even if the limitation issue had favored the plaintiff, the discretionary relief of specific performance would likely have been denied. The judgment affirms that the burden of proving service of notice rests on the party asserting it, and specific performance remains a discretionary remedy.
Questions settled- Does publication of a notice of refusal in a newspaper constitute sufficient service of notice to trigger the limitation period for a specific performance suit?
- Can a court grant specific performance of a contract where the plaintiff has demonstrated a lukewarm attitude toward the transaction?
- What is the burden of proof for a subsequent purchaser claiming to be a transferee for value without notice under the Specific Relief Act 1877?
- Is time of the essence in contracts for the sale of immovable property unless explicitly stipulated otherwise?
- Messrs Pak Towels vs Messrs Style Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and 4 others1992 CLC 1016 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-07Read full judgment →
- Messrs Pacific Multinational (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Inspector General of Police, Sindh Police Headquarters And 2Other1992 PLD Karachi 283 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged the decision of the Government of Sindh awarding a public procurement contract for two helicopters to respondent No. 3 instead of the petitioner, who claimed to be the lowest bidder. The preliminary issue was whether judicial review is maintainable in public tender awards, alongside the substantive issue of whether the government acted arbitrarily by bypassing the lowest financial bid. The Sindh High Court held that while purely contractual obligations are not enforceable under writ jurisdiction, the State must act fairly and non-arbitrarily when exercising administrative discretion in awarding tenders; thus, the petition was maintainable. On the merits, the Court declined to interfere, holding that procurement of sophisticated machinery is not determined solely by the initial price tag. Relevant considerations such as status as an authorized manufacturer's agent, availability of genuine spare parts, warranty administration, technical maintenance, and after-sales support justified selecting respondent No. 3, especially after price adjustments made through undertakings.
Questions settled- Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution maintainable to review arbitrary or unfair administrative action in the award of a government contract?
- Is the government legally bound in all circumstances to award a public procurement contract to the lowest bidder?
- Can technical expertise, warranty administration, and after-sales support from an accredited agent justify awarding a public contract over a lower financial bid?
- Messrs Nursery Cofee House vs Controller, Department of Tourism1992 CLC 2483 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-11Read full judgment →
- Messrs Noor Trading Corporation vs Nanji1992 PLC 620 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-03-09Read full judgment →
- Messrs National Security Insurance Company Limited and others vs Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Limited and others1992 SCMR 718 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from Civil Appeals Nos. 277 and 278 of 1990 before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging a judgment of the Lahore High Court passed in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The respondent-supplier filed a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) against the principal debtors and the guarantor for recovery of funds on the basis of dishonoured cheques and guarantee deeds. The trial court granted both defendants unconditional leave to defend without providing reasons. The High Court modified this order on revision, granting leave subject to depositing the claimed suit amount. The core legal questions pertained to whether summary procedure under Order XXXVII applies to a guarantor who has executed guarantee bonds, and whether an interlocutory order granting leave to defend constitutes a "case decided" under Section 115 C.P.C. The Supreme Court held that guarantee bonds are not negotiable instruments, making Order XXXVII inapplicable to the guarantor, who was entitled to defend unconditionally under ordinary procedure. However, the Court affirmed that an unreasoned interlocutory order passed on no material is revisable as a "case decided" under Section 115 C.P.C., thereby upholding the conditional leave imposed on the principal debtors.
Questions settled- Is summary procedure under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable against a guarantor who executed a guarantee bond rather than a negotiable instrument?
- Does an interlocutory order granting leave to defend under Order XXXVII, Rule 3 of the C.P.C. constitute a "case decided" under Section 115 of the C.P.C.?
- Can the High Court exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C. to interfere with a trial court order that grants unconditional leave to defend without examining the defence or available material?
- Messrs National Industrial Cooperative Finance Corporation vs Soofi1992 CLC 1468 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-18Read full judgment →
- Messrs National Construction Ltd. vs Aiwan 1 10Bal Authority, Lahore1992 PLD Lahore 86 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises out of an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, filed by the appellants against the respondent, Aiwan-i-Iqbal Authority, Lahore, concerning the construction of a building complex and the encashment of a performance and mobilization bond. Along with the main application, the appellants filed a petition under section 41 of the Arbitration Act for a temporary injunction to restrain the respondent from encashing the bond. The trial court dismissed the injunction petition on the ground that no irreparable injury would be caused to the appellants. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that temporary injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, require the satisfaction of three conditions: a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. The Court laid down the principle that in monetary disputes where the amount is easily ascertainable and recoverable upon ultimate success, the element of irreparable injury is absent, thereby disentitling the party to interim injunctive relief.
Questions settled- Whether a temporary injunction can be granted under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the absence of irreparable injury?
- Does the refusal to grant a temporary injunction in a monetary dispute cause irreparable injury when the claimed amount is easily ascertainable and recoverable?
- What are the essential conditions required for the grant of a temporary injunction in proceedings governed by the Arbitration Act, 1940?
- Messrs Nagina Cotton Mills Limited vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1992 PTD 341 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-12Read full judgment →
- Messrs Nadeem & Company and anothers vs Messrs Impex International1992 CLC 1913 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-26Read full judgment →
- Messrs Muzaffar Poultry Farm vs Pakistan Poultry Association, Sindh1992 PLD Karachi 181 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-10Read full judgment →
- Mohammad Jaffer Abbasi vs The Chairman And Other(K.L.R.1992 Labour and Service Cases 39) · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1992-01-08Read full judgment →
- Messrs Muhammad Ishaq & Sons vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Railways Federal Secretariat, Islamabad and another1992 CLC 1515 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, wherein the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the handling of the luggage and parcel contract at Karachi City and from awarding the contract to any third party in violation of departmental policy. The core legal question concerned whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction following the expiry of a railway handling contract. The court held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case for an injunction, noting that the balance of convenience lay with the defendants and that the plaintiff's remedy, if any, lay in a suit for damages for breach of contract. The key principle laid down is that temporary injunctions will not be granted to enforce the renewal of expired commercial contracts or discretionary licenses where adequate alternative remedies such as damages are available.
Questions settled- Whether a plaintiff can obtain a temporary injunction to prevent the awarding of a commercial contract to a third party after the expiration of their own contract?
- Does a licensee have a legal right to compel the renewal of a discretionary contract with a governmental authority?
- Whether an injunction can be granted where the applicant has an alternative remedy to sue for damages in case of breach of contract?
- Messrs Modern Textile Mills Ltd., Tando Jam, Hyderabad vs Muhammad1992 PLC 1131 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-20Read full judgment →
- Messrs Modern Textile Mills Ltd., Tando Jam vs Mubarak Ali and 3 others1992 PLC 1138 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-20Read full judgment →
- Messrs Modern Textile Mills Ltd., Hyderabad vs Rounaq Ali and another1992 PLC 764 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-20Read full judgment →
- Messrs Modern Textile Mills Ltd. vs Mubarak Ali and another1992 PLC 806 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-20Read full judgment →
- Messrs Metro Garments Industries vs Metro Garments Industries1992 PLC 694 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-04-08Read full judgment →
- Messrs Meincke Food Processing Equipment vs Messrs Danish Butter1992 CLC 1132 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges an order passed by a learned Single Judge declining the appellant's application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for the stay of a suit for damages arising out of a contract for the supply and installation of a cookies and semi-hard biscuits manufacturing plant. The core legal questions involved whether a valid arbitration agreement existed between the parties, whether section 34 of the Arbitration Act applied to foreign arbitrations under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, and whether the court could exercise discretion to refuse a stay based on the balance of convenience. The court held that the appellants failed to establish the existence of a binding written arbitration agreement, that section 34 of the Arbitration Act does not apply to arbitrations governed by foreign institutional rules which depart from the Act, and that the balance of convenience heavily favored litigating the dispute in Pakistan where the plant and evidence were located. The court affirmed the impugned order and dismissed the appeal, laying down that the power to stay proceedings under section 34 is discretionary and requires clear proof of an enforceable arbitration agreement.
Questions settled- Whether the existence of a valid written arbitration agreement is a mandatory precondition for staying a suit under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
- Does section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 apply to foreign arbitrations conducted under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce?
- Is the power of the court to stay legal proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 a matter of right or a discretionary power?
- Can a court refuse to stay a suit where the subject-matter and evidence are located in Pakistan and arbitration abroad would be inconvenient and expensive?
- Messrs Mehran Cotton Factory vs Allauddin and another1992 PLC 611 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-01-20Read full judgment →
- Messrs Matin Silk Factory vs Muhammad Wais1992 PLC 678 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-03-26Read full judgment →
- Messrs Market Services (Pvt.) Limited vs Iqbal Javed and 2 others1992 PLC 687 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-01-19Read full judgment →
- Messrs Maniar Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Sindh Industrial Trading Estate1992 CLC 2329 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These constitutional petitions challenge the arbitrary allotment of a storm-water nallah (drainage channel) land by the Sindh Industrial Trading Estate (SITE) to a private party, reducing its width from sixty feet to eight feet and endangering adjacent factories. The core legal questions concern whether SITE is a department of the Provincial Government amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and whether an executive authority can abruptly and arbitrarily depart from a consistent, long-standing policy without rational justification and without affording a hearing to affected persons. The Sindh High Court held that SITE performs essential provincial functions and functions as a department of the Provincial Government, making its executive actions subject to judicial review. The Court ruled that the abrupt allotment of the nallah land, contrary to SITE's own consistent stance for nearly a decade and without rational basis or notice to affected factory owners, was arbitrary, unreasonable, and without lawful authority. The key principle laid down is that executive discretion affecting private rights must be exercised justly, fairly, and reasonably, and public functionaries cannot arbitrarily change settled reasonable policies without adequate recorded reasons and proper hearings.
Questions settled- Is the Sindh Industrial Trading Estate (SITE) amenable to the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Can a government agency or statutory functionary abruptly and without rational justification depart from a consistent, long-standing public policy or stance?
- Does an affected adjoining property owner have the locus standi to challenge the arbitrary allotment of a public nallah land to a third party?
- Are executive decisions of public authorities affecting private rights subject to judicial review for being arbitrary and unreasonable?
- Messrs M.S. Engineering Company vs Muhammad Mushtaq and 2 others1992 SCMR 1294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a tenant, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh upholding an ex parte ejectment order and dismissing its appeal. The dispute arose over a plot of land purchased by the respondents who initiated ejectment proceedings following prior contentious litigation between the parties. An ex parte ejectment order was passed after the petitioner failed to appear. The petitioner contended that it remained uninformed due to improper service, including publication in a newspaper with limited circulation. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that various modes of service had been attempted on at least eight occasions, including registered post, postal certificates, bailiff delivery, and newspaper publication. The Court held that the lower authorities had exhausted all possible means to effect service and that the decision to proceed ex parte was fully justified. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower forums.
Questions settled- Whether an ex parte ejectment order is justified when multiple attempts at service including registered post, bailiff, and newspaper publication have been made?
- Can a tenant challenge an ex parte order of ejectment on the ground of improper service when all modes of service were tried by the court?
- Does a High Court's finding on the sufficiency of service warrant interference by the Supreme Court under leave to appeal?
- Messrs M.S. Engineering Co. vs Muhammad Mushtaq and others1992 CLC 492 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-31Read full judgment →
- Messrs Latif BROTHERSs vs Deputy Collector, Customs, Lahore and others1992 SCMR 1083 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a customs dispute where the appellant imported a consignment of Teak Plywood from Thailand. The Customs Authorities accused the appellant of under-invoicing and misdeclaring the value of the goods under Sections 16, 32, and 156 of the Customs Act, 1969, by comparing the declared price with invoices of similar goods originating from Singapore and other Far East countries. The Deputy Collector ordered confiscation and imposed penalties, which were upheld on appeal and revision, and the High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted the appeal, holding that under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969, the 'normal price' of imported goods must be determined based on the open market price in the country of origin (Thailand) rather than other countries (Singapore). The Court ruled that the onus of proving misdeclaration of value lies on the department, which failed to produce any evidence of the prevailing commercial prices in the country of origin.
Questions settled- Whether the valuation of imported goods under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969, must be determined based on the prevailing commercial price in the country of origin rather than other countries?
- On whom does the onus lie to establish that an importer has made a misstatement or misdeclaration of price under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969?
- Can the Customs Department rely on price lists of similar goods from other countries to prove under-invoicing without first attempting to obtain the price list from the country of origin?
- Messrs Latif Brother vs Deputy Collector, Customs, Lahore And OtherKL.R. 1992 Tax & Custom Cases 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a dispute over the valuation of imported Teak Plywood by the Customs Department. The core legal question was whether customs authorities could reject the importer's declared value and allege under-invoicing based on price lists from countries other than the country of origin, specifically when no attempt was made to verify prices from the country of origin (Thailand). The Supreme Court held that the assessment was arbitrary and legally flawed. The Court ruled that under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969, the "normal price" for customs valuation must be determined based on the open market price in the country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the department to establish misdeclaration, which requires evidence from the country of origin. Consequently, the Court set aside the departmental orders, holding that the authorities could not rely on price lists from third-party countries (e.g., Singapore) to invalidate a declared value without first exhausting efforts to obtain accurate pricing data from the country of origin. The appellant's declared value was upheld.
Questions settled- Can customs authorities reject an importer's declared value based on price lists from countries other than the country of origin?
- What is the legal criterion for determining the 'normal price' of imported goods under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969?
- Does the burden of proof lie with the customs department to establish misdeclaration of value?
- Messrs Lahore Bricks (Pvt.) Ltd. vs S.H.O. and others-1992 P Cr. L J 344 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-12Read full judgment →
- Messrs Kohinoor Trading (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Mangrani Trading Co. and others1992 CLC 1559 · Sindh High Court · 1987-04-15Read full judgment →
- Messrs Karimi Mill Stores vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, East Zone, Karachi1992 PTD 333 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-10Read full judgment →
- Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd.), Rawalpindi vs Messrs National Motors1992 SCMR 1174 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by Messrs Kadir Motors challenges the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing their appeal regarding territorial jurisdiction in a recovery suit. The core legal question involved the interpretation of clause 27 of the parties' agreement conferring exclusive jurisdiction on Karachi Courts, and whether such an ouster of jurisdiction by consent violates section 28 of the Contract Act. The Supreme Court held that where two or more courts have jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure Code, an agreement between the parties to submit their disputes to only one of such courts is valid, does not contravene section 28 of the Contract Act, and is not contrary to public policy. The key principle laid down is that parties may lawfully agree to select a specific forum of competent jurisdiction for their convenience, provided the chosen court already possesses jurisdiction under the law.
Questions settled- Whether an agreement between parties conferring exclusive jurisdiction on one of multiple competent courts violates section 28 of the Contract Act?
- Can parties by mutual consent confer territorial jurisdiction on a court that otherwise possesses no jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure Code?
- Is an agreement restricting the trial of suits to a particular court of competent jurisdiction considered contrary to public policy?
- Messrs Julian Hoshang Dinshaw Trust and others vs Incometax1992 SCMR 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from Constitutional petitions challenging the Income Tax Department's decision to tax dividends distributed to shareholders out of compensation received by a company for the compulsory acquisition of land. The core legal question was whether such dividends, derived from non-taxable capital receipts, retained their character as capital in the hands of the shareholders or became taxable income. The Supreme Court held that the receipts were not taxable. The Court ruled that the nature of a receipt does not change when distributed as dividends; if a sum is a capital receipt in the hands of the company, it remains a capital receipt in the hands of the shareholders. Consequently, such receipts fall outside the definition of income under the Income Tax Act and Ordinance. The Court further clarified that Section 151 of the Income Tax Ordinance, which limits exemptions, is inapplicable because the receipts are not income to begin with, and there is a constitutional bar on taxing capital gains from immovable property. The judgment affirmed that the character of a receipt is determined by its source, not its label.
Questions settled- Does the distribution of compensation for compulsory acquisition of land by a company to its shareholders constitute taxable income in the hands of the shareholders?
- Does the character of a receipt as a capital asset change when it is distributed as a dividend to shareholders?
- Can the High Court exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution in fiscal matters where the authority's position is predetermined by a circular?
- Does Section 151 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, apply to receipts that are fundamentally outside the definition of income under the taxing statute?
- Messrs Johnson and Philips (Pak.) Ltd. vs Syed Tahir Hussain Zaidi1992 PLC 1176 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-08-06Read full judgment →
- Messrs Island Textile Mills Limited vs Ghulam Ahmed1992 PLC 358 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-09-09Read full judgment →
- Messrs Iobal Ghafoor Engineering Works vs Mst. Ghafoor Begum1992 CLC 820 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-12Read full judgment →
- Messrs Inter-Ocean Cargo Services, Karachi vs Federation of Pakistan through Chairman, Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others1992 PTD 1411 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a constitutional petition filed by Messrs Inter-Ocean Cargo Services, Karachi, against the Federation of Pakistan and others, seeking interim relief regarding tax recovery proceedings initiated by the Income Tax Department. The core legal question addressed by the Court was whether interim relief should be granted to the petitioner to restrain the tax authorities from enforcing a tax demand and recovering funds from the petitioner's bank account, specifically where a notice had already been issued to the bank under the relevant tax statute. The Court, following the precedent set in similar matters, held that the department should be restrained from enforcing the demand under Section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. Consequently, the Court ordered that if the department had not yet recovered the funds from the Allied Bank of Pakistan pursuant to the notice issued under Section 92 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, no further recovery action should be taken against the petitioner pending the final adjudication of the petition. The principle established is that interim relief may be granted to stay recovery proceedings even after a notice of attachment has been issued to a third party.
Questions settled- Can the High Court grant interim relief to restrain tax authorities from enforcing a demand under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
- Does the issuance of a notice under Section 92 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, to a bank preclude the court from granting interim relief to the taxpayer?
- Is the department restrained from further recovery action if the amount has not yet been recovered from the bank pursuant to a notice under Section 92 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
- Messrs Industrial Clothings (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs Muhammad Ismail1992 PLC 1079 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-02-12Read full judgment →
- Messrs Ifi'ikhar Brothers vs Trustees of Port of Karachi1992 CLC 2124 · Sindh High Court · 1981-04-22Read full judgment →
- Messrs Home Insurance Co. Ltd., Karachi vs Commissioner of Income1992 PTD 1177 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns four consolidated income-tax reference applications filed by an insurance company challenging the disallowance of provisions for taxation, gratuity, and civil commotion by income-tax authorities for the assessment years 1980-81 to 1983-84. The core legal question was whether, under the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, the assessing officer possessed the jurisdiction to disallow these reserves and provisions, given that previous jurisprudence under the repealed Income-tax Act, 1922, had restricted such interference with accounts approved by the Controller of Insurance. The Court held that the amendment to Rule 5(a) of the Fourth Schedule to the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, introduced by the Finance Ordinance, 1980, significantly altered the legal position. By explicitly including 'any reserve or provision for any expenditure' as items subject to exclusion, the legislature expanded the assessing officer's authority. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, ruling that income-tax authorities are empowered to disallow such reserves and provisions if they are not deductible under the Ordinance, notwithstanding their inclusion in accounts submitted to the Controller of Insurance.
Questions settled- Does the amendment to Rule 5(a) of the Fourth Schedule to the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, by the Finance Ordinance, 1980, empower income-tax authorities to disallow reserves and provisions for expenditure?
- Can income-tax authorities disallow reserves and provisions in the accounts of an insurance company that have been submitted to the Controller of Insurance?
- Is the term 'expenditure' under the repealed Income-tax Act, 1922, equivalent to 'reserve' or 'provision for expenditure' under the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979?
- Messrs Hindustan Sanitary & Drainage Works- vs Shabbir Burhani And 6 Other1992 PLD Karachi 21 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves an application filed by the plaintiff under Order 23 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking to unconditionally withdraw the suit for declaration, injunction, and damages. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff has an absolute right to unconditionally withdraw a suit at any stage and whether the court can compel an unwilling plaintiff to prosecute the proceedings, subject to exceptions where valuable rights have accrued to the defendants. The Sindh High Court held that a plaintiff generally possesses the right to withdraw a suit unconditionally at any stage without requiring court permission, provided no fresh suit on the same cause of action is sought to be brought and no valuable or enforceable independent rights (such as in partition or administration suits, or where preliminary decrees exist) have been created in favour of the defendants. The court laid down that an unwilling plaintiff cannot be forced to continue litigation, and withdrawal is permissible subject to the payment of costs where no prejudice or vested rights of opposing parties are affected.
Questions settled- Does a plaintiff have an absolute right to unconditionally withdraw a suit at any stage of the proceedings?
- Can a court compel an unwilling plaintiff to continue prosecuting a suit against their will?
- What are the exceptions where a court can refuse the unconditional withdrawal of a suit by a plaintiff?
- Does the unconditional withdrawal of a suit preclude the plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit on the same cause of action without court permission?
- Messrs Haroon BROTHERSs vs Drugs Registration Board and another1992 CLC 1017 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition before the Sindh High Court challenged an order of the Assistant Drugs Controller refusing to renew the registration of the drug 'Disflatyl Tablets' under Rule 27 of the Drugs (Licensing, Registering and Advertising) Rules 1976. The respondents contended that the petitioners had an alternate remedy by way of appeal under the Drugs (Appellate Board) Rules 1976. The High Court held that the existence of an alternate remedy does not bar its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution where the impugned order is patently illegal, without lawful authority, or violates natural justice. On the merits, the Court observed that the show-cause notice directed local manufacture, whereas the final registration cancellation was based on different grounds, namely that the drug was adequately manufactured locally and import was not in the public interest. The Court ruled that quasi-judicial orders must be supported by reasons and that changing the grounds of cancellation without specific notice prejudiced the petitioners. The petition was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside.
Questions settled- Does the existence of an alternate statutory appeal bar the High Court from exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution if the impugned order is patently illegal or violates natural justice?
- Is a quasi-judicial authority required to record reasons in support of its decision to cancel or refuse renewal of a drug registration?
- Can a regulatory authority cancel or refuse to renew a drug registration on grounds not specifically and categorically alleged in the preceding show-cause notice?
- Messrs Globe Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi vs Meerzada1992 PLC 447 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a Labour Court order directing the reinstatement of a respondent-workman with full back benefits after his services were terminated. The core legal question was whether the respondent had voluntarily resigned or if the employer had terminated his services without a written order, relying on disputed documents including a resignation letter and a full and final settlement. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the employer failed to prove the resignation was voluntary or that the documents were genuine. The Tribunal found the documents suspicious as they were not produced with the written statement and failed to account for the respondent's Provident Fund and bonus. Furthermore, the employer failed to prove that the contents of the English-language documents were read over and explained to the illiterate respondent. The Tribunal affirmed the principle that the burden of proof lies on the employer to establish the validity of a resignation when challenged, and that documents not produced with pleadings carry diminished evidentiary value. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the reinstatement order.
Questions settled- Does the burden of proof lie on the employer to establish the validity of a resignation when a workman challenges it?
- Can an employer rely on documents in cross-examination that were not produced with the written statement?
- Is a resignation valid if the employer fails to prove that the contents of the document were read over and explained to an illiterate workman?
- Messrs Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah Mills Ltd. vs Barkat Ali and 21992 PLC 1262 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-02-18Read full judgment →
- Messrs Ghandhara Nissan (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others vs Ghulam Rabbani1992 PLC 1245 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-11-21Read full judgment →
- Messrs Ganguli Textile Mills vs Muhmammad Musiitaque and another1992 PLC 517 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1992-01-15Read full judgment →
- Messrs G.E.C. Private Limited, Karachi vs Yaq00b Bhatti1992 PLC 756 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-10-14Read full judgment →
- Messrs Duncan Stratton & Co. vs Messrs N.S. Construction Co. and 21992 CLC 1128 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the Senior Civil Judge dismissing the appellant company's suit for damages for breach of contract regarding the installation of passenger lifts. The core legal question was whether the trial court could dismiss the suit on the ground that it was instituted by a director without an express board resolution, even though no such plea was raised in the written statement, no issue was framed, and the company's Articles of Association were not placed on record. The Sindh High Court held that the question of whether a person is authorized to institute a suit on behalf of a company is a mixed question of fact and law requiring reference to the company's Articles of Association and the leading of evidence, and cannot be determined merely on a stray admission in cross-examination without proper pleadings or issues. The appeal was allowed, the trial court's judgment was set aside, and the suit was decreed in favor of the appellant.
Questions settled- Can a trial court dismiss a company's suit on the ground of lack of authorization of its director where no such plea was raised in the pleadings and no issue was framed?
- Whether the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a company requires the examination of the company's Articles of Association and evidence?
- Can an appellate court uphold the dismissal of a suit based on an unpleaded legal ground that necessitates factual inquiry and evidence?
- Messrs Dawn Sports vs Income Tax Officer1992 PTD 1285 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-29Read full judgment →
- Messrs Daily Mashriq vs Nafees Ahmed Bazmi and another1992 PLC 314 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-12-05Read full judgment →
- Messrs Cyanamid (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi vs Musarrat Gul and another1992 PLC 1237 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1992-03-03Read full judgment →
- Messrs Crescent Garments Industries (Pvt.) Limited vs Miss Shamim1992 PLC 964 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-01-14Read full judgment →
- Messrs Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan Limited, Karachi vs Noor Muhammad Naeem1992 PLC 827 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-05Read full judgment →
- Messrs Colgate-Palmolive (Pakistan) Ltd. vs Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks1992 PLD Karachi 115 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellants, successors to National Detergents Limited, sought registration of the trade mark "DENTAID" for toothpaste and tooth powder in Class-3. The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks refused the application, citing Section 6(1)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, on the grounds that "DENTAID" was a descriptive combination of "Dent" and "Aid" and thus ineligible for registration. The appellants challenged this, arguing they were already registered proprietors of the same mark for other goods and that the Registrar failed to consider the applicability of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, regarding associated trade marks. The High Court held that Section 12 provides a special mechanism for registering associated trade marks, which operates independently of the restrictive criteria found in Section 6. Because the Registrar failed to evaluate the application under the specific provisions of Section 12, the Court set aside the refusal order. The matter was remanded to the Registrar with a direction to reconsider the application specifically in terms of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, and to decide the case afresh in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Does the registration of an associated trade mark under Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, remain subject to the restrictive provisions of Section 6 of the same Act?
- Is the Registrar of Trade Marks required to consider the provisions of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, when an applicant is already a registered proprietor of the same mark for other goods?
- What is the legal effect of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, regarding the registration of trade marks that are identical or nearly resemble existing registered marks held by the same proprietor?
- Messrs Colgate-Palmolive (Pakistan) Ltd. vs Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks1992 PLD Karachi 15 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal was filed under Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act against the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks' rejection of an application for the registration of the trade mark "TIP TOP" in class-3. The Registrar had rejected the application at a preliminary stage, citing potential confusion with existing registered marks like "TOP," "TIP JOB," and "TIP and TOES." The core legal question was whether the Registrar could summarily reject a trade mark application based on similarity to existing marks without first advertising the application and allowing for potential opposition by the proprietors of those existing marks. The Court held that the Registrar erred by deciding the issue of similarity at the preliminary stage. Relying on established precedents, the Court ruled that such questions should be determined only after the proposed mark is advertised and the proprietors of conflicting marks are given an opportunity to oppose the registration. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the Registrar to process the application by issuing notices to the relevant proprietors and proceeding in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Can the Registrar of Trade Marks reject an application for registration at a preliminary stage based on similarity to existing marks?
- Is it mandatory to advertise a trade mark application and invite opposition before determining similarity with existing registered marks?
- What is the correct procedure for the Registrar of Trade Marks when a proposed mark appears similar to existing registered marks?
- Messrs Central Insurance Company Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income1992 PTD 32 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-13Read full judgment →
- Messrs Mumtaz Industries And Other vs Industrial Development Bank1992 PLD Federal Shariat Court 360 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-02-02Read full judgment →
- Messrs Central Cotton Mills Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise &1992 CLC 841 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of eight constitutional petitions challenging demand-cum-show-cause notices and subsequent orders issued by the Customs Department for the recovery of balance customs duty on imported textile machinery. The petitioners had claimed a fifty percent rebate on customs duty under S.R.O. 500(I)/84 dated 14th June 1984, which grants exemptions for machinery not manufactured locally when installed in specified industrial areas. The core legal questions involved whether the show-cause notices fell under section 32(2) or section 32(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 regarding limitation periods, and whether the onus to prove local manufacture lay on the importer or the department. The Sindh High Court held that the cases involving notices issued after six months fell under section 32(3) for inadvertence or error, rendering those notices time-barred and void. However, for the petitions where notices were issued within the six-month limitation period, the court held that the burden of proof to establish eligibility for an exemption lies squarely on the party claiming it. As the department successfully proved that the machinery was locally manufactured, those petitions lacked merit and were dismissed.
Questions settled- Does a short-levy of customs duty resulting from inadvertence or omission fall under section 32(2) or section 32(3) of the Customs Act, 1969?
- What is the limitation period for issuing a demand-cum-show-cause notice under section 32(3) of the Customs Act, 1969?
- On whom does the burden of proof lie when a party claims a tax exemption or preferential treatment under a statutory notification?
- Does the mere mentioning of an exemption S.R.O. on a Bill of Entry constitute an untrue declaration or positive statement bringing a case within section 32(2) of the Customs Act, 1969?
- Messrs Central Cotton Mills Ltd. And Another vs Gulzar Ahmed And 81992 PLD Karachi 29 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal under section 10(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 challenges three interim orders passed by the Company Judge in a winding up petition filed under section 305 read with sections 290 and 152 of the Ordinance. The core legal questions involved the legality of appointing a provisional manager without recording reasons or giving notice under section 325(2), the maintainability of a single appeal against multiple orders passed on different dates, and the validity of issuing ex parte chamber orders directing banks to produce pledged records without hearing the affected company. The Sindh High Court held that while a single appeal against multiple related orders is maintainable where no prejudice is caused, the appointment of a provisional manager and the subsequent ex parte chamber order directing banks to produce records were illegal as mandatory statutory requirements of notice and recording special reasons were violated. The court modified the order to treat the official assignee merely as a commissioner for inventory and set aside the ex parte bank record production order, remanding the applications for fresh consideration after hearing the parties.
Questions settled- Whether a single appeal is maintainable against multiple orders passed on different dates arising out of the same subject matter in a single proceeding?
- Can a provisional manager be appointed in a winding up proceeding without issuing prior notice to the company and recording special reasons?
- Whether an ex parte chamber order directing banks to produce pledged and hypothecated records of a company can be sustained without notice to the company and without urgent extraordinary circumstances?
- Does the appointment of an official assignee solely to prepare an inventory of company assets amount to the appointment of a provisional manager under the law?
- Messrs Burjorjee Cowasjee & Co. vs New Hampshire Insurance1992 CLC 1269 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-08Read full judgment →
- Messrs Bengal Corporation vs Messrs D.D.G. Hansa And 3 Other S Plaint1992 PLD Karachi 75 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-10Read full judgment →
- Messrs Bara Imam Bara Trust vs Messrs Hakim & Co.1992 CLC 2235 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, a Trust, sought the eviction of tenants from commercial premises, asserting a bona fide personal requirement to use the property for religious activities (Imambara) as mandated by a Gift Deed. The tenants contested the applications, citing prior payments of 'Pugree' and denying the necessity of the premises. The Rent Controller dismissed the applications, prompting this appeal. The Sindh High Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the appellant failed to establish its bona fide requirement. The Court emphasized that a landlord’s mere assertion on oath is insufficient; the landlord must provide concrete evidence demonstrating the necessity and suitability of the premises for the stated purpose. The Court noted the appellant failed to explain how the non-adjacent, physically separated premises would function as an annex or accommodate the congregation. Furthermore, while the statutory language regarding eviction is mandatory, it is contingent upon the landlord first proving the grounds for eviction. Consequently, the Court found the appellant’s claim lacked the requisite good faith and factual substantiation, rendering the eviction applications unsustainable.
Questions settled- Is a landlord's statement on oath sufficient to establish bona fide personal requirement for eviction?
- Can a landlord seek eviction for personal requirement even if the premises are not required for day-to-day use?
- Does the payment of 'Pugree' by a tenant prevent a landlord from seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide personal need?
- Is the word 'shall' in Section 15(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 mandatory in a way that removes judicial discretion?
- Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others1992 SCMR 1652 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These civil appeals arose from a High Court judgment concerning constitutional petitions challenging the withdrawal of central excise duty exemptions on sugar production via SROs Nos. 555(I)/89 and 556(I)/89. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed several core legal questions, including the retrospective effect of beneficial notifications, the application of promissory estoppel against executive actions withdrawing tax exemptions, and the interaction between sections 3 and 3-C of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Court held that while notifications impairing vested rights cannot operate retrospectively without legislative sanction, beneficial notifications granting concessions or retrospective adjustments are valid. Under sections 3 and 3-C, excise liability is determined at clearance; however, executive withdrawal of standing representations cannot arbitrarily defeat vested rights acquired by manufacturers acting to their detriment prior to rescission. Promissory estoppel is enforceable against executive authorities unless overridden by a legislative act or when invoking equity is unconscionable. Consequently, the Court remanded matters involving excess production exemptions to the Central Board of Revenue to ascertain production figures and verify if the tax burden was passed on to buyers.
Questions settled- Can the Government retrospectively confer a tax benefit or exemption through an executive notification in the absence of explicit statutory prohibition?
- Whether an exemption granted for a specified period or standing representation creates a vested right enforceable against executive rescission under the doctrine of promissory estoppel?
- Does the determination of the rate of duty at the time of clearance under Section 3-C of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 override a validly accrued vested right of exemption?
- Is a taxpayer entitled to invoke promissory estoppel against the Government if the financial burden of the withdrawn tax concession has been passed on to consumers?
- Messrs Arkways (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan1992 PLD Supreme Court 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against an interim order passed by the High Court in a Regular First Appeal, which stayed the operation of a money decree passed in the petitioner's favour during the pendency of the appeal. The core legal question concerns the propriety of staying the execution of a money decree pending appeal. The Supreme Court held that while the ordinary rule and practice is that the execution of a money decree should not be stayed, recognized exceptions do exist, and the High Court was conscious of both the rule and its exceptions. The Court disposed of the petition by permitting the petitioner to approach the High Court by filing an application for variation of the interim order, either to seek its withdrawal or its substitution with an order safeguarding the petitioner's financial interests should the respondent's appeal fail. The key principle laid down is that although execution of money decrees is ordinarily not stayed, interim orders may incorporate measures to safeguard the decree-holder's interest.
Questions settled- Should the execution of a money decree ordinarily be stayed during the pendency of an appeal?
- Can the High Court make exceptions to the ordinary rule against staying money decrees?
- What remedy is available to a decree-holder when an interim stay of a money decree is granted without safeguarding their financial interest?
- Messrs Alyousuf Baghpati & Co. and anothers vs m.v. Naran and 3 others1992 CLC 833 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-06Read full judgment →
- Messrs Alpha Restaurant, Karachi vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Culture, Archaeology Sports and Tourism, Islamabad and 3 others1992 CLC 1000 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-07Read full judgment →
- Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. vs Messrs Faisal Glass Industries1992 PLD Karachi 94 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-12Read full judgment →
- Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. vs Jan Muhammad Khaskheli and others1992 PLC 462 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-10-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These cross-appeals arise from an order of the Sindh Labour Court No. VII at Sukkur, which allowed a workman's grievance petition and ordered his reinstatement with 25% back benefits. The bank challenged the decision on the ground of limitation and jurisdiction, arguing the employee was not a workman, while the employee appealed for full back benefits. The core legal questions involved whether the Efficiency and Discipline Rules framed under the Wage Commission Award are statutory rules, whether an order passed under non-statutory rules is void, and whether the law of limitation applies to a void dismissal order. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that rules framed under the Wage Commission Award are not statutory and do not supersede the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Consequently, the dismissal order passed without lawful authority was declared void and a nullity in the eye of the law. The Tribunal laid down the principle that no limitation runs against a void order, and affirmed the Labour Court's discretion regarding the award of back benefits.
Questions settled- Are the Efficiency and Discipline Rules framed under the Wage Commission Award considered statutory rules?
- Does a dismissal order passed under non-statutory rules without lawful authority constitute a void order?
- Does the law of limitation run against an order that is void and a nullity in the eye of the law?
- What is the statutory time limit for informing a workman of alleged misconduct under Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
- Messrs Algemene Bank, Nederland N.V. Karachi vs The C.I.T., Central1992 PTD 439 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-16Read full judgment →
- Messrs Alfarooq Builders vs The Federation of Pakistan1992 CLC 2131 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-04Read full judgment →
- Messrs A.B. Food Industries Ltd., Karachi vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, Central Zone 'A', Karachi1992 PTD 945 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Messes Na. Industries, Karachi vs Commissioner of Income Tax1992 PTD 50 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This income tax reference concerns the assessment of an assessee engaged in the ship-breaking business for the assessment year 1977-78. The core legal questions involved whether the Income Tax Officer was justified in his computation method regarding the assessee's original and revised returns, and whether the Appellate Tribunal correctly confirmed additions to the assessee's income concerning unexplained capital and unproved advances. The assessee contended that the assessment should have been based solely on the revised return, while the Department sought to challenge deletions made by the Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals). The Court held that the Income Tax Officer had, in fact, properly considered the revised return, rejecting the assessee's argument that the original return was improperly utilized. Furthermore, the Court determined that the issues regarding the additions of advances were essentially questions of fact rather than law, and thus declined to answer those specific questions. The principle laid down is that where an appellate tribunal has based its final assessment on the revised return, mere reference to an original return in the assessment order does not invalidate the assessment process.
Questions settled- Can an Income Tax Officer refer to an original return if a revised return has been filed?
- Does the confirmation of additions to income based on factual findings regarding unproved advances constitute a question of law?
- Is an application for additional questions in a tax reference maintainable if it is time-barred under Section 66(2) of the Income Tax Act 1922?
- Merck Sharp & Dohme of Pakistan Ltd., Karachi vs Third Sindh Labour1992 PLC 1071 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-02-27Read full judgment →
- Meraj Din anothers vs Kh. Mahboob Elahi and 4 others1992 CLC 2457 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition arises from an ejectment matter where the tenant and alleged sub-tenant challenged an appellate order directing their eviction from a rented Khokha. The core legal questions involve the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship and the validity of findings of fact recorded by the appellate court regarding the execution of a rent-note. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the execution of the rent-note was duly proved by the landlords through attesting witnesses and the scribe, and that the tenant's failure to produce expert evidence to rebut his signatures raised an adverse inference against him. The court further held that a tenant who sets up a false and mala fide plea denying the landlord-tenant relationship is liable to be ejected straightaway, and findings of fact by a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction cannot be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction absent misreading or non-reading of evidence.
Questions settled- Does a tenant have locus standi to challenge the tenancy on the ground that the person who inducted him was not the real owner?
- Whether the failure of a tenant to produce expert evidence to rebut his signatures on a rent-note raises an adverse inference against him?
- Is a tenant who takes a mala fide plea denying the relationship of landlord and tenant liable to be ejected straightaway?
- Can findings of fact recorded by a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction when no misreading or non-reading of evidence is pointed out?
- Memon Medical Society vs Messrs Bantva Housing Enterprises1992 CLC 1093 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-29Read full judgment →
- Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others vs Ramzan Shah and another1992 SCMR 1163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a dispute over the conferment of proprietary rights under the Guzara Scheme, later merged into the Ejected Tenants Scheme. The core legal question was whether a lessee, Kale Khan, who failed to personally cultivate the land due to a trespasser's interference, remained eligible for proprietary rights, and whether the High Court could mandate the allotment of alternate land to a claimant, Ramzan Shah. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision regarding Kale Khan, affirming that a lessee cannot be penalized for failing to cultivate land when prevented by a trespasser, especially when the revenue authorities had previously restored the allotment. Regarding Ramzan Shah, the Court held that the High Court's mandatory direction to provide alternate land was inappropriate as he lacked a legal right to such allotment. Consequently, the Court modified the order to grant the Member, Board of Revenue, discretion to consider providing alternate land. The principle established is that a lessee's failure to personally cultivate land due to circumstances beyond their control, such as illegal dispossession, does not automatically disqualify them from proprietary rights.
Questions settled- Does a lessee's failure to personally cultivate land due to the presence of a trespasser disqualify them from claiming proprietary rights?
- Can the High Court issue a mandatory direction to the Board of Revenue to allot alternate land to a claimant who lacks a legal entitlement?
- Is a lessee entitled to proprietary rights if the revenue authorities have previously restored their allotment despite a breach of cultivation conditions?
- Mehtab Ahmed and anothers vs Government of Sindh through Addl.1992 CLC 986 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-06Read full judgment →
- Mehtab Ahmad vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1660 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-11Read full judgment →
- Mehrab vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 658 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-25Read full judgment →
- Mehr Khan vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 899 · Lahore High Court · 1991-09-10Read full judgment →
- Mehmood Ayyaz- vs Additional District Judge, Chakwal And Other1992 PLD Lahore 441 · Lahore High Court · 1992-05-27Read full judgment →
- Mehmood Armed vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 846 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-21Read full judgment →
- Mazhar Hussain and others vs Karam Hussain and others1992 CLC 590 · Board of Revenue · 1991-02-24Read full judgment →
- Mazhar Au And 2 Others vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 165 · Federal Shariat Court · 1991-08-27Read full judgment →
- Mazhar Ali vs Federation of Pakistan/President of Pakistan through1992 SCMR 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil service appeal, brought under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, arose from the compulsory retirement of the appellant by the President of Pakistan under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. The core legal question was whether a permanent civil servant of a Provincial Government on deputation to the Federal Government retains his lien on his parent provincial post, and whether the Federal Government has jurisdiction to terminate his service or compulsorily retire him. The Supreme Court held that under Civil Services Rules (Punjab) and Fundamental Rules, a permanent civil servant's lien cannot be terminated (even with consent) unless confirmed in another permanent post. Consequently, the appellant remained on deputation and was excluded from the definition of a federal 'civil servant' under Section 2(1)(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. Setting aside the Service Tribunal's judgment and the President's order of compulsory retirement, the Court declared the federal action to be without jurisdiction, affirming the appellant's continued provincial service rights.
Questions settled- Can the lien of a permanent provincial civil servant be terminated without being confirmed in another permanent post?
- Is a provincial civil servant on deputation to the Federal Government a civil servant within the meaning of Section 2(1)(b) of the Civil Servants Act?
- Does the President/Federal Government have jurisdiction to compulsorily retire a provincial civil servant serving on deputation with the Federal Government?
- Maulvi Abdul Qayyum vs Syed Ali Asghar Shah and 5 others1992 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal, brought by a pre-emption decree-holder, arose from a High Court judgment in revision that dismissed his execution petition as time-barred. The trial court had decreed the suit in 1981, which was affirmed in first appeal and subsequently in revision by the High Court in 1986. The appellant filed for execution in 1987, within two months of the revision decision but more than three years after the first appellate decree. The High Court held the execution barred under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, calculating time from the first appellate decree. The Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted the appeal, holding that under the doctrine of merger, the decree of the lower court merges into the decree of the court of last instance, whether affirmed, reversed, or modified. This doctrine applies equally to revisional jurisdiction, which is part of the general appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the right to apply under Article 181 accrues when the revision is decided, making the execution petition timely.
Questions settled- Whether the doctrine of merger applies to a decree affirmed or modified in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
- Does the period of limitation under Article 181 of the Limitation Act for executing a decree run from the date of the appellate decree or the final order passed in revision?
- Does the filing of a revision petition and its subsequent disposal affect the starting point of limitation for the execution of a civil court decree?
- Masud Ahmad and 2 others vs United Bank Limited1992 SCMR 424 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1991-11-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal against a judgment of the High Court which dismissed the appellants' appeal as time-barred. The respondent Bank had obtained a money decree against the appellants, who initially filed an appeal before the District Judge. Realizing that the appeal lay before the High Court due to the pecuniary limits, the District Judge returned the memorandum of appeal, which was subsequently refiled in the High Court after the period of limitation had expired. The appellants sought condonation of delay on the ground that the wrong filing was a bona fide mistake resulting from the erroneous advice of their counsel. The core legal question was whether a mistake of law committed by counsel in choosing a wrong forum constitutes 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that where the statutory provisions regarding jurisdiction are clear and unambiguous, choosing a wrong forum without exercising due care and attention amounts to gross negligence rather than a bona fide mistake, and thus does not constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.
Questions settled- Does section 14 of the Limitation Act apply to civil appeals as it does to civil suits?
- Can the principles of section 14 of the Limitation Act be invoked by analogy to determine 'sufficient cause' under section 5 of the Limitation Act?
- Is a mistake of law or the wrong advice of counsel regarding the choice of forum automatically considered a bona fide mistake sufficient to condone delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act?
- Does the selection of a wrong appellate forum where the statutory provision on jurisdiction is clear and unambiguous constitute gross negligence?
- Master Muhammad Sabir vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 352 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-25Read full judgment →