Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- Mst. Sakina Bibi vs Federation of PakistanK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 83 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-14Read full judgment →
- Mst. Said Khanum vs Munsif Khan And 7 Other1992 PLD Peshawar 71 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-02-09Read full judgment →
- Mst. Sahib Bibi and others vs Lal1992 CLC 807 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition arises from a suit filed by the respondent challenging a registered gift-deed and subsequent mutation of land left by his deceased father, Alawal. The respondent alleged that the gift-deed and its registration were fraudulent, collusive, and forged, executed after Alawal had already died by producing an impersonator before the Sub-Registrar. Both the trial court and lower appellate court concurrently decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, holding the gift-deed and mutation void and ineffective. The Lahore High Court reviewed the documentary and oral evidence, including the death register showing fraudulent overwriting of Alawal's date of death. The High Court affirmed the lower courts' concurrent findings of fact, holding that no presumption of correctness attaches to a registered document when challenged as forged, and the burden of proving genuine execution remains on the beneficiary. Finding no misreading, non-reading, or material irregularity in the lower courts' rulings, the High Court dismissed the revision petition with costs.
Questions settled- Does a presumption of correctness attach to a registered document when its execution is challenged as forged or fictitious?
- On whom does the burden of proof lie when a registered gift-deed is challenged as forged and executed by an impersonator after the alleged donor's death?
- Can a party claiming under a challenged gift-deed rely on the document without examining its scribe or marginal witnesses?
- Mst. Safeena vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 554 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-26Read full judgment →
- Mst. Sabira Sultana vs Zafarullah Khan and another-1992 P Cr. L J 2150 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-20Read full judgment →
- Mst. Sabihia And Another vs Moosa And AnotherK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 155 · Sindh High Court · 1991-06-16Read full judgment →
- Mst. Roheeda vs Khan Bahadur and another1992 SCMR 1036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by leave of the Court challenges the acquittal of respondent Khan Bahadur and his co-accused by the Sessions Judge, Peshawar, which was upheld by the Peshawar High Court, on charges of murder under Section 302/34 PPC. The core legal question involved whether the lower courts misread and ignored material ocular and circumstantial evidence, thereby resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice in acquitting the accused. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts' findings of complete darkness were contrary to the proved facts regarding a lit electric bulb at the scene, and that the ocular testimony was fully corroborated by medical evidence, recoveries of weapons and bullets, and the unexplained long abscondence of the accused. The ratio laid down is that while appellate courts give due weight to a double presumption of innocence in acquittal appeals, the Supreme Court will interfere and set aside an acquittal to avoid a grave miscarriage of justice where the lower courts' findings are based on non-reading or misreading of material evidence, and are artificial or shocking.
Questions settled- When can the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal?
- Does the unexplained long abscondence of an accused serve as corroborative evidence in a criminal trial?
- Whether the presence of a street light or electric bulb at night is sufficient to dispel doubts regarding the visibility and identification of assailants?
- Are heirs of a deceased entitled to file a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal under the relevant laws?
- Mst. Rehmat Bibi and others vs Mst. Jhando Bibi and others1992 SCMR 1510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a suit for specific performance concerning land held under the Well Sinking Scheme. The respondents alleged an oral agreement for the sale of land by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, who had received consideration and transferred possession but died before proprietary rights were conferred. The petitioners, having subsequently obtained proprietary rights, denied the agreement, asserting the respondents were mere tenants. The trial and appellate courts initially rejected the plaint, citing Section 19 of the Punjab Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, which restricts alienation without government approval. The High Court remanded the case, relying on precedent. The Supreme Court examined whether an oral agreement for the sale of such land is enforceable despite the restrictions in Section 19. The Court held that the bar under Section 19 applies to the act of alienation itself, not to the underlying agreement to sell. Consequently, such agreements are enforceable through specific performance once proprietary rights are granted. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the legal prohibition does not preclude the enforcement of agreements made prior to the acquisition of full proprietary title.
Questions settled- Does the prohibition on alienation under Section 19 of the Punjab Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, invalidate an agreement to sell land made before the grant of proprietary rights?
- Can an oral agreement for the sale of land held under the Well Sinking Scheme be enforced through specific performance after the grantor acquires proprietary rights?
- Is the bar against alienation contained in Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act applicable to the agreement to sell itself, or only to the final act of alienation?
- Mst. Razia Pervez And Another vs The Senior Superintendent of Police, .1992 P Cr. L J 131 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition challenged the continuous physical detention of an accused person, Haji Anwarul Hassan, for more than fifteen days by the S.H.O. Police Station Saddar Multan, who repeatedly arrested him in different cases registered at the same police station after the expiry of remand in one case. The petitioners contended that this practice constituted a misuse of legal provisions. The S.H.O. and the Magistrate involved initially tried to justify their actions but ultimately tendered an unqualified apology. The Additional Advocate-General assured the court that no further physical remand would be sought in existing cases and the detenu would be sent to judicial lock-up. The Court disposed of the petition, observing that Sections 54 and 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 were being misused. It was held that an accused required in multiple cases should be deemed arrested in all cases simultaneously, and the maximum physical detention period of fifteen days applies collectively, prohibiting successive arrests or remands in different cases to prolong police custody.
Questions settled- Can an accused person required in multiple cases be successively arrested in each case to prolong physical detention?
- Does the fifteen-day limit for physical detention under Section 167, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, apply to each case individually or to the total period of continuous custody?
- When an accused is arrested in one of several cases registered against them, are they deemed to have been arrested in all such cases simultaneously?
- Is it permissible for police to re-arrest an accused in another case after their release on bail or expiry of remand in a previous case, if all cases were registered at the same police station?
- What is the scope of a police officer's power to arrest without warrant under Section 54, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly when an accused is involved in multiple cognizable offenses?
- Mst. Razia Bibi vs Abdul Ghafoor1992 CLC 1203 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-15Read full judgment →
- Mst. Razia Ball. vs District Judge, Bahawalnagar and 3 others1992 CLC 1981 · Lahore High Court · 1992-04-01Read full judgment →
- Mst. Rashida Bibi vs Liaqat Ali And Others1992 P, Cr. L J 1684 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-09Read full judgment →
- Mst. Rashida Begum vs Assistant Controller, Estate Duty, Karachi1992 PTD 1001 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This reference under Section 59A(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1950, concerns the assessment of estate duty for the estate of a deceased person. The core legal questions involved the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to proceedings initiated after the repeal of the Estate Duty Act, 1950; the validity of such proceedings under the Finance Ordinance, 1982; and the inclusion of gifted properties in the deceased's estate under Section 9 of the Estate Duty Act, 1950. The Court held that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, did not save proceedings initiated post-repeal where no prior proceedings existed. However, the Court affirmed that the Finance Ordinance, 1982, effectively validated these proceedings. Regarding the gifted property, the Court established that Section 9 of the Estate Duty Act, 1950, requires both that the gift occurred within five years of death and that gift tax was unpaid. Since gift tax was paid, the gifted property was improperly included in the estate.
Questions settled- Does Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, save proceedings initiated after the repeal of the Estate Duty Act, 1950, when no proceedings were pending at the time of repeal?
- Do the Finance Ordinance, 1982, and the Finance Ordinance, 1979, collectively validate estate duty proceedings initiated after the repeal of the Estate Duty Act, 1950?
- Can property gifted within five years of death be included in the estate of the deceased under Section 9 of the Estate Duty Act, 1950, if gift tax has been paid on that property?
- Mst. Ramzan Bibi vs Muhammad Boota1992 CLC 2318 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-08Read full judgment →
- Mst. Rajo Mai vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1011 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-01-21Read full judgment →
- Mst. Rajan And Other vs Siraj Din And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 48 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1990-06-19Read full judgment →
- Mst. Rahim Noor vs Mst. Salim Bibi And 2 Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order allowing the amendment of a plaint to correct the plaintiff's father's name. The petitioner argued that the amendment was sought at a very late stage, causing inconvenience and necessitating fresh pleadings and evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the respondent had testified as P.W.4 nearly three years prior, identifying her father as Rahim Bakhsh, and the error in the plaint was attributable to a gross mistake by legal counsel or the trial court. The Court held that technicalities cannot be used to obscure the truth or alter the real parentage of a party, as such an approach is contrary to the interests of justice and the constitutional framework. Affirming the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court ruled that the Code of Civil Procedure does not prohibit late-stage amendments when necessary for justice. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused, as the impugned order was deemed just and proper.
Questions settled- Does the Code of Civil Procedure prohibit the amendment of pleadings at a late stage of the proceedings?
- Can a court allow an amendment to a plaint to correct a party's parentage when the error was caused by legal counsel?
- Should technicalities be permitted to override the determination of the real parentage of a party in a suit?
- Mst. Raheela Sattar vs Government of Punjab Through Secretary, Home1992 P Cr. L J 1703 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Mst. Parveen Khalid vs Tahir Butt, S.I. and 6 others-1992 P Cr. L J 512 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-06Read full judgment →
- Mst. Noor Jahan vs Azmat Hussain Farooqi and another1992 SCMR 876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court addresses whether an advocate's authority to compromise a matter is strictly restricted to the subject-matter of the proceedings and nothing beyond. The appellant challenged a consent order recorded by her advocate in an appeal arising from execution proceedings, wherein she agreed to deposit a monthly amount and produce evidence, contending that the advocate acted without her specific instructions and that the matter of mesne profits was collateral to the main controversy. The Supreme Court held that while an advocate with a general power to compromise has the authority to settle the dispute within the case, such authority does not extend to compromising matters that are collateral or extraneous to the main action without specific instructions. The Court laid down that an advocate's implied or general express authority to compromise is limited to the issues in the action, and a compromise affecting collateral matters will not bind the client unless expressly assented to, particularly where special protection is required for pardanashin ladies or where the consent was given under a misapprehension.
Questions settled- Does an advocate's authority to compromise extend to matters collateral or extraneous to the main subject-matter of the suit?
- Can a client resile from a consent order or compromise entered into by an advocate without specific instructions on collateral issues?
- What is the extent of an advocate's implied or express authority to enter into a binding compromise on behalf of a client?
- Mst. Nisar Fatima vs Member (Consolidation) Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1992 CLC 537 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-06Read full judgment →
- Mst. Naz Bibi vs Khuda Bukhsh and another1992 CLC 104 · Balochistan High Court · 1991-09-24Read full judgment →
- Mst. Nasreen vs S.H.O.1992 P Cr. L J 948 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-24Read full judgment →
- Mst. Nasreen Begum Alias Sakina And Another vs S.H.O., Police Station1992 P Cr. L J 1455 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition was filed seeking the quashment of F.I.R. No. 353/91, registered under Sections 10 and 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, at the instance of the father of petitioner No. 1. The petitioners contended that they had entered into a valid marriage of their own free will, and that the F.I.R. was a mala fide attempt by the father to harass them for marrying against his wishes. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings for abduction and Zina could be sustained when the alleged abductee, a sui juris adult, denied the abduction and affirmed the marriage. The Court held that the F.I.R. was registered with mala fide intent and constituted an abuse of the process of law. The Court quashed the F.I.R., establishing that where a valid marriage is contracted under Muhammadan Law, and the alleged victim denies abduction, criminal proceedings initiated solely to harass the couple are unsustainable and liable to be quashed to prevent the abuse of legal process.
Questions settled- Can criminal proceedings for Zina and abduction be quashed when the alleged victim denies the offense and affirms a valid marriage?
- Does a marriage contracted by a girl who has attained the age of puberty constitute a valid marriage under Muhammadan Law?
- Is an F.I.R. liable to be quashed if it is found to be registered with mala fide intent to harass a couple?
- Mst. Nasiran vs Mst. Rabia and others1992 SCMR 693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-11-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an order denying the petitioner's claim as an informer for the allotment of excess land. The petitioner had initially lodged information under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, leading to a finding by the Additional Settlement Commissioner that the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents had obtained excess land due to a miscalculation by the field staff rather than through fraud. The core legal question concerned whether an informer is entitled to the transfer of excess land when the cancellation is due to administrative miscalculation rather than fraud. The Supreme Court held that under section 2(2) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) (Amendment) Act, 1974, an informer is only entitled to such transfer if the allotment was obtained by fraud or was bogus. The Court thus affirmed the concurrent findings and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Is an informer entitled to the transfer of excess land when the cancellation results from a field staff miscalculation rather than fraud?
- What statutory conditions must be satisfied for an informer to claim excess land under the Displaced Persons laws?
- Mst. Nasim Bibi vs S.H.O., Tandlianwala, District Faisalabad and another-1992 P Cr. L J 1699 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-29Read full judgment →
- Mst. Naseem Khatoon and 6 others vs Mst. Tasneem Farzana1992 CLC 1091 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-10Read full judgment →
- Mst. Najma Qureshi and others vs Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi and others1992 CLC 1639 · Sindh High Court · 1986-05-18Read full judgment →
- Mst. Najma Begum vs Ghulam Rasool1992 CLC 1739 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-15Read full judgment →
- Mst. Musarat Bibi And Another vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 158 · Federal Shariat Court · 1991-10-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants under Section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for allegedly committing Zina. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the prosecution's eye-witness testimony and the procedural legality of the FIR registration process. The Federal Shariat Court held that the prosecution's case was fraught with material contradictions, including discrepancies regarding the site of the incident and the timing of the FIR registration. The Court found the prosecution's reliance on a Murassala drafted outside the police station highly suspicious, noting that such practices allow for police manipulation and are contrary to fundamental principles of justice. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellants, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that the practice of drafting a Murassala before formal FIR registration is dangerous, undermines the integrity of the investigation, and creates a presumption of mala fides, necessitating strict judicial scrutiny of such procedures to prevent fabricated cases.
Questions settled- Does the practice of drafting a Murassala before registering a formal FIR violate fundamental principles of justice?
- Can a conviction for Zina be sustained when the prosecution's evidence regarding the occurrence is riddled with material contradictions?
- Is the registration of an FIR after deliberation and consultation with the police sufficient to cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
- Mst. Mumtaz Bibi And Others vs S.H.O. and others-1992 P Cr. L J 1702 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-06Read full judgment →
- Mst. Mukhtar Begum vs Fida Hussain and another1992 CLC 1314 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-07Read full judgment →
- Mst. Muhammadi Begum vs S. Salauuddin Ahmad1992 PLD Karachi 86 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision application arose from a property dispute between a husband and wife concerning houses in Muslim Town, North Karachi. The core legal question was whether the suit property, purchased and held in the name of the wife, was a benami transaction or her independent property acquired through her own sources. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently found that the husband was the real owner who provided the purchase money and financed the construction, while the wife was merely a benamidar with no independent source of income. Upholding these concurrent findings of fact, the High Court dismissed the revision application, reaffirming that High Courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of subordinate courts under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code unless such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from misreading of evidence. The key legal principle laid down is that a purchase of property in India by a husband in the name of his wife is presumed to be a benami transaction where the source of consideration flows from the husband and the wife lacks independent means, as the English law presumption of advancement does not apply.
Questions settled- Whether a property purchased in the name of a wife by her husband is to be regarded as a benami transaction in the absence of independent sources of income?
- Does the English law presumption of advancement apply to a purchase of property made by a husband in the name of his wife in Pakistan?
- Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact of subordinate courts in civil revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- What are the principal tests for determining whether a transaction is benami?
- Mst. Muhammadi Begum vs S. Salahuddin AhmadK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 220 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-29Read full judgment →
- Mst. Mubarik Bano through Legal Heirs vs Ghaffar Khan and 4 others1992 SCMR 837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Peshawar High Court arising from a suit for redemption of a mortgage. The core legal question concerns whether a mortgagee, whose possession is traceable to a mortgage and who has established the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee, can set up a subsequently acquired share as a co-sharer to resist redemption, and whether they are bound to surrender possession. The Supreme Court held that a mortgagee who entered possession as such cannot set up a subsequently acquired claim to widen the controversy and resist redemption, and any other person claiming a share must enforce it in independent proceedings. The Court laid down the principle that in a simple redemption suit where the mortgagee's initial possession is admitted, the mortgagee must surrender possession, and disputes regarding rival shares should be relegated to separate proceedings rather than encumbering the redemption suit.
Questions settled- Whether a mortgagee whose possession is traceable to a mortgage is bound to surrender possession to the mortgagor upon redemption?
- Can a mortgagee set up a share subsequently acquired during the pendency of a redemption suit as a co-sharer to answer the mortgagor's claim?
- Do persons claiming an interest in a mortgaged property have the right to seek redemption under section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act?
- Mst. Miskina Jan vs Rehmat Din1992 SCMR 1149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arose from the judgment of the Sindh High Court, which dismissed the appellant's First Rent Appeal and maintained the ejectment order passed after striking off her defence for non-compliance with a rent deposit order under section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller should have framed and decided the issue regarding the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties before passing a rent order under section 16(1), particularly when that relationship was bona fide disputed and parallel civil proceedings were pending. The Supreme Court held that in cases where the relationship of landlord and tenant is seriously disputed and complex factual controversies exist concerning the true status of the occupant (such as whether they are a tenant, licensee, or claiming title through a suit for specific performance), the Rent Controller is bound to frame and decide the issue of tenancy first before issuing a rent deposit order under section 16(1). The appeal was accordingly allowed, the impugned orders were set aside, and the case was remanded to the Rent Controller to first determine the question of tenancy.
Questions settled- Whether the Rent Controller is legally bound to frame and decide the issue of the relationship of landlord and tenant before passing a rent order under section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, when such relationship is disputed?
- Can a defense be validly struck off under section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, without first determining a bona fide dispute regarding tenancy?
- Does the pendency of a civil suit for specific performance concerning the disputed property necessitate a preliminary determination of the tenancy issue by the Rent Controller?
- Mst. Mehran vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 518 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-12Read full judgment →
- Mst. Manzoor Mai vs Abdul Aziz1992 CLC 235 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This regular second appeal arose from a suit for declaration challenging the validity of a gift of agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the gift was perfected under Muslim Law through the essential requirements of declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession, and whether the respondent-donor was entitled to discretionary relief despite claiming the gift was a fictitious scheme to deceive consolidation authorities. The High Court held that the gift was valid, finding that the donor’s admissions in mutation proceedings and the attornment of tenants constituted sufficient delivery of possession. The Court emphasized that under Muslim Law, where land is occupied by tenants, a request to them to attorn to the donee is sufficient to complete the gift. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the respondent was not entitled to discretionary relief under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, as he approached the court with "unclean hands" by admitting to a fraudulent scheme. Consequently, the Court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the suit.
Questions settled- Does a request to tenants to attorn to the donee constitute sufficient delivery of possession for a valid gift under Muslim Law?
- Can a party seeking discretionary relief under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 succeed if they admit to a fraudulent scheme to deceive authorities?
- Are findings of fact by lower courts open to interference in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if they are contrary to the evidence and law?
- What is the evidential value of admissions made by a donor in mutation proceedings regarding the completion of a gift?
- Mst. Mahmooda Begum and anothers vs Taj Din1992 SCMR 809 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that set aside an appellate court's decision in a rent eviction matter and remanded the case for fresh adjudication. The landlord had sought eviction, which the Rent Controller granted, but the Additional District Judge reversed this on appeal. The High Court, in writ jurisdiction, set aside the appellate judgment, citing a failure to apply relevant superior court precedents, but did not specify errors in the appreciation of evidence or law. The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot interfere with findings of fact by a tribunal of special jurisdiction merely by observing that certain authorities were not considered. The Court established that for the High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction, it must explicitly identify specific instances of misreading or misappreciation of evidence, or a failure to apply established legal principles. Since the High Court failed to perform this duty, the Supreme Court set aside the remand order and directed the High Court to re-examine whether valid grounds for interference exist.
Questions settled- Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact by a tribunal of special jurisdiction without identifying specific misreading or misappreciation of evidence?
- Is the mere failure of an appellate court to discuss relevant superior court authorities sufficient ground for the High Court to set aside a judgment and remand the case?
- What is the scope of the High Court's authority to interfere with the findings of a tribunal of special jurisdiction in writ proceedings?
- Mst. Laila Bai and others vs Mst. Gul Bano and others1992 CLC 1643 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-25Read full judgment →
- Mst. Kharo and 2 others vs Sher Afzal alias Sheray1992 SCMR 1844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption matter wherein the defendants/vendees challenged the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a court is duty-bound to examine a factual question such as the performance of Talabs even when the counsel for the party has expressly given up that plea during the proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the question of Talabs is essentially a question of fact depending on the circumstances of each case, and it is the will and choice of the defendant/vendee to raise or give up such a plea. The Court ruled that if a party knowingly gives up a factual plea, the court is not under a legal duty to examine it on its own. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, affirming that parties may waive factual contentions based on their assessment of the case's realities.
Questions settled- Is it the duty of a court to examine a factual question regarding Talabs in a pre-emption suit if the party has expressly given up that plea?
- Whether the question of whether requisite Talabs were made is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of each case?
- Can a defendant or vendee choose to give up a plea regarding Talabs in a pre-emption matter?
- Mst. Khanoo alias Khanum vs Mamoon and others1992 CLC 2315 · Lahore High Court · 1988-10-29Read full judgment →
- Mst. Karim Bib! and others vs Khalifa Ali Muhammad and others1992 CLC 1249 · Lahore High Court · 1991-09-09Read full judgment →
- Mst. Karamtay Bibi vs Mst. Alam Bibi and others1992 CLC 596 · Board of Revenue · 1990-12-22Read full judgment →
- Mst. Kapoori and 4 others vs Man Khan and 6 others1992 SCMR 2298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' second appeal in limine, which had challenged concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution of a general power of attorney. The core legal question was whether concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts could be interfered with in second appeal on the premise that the High Court's observations implied improper appraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact, even if they could theoretically lead to a different conclusion upon re-appraisal, cannot be interfered with in second appeal when based on a due appraisal of evidence by the lower forums. The key principle laid down is that a mere observation by an appellate court that a different view of evidence might be possible does not invalidate concurrent factual findings or warrant interference in second appeal unless the findings are shown to be suffering from a legal defect or misreading.
Questions settled- Whether concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts can be interfered with in a second appeal?
- Does an observation by a High Court that a different conclusion might be possible on re-appraising evidence warrant interference with concurrent findings of fact?
- Can a new submission not raised in the lower courts be permitted to be argued for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal?
- Mst. Johar SULTANAs vs Syed Muqaddar Shah and another1992 SCMR 1505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns criminal appeals filed by the State and a private complainant (the respondent's step-sister) challenging the acquittal of the respondent in a criminal case involving allegations of forgery, fraud, and misappropriation. The core legal question was whether the acquittal, upheld by the High Court, warranted interference by the Supreme Court. During the proceedings, the parties, who are closely related, engaged in discussions facilitated by the Court and the Advocate-General. Recognizing the underlying family discord and the potential for a constructive resolution, the parties reached an amicable settlement. The Court accepted this written agreement, wherein the respondent undertook to withdraw all pending criminal and civil litigation initiated against the appellant and her relatives. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeals in terms of the settlement, emphasizing the restoration of amity between the parties over the continuation of adversarial litigation. The holding establishes that in disputes involving family members, the Court may prioritize amicable settlements and the withdrawal of litigation to foster reconciliation, even within the context of an appeal against acquittal.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court dispose of an appeal against acquittal based on an amicable settlement between the parties?
- Is it permissible for parties in a criminal appeal to resolve their dispute through the withdrawal of pending civil and criminal litigation?
- Does the Court have the authority to facilitate a compromise in a criminal case involving family members to restore amity?
- Mst. Jhali (widow) and b others vs Lal Khan and another1992 CLC 2320 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1992-08-08Read full judgment →
- Mst. Jewni And Other vs Karim Bakhsh And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 376 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-03Read full judgment →
- Mst. Janna T Bibi vs The State and others-1992 P Cr. L J 1673 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-24Read full judgment →
- Mst. Jan Begum and 3 others vs Muhammad Ismail and 6 others1992 CLC 187 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1991-10-28Read full judgment →
- Mst. Iqbal Begum through her Legal Heirss vs Muhammad Akbar and 51992 CLC 232 · Lahore High Court · 1991-09-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Mst. Iqbal Begum (predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners) filed a civil suit challenging a land mutation as fraudulent. During the trial, the defendants closed their evidence but later applied to examine additional revenue witnesses (Halqa Patwari and Halqa Girdawar). The trial court dismissed the application, but the District Judge accepted the defendants' revision petition and allowed the additional evidence. The petitioners challenged this revisional order through a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court, primarily contending that an order disallowing or allowing additional evidence does not amount to a 'case decided' under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether an interlocutory order regarding additional evidence constitutes a 'case decided' for the purpose of revision. The High Court held, relying on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Abdul Aziz Shah's case, that an order deciding a matter after judicial consideration amounts to a 'case decided' under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, making the revisional order competent. The court laid down that leave-refusing orders do not constitute binding declared law, and orders on additional evidence are revisable.
Questions settled- Does an order regarding the summoning of additional evidence amount to a 'case decided' within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Whether a decision given by the Supreme Court while refusing leave to appeal can be regarded as a considered judgment setting binding law?
- Is a revisional order passed by a District Judge open to further scrutiny by the High Court under constitutional jurisdiction?
- Can a trial court's order disallowing additional evidence be revised under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Mst. Iqabal Jan vs Mst. Habab Jan and 9 others1992 SCMR 935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal, converted into an appeal, arises from concurrent findings of the lower forums dismissing the petitioner's declaratory suit regarding her inheritance share from her grandfather, Saadullah. The core legal question concerned the extent of inheritance a grandchild is entitled to under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, when the parent predeceased the propositus. The Supreme Court held, following precedent, that a grandchild is not entitled to a greater share than what their parent would have inherited under Islamic law. Consequently, the petitioner was held entitled only to her specific share, while the remaining shares of the predeceased father were distributed among his other legal heirs, rectifying the revenue records accordingly. The key principle laid down is that succession of grandchildren under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 is strictly limited to the share the predeceased parent would have received.
Questions settled- What is the extent of share a grandchild can inherit under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 from the estate of a grandfather?
- Whether a grandchild is entitled to inherit more than what their predeceased parent would have received under Islamic law?
- How are the remaining shares of a predeceased father to be distributed among other Shari heirs?
- Mst. Inayat Bibi Through Legal Heirs vs 1Ssac Nazir. Ullah And 2 Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned the succession to property left by a deceased Christian male, contested between his widow and daughters on one side, and his son and nephew on the other. The case originated from mutation proceedings before Revenue Authorities, which applied customary law under Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act 1872 to exclude female heirs from inheritance, a decision upheld by the High Court in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court addressed whether the Succession Act 1925 altered and abolished customary law regarding inheritance for Christians in the Punjab, and whether female heirs are entitled to inherit under the 1925 Act. Overruling technical objections against the writ petition by invoking its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to enforce fundamental rights and ensure complete justice, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The Court held that the Succession Act 1925 abolished customary succession for Christians in Punjab, and established that Christian female heirs are entitled to their statutory shares alongside male heirs under the Succession Act 1925.
Questions settled- Does the Succession Act 1925 abolish customary law of succession for Christians in Punjab?
- Does Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act 1872 override the statutory scheme of inheritance under the Succession Act 1925 for Christians?
- Are female Christian heirs entitled to inherit property alongside male heirs under the Succession Act 1925?
- Can the Supreme Court exercise its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to protect fundamental property rights of minority female heirs in a mutation matter?
- Mst. Hamida Begum vs Mst. Hussain Akhtar1992 CLC 2515 · Lahore High Court · 1992-09-19Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hameeda Bibi and 3 others vs Member, Board of Revenue and another1992 CLC 1585 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-08Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hajra Bibi And Another vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 796 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-04Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hajiani Momin Bai vs Mst. Razia Sultana1992 CLC 684 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-20Read full judgment →
- Mst. Haideri Begum and others vs Muhammad Aslam Sultan1992 CLC 1255 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-10Read full judgment →
- Mst. Ghulan and others vs Punjab Province1992 CLC 1204 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition arises from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction challenging the resumption of land granted under the Livestock Breeding Scheme by the Collector, Sargodha. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the District Judge subsequently dismissed the petitioners' appeal in limine. The core legal question was whether the appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal on merits rather than rejecting it as improperly constituted due to the absence of the impugned decree. The High Court held that the appellate court should have rejected the appeal as improperly constituted under Order XLI, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, rather than dismissing it on merits. This approach would have preserved the petitioners' right to file a fresh appeal within the remaining period of limitation. Consequently, the High Court set aside the appellate judgment, treating it as a rejection of the appeal, and granted the petitioners liberty to file a fresh appeal accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, to be decided by the appellate court in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Whether an appellate court can dismiss an appeal on merits when it is improperly constituted due to the absence of the impugned decree?
- Does an appellate court have the authority to reject an appeal as improperly constituted instead of dismissing it on merits?
- Is a party entitled to file a fresh appeal if the initial appeal was rejected as improperly constituted?
- Mst. Ghulam Sakina and 4 others vs Nishan and 2 others1992 CLC 87 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 arises out of a partition suit and subsequent appellate proceedings. The core legal question involved whether a memorandum of appeal could be dismissed for a deficiency in court-fee without first determining the exact amount due and affording the appellant an opportunity to make up the deficiency. The Lahore High Court held that a plaint or memorandum of appeal cannot be dismissed or rejected for being insufficiently stamped unless the correct court-fee is determined with exactitude and a reasonable opportunity is given to the party to pay the deficit. The High Court set aside the lower appellate court's judgment and remanded the matter for a fresh decision after proper determination of the court-fee and affording time for its payment.
Questions settled- Can a memorandum of appeal be dismissed for insufficient court-fee without first determining the exact amount payable and affording an opportunity to pay the deficit?
- Does the bar of res judicata and Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to a fresh suit for partition?
- Is the cause of action for a partition suit a recurring one?
- Mst. Ghulam Fatima And Other vs Bashir AhmedK.L.R 1992 Revenue Cases 99 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1989-10-31Read full judgment →
- Mst. Ghulam Fatima and 5 others vs Manzoor Hussain and 5 others1992 CLC 1865 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1992-05-30Read full judgment →
- Mst. Fozia and 6 others vs Messrs Canadian Apparal Company Ltd., Karachi1992 PLC 705 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-01-14Read full judgment →
- Mst. Feroza Hajiani And Another vs Abdul Razzak And AnotherK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 273 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-12Read full judgment →
- Mst. Fehmida Begum vs Muhammad Khalid and another1992 SCMR 1908 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute where a third party (the respondents) filed a civil suit for possession and permanent injunction, alleging that the appellant had fraudulently obtained an ex parte ejectment order under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, and dispossessed them from their property instead of the actual tenant's unit. The core legal question was whether a civil suit by a stranger to the rent proceedings, challenging an ejectment order on the ground of fraud, was barred by Section 12(2) or Order 21 Rules 100 and 103 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), or by Section 22 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the civil suit was competent. The Court ruled that since the C.P.C. does not apply of its own force to rent proceedings, and the unamended Section 22 of the Ordinance did not bar civil suits, a stranger to the rent proceedings who is fraudulently dispossessed has two concurrent remedies: they may either apply to the Rent Controller to recall the fraudulent order or file a separate civil suit in a court of general jurisdiction under Section 9 C.P.C.
Questions settled- Whether a civil suit by a third party challenging an ejectment order on the ground of fraud is barred by Section 12(2) of the C.P.C.?
- Does the Rent Controller have the inherent power to recall or review an ejectment order obtained by practising fraud or misrepresentation?
- Whether a stranger to rent proceedings who is dispossessed by fraud has the option to choose between filing an application before the Rent Controller and instituting a separate civil suit?
- Mst. Fazal Nishan and others vs Ghulam Qadir and others1992 SCMR 1773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a dispute over the inheritance of agricultural land following the death of a widow, Mst. Gouhri, in 1968. The original owner, Suba Khan, died in 1933, leaving the land to his widow and two sons. The central legal question was whether the widow held the land as a limited owner under customary law or merely for maintenance, and how the subsequent enactment of Section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1962, affected the devolution of this property. The lower appellate court and the High Court had previously ruled that the widow held only a maintenance interest, causing the property to revert to the male lineal descendants. The Supreme Court, referencing the interpretation of Section 2-A established in Abdul Ghafoor v. Muhammad Shafi, held that a male heir acquiring land under custom prior to 1948 is deemed an absolute owner under Muslim Shariat Law. Consequently, the estate must devolve upon the heirs of the last male holder according to Islamic inheritance law, rather than customary law, rendering the prior judgments void.
Questions settled- Does Section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1962, retrospectively convert a male heir's customary acquisition of land into absolute ownership under Muslim Law?
- In the presence of male lineal descendants, does a widow inherit a life estate or merely a right to maintenance under customary law?
- Are judgments affirming the rights of reversioners under customary law rendered void by the enactment of Section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1962?
- Mst. Fazal Bibi and others vs Bhikan1992 CLC 1484 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-21Read full judgment →
- Mst. Fatima Bibi vs Muhammad Sadiq and others1992 CLC 1666 · Lahore High Court · 1992-05-13Read full judgment →
- Mst. Dilbar Jan vs Sohrab Khan and 3 others1992 SCMR 743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a dispute over the ownership of property sold by a father (Khadim Hussain) to the appellant (Mst. Dilbar Jan). The respondents, the father's sons, challenged the sale, claiming the property was purchased in their names during their minority and that they were the sole owners at the time of the sale. The core legal question was whether the father, having purchased the property in his sons' names, retained the right to sell it, or if the sale was invalid due to the sons' alleged ownership. The Supreme Court held that the respondents could not approbate and reprobate by claiming the property was purchased with the father's funds while simultaneously asserting exclusive ownership. The Court found the suit to be collusive, noting the respondents' long silence regarding the registered sale-deed and the lack of evidence that they ever exercised control over the property. The Court restored the trial court's judgment, establishing that where a property is purchased in the name of a minor by a father, the father may be treated as the real owner, and the sons are estopped from challenging a sale made with their implied consent.
Questions settled- Can a party simultaneously claim that property was purchased with a father's funds while asserting exclusive ownership of that property?
- Is a son estopped from challenging a property sale made by his father when the property was originally purchased in the son's name during minority but the son remained silent for a significant period?
- Does a father who purchases property in the name of his minor sons retain the right to sell the property?
- Mst. Dilbar Jan vs Khan Muhammad1992 P Cr. L J 683 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was filed by a mother seeking the recovery of her two-year-old son from the custody of her former husband. The applicant alleged that the respondent forcibly removed the child from her custody during the pendency of a maintenance suit. The respondent contested the claim, asserting that the custody was voluntarily transferred to him pursuant to a Jirga decision. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in summary habeas corpus proceedings, could order the restoration of a minor's custody where the legality of the detention is disputed. The Court held that while the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 provides the ordinary forum for custody disputes, the High Court possesses jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to intervene in exceptional cases of illegal or improper detention. Emphasizing that a mother's custody is generally paramount for a child of tender age, the Court allowed the petition, directing the restoration of the child to the mother, while noting that the respondent could pursue a final adjudication before a competent Guardian Judge.
Questions settled- Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to determine the custody of a minor?
- Are proceedings under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 mutually exclusive?
- Does the High Court have the authority to decide disputed questions of fact regarding custody in summary habeas corpus proceedings?
- Is the High Court's order under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding minor custody final or subject to adjudication by a Guardian Judge?
- Mst. Darya Khatoon vs The State1992 MLD 713 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-06Read full judgment →
- Mst. Begum vs S.H.O. -1992 P Cr. L J 1705 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-10Read full judgment →
- Mst. Azra Parveen vs Rana Saeed AhmadPLD1992 Lahore 235 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-17Read full judgment →
- Mst. Asu and 5 others vs Mamun Sadiq and 28 others1992 MLD 705 · Board of Revenue · 1990-06-30Read full judgment →
- Mst. Amiran vs Akbar Ali And 3 Others1992 P Cr. L J 2592 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Mst. Amir Bibi vs Ata Muhammad Khan and 14 others1992 SCMR 553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a suit instituted by an illiterate, dependent sister challenging two sale mutations through which her brother purportedly acquired her inherited agricultural land. The lower courts decreed the suit regarding one mutation on grounds of fraud and lack of consideration, but dismissed the claim regarding the second mutation as barred by limitation and purportedly supported by family advice. The Supreme Court examined whether the lower courts erred in denying relief regarding the second mutation despite finding the brother guilty of fraud in an identical, unified transaction. The Supreme Court held that the brother stood in a fiduciary relationship towards his illiterate, pardanashin sister and bore the burden of proving that the transaction was executed through free will and independent advice. Reaffirming that brothers cannot claim adverse possession against sisters under Islamic principles and that possession of one part of joint property extends to the whole, the Court ruled that neither limitation nor subsequent alienations barred the suit. The appeal was accepted, and the suit was decreed in its entirety.
Questions settled- What is the standard of burden of proof on a male relative in a fiduciary relationship who sets up a transfer of property from an illiterate or pardanashin female heir?
- Whether the failure of dependent female family members to object or testify can be construed as proof of valid consent and independent advice in transactions favoring a dominant male relative?
- Can a brother holding joint family property successfully plead adverse possession or limitation against his co-heir sister under Islamic principles?
- Does lawful possession established over a portion of joint family property extend to the whole joint property to defeat a plea of ouster?
- Mst. Amir Bano and another vs Jan Muhammad and another1992 SCMR 843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This review petition arises from a judgment concerning a pre-emption suit where the petitioners challenged the applicability of the limitation period prescribed under the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The core legal question was whether the suit was governed by the residuary Article 120 of the Limitation Act or by the specific provisions of Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, and whether the sale of the land in question admitted of physical possession. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act is a specific provision that excludes the application of the residuary Article 120. The Court clarified that the two parts of Section 30(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act—relating to the attestation of mutation and the delivery of physical possession—are independent, distinct triggers for the limitation period. Furthermore, based on concurrent findings of lower courts supported by revenue records, the Court affirmed that the land sold was a specific, identifiable portion capable of physical possession, thereby rejecting the petitioners' arguments regarding the nature of the sale and the limitation period.
Questions settled- Does the residuary Article 120 of the Limitation Act apply to pre-emption suits when specific provisions under the Punjab Pre-emption Act exist?
- Are the two parts of Section 30(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, concerning attestation and physical possession, independent triggers for the limitation period?
- Can a sale of a portion of a joint holding be considered a sale of a specific portion capable of physical possession?
- Mst. Am1na Parekh and others vs Ahmed Parekh and others1992 CLC 2492 · Sindh High Court · 1987-01-15Read full judgment →
- Mst. Alam Khatoon and others vs Mst. Alam Khatoon and others1992 CLC 660 · Board of Revenue · 1990-01-30Read full judgment →
- Mst. Aisha and 2 others vs Bahawal1992 CLC 861 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-13Read full judgment →
- Mst. Aimna Bibi and others vs Muhammad Sardar and others,1992 CLC 580 · Board of Revenue · 1990-03-27Read full judgment →
- Mst. Abdara vs Salim Khan And Other1992 PLD Peshawar 98 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-11-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision arose from a suit filed by the petitioner seeking a declaration of title, confirmation of possession, or alternatively, possession of her inherited share in land. The petitioner contended that she inherited the land from her father, but her mother, acting as a de facto guardian, executed a registered sale-deed in 1938 during her minority, which was subsequently pre-empted and eventually sold to the respondents. The core legal questions were whether a Muslim mother is a de jure guardian authorized to alienate a minor's property, and what limitation period applies to challenge such a transaction. The Peshawar High Court held that under Muslim Law, a mother is merely a de facto guardian with no authority to alienate a minor's property, rendering the sale void. However, the Court ruled that a suit to challenge such an alienation by a de facto guardian is governed by Article 144 read with Section 8 of the Limitation Act 1908, prescribing a twelve-year period from the date the petitioner attained majority. Since the petitioner attained majority in 1947 but sued in 1983, the suit was barred by limitation.
Questions settled- Whether a mother under Muslim Law has the legal authority as a de jure guardian to alienate the immovable property of her minor child?
- What is the status of a sale of a minor's property executed by a de facto guardian who has no lawful authority of disposition?
- Which provision of the Limitation Act 1908 governs a suit to set aside an alienation of property made by a de facto guardian, and what is the limitation period for such a suit?
- Does the limitation period under Article 44 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to transfers made by a de facto guardian?
- Mst Amina Bibi Etc vs Muhammad Sardar EtcK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 74 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1990-03-27Read full judgment →
- Mst Alam Khatoon And Other vs Mst. Alam Khatoon Wife of Ghulam AliK.L.R 1992 Revenue Cases 110 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1989-09-26Read full judgment →
- Ms. Benazir Bhutto vs The President of Pakistan and another1992 SCMR 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This transfer application was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan under Article 6-A of the President's Order 17 of 1977 (P.O. 17 of 1977) by a former Prime Minister and Opposition Leader, seeking to transfer three accountability references from a Special Court comprising a Judge of the Lahore High Court to a Special Court in Karachi. The petitioner alleged a reasonable apprehension of judicial bias based on multiple interlocutory orders, including refusal to move proceedings to Karachi, denial of inspection of certain official records, rejection of requests to summon Court witnesses under Section 540 Cr.P.C., and special procedure adopted for recording her statement. The core legal questions centered on whether procedural rulings, prior confirmation of the Judge, or past administrative Press Notes established a 'real likelihood of bias', and the scope of Supreme Court powers under Article 6-A. The Supreme Court dismissed the application, holding that judicial bias must be proved as a matter of fact showing a real likelihood of bias, rather than a mere apprehension or opinion derived from adverse interlocutory orders passed in good faith.
Questions settled- What legal standard must be established to substantiate an allegation of judicial bias against a Judge of a Superior Court acting as a Special Court?
- Does the passing of adverse interlocutory orders against a litigant constitute a valid ground for inferring judicial bias to transfer a case?
- Under what grounds can the Supreme Court exercise its power to transfer a case from one Special Court to another under Article 6-A of President's Order 17 of 1977?
- Is a Special Court obligated under Section 540 Cr.P.C. to summon persons as Court witnesses whenever requested by an accused party?
- Mrs. Zehra Begum vs Messrs Pakistan Burmah Sheell Limited1992 SCMR 943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a landlord's application for eviction under Section 15(2)(viii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, based on personal bona fide need. The core legal question was whether the statutory ground of personal need overrides a subsisting contractual lease agreement that restricts eviction, and whether a landlord can unilaterally repudiate such a contract. The Supreme Court held that the landlord could not invoke personal need to evict the tenant while a valid, subsisting lease agreement remained in force. The Court established that rent laws do not automatically negate valid contractual obligations. Where a landlord has bartered away their right to possession for a fixed period in exchange for valuable consideration, they cannot repudiate that contract at their convenience. The Ordinance recognizes and formalizes tenancy agreements, and personal need cannot be used to bypass valid contractual terms voluntarily accepted by the landlord. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the application was premature, as the landlord's claim for possession in violation of the existing lease agreement failed to satisfy the requirement of good faith.
Questions settled- Can a landlord invoke the statutory ground of personal need to evict a tenant while a valid, subsisting lease agreement is in force?
- Does the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, automatically override the terms of a registered lease deed regarding the landlord's right to evict?
- Is a landlord entitled to repudiate a contractual clog on their right to eviction at their convenience?
- Can a respondent urge the appellate court to maintain a lower court's order on different grounds without filing formal cross-objections?
- Mrs. Shushma vs District Magistrate, Thatta, and others1992 CLC 895 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This consolidated judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses constitutional petitions challenging the cancellation of Domicile Certificates and Permanent Residence Certificates (PRCs) issued to the petitioners. The District Magistrate, Thatta, cancelled the certificates pursuant to directions issued by the Home Department, Government of Sindh, which relied on an inquiry report by the Additional Commissioner. The legal question before the court was whether an administrative authority can validly cancel issued domicile certificates and PRCs at the behest of a superior department without exercising independent discretion and without affording the affected persons a hearing. The High Court held that the District Magistrate failed to apply his independent mind and merely acted under orders from the Home Department. Furthermore, no show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioners prior to cancellation. The Court laid down that orders passed without independent application of mind and in violation of the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) are illegal, without jurisdiction, and of no legal effect.
Questions settled- Is an order cancelling a Domicile Certificate or Permanent Residence Certificate valid if passed without issuing a show-cause notice or providing an opportunity of hearing?
- Can an issuing authority validly cancel a domicile certificate merely on the direction of a superior department without applying its own independent mind?
- Is the principle of audi alteram partem applicable to administrative decisions that adversely affect a party's legal rights even in the absence of an express statutory provision?
- Mrs. Shamshad Anwar vs Lam Ahmed1992 CLC 2077 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-12Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Rafia Ahmed vs Excise and Taxation Officer and others1992 SCMR 1941 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by the property owner challenged a High Court judgment maintaining the order of the Director-General of Excise and Taxation regarding the reassessment of the gross annual rental value (GARV) of a residential bungalow under the Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. The core legal questions centered upon the interpretation of section 9 concerning the amendment of valuation lists, the effect of the proviso to section 5 regarding rent restriction laws, and whether mere changes in rent or use during the currency of a valuation list warrant an enhancement of the GARV. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and held that the assessing authority's power to amend a valuation list under section 9 is restricted and does not permit the continuous or arbitrary enhancement of GARV merely due to rising market rents or a change of use simpliciter, unless authorized by specific statutory grounds such as structural additions, alterations, or destruction. The Court laid down that valuation lists enjoy statutory finality, and while fair rent principles under rent control legislation are relevant considerations, routine rent increases during the validity period of a list cannot be used to reopen and enhance the annual rental value.
Questions settled- Whether the assessing authority can enhance the gross annual rental value of a property during the currency of a valuation list merely due to an increase in market rent?
- Does a change in the use of a building from residential to commercial automatically warrant an increase in its gross annual rental value under section 9 of the Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958?
- What is the legal effect and scope of section 7-A of the Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 regarding the continuance of existing valuation lists?
- Are the principles of fair rent under rent restriction laws relevant when determining the annual rental value of a property for taxation purposes?
- Mrs. Nuzhat Shoukat vs Superintendent, Central Jail, Karachi1992 PLD Karachi 108 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-03Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Naz Shaukat Khan and 3 others vs Mrs. Yasmin R. Minhas and another1992 CLC 2540 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The plaintiffs, residents of a housing society, sought an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from operating a school in a residential bungalow, alleging nuisance and violation of restrictive covenants. The core legal questions concerned whether the school's operation constituted an actionable nuisance, whether neighbors could enforce restrictive covenants regarding residential use, and whether the suit was barred by Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for lack of the Advocate-General's consent. The Court held that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, confirming the interim injunction. It ruled that restrictive covenants limiting land use to residential purposes are enforceable by neighbors if they arise from a common building scheme. Furthermore, the Court determined that a private nuisance causing specific injury to neighbors is actionable independently of public nuisance provisions, meaning the consent of the Advocate-General is not required. The judgment emphasizes that while schools are socially beneficial, they cannot be established in residential areas if they infringe upon the rights of neighbors to peaceful enjoyment of their property, particularly when such use violates established restrictive covenants.
Questions settled- Can neighbors enforce restrictive covenants regarding the residential use of land against another plot holder?
- Is the consent of the Advocate-General required under Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for a suit alleging private nuisance?
- Does the operation of a school in a residential area constitute an actionable nuisance despite the social utility of education?
- What are the criteria for establishing a prima facie case for a temporary injunction in a nuisance dispute?
- Mrs. Naseem Khan , vs Province of Punjab Through Chief Secretary And 3PLD 1992. Lahore 359 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Mrs. Naila Arshad and anothers vs Mst. Qaisara Sheraz Khan and 71992 MLD 683 · Board of Revenue · 1990-02-27Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Maqbool Begum And Another vs The State and 4 others-1992 P Cr. L J 1240 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-17Read full judgment →
- Mrs. M.S. Baroba vs Manzoor Ahmad1992 SCMR 1158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from an ejectment application filed by the respondent-landlord against the appellant-tenant under Section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether a tenant can challenge the bona fides of a landlord seeking possession for personal use when the landlord intends to demolish the existing structure for reconstruction. The Supreme Court held that in proceedings under Section 14, the landlord’s bona fides are not subject to investigation, as the legislature intended to provide a summary remedy for specific classes of landlords. The Court further determined that the pleas of "reconstruction" and "personal use" are not mutually exclusive. It was established that a landlord may seek possession under Section 14 even if the disputed premises are intended to become open space under an approved reconstruction plan, provided the statutory conditions of Section 14 are satisfied. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the landlord's requirement for personal use remains valid despite the proposed demolition and reconstruction.
Questions settled- Can a tenant challenge the bona fides of a landlord in an ejectment application filed under Section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
- Are the pleas of 'reconstruction' and 'personal use' mutually destructive in an ejectment application under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
- Can a landlord seek possession under Section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 if the premises occupied by the tenant are intended to be converted into open space under an approved reconstruction plan?
- Mrs. Farzana Kamran vs District Magistrate, Gujrat And 2 Others1992 P Cr. L J 2336 · Lahore High Court · 1992-07-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged the preventive detention of the petitioner's husband, ordered by the District Magistrate of Gujrat under Section 3 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. The core legal questions involved whether grounds of detention amounting to criminal charges bar preventive detention, whether the detention order was vague, malicious, or passed under dictation, and whether confinement outside the detenu's district violated Section 26 of the Ordinance. The Lahore High Court held that preventive detention can legally be based on conduct that may also constitute a criminal offence, provided the statutory requirements are met. The Court found the grounds specific and unrebutted, the allegations of mala fides unsubstantiated, and noted that a subsequent corrigendum rectifying the place of confinement cured any initial jurisdictional defect under Section 26. The key principle laid down is that the availability of punitive criminal proceedings does not bar preventive detention where information indicates activities prejudicial to public order, and the burden of proving mala fides rests heavily on the petitioner.
Questions settled- Can preventive detention be ordered on grounds that also constitute a criminal charge?
- Whether an initial defect regarding the place of confinement in a detention order can be cured by a subsequent corrigendum?
- What is the standard of proof required to establish mala fides in a preventive detention order?
- Are the grounds of detention considered vague if they specify names, particulars, and incidents relied upon by the detaining authority?
- Mrs. Farzana Kamran vs District Magistrate, Gujrat and 2 others1992 SCMR 2434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which had declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction regarding a grievance raised by the petitioner, Mrs. Farzana Kamran. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to interfere in the matter under its constitutional writ jurisdiction. Upon careful examination of the records and the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court found no evidence of mala fides or any jurisdictional defect in the proceedings below. The Court held that the High Court correctly declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction because the petitioner had an adequate and specific remedy available under the relevant statute to seek the desired relief. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that writ jurisdiction is not to be invoked when alternative, adequate statutory remedies exist and when the impugned order does not suffer from legal infirmity or bad faith. The petition was accordingly dismissed, maintaining the principle of judicial restraint in constitutional matters.
Questions settled- Is the High Court's refusal to exercise writ jurisdiction justified when an adequate alternative statutory remedy is available to the petitioner?
- Does the absence of mala fides or jurisdictional defect preclude interference by the Supreme Court in a matter previously decided by the High Court?
- Mrs. Farida vs Mohsin Tayyabali and others1992 CLC 91 · Sindh High Court · 1987-01-22Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Farida Mirza. vs The Income Tax Officer, P.I.A.Employees Salary Circle I, Zone 'D'Karachi and 3 othersPTCL 1992 CL. 352 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Mrs. Farida Mirza vs The Income Tax Officer, P.Ia. Employees Salary1992 PTD 173 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-14Read full judgment →