Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- Haji Ismail Ibrahim vs Income Tax Officer, Circle W-II, West Zone, Karachi and 2 others1992 PTD 45 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-10Read full judgment →
- Haji Habib & Co.s vs Alpha Insurance Co. Ltd. and 3 others1992 CLC 1586 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-04Read full judgment →
- Haji Faqir Muhammad vs Abdul Razzak And Another1992 PLD Karachi 398 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant instituted an appeal challenging the dismissal of his rent eviction application by the First Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi South. The appellant sought the eviction of respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 on grounds of non-payment of rent, reconstruction, and unauthorized subletting. Respondent No. 2 contested the application, asserting exclusive ownership and possession while denying any tenancy relationship. Two main issues arose: whether the appeal was time-barred due to delays in supplying copying stamps under the Sindh Civil Court Rules, and whether a valid landlord-tenant relationship existed between the appellant and the respondents. The High Court affirmed that the appeal was timely under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908, as no official communication date for copying fees was established under Rule 323(1). On the merits, the Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the burden of proving tenancy rests strictly upon the alleged landlord. Entries in Excise and Taxation Department records and mere ownership or leasehold rights do not ipso facto establish a landlord-tenant relationship without credible, conscious evidence of tenancy.
Questions settled- Can time spent obtaining certified copies be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 where the date of communication under Rule 323(1) of the Sindh Civil Court Rules is not established?
- Does a party have the right to introduce substantive amendments to pleadings without prior leave or permission of the Court?
- Do entries in Excise and Taxation Department records establish the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties?
- Does the mere acquisition of leasehold ownership rights ipso facto create a relationship of landlord and tenant with existing occupants of a property?
- Haji Faqir Muhammad Through His Legal Heirs vs Khuda Bakhsh And Another1992 PLD Karachi 406 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-03Read full judgment →
- Haji Anwarul Haq vs Abdul Jabbar1992 PLC 456 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-03-18Read full judgment →
- Haji Ali Khan and Company, Abbottabad through Managing Director and 8 others vs M_s. Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited1992 CLC 1906 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-05-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment concerns an appeal against a Special Court's decision under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, which refused the appellants leave to defend a loan recovery suit and decreed the claim in favour of the bank. The core legal questions revolved around the justification for refusing leave to defend, the bank's entitlement to charge penal interest, and the legality of charging interest in light of Islamic injunctions and the Constitution. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Special Court was justified in refusing leave to defend as the appellants failed to disclose a plausible defence or triable issues. The Court held that penal interest cannot be charged by the bank without an explicit agreement. It further reiterated that claims for interest under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, are permissible due to the protection afforded by Article 270-A of the Constitution, despite being un-Islamic.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances can a Special Court refuse leave to defend a loan recovery suit filed by a banking company?
- Is the grant of leave to appear and defend a suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 a matter of routine or right?
- Can a banking company charge penal interest on a loan in the absence of an explicit contractual agreement?
- Are the provisions of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979, including the claim of interest, protected by the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan?
- What grounds are permissible for an appeal against a judgment and decree of a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
- Haji Abdullah Jan vs The State Through F.I.A.1992 PLD Quetta 67 · Balochistan High Court · 1992-03-24Read full judgment →
- Haji Abdul Majeed- Sajid vs Sogea (Pakistan Branch), Karachi1992 PLC 1299 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1992-04-23Read full judgment →
- Haji Abdul Majeed and another vs Muhammad Yousuf and others1992 CLC 593 · Board of Revenue · 1991-02-11Read full judgment →
- Haji Abdul Ghafoor vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 941 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-08Read full judgment →
- Hafiz Muhammad Irfan Dar and another vs Ghulam Sabir and others1992 CLC 1717 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-12Read full judgment →
- Hafiz Muhammad Bashir vs Habib Bank Ltd.1992 CLC 1937 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-19Read full judgment →
- Hafiz Laeeq Ahmad and others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner and 21992 SCMR 701 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition regarding the transfer of a shop under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the shop in dispute was part of the property unit previously transferred to the appellant, and whether the High Court erred in refusing to disturb concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that the appeal must fail because the appellant’s original NCH form explicitly stated he was in physical possession of only two rooms, excluding the shop. The Settlement Commissioner’s order had only transferred the portion in the appellant's actual possession. Consequently, the shop was available for transfer to the respondent. The Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction is not the appropriate venue to re-examine disputed questions of fact that have been concurrently decided by competent settlement forums. The principle established is that a transferee under settlement laws cannot claim property beyond what was in their physical possession at the time of transfer, and courts will not interfere with concurrent factual findings absent manifest illegality.
Questions settled- Can a court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities in writ jurisdiction?
- Does a transfer order under settlement laws cover property not in the physical possession of the transferee?
- Is a statement in an NCH form regarding physical possession binding on the applicant?
- Hafiz Abdul Majeed vs Muhammad Y Ounis1992 MLD 82 · Balochistan High Court · 1991-08-18Read full judgment →
- Hafiz Abdul Hadi vs Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Karachi City1992 PLC 698 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-04-02Read full judgment →
- Hada Textile Industries Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1992 PTD 1010 · Calcutta High Court · 1989-05-31Read full judgment →
- Habiburrehman vs Mst. Zeenatunnisa and others1992 SCMR 737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court order that set aside an appellate court's injunction order and restored the trial court's refusal to grant an interim injunction in a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction regarding disputed land. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in vacating the status quo order when the defendants were constructing on the disputed property. The Supreme Court observed that the trial court had already protected the petitioner's interest by stipulating that any construction by the defendants was at their own risk and that no compensation could be claimed if the suit was decreed in the plaintiff's favor. Furthermore, the trial was at its final stage. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was appropriate given the circumstances, particularly as the construction was largely complete and the trial court's original order adequately mitigated potential prejudice. The Court dismissed the petition, directing that any rent generated from the constructed shops be deposited in the trial court pending final adjudication.
Questions settled- Can a court refuse an interim injunction if it directs that construction on disputed land is at the defendant's own risk?
- Is an order restoring a trial court's refusal of an interim injunction sustainable when the trial is at its final stage?
- Should rental income from disputed property be deposited in court pending the final disposal of a suit?
- Habiburrehman alias Rehman alias Raja Bottal vs The State1992 SCMR 1625 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment, which upheld the appellant's conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 while reducing the death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal questions concerned whether the ocular evidence remained credible despite the court disbelieving the complainant's claim regarding his own injuries, and whether the selective acceptance of witness testimony undermined the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court affirmed that the presence of the deceased's sons at the scene was natural, and the injuries sustained by one son corroborated his presence, even if the specific assailant was acquitted. Furthermore, the Court established that statements made by bystanders immediately following an occurrence are admissible under the doctrine of res gestae. Additionally, while abscondence does not prove guilt, it serves as sufficient corroboration of ocular testimony when unexplained. The Court concluded that the prosecution's case was consistent and the conviction was justified based on the overwhelming evidence presented.
Questions settled- Does the acquittal of a co-accused for causing injuries to a witness negate the witness's presence at the scene of the crime?
- Are statements made by bystanders immediately after an occurrence admissible as evidence under the doctrine of res gestae?
- Can abscondence of an accused be used as corroboration for ocular evidence in a murder case?
- Is the testimony of interested witnesses inherently unreliable if their presence at the scene is natural?
- Habibur Rehman vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1551 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-20Read full judgment →
- Habibullah vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2489 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-24Read full judgment →
- Habibullah vs M/s. Gul Ahmed Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi and1992 PLC 466 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-10-23Read full judgment →
- Habibullah and 11 others vs Mst. Shamim Akhtar and 9 others1992 CLC 1567 · Sindh High Court · 1991-06-04Read full judgment →
- Habib vs Noor Ahmad And 4 Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the High Court's acquittal of respondents convicted by the trial court for murder and related offences. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in discarding ballistic evidence due to a six-month delay in sending sealed parcels to the laboratory and whether the ocular evidence was sufficient for conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the acquittal. The Court held that while a delay in sending forensic samples to a laboratory does not automatically invalidate the report unless there is proof of tampering or dishonest investigation, the prosecution's case suffered from multiple infirmities. These included the interested nature of witnesses, unexplained delays in lodging the FIR, and material contradictions in the prosecution's narrative. The Court emphasized that tainted evidence cannot corroborate other tainted evidence. Furthermore, the Court noted that in an appeal against acquittal, the standard of review is more rigid, and no interference was warranted as the High Court's judgment did not suffer from legal infirmity.
Questions settled- Does a delay in sending sealed parcels to a ballistic expert automatically invalidate the forensic report?
- Can tainted evidence be used to corroborate other tainted evidence in a criminal trial?
- What is the standard of review in an appeal against an acquittal?
- Is the testimony of a related witness sufficient for conviction without independent corroboration when the prosecution case has other weak points?
- Habib Ullah vs Zahid and others-1992 P Cr. L J 588 · Lahore High Court · 1991-01-21Read full judgment →
- Habib Bank Ltd., Karachi and another vs Altaf Hussain Qureshi1992 PLC 450 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-03-11Read full judgment →
- Habib Bank Limited vs Reyazokhalid Limited and 3 others1992 CLC 1056 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-26Read full judgment →
- Habib Bank Limited vs Mussadiq Hussain and 2 others1992 PLC 1109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a disciplinary dismissal of a bank employee charged with seven counts of misconduct. While the Labour Court upheld the dismissal, the Labour Appellate Tribunal found only two charges proved. Relying on precedent, the Tribunal set aside the entire dismissal order, reasoning that the failure of some charges vitiated the whole decision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to determine whether the Tribunal was legally obligated to set aside the dismissal entirely or if it possessed the authority to modify the punishment based on the remaining proven charges. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred by applying principles from detention cases to labour disputes. The Court ruled that under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal have the statutory power to examine all facts and vary or modify the punishment. Consequently, the Tribunal is not bound to invalidate the entire order but must determine whether the remaining proven charges justify the original punishment or warrant a lesser penalty, thereby ensuring justice in the circumstances.
Questions settled- Does the failure to prove all charges in a disciplinary proceeding automatically vitiate an order of dismissal?
- Does the Labour Appellate Tribunal have the power to modify or vary a punishment imposed by an employer?
- Can the legal principles governing detention cases be applied to labour disciplinary proceedings?
- What is the scope of the Labour Court's power under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 regarding the determination of facts and punishment?
- Habib Al-Wahab Alkhairi And Other vs Commissioner, Rawalpindi1992 PLD Supreme Court 587 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan where the appellants' Advocate-on-Record (A.O.R.) sought an adjournment due to the absence of the lead counsel. The Court declined the request, emphasizing that established procedures for seeking adjournments via the office were ignored, and that such last-minute requests in open court are inefficient and undignified. The core legal question addressed was whether an Advocate-on-Record is obligated to argue a case in the absence of the lead counsel. The Court held that an A.O.R. has a professional duty to assist and argue the case even if the primary counsel is absent. Upon the A.O.R.'s persistent refusal to argue the case despite being provided with the necessary paper book and given time to prepare, the Court determined that such conduct constituted non-cooperation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution. The judgment reinforces the principle that legal practitioners have a binding duty to facilitate the court's proceedings and that an A.O.R. cannot unilaterally refuse to argue a case to force an adjournment.
Questions settled- Is an Advocate-on-Record obligated to argue a case if the lead counsel is absent?
- Can an appeal be dismissed for non-prosecution if the Advocate-on-Record refuses to argue the case?
- Does the refusal of an Advocate-on-Record to argue a case constitute non-cooperation with the Court?
- H.H. Sri Rama Verma vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1992 PTD 415 · Supreme Court of India · 1990-09-12Read full judgment →
- H Aijaz Nabi Abbasi vs Water and Power Development Authority and another1992 SCMR 774 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a Federal Service Tribunal judgment regarding the removal of a WAPDA employee under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958. The appellant contended that invoking this provision after a prior exoneration constituted double jeopardy and that the Tribunal failed to adequately review the material underpinning the removal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the power conferred by Section 17(1-A) to remove or retire an employee without assigning reasons is distinct from disciplinary proceedings. Consequently, initiating action under this section after a previous exoneration does not amount to double jeopardy. The Court reaffirmed that while the Service Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction to examine both law and facts—including the bona fides of an order—the Authority’s power under Section 17(1-A) is not unbridled. It must be exercised in good faith for organizational efficiency, free from mala fides or bias. As the appellant failed to establish mala fides, the Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, which had already modified the removal to retirement.
Questions settled- Does the invocation of Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, after a prior exoneration in disciplinary proceedings constitute double jeopardy?
- Does the Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to examine the adequacy of material and the bona fides behind an order passed under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958?
- Is the power of the WAPDA Authority to remove or retire an employee under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, an unbridled and arbitrary power?
- Gustasab And 2 Other vs The State1992 PLD Peshawar 154 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-07-03Read full judgment →
- Gulzar vs Additional District Judge1992 CLC 1006 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-15Read full judgment →
- Gulzar Hussain Shah vs Pakistan Industrial Development1992 PLC 850 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-04-10Read full judgment →
- Gulzar Hussain Noon vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 628 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-07Read full judgment →
- Gulzar Ahmad vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1616 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-14Read full judgment →
- Gulzar Ahmad Khan, Senator vs Province of Punjab through Secretary, Cooperative Government of Punjab1992 PLD Federal Shariat Court 538 · Federal Shariat CourtRead full judgment →
- Gulzar Ahmad Khan And 2 Other vs Province of Punjab And Other1992 PLD Federal Shariat Court 535 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-06-30Read full judgment →
- Gulzaman Khan vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1635 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-03-18Read full judgment →
- Gulzada vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 631 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-05Read full judgment →
- Gulzada vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 444 · Lahore High Court · 1991-01-05Read full judgment →
- Gulshan Spinning Mills Limited vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 3 others1992 CLC 1579 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-08Read full judgment →
- Gullat Shah vs The State1992 SCMR 1424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by leave of the Court arose from a triple murder case wherein the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the sustainability of the conviction in light of discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence regarding the number of fire-arm injuries, the effect of proved enmity, and the grant of mitigating reliefs such as concurrent sentences and the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on merits while allowing the appellant the benefit of preserving any rights regarding a previous amnesty of 1988 that reduced death sentences to life imprisonment, while refusing concurrent running of sentences and the benefit of Section 382-B due to a lack of mitigating circumstances. The key principle laid down is that where a death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment, sections 35(1) and 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are not attracted to make multiple life sentences run concurrently.
Questions settled- Whether multiple sentences of life imprisonment can be ordered to run concurrently when a death sentence has been commuted?
- Is a convict entitled to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without mitigating features?
- Whether discrepancies between single-shot allegations in the FIR and multiple injuries in medical evidence support a defence version?
- Guljehan And Another vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 47 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Gulistan vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2383 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-05-10Read full judgment →
- Gulbat Khan vs Water and Power Development Authority through its1992 SCMR 1789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the Federal Service Tribunal's dismissal of the appellant's service appeal as time-barred. The appellant, a WAPDA employee, was removed from service and subsequently filed a departmental appeal, followed by an appeal to the Tribunal after 90 days passed without a decision. The Tribunal held the appeal time-barred, reasoning that no departmental remedy existed for the removal order, thus time spent pursuing it could not be excluded from the limitation period. The Supreme Court addressed whether WAPDA employees, deemed civil servants under the Service Tribunals Act, could invoke Section 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, to make a representation. The Court held that the broader interpretation applies: WAPDA employees must exhaust departmental remedies (representation) before approaching the Tribunal. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a departmental appeal filed by an employee should be treated as a representation under Section 22 if the authority fails to process it correctly. Consequently, the appellant's appeal was deemed within time, the Tribunal's order was set aside, and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication.
Questions settled- Are WAPDA employees deemed civil servants for the purpose of exhausting departmental remedies under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
- Can a departmental appeal filed by a civil servant be treated as a representation under Section 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
- Is the exhaustion of departmental remedies a condition precedent for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
- Does the time spent pursuing a departmental representation count towards the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
- Gulab vs Mst. Malkani1992 CLC 2123 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This review petition was filed seeking review of a judgment dated 10-9-1988 dismissing a Regular Second Appeal based on the precedent in Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287). The core legal question was whether the ratio of Sardar Ali's case applied to a matter where a decree had already been passed prior to the crucial date. The Lahore High Court held that since the pre-emption suit was decreed on 22-12-1965, prior to the crucial date of 31-7-1986, it was not a 'no decree' case and the appeal must be disposed of on merits. The Court also accepted the explanation for the delay in filing the review application as the factual position regarding lack of knowledge was uncontroverted, condoned the delay, accepted the review application, and restored the Regular Second Appeal to its original number for disposal according to law.
Questions settled- Does the rule in Sardar Ali and others v. Muhammad Ali and others PLD 1988 SC 287 apply to pre-emption suits where a decree was passed prior to the crucial date?
- Can delay in filing a review application be condoned when the applicant lacks knowledge of the dismissal and the opposing party files no counter-affidavit?
- What is the legal effect on an appeal when it is incorrectly dismissed on the premise of being a 'no decree' case?
- Gulab Sher And Others vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1835 · Federal Shariat CourtRead full judgment →
- Gul Wazir vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2631 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-06-30Read full judgment →
- Gul Sher vs Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Sukkur and 12 others1992 PLC 1090 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal against the order of the Sindh Labour Court dismissing the appellant school teacher's grievance petition challenging the revision of a seniority list. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant was a workman entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and whether the revised seniority list issued without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant was sustainable. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that a school teacher qualifies as a workman and that revising a seniority list adversely affecting an employee without providing an opportunity of being heard violates the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned orders setting aside the seniority revision were passed with the observation that any future revision must comply with the principles of natural justice.
Questions settled- Whether a school teacher is a workman under labour laws?
- Does the revision of a seniority list adverse to an employee require an opportunity of being heard under the principles of natural justice?
- Can a provisional seniority list be revised without issuing notice to the affected employee?
- Gul Raza vs The State and 2 others-1992 P Cr. L J 414 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-09-20Read full judgment →
- Gul Mt 1Hammad vs Agricultural Engineer, Agricultural Engineering1992 PLC 1304 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1992-06-03Read full judgment →
- Gul Jehan And Another vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 47 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1990-01-01Read full judgment →
- Gul Hassan vs Kadir Bux And Others1992 P Cr. L J 2021 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-17Read full judgment →
- Gul Faraz Khan And 2 Others vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1133 · Sindh High Court · 1991-06-16Read full judgment →
- Gul Bahar vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1645 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-14Read full judgment →
- Gul Akber vs Messrs General Tyre and Rubber Company of Pakistan Ltd1992 PLC 373 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-10-15Read full judgment →
- Gul Afzal vs The State1992 PLD Peshawar 125 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-01-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This bail application arises from a criminal case where the petitioner, charged with attempted murder and causing grievous hurt via firearm, sought release after eight months of abscondence. The core legal question concerns whether an accused who has remained a fugitive from law for a significant duration is entitled to bail, particularly when the offense involves effective firing and a clear motive, notwithstanding arguments regarding sentencing anomalies in the relevant statutes. The Court held that unexplained abscondence constitutes a significant factor that cautions the Court against granting bail, as it reflects misconduct. While abscondence is not an absolute bar to bail if the case falls under specific statutory exceptions—such as being a woman, child, sick, or where there are no reasonable grounds for guilt—the Court emphasized that bail in non-bailable offenses remains a matter of judicial discretion. The key principle laid down is that where an accused, driven by motive, uses a firearm causing grievous hurt, the Court should exercise its discretion to refuse bail, making refusal the rule and grant of bail the exception.
Questions settled- Does unexplained abscondence of an accused automatically disentitle them to the concession of bail?
- Is the grant of bail in non-bailable offenses a matter of right or judicial discretion?
- Under what circumstances can an accused be released on bail despite being a fugitive from law?
- Does the use of a firearm causing grievous hurt with a clear motive generally warrant the refusal of bail?
- Grindlays Bank Limited vs Messrs Cheap John1992 CLC 1108 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a suit for the recovery of Rs. 52,104.19 filed by Grindlays Bank Limited against Messrs Cheap John, arising from an unpaid overdraft facility. The defendants admitted the debt but contended that the suit was time-barred and that the surrender of life insurance policies by the partners constituted full and final settlement of the bank's claim. The core legal questions were whether the suit was barred by limitation and whether the bank had agreed to accept the surrender value of the insurance policies in full satisfaction of the debt. The Court held that the suit was within the limitation period, as the defendants had acknowledged the liability in writing through various letters, the last being dated 22-4-1975. Furthermore, the Court found that the defendants failed to discharge the burden of proof regarding the alleged full and final settlement agreement. Consequently, the Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the bank's statement of accounts was admissible and correct under the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891, and awarded the claimed amount with interest.
Questions settled- Does a written acknowledgment of debt by the debtor extend the limitation period for a recovery suit?
- Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when a defendant claims that a partial payment or collateral realization constitutes full and final settlement of a debt?
- Is a statement of accounts produced by a bank admissible in evidence under the Bankers Books Evidence Act 1891?
- Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Finance vs Punjab Public Service Commission's Employees Association, Lahore and 12 others1992 SCMR 1847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Government of the Punjab sought leave to appeal against an interim order passed by the Lahore High Court, which had granted interim relief regarding the payment of a Secretariat Allowance to the employees of the Punjab Public Service Commission during the pendency of their writ petitions. The core legal question revolved around whether the High Court was justified in granting interim relief for the allowance based on parity and previous judicial precedents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the interim order called for no interference, noting that the balance of convenience favoured the employees who would suffer irreparable loss if denied the allowance to meet rising living costs, whereas any disbursed amounts could easily be recovered from their salaries if the writ petitions ultimately failed. The Court reaffirmed the principle that interim orders will not normally be interfered with by the appellate court absent extraordinary grounds, and dismissed the petition while suggesting the petitioner seek an early disposal of the main writ petitions from the High Court.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an interim order of the High Court granting interim relief during the pendency of a writ petition?
- Does the balance of convenience favour granting an interim allowance to lower-paid employees to meet rising living costs when recovery is possible?
- Can employees claim an interim allowance pending final adjudication based on parity with previous judicial decisions concerning similar establishments?
- Government of Sindh through Secretary, Housing, Karachi and 2 others1992 PLD Karachi 150 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a judgment and decree by the Additional District Judge, Nawabshah, modifying a land acquisition award. The appellants, the Government of Sindh and the Municipal Committee, Nawabshah, sought to contest the compensation awarded for acquired land. The respondents raised two preliminary objections: first, that the appeal was not competently instituted because the advocate filing it lacked proper authorization from the Government; and second, that the Municipal Committee, as a local authority, lacked the locus standi to file an appeal against an award in a land acquisition reference. The Court held that the appeal was not maintainable on both counts. Regarding the first issue, the Court found that the advocate lacked the requisite authorization to represent the Government. Regarding the second issue, the Court affirmed the principle that under the Land Acquisition Act, a local authority or company for whom land is acquired has no right to demand a reference under Section 18, nor a right to appeal against the court's decision on such a reference, as the award becomes final against them.
Questions settled- Does a local authority or company for whom land is acquired have the locus standi to file an appeal against a court's decision on a land acquisition reference?
- Can an appeal filed on behalf of the Government be maintained if the advocate lacks specific authorization or appointment as a law officer?
- Does a local authority have the right to demand a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
- Government of Sindh through Mechanical Engineer vs Muhammad1992 PLC 31 · Sindh High Court · 1991-07-21Read full judgment →
- Government of Sindh and others vs Khalil Ahmed1992 CLC 1958 · Sindh High Court · 1990-10-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This application was filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking to challenge a compromise decree passed on 23-12-1985 in a suit concerning land ownership and the issuance of a No-Objection Certificate. The petitioners, who were defendants in the original suit, alleged fraud or misrepresentation regarding the status of the land, which they claimed was evacuee property. The core legal question was whether the application filed on 23-7-1989 was time-barred under Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Court held that the application was indeed time-barred. It reasoned that the right to apply under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 accrues from the date of the impugned decree or when the alleged fraud or misrepresentation becomes known to the applicant. Since the petitioners were present during the original proceedings and were aware of the property's status, the three-year limitation period commenced on the date of the compromise decree. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition without addressing the merits of the case.
Questions settled- From what date does the period of limitation commence for an application filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to applications filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a party challenge a compromise decree under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if they were present during the proceedings and aware of the facts at the time?
- Government of Punjab through Secretary, Home Department vs Zia Ullah Khan and 2 others1992 SCMR 602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which declared that the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act XV of 1987 had expired. The core legal question was whether a textual amendment made to a parent Act by a temporary Ordinance (extending the Act's life from one to two years) survived the automatic repeal of that Ordinance under Article 89 of the Constitution. The appellant, the Government of Punjab, argued that under Article 264(b) of the Constitution, the amendment remained operative despite the Ordinance's repeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an Ordinance is a temporary piece of legislation and its textual amendments do not survive its repeal. The Court ruled that Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which saves textual amendments, cannot be applied to interpret Constitutional provisions in the absence of an express Constitutional mandate. Consequently, the parent Act expired upon the lapse of the amending Ordinance, and all subsequent proceedings before the Special Courts were without lawful authority.
Questions settled- Can the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897, be used to interpret or aid in the construction of Constitutional provisions in the absence of an express Constitutional mandate?
- Does a textual amendment made to a parent Act by a temporary Ordinance survive the automatic repeal of that Ordinance under Article 89 of the Constitution?
- Whether Article 264(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, can be equated with Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to save amendments made by a repealed Ordinance?
- Government of Punjab through Secretary (Services) Sga&Id, Lahore and others vs Rao Shamsher Ali Khan, Additional Commissioner (Cons.), Multan and others1992 SCMR 1388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This case arises from six appeals by special leave filed by the Government of Punjab against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had accepted the appeals of Messrs M.A. Lone, Raja Muhammad Ashraf Bhatti, and Rao Shamsher Ali Khan regarding their seniority in Grade-18 of the former Provincial Civil Service (Executive Branch). The respondents were granted out-of-turn promotions to Grade-18 in the 1970s without competing with their seniors, who were not considered at the time. A provisional seniority list issued in 1982 relegated the respondents in seniority until their batchmates got promotion. The core legal question was whether civil servants granted out-of-turn promotions can claim seniority in Grade-18 over those senior to them in Grade-17 who were promoted later, when those seniors were kept out of competition during the initial promotions. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the senior officers were not considered alongside the respondents, the respondents did not legally supersede them under Explanation III to rule 8(b) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974. Consequently, the senior officers are entitled to the protection of Explanation III and retain their proper seniority upon promotion. The appeals were accepted, the Tribunal's judgment was set aside, and directions were issued to regulate seniority accordingly.
Questions settled- Can a civil servant granted an out-of-turn promotion claim seniority over seniors who were not considered for promotion at the same time?
- Does the failure to consider senior officers during a junior's promotion constitute legal supersession under the civil service rules?
- How is seniority determined between civil servants promoted in different batches when earlier out-of-turn promotions bypassed competition?
- What is the effect of Explanation III to rule 8(b) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 on the seniority of previously unconsidered senior officers?
- L. D.A. vs Karim Bakhsh NasirK.L.R 1992 Labour & Service Cases 227 · Lahore High Court · 1992-06-30Read full judgment →
- Government of Pakistan vs Messrs Overseas Enterprises (Pte) Ltd.1992 CLC 1138 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involved a commercial dispute arising from a contract for the supply of hardwood bridge and crossing timbers (sleepers) by the defendant to the plaintiff, Government of Pakistan (Pakistan Railways). After shipment from Singapore and delivery at Karachi, the plaintiff conducted a subsequent inspection and claimed that a majority of the sleepers were defective, invoking the arbitration clause. The sole arbitrator rejected the plaintiff's claim and partly allowed the defendant's counter-claim for refund of bank guarantees and performance bonds, holding that pre-shipment inspection by the plaintiff's appointed inspector absolved the defendant of further liability. The plaintiff filed objections against the award under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Sindh High Court held that the arbitrator committed legal misconduct by ignoring crucial contractual clauses and the express reservations in the inspection certificates—which stated that visual pre-shipment inspection did not relieve the seller of contractual obligations—as well as statutory provisions under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Consequently, the High Court set aside the arbitral award.
Questions settled- Does a pre-shipment inspection certificate absolve a seller from liability for latent defects when the certificate expressly states it is based on a visual inspection only?
- Can an arbitral award be set aside under the Arbitration Act, 1940, for error on the face of the award and failure to consider vital contract documents?
- Whether the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, regarding description and merchantable quality apply notwithstanding a buyer's pre-delivery inspection?
- What is the legal effect of an inspection clause read in conjunction with standard railway conditions regarding a contractor's continuing responsibility for supplied goods?
- Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Islamabad and 3 others vs Zafar Iqbal and 3 others1992 CLC 219 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This case involves Intra-Court Appeals filed by the Government of Pakistan challenging a High Court judgment that directed the transfer of Evacuee Trust Property to the respondents on the same terms as a previously transferred portion. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government's decision to sell one portion of the property to a specific individual at a fixed rate based on 100 years' rent, while mandating a public auction for the respondents' portions, violated the constitutional guarantee of equality. The Court held that the respondents and the other occupant were similarly situated, and the disparate treatment lacked a reasonable classification. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the administrative action was discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights. The key principle laid down is that the doctrine of equality before the law and equal protection, enshrined in Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution, prohibits the State from exercising discretionary authority in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner against similarly situated citizens, even when acting under statutory schemes that grant administrative discretion.
Questions settled- Does the disparate treatment of similarly situated citizens in the disposal of government property violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Is the exercise of administrative discretion under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 subject to judicial review if it is exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner?
- Can the State justify discriminatory treatment of citizens by citing the personal influence or status of one of the parties involved?
- Does Article 2-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, read with the Objectives Resolution, impose a limitation on the exercise of discretionary power by State functionaries?
- Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance vs M.I. Cheema, Dy. Registrar, Federal Shariat Court and others1992 SCMR 1852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which directed the payment of a 'Secretariat Allowance' to the staff of the Federal Shariat Court during the pendency of their writ petition. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in granting such interim relief, effectively awarding the final relief sought, and whether the staff of the Federal Shariat Court were entitled to the allowance based on the Chief Justice's approval under the Federal Shariat Court (Terms and Conditions of Service of Staff) Rules, 1982. The Supreme Court held that the interim order was just and proper, noting that the Chief Justice of the Federal Shariat Court, exercising powers analogous to the President under the Rules, had prima facie authorized the allowance. The Court affirmed that while interim relief generally should not mirror final relief, exceptions exist where the dictates of justice demand it, particularly when the balance of convenience favors the employees and the allowance addresses rising living costs. The appeal was dismissed, maintaining the status quo pending final adjudication.
Questions settled- Can a court grant interim relief that effectively mirrors the final relief sought in a writ petition?
- Does the Chief Justice of the Federal Shariat Court possess the authority to extend government-wide allowances to the court's staff under the Federal Shariat Court (Terms and Conditions of Service of Staff) Rules, 1982?
- Under what circumstances may a court grant interim relief concerning monetary allowances during the pendency of a writ petition?
- Government of Pakistan Through DivisionalEngineer Telegraphs, Hyderabad vs Muhammad Abbas1992 PLD Karachi 144 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Government of Northwest Frontier Province through Secretary1992 SCMR 750 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the High Court judgment whereby a constitutional petition filed by the respondents—owners of Timber Sale Depots and Sawing Mills—was accepted. The respondents had challenged the enhancement of the registration fee from Rs.100 to Rs.1,000 under the N.-W.F.P. (Establishment of Sale Depots and Sawing Units) Rules, 1978, contending it amounted to an unconstitutional tax rather than a fee. The core legal question was whether the enhancement of the registration fee constituted a valid fee for services rendered or an illegal tax levied to generate provincial revenue. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that the fee enhancement was justified to meet increased administrative and staff expenses and to provide indirect benefits such as forest conservancy by discouraging unauthorized saw-mills. The key principle laid down is that a fee does not lose its character as such merely because it is enhanced after a long period to meet mounting administrative costs, provided there is a reasonable nexus between the services rendered and the levy collected, and such an enhancement does not violate Article 163 of the Constitution.
Questions settled- Whether the enhancement of a registration fee for timber sale depots and sawing mills amounts to the imposition of a tax?
- Is mathematical exactitude required to show a precise correlation between the amount realized as a fee and the services rendered?
- Does the enhancement of a registration fee to cover increased administrative expenses and ensure forest conservancy violate Article 163 of the Constitution?
- Government of N.W.F.P. through Collector, Dera Ismail Khan vs Krishan1992 SCMR 2320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the dismissal of the appellant's civil revision by the High Court arising from a case regarding a succession certificate. The core legal questions involved the validity of the grant of a succession certificate to an Indian national for assets left by a deceased Pakistani non-Muslim in the absence of notice to other legal heirs, and the legality of removing such assets, specifically cash and gold, out of Pakistan to India. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal while upholding the entitlement to the succession certificate, noting that no other heirs had appeared to object. However, the Court laid down the principle that the removal of assets from Pakistan remains strictly subject to mandatory legal formalities, including prior permission and licences from the State Bank of Pakistan and relevant authorities, directing that the provincial government be informed and its prior permission sought before delivery of any property of the deceased by state authorities.
Questions settled- Whether a succession certificate can be granted when some legal heirs were not served with notice but none have appeared to object?
- Can an Indian national remove cash and gold inherited from a deceased person out of Pakistan without observing legal formalities and obtaining permission from the State Bank of Pakistan?
- What is the role and locus standi of the provincial government regarding the protection and release of property belonging to a deceased person within its jurisdiction?
- Government of N.W.F.P, through Secretary, Home and others vs Zarawar Malak1992 MLD 51 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-08-24Read full judgment →
- Government of Balochistan through Secretary, Local Government1992 SCMR 1062 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the validity of an import tax imposed under a 1962 notification issued pursuant to the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, following the enactment of subsequent local government legislation in Balochistan. The core legal question was whether procedural differences—specifically regarding the sanctioning authority for the tax—between the repealed Basic Democracies Order, 1959, and successor statutes like the Balochistan Local Government Act, 1975, and the Balochistan Local Government Ordinance, 1979, rendered the original tax levy inconsistent and legally ineffective. The Supreme Court held that the tax remained valid. The Court reasoned that "inconsistency" implies a direct, irreconcilable repugnance where two laws cannot coexist. Minor procedural variations in sanctioning authority do not constitute such inconsistency. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that validation clauses within the successor statutes explicitly preserved the efficacy of earlier notifications and actions taken under repealed laws. Consequently, the Court established that where the fundamental power to levy a tax exists under both regimes, procedural differences in the sanctioning process do not invalidate the tax, and existing levies continue to operate unless expressly repealed or replaced.
Questions settled- Does a procedural difference in the sanctioning authority between a repealed law and a successor statute render a tax levy imposed under the former invalid?
- What constitutes 'inconsistency' between two statutes for the purpose of determining the validity of a tax imposed under a repealed law?
- Do validation clauses in successor local government legislation preserve the efficacy of tax notifications issued under the Basic Democracies Order, 1959?
- Golden Plastics Employees' Union through General Secretary vs Messrs1992 PLC 309 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-11-28Read full judgment →
- Golden Industries' Employees' Union vs Messrs Golden Industries (Pvt.)1992 PLC 797 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-02-07Read full judgment →
- Gohar Hayat Nas1r vs A.C. Samundri/Registration Officer, Samundri1992 CLC 1005 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-07Read full judgment →
- Glaxo Laboratories of Pakistan Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan And Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arises from the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the appellant's constitution petition, which challenged a show-cause notice and subsequent orders demanding sales tax on 'Dybenal lozenges' manufactured by the appellants. The core legal question was whether Dybenal lozenges qualify as a medicinal product or drug under PCT Heading No.30.03 entitled to sales tax exemption, or as confectionery falling under PCT Heading No.17.04. The Supreme Court held that since Dybenal lozenges are duly registered as a drug under the Drugs Act, 1976, contain active therapeutic ingredients (2:4 dichlorobenzyl alcohol and amylmeta cresol), and are listed in the National Formulary, they constitute a pharmaceutical product rather than confectionery and are exempt from sales tax. The key principle laid down is that where the Sales Tax Act or Customs Tariff does not specifically define a term like 'medicament' or 'drug', the classification and registration of such a product by the specialized health authority under the Drugs Act is highly relevant and should heavily weigh in determining its true character.
Questions settled- Whether Dybenal lozenges qualify as a drug or medicament under PCT Heading No.30.03 or as confectionery under PCT Heading No.17.04 for the purpose of sales tax?
- Does the registration of a product as a drug under the Drugs Act, 1976 by the Ministry of Health serve as a relevant consideration in determining its classification under the Pakistan Customs Tariff?
- Can a general circular regarding menthol sweet drops and lozenges issued by the Central Board of Revenue be applied to pharmaceutical lozenges containing distinct active therapeutic ingredients without considering their specific composition?
- Glaxo Laboratories Limited vs Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Incometax1992 SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition against a notice issued under Section 66-A of the Income-tax Ordinance 1979. The petitioner contended that the original assessment order had merged into the appellate order, thereby precluding the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner from exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 66-A. The High Court had rejected the doctrine of merger, citing previous authorities and emphasizing that defects in original assessments could be rectified under the Ordinance. Upon review, the Supreme Court identified that the core legal questions concern whether the doctrine of merger applies to income tax assessment orders upon the passing of an appellate order, and whether such merger divests the revenue authorities of the power to revise the original assessment. Finding these issues to be of general legal importance requiring authoritative interpretation of Section 66-A, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine the extent of revisional powers and the applicability of the merger doctrine in tax assessment proceedings.
Questions settled- Can the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner revise an original assessment order under Section 66-A of the Income-tax Ordinance 1979 after an appellate order has been passed?
- Does the doctrine of merger apply to income tax assessment orders such that the original order merges into the appellate order, rendering it unavailable for revision?
- Does the existence of an appellate order divest the revenue authorities of jurisdiction to invoke revisionary powers under Section 66-A of the Income-tax Ordinance 1979?
- Glaxo Laboratories Limited vs Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax1992 PTD 566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of its constitutional petition by the High Court of Sindh, which had challenged a notice issued by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under section 66-A of the Income-tax Ordinance. The original assessment for the year 1987-88 was completed under section 62, and subsequent appeals and reopening proceedings under section 65 had various outcomes, leading ultimately to a notice of revision under section 66-A. The core legal question revolved around the application of the doctrine of merger, specifically whether the original assessment order merged into the appellate order, thereby divesting the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of jurisdiction to revise the original assessment order under section 66-A. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions raised regarding the interpretation of section 66-A and the doctrine of merger in tax proceedings are of general legal importance.
Questions settled- Whether upon the appellate order being made on the appeal from the original assessment order the Respondents have jurisdiction under section 66A of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 to revise the original assessment order?
- Whether upon the appellate order being made the original assessment order merged with the appellate order according to the doctrine of merger with the consequence that there is then no longer available an order of the Income-tax Officer capable of revision under section 66A of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979?
- Glaxo Laboratories Limited vs Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax and others1992 PTD 932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant challenged a notice issued by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (IAC) under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, seeking to revise an assessment order. The core legal question was whether the IAC possessed jurisdiction to invoke Section 66-A to revise an assessment order after that order had been subjected to appellate proceedings and merged into the appellate order. The Supreme Court held that the original assessment order of the Income Tax Officer (ITO) had merged into the appellate order of the Tribunal. Consequently, the IAC lacked the jurisdiction to initiate revision proceedings under Section 66-A as it existed prior to the 1991 amendment. The Court established the key principle that the doctrine of merger dictates that an original order is absorbed into the appellate order once an appeal is decided. Where a single assessment order is challenged in appeal, the entire order merges, precluding revisional jurisdiction over the original order by lower authorities, unless specific statutory provisions explicitly authorize such action.
Questions settled- Does an original assessment order by an Income Tax Officer merge into an appellate order once an appeal is decided?
- Can an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner invoke revisional jurisdiction under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, to revise an assessment order that has already merged into an appellate order?
- Does the doctrine of merger apply to assessment orders where the subject matter of the appeal covers the original assessment?
- Glaxo Laboratories Limited vs Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax And Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal was filed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging a show-cause notice issued under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal issue was whether the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax had jurisdiction to revise an Income Tax Officer's original assessment order under Section 66-A after appellate proceedings were completed, or whether the original assessment order had merged into the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under the doctrine of merger. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that upon completion of the appellate process, the original assessment order of the Income Tax Officer merged into the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Consequently, prior to the addition of subsection (1-A) to Section 66-A in 1991, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner possessed no jurisdiction to revise the original assessment order. The impugned notice was accordingly declared to be without jurisdiction and of no legal effect.
Questions settled- Whether an assessment order passed by an Income Tax Officer merges into the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upon decision of an appeal?
- Whether the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had jurisdiction under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, prior to the 1991 amendment, to revise an assessment order after an appellate decision was rendered?
- Does the doctrine of merger prevent the reopening of an original assessment order under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, where the order has been merged into a superior appellate authority's order?
- Glaxo Laboratories (Pakistan) Limited vs Inspecting Assistant1992 PTD 82 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-24Read full judgment →
- Glaxo Laboratories (Pak.) Ltd. vs Government of Sindh And Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 447 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing its constitutional petition, which challenged the withdrawal of a stay order that had suspended the application of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 to the petitioner's establishment. The core legal question was whether the withdrawal of this long-standing executive stay order, without a fresh formal hearing, violated the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court held that the initial notification applying the Ordinance remained in force and the stay was merely a temporary executive arrangement. The Court found that the petitioner had no substantive right to the stay and that the requirements of natural justice were satisfied, as the respondent had issued a notice in 1983 explicitly stating the intention to vacate the stay, to which the petitioner had responded. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the withdrawal of an interim executive stay, following notice, does not violate natural justice, while noting that the petitioner remained free to apply for formal exemption under the law.
Questions settled- Does the withdrawal of an interim executive stay order require a fresh formal hearing to satisfy the principles of natural justice?
- Does the issuance of a notification under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 create an immediate liability for the establishment?
- Can an establishment claim a substantive right to the continuation of an interim stay order granted by executive authorities?
- Glaxo Group Limited vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone 'B', Karachi1992 PTD 636 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This tax reference application from the Sindh High Court arises from assessment proceedings for the assessment years 1975-76, 1976-77, and 1977-78, where the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal referred a question regarding whether manufacturing royalties received by a United Kingdom non-resident company from a Pakistani company were exempt from Pakistan tax under the Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation between Pakistan and the United Kingdom. The core legal question was whether payments for specific manufacturing services (sub-clauses (d) and (g) of clause 4 of the consultancy agreement) qualified as exempt royalty or industrial and commercial profits under the Treaty. The Court held, following its earlier precedent, that payments for services under sub-clauses (d) and (g) did not fall within the definition of royalty under Article VIII of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Court held that these technical services rendered by the assessee's staff constituted 'personal services' which are expressly excluded from the definition of 'industrial or commercial profits' under Article II(1)(k), and thus they are not exempt from income tax under Article III of the Treaty. The reference question was accordingly answered in the affirmative.
Questions settled- Whether manufacturing royalties received by a non-resident company are exempt from Pakistan tax under the Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation between Pakistan and the United Kingdom?
- Does the definition of industrial or commercial profits in Article II(1)(k) of the Double Taxation Treaty include payments for technical services rendered through staff delegation?
- Are technical services rendered by a company through its staff considered personal services that stand excluded from the definition of industrial or commercial profits under the Double Taxation Treaty?
- Whether payments for factory inspection and technical advice under a manufacturing agreement qualify as royalty under Article VIII of the Pakistan-United Kingdom Double Taxation Treaty?
- Glaxo Group Limited and 2 others vs Evron (Private) Limited and another1992 CLC 2382 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the dismissal of an application for an interim injunction in a patent infringement suit. The appellants, holders of Pakistani patents for processes related to 'ranitidine hydrochloride,' alleged that the respondents infringed these patents by importing and selling a drug named 'Melfax' containing the patented compound. The core legal question concerned whether the importation and sale of a product manufactured abroad using a process patented in Pakistan constitutes actionable infringement under the Patents and Designs Act, 1911, and whether an interim injunction was warranted. The Court held that the importation and sale of such products constitute a 'user' of the invention, thereby infringing the patent. It rejected the respondents' arguments regarding patent invalidity and public interest. Furthermore, the Court determined that the balance of convenience favored the appellants, as the respondents had made minimal capital investment compared to the appellants' established market presence. Finally, the Court ruled that mere delay, absent evidence of prejudice to the defendant, does not disentitle a plaintiff from obtaining interlocutory relief. The appeal was allowed, and the interim injunction was granted.
Questions settled- Does the importation and sale of a product manufactured abroad using a process patented in Pakistan constitute patent infringement?
- Does the possession of patented goods with the intention of sale amount to a 'user' of the invention under the Patents and Designs Act, 1911?
- Is a plaintiff disentitled from seeking an interim injunction solely due to a delay in filing the suit, if the delay has not caused prejudice to the defendant?
- What principles govern the balance of convenience in patent infringement cases involving competing commercial interests?
- Girraj Kishore Kanhaiya Lal vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1992 PTD 875 · Allahabad High Court · 1990-07-11Read full judgment →
- Ghullam Kadir and others vs State Life Insurance1992 CLC 1410 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-03Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Yasin vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 296 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-05Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Yasin vs Muhammad LukmanK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 21 · Lahore High Court · 1989-01-23Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Shahbaz vs S.H.O. P/S Saddar Kehror Pacca, Multan AndK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 494 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-04Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Shabbir vs Presiding Officer, Fourth Sindh Labour Court and 2 others1992 PLC 877 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-02-25Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Shabbir And 37 Others vs Punjab Special Court (Suppression1992 P Cr. L J 1932 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged an order dated 13 June 1990 passed by Special Court No. 5, Faisalabad, constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975. The Special Court had dismissed the petitioners' application objecting to its jurisdiction to try non-scheduled offences arising from the same transaction as scheduled offences. The core legal question was whether a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975 possesses jurisdiction to try non-scheduled offences alongside scheduled offences. The Lahore High Court allowed the petition, declaring the impugned order to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, and directed that the non-scheduled offences be tried by an ordinary criminal court. The Court laid down that a Special Court is a creature of statute and cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the statutory mandate; under Section 4(2) of the Act, it possesses jurisdiction exclusively to try scheduled offences and cannot try non-scheduled offences.
Questions settled- Does a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975 have jurisdiction to try non-scheduled offences committed in the course of the same transaction as scheduled offences?
- What course of action must a Special Court take under Section 4(2) of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975 upon forming the opinion that an alleged offence is not a scheduled offence?
- Can a statutory Special Court expand its jurisdiction beyond the express terms and offences listed in the schedule of the statute creating it?
- Ghulam Sarwar vs Mst. Shahjehan And 10 OtherK.L.R 1992 Revenue Cases 34 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1992-09-15Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Sarwar vs Mst. Shah Jehan and 11 others1992 CLC 577 · Board of Revenue · 1990-09-15Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Sarwar vs Ghulam Rabbani And 3 Other1992 PLD Peshawar 130 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-01-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition challenges the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner for contempt of court, arising from an alleged violation of a status quo order issued by a Civil Judge. The core legal questions concern whether a civil suit filed against public officials by their official designation, rather than their individual names, is maintainable, and whether contempt proceedings can be sustained for violating an injunction issued in such a suit. The High Court held that a suit against public officials by official designation alone is not maintainable under Order 1, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, as they are not juristic persons. Consequently, the injunction issued was void ab initio, and no contempt of court could be committed by violating it. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that equity acts in personam, requiring injunctions to be addressed to named individuals. Additionally, the Court ruled that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and require strict adherence to procedural fairness, including the formal framing of a charge, which was absent in this case. Accordingly, the conviction was set aside.
Questions settled- Can a civil suit be maintained against a public official sued solely by their official designation?
- Is an injunction issued against a non-juristic entity legally binding?
- Can a person be convicted for contempt of court for violating an order that was passed without jurisdiction?
- What procedure must a court follow when initiating contempt proceedings for the violation of a civil injunction?
- Ghulam Sarsar Khan And 5 Other vs Mst. Goher Sultan And 14 Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a suit for declaration regarding the redemption of a mortgage of land. The respondents, as mortgagees, sought a declaration that the petitioners, as mortgagors, failed to redeem the property within the statutory period of limitation, thereby rendering the respondents the owners of the land. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, and subsequent appeals and revisions were dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners challenged the lower courts' findings, arguing that the respondents failed to establish the expiry of the 60-year limitation period due to insufficient evidence regarding the date the mortgage money became payable. Furthermore, the petitioners contended that the law of limitation regarding mortgages is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and that the court should exercise its discretion under the Specific Relief Act to deny relief to the respondents, whose claim was allegedly immoral under Islamic principles. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these fundamental constitutional and legal questions.
Questions settled- Does the burden of proof lie on the plaintiff to establish the expiry of the 60-year limitation period in a suit for declaration regarding mortgage redemption?
- Can a court exercise its discretion under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 to deny relief if the claim is argued to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
- Does the failure to produce the original mortgage deed or decree prevent the determination of the limitation period for mortgage redemption?
- Ghulam Samdani vs Abdul Hameed1992 SCMR 1170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a rent dispute where the appellant, a purchaser of property, sought the eviction of the respondent, who claimed tenancy under the deceased former owner. The core legal question concerned whether the respondent could deny the landlord-tenant relationship with the appellant despite the appellant's registered sale deed and the respondent's lack of independent title. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was estopped from denying the relationship, as the transferor (the appellant's predecessor) held a valid decree of ownership and was also a legal heir of the original owner. The Court emphasized that a tenant who denies the landlord-tenant relationship is liable for immediate eviction without the necessity of proving other grounds like default or personal need. Furthermore, the Court ruled that depositing rent in court without attorning to the new owner, after having notice of the transfer of title, does not absolve a tenant of the liability for rent payment. Consequently, the High Court's order was set aside, and the Rent Controller's eviction order was restored.
Questions settled- Is a tenant who denies the relationship of landlord and tenant liable for immediate eviction without proof of other grounds?
- Does the deposit of rent in the office of the Rent Controller by a tenant, without attorning to the new owner, satisfy the legal obligation to pay rent?
- Can a tenant challenge the title of a landlord when the tenant claims no title of their own in the property?
- Ghulam Sadiq And Another vs The StateK.L.R.1992 Criminal Cases 258 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-10Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Rasul vs Mahmood Ahmad and 42 others1992 SCMR 136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside orders passed by the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) and the Member, Board of Revenue. The core legal question was whether the Minister for Consolidation possessed the jurisdiction to interfere with a consolidation scheme sanctioned under the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, and whether the Additional Commissioner could lawfully act upon such ministerial directions to set aside a scheme. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the Minister for Consolidation lacked the jurisdiction to interfere with the consolidation scheme. The Court held that the proceedings initiated by the Additional Commissioner, which were based solely on the Minister's unauthorized directions, were void and unsustainable in law. The key principle laid down is that administrative authorities exercising powers under the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, must act within their statutory mandate and cannot be directed by political functionaries to interfere with quasi-judicial or administrative schemes, rendering any such directed actions legally void.
Questions settled- Does the Minister for Consolidation have the jurisdiction to interfere with a consolidation scheme sanctioned under the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960?
- Are proceedings taken by an Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) pursuant to unauthorized directions from a Minister legally sustainable?
- Can a consolidation scheme be set aside by an Additional Commissioner based on a directive from the Minister for Consolidation?
- Ghulam Rasul vs Bashir Ahmad and others1992 CLC 2028 · Board of Revenue · 1991-02-04Read full judgment →