Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- Ghulam Rasool vs StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 148 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-28Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Rasool vs Nazir of the Sindh High Court, Karachi and others1992 CLC 2490 · Sindh High Court · 1990-09-18Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Rasool vs Mst. Hamioa Begum And Other1992 PLD Lahore 363 · Lahore High Court · 1992-05-16Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Rasool Mahar vs Govt. of Sindhh, Irrigation and Power(K.L.R. 1992 Labour & Service Cases 214) · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- Ghulam Rasool Etc vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases .35 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-20Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Rasool and 2 others vs Faiz Bakhsh1992 SCMR 1328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed a pre-emption suit filed by the appellants, Ghulam Rasool and others, against the respondent, Faiz Bakhsh. The core legal question was whether a pre-emption suit, in which an initial decree was passed prior to the Federal Shariat Court's declaration striking down certain provincial pre-emption laws on 31-7-1986, could proceed to a final decree after that date. The High Court had held that because the initial ex parte decree from 1982 was set aside by an appellate court in 1983, no decree existed before the cut-off date, thus invalidating the suit. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, relying on the precedent established in Sardar Ali's case (PLD 1988 SC 287). The Court held that the suit could validly proceed and be decreed by a competent court after 31-7-1986, provided the initial proceedings commenced before that date. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the judgments of the lower courts in favor of the appellants.
Questions settled- Can a pre-emption suit proceed to a final decree after 31-7-1986 if the initial decree was set aside by an appellate court before that date?
- Does the setting aside of an ex parte decree by an appellate court negate the existence of a suit for the purposes of the pre-emption law cut-off date?
- Ghulam Qasim vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 306 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-28Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Qasim And Other vs The State And Other1992 PLD Peshawar 83 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-01-31Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Qadir Etc. vs Haji Muhammad Akbar Khan Etc.K.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 177 · Board of Revenue · 1990-05-29Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Qadir Etc. vs Bati Etc.K.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 224 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1989-11-29Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Qadir Etc vs Qaim Bakhsh And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 36 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1990-08-16Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Oasim vs Ghulam Hussain1992 PLD Supreme Court 577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from the High Court's refusal to restore a Civil Revision that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The appellant had filed a general adjournment application due to the counsel's unavailability, which was granted, yet the High Court dismissed the revision when the counsel appeared on the adjourned date without explicitly informing the court of the pending application. The High Court inferred that the counsel's conduct was a deliberate attempt to avoid a specific Bench, leading to the dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by assuming ulterior motives when equally reasonable, innocent explanations existed, such as genuine miscalculation or misinformation regarding the status of the adjournment application. Emphasizing that lawyers are entitled to the same consideration for human failings as ordinary litigants, the Court ruled that dismissal for non-prosecution was unjustified in the absence of proven misconduct. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order set aside, and the case remanded for disposal on merits. The judgment reinforces that courts should avoid punitive measures based on suspicion when reasonable alternative explanations for procedural lapses exist.
Questions settled- Can a court dismiss a civil revision for non-prosecution when a general adjournment application has been granted but not communicated to the presiding judge?
- Should a court prefer an innocent explanation for a lawyer's procedural lapse over an assumption of ulterior motive when multiple possibilities exist?
- Are lawyers entitled to the same consideration for honest miscalculations or misinformation as ordinary litigants in procedural matters?
- Ghulam Oadir And Others vs The State and another-1992 P Cr. L J 1471 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-28Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Nabi vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1852 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-10Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Nabi Baloch vs Government of Sindh And 2 Other(K.L.R. 1992 Labour & Service 41) · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1991-10-28Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Nabi And Another vs Fateh Muhammad And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 54 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1989-11-18Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Mustafa vs Muhammad Ismail and 2 others1992 MLD 67 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1991-09-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a revision petition challenging an order passed by a Magistrate under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding an alleged obstruction of a public passage. The petitioner initiated proceedings alleging public nuisance, but the Magistrate, after a spot inspection, directed the petitioner to seek redress in a civil court rather than proceeding with the inquiry. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate erred by failing to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements of Section 139-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before proceeding to the merits of the case. The Court held that the Magistrate's failure to question the respondents regarding the denial of the public right of way, as required by Section 139-A, rendered the proceedings illegal. The Court established that Section 139-A is mandatory; a Magistrate must first inquire into the existence of a public right when denied by the respondent before proceeding under Sections 137 or 138. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded for fresh proceedings starting from the stage of non-compliance.
Questions settled- Is the procedure prescribed under Section 139-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory for a Magistrate dealing with a public nuisance complaint?
- Must a Magistrate inquire into the denial of a public right of way before proceeding to the merits of a case under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does a failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 139-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate the final order passed by a Magistrate?
- Ghulam Mustafa vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner and others1992 CLC 278 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-15Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Mustafa Alias Modia vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 459 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-04Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Mustafa A. Kabirani vs The Province of Sindh(K.L.R. 1992 Labour & Service Cases 87) · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1991-11-19Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Muhammad vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2394 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-05-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for the alleged unlawful detention of a woman. The core legal question was whether a conviction could be sustained based primarily on a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the alleged victim was never produced as a witness in court. The Federal Shariat Court held that the conviction was unsustainable. The Court ruled that a statement recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 cannot be treated as substantive evidence if the maker of the statement is not examined as a witness during the trial, and the conditions for admitting such evidence under Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 were not satisfied. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to establish the essential elements of enticing or detaining with criminal intent. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, noting that the absence of the victim's testimony proved fatal to the prosecution's case.
Questions settled- Can a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be read as evidence if the witness is not examined in court?
- What are the requirements for admitting a witness's prior statement under Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984?
- Does the failure to produce the alleged victim as a witness in a criminal trial render the prosecution's case fatal?
- Ghulam Muhammad And Other vs Syed Nasir Hussain And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 7 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-03Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Muhamamd and others vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab (West Pakistan) Lahore and another1992 SCMR 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns whether the law of limitation regarding the foreclosure or redemption of mortgages continued to run against evacuee property after the partition of the subcontinent. The appellants, mortgagees of land owned by evacuees, argued that because the mortgage remained unredeemed for over sixty years, the property ceased to be evacuee property and vested in them by prescription. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957, all evacuee property vested in the Custodian effective March 1, 1947, thereby freezing the rights and interests of the evacuees. The Court affirmed that the law of limitation ceased to operate against the Custodian or the evacuee property from that date. Furthermore, the Court noted that subsequent legislative amendments, specifically section 14-A of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958, converted mortgagee rights into a mere charge on the land. Consequently, the appellants could not acquire title through prescription, and the appeal was dismissed, upholding the Custodian's authority to manage and dispose of the property subject to the mortgage charge.
Questions settled- Does the law of limitation continue to run against evacuee property after it has vested in the Custodian?
- Can a mortgagee acquire title to evacuee property by prescription if the mortgage remains unredeemed for the statutory period?
- What is the effect of section 14-A of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 on the rights of a mortgagee of evacuee land?
- Does the vesting of evacuee property in the Custodian freeze the rights and interests of the evacuee owner?
- Ghulam Mohyuddin vs CI WNW -National Press Trust/Progressive1992 PLC 557 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1992-03-09Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Mohiuddin vs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd., Karachi , .1992 PLC 752 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-23Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Mohammad And Other vs Mst. Bavi And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases79 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1990-01-27Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Hussain vs Saghir Hussain1992 CLC 1848 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-20Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Hussain vs Messrs Adam Limited and 3 others1992 CLC 1883 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-08Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Hussain vs District Magistrate, Muzaffargarh And 3 Others1992 P Cr. L J 1870 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal revision petition under section 435/439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenged an order of the District Magistrate permitting the exhumation of a deceased person and a fresh post-mortem examination upon an application by the accused party. The core legal questions were whether an inquiry and order passed under section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are judicial in nature and amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, and whether such an order is vitiated if passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the complainant or the State in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Lahore High Court held that proceedings and orders of a Magistrate holding an inquest and ordering exhumation under section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are judicial in character and consequently open to revision under section 439 of the Code. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that passing a mechanical order for exhumation without notice to the opposing parties violates the fundamental principle of natural justice that no person shall be condemned unheard.
Questions settled- Whether an order passed by a Magistrate under section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is a judicial order?
- Is an inquiry and order for exhumation under section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 439 of the Code?
- Does an order for the exhumation of a dead body passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the complainant or the State violate the principles of natural justice?
- Ghulam Hussain And Another vs Province of Punjab And 2 Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court arises out of the dismissal of the appellants' civil revision by the High Court, which had originated from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction concerning the allotment of State land on lease with the potential grant of proprietary rights. The core legal question was whether the disputed allotment of State land in favour of the appellants was made within the stipulated target date. Upon scrutinizing the original record, the Supreme Court held that the allotment was indeed made on 30-5-1971, prior to the target date, and that the High Court's contrary finding was based on non-consideration and misconsideration of substantive evidence. The Court laid down the principle that appellate courts must carefully examine original records rather than proceed on incorrect assumptions regarding documentary evidence, and it resolved the dispute by adopting a balanced compromise suggested by the Additional Advocate-General regarding the division of land between the competing allottees and auction-purchasers.
Questions settled- Whether an appellate court can interfere with a finding of fact based on misconsideration of substantive evidence?
- Can the Supreme Court decide a matter directly instead of remanding the case after reversing the High Court's findings?
- Whether an allotment of State land was made within the target date based on the original record?
- Ghulam Hassan and anothers vs Government of N.W.F.P. through Chief Secretary and 3 others1992 SCMR 2427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court arising out of land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Land situated in Mansehra was acquired by the Provincial Government, and the Senior Civil Judge subsequently enhanced the compensation awarded by the Collector, granting compound interest at eight per centum per annum. Upon review, the High Court modified the judgment to grant simple interest at six per centum per annum, pursuant to an amendment introduced by Ordinance No. V of 1983 in the N.-W.F.P. The core legal question was whether landowners are entitled to the rate and nature of interest prevailing at the time of land acquisition or at the time of the judicial determination enhancing compensation. The Supreme Court held that landowners do not acquire a vested right to interest prior to the judicial determination of enhanced compensation, and the rate and nature of interest are governed by the statutory provision in force at the time of such determination. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether landowners have a vested right to the rate and nature of interest prevailing at the time of land acquisition or at the time of the judicial determination enhancing compensation?
- Does Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 apply based on the law in force when the acquisition proceedings commenced or when the court announces its judgment enhancing compensation?
- What is the effect of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition (North-West Frontier Province) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 on interest already accrued prior to the commencement of the Ordinance?
- Ghulam Haider vs Muhammad Qasam1992 CLC 1386 · Lahore High Court · 1992-02-17Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Haider vs Abdul Ghaffar and another1992 SCMR 1303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which upheld an eviction order granted by a Rent Controller in favor of a landlord seeking premises for his son's use. The core legal question concerned whether a landlord, who possesses other vacant premises in the same urban area, is legally obligated to disclose these properties and explain why they are unsuitable for his requirements before seeking eviction of a tenant. While the High Court had ruled that a landlord possesses an absolute prerogative to select any property for his use without justifying the choice or disclosing other holdings, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether this view conflicted with established principles requiring landlords to justify the unsuitability of existing accommodation. Ultimately, the parties consented to setting aside the lower courts' orders. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Rent Controller for a fresh decision, directing that the parties be permitted to lead further evidence regarding the status of the landlord's other properties, with an order for expeditious disposal within six months.
Questions settled- Is a landlord required to disclose other vacant premises in the same urban area when seeking eviction for personal use?
- Does a landlord have an absolute prerogative to select any property for personal use without explaining why other available properties are unsuitable?
- Can a case be remanded to the Rent Controller for fresh evidence if the landlord's other properties become vacant during the pendency of eviction proceedings?
- Ghulam Haider and 3 others vs M.La. Zone 'D', Quetta and another1992 SCMR 1075 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court on the grounds of laches. The appellants had originally sought the lease and subsequent sale of land from the Board of Revenue, claiming it was State land. Following the promulgation of Martial Law Order No. 16 and its successor, Martial Law Order No. 46, the authorities reviewed and cancelled these allotments, determining they were made without jurisdiction as they fell outside any established uniform policy or scheme. The appellants challenged these cancellations in 1988, years after the orders were passed. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in dismissing the petition due to laches. The Court held that the initial grants were void ab initio because the Board of Revenue lacked the authority to make individual sales by private negotiation outside of a prescribed scheme. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, noting that the appellants' challenge was an afterthought and that the underlying grants were legally unsustainable, rendering the review and subsequent cancellation by Martial Law authorities valid.
Questions settled- Does the Board of Revenue possess the authority to make individual sales of State land by private negotiation outside of an established scheme?
- Can a constitutional petition be dismissed on the grounds of laches when the underlying administrative grant was made without jurisdiction?
- Are allotments or sales of State land made outside of a uniform policy reviewable under Martial Law Order No. 16 and Martial Law Order No. 46?
- Ghulam Habib vs Rahim Gul and 2 others-1992 P Cr. L J 384 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-11-13Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Habib vs Mst. Zubaida Khatoon1992 CLC 1926 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan challenged orders passed by the Collector and the Chairman, Arbitration Council, which awarded the respondent maintenance for a period of ten years and six months, alongside a payment for dowry articles. The core legal question was whether the Arbitration Council possesses the authority to award past maintenance for a period exceeding the limitation period prescribed by law. The Court held that awarding maintenance for ten years and six months was legally unsustainable. Relying on the principle established in Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Khurshid Begum (PLD 1972 SC 302), the Court affirmed that Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to claims for past maintenance, which limits the claim to a period of six years from the date the right to sue accrues. Consequently, the impugned orders were declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, and the matter was remanded to the Collector for a fresh decision in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- What is the applicable limitation period for a claim of past maintenance under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
- Does Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to claims for past maintenance?
- Can an Arbitration Council award maintenance for a period exceeding six years prior to the institution of the application?
- Ghulam Habib Rana vs District Judge, Rawalpindi/Election Tribunal1992 CLC 1824 · Lahore High Court · 1992-05-08Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Farid vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1213 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Farid vs The State1992 SCMR 1258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased, resulting in a sentence of imprisonment for life. The core legal question was whether the lower courts properly appraised the evidence and whether the interested ocular testimony was sufficiently corroborated. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower courts' judgments, and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that the testimony of the related eye-witnesses suffered from material contradictions and, given the prior animosity between the parties, required independent corroboration. The Court established that neither the alleged motive, the medical evidence, the discarded weapon recovery, nor the appellant's abscondence provided the necessary corroboration, especially when the prosecution's version was rendered highly improbable by the appellant's physical disability of an amputated leg.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of related eye-witnesses requires independent corroboration when there is evidence of prior animosity between the parties?
- Can medical evidence regarding the nature of a weapon used furnish corroboration as to the identity of the accused person?
- Does the fact of an accused person's abscondence alone constitute sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction when the presence of eye-witnesses is doubtful?
- Can interested witnesses sustain a conviction in the absence of reliable corroborative evidence?
- Ghulam Farid vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 486 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-14Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Farid vs Member, Board of Revenue and others1992 CLC 1956 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-14Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Fareed vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 571 · Lahore High Court · 1992-01-25Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Dastgir and others vs Messrs Pakistan Steel Mills Ltd.1992 PLC 947 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-02-25Read full judgment →
- Ghulam And Others vs The State-1992 P Cr. L J 1345 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-06Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Ali vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2033 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given that the trial court acquitted the co-accused based on the same evidence, and the prosecution failed to examine the Investigating Officer and the first medical examiner. The Sindh High Court held that the conviction could not be sustained. The Court established that where eye-witnesses are closely related to the deceased and have been disbelieved regarding co-accused, their testimony against the remaining accused requires independent material corroboration, which was absent here. Additionally, material contradictions regarding the place of occurrence, the timing of the FIR, and the failure to examine crucial witnesses—specifically the Investigating Officer and the first medical officer—created significant gaps in the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of interested witnesses, who have been disbelieved regarding co-accused, can be relied upon against the remaining accused without independent corroboration?
- Does the non-examination of the Investigating Officer in a murder trial cause material prejudice to the accused?
- Can a conviction be sustained when there are material contradictions regarding the place of occurrence and the timing of the FIR?
- Ghulam Ali and others vs Haji Allah Bakhsh and others1992 CLC 498 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-04Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Akbar Alias Abari vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 487 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-14Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Ahmad vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 2 others1992 SCMR 957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a service dispute regarding the seniority of a railway employee who held an officiating promotion to a senior post. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having served in an officiating capacity under Paragraph 121(1)(b) of the Pakistan Government Railway Code, was entitled to be included in the Grade-18 seniority list despite not being regularized against the reserved quota at that time. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant’s officiating promotion did not confer a right to seniority in the higher grade. The Court clarified that officiating arrangements made due to the non-availability of regular officers do not integrate the incumbent into the cadre. The ratio established is that seniority in a higher grade is strictly contingent upon regular promotion against a reserved vacancy in accordance with the prescribed quota and rules. The Court emphasized that holding a Class-I post in an officiating capacity is legally distinct from being inducted into the Class-I service cadre, and thus, such service cannot be counted for seniority purposes.
Questions settled- Does an officiating promotion under the Pakistan Government Railway Code confer a right to seniority in the higher grade?
- Can an employee count the period of officiating service against a post for seniority purposes if that post was not part of the reserved quota for their cadre?
- Is there a legal distinction between holding a Class-I post and being inducted into the Class-I service cadre?
- Does the Civil Servants Act 1973 grant a vested right to seniority?
- Ghulam Ahmad Sheikh vs The State and others1992 CLC 2018 · Board of Revenue · 1991-06-30Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Abbas vs The State1992-P-Cr. L J 842 · Lahore High Court · 1991-08-20Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Abbas vs The Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 51992 SCMR 1977 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the appointment of a Lambardar for Chak No. 281/EB, Tehsil Burewala. The core legal question was whether respondents who had failed to challenge the dismissal of their appeals by the Commissioner against an initial appointment order could re-enter the litigation process following a subsequent remand order by the Board of Revenue. The Supreme Court held that the respondents, having allowed the Commissioner's order dismissing their appeals to attain finality, had effectively exited the litigation arena. Consequently, a later remand order by the Board of Revenue, which was upheld by the High Court, did not revive their right to contest the appointment. The Court ruled that the Board of Revenue correctly confined the controversy to the remaining active contestants. The principle established is that parties who fail to challenge an adverse appellate order cannot subsequently re-litigate their claims upon a remand order issued in proceedings to which they are no longer parties, as the initial finality of the appellate dismissal precludes their re-entry into the dispute.
Questions settled- Can a party who fails to challenge an appellate order dismissing their appeal re-enter litigation following a subsequent remand order in the same case?
- Does a remand order by the Board of Revenue revive the claims of parties whose previous appeals were already dismissed and not further challenged?
- Is the scope of a remand order limited to the remaining active contestants when some parties have already exited the litigation process?
- Ghulam Abbas and others vs Mansub Dad and others1992 CLC 1609 · Board of Revenue · 1991-08-19Read full judgment →
- Ghuiam Abbas vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 337 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-13Read full judgment →
- Ghiasuddin And Another vs The State1992 PLD Peshawar 179 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-01-15Read full judgment →
- Ghias-Ud-Din And Another vs The StateK.L.R 1992 Criminal Cases 471 · Peshawar High Court · 1992-01-15Read full judgment →
- Ghee Corporation of Pakistan and anothers vs Sh. Abdul Haq & Sons1992 SCMR 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the determination of compensation for a lessee company whose assets were taken over by the Government during the nationalization of the Crescent Factory Ltd. under the Hydrogenated Vegetable Oil Industry (Control and Development) Act, 1973. The core legal question was whether the compensation payable to the respondent lessee for its goods, machinery, and assets taken over during nationalization should be governed by the specific compensation principles in the Schedule to the Act, or by the ordinary law of the land. The Court held that the Schedule to the Act applies exclusively to the compensation for the shares or proprietary interests of the nationalized establishment itself. It does not govern claims by third-party creditors or lessees. The Court affirmed that such third parties are entitled to compensation for their assets taken over by the Government, to be assessed according to the ordinary law of the land, rather than the statutory formula provided for the nationalized entity. The judgment establishes that the definition of 'creditor' under the Act includes lessees, and their claims must be adjudicated based on general legal principles.
Questions settled- Does the Schedule to the Hydrogenated Vegetable Oil Industry (Control and Development) Act 1973 apply to the determination of compensation for third-party assets taken over during nationalization?
- Is a lessee whose property is taken over during the nationalization of an establishment considered a 'creditor' under the Hydrogenated Vegetable Oil Industry (Control and Development) Act 1973?
- Should compensation for assets belonging to third parties, taken over during the nationalization of an establishment, be assessed under the Act or the ordinary law of the land?
- General Tyre & Rubber Company of Pakistan Limited, Karachi vs Sindh1992 PLC 1028 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These constitutional petitions challenge an order of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, which reinstated employees previously terminated by the petitioner. The core legal questions were whether the employees qualified as 'permanent workmen' and whether their termination letters complied with the statutory requirement to provide explicit reasons for dismissal. The High Court held that the employees were 'temporary workmen' because the nature of the work was temporary and not likely to exceed nine months; the mere duration of employment or re-hiring after short breaks does not confer permanent status. However, the Court further held that the termination letters, which merely stated that services were 'no longer required,' failed to meet the 'explicit' requirement of Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968. The Court established that the classification of a workman depends on the nature of the work, not the duration of service, and that employers must provide clear, specific reasons for termination to facilitate judicial review. The case was remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision regarding compliance with Standing Order 12(3).
Questions settled- Does the duration of employment or re-hiring after short breaks automatically confer the status of a 'permanent workman' under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
- Is the statement 'services are no longer required' a sufficient reason for termination under Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
- What is the legal test for distinguishing between a 'permanent workman' and a 'temporary workman' under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
- General Secretary, Attock Cement Pakistan Employees Union vs Messrs1992 PLC 590 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1991-12-24Read full judgment →
- General Manager, National Radio Telecommunication Corporation, Haripur, District Abbottabad vs Muhammad Aslam and 2 others1992 SCMR 2169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arose from a High Court decision granting reinstatement in service to a worker dismissed on allegations of misconduct. The employer contended that because the employee had accepted his accrued service dues following his termination, he was no longer an aggrieved person under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and was estopped from challenging the dismissal. The Supreme Court reviewed the findings of fact and affirmed that misconduct had not been proved by the departmental inquiry. Addressing the legal effect of receiving service dues, the Supreme Court held that mere acceptance of earned legal dues does not constitute a waiver or debar an employee from seeking reinstatement, unless the employee accepted the payment as a full and final settlement intending to sever all ties. On the issue of back benefits, the Court held that back benefits do not automatically follow reinstatement. Since the employee failed to assert that he remained unemployed during the relevant period, the employer was not required to prove gainful employment. Consequently, the High Court's reinstatement order was upheld, but modified to deny back benefits.
Questions settled- Does the mere acceptance of earned legal dues by a dismissed worker estop them from challenging their dismissal before a Labour Court?
- Does an order setting aside a dismissal automatically entitle the reinstated employee to back benefits?
- On whom does the onus of proof lie to establish whether a worker remained gainfully employed during the period of illegal termination?
- General Manager, Fauji Sugar Mills vs Haji Muhammad Anwar.1992 PLC 794 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-01-31Read full judgment →
- Garden Silk Weaving Factory vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, .(1992 PTD 307 · Supreme Court of India · 1991-03-22Read full judgment →
- Gall vs Muhammad Iqbal And Another1992 P Cr. L J 1393 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-06Read full judgment →
- Gadoon Textile Mills Ltd vs Assistant Collector And Other1992 PLD Peshawar 191 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-03-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills Limited filed a constitutional petition before the Peshawar High Court challenging the customs authorities' demand for regulatory duty on imported Viscose Staple Fibre at Rs.5 per kg, seeking a refund of duties paid under protest and the release of bank guarantees. The petitioner contended that an exemption notification (SRO No. 517(I)/89) issued under Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969, exempting imported raw materials from the 'whole of the customs duties' for approved industrial units in Gadoon Amazai, also covered regulatory duty. The respondents argued that regulatory duty under Section 18(2) of the Act is distinct from ordinary customs duties and required a separate exemption. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that regulatory duty is in pith and substance an additional customs duty, and that the phrase 'whole of the customs duties' encompasses regulatory duty. The Court held the demand unlawful for the operative period of the notification, ordering a refund of duties paid and the discharge of the relevant bank guarantees.
Questions settled- Whether regulatory duty levied under Section 18(2) of the Customs Act 1969 falls within the legal expression and character of customs duty?
- Whether an exemption granted from the 'whole of the customs duties' under Section 19 of the Customs Act 1969 encompasses regulatory duty levied under Section 18(2) of the same Act?
- Whether regulatory duty requires an independent statutory exemption notification distinct from general exemptions granted under the Customs Act 1969?
- Francis (Muslim Name Mohammad Yaqoob) vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 981 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-07Read full judgment →
- Finance Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others vs Shahid Hussain and others1992 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the validity of promotions granted to employees of the Auditor-General of Pakistan, which were subsequently cancelled by the department. The core legal question was whether the respondents were entitled to promotion against a 33% quota based on seniority-cum-fitness, independent of the 67% quota reserved for those passing the departmental examination, or whether a 'cycle system' (filling vacancies in a 2:1 ratio) mandated by the Establishment Division and Presidential directive was binding. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in prioritizing a Ministry of Finance memorandum over the Presidential directive of 1973 and the Establishment Division's 1983 instructions. The Court ruled that the Establishment Division, under the Rules of Business, holds jurisdiction over civil servant terms and conditions, and its approved 'cycle system' for filling vacancies must be followed. The Court affirmed that civil servants in a junior cadre possess no vested right to promotion in a senior cadre post merely due to quota reservation, and the cancellation of the respondents' tentative promotion orders was legally justified.
Questions settled- Does a civil servant in a junior cadre possess a vested right to promotion in a senior cadre based solely on a quota reservation?
- Which authority has the jurisdiction to lay down terms and conditions of civil servants under the Rules of Business when conflicts arise between Ministry instructions and Establishment Division directives?
- Can a promotion order explicitly made subject to revision be cancelled if it is found to be non-compliant with applicable service rules?
- Fida Hussain Ansari vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2002 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-31Read full judgment →
- Fida Hussain and anothers vs The State1992 SCMR 1513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the conviction of the appellants for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court, having concluded that the incident involved a free fight between parties with mutual mistrust, erred in failing to apply Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which would necessitate altering the conviction to Section 304, Part I. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings clearly established the elements of a sudden fight without premeditation, thereby attracting Exception 4 to Section 300. The Court rejected the appellants' argument for acquittal based on self-defence, noting that under the explanation to Exception 4, it is immaterial which party initiated the assault once the exception is attracted. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304, Part I, and reducing the sentence accordingly. The principle laid down is that where a free fight occurs, the court must apply Exception 4 to Section 300, rendering the conviction under Section 304, Part I, appropriate.
Questions settled- Does a finding of a free fight between parties necessitate the application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Is the question of which party initiated the assault relevant when Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is attracted?
- Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 304, Part I, if the incident is determined to be a sudden fight?
- Fiaz Hussain vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1715 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-18Read full judgment →
- Ferro Alloys Pakistan Ltd. and anothers vs Toyo Manka Ka Isha Ltd. and another1992 SCMR 1700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves appeals arising from a commercial dispute between Ferro Alloys Pakistan Ltd. and Toyo Menka Kaisha Ltd. regarding a shipment of machinery. During the hearing, the Supreme Court encouraged the parties to explore avenues of amicable settlement and cooperation concerning the inspection and testing of the disputed shipment, reserving judgment to facilitate out-of-court discussions. Subsequent communications from counsels for both parties indicated a mutual willingness to cooperate on inspection, testing, and related logistical terms, though certain conditions and counter-proposals were exchanged regarding customs clearance, testing equipment, and substitution liabilities. Without commenting on the merits of the case or the specific proposals, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeals directing the parties to proceed with settling the dispute based on the foundation laid down in their communications, ordering no costs.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court can dispose of appeals based on a framework of amicable settlement established through communications between the parties?
- Can appellate proceedings be concluded by directing parties to resolve their commercial disputes through mutual cooperation and inspection as agreed upon before the court?
- Feroze Din Etc. vs StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 198 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-11Read full judgment →
- Feroze Din and 12 others vs Administrator, R.P.1992 CLC 2430 · Lahore High Court · 1992-08-31Read full judgment →
- Feroze Ahmed vs Mst. Zohra KhatoonK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 284 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-12Read full judgment →
- Feroze Ahmad vs Mst. Zehra Khatoon1992 CLC 735 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 arose from an ejectment order passed against the appellant-tenant on the ground of default in the payment of rent. The core legal questions involved whether the tenant's deposit of rent before the Rent Controller was valid without prior refusal by the landlord, whether the tenant committed a default under section 10 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, and whether the landlord's withdrawal of deposited rent constituted a waiver of the default. The Sindh High Court held that a tenant cannot arbitrarily choose to deposit rent with the Rent Controller without a genuine refusal or avoidance by the landlord to accept it, and that failure to pay rent within the stipulated timeframe constitutes a valid default leading to ejectment. Furthermore, the Court held that the mere withdrawal of deposited arrears by a landlord does not amount to a waiver of the right to seek ejectment unless there is an intentional relinquishment of a known right with full knowledge. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the deposit of rent in the office of the Rent Controller constitute a valid tender without a prior refusal or avoidance by the landlord to accept the rent?
- What is the prescribed time limit for the payment of rent in the absence of a written agreement between the landlord and tenant under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
- Does the withdrawal of arrears of rent by a landlord from the Rent Controller amount to a waiver of the tenant's default in timely payment?
- What are the consequences under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 once a tenant commits a default in the payment of rent within the prescribed period?
- Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabads vs Zafar Awan, Advocate, High Court1992 PLD Supreme Court 72 · Federal Shariat Court · 1991-11-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Federation of Pakistan appealed against a Federal Shariat Court judgment declaring Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Section 6(5) of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958 repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal question was whether statutory requirements for prior government sanction to prosecute public servants for acts performed in the discharge of official duties violate Islamic principles of equality and access to justice. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that these provisions create an unguided, absolute impediment to an aggrieved party's right to seek judicial redress. The Court held that while the legislature may establish specialized forums for administrative accountability, it cannot grant immunity or restrict access to justice through arbitrary executive discretion. The foundational principle laid down is that public power is a trust, and all functionaries must be accountable; therefore, any law shielding public servants from judicial scrutiny without providing a regulated, independent avenue for redress is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The Court extended the deadline for legislative amendment to June 30, 1992.
Questions settled- Are provisions requiring prior government sanction for the prosecution of public servants repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
- Does the requirement of prior sanction for prosecuting a public servant constitute a procedural matter or a substantive right?
- Can the legislature establish exclusive forums for adjudicating claims against public servants without violating the right to seek judicial redress?
- Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Law, Justice And Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad And Other vs Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao And Other1992 PLD Supreme Court 723 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This case arose from the dissolution of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) Assembly and Cabinet by the Governor on August 6, 1990, under Article 112(2)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan. The outgoing Chief Minister challenged the order via a constitutional petition. The Peshawar High Court accepted the petition and restored the Assembly, holding that presidential approval was not established and Order XXVIIA, Rule 1 Cr.P.C. did not require notice to the Attorney-General when the Federation was already represented. The Federation and Provincial Government appealed to the Supreme Court.
The core legal questions were: whether compliance with Order XXVIIA, Rule 1 C.P.C. is mandatory when substantial constitutional questions are determined; whether the Governor's dissolution order satisfied the objective requirements of Article 112(2)(b); and whether widespread defections and political corruption justify assembly dissolution.
The Supreme Court, by majority, accepted the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment. The ratio holds that compliance with Order XXVIIA, Rule 1 C.P.C. is mandatory in constitutional matters involving interpretation of constitutional law. Further, political defection and corruption defeat the representative mandate, providing valid, objective grounds for dissolving an assembly under Article 112(2)(b).
Questions settled- Is notice to the Attorney-General for Pakistan under Order XXVIIA, Rule 1 C.P.C. mandatory in constitutional petitions involving substantial questions of constitutional law?
- Does widespread floor-crossing and political defection constitute a valid ground for dissolving a Provincial Assembly under Article 112(2)(b) of the Constitution?
- Can a High Court determine constitutional questions affecting the Federal Government without issuing notice to the Attorney-General when the Federation is already a party represented by counsel?
- Are the grounds for dissolution of an assembly under Article 112(2)(b) subject to objective evaluation through judicial review?
- Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, Islamabad vs Mirza Muhammad Irfan Baig and 4 others1992 SCMR 2430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court was filed by the Federation of Pakistan against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a writ petition filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The respondents qualified the 1988 C.S.S. Examination but failed to secure allocation within the Punjab quota due to poor merit. They sought adjustment against vacancies caused by repeaters and non-joiners based on an Establishment Division Memorandum dated 19-4-1988, which was subsequently superseded by a Memorandum dated 1-7-1989 providing for such vacancies to be carried over to the next competitive examination. The core legal question was whether the respondents had acquired a vested right under the earlier memorandum to be adjusted against the vacancies, which could not be taken away retrospectively by the subsequent memorandum. The Supreme Court held that the respondents had not acquired a vested right as the recruitment notice expressly reserved the government's power to make changes before finalising appointments. Consequently, the appeal was accepted and the High Court's judgment was set aside.
Questions settled- Whether candidates appearing in a competitive examination acquire a vested right to be adjusted against vacancies left by repeaters and non-joiners under an existing government memorandum?
- Can the Government alter its recruitment policy or carry forward vacancies to the next competitive examination before appointments are finalized?
- Is a writ petitioner who appeared in an examination under a specific public notice permitted to challenge the validity of conditions contained in that notice?
- Does a change in government policy regarding the filling of repeater or non-joiner vacancies prior to the finalization of appointments violate any accrued rights of candidates?
- Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance, Islamabad and 41992 SCMR 1898 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment addresses civil appeals against a High Court decision annulling recovery notices for short-levied customs duties. The core legal questions revolved around the applicability of Section 32(2) and the mandatory nature of the six-month notice period under Section 32(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, for duties short-levied due to inadvertence or error. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the notices issued beyond the prescribed six-month period were without lawful authority. The Court held that the six-month period in Section 32(3) is mandatory, not merely directory, and that recovery of money after a statutorily prescribed period becomes unenforceable. It further clarified that discretionary relief should not be denied to a party legally entitled to it, especially when no fault is attributable to them, and emphasized the strict construction of financial statutes.
Questions settled- Is the six-month period for issuing recovery notices under Section 32(3) of the Customs Act, 1969, for short-levied duties due to inadvertence, error, or misconstruction, mandatory or merely directory?
- Can recovery of short-levied customs duties be enforced if the statutory notice period for recovery has lapsed?
- Under what circumstances is Section 32(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, applicable for demanding short-levied duties?
- Should discretionary relief be denied to a party in a constitutional petition when they are not at fault and are legally entitled to the relief?
- Are the terms of a financial statute to be strictly followed when construing it?
- Federation of Pakistan Through Regional Director, Pakistan Narcotics1992 P Cr. L J 1811 · Federal Shariat Court · 1992-03-11Read full judgment →
- Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and others vs M/s.1992 SCMR 710 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1391-08-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from appeals filed by the Federation of Pakistan against High Court judgments that had invalidated the levy of central excise duty on iron and steel plates recovered through ship-breaking activities. The core legal question examined was whether central excise duty could be lawfully levied on ship plates and other items obtained by dismantling ships, given that ship-breaking was argued not to constitute 'manufacture' under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court judgments, holding that the legislature specifically amended the law through successive legislative instruments (Ordinance III of 1988, Ordinance XXII of 1988, and Act VI of 1988) to explicitly bring iron and steel plates recovered from ship-breaking within the tax net. The Court established that excise duty is governed by legislative intent rather than an inviolable theoretical concept restricting it solely to traditional manufacture, and the critical stage for levying the duty is determined by the date of clearance of the goods for home consumption or export pursuant to section 3-C of the Act.
Questions settled- Whether central excise duty is leviable on iron and steel plates recovered through the dismantling or breaking of ships and vessels?
- Does the definition of 'manufacture' under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 preclude the legislature from imposing excise duty on items obtained via ship-breaking?
- At what stage does the liability for central excise duty arise under section 3-C of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
- How should an amended fiscal provision be construed in light of legislative history and the mischief sought to be remedied?
- Federation of Pakistan and others vs Amjad Hussain Dilawari and 21992 SCMR 1270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns three appeals filed by the Federation of Pakistan against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the applicability of customs duty exemptions on imported motor vehicles. The core legal question was whether importers were entitled to customs duty exemptions granted under S.R.O. No. 526(1)/76 after such exemptions were revised or withdrawn by S.R.O. No. 21(1)/78, specifically where the vehicles arrived and Bills of Entry were filed after the withdrawal date. Relying on the precedent established in Federation of Pakistan v. M. Afzal & Sons, the Supreme Court held that the benefit of a customs duty exemption is only available if the importer has filed the Bill of Entry with the Customs authorities before the date the exemption is withdrawn, even if other preparatory steps like opening a letter of credit were taken. Applying this principle, the Court found the respondents liable for customs and regulatory duties as their Bills of Entry were filed after the exemption revision, thereby setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the orders of the Customs authorities.
Questions settled- Does the benefit of a customs duty exemption remain available if an importer has taken effective steps to import goods but has not filed a Bill of Entry before the exemption is withdrawn?
- Is the filing of a Bill of Entry with Customs a mandatory requirement to claim a customs duty exemption that has been subsequently withdrawn?
- Does the rule in Al-Samrez's case regarding customs duty exemptions still hold, or has it been modified by the decision in Federation of Pakistan v. M. Afzal & Sons?
- Fazlur Rahman vs Registration Officer1992 CLC 1278 · Lahore High Court · 1991-10-28Read full judgment →
- Fazeelat Akhtar and another vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Lahore and others1992 SCMR 1146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of an Intra-Court Appeal by the High Court regarding a State land allotment dispute. The High Court had dismissed the petitioners' appeal primarily because they failed to disclose in their initial writ petition that they had previously filed and lost a civil suit concerning the same subject matter, invoking the doctrine of unclean hands. The petitioners argued that the dismissal on these grounds was a matter of judicial discretion, which the learned Single Judge had not exercised against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the land in question had been incorporated into the Gujranwala Permanent Scheme, precluding the grant of proprietary rights to the petitioners. However, the Court observed that consistent government practice dictates offering alternative State land to such affected persons, a process that had not occurred. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, directing the petitioners to apply for alternative land while maintaining their current possession under specific conditions, including sharing produce with any future allottee, pending the final decision of the appeal.
Questions settled- Does the failure to disclose a prior unsuccessful civil suit in a writ petition automatically warrant the dismissal of an Intra-Court Appeal on the ground of unclean hands?
- Is the government practice of offering alternative State land to persons affected by the inclusion of their land in a permanent scheme a legal entitlement or a mere bounty?
- Can the Supreme Court direct the provision of alternative land as an interim measure pending the final adjudication of an appeal regarding land allotment?
- Fazalur Rehman and 2 others vs Messrs Nagaria Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi1992 PLC 790 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-10Read full judgment →
- Fazal Muhammad vs Mst. Chohara and others1992 SCMR 2182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 27-1-1992, which set aside the appellate court's judgment and restored the trial court's dismissal of the petitioner's suit. The core legal question concerns the validity of a registered will deed executed by the predecessor-in-interest in favour of the petitioner, who was a presumptive heir, without the consent of other legal heirs. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Muhammadan Law, a will in favour of an heir is invalid unless all other heirs consent to it. Since the other heirs disputed the will in their written statement, the bequest could not take effect. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision and established the principle that a testamentary disposition in favour of a legal heir requires the unanimous consent of the remaining heirs to be legally valid and enforceable.
Questions settled- Is a will executed in favour of a legal heir valid under Muhammadan Law without the consent of the other heirs?
- Can an unverified additional written statement not mentioned in the court order sheet be relied upon to prove a claim?
- Does a will in favour of a presumptive heir require the consent of all other heirs to take effect?
- Fazal Hussain vs Mst. Musharraf Sultana1992 PLD Lahore 250 · Lahore High Court · 1992-03-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an application for the restoration of a civil revision petition that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses the inherent jurisdiction to restore a civil revision petition dismissed in default, despite the absence of an express provision in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 analogous to those governing suits or appeals. The Court held that while the Code does not contain a specific provision for restoring a civil revision, it does not prohibit such action. Relying on the principle that tribunals possess inherent power to correct errors and prevent the abuse of process to ensure justice, the Court affirmed that it has the inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to recall an order of dismissal in default and restore the petition. The key principle laid down is that the inherent power of the Court is designed to meet situations not covered by express provisions, and it may be invoked to promote justice and rectify procedural omissions.
Questions settled- Does the High Court have the inherent power to restore a civil revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution?
- Are the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 or Order XLI Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to civil revision petitions?
- Can a court invoke Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to recall an order of dismissal in default in the absence of an express statutory provision?
- Fazal Ghani vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 373 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-09-03Read full judgment →
- Fazal Din vs Ahmed through his Legal Heirs, and others,1992 CLC 615 · Board of Revenue · 1990-06-25Read full judgment →
- Fazal Din vs Ahmad Through His Legal HeirsK.L.R. 1992 Revenue Cases 211 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1990-07-25Read full judgment →
- Fazal Ahmed and another vs Naeem Akhtar and 2 others1992 MLD 251 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1991-11-14Read full judgment →
- Fayyaz Hussain vs Tahir Naseem1992 PLD Karachi 423 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal concerns the dismissal of a recovery suit on the grounds of Order II, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appellant had previously sued for recovery of three loan instalments and subsequently filed a second suit for the remaining balance. The lower courts dismissed the second suit, reasoning that the entire claim should have been included in the first suit. The core legal question was whether the second suit was barred under Order II, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, given the appellant's claim that the loan was repayable in monthly instalments. The High Court held that Order II, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, only bars subsequent suits where the cause of action for the entire claim had already accrued at the time of the first suit. Since the loan was repayable in instalments, the cause of action for the remaining balance had not accrued when the first suit was filed. The Court established that a plaintiff is not barred from suing for subsequent instalments that were not due at the time of the initial litigation.
Questions settled- Does Order II, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a subsequent suit for loan instalments that had not yet fallen due at the time of the first suit?
- Is a plaintiff permitted to adduce oral evidence regarding the mode of loan repayment when the written mortgage agreement is silent on the matter?
- Can a court reject a party's uncontroverted sworn testimony regarding the terms of a loan agreement?
- Fatima Moeen vs Additional District Judge, Sheikhupura and 22 others1992 SCMR 1199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appellant, upon returning from abroad, filed a suit for declaration and joint possession challenging the alienation of her property by her guardian during her minority without the Guardian Judge's permission. The defendants sought rejection of the plaint as time-barred. The Trial Court dismissed the application, holding limitation to be a mixed question of law and fact, but the revisional court reversed this and rejected the plaint. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the High Court and the revisional court. The Court held that a plaint can only be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) if the suit appears to be barred by law from the statement in the plaint itself. Since the determination of limitation involved disputed facts, including the appellant's age, subsequent alienations, and adverse possession, it could not be decided summarily without framing issues and recording evidence.
Questions settled- Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground of limitation if the determination of limitation requires the resolution of disputed questions of fact?
- Whether a subsequent alienation of property or invasion of rights provides a fresh cause of action for a declaratory suit?
- Is a summary rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 sustainable when the plaintiff has prayed for joint possession which carries a twelve-year limitation period?
- Fateh Muhammad vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1549 · Lahore High Court · 1991-09-24Read full judgment →
- Fateh Muhammad vs Director, Agricultural Engineering1992 PLC 1250 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-17Read full judgment →
- Fateh Mohammad vs Muhammad Ali HassanK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 507 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-10Read full judgment →
- Fateh Khan and others vs Mst. Begum Jan and others1992 CLC 1817 · Lahore High Court · 1992-04-29Read full judgment →
- Farrukh K. Captain. vs Exxon Chemical Pakistan Ltd. and 8 others.PTCL 1992- CL.103 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-28Read full judgment →
- Farooz vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 284 · Lahore High Court · 1991-12-23Read full judgment →
- Farooq Ur Rehman vs The State1992 MLD 349 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-04-21Read full judgment →
- Farooq Hussain vs Muhammad Saleem Khan1992 CLC 2276 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged an order passed by the Rent Controller striking off the appellant's defence and directing the vacation of the premises due to non-compliance with a tentative rent order. The respondent had filed an eviction application under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, alleging default in rent payment. A consent tentative rent order was previously passed requiring the appellant to deposit future rent in the specific rent case. The appellant subsequently deposited rent for certain months in a separate Miscellaneous Rent Case rather than the current rent case, and failed to deposit rent for August 1990 by the due date. The Court held that depositing rent in a different case file, contrary to the explicit terms of a consent tentative rent order, constitutes a violation of that order. Furthermore, the unexplained delay in depositing rent for August 1990 confirmed the default. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the striking off of the defence and ordering the appellant to vacate the premises, establishing that strict adherence to the terms of a tentative rent order is mandatory to avoid eviction.
Questions settled- Does depositing rent in a separate miscellaneous case file instead of the specific rent case constitute a violation of a tentative rent order?
- Can a tenant's defence be struck off for failing to comply with a consent tentative rent order regarding the place of deposit?
- Is an unexplained delay in depositing rent sufficient grounds to uphold an order striking off a tenant's defence?
- Farman Ali vs Muhammad Yousaf Ali And Another1992 PLD Supreme Court 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing an application for restoration of a revision petition, which had been dismissed for non-prosecution, along with an application for condonation of delay. The core legal question was whether a litigant should suffer for the omission or negligence of the court office in failing to place a newly engaged counsel's power of attorney on the judicial file and omitting their name from the cause list, coupled with the previous counsel's statement of 'no instructions'. The Supreme Court held that a party cannot be penalized for the mistakes or omissions of the court or its office, and that nobody should suffer for acts of the court. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, condoned the delay, restored the revision petition, and remanded it back to the High Court for a decision on merits.
Questions settled- Whether a litigant can be penalized for the failure of the court office to place a newly filed power of attorney on the judicial file?
- Does a party suffer prejudice when an office omission results in a new counsel having no notice of the date of hearing?
- Can a revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution due to institutional default be restored after condoning the delay?