Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Malik Fazalur Rehman vs Post Master-General and anothers1991 PLC (C.S.) 953 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1990-10-15Read full judgment →
• Malik Azharul Haq vs Director of Food, Punjab, Lahore And Another1991 SCMR 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-02
  civil servicewrongful dismissalreinstatementcriminal acquittaldepartmental inquiryback benefitsEfficiency and Discipline Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Senior Clerk, was dismissed from service following his conviction by a Special Judge. Subsequently, the Lahore High Court allowed his appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted him. The departmental authorities refused his reinstatement, citing that the acquittal was not honourable. The Punjab Service Tribunal upheld this decision. The Supreme Court examined whether the dismissal, predicated solely on a conviction that was later overturned, could be sustained. The Court held that Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, which allows for dismissal without inquiry upon conviction, is inapplicable once the conviction is set aside. The Court emphasized that when a conviction is reversed, the foundational basis for the removal order disappears. Furthermore, the Court clarified that departmental action following a criminal acquittal must adhere to established inquiry procedures unless specific exemptions apply. Consequently, the Court set aside the dismissal and directed the reinstatement of the appellant with full back benefits, ruling that the order of removal could not be maintained after the underlying conviction was vacated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be dismissed under Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules if their underlying criminal conviction has been set aside?
  • Does an acquittal on the benefit of doubt preclude a civil servant from reinstatement if the dismissal was based solely on a conviction that was later overturned?
  • Is a formal departmental inquiry mandatory for a civil servant if the summary dismissal procedure under Rule 9 is inapplicable?
  • Does the reversal of a criminal conviction automatically invalidate a dismissal order based exclusively on that conviction?
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• Malik Amir Khan vs Muhammad Ishaque And Other1991 SCMR 1483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-22
  declaratory suitconsequential reliefpossessionrevenue recordleave to appealKhatedar
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of a civil suit filed by the petitioner against the respondents seeking a declaration of being the sole Khatedar of the suit-land along with a permanent injunction. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the respondents were in possession for over 16 years, had paid the price of the land, had mutations attested in their favour, and that the suit for mere declaration without seeking consequential relief of possession was not maintainable. The District Judge and the High Court concurrently dismissed the petitioner's appeal and revision respectively. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that the respondents were in occupation as tenants and had been allowed transfer of the property by Colonization Authorities, and furthermore, since the petitioner was out of possession for over 15 years, the suit in its declaratory form without a prayer for consequential relief of possession was barred under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for mere declaration maintainable when the plaintiff is out of possession and fails to seek the consequential relief of possession?
  • Does a declaratory suit fail under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 if the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property for over fifteen years?
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• Malik Aman vs Khawaja Abdul Aziz Through Legal Heirs1991 SCMR 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-25
  ejectment proceedingsstriking off defenserent depositdefault in payment of rentSindh Rented Premises Ordinancesubstantial compliancetenancy dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Sindh High Court upholding the striking off of the appellant-tenant's defense in an ejectment proceeding. The core legal question was whether the tenant's deposit of rent in a separate Miscellaneous Rent Case, initiated due to a tenancy dispute, constituted sufficient compliance with the Rent Controller's order to deposit rent in the ejectment proceedings, thereby precluding the striking off of the defense under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Rent Controller and the High Court. The Court held that the tenant had made a genuine effort to pay the rent, and the failure to transfer the funds from the separate case account to the ejectment case was not a willful default but an administrative irregularity. The principle established is that where a tenant has deposited rent in court with the clear intention of payment, technical errors in the specific case account number or failure to transfer funds due to procedural hurdles do not constitute willful non-compliance warranting the penal striking off of the defense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of rent in a separate miscellaneous rent case constitute compliance with a Rent Controller's order to deposit rent in an ejectment proceeding?
  • Can a defense be struck off for non-compliance with a rent deposit order when the tenant has already deposited the funds in court under a different case number?
  • Is the failure to transfer deposited rent funds from one case account to another due to administrative hurdles sufficient grounds for striking off a tenant's defense?
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• Malik Altaf Sikandar, Advocate vs Zohra Bano And Other1991 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-17
  dissolution of marriagehabitual crueltyfamily courtwrit jurisdictionexpunction of remarksletters patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the dissolution of marriage on the ground of habitual cruelty. The respondent had filed a suit for dissolution of marriage before the Family Court, which was decreed in her favor after finding the appellant's conduct to be habitually cruel. The appellant challenged the decree through a writ petition and subsequently a Letters Patent Appeal, both of which were dismissed. Upon the hearing of the present appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellant sought permission to withdraw the appeal subject to the expunction of certain remarks concerning his mental state made in the judgment of the Family Court. The Supreme Court held that there was no objection to expunging the specified words while maintaining the findings on habitual cruelty and the decree for dissolution of marriage. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the expunction of the objectionable remarks, making no order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether findings of a factual nature rendered by a Family Court can be disturbed in writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can objectionable remarks regarding a party's mental state be expunged from a judgment while maintaining the decree for dissolution of marriage?
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• Malik Aftab Aslam vs Mian Altaf Ahmad and OtherK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 214 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-02Read full judgment →
• Malhi Khan vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 2 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-29
  pre-emptiontenant pre-emptionMartial Law Regulation 115Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913cantonment area exemptionconstitutional repugnancyfederal and provincial laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two civil appeals arising from judgments of the Lahore High Court concerning pre-emption suits filed by tenants under paragraph 25(3)(d) of Martial Law Regulation 115 (M.L.R. 115). The core legal question was whether the superior right of pre-emption granted to tenants under M.L.R. 115 can be defeated, controlled, or limited by provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, specifically exemptions or exclusions under section 8 of the said Act, or by requirements to hold the right on the date of the suit and decree. The Supreme Court held that paragraph 25(3)(d) of M.L.R. 115 creates a substantive, overriding socio-economic right for tenants that prevails over provincial legislation pursuant to Article 143 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that restrictions such as section 8 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act cannot frustrate or destroy the tenant's right of pre-emption, and that procedural or limitation matters continue to be governed by the 1913 Act while substantive tenancy pre-emption rights remain paramount. Both appeals were accordingly accepted and the tenants' suits were decreed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of pre-emption granted to a tenant under paragraph 25(3)(d) of M.L.R. 115 override conflicting provisions and exemptions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Can a notification issued under section 8 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, defeat a tenant's right of pre-emption provided by M.L.R. 115?
  • Whether the provisions of M.L.R. 115 prevail over provincial enactments to the extent of repugnancy under Article 143 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Must a tenant exercising pre-emption under M.L.R. 115 maintain their tenant status on the date of the suit and the date of the decree as required by the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
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• MAkbar, Ca for Appellant (in -91) Qudrat Ullah, D. for Appellant (in -91) vs Oudrat Ullah, D.R. for Respondent (in ,13 of 1990-91) . M. Akbar, Ca for Respondent1991 PTD (Trib.) 1068 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1991-03-25Read full judgment →
• Major, General (Retd.) Sher Ali Khan vs Commissioner of Incometax and Gift Tax1991 PLD Supreme Court 422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-30
  gift taxvaluation of agricultural landassessment yearcharging sectionretrospective operationfiscal statutestax liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the valuation of agricultural land for gift tax purposes. The appellant gifted land on April 28, 1971, falling within the assessment year 1971-72. The Gift Tax Officer valued the land based on market price, rejecting the appellant's request to apply Rule 9(3B) of the Gift Tax Rules, 1963, which was notified on July 29, 1971. The High Court upheld the assessment, reasoning that the rule could not apply retrospectively to the date of the gift. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that Section 3 of the Gift Tax Act, 1963, is the charging section, not Section 6, which merely prescribes valuation methods. Because the tax is chargeable for the assessment year commencing July 1, 1971, the law in force at the start of that assessment year governs the valuation. Consequently, the Court held that the valuation must be determined in accordance with Rule 9(3B). The appeal was accepted, setting aside the lower authorities' orders and directing the valuation to be recalculated under the specified rule.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 6 or Section 3 of the Gift Tax Act, 1963, the charging section for the purpose of determining tax liability?
  • Does the valuation of a gift made during a previous year depend on the law in force at the time of the gift or the law in force at the commencement of the assessment year?
  • Can Rule 9(3B) of the Gift Tax Rules, 1963, be applied to determine the value of agricultural land gifted prior to the notification of the rule but falling within the relevant assessment year?
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• Major Riaz Ahmad Rashid and others vs The State and others1991 CLC 277 · Board of Revenue · 1990-08-13
  evacuee propertyland allotmentrevenue recordjurisdiction of district collectorrepeal of settlement lawsrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The revision petitions arose from concurrent orders of the District Collector and the Additional Commissioner regarding the ownership and resumption of an evacuee property, Khasra No. 837, situated in Village Fatto Mand, Gujranwala. The core legal question was whether the District Collector had the jurisdiction to reopen and cancel a settled land allotment and resume the property in favour of the Provincial Government long after the repeal of the settlement laws, and whether entries longstanding in the revenue record could be disturbed on a belated miscellaneous application. The Board of Revenue held that following the repeal of the settlement laws by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, settled matters and long-standing entries attaining finality in the revenue record could not be re-opened by the District Collector on a miscellaneous application, rendering the resumption orders void. The key principle laid down is that after the repeal of the evacuee settlement laws, revenue authorities lack jurisdiction to entertain miscellaneous applications to disturb settled property allotments and long-standing revenue records that have attained finality.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the District Collector has jurisdiction to reopen and cancel a land allotment after the repeal of the settlement laws?
  • Can long-standing entries in the revenue record and finalized property rights be disturbed on a miscellaneous application?
  • Whether revenue authorities are competent to resume settled evacuee land in favour of the Provincial Government years after finalization?
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• Major (Retd.) Wazir Ahmad And Another vs Federation of Pakistan1991 SCMR 438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-04
  seniority fixationsecondmentAirport Security Forceadministrative decisionleave to appealvested rightsservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals regarding the determination of their seniority. The petitioners, formerly Majors in the Pakistan Army, were seconded to the Airport Security Force (A.S.F.) as Assistant Directors. Initially, the Establishment Division approved a seniority fixation placing the petitioners above officers promoted to Assistant Director after the petitioners' secondment. However, the A.S.F. subsequently issued a memorandum disturbing this seniority by counting it only from the date of their permanent induction into the A.S.F., contrary to the earlier approved decision. The petitioners challenged this change, arguing that the initial seniority determination, having been approved by the competent authority, could not be unilaterally altered without notice. The Supreme Court observed that the conflicting views regarding the petitioners' seniority raised significant legal questions, particularly regarding the finality of administrative decisions and the propriety of altering seniority without notice. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the initial seniority determination could be lawfully disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a competent authority unilaterally alter a previously approved seniority determination without providing notice to the affected civil servants?
  • Does the permanent absorption of seconded officers into a new service allow for the retrospective disturbance of seniority rights previously established by the competent authority?
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• Major (Retd.) S.A. Qayyum vs Secretary (Urban) And Other1991 SCMR 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-24
  settlement disputeevacuee propertyconstitutional jurisdictionfactual findingspermanent transfer deedleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the ownership of 20 marlas of land, which the petitioner claimed was part of a property known as 'Chappar' previously transferred to his predecessors-in-interest. Conversely, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had transferred the same land to respondent No. 3 via a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD), who subsequently sold it to respondent No. 4. The petitioner challenged the High Court's dismissal of his constitutional petition, which had declined to interfere with the Settlement Authorities' findings. The core legal question was whether the disputed land constituted part of the 'Chappar' property or remained available for transfer as evacuee property. The Supreme Court observed that the Settlement Authorities had thoroughly examined the factual record and determined the land was not part of the 'Chappar' property. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court correctly refused to interfere with these factual findings in its constitutional jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not re-examine concurrent findings of fact made by specialized Settlement Authorities when exercising constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings made by Settlement Authorities in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is a dispute regarding whether a specific plot of land is part of a previously transferred property a question of fact?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition that relies on concurrent findings of fact by lower authorities?
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• Major (Retd.) Iftikhar Aziz Ahmad vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Establishment Division, Rawalpindi And 71 Other1991 SCMR 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-22
  civil serviceinductionsenioritylocus poenitentiaeFederal Public Service Commissionvoid orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired army officer selected for induction into the civil service in 1979, sought leave to appeal against the Federal Service Tribunal's judgment dismissing his appeal. His initial induction notification was subsequently revoked by the Government and his date of induction was deferred from 19-12-1979 to 9-8-1981, altering his seniority. The core legal question was whether the President had the locus poenitentiae to revoke the earlier induction notification and whether the initial induction bypassing the Federal Public Service Commission was lawful. The Supreme Court held that in 1979 the President lacked the power to bypass the Federal Public Service Commission, rendering the initial induction ab initio void and a nullity in law. The Court ruled that the subsequent revocation was not an exercise of locus poenitentiae but a lawful correction of a void order and an error. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the Service Tribunal's decision and establishing that void administrative actions lacking statutory backing can be corrected without invoking the doctrine of locus poenitentiae.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the President possessed the power in 1979 to induct officers into the civil service by bypassing the Federal Public Service Commission?
  • Can the revocation of an illegal and void induction order be challenged on the basis of the doctrine of locus poenitentiae?
  • Whether an initial induction order that is ab initio in conflict with the law can be treated as a nullity and corrected subsequently?
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• Maj. Pervez Shakoor and 4 others vs Muhammad Usman1991 MLD 536 · Lahore High Court · 1990-10-02Read full judgment →
• Maj. (Retd.) Khaliq-Uz-Zaman vs Chairman, Board of Directors, Ghee1991 PLC (C.S.) 519 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-16Read full judgment →
• Mahr Sakhi Muhammad vs Board of Arbitrators And Another1991 SCMR 1511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-10
  arbitration awardintra-court appealterritorial jurisdictionmarket committeeleave to appealprocedural validitydealer and grower dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court in an Intra-Court Appeal, which had set aside an arbitration award regarding a cotton sale/purchase contract. The dispute was initially adjudicated by the Arbitration Board of the Market Committee, Khanewal, which ruled in favor of the petitioner. The High Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, declared the award without lawful authority, citing two primary grounds: that the dispute was between two dealers rather than a dealer and a grower, and that the Market Committee lacked territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner challenged this decision, arguing that the findings were factually and legally erroneous regarding the nature of the parties' relationship and the territorial scope of the Committee's authority. Additionally, the petitioner raised a procedural objection regarding the validity of the High Court's judgment, noting it was signed by only one of the two judges who heard the Intra-Court Appeal. Finding that the contentions raised by the petitioner required further examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address these substantial questions of law and procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Intra-Court Appeal judgment signed by only one of the two judges who heard the case constitute a valid judgment?
  • Does the Arbitration Board of a Market Committee have jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between two dealers?
  • What constitutes a proper reference to arbitration under the rules governing Market Committees?
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• Mahni And 2 Others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner And Another1991 SCMR 1326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18
  leave to appealauction cancellationconstitutional jurisdictionquestion of factwrit petitionsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petition against the order of the Settlement Authorities regarding the cancellation of an auction. The dispute concerns land measuring 25 kanals and 10 marlas, which was auctioned to the petitioners after being recovered as Darya Burd land. Upon an application by villagers alleging a lack of publicity and proclamation for the auction, the Deputy Commissioner cancelled the auction proceedings. The High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition, holding that the adequacy of publicity is a question of fact not warranting interference in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court considered the record and concluded that the finding of fact was properly reached by the Deputy Commissioner after appreciating the evidence, and no legal defect existed in the findings of the courts below. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of proper publicity and proclamation of an auction constitutes a question of fact?
  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact regarding auction proceedings in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against concurrent factual findings of lower forums regarding auction cancellation?
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• Mahmoodul Hassan vs Town Committee, Sialkot and others1991 CLC 1549 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-23Read full judgment →
• Mahmoodul Hassan vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1205 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-27Read full judgment →
• Mahmoodul Hassan Naqvi vs Government of Sindh and another1991 PLC (C.S.) 1017 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1990-11-15Read full judgment →
• Mahmoodul Hassan Naqvi vs Government of Sindh & Another(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Secvice Cases 251) · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1990-11-15Read full judgment →
• Mahmooda Begum vs District Magistrate, Sialkot and 2 others1991 PLD Lahore 230 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-06
  cinema license suspensionMotion Pictures Ordinance 1979Punjab Cinematograph Rules 1984Licensing Authorityobscenitydepartmental actionultra vireswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 challenged an order by the District Magistrate, Sialkot, suspending a cinema license for two months following the exhibition of obscene films. The petitioner contended that the raid and subsequent suspension were illegal, arguing that the District Magistrate lacked authority under the Motion Pictures Ordinance 1979 and that the relevant Punjab Cinematograph Rules 1984 were ultra vires. The Court held that the District Magistrate, having been designated as the Licensing Authority, possesses the inherent power to suspend or cancel a license for breach of conditions or rules, independent of criminal proceedings. It determined that Rule 80, authorizing inspection of premises, and Rule 109, governing suspension, are intra vires the Ordinance. The Court clarified that departmental action under Rule 109 is distinct from criminal penalties under Section 18 of the Ordinance and does not require a prior criminal conviction. Finding that the petitioner was afforded due process and that the allegations of mala fides were unsubstantiated, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the authority's power to regulate cinema exhibitions to prevent obscenity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the District Magistrate, as the Licensing Authority, have the power to suspend a cinema license for breach of rules independent of a criminal conviction?
  • Are Rule 80 and Rule 109 of the Punjab Cinematograph Rules 1984 ultra vires the Motion Pictures Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the power to grant a license under the Motion Pictures Ordinance 1979 imply the power to suspend or cancel it for violations?
  • Is departmental action for license suspension under the Punjab Cinematograph Rules 1984 contingent upon a prior criminal conviction under the Motion Pictures Ordinance 1979?
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• Mahmood Shariff vs Mst. Tehseen Iqbal and another1991 CLC 972 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-27Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Shah vs Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 21991 PLC (C.S.) 572 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1990-07-22Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Shah vs I.G. Police, Punjab and 2 Other(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 9) · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1990-07-22Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Khan vs Muhammad Hasan And 7 Other1991 SCMR 1566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-29
  declaratory suitlimitationtime-barred suitminorityconcurrent findingssale deedcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision regarding a declaratory suit. The petitioner sought a declaration of ownership and joint possession of disputed land, challenging a sale deed executed on his behalf by his uncle in 1947, claiming it was void against his interest. The respondents contested the suit, raising defenses of limitation, insufficient court-fee, and estoppel, noting the petitioner's long-standing silence since 1947. The trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court concurrently dismissed the petitioner's suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the petitioner, who was a minor at the time of the 1947 sale, attained the age of majority in 1964. However, the suit was not filed until 1984. Consequently, the Court held that the suit was clearly barred by the law of limitation. Finding no substance in the petition, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the time-barred nature of the claim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit challenging a sale deed executed during the plaintiff's minority is maintainable if filed twenty years after attaining the age of majority?
  • Does a suit filed decades after the cause of action accrued, where the plaintiff attained majority long before filing, constitute a time-barred claim?
  • Can a civil revision be maintained against concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the limitation period?
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• Mahmood Ahmed vs Feroze Din1991 MLD 975 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1991-01-16Read full judgment →
• Mahfooz Khan through Legal Heirs vs Mst. Zubeda Khatoon1991 MLD 1854 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-02Read full judgment →
• Maheea and 5 others vs Shaiya and 7 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-08
  inheritancemurderer exclusionsuccessionQisas and Diyat OrdinanceMuslim law of inheritancedebarment from succession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the High Court which dismissed the appellants' Regular Second Appeal in an inheritance dispute. Appellant No. 1 was convicted of the culpable homicide of his father, Ramzan, which conviction was altered on appeal to section 304 Part-II, Pakistan Penal Code. Both the appellant and his progeny (appellants Nos. 2 to 6) were excluded from inheriting the deceased's property based on the Muslim law principle that a murderer and his descendants are disqualified from inheriting from the victim. The core legal question was whether the heirs of a murderer are also excluded from inheriting the victim's estate. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the controversy has been statutorily settled by the promulgation of Ordinance I of 1991 (Qisas and Diyat Ordinance), which introduced amended provisions into the Pakistan Penal Code barring persons who commit certain homicides from succession. The key principle laid down is that under statutory provisions incorporating Islamic injunctions, a person who commits culpable homicide is debarred from succession to the estate of the victim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a murderer is excluded from inheriting the property of his victim under Muslim law?
  • Are the descendants of a murderer also debarred from inheriting the estate of the victim?
  • How does the enactment of the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance affect the succession rights of a person committing homicide and their progeny?
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• Mahboob Khan and 242 others vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Railways Islamabad and 5 others1991 PLC (C.S.) 415 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-05
  Pakistan Railwayscivil servantssupervisory staffjurisdiction barFederal Service Tribunallocus poenitentiaepiece work allowanceworkmen definitionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of multiple connected constitutional petitions filed by supervisory staff of Pakistan Railways (Sub-Engineers, Chargemen, and Foremen in BPS-11 to 16) challenging a Railway Administration recommendation and notification that modified and altered their entitlement to consolidated piece-work profit/allowance. The petitioners argued that piece-work profits granted via prior notifications created a vested right under the principle of locus poenitentiae that could not be rescinded. The respondents raised preliminary objections asserting that the petitioners were civil servants whose terms and conditions were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal, thereby barring High Court jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Lahore High Court examined Articles 212, 240, and 260 of the Constitution alongside Section 2(b) of the Civil Servants Act 1973, Section 2(h) of the Factories Act 1934, and Section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923. The Court held that supervisory staff are neither 'workers' nor 'workmen' under the statutory exceptions, but are civil servants in the Service of Pakistan. Consequently, the High Court held that the petitions were incompetent and barred by Article 212 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Are supervisory staff of Pakistan Railways in Grades 11 to 16 classified as civil servants under Section 2(b) of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 to entertain service disputes of Railway supervisory staff in light of the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether supervisory Railway staff performing administrative or supervisory duties fall under the statutory exceptions of 'worker' or 'workman' under the Factories Act 1934 or Workmen's Compensation Act 1923?
  Read full judgment →
• Mah Mood Ahmad Etc vs Ghulam Rasool EtcK.L.R. 1991 Revenue Cases 66 · Lahore High Court · 1990-11-24Read full judgment →
• Madrassa Darul Aloom Albaqiatulsalihat vs Additional,District1991 CLC 882 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-16Read full judgment →
• Madar Ali alias Muhammad Ali Khan and anothers vs The State1991 MLD 2564 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-05-15Read full judgment →
• Madad Ali Shah vs Revenue Minister and others1991 MLD 2394 · Lahore High Court · 1991-11-27Read full judgment →
• M.Z. Haq vs Mst. Umtul Hamid Begum and 3 others1991 CLC 1036 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-11Read full judgment →
• M.K.Mohammad and Other vs Mohammad AboobakerK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 371 · Sindh High Court · 1990-10-21Read full judgment →
• M.K. Muhammad and anothers vs Muhammad Aboobakar1991 MLD 801 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-13
  ejectmentpugripersonal bona fide requirementrent defaultgoodwillstatutory righttenancy agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  The appeal challenged an ejectment order granted on grounds of default and personal bona fide requirement. The appellant contended that the landlord was estopped from seeking eviction because the landlord had accepted "pugri" (goodwill) and agreed not to eject the tenant. The core legal question was whether an agreement to pay "pugri" creates a binding contract that overrides the landlord's statutory right to seek eviction for personal use. The Court held that an agreement to charge "pugri" is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act 1872, as it conflicts with statutory provisions. The Court ruled that a landlord is not debarred from seeking eviction for personal bona fide need simply because "pugri" was accepted. Furthermore, statutory rights to eviction cannot be waived by private contract. The Court also determined that "pugri" payments cannot be unilaterally adjusted against rent arrears absent a specific agreement. Consequently, the eviction order was upheld, though the Court directed the refund of the "pugri" amount upon the tenant's vacation of the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acceptance of 'pugri' (goodwill) by a landlord legally bar them from seeking the tenant's eviction on the grounds of personal bona fide requirement?
  • Can a tenant and landlord contract out of the statutory right of the landlord to seek eviction for personal bona fide need?
  • Is an agreement to pay 'pugri' enforceable if it conflicts with the statutory provisions governing rent restriction?
  • Can a 'pugri' payment be unilaterally adjusted against rent arrears in the absence of an agreement to that effect?
  Read full judgment →
• M.K. Mohammad & Another vs Mohammad AboobakarK.L.R 1991 Civil Cases 656 · Sindh High Court · 1990-10-21Read full judgment →
• M.H. Pandya vs Tax Recovery Officer and others1991 PTD 160 · Gujarat High Court · 1984-12-26Read full judgment →
• M.F.M.Y. Industries Ltd. vs Additional Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 2 others1991 PTD 513 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-06Read full judgment →
• M.D. Traders and Chit Fund Financiers (P.) Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1991 PTD 98 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-15Read full judgment →
• M.D. Tahir, Advocate vs The Managing Director, Pakistan Television1991 P Cr. L J 1674 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-08Read full judgment →
• M.B. Abdullah vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kerala1991 PTD 165 · Supreme Court of India · 1990-03-19Read full judgment →
• M.A. Baqi Khan vs The StateK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 442 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-10Read full judgment →
• M. Salim Khan vs The State and 3 others--1991 P Cr. L J 285 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-15
  superdariinterim custodyquestion of titlecriminal procedurepossession of propertycivil court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Miscellaneous Application challenged an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Jacobabad, which reversed an earlier order of the Additional District Magistrate regarding the interim custody (superdari) of a tractor. The applicant, having sold the tractor to respondents Nos. 3 and 4, alleged they failed to pay the full consideration and subsequently sold the vehicle to respondent No. 2. The core legal question was whether a Criminal Court, while exercising powers under Section 516-A or 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is competent to determine the title of property in dispute between parties. The Court held that Criminal Courts are not competent to investigate or adjudicate upon questions of title, as such jurisdiction lies exclusively with a competent Civil Court. The Court emphasized that in proceedings regarding interim custody, the focus must remain on the entitlement to possession rather than ownership. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application, affirming that the dispute over title must be resolved by a Civil Court, and the Criminal Court's role is limited to determining interim possession based on the circumstances of recovery.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Criminal Court competent to determine the question of title to property in proceedings under Section 516-A or 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should the custody of property be entrusted to a person from whom it was recovered if there is no allegation of crime against that person?
  • Can a High Court interfere with an order passed under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the trial or revisional court takes an erroneous view?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Nawaz Khan, I.T.P. for Appellant. vs Aftab Iqbal Lone, D.R. for Respondent.1991 PTD (Trib.) 541 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-16Read full judgment →
• M. Muzaffar Ali vs Chairman, N.I.R.C. and others1991 PLC 876 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-02
  unfair labour practiceN.I.R.C. jurisdictionwrit petitiondepartmental inquirylawful discharge of dutyindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three consolidated writ petitions challenging the assumption of jurisdiction by the Chairman, National Industrial Relations Commission (N.I.R.C.) regarding complaints of unfair labour practices filed against employees of Pakistan International Airlines. The petitioners, including a Security Officer, a District Manager, and Inquiry Officers, were summoned by the N.I.R.C. following the dismissal of certain staff members. The core legal question was whether the allegations contained in the complaint, even if accepted as true, constituted an 'unfair labour practice' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Upon reviewing the complaint, the Lahore High Court held that the actions taken by the petitioners—namely, submitting reports and conducting departmental inquiries—were performed in the lawful discharge of their official duties and did not fall within the ambit of unfair labour practices defined under Section 15 of the Ordinance. Consequently, the Court ruled that the N.I.R.C. acted in excess of its lawful authority. The impugned notices were declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, establishing that jurisdiction cannot be assumed where the alleged conduct fails to meet the statutory criteria for unfair labour practices.

  Questions settled

  • Does the performance of official duties, such as reporting misconduct or conducting departmental inquiries, constitute an unfair labour practice under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can the National Industrial Relations Commission assume jurisdiction over a complaint that fails to allege facts constituting an unfair labour practice?
  • Are notices issued by the National Industrial Relations Commission without a valid basis in law liable to be set aside in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Muhammad Sadiq And Another vs Punjab Road Transport Board, Lahore Through Managing Director1991 SCMR 2321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-11
  fatal accidentsex parte decreedismissal for defaultappellate procedurecivil procedurenon-appearance of appellantdecision on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855, filed by the appellants following the death of their daughter in a road accident caused by the respondent's driver. The trial court decreed the suit ex parte against the respondent. The respondent appealed to the High Court, but failed to appear on the date of hearing. Despite the respondent's absence, the High Court proceeded to decide the appeal on merits, partially modifying the trial court's decree. The appellants challenged this, arguing that the High Court lacked the authority to decide the appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant. The Supreme Court held that under Order 41, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, while the court has discretion to dismiss an appeal for default or adjourn it when the appellant is absent, it possesses no authority to render a decision on merits in the appellant's absence. A decision on merits requires the hearing of both sides as a condition precedent. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside and the trial court's decree restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court decide an appeal on merits when the appellant fails to appear at the hearing?
  • Is the dismissal of an appeal for non-appearance under Order 41, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory or discretionary?
  • Does the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 permit a court to pass a judgment on merits in the absence of the appellant?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Iqbal Shahid vs Mst. Zohra Khatoon and others1991 CLC 861 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-10Read full judgment →
• M. Iqbal And Others vs S.H.O. and others-1991 P Cr. L J 1354 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-03Read full judgment →
• M. Imamuddin vs Mst. Surriya Khanum through Legal HeirsPLD'1991 Supreme Court 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-01
  tentative rent orderstriking off defencelandlord and tenant relationshipWest Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinancespecific performanceejectment proceedingsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order striking off the appellant's defense for non-compliance with a tentative rent order passed under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions concerned whether a Rent Controller must determine the landlord-tenant relationship before issuing a tentative rent order, whether the High Court possesses co-extensive powers to pass such orders, and whether the appellant’s failure to comply justified the striking of his defense. The Supreme Court held that a prior determination of the landlord-tenant relationship is unnecessary under Section 13(6) unless the tenant explicitly denies the relationship. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the High Court’s appellate powers are co-extensive with those of the Rent Controller. Regarding the specific facts, the Court found no valid justification for the appellant's failure to deposit rent and ruled that the striking of the defense was legally sound. The Court established that the special provisions of the Rent Ordinance prevail over the Transfer of Property Act in cases of inconsistency, and non-compliance with a tentative rent order warrants striking the defense absent uncontrollable circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Must a Rent Controller determine the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship before passing a tentative rent order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Are the powers of the High Court in an appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 co-extensive with those of the Rent Controller?
  • Does the non-compliance with a tentative rent order by a tenant justify the striking off of the defense in the absence of reasons beyond the tenant's control?
  • In case of inconsistency, which prevails: the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 or the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Ashraf Etc. vs Member Board of Revenue Etc.K.L.R. 1991 CivU Cases 107 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-08Read full judgment →
• M. Anwar And Another vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1700 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-02Read full judgment →
• M. Akmal Beg Mirza vs Tahawwar Ali Khan and another1991 CLC 304 · Lahore High Court · 1990-09-24Read full judgment →
• M. A. Baqi Khan vs The State and another1991 PLD Karachi 355 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-10Read full judgment →
• M Uza Mmil Shah vs The State1991 MLD 1944 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-04-08
  sodomychild witnesscorroborationcriminal appealmedical evidencesentencingcompensationcompetency of witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing sodomy against a seven-year-old mentally retarded victim. The core legal question concerns the admissibility and reliability of the testimony provided by a child witness, alongside the sufficiency of the corroborative evidence. The Court held that while the evidence of a child witness requires close and careful scrutiny, it is not inherently inadmissible if the witness is intelligent and capable of providing rational answers. Upon reviewing the record, the Court found the child witness credible and corroborated by medical evidence and positive chemical analysis reports regarding semen stains. Consequently, the conviction was upheld. However, the Court modified the sentence, reducing the life imprisonment to eight years rigorous imprisonment, while maintaining the fine and mandating compensation to the victim's heirs under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The judgment reaffirms that the competency of a child witness is determined by their ability to understand questions and provide rational responses.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a child witness inherently inadmissible in criminal proceedings?
  • What criteria determine the competency of a child witness to testify?
  • Is a court required to award compensation to the victim under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a conviction for sodomy be sustained based on the testimony of a child witness corroborated by medical and forensic evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Lyallpur Cotton Mills vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others1991 PLC 32 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-04
  grievance petitionlimitation periodretrenchmentemployer discretionmemorandum of appealtechnical irregularitiesindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the orders of the Punjab Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had ruled in favor of an employee whose services were retrenched due to the closure of a weaving section. The core legal questions concerned whether the employee's grievance petition was time-barred, whether the failure to sign the memorandum of appeal rendered it incompetent, and whether the Labour Court could interfere with an employer's business decision to close a department. The Court held that the grievance petition was time-barred, as Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 was inapplicable to a voluntarily withdrawn petition, and the employee failed to justify the delay. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the signing of a memorandum of appeal by a counsel is sufficient, and technical irregularities in pleadings are curable. Finally, the Court held that it is the exclusive discretion of an employer to manage business operations, including the closure of a department. The impugned orders were set aside, and the employee's grievance petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of a grievance petition allow for the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is a memorandum of appeal filed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 incompetent if signed by the counsel rather than the appellant?
  • Can a Labour Court interfere with an employer's decision to close a specific department of their business?
  • Does the definition of 'employer' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 require the naming of specific managers in a grievance petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Lutuf Ali And Another vs The State1991PCr.LJ 544 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-25Read full judgment →
• Lutfullah Khatri vs Secretary, Ministry of Food & Agriculture, Islamabad and another1991 PLC (C.S.) 54 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1990-06-12Read full judgment →
• Lutfi Siddiqui vs The Secretary, Establishment Division, Rawalpindi And 2 Other1991 SCMR 125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-26
  service appealsenioritycivil servantlimitation periodretrospective promotionback benefitsautonomous bodysupersession
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal concerns the seniority and promotion rights of a civil servant formerly employed by the Family Planning Board. The core legal questions were whether the appellant’s appeal before the Service Tribunal was time-barred and whether he was entitled to retrospective seniority and promotion benefits from the date he became a civil servant, notwithstanding his earlier supersession while employed by an autonomous body. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was within time, as it was filed against the final departmental notification addressing the appellant's representation. On merits, the Court found that the appellant had been unfairly superseded during his tenure in the autonomous body. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and ruled that the appellant was entitled to be treated as a Grade-19 officer effective from May 11, 1981—the date he became a civil servant—for the purposes of pay, seniority, arrears, and pension. The judgment establishes that once a civil servant’s status is regularized, they are entitled to full consequential benefits for past service irregularities, provided the claim is brought against the final departmental order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent departmental notification issued on a representation provide a fresh starting point for the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to seniority and pay fixation from the date of their regularization as a civil servant, even if they were previously superseded while employed by an autonomous body?
  • Are government service rules applicable to autonomous bodies stricto senso?
  Read full judgment →
• Lt: Col. K.D. Gupta vs Union of India and another1991 PTD 284 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-08-03Read full judgment →
• Lt.Con. (Retd.) Abdul Aziz and 2 otherss vs Muhammad Ibrahim and 31991 CLC 1801 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-28Read full judgment →
• Lt.Col. (Retd.) Muhammad Anwar Khan vs Province of Punjab through Secretary, Industries and Mineral Development Department, Lahore and 3 others1991 CLC 1805 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-10Read full judgment →
• Lilaram vs Ghulam Ali Alias Essa Through Legal Heirs And Other1991 SCMR 932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-11
  execution of decreespecific performancelegal representativesOrder XXI Rule 22non-prosecutioncoram non judicefraudulent entrylimitation in executionremand for inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose out of execution proceedings relating to a 1949 decree for specific performance. The judgment-debtor's legal representative challenged the High Court's dismissal of his execution appeal on grounds that the execution application had been dismissed for non-prosecution, that mandatory notice under Order XXI Rule 22 read with Section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was absent, and that the execution application was barred by limitation due to fraudulent ante-dating in the institution register. The Supreme Court held that an order dismissing execution without notice to the parties is non est and coram non judice, and the dismissal in question related to a previously disposed of execution file rather than the active one. Further, where a substituted legal representative receives actual notice and files objections, failure to serve formal notice under Order XXI Rule 22 constitutes a curable irregularity and not a jurisdictional defect. However, noting prima facie evidence of forgery in the execution register impacting limitation, the Court remanded the matter to the executing court under Section 12(2) for a factual inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order dismissing an execution application for non-prosecution passed without prior notice to the decree-holders void and coram non judice?
  • Does the absence of a formal notice under Order XXI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 vitiate execution proceedings where the legal representative has actual notice and actively participates by filing objections?
  • Can a party who voluntarily applied and was substituted as the sole legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor subsequently object that other legal heirs were omitted?
  • Should an allegation of fraudulent ante-dating of an execution application in court registers affecting limitation be referred to the executing court for inquiry under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaquat vs The State1991 PCr.LJ 1721 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-18Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Ali vs Messrs Shakeel Silk Industry and another1991 PLC 885 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-05-27Read full judgment →
• Liaqat vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1276 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-03Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Hussain Shah And Another vs The State1991 SCMR 1124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-27
  murder convictioninterested witnessesalibi defensefalse implicationcriminal appealcross-examinationeyewitness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions concerned whether the conviction was sustainable despite the appellants' plea of alibi, the acquittal of co-accused, and allegations of false implication due to long-standing enmity. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. The Court held that the testimony of interested witnesses is not inherently unreliable due to enmity, particularly when corroborated by the circumstances of the case. It emphasized that a complainant is unlikely to substitute an innocent person for the actual killer of their own child. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the opinion of an Investigating Officer regarding an accused's innocence is not binding, as the court must independently assess the evidence. The judgment also established that trial courts have a duty to regulate proceedings to prevent the wastage of judicial time through excessive and irrelevant cross-examination, and that a plea of alibi requires more than a mere oral statement to be credible.

  Questions settled

  • Is the opinion of an Investigating Officer regarding the innocence of an accused binding upon the court?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused automatically render the conviction of remaining accused doubtful?
  • Can the testimony of interested witnesses be rejected solely on the ground of enmity?
  • What is the legal effect of a failure to support a plea of alibi with documentary or circumstantial evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 2097 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-11Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali vs Muhammad Saleem, A.S.I.1991 P Cr. L J 1322 · Lahore High Court · 1990-11-24Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali And Another vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 436 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-11Read full judgment →
• Laus DEO Enterprises through its Partner, Karachi vs Mrs. Suraya Jameel1991 PLD Karachi 309 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-24
  rent appealenhanced renttenancy agreementpenaltycantonments rent restrictiondefault in rentexpired agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This first rent appeal arises from an eviction order passed against the appellant tenant for default in depositing rent at an enhanced rate pursuant to a tenancy agreement. The core legal question is whether a tenancy agreement providing for an increase of rent after a specific period is illegal and unenforceable before the Rent Controller under the relevant rent restriction law. The Sindh High Court held that Section 10 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, only prohibits the charging of a fine, premium, or like sum in addition to rent, and does not prohibit contractual increases in rent where fair rent has not been fixed. The Court further held that an option given to a tenant to either vacate or pay an increased rent is not in the nature of a penalty under Section 74 of the Contract Act, and that terms of an expired agreement continue to operate to the extent they are not repugnant to rent laws. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenancy agreement providing for an increase of rent after the lapse of a particular period is illegal and unenforceable before the Rent Controller?
  • Does Section 10 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 prohibit an agreed increase in rent where fair rent has not been fixed?
  • Whether a contractual stipulation requiring the payment of an increased rent upon default in vacating the premises constitutes a penalty under Section 74 of the Contract Act?
  • Do the terms of an expired tenancy agreement continue to operate between the landlord and tenant to the extent they are not repugnant to the rent law?
  Read full judgment →
• Land Acquisition Collector, T.D.R.O., Ghazi and 2 others vs Abdul1991 MLD 554 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-12-02Read full judgment →
• Land Acquisition Collector And Another vs Afzal Shah1991 SCMR 1510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-15
  land acquisitioncompensationleave to appealenhancement of compensationSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Land Acquisition Collector challenging the judgment of the High Court dated 29th January, 1990, which had enhanced the amount of compensation awarded by the lower forums in favour of the respondent. The core legal question before the court involved the correctness of the High Court's enhancement of compensation in land acquisition matters. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider the matter alongside a connected pending appeal, Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1990, to be heard on the present record with directions for the parties to file necessary documents for disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted against a High Court judgment enhancing land acquisition compensation when a related appeal is already pending before the Supreme Court?
  • Can connected cases dealt with in a single impugned judgment be heard together upon the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Lala Niaz Ahmad vs Malik Ishtiaq Ahmad and others1991 MLD 1655 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-26Read full judgment →
• Lal Khan vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1661 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-03Read full judgment →
• Lal Khan vs Mst. Zarina Jan And Another1991 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-28
  pre-emptionlimitationconcurrent findings of factsale mutationleave to appealpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against judgments of the Peshawar High Court, which arose from consolidated pre-emption suits filed by Lal Khan and Khani Zaman against a vendee, Mst. Zarina Jan. The core legal question was whether the pre-emption suit filed by Khani Zaman was time-barred, specifically hinging on whether the limitation period commenced from the date of alleged possession or the date of the attestation of the sale mutation. The trial court, the District Judge, and the High Court all concurrently found that possession of the disputed land had not passed to the vendee at the time of the alleged transaction, and therefore, the limitation period commenced from the date of the attestation of the sale mutation, rendering the suit within time. The Supreme Court upheld these concurrent findings of fact, holding that there was no merit in the petitions and no grounds for interference with the lower courts' findings. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will generally decline to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commence from the date of possession or the date of attestation of the sale mutation when possession is disputed?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by three lower courts in a pre-emption matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Lal Khan And Another vs Sham Din And Other1991 SCMR 826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-20
  mukhbari applicationland allotmentsettlement authoritiesnon-completion of recordinformer rightscivil appealallotment cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil appeals filed by appellants claiming a superior right to land allotments as informers (mukhbir) against private respondents who were allotted the same land as claimants. The core legal questions were whether the appellants had established their status as informers and whether the High Court erred in upholding the cancellation of the appellants' claims. The Supreme Court found that the appellants failed to provide the necessary record, specifically the Mukhbari application and relevant settlement orders, resulting in a clear non-compliance with Order 14 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. On merits, the Court held that the initial Mukhbari application had been consigned to the record, terminating those proceedings, and that subsequent actions were initiated by different parties. Furthermore, the Court noted serious doubts regarding the bona fides of the application, as the alleged informers never appeared during the inquiry. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed for non-completion of the record and on merits, affirming the High Court's decision that the respondents' allotments were valid and could not be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide essential documents in an appeal constitute grounds for dismissal under the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
  • Can a claim as an informer be sustained when the initial Mukhbari application has been consigned to the record and proceedings terminated?
  • Are allotments made to regular claimants liable to be disturbed in the absence of clear evidence supporting an informer's claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Lal Din vs The State OtherK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 91 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-06Read full judgment →
• Lal Din vs Muhammad Afsar and 2 others1991 MLD 895 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-01-23Read full judgment →
• Lal Din vs Executive Engineer and 3 others1991 PLC 84 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-05-13Read full judgment →
• Lal Din vs Bashir Ahmad1991 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-18
  pre-emptiontenantChakotaLand Reforms RegulationWest Pakistan Land Revenue Actagricultural landfixed rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns a pre-emption suit involving agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the appellant, described in revenue records as a "Ghair Dakheel Kar" paying "Chakota" (fixed rent), qualified as a "tenant" under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, thereby possessing a right of pre-emption. The respondent argued that "Chakota" indicated a fixed-term lease rather than a tenancy. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was a tenant. The Court reasoned that the definition of "tenant" under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, which applies to the Regulation, does not exclude persons paying cash rent. It determined that "Chakota" represents a valid mode of rent payment, and the status of a tenant is established by the relationship of holding land under a landlord, regardless of whether the rent is paid in cash or kind. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restoring the pre-emption decree in favor of the appellant, affirming that the mode of payment does not alter the essential legal status of a tenant entitled to pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person paying 'Chakota' (fixed rent) qualify as a tenant under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
  • Can the definition of 'tenant' provided in the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, be applied to the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
  • Does the payment of rent in cash, rather than in kind, negate the status of a tenant for the purpose of pre-emption rights?
  • Is the Supreme Court of Pakistan restricted to deciding only the specific points on which leave to appeal was granted?
  Read full judgment →
• Lal Din vs Additional District Judge and others1991 CLC 1559 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-10Read full judgment →
• Lal Din And Others vs Ali Ahmad And Other1991 SCMR 1553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-16
  mukhbari applicationallotment cancellationevacuee propertyconstitutional jurisdictiondisplaced personsstatutory rightsrepeal act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the interpretation of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The core legal questions involve whether a pending mukhbari application, upon which no action has been taken, constitutes proceedings saved under the Repeal Act of 1975; whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, may set aside a notified officer's order cancelling an allotment without a definitive finding on whether the allotment was in excess; and whether a mukhbir holds a statutory right to claim land against an unsatisfied claim from an allotment cancelled due to their information. The Court granted leave to appeal to address these significant questions of law concerning the rights of mukhbirs and the scope of constitutional review regarding the cancellation of allotments. The proceedings were directed to be prepared for hearing on the existing record, with liberty for parties to file additional documents, thereby setting the stage for a determination on the merits of these statutory and jurisdictional interpretations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mukhbari application under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, upon which no action has been taken, be treated as proceedings saved by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
  • May the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction set aside an order cancelling an allotment without a definite finding that the allotment was in excess?
  • Does a mukhbir possess a statutory right to seek allotment of land against an unsatisfied claim out of an allotment cancelled due to information supplied by them?
  Read full judgment →
• Lal Deeno And Others vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 2000 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-09Read full judgment →
• Lal Bux Soomro and Other vs The Chief Secretary to Govt. of Sindh(K.L.R 1991 Labour & Secvice Cases 230) · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Lakeview Properties (Pvt.) Limited- vs Faizehuseni Trust, Karachi and 31991 MLD 1093 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-17Read full judgment →
• Lakeview Properties (Pvt) Ltd vs Faiz-E-Huseni Trust Karachi and OtherK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 419 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-17Read full judgment →
• Lahore Municipal Corporation vs Muhammad Anwar And Other1991 SCMR 1821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-17
  settlement allotmentcompensation poolleave to appealmunicipal landcancellation of allotmentwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Lahore Municipal Corporation against a High Court judgment that set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner. The dispute arose over a piece of land measuring 9 Marlas, which had been allotted by Settlement authorities to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest. The respondents had subsequently constructed a structure on the land with the Corporation's permission. However, the Settlement Commissioner later cancelled the allotment upon a Mukhbari application, asserting the land belonged to the Municipal Corporation. The High Court declared this cancellation illegal. The petitioner contends that because the property was never part of the compensation pool, the Settlement authorities lacked the jurisdiction to transfer it, and that the Corporation's prior sanction for construction did not estop it from asserting ownership. The Supreme Court, finding that the contentions raised regarding the scope of the compensation pool and the authority of the Settlement Commissioner require deeper judicial examination, granted leave to appeal to resolve whether the land was lawfully transferable by the Settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can land that does not form part of the compensation pool be validly transferred by Settlement authorities?
  • Does the grant of building permission by a Municipal Corporation estop it from later claiming ownership of the land?
  • Are the considerations of prior sanction and lack of previous claim sufficient to set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner cancelling an allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Lahore Improvement Trust through Chairman vs Messrs Alazam Limited1991 CLC 1307 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-27Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority through its Director-General vs Muhammad Mushtaq and 5 others1991 MLD 47 · Lahore High Court · 1990-10-07Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority through its Director General vs Mst. Rubi1991 CLC 302 · Lahore High Court · 1990-09-18Read full judgment →
• Lahore Cantt. Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. vs Punjab1991 CLC 1740 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-02Read full judgment →
• Laher Khan and anothers vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands)1991 CLC 1561 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-19Read full judgment →
• Laeeq Ahmad Khan vs Central Board of Revenue and others1991 PLC (C.S.) 595 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1990-04-02Read full judgment →
• Laeeq Ahmad And Another vs Maqsood Ahmad And Another1991 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-23
  Permanent Transfer DeedP.T.D. cancellationSettlement Department authorityCivil Court jurisdictionwrit jurisdictiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a writ petition filed by the respondent. The dispute arose over the transfer of a plot of land, for which the respondent had obtained a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) in 1973. Subsequently, the petitioners claimed the land had been purchased by them in an open auction, leading the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (D.S.C.) to cancel the respondent's P.T.D. in 1978. The High Court set aside this cancellation, holding that the D.S.C. lacked the authority to cancel a P.T.D. once issued, particularly in the absence of fraud, and that such disputes must be adjudicated by a Civil Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, finding no legal infirmity in the reasoning. The Court affirmed that administrative departments possess no authority to cancel a P.T.D. after its issuance, establishing the principle that any subsequent dispute regarding title or entitlement after the issuance of a P.T.D. must be resolved exclusively through civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Deputy Settlement Commissioner have the authority to cancel a Permanent Transfer Deed once it has been issued?
  • Is a Civil Court the appropriate forum to resolve disputes regarding property title after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Can a Permanent Transfer Deed be cancelled by the Settlement Department in the absence of fraud?
  Read full judgment →
• La. Sharwani vs Government of Pakistan1991 MLD 2613 · Federal Shariat Court · 1990-11-11Read full judgment →
• Kwality Food Products vs Mst. Sehba Nishat Haq1991 MLD 1331 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-24Read full judgment →
• Kusum Lata Singhal vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Rajasthan and others1991 PTD 1105 · Supreme Court of India · 1990-07-16Read full judgment →
• KSB Pumps Company Limited vs KSB Employees Association, Hassanabdal1991 PLC 556 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1990-10-30Read full judgment →