Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Messrs Platinum Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Messrs State Life Insurance1991 MLD 1256 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pasrur Sugar Mill vs Abdul Qadeer and others1991 PLC 821 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Paper Corner vs Board of Intermediate and Secondary1991 CLC 740 · Lahore High Court · 1990-12-01
  rejection of plaintappellate court powersconstructive res judicatasuit for rendition of accountslimitation periodtemporary injunctioninterlocutory order
  Summary & questions settled

  This first appeal arises from a decision of the District Judge, Sargodha, which set aside a temporary injunction and rejected the plaint in a subsequent suit for rendition of accounts filed by the appellants against the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Sargodha. The core legal questions involve the power of an appellate court under section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to reject a plaint during an appeal against an interlocutory order, whether the subsequent suit was barred by the principles of constructive res judicata under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the suit was barred by limitation without the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Lahore High Court held that an appellate court, possessing co-extensive powers under section 107(2) and having explicitly withdrawn the suit to its own file, is fully empowered to reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, the Court held that the subsequent independent suit based on pleas already adjudicated in earlier proceedings was barred by constructive res judicata and time-barred. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate court have the power to reject a plaint when hearing an appeal against an interlocutory order if the suit has been transferred to its own file?
  • Whether a subsequent independent suit raising pleas already adjudicated in a prior suit between the same parties is barred by constructive res judicata?
  • Can the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 be extended to a plaintiff who failed to show due diligence and good faith in prosecuting a prior proceeding?
  • Are the instances given in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for rejecting a plaint exhaustive?
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• Messrs Pangrio Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Hazoor Bux and 6 others1991 PLC 920 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-05-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakland Scientific Production vs Messrs Pioneer Insurance1991 PLD Karachi 414 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-24
  verification of plaintpower of attorneyirregularity in pleadingsinsurance claimexhibited documentsremand of suitprocedural defect
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular first appeal was preferred against the judgment and decree of the Senior Civil Judge dismissing the appellant's suit for recovery of insurance claim. The trial court had dismissed the suit on two grounds: first, that the plaint was signed and verified by an attorney whose power of attorney was executed eight days after the plaint's presentation; and second, that documentary evidence (insurance papers, correspondence, and survey report) could not be accepted because their authors were not examined. The High Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the failure to sign a plaint properly or its signing by an unauthorized person is a mere technical irregularity under Order VI, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which can be cured at any subsequent or appellate stage without necessitating a separate formal application. Furthermore, documents exhibited in evidence without objection cannot be rejected solely because the authors were not examined. The impugned decree was set aside and the suit remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the signing and verification of a plaint by an attorney prior to the formal execution of a power of attorney is a fatal defect or a curable irregularity?
  • Can a defect in the signing of a pleading under Order VI, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be rectified at a subsequent or appellate stage without a formal application?
  • Can documents produced and exhibited in evidence without objection be rejected solely on the ground that their authors were not examined as witnesses?
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• Messrs Pakistan Warranted Warehouse Ltd. vs Messrs Sindh Industrial1991 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-25
  easement of necessityright of wayindustrial plot allotmentalternative accessleasehold rightscivil revisionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Sindh High Court dismissing a civil revision against the concurrent dismissal of the appellant's suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The appellant, lessee of three industrial plots used as warehouses from Sindh Industrial Trading Estates Limited (SITE), claimed a right of way as an easement of necessity under section 13(a) of the Easements Act over an L-shaped disputed area between the plots, which SITE had allotted to another party. The core legal questions involved whether the disputed land was a public road, and whether the appellant established an easement of necessity. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact established that the disputed area was an independent industrial plot rather than a public road, and that the appellant had alternative access to its plots from a 66-foot wide metalled road. The Court affirmed that an easement of necessity under section 13(a) of the Easements Act requires proof of absolute necessity rather than mere convenience or ordinary necessity. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an easement of necessity under section 13(a) of the Easements Act 1882 requires proof of absolute necessity or mere reasonable enjoyment?
  • Can a lessee claim a right of way over adjacent land of the transferor as an easement of necessity when alternative access to the property exists?
  • Whether unallotted land within an industrial estate constitutes a public road or an independent plot available for industrial allotment?
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• Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Limited vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance,1991 PTD 355 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited vs Government of Pakistan1991 PTD 345 · Sindh High Court
  reassessmentchange of opinionincome taxconstitutional jurisdictionstatutory remedyperquisiteswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged assessment orders and notices issued under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance regarding perquisites and export rebates. The petitioner argued that the reassessment was based on a mere change of opinion regarding material already available during the original assessment. The Court examined whether the assessing officer had applied their mind during the initial assessment. It held that where an assessment is framed mechanically without a conscious application of mind, the assessing officer is entitled to initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 65 upon receiving new information. The Court further addressed the maintainability of the petition, ruling that because the petitioner had participated in the reassessment proceedings and the dispute required factual investigation, the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 could not be invoked to bypass existing statutory appellate remedies. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, directing the petitioner to exhaust the remedies provided under the Income Tax Ordinance, while permitting the appellate authorities to consider condoning the limitation period if an appeal were filed within two weeks.

  Questions settled

  • Can an assessing officer initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance if the original assessment was made mechanically without a conscious application of mind?
  • Does the doctrine of 'change of opinion' preclude reassessment if the initial assessment order failed to address the specific items in question?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 maintainable when the petitioner has already participated in the reassessment proceedings and has access to adequate statutory remedies?
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• Messrs Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd. vs The Chairman, Sindh Labour1991 PLC 811 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Press International vs Muhammad Abdul Chohan and 2 others1991 PLC 818 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Insurance Corporation vs Pakistan Shipping Lines1991 PLD Karachi 271 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pak Resources Insurance Company Ltd. vs Messrs Compagnia Di1991 MLD 706 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Packages Ltd.---Applicants vs The Commissioner of Income-1991 PTD 1049 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Oriental Shipping Co Ltd., Karachi vs Panaghia Odigitria and 21991 MLD 148 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-16
  admiralty jurisdictionsuit in remmaritime liennecessariesadmissibility of evidencesecondary evidenceship breakingchange of ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for the recovery of disbursements and agency fees filed by a shipping agent against a vessel and its owners. The plaintiff claimed expenses incurred for provisions, crew wages, and other services provided to the vessel. The core legal questions were whether the plaintiff had sufficiently proven the alleged expenses through admissible evidence and whether an admiralty suit in rem for necessaries is maintainable against a vessel after its ownership has transferred to a new purchaser. The Court held that the suit was not maintainable. It found that the plaintiff failed to prove the alleged payments, as only inadmissible photostat copies of vouchers were produced without secondary evidence or proof of the originals' loss. Furthermore, the Court held that in admiralty law, a suit in rem for necessaries cannot be enforced against a vessel if its ownership has changed prior to the filing of the suit, absent a maritime lien. As the vessel had been transferred to the new owner before the suit was filed, the claim against the vessel was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit in rem for the recovery of necessaries maintainable against a vessel after its ownership has changed?
  • Are photostat copies of vouchers and receipts admissible as evidence when the originals are not produced and no foundation for secondary evidence is laid?
  • Does a claim for agency fees and disbursements constitute a maritime lien enforceable against a vessel after its transfer to a new owner?
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• Messrs Nlisrat Elahi and 41 others vs The Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore and 68 others1991 MLD 2546 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-05
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionjudicial independenceservice mattermaintainabilityHigh Court employeesadministrative orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by 42 senior clerks of the Lahore High Court challenging the promotion of other employees to B.P.S. 11 and 16, alleging that these promotions were made without the mandatory competitive test required by the High Court (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is maintainable by employees of the High Court against administrative orders passed by the Court or its Registrar. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. It reasoned that Article 208 of the Constitution grants the High Court the power to regulate the terms and conditions of its own staff to ensure judicial independence. Furthermore, Article 199(5) of the Constitution explicitly excludes the High Court from the definition of 'person' against whom writ jurisdiction can be exercised. Consequently, administrative orders passed by the Chief Justice or the Registrar on behalf of the Court are immune from challenge under Article 199.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable by High Court employees against administrative orders passed by the High Court or its Registrar?
  • Does the definition of 'person' in Article 199(5) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 exclude the High Court from writ jurisdiction regarding its own administrative actions?
  • Are High Court employees governed by the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to frame its own rules for the appointment and conditions of service of its staff under the Constitution?
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• Messrs Nizam Impex through Partner Muhammad Arif vs The Government1991 PLD Karachi 208 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-14
  regulatory dutycustoms dutyad valoremultra viresimport licensestatutory interpretationdelegated legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the imposition of a 40% regulatory duty on imported welding electrodes by the Federal Government. The core legal question was whether the Government acted within its statutory authority under Section 18(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, by imposing an ad valorem regulatory duty on goods that already carried a fixed per-unit duty in the First Schedule of the Act. The Court allowed the petition, holding that the notification imposing the duty was ultra vires and illegal. Relying on the Supreme Court's precedent in M/s. Yousaf Re-Rolling Mills, the Court established the principle that the Federal Government’s power to levy regulatory duty under Section 18(2) is constrained by the nature of the existing duty in the First Schedule. Where a fixed per-unit duty is prescribed, the Government lacks the discretion to impose an ad valorem regulatory duty; such ad valorem levies are permissible only for articles lacking a fixed per-unit duty. Consequently, the impugned notification was declared invalid as it exceeded the statutory limits of delegated authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government impose an ad valorem regulatory duty on goods that are subject to a fixed per-unit duty under the First Schedule of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, have the effect of taking away vested rights regarding customs duty exemptions?
  • Is the Federal Government's power to levy regulatory duty under Section 18(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, restricted by the method of duty assessment prescribed in the First Schedule?
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• Messrs Nida-E-Millat (Nawai Waqt), Karachi vs Salai-Iuddin Toor and 6 others1991 PLC 591 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-11-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nemat Flour Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Government of Punjab and others1991 CLC 1196 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Food vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax1991 PTD 850 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Film Development Corporation Ltd., Islamabad vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Islamabad1991 PTD 1056 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-07Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Cables (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Additional Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 2 others1991 PTD 654 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nasir Mughis Ltd., Lahore vs Income-Tax Officer, Companies1991 PTD 874 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Naseer Mughis Ltd. vs Commissionzr of Income-Tax, Lahore1991 PTD 871 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nagina Cotton Mills Limited vs The Collector of Central1991 PTD 522 · Sindh High Court · 1990-09-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Murree Brewery Company Limited vs Directorgeneral, Excise1991 MLD 267 · Lahore High Court · 1990-11-07
  freedom of tradepolice powersnatural justiceaudi alteram partembrewery rulesnon-alcoholic beveragesmala fidesconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitution petition was filed by M/s. Murree Brewery Company Limited challenging the legality of orders and actions of the Excise and Taxation Department restraining the company from manufacturing and producing a non-alcoholic beverage named 'Malt-79' within its brewery premises. The core legal questions involved whether the company required permission under the Punjab Excise Act 1914 to manufacture non-alcoholic beverages, whether the state could prohibit rather than merely regulate such activity, and whether the impugned orders violated the principles of natural justice and were tainted with mala fides. The Lahore High Court held that freedom of trade under Article 18 of the Constitution allows citizens to conduct lawful business subject only to licensing systems or statutory qualifications, and since no law prohibited manufacturing non-alcoholic beverages, no special permission under the Excise Act was required. The court further held that while the state possesses police powers to regulate commercial activities to protect public health, regulation does not encompass total prohibition. Finally, the court ruled that the impugned orders were void ab initio for violating the principle of audi alteram partem as no opportunity of hearing was afforded, though the allegation of mala fides was rejected for lack of specific proof. The petition was accepted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a citizen or public company requires permission under the Punjab Excise Act 1914 to manufacture non-alcoholic beverages within a licensed brewery?
  • Does the power of the State to regulate a trade or business under its police powers include the authority to totally prohibit it?
  • Whether the withdrawal of a manufacturing permission without affording an opportunity of hearing violates the principle of audi alteram partem?
  • What is the standard of proof required to establish allegations of mala fides against official executive actions in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Messrs Mumtaz Industries vs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, Multan through Manager and another1991 MLD 863 · Lahore High Court · 1990-12-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mumtaz Industries through Haji Karim Bakhsh and 2 others vs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-21
  leave to appealwrit jurisdictioncontractual liabilityObjectives Resolutionrecovery of loandiscretionary reliefpenal interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of an Intra Court Appeal by the High Court, wherein the petitioner, a borrower, sought to restrain the respondent creditor from recovering outstanding loan amounts. The petitioner primarily argued that, pursuant to Article 2-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which incorporates the Objectives Resolution as a substantive part of the Constitution, the recovery of interest was impermissible. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had utilized the loan since 1974 and failed to discharge the liability by 1987. While acknowledging the petitioner's contention regarding the scope of Article 2-A, the Court noted this issue was pending in other matters and did not necessitate leave in this specific case. The Court held that mere inability to discharge a contractual liability does not justify interference under discretionary writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that public institutions require loan recoveries to function. Ultimately, the Court refused leave to appeal, advising the petitioner to seek administrative resolution or government assistance regarding the hardship of penal interest rather than invoking constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inability to discharge a contractual liability constitute sufficient grounds for interference under the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Can a borrower invoke Article 2-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to prevent the recovery of interest on a loan contract?
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• Messrs Muhammadi Industries vs Federation of Pakistan through Additional Secretary, Ministry of Finance,1991 PTD 511 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Muhammad Ismail Muhammad Aslam (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Bakar1991 PLC 255 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-05-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Moon Elite Enterprises vs M.C. Lyallpur and others1991 CLC 796 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-26
  natural justicerecovery of taxesshow-cause noticemunicipal taxationdue processwarrant of distressadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges a notice of demand issued by the Municipal Committee for the recovery of Rs. 1,48,538.75, purportedly under the Pakistan Municipal Committee (Recovery of Taxes) Rules, 1962. The core legal question was whether the Taxation Officer could initiate recovery proceedings via a warrant of distress without first issuing a show-cause notice or conducting an inquiry to ascertain the liability of the petitioner. The petitioner contended that the failure to provide an opportunity to explain the accounts violated the principles of natural justice and established legal precedents. The Lahore High Court held that the impugned order was passed without lawful authority because the Taxation Officer failed to provide the petitioner with an adequate opportunity to explain their position regarding the alleged liability. The Court affirmed that it is a cardinal principle of natural justice that a party must be given notice and a fair opportunity to be heard before a liability is determined and recovery proceedings are initiated. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Taxation Officer for fresh proceedings in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Taxation Officer required to issue a show-cause notice before initiating recovery proceedings for taxes?
  • Does the failure to provide an opportunity to explain liability before issuing a demand notice violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Can recovery proceedings under the Pakistan Municipal Committee (Recovery of Taxes) Rules 1962 be initiated without first ascertaining the amount due?
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• Messrs Modern Textile Mills Ltd., Tando Jam vs Muhammad Samiullah1991 PLC 579 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mashriq Press and Publications, Karachi vs Sajid Hussain1991 PLC 584 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-12-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mashriq Press and Publication vs Munawar Khan1991 PLC 82 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-04-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mandviwalla Motors Limited, Karachi vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone B', Karachi1991 PTD 683 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Latif Carpet Industries vs Central Board of Revenue (Judicial), Islamabad And Another1991 SCMR 1819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  export rebatecustoms valuationleave to appealadministrative findingdue processconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition regarding a dispute over export performance rebate benefits. The petitioners challenged the Customs Authorities' decision to limit the rebate to approximately Rs. 23 lacs, despite a declared and received export value of nearly Rs. 36 lacs. The core legal questions were whether the petitioners were denied a proper opportunity of hearing and show cause, and whether there was sufficient evidentiary basis for the Customs Authorities' determination. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' claim regarding a lack of hearing was factually unsupported, noting that a final finding was rendered after due opportunity was provided. Furthermore, the Court found that the advice of the Art Silk Valuation Committee, combined with the examination of material and assessment of prevailing market sale values by the Customs Authority, constituted sufficient evidence to support the finding of fact against the petitioners. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming that the administrative findings were based on adequate material and procedural fairness.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tentative finding by an administrative authority, followed by a final finding after a hearing, violate the requirement of due process?
  • Is the advice of a specialized valuation committee and market assessment sufficient evidence for customs authorities to determine export value?
  • Can a constitutional petition succeed where the petitioner fails to demonstrate a lack of factual support for administrative findings?
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• Messrs Kohinoor Marble Industries Limited vs Mirza Zamir Baig and another1991 PLC 408 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khawaja Auto Cars Limited vs Muhammad Yousuf And Other1991 SCMR 2223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-16
  statutory tenancyevacuee propertydistinct legal entitylicenseelocus standimandatory injunctionpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a suit for mandatory and prohibitory injunctions filed by the appellant, a private limited company, seeking to restrain the respondent-landlords from obstructing a passage to the suit premises. The appellants claimed to be statutory tenants under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, having occupied the premises since 1956 after their Managing Director, who was the original individual allottee, converted his business into a limited company. The respondents contended that only the individual allottee was the statutory tenant and the company was a mere licensee. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court concurrently dismissed the suit, holding that the company was a distinct legal entity and had no locus standi. The Supreme Court, by a majority decision, dismissed the appeal, holding that the extended definition of 'possession' under the notification dated 13 October 1959 did not apply to licensees or unauthorized occupants. The Court laid down that a company is a distinct legal entity from its shareholders or directors, and an allottee's permission to let a company occupy the premises makes the company a licensee, which does not confer statutory tenancy rights under Section 30 of the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does a private limited company acquire statutory tenancy rights under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 merely because its Managing Director was the original individual allottee of the premises?
  • Can the extended definition of 'possession' under the notification dated 13 October 1959 be availed of by a licensee or unauthorized occupant to claim statutory tenancy?
  • Does the mere acceptance of rent cheques by a landlord from a company occupy the premises create a tenancy in favor of that company when the original allotment was in the name of an individual?
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• Messrs Khanzada Muhammad Abdul Haq Khan Khattak & Co. vs WAPDA Through Chairman WAPDA And Another1991 SCMR 1436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-12
  liquidated damagesbreach of contractpenalty clauseproof of actual lossContract Actpre-estimate of damages
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court arose from a contract dispute where the appellant contractor failed to complete the construction of residential buildings within the stipulated timeframe. Consequently, the respondent (WAPDA) deducted Rs. 5,08,000 from the appellant's bills as liquidated damages pursuant to Clause 46 of the contract. The appellant challenged this deduction, arguing that the clause was penal and that the respondent was required to prove actual loss under Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the appellant's suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that Section 74 of the Contract Act dispenses with the requirement of proving actual loss or damage when a specific sum is named in the contract as liquidated damages, provided it represents a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is not oppressive or penal. The Court established that where parties agree on a reasonable pre-estimate of damages to avoid future calculation difficulties, the aggrieved party is entitled to recover it upon breach without proving actual loss.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party required to prove actual loss or damage to recover a sum named as liquidated damages under Section 74 of the Contract Act?
  • How does Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872 distinguish between a penalty and a genuine pre-estimate of liquidated damages?
  • Can a court reduce or refuse to grant the amount stipulated as liquidated damages in a contract if it is found to be oppressive or penal in nature?
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• Messrs Kausar & Co. vs Messrs Universal Insurance Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.1991 MLD 1774 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-11
  rented premiseslandlord and tenantrepairsrent controllercommissioner's reportcross-examinationjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a tenant's application for repairs under section 12 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, which was dismissed by the Rent Controller. The core legal question was whether a tenant can seek court-ordered repairs in the absence of a written tenancy agreement and whether the Controller correctly evaluated the evidence, including a Commissioner's report. The High Court held that the Controller erred in dismissing the application solely due to the lack of a written agreement. The Court clarified that while section 12(1) of the Ordinance makes the landlord's obligation to repair subject to any existing agreement, the absence of such an agreement does not preclude a tenant from seeking repairs. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Controller improperly disregarded the Commissioner's neutral report by over-relying on the tenant's failure to cross-examine the landlord's witness. The judgment establishes that the Controller has discretion to grant or refuse repairs based on factors like cost versus rent, but must exercise this discretion judicially rather than arbitrarily, and that eviction proceedings are extraneous to the merits of a repair application.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a written tenancy agreement preclude a tenant from seeking repairs under section 12 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Is the Rent Controller's discretion to grant or refuse repairs under section 12 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 absolute?
  • Can a Rent Controller ignore a neutral Commissioner's report solely because a party failed to cross-examine a witness?
  • Does the pendency of an eviction petition affect the merits of a tenant's application for repairs under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
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• Messrs Karamker (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Mst. Akhtar Bano1991 MLD 2141 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. vs Mustafa Kamil1991 PLC 216 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-04-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Kamran Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan1991 PTD 517 · Sindh High Court · 1990-06-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs K.S.B. Electrical Industries vs Messrs K.B.S. (Pumps) Company1991 SCMR 1818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-23
  trademark registrationpassing offhonest concurrent uselikelihood of confusionintellectual propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that affirmed the Registrar of Trade Marks' decision to reject the petitioner's application for the registration of the trademark 'KSB'. The respondent-company, the registered owner of the 'KSB' trademark for water pumps and related electrical apparatus, successfully opposed the petitioner's application for the same mark, intended for use on electric fans and desert coolers. The Registrar found that the petitioner's adoption of an identical mark for goods of a similar description was likely to cause confusion and deception among the public and purchasers, amounting to passing off. Furthermore, the Registrar determined that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of honest concurrent use under the relevant statute, characterizing the adoption as mala fide. The High Court upheld these findings, concluding that customers would likely be misled into believing the petitioner's goods were manufactured by the respondent. The Supreme Court, finding no infirmity in the concurrent findings of fact, refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the adoption of an identical trademark for goods of a similar description constitute grounds for rejection of a registration application?
  • Can an applicant claim the benefit of honest concurrent use under the Trade Marks Act 1940 if the adoption of the mark is found to be mala fide?
  • Is the likelihood of confusion among the general public a sufficient basis to deny the registration of a trademark?
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• Messrs Javed Garments INDUSTRIESs vs Messrs Grain Lodge Limited1991 MLD 1232 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Iqbal Sweet House vs Director, Punjab Social Security1991 PLC 331 · Lahore High Court · 1991-01-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Industrial Engineering Ltd., Karachi vs The Assistant1991 PTD 562 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Humayun Ltd. vs Pakistan and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 963 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-19
  central excise dutyexcisable servicesexemption notificationannual turnoverassessment yearinterpretation of fiscal statutesstrict constructionpenalties
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Sindh High Court regarding the levy of central excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The core legal issue was whether the withdrawal of an excise duty exemption for restaurants—contingent upon achieving an annual turnover exceeding Rs. 4 lacs as determined by the Income Tax Officer under S.R.O. 557(1)/72—takes effect from the relevant assessment year in which the turnover limit was crossed, or only from the subsequent date on which the income tax assessment order was physically passed. Dismissing the appeal with a minor modification regarding penalty, the Supreme Court held that liability to excise duty attaches from the assessment year in which the annual turnover crosses the base limit, rather than the date of the assessment order. The Court re-affirmed that grants of tax exemption in fiscal statutes must be rigidly interpreted against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority to ensure uniform application and prevent arbitrary advantages resulting from delayed administrative assessments.

  Questions settled

  • Does liability for excise duty under an exemption notification take effect from the relevant assessment year or from the date the income tax assessment order is actually passed?
  • How are tax exemption provisions and notifications construed under fiscal statutes?
  • Is a penalty for procedural breach under central excise rules sustainable where there is no wilful evasion of tax duty?
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• Messrs Hudaybia Textile Mills Limited And 8 Others vs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited And 7 Other1991 SCMR 1756 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-21
  Review petitionSpecial CourtExecution of decreeBanking Companies (Recovery of Loans) OrdinanceAuction confirmationInterim injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two review petitions arising from a previous judgment regarding the execution powers of a Special Court constituted under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioners challenged the previous finding that the procedure for executing a decree in the Special Court was governed strictly by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, arguing that this ignored the specific powers of confirmation of auction vested in the Special Court under Section 8(3) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court found that a valid case for review was established, noting that the previous judgment may have failed to give due effect to the express reservations and powers of confirmation retained by the Special Court in its earlier orders. Consequently, the Court admitted the review petitions for hearing, directed that notices be issued to the respondents, and ordered the matters to be placed before a larger bench. Additionally, the Court imposed an interim injunction restraining the parties from transferring or encumbering the property in dispute pending the final outcome of the review proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 possess powers of auction confirmation distinct from the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a review petition be entertained where the previous judgment allegedly failed to give effect to statutory powers of the court?
  • Is a party who was not an appellant in the original proceedings entitled to file a review petition?
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• Messrs Haji Butt and others vs National Bank of Pakistan1991 CLC 778 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Golden Plastic (Pvt.) Ltd.1991 MLD 124 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-24
  winding upcommercial insolvencystatutory noticebanking companyunable to pay debtssuspension of businessdiscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for the winding up of the respondent company was filed by a creditor banking company under Section 309 of the Companies Ordinance 1984, asserting that the respondent was unable to pay its outstanding debts. The respondent contested the petition, disputing the exact quantum of the debt and raising a preliminary objection that the statutory notice of demand served by the petitioner was invalid. The High Court of Sindh held that the notice of demand was invalid as it failed to strictly comply with the statutory requirements of Section 306(1)(a) of the Ordinance, noting that such provisions must be strictly construed. However, the Court observed that an invalid notice does not bar a winding-up petition if the petitioner can independently prove commercial insolvency under Section 306(1)(c). On the merits, the Court determined that the respondent was not commercially insolvent as its assets were sufficient, its business suspension was temporary and satisfactorily explained, and the debt dispute was of substance. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, reserving the petitioner's right to pursue other remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an invalid statutory notice under Section 306(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 completely bars a creditor from maintaining a winding-up petition?
  • What constitutes 'commercial insolvency' for the purpose of winding up a company under Section 306(1)(c) of the Companies Ordinance 1984?
  • Does the temporary suspension of business due to a labor dispute satisfy the requirements for winding up under Section 305(c) of the Companies Ordinance 1984?
  • Can a winding-up order be made as a matter of right upon mere proof of an unpaid debt, or is it subject to the equitable discretion of the Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs H.M. Abdullah vs The Income-Tax Officer, Circle-v, West Zone, Karachi1991 PTD 217 · Sindh High Court
  self-assessment schemechange of opinionreopening of assessmentprivileged documentsquasi-judicial discretionincome tax noticecommand performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges notices issued under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance and subsequent assessment proceedings by the Income Tax Officer. The core legal questions involve whether the reopening of assessment under section 65 was barred due to a 'change of opinion', whether internal departmental correspondence is privileged, and whether an Income Tax Officer can abdicate independent quasi-judicial judgment by blindly following directions from a superior officer under section 7 of the Ordinance. The Sindh High Court held that since the initial assessments under the self-assessment scheme were made mechanically without applying the mind, the rule against a 'change of opinion' did not apply, rendering the section 65 notices valid. Furthermore, internal tax assessment files do not constitute privileged state affairs under Articles 6 and 7 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. However, while section 7 permits seeking general guidance in complicated cases, an assessing officer must act independently in quasi-judicial proceedings and cannot be dictated to by superiors. The court consequently upheld the validity of the section 65 notice but declared the subsequent assessment proceedings void for lack of independent application of mind, directing a fresh assessment by another Income Tax Officer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the reopening of an assessment under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance is barred by the rule of change of opinion when the original assessment was framed under the self-assessment scheme without applying the mind?
  • Do internal departmental notes and correspondence between an Income Tax Officer and an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner constitute privileged state documents under Articles 6 and 7 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can an Income Tax Officer seek binding directions or instructions from a superior administrative authority regarding the merits of an assessment under section 7 of the Income Tax Ordinance, compromising their quasi-judicial independence?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Golden Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Ahmad Khan1991 PLC 93 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-04-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah Textile Mills Ltd. vs Muhammad1991 PLC 589 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-11-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ghandhara Nissan (Pvt) Ltd, an Other vs Ghulam Rabbani and Other(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 29) · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Friend Engineering Corporation, the Mall, Lahore vs Government of Punjab And 4 Other1991 SCMR 2324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-31
  rendition of accountspreliminary decreefinal decreelimitationjurisdictionwaivervoid ordercontractual relationship
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arose from a suit for rendition of accounts filed by the appellant contractor against the Government of Punjab. The trial court had passed an ex parte preliminary decree, followed by a final decree based on a Local Commissioner's report. The High Court, in an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, set aside both decrees and remanded the matter, holding that a suit for rendition of accounts was not maintainable as the relationship was contractual. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether a party who failed to appeal a preliminary decree could challenge its validity in an appeal against the final decree. The Court held that under Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree who does not appeal from it is precluded from disputing its correctness in an appeal against the final decree. The Court further ruled that an incorrect decision on the form of a suit does not render the decree void or without jurisdiction, and restored the trial court's decrees.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who fails to appeal against a preliminary decree challenge its validity or correctness in an appeal preferred against the final decree?
  • Does an error in determining the maintainability of a suit for rendition of accounts render the resulting preliminary decree void and without jurisdiction?
  • Can a party waive an objection regarding the form of a suit where no question of public policy is involved?
  • Is a suit for rendition of accounts maintainable between parties whose relationship is purely contractual and where the plaintiff has knowledge of the work performed?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Fauji Sugar Mills, Tando Muhammad Khan, through its General1991 PLC 425 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-12-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Fauji Sugar Mills vs Liaquat Ali1991 PLC 455 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-01-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs English Biscuit Manufacturers Ltd, vs The Assistant Collector, Central Excises & Land Customs,1991 PTD 478 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ebrahim Bros. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone B', Karachi1991 PTD 374 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Duke Sports Ltd vs The C.I.T., Rawalpindi1991 PTD 776 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Daily Mashriq vs Muhammad Aslam Anwar1991 PLC 106 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-04-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Crescent Mills Limited vs Mushtaq1991 PLC 888 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-05-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Coffee Shop vs National Bank of Pak I3 an1991 MLD 793 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Coffee Club and 4 others vs Pakistan National Shipping1991 MLD 644 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Capgas (Private) Ltd. Karachi vs Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources through Directorgeneral, Gas, Islamabad and another1991 MLD 2493 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bata Shoe Company And 2 Others vs Muhammad Arshad Siddiou11991 SCMR 1775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-14
  ejectmenttenantdefault in rentleave to appealrent controllerconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who were tenants facing ejectment, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing their first appeal under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act. The respondents had purchased the property in 1981, and subsequently sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment, personal need, and damage to the property. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, and the High Court maintained the order. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had committed default in the payment of rent and whether sufficient ground existed to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower forums. The Supreme Court examined the record and found no evidence supporting the petitioners' claim that rent had been tendered and refused. Furthermore, the court held that having voluntarily closed their evidence, the petitioners could not claim a right to reopen the case for producing further witnesses. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that concurrent findings of fact regarding default cannot be interfered with without substantiating evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant claim absence of default when there is no documentary or oral evidence on record showing that rent was tendered and refused?
  • Whether a party who has voluntarily closed its evidence is entitled to reopen the case for producing additional witnesses as a matter of right?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding default in rent payment without substantiating proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bashir & Co. vs The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 4 others1991 CLC 2061 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Balagamwala Oil Mills vs Messrs Shakarchi Trading A.G., and others1991 CLC 2071 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-08
  temporary injunctionattachment before judgmentbreach of contractprima facie caseforeign companycivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two applications filed by the plaintiff seeking a temporary injunction and attachment before judgment against the defendants in a suit for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. The plaintiff, having contracted with a foreign company for the purchase of goods, alleged that the defendant failed to perform, causing financial loss. The core legal questions were whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for a temporary injunction and whether grounds existed for attachment before judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court held that where a claim for damages requires evidence to be led to establish the breach, a prima facie case cannot be determined solely on pleadings and documents, thus precluding temporary injunctions. Furthermore, the Court held that the mere fact that a defendant is a foreign company with no assets in Pakistan, or the allegation that funds are being remitted abroad, is insufficient for attachment before judgment without satisfying the specific statutory requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure, especially when the plaintiff was aware of the defendant's lack of local assets at the time of contracting.

  Questions settled

  • Can a temporary injunction be granted when the claim for damages requires evidence to be led to establish a breach of contract?
  • Is the fact that a defendant is a foreign company with no assets in Pakistan sufficient ground for attachment before judgment?
  • Does the knowledge of a plaintiff regarding a defendant's lack of assets in Pakistan at the time of contracting affect the grant of attachment before judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs B.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd., Karachi vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone a, Karachi1991 PTD 835 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Azam Agencies vs Excise and Taxation Officer and others1991 CLC 1366 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-05
  constitutional petitiontaxationimport and exportlawful authoritytax demand
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by M/s. Azam Agencies Limited challenging the demand for tax imposed by the Excise and Taxation Officer under the West Pakistan Finance Act, 1963. The petitioner, a registered importer and exporter under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, contested the legality of the tax demand. The core legal question before the Lahore High Court was whether the tax levied under the West Pakistan Finance Act, 1963, upon persons engaged in the trade of importing and exporting was lawful. Relying on the precedent established in the case of Burma Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi v. Excise and Taxation Officer 'L' Division Karachi (PLD 1976 Karachi 1238), the Court held that the tax demand was illegal and issued without lawful authority. Consequently, the High Court accepted the petition and restrained the respondents from levying the tax on the petitioner. The judgment affirms that demands for tax under the West Pakistan Finance Act, 1963, are without lawful authority, thereby providing relief to the petitioner against such tax impositions.

  Questions settled

  • Is the demand for tax made under the West Pakistan Finance Act, 1963, considered lawful?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to restrain tax authorities from levying taxes deemed illegal?
  • Can a registered importer and exporter challenge a tax demand under the West Pakistan Finance Act, 1963, through a constitutional petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Avari Towers, Karachi vs Zahid Siddiqui1991 PLC 705 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-09-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ashrafi (Private) Ltd. through Managing Director Sharafat Ali1991 MLD 1101 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-04
  suit for damagesbreach of contractparol evidence rulevoid contractsuperstructure principleattachment of propertyexecution of decreeproof of damages
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs filed a civil suit for recovery of Rs. 14,51,000 as damages for alleged breach of contract regarding the financing and development of a commercial plot. The plaintiffs had entered into an agreement to purchase the plot from a transport syndicate and subsequently executed a second agreement assigning their rights to the deceased defendant. However, the plot was attached and auctioned by the court in execution of decrees against the syndicate. The primary legal questions were whether oral evidence could be led to contradict written contract terms, whether the second agreement was enforceable, and whether the plaintiffs had established lost profit damages. The High Court dismissed the suit, holding that under Article 103 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, oral evidence cannot override terms of a written contract. Furthermore, applying the principle in Yousuf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia, since the underlying agreement with the syndicate was void, the subsequent superstructure of rights under the second agreement was also void. Finally, the plaintiffs failed to discharge the burden of proving damages with concrete evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can oral evidence be admitted to contradict or vary the written terms of an admitted contract under Article 103 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • What is the effect on a subsequent derivative contract when the primary underlying agreement on which it is based is declared void?
  • Does a private transfer or contract for sale of property subject to court attachment convey any legal rights or bind the property under Section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish the precise quantum of damages resulting from an alleged breach of contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asbestos Cement Industries Ltd. vs The Superintendent, Central1991 PTD 506 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asad Brothers vs Ibadat Yar Khan1991 SCMR 986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-06
  rent evictiontentative rent orderstriking off defencejurisdiction of Rent Controllerdefinition of rentSindh Rented Premises Ordinanceappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an eviction order against tenants for alleged default in paying water charges and Betterment Tax, which the landlord claimed as rent. The Rent Controller, acting under Section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, ordered the deposit of these charges and subsequently struck off the tenants' defense for non-compliance. The core legal question was whether a tenant can challenge the validity of a tentative rent order in an appeal against the final eviction order, and whether the Rent Controller must determine if disputed charges constitute "rent" before ordering their deposit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by refusing to examine the legality of the Rent Controller's tentative order. The Court ruled that a tenant is entitled to challenge the validity of a tentative rent order during an appeal against the final eviction order. The key principle laid down is that a tribunal of limited jurisdiction must perform a summary inquiry to determine if disputed amounts qualify as "rent" under the statute before exercising its power to penalize a tenant for non-compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant challenge the validity of a tentative rent order passed under Section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 in an appeal against the final eviction order?
  • Must a Rent Controller determine whether disputed charges constitute 'rent' as defined by the Ordinance before ordering their deposit under Section 16(1)?
  • Does the Rent Controller have the authority to order the deposit of future monthly dues even if the landlord's application only explicitly prayed for the deposit of arrears?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asad Brothers vs Ibadat Yar Khan1991 PLD Supreme Court 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-17
  evictionnuisancelease agreementunauthorized alterationrent restrictioncommercial premisesimpairment of property value
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding an eviction order against the appellants (tenants) from two shops used as a snack bar. The landlord sought eviction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, alleging that the tenants had unauthorizedly altered the premises by cutting a hole in the wall to install a large exhaust fan, which caused vibrations, noise, and obnoxious fumes, thereby constituting a nuisance to residential tenants in the building and impairing the property's value. The core legal questions were whether the tenants had obtained the requisite permission for the structural alterations and whether their business activities amounted to a nuisance under the Ordinance. The Court held that the tenants failed to prove they obtained the necessary written consent for the alterations and that their conduct, specifically the creation of a nuisance, justified eviction. The Court affirmed that even in commercial areas, tenants are bound by contractual and statutory obligations to avoid causing nuisance to other occupants, and that the landlord's evidence of material impairment to the property's value and utility was sufficient to warrant eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the installation of an exhaust fan without written consent constitute a violation of a lease agreement prohibiting structural alterations?
  • Can a tenant be evicted from commercial premises for causing a nuisance to residential occupants in the same building?
  • Does the failure to obtain written consent for structural changes, despite alleged verbal permission, justify an order of eviction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Is a landlord required to prove material impairment of property value to succeed in an eviction claim based on nuisance?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ark Industrial Management Ltd. vs Messrs Habib Bank Limited1991 PLD Supreme Court 976 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-20
  summary suitleave to defendpromissory notesconditional leaveOrder XXXVII C.P.C.commercial litigationtriable issuejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court order granting conditional leave to defend a summary suit filed under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. The appellants argued that their defense, involving allegations of duress and lack of consideration for promissory notes, raised triable issues entitling them to unconditional leave. The Supreme Court examined whether the trial court’s discretion to impose conditions, such as furnishing security, was exercised correctly. The Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion under Order XXXVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. It clarified that, unlike the Indian Civil Procedure Code, the Pakistani provision does not mandate unconditional leave merely upon the disclosure of a triable issue. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the summary procedure is the expeditious disposal of commercial litigation. Consequently, where a defendant’s plea appears aimed at prolonging proceedings or lacks sufficient substantiation at the leave stage, the court may validly impose conditions. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the trial court’s discretion remains unfettered and is not restricted to granting unconditional leave solely because a triable issue is raised.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a triable issue in a summary suit under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. automatically entitle a defendant to unconditional leave to defend?
  • Is the trial court's discretion to impose conditions for leave to defend under Order XXXVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. unfettered?
  • Can a court impose conditions for leave to defend if the defendant's plea appears designed to prolong litigation?
  • Are Indian judicial precedents regarding unconditional leave to defend applicable to the Pakistani Order XXXVII, Rule 3, C.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Amir Weaving Factory And Others vs Messrs United Bank Ltd:1991 SCMR 1737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-29
  ex parte decreebanking loan recoverypost-decretal interestsufficient causemandatory interestbanking law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute between a banking institution and borrowers regarding the recovery of a loan and the imposition of post-decretal interest. The appellants, having initially confessed judgment in a Special Court (Banking), were granted payment in installments without interest. The respondent-Bank appealed this decision to the Lahore High Court, which subsequently granted an ex parte decree awarding interest. The appellants unsuccessfully sought to set aside the ex parte decree via a miscellaneous petition, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly dismissed the application to set aside the ex parte decree and whether the mandatory provisions of banking law required the imposition of interest. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to establish sufficient grounds for rehearing the ex parte appeal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Section 8(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, imposes a mandatory requirement to grant interest to a decree-holder, rendering the rehearing of the matter futile.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 8(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 mandate the grant of interest to a decree-holder?
  • Can an ex parte decree be set aside if the applicant fails to show sufficient cause for non-appearance?
  • Is a direct appeal maintainable against an order dismissing a miscellaneous petition filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited vs Super Electric Industries1991 SCMR 2319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-31
  recovery of loansexecution of decreestay of executionappellate powersbanking companiestemporary injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a suit filed by the appellant-Bank against the respondent for recovery of money under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, which was decreed by the Lahore High Court. The respondent filed an appeal under Section 12 of the Ordinance and obtained an order suspending the execution of the decree. The appellant subsequently sought vacation of the stay order, contending that under Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the stay ceased to have effect after six months. The High Court rejected the application, holding that the stay was governed by Order XLI, Rule 5 rather than Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the power of an appellate court to suspend the execution of a decree is an ancillary and incidental power tied to its jurisdiction to hear appeals, and is not governed by the six-month limitation imposed by Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeal, upholding the continuation of the stay under the court's ancillary powers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order suspending the execution of a decree passed by an appellate court is governed by Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A or Order XLI, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the six-month time limit imposed on certain injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to stay orders issued during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Is the power to suspend the execution of a decree an ancillary and incidental power attached to the appellate jurisdiction under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Agencies Corporation vs The Central Board of Revenue and others1991 MLD 1486 · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-01Read full judgment →
• Messrs Aftab Soap Factory Ltd. vs Mujahid Soap Factory, Rawalpindi1991 SCMR 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-13
  trade mark registrationdeceptive similaritymisrepresentationfraud on the courtunwary customerappellate proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the registration of a trade mark for washing soap, where the appellant challenged the respondents' application on the grounds of deceptive similarity under the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The appellant contended that the respondents' use of a 'Billi' (cat) device was deceptively similar to their own registered 'Milan Soap' mark, potentially misleading unwary customers. During the appellate proceedings, the Supreme Court examined the original wrappers and materials submitted by the parties. The Court discovered that the appellants had misrepresented the respondents' actual trade mark and packaging in their submissions to the Court, presenting materials that differed drastically from the original records. Upon comparing the actual wrappers, the Court found the differences so obvious that no customer could be misled. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's case was undermined by their own misrepresentation and fraudulent conduct during the proceedings. The Court granted both parties liberty to pursue legal action against each other for any fraud or misrepresentation committed during the litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presentation of misrepresented evidence by a party during appellate proceedings warrant the dismissal of their appeal?
  • Can a party be held liable for misrepresentation or fraud committed during the course of court proceedings?
  • Is the visual similarity of a trade mark device sufficient to prove deceptive similarity when the actual packaging differs significantly?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs A.R. Khan & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. and 22 others vs The Registrar of Trade Unions, Karachi and 2 others1991 PLC 846 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs A.D. Surgico (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Chairman Central Board of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad And 2 Other1991 SCMR 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-27
  leave to appealimport licencecustoms penaltyexpert evidencefinding of factconstitution petitionold and used machinery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Constitution Petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the imposition of penalties on the petitioner for importing old and used machinery contrary to the import licence under the guise of new equipment. The core legal question concerned whether reliance could be placed on the expert opinion of engineering professors who inspected the machinery. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the administrative tribunals and the High Court—supported by expert evidence and opportunity for cross-examination—were well-founded and involved no substantial point of law of public importance. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that factual determinations based on properly tested expert evidence by administrative authorities will not be interfered with absent legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether expert evidence examined in the absence of a party is vitiated if the expert is subsequently made available for and subjected to extensive cross-examination?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by administrative tribunals and the High Court based on material evidence?
  • Whether the importation of old and used machinery under an import licence restricted to new goods attracts penal consequences under the Customs Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Meraj Din Alias Majah And Others vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1295 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-27Read full judgment →
• Mehrzad Khan vs The State1991 PLD Supreme Court 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-02
  Court-witnessmaterial witnessdiscretionary powermandatory dutygiven up witnesscriminal trialjust decision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the dismissal of the appellant's application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) to summon two eye-witnesses as Court-witnesses, who had been given up by the prosecution on the ground of being won over. The trial court and the High Court had dismissed the application on the basis that the court's power under Section 540 was discretionary. The Supreme Court analyzed the statutory language and established that Section 540 Cr.P.C. consists of two distinct parts: the first part, using the word 'may', is discretionary, while the second part, employing the word 'shall', is mandatory. The Court held that if the evidence of a witness appears essential to the just decision of the case, the trial court has no discretion and is legally bound to summon them. Finding that both lower courts failed to determine whether the testimony of the given-up eye-witnesses was essential for a just decision, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter to the trial court for a fresh determination on this specific question.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains both a discretionary and a mandatory part?
  • Is a trial court obligated to summon a witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if their evidence is essential to the just decision of the case?
  • What criteria must a trial court use to determine whether a given-up prosecution witness should be summoned as a Court-witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehran Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Sindh Employees' Social Security1991 PLC 310 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-29Read full judgment →
• Mehraj Din Alias Maja vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1694 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-02Read full judgment →
• Mehr Lal Khan vs Haji Ahmad and 2 others1991 M L'D 663 · Lahore High Court · 1990-09-15Read full judgment →
• Mehr Khan vs The StateK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 366 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-22Read full judgment →
• Mehr Khan vs The State-1991 PCr.LJ 93 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-22Read full judgment →
• Mehr Khan And Another vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 35 · Federal Shariat Court · 1989-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mehnaz Begum and anothers vs Muhammad Sarfraz and others1991 CLC 782 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-03Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Khan vs The State-1991 P Cr. L J 2158 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-17
  plea of guiltyconviction on admissionshow cause noticeexplosive substancesremand for fresh trialcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Special Court (Suppression of Terrorist Activities) Sargodha, convicting the appellant under Section 4-B of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, and sentencing him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment based on his plea of guilty regarding the possession of 300 detonators. The core legal question was whether convicting the appellant forthwith upon his plea of guilty without providing him an opportunity to show cause why he should not be convicted, as mandated by Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is legal. The Lahore High Court held that the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of asking the accused to show cause after recording his admission, which is designed to avoid involuntary admissions and ensure fairness. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and remanded the case back to the trial court for a fresh trial in accordance with the law, laying down the principle that the procedure under Section 243 Cr.P.C. must be strictly followed before sentencing upon a plea of guilty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conviction based on a plea of guilty without giving the accused an opportunity to show cause under Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is legal?
  • Is a trial court obliged to ask the accused to show cause why he should not be convicted after recording an admission of guilt?
  • What is the legal consequence of failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 upon a plea of guilty?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Alam Jat vs Director Education Schools and 2 others1991 PLC (C.S.) 1061 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1990-04-25Read full judgment →
• Meher Muhammad And Others vs Ahmed Khan And Other1991 SCMR 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-03
  settlement of landdisplaced personssurrendered landsitting tenantscompensation poolMartial Law Regulationwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the allotment of surrendered agricultural land previously held by a displaced person. The core legal question was whether land surrendered by a displaced person under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 reverted to the compensation pool or vested in the Provincial Government, and consequently, whether sitting tenants held a superior right to such land. The High Court had determined that the surrendered land vested in the Provincial Government and that, under the relevant settlement scheme, sitting tenants were entitled to priority in allotment. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's findings and concluded that the lower court's exercise of writ jurisdiction and its interpretation of the law were legally sound and free from error. The Supreme Court upheld the decision, affirming that the entitlement of sitting tenants must be prioritized. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the land must be offered to the sitting tenants first, with any remaining land thereafter available for the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Does land surrendered by a displaced person under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 vest in the Provincial Government or revert to the compensation pool?
  • Are sitting tenants entitled to priority in the allotment of land surrendered by displaced persons under the relevant settlement scheme?
  • Can a High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, remit a matter to the Deputy Commissioner to determine the entitlement of sitting tenants?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob vs The State1991 MLD 545 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-11-18Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Pictures vs The Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Culture Archaeolgy, Sports and Tourism, Islamabad and another1991 CLC 1436 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-27Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Hussain vs Additional Inspector-General of Police, Sindh, Karachi1991 PLC (C.S.) 462 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1990-08-20Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Hussain vs Additional Inspector General of Police Sindhh, Karachi(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 10) · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Mehboob Hussain Shah vs Syed Muhammad Iqbal Gilani And Other1991 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-04
  ejectment proceedingsdeclaratory suitthird-party objectorstay of executionleave to appealpossessionlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment concerning the interplay between ejectment proceedings and a separate declaratory suit filed by a third-party objector. The core legal question is whether a third party, who was not a party to the ejectment proceedings, can be legally compelled to surrender possession of the disputed property as a condition precedent to contesting a declaratory suit regarding title. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the High Court’s direction requiring the petitioner to deliver possession before the suit could proceed was unwarranted and unjustified. The Court established the principle that a person not party to ejectment proceedings is not bound by the Rent Controller's order, and imposing a condition of surrendering possession to contest a title suit is legally unsustainable. Consequently, the Court vacated the High Court's order that had set aside the stay of execution, allowing the petitioner's suit to proceed on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a third party who is not a party to ejectment proceedings be compelled to surrender possession as a condition to contest a declaratory suit?
  • Is a person who is not a party to ejectment proceedings bound by the order of a Rent Controller?
  • Can a High Court impose a condition of delivering possession on a plaintiff before allowing their declaratory suit to proceed?
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• Mehboob Ali vs The State1991 MLD 2455 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-21
  smugglinghostile witnesscustoms offenceadverse inferencecriminal appealappreciation of evidenceF.I.R. evidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for smuggling gold under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given that key witnesses were declared hostile and the F.I.R. omitted certain details. The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence. The court held that a witness declared hostile does not necessarily lose credibility, and their testimony remains admissible if corroborated by other evidence. Furthermore, the court clarified that the F.I.R. is not a substantive statement of the prosecution's case, and the omission of a witness's name therein is not fatal to the prosecution. Finally, the court affirmed that an adverse inference must be drawn against an accused who fails to testify on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, reinforcing the necessity for the accused to rebut the prosecution's case when afforded the opportunity.

  Questions settled

  • Does a witness declared hostile automatically lose their credibility in a criminal trial?
  • Is the absence of a witness's name in the F.I.R. fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • What is the effect of an accused's failure to testify on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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