Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Dost Mohammad Chandio and Other vs Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 136) · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Karachi Division vs Muhammad Asad Khan1991 PLC 676 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-09-09Read full judgment →
• Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways and others vs Muneer1991 PLC 294 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-03-24Read full judgment →
• Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways and another vs Anwer Ali1991 PLC 723 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-07-15Read full judgment →
• Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways and another vs Abdul1991 PLC 399 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-01-18Read full judgment →
• District Manager, KTC, Karachi vs Nazir Ahmed and 7 others1991 PLC 891 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1991-05-20Read full judgment →
• District Manager, Karachi Transport Corporation, Orangi Nallah1991 PLC 423 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-12-06Read full judgment →
• District Manager, Karachi Transport Corporation vs Rahim Bux1991 PLC 90 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-04-15Read full judgment →
• District Manager, Karachi Transport Corporation vs Muhammad1991 PLC 224 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-05-10Read full judgment →
• District Manager vs Muhammad Saeed1991 PLC 364 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-03-11Read full judgment →
• District Evacuee Trust Committee, Lyallpur vs Abdul Ghafoor1991 CLC 1670 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-14Read full judgment →
• Directorgeneral, Pakistan Post Office Department, through Assistant1991 CLC 1601 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-21Read full judgment →
• Director-General T & T, Islamabad and 2 others vs Nawab Ali1991 PLC 443 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-11-27Read full judgment →
• Director Education and others vs Islamulhaq and others1991 CLC 1434 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-22Read full judgment →
• Dinar Wali Khan And Others vs Rehman Deyar And Other1991 SCMR 1660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-26
  leave to appealwrit jurisdictionland disputeownership claimChitral
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal concerning a dispute over the ownership of land in the erstwhile State of Chitral, where both parties claimed ownership declarations. An Additional Deputy Commissioner had declared the land State property in 1975, while the Federal Land Commission later found in favour of one set of petitioners for half the property, a decision that remained largely unaltered upon review by the Chairman, Tribunal Land Disputes Swat and Chitral. A subsequent writ petition in the High Court was dismissed, but the Division Bench additionally held that the relief granted to the opposing petitioners was unjustified, prompting cross-petitions for leave to appeal. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court is whether the High Court could, in its writ jurisdiction, deprive a party of the advantage gained from lower forums. The Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions to examine this and other raised questions, requiring security of Rs.5,000 in each case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can in its writ jurisdiction deprive a party of the advantage gained from lower forums?
  • Can ownership claims regarding land in the erstwhile State of Chitral be adjudicated through constitutional petitions?
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• Din Muhammad vs Eidu1991 SCMR 1787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-28
  mortgage deedconditional salefraudulent contractcivil revisionland disputeappellate findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing a civil revision. The dispute concerned a land transaction involving 49 Kanals 6 Marlas of land, where the petitioner claimed ownership based on a document he characterized as a mortgage deed with conditional sale, while the respondent contended it was merely a simple mortgage. The core legal question was whether the transaction was valid or vitiated by fraud. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner, but the appellate court reversed this decision, finding the transaction was a simple mortgage and that fraud had been committed against the respondent. The Supreme Court upheld the lower appellate court's findings, noting that the petitioner's own witnesses failed to support the claim of a settled bargain and that the consideration amount was disproportionately low compared to the property's actual value. The Court held that a contract based on fraud cannot be enforced or upheld, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court enforce a contract that is found to be based on fraud?
  • Does a finding of fact regarding fraud by lower courts warrant interference in civil revision?
  • Is a transaction involving a significantly undervalued property subject to scrutiny for fraud?
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• Din Muhammad vs Additional District Judge, Multan and another1991 MLD 791 · Lahore High Court · 1990-12-23Read full judgment →
• Din Muhammad vs Additional Commissioner, Quetta Division, Quetta1991 SCMR 810 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-04
  building plan approvaldemolition of wallprivate land vs public roadmunicipal appellate authoritydisputed question of factjurisdiction of civil courtconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court concerning a dispute over a boundary wall separating Ram Bagh Colony from a street leading to Stewart Road in Quetta. The factory owners (respondents) secured a revised building plan to open a gate onto Ram Bagh Road, which was opposed by the appellant, leading the Municipal Administrator to prohibit breaking the wall. On statutory appeal, the Additional Commissioner ordered the wall's demolition, finding the route necessary for factory access. The High Court dismissed the appellant's constitutional petition, holding that the appellate authority was competent to record a finding of fact regarding whether the road was private or public. The Supreme Court partly disagreed with the High Court's reasoning, holding that the municipal appellate authority, when dealing with building plan approvals, possessed no jurisdiction to conclusively decide disputed questions of title or determine whether a lane was private or public. The Supreme Court upheld the petition's dismissal but clarified that parties must resolve the disputed factual controversy before a competent civil court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a municipal appellate authority dealing with building plan approvals possess the jurisdiction to conclusively determine whether a lane is a private passage or a public road?
  • Can a municipal authority or its appellate forum order the demolition of a private wall to provide access over disputed property?
  • Whether disputed questions of title and status of land as private or public can be conclusively determined in constitutional writ proceedings rather than before a civil court?
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• Din Muhammad and others vs Evacuee Property Trust Board and others1991 MLD 2353 · Lahore High Court · 1991-06-10Read full judgment →
• Dilshad vs Mst. Musarat Nazir and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-23
  Khuladissolution of marriagereturn of benefitswrit jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a former husband against the affirmation of the dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khula` through writ jurisdiction by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to order the return of monetary benefits to the petitioner in its writ jurisdiction while upholding the dissolution of marriage. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the petitioner failed to insist upon the determination and return of monetary benefits at the proper stage before the lower forums, such relief could not be granted in the highly discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court further noted that initiating a fresh civil suit for the same purpose would be a futile exercise. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, and the impugned judgment was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim the return of monetary benefits in writ jurisdiction upon the dissolution of marriage through Khula if no such insistence was made at the proper stage below?
  • Whether the High Court is bound to issue directions for the return of benefits while upholding a dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khula in discretionary writ proceedings?
  • Is it appropriate to file a fresh civil suit for the recovery of monetary benefits after failing to seek the same during Khula proceedings?
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• Dilshad vs Judge Family Court, Kharian and another1991 CLC 1564 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-12Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Khan And Others vs Ghulam Nabi And Other1991 SCMR 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-26
  constructive res judicatacivil revisionrevenue recordspermanent injunctionco-ownershipleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction, wherein the plaintiffs sought to establish their status as co-owners in possession of the suit property, challenging the revenue entries designating the contesting defendants as owners. Having faced concurrent findings against them in lower courts, including the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court, the petitioners challenged the revisional order before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions concerned whether the petitioners' suit was barred by the principles of constructive res judicata and the provisions of Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that previous judicial decisions did not operate as res judicata. The Court affirmed that if the issues raised were previously adjudicated, the suit is barred by res judicata; conversely, if the subject matter was omitted from prior litigation, it is barred by Order II, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Consequently, the leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit become barred by res judicata if the issues raised therein were previously decided in earlier litigation?
  • Does Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a suit if the subject matter was not included in previous litigation?
  • Can a party succeed in a civil suit if the claim is barred by either res judicata or Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Dil Muhammad vs Additional District Judge, Sahiwal and 3 others1991 MLD 2068 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-17
  arbitration awardlimitation periodwritten noticerule of the courtresiduary articleconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged concurrent orders of the lower forums rejecting the petitioner's plea that an application to make an arbitration award a rule of the court was barred by time. The core legal question was whether limitation under Article 178 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, runs from the date of a formal written notice served by the arbitrator under Section 14(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, or if mere knowledge or information obtained otherwise (aliunde) suffices to trigger the limitation period. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that a written notice served strictly in the manner prescribed by Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, is a condition precedent for attracting Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court laid down that knowledge gained aliunde does not substitute for the formal written notice, and in the absence of such statutory notice, the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act applies.

  Questions settled

  • Does limitation under Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908 run from the date of knowledge of an arbitration award or from the service of a formal written notice?
  • Is a written notice served by the arbitrator under Section 14(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 mandatory to attract Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • What limitation article applies to an application for filing an award when no formal written notice has been served by the arbitrator?
  • Does knowledge gained aliunde of the making of an award suffice to commence limitation under Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
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• Dil Ahsan Khan vs The State1991 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-10
  territorial jurisdictioncriminal misappropriationdowry articlesquashment of proceedingscriminal breach of trustCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns a challenge to the territorial jurisdiction of a trial court in Karachi regarding a criminal complaint filed against the appellant. The appellant, accused of misappropriating dowry articles, sought the quashment of proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arguing that no offence occurred within the jurisdiction of Karachi. The core legal question was whether the Karachi court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to inquire into or try the complaint. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court correctly exercised jurisdiction. The Court relied on Section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which stipulates that an offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust may be tried by a court within whose local limits the property was received, retained, or the offence committed. Since the complainant alleged that the entrustment of dowry articles occurred in Karachi, the Court affirmed that the Karachi court had the legal authority to proceed with the matter, thereby upholding the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have jurisdiction to try a case of criminal misappropriation if the entrustment of the property occurred within its local limits?
  • Can proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 solely on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction when the complaint alleges entrustment within that jurisdiction?
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• Dharmendra Prasad Singh vs Commissioner of Wealth-Tax1991 PTD 718 · Allahabad High Court · 1988-12-22Read full judgment →
• Deputy Director, Sindh Agricultural Supplies Organization and 21991 PLC 284 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-03-25Read full judgment →
• Deputy Collector of Customs And 2 Others vs Messrs Reezan Trading1991 SCMR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-28
  customs dutytariff classificationadministrative reviewmisdeclarationimport policyjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment, which had set aside a customs re-classification order issued against the respondent. The respondent imported a substance identified as 'Ethanol G.R.' (guaranteed reagent), which was initially cleared under Pakistan Customs Tariff heading 38.19. Subsequently, customs authorities, acting on secret information, sought to re-classify the product, alleging misdeclaration and short-payment of duty. The core legal question was whether the customs authorities were justified in re-classifying the imported chemical as an alcoholic beverage rather than a laboratory reagent, given its specific use for diagnostic and analytical purposes. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the administrative re-classification lacked a sound basis. The Court held that since the Government of Pakistan had previously permitted the import specifically as a chemical for laboratory use, and given the product's high purity (99.9%) rendering it unsuitable for human consumption, the original classification was correct. The principle established is that administrative re-classification of goods must be based on relevant data and consistent with the intended use authorized by the government at the time of import.

  Questions settled

  • Can customs authorities re-classify imported goods after the government has already permitted their import under a specific chemical classification?
  • Does the intended use of a chemical for laboratory and diagnostic purposes justify its classification under chemical tariff headings rather than as an alcoholic beverage?
  • Is a high-purity chemical substance unsuitable for human consumption properly classifiable as an alcoholic beverage for customs duty purposes?
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• Department. Assessee. vs AssesseePTCL 1991 CL. 16 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1989-09-14Read full judgment →
• Department vs AssesseePTCL 1991 CL. 160 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1990-05-07Read full judgment →
• Daya Ram and another vs Muhammad Irshad and 2 others1991 CLC 900 · Sindh High Court · 1990-10-14Read full judgment →
• Dawood Hercules Chemicals Limited vs The Registrar of Trade Marks1991 MLD 2307 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-23Read full judgment →
• Dawar and anothers vs The State1991 MLD 1864 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-06-01Read full judgment →
• Daulat Khan And Another vs The State1991 SCMR 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-06
  leave to appealsmugglingcontrabandsearch and seizurepublic witnessmens reaCustoms Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a conviction under the Customs Act, 1969, where the petitioners, a driver and a cleaner of a coach, were found guilty of smuggling contraband goods discovered in a hidden compartment of the vehicle. The petitioners challenged the conviction before the Supreme Court, arguing that the search was conducted without independent public witnesses, that there was no evidence establishing their knowledge of the contraband, and that the vehicle belonged to a third party, suggesting the goods could have been secreted without their involvement. Furthermore, they contended that their defense of being detained during the search was ignored by the lower courts. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the submissions, determined that the issues raised regarding the evidentiary value of the search, the lack of public witnesses, and the requirement of proving mens rea in smuggling cases necessitated a deeper examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the conviction could be sustained in light of these legal and factual contentions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of public witnesses during a vehicle search under the Customs Act 1969 invalidate the recovery of contraband?
  • Is it necessary to prove the driver's knowledge of contraband secreted in a vehicle to sustain a conviction for smuggling?
  • Can a conviction under the Customs Act 1969 be upheld if the defense plea regarding the circumstances of the search was not considered by the trial court?
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• Daulat Bibi vs Galeen Khan and another1991 MLD 2335 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-14Read full judgment →
• Daraz Khan And 4 Others vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 68 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-03-27Read full judgment →
• Darakshan Afridi and 2 others vs Additional Director (Com), Karachi1991 CLC 1844 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-26Read full judgment →
• Crescent Textile Mills Ltd. through its Manager vs Abdul Aziz and another1991 PLC 494 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-09Read full judgment →
• Crescent Sugar Mills & Distillery Limited vs Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-03
  leave to appealexcise dutyproduction capacitypenaltyabatementCentral Board of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the imposition of penalties under the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972. The core legal questions examined are whether a penalty under rule 5(3) of the said Rules follows as a matter of course regardless of abatement allowed by the Central Board of Revenue, and whether such penalty liability must be proportionate to the capacity duty for which abatement was not allowed while the main abatement claim remains pending finalization. The Court granted leave to appeal to consider these substantial questions of law regarding tax and excise duty penalties and directed security to be furnished.

  Questions settled

  • Whether penalty under rule 5(3) of the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1972 follows as a matter of course and irrespective of the extent of the abatement allowed by the Central Board of Revenue?
  • Whether the liability to the penalty was dependent on, and had to be proportionate to the extent of capacity duty of which abatement was not allowed?
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• Crescent Board Ltd. vs Collector of Customs (Appraising), Custom1991 CLC 1522 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-07Read full judgment →
• Cosmopolitan Development Company Ltd. vs Alfred C. Toepfer1991 CLC 1087 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-13Read full judgment →
• Cosmopolitan Development Company Limited vs District Council, Thatta and others1991 MLD 1513 · Sindh High Court · 1988-01-13Read full judgment →
• Consolidated Shipping (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Bamber Shipping A.G., Auelestrasse1991 MLD 1367 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-17Read full judgment →
• Consolidated Exports Ltd. vs Messrs Haji Abdul Razak & Co.1991 MLD 1308 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-26Read full judgment →
• Commmissioner of Income-Tax vs Har Parshad and others1991 PTD 94 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-10-05Read full judgment →
• Committee of Administration, Fauji Foundation, Rawalpindi Cantt. vs Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others s1991 CLC 1167 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-30Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of. Income-Tax, Central Zone `B', Karachi vs Tarique1991 PTD 350 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Shadiram Ganga Prasad (Huf)1991 PTD 235 · Allahabad High Court · 1989-02-27Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Sardar Rajendra Singh1991 PTD 456 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1989-11-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Ram Awatar1991 PTD 272 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1988-01-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs N. R. Sirkar1991 PTD 705 · Gauhati High Court · 1988-08-18Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax/Income-Tax, Central Zone, Karachi vs1991 PTD 495 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-29Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Sales Tax/Income Tax, Central Zone, Karachi vs M/s.PTCL 1991 CL. 299 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax, Central Zone `A', Karachi vs Messrs a & B1991 PTD 909 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-03Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax vs Lever Brothers Pakistan Limited1991 PTD 973 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Incometax, Peshawar Zone, Peshawar vs Messrs Siemen A.G_1991 PLD Supreme Court 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-21
  income taxdividendreturn on capitalinterpretation of statutesIslamic jurisprudencecontractual obligations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax challenges the Peshawar High Court's decision holding that the return on capital paid by Telephone Industries of Pakistan Limited to Siemens A.G. constituted "dividend" under section 2(6-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, rather than "interest" or an "obligatory charge". The core legal question was whether the guaranteed return on share capital under the corporate agreements amounted to dividend income. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the disputed return was indeed dividend, as dictionaries and the intention of the contracting parties established that the return was profit in the nature of dividend. Furthermore, the Court laid down the key principle that under Islamic jurisprudence and constitutional interpretation, when parties enter into a valid mutual contract not prohibited by Islam, third parties such as the income tax authorities or courts have no power to intervene and alter the nature of the contract.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the return on capital paid to a shareholder under an agreement is considered 'dividend' within the meaning of section 2(6-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Can income tax authorities alter the nature of a valid mutual contract between parties under the pretext of interpreting fiscal laws?
  • Does the interpretation of existing statutes in Pakistan require alignment with the Injunctions of Islam pursuant to Article 227 of the Constitution?
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• Commissioner of Incometax (Central), Karachi vs Messrs Fakir1991 PLD Supreme Court 280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-30
  Income Tax Actdepreciation allowancewritten down valuesurplus sale proceedscessation of businesstaxing statute interpretationcharging provisiondeeming provision
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses appeals regarding the interpretation of the Second Proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, concerning the taxability of surpluses arising from the sale of plant, machinery, and buildings when the assessee carried on no business during the relevant accounting period. The core legal question was whether the Second Proviso is an independent charging provision enabling the Revenue to tax the surplus even if the business was not active or the machinery was not used in the relevant accounting period. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court correctly interpreted the law, ruling that the condition precedent under Section 10(1) requiring business to be carried on in the year of account is implicit in the Second Proviso, and 'any such building, machinery or plant' refers back to properties used for business in the previous year. The key principle laid down is that in interpreting taxing statutes, courts must look strictly at what is clearly said without implying unexpressed provisions or treating a proviso as an independent charging section untethered to the main enactment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 is an independent charging provision that operates regardless of whether the business was carried on or the machinery was used during the relevant accounting period?
  • Can surplus realized from the sale of plant, machinery, and buildings be assessed to tax under the Income Tax Act, 1922 if the assessee conducted no business in the accounting year of the sale?
  • How should the phrase 'any such building, machinery or plant' in the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 be construed in relation to preceding clauses?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Peshawar Zone, Peshawar vs Messrs Siemen A.G_1991 PTD 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-21
  dividendincome taxinterpretation of statutesislamic jurisprudencemutual contractreturn on capital
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax arises from a decision of the Peshawar High Court regarding the nature of a return on capital paid by Telephone Industries of Pakistan, Limited to Siemens A.G. The core legal question was whether the return on capital paid on the shareholding constituted 'dividend' within the meaning of section 2(6-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, or interest/obligatory charge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court rightly concluded the amount was dividend, noting that the intention of the parties and the term 'return' signified profit in the nature of dividend. Furthermore, invoking Islamic jurisprudence and principles of interpretation, the Court ruled that third parties, including tax authorities, cannot alter the nature of a mutually agreed valid contract freely entered into by parties. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the return on capital paid on shareholding constitutes dividend within the meaning of section 2(6-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Can tax authorities alter the nature of a mutually agreed valid contract between parties?
  • How do Islamic injunctions and principles of interpretation apply to the enforcement and interpretation of existing fiscal statutes?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras vs South Arcot Distt.1991 PTD 163 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-01-25Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras vs P. Doraiswamy Chetty1991 PTD 1143 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-10-26Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Noorani Calandering1991 PTD 830 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-06
  Income-taxprevious yearaccounting periodassessment yearstatutory discretiontax evasiontax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals by the Commissioner of Income-Tax challenging the High Court's decision regarding the authority of an Income-tax Officer to impose conditions when permitting an assessee to change their 'previous year' accounting period. The core legal question was whether, under Section 2(11) of the Income-tax Act, an Income-tax Officer, while consenting to a change in the accounting year, possesses the statutory discretion to impose a condition requiring the entire extended period (e.g., fifteen months) to be treated as a single 'previous year' for assessment purposes. The Supreme Court held that the Income-tax Officer acted within their statutory discretion. The Court reasoned that the proviso to Section 2(11) explicitly empowers the Officer to impose conditions upon granting consent for such changes. Furthermore, the Court established that the concept of two 'previous years' for a single assessment year is legally untenable under the Act. Consequently, the Officer may validly mandate that the transition period be consolidated into one assessment year to prevent income from escaping taxation, thereby safeguarding revenue interests.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Income-tax Officer impose a condition to count a period longer than twelve months as a single 'previous year' when allowing an assessee to change their accounting year?
  • Does the Income-tax Act permit the existence of two 'previous years' in relation to the same assessment year?
  • Does the proviso to Section 2(11) of the Income-tax Act grant the Income-tax Officer the power to impose conditions when consenting to a change in the 'previous year'?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone,---a--- Karachi vs Messrs.1991 PTD 869 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-03
  Income TaxBonus SharesUnabsorbed DepreciationSet-off of LossesDeemed IncomeTax Assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application before the Sindh High Court arose from a dispute regarding the tax assessment of a private limited company. The core legal question was whether the deemed income derived from bonus shares (free reserves) could be adjusted or set off against the business loss, specifically unabsorbed depreciation, incurred by the assessee during the relevant tax year. The Income-tax Officer had initially set off the loss against the bonus share income, but the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal subsequently ruled that such adjustment was impermissible, as bonus shares do not fall under the heads of income enumerated in the Income-tax Act of 1922. The Commissioner of Income-tax challenged this decision. Relying on the precedent established by a Division Bench of the same Court in 'Commissioner of Income-tax (Central Zone), Karachi v. Messrs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.', the High Court held that losses cannot be adjusted against fictional income. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the assessee is entitled to carry forward and set off such unabsorbed depreciation against future income, consistent with the spirit and provisions of the relevant tax legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Can deemed income from bonus shares be adjusted against business losses or unabsorbed depreciation?
  • Is unabsorbed depreciation entitled to be carried forward and set off in subsequent years when it cannot be adjusted against fictional income?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to reframe a question referred to it by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone, `A', Karachi vs Messrs1991 PTD 1028 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-12
  insurance businesstaxation reserveprovision for taxationexpenditureFirst Schedule Income Tax ActController of Insuranceassessment of income-tax
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the Supreme Court arise from a common order of the Sindh High Court disposing of Income Tax References under section 66 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. The respondent, a non-life insurance company, had charged provision for taxation to its Profit and Loss account, which the Income Tax Officer disallowed and added back to the taxable profits. The core legal question was whether the provision for taxation constituted an 'expenditure' empowering the Income Tax Officer to make adjustments under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court held that the accounts submitted under the Insurance Act, 1938 are binding and final as a fait accompli, and the Assessing Officer's power is strictly limited to excluding items that constitute actual 'expenditure' not allowable under section 10. Ruling that taxation reserves or provisions do not constitute expenditure—as they are not sums paid out irretrievably—the Court held that the Income Tax Officer lacked the jurisdiction to disallow and add back such reserves. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the statutory scheme confines the assessing authority strictly to the mechanism provided.

  Questions settled

  • Whether provision for taxation or taxation reserve constitutes expenditure under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Does an Income Tax Officer have the jurisdiction to alter or adjust items in the annual accounts of a non-life insurance company that do not constitute actual expenditure?
  • Are the annual accounts submitted by an insurance company to the Controller of Insurance binding on the Income Tax Officer for the purpose of computing taxable profits?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone, Karachi vs Messrs Seven-1991 PTD 860 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-04Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone `C', Karachi vs Messrs1991 PTD 493 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-29Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone `C', Karachi vs Messrs1991 PTD 569 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-12
  bad debtsincome taxreference applicationfinding of factbanking companyallowance
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a reference application filed by the Commissioner of Income-Tax under section 136(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, seeking to refer a question of law to the High Court arising from an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The respondent, a non-resident banking company, claimed bad debts for the assessment year 1976-77, which were partly disallowed by the Assessing Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal, however, allowed the claim based on the consistent banking practice of accounting for bad debts and previous judicial precedents, concluding that the amounts written off were indeed bad debts. The core legal question revolved around whether the Tribunal was justified in holding the claimed bad debts as admissible under section 10(2)(xi) of the repealed Income Tax Act, 1922. The Sindh High Court held that the Tribunal's determination that the amount claimed was a bad debt constituted a pure finding of fact, which remained unchallenged by the applicant. Consequently, no referable question of law arose, and the High Court dismissed the application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal that an amount claimed is a bad debt constitutes a finding of fact?
  • Whether a reference application under section 136(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance can be maintained when no question of law arises from the Tribunal's finding?
  • Whether the claim for bad debts made by a banking company under the consistent practice of accounting is admissible under section 10(2)(xi) of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone `C', Karachi vs Messrs1991 PTD 385 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-14Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone `B', Karachi vs Messrs1991 PTD 567 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-10Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone `A', Karachi vs Messrs1991 PTD 905 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-11Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone `A', Karachi vs Glaxo1991 PTD 393 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-22
  income taxnon-resident associatestransfer pricingdeemed profittax evasionappellate jurisdictionremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This income tax reference concerns the applicability of Section 42(2) of the Income Tax Act regarding a resident company purchasing raw materials from non-resident associates at allegedly inflated prices. The Income Tax Officer had invoked Section 42(2) to tax the deemed profit, but the Appellate Assistant Commissioner set aside this finding and remanded the matter. The Tribunal, however, failed to address the factual finding of manipulation, focusing instead on Section 42(1). The core legal question was whether the Tribunal was justified in excluding the application of Section 42(2). The High Court held that the applicability of Section 42(2) is contingent upon a clear factual finding that purchases were made at prices exceeding the international market, thereby artificially depleting the resident company's profits. Since the initial finding of manipulation was set aside and not restored, Section 42(2) could not be applied in the current state of the record. The Court clarified that if de novo proceedings establish such price manipulation, Section 42(2) would be applicable to tax the profits that should have normally accrued.

  Questions settled

  • Does the applicability of Section 42(2) of the Income Tax Act depend on a factual finding of price manipulation between a resident and a non-resident associate?
  • Can Section 42(2) of the Income Tax Act be applied if the finding of the assessing officer regarding inflated purchase prices has been set aside by an appellate authority?
  • Is a finding of manipulated transactions a prerequisite for invoking the provisions of Section 42(2) of the Income Tax Act?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone "B", Karachi vs Messrs1991 PTD 39 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone "B", Karachi vs Messrs1991 PTD 859 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-11Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone vs Messrs Karachi Race1991 PTD 36 · Sindh High Court · 1990-10-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone a, Karachi vs Messrs1991 PTD 867 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-11Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City vs Narsee Nagsee & Co.1991 PTD 415 · Supreme Court of India · 1960-05-06Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Ved Parkash1991 PTD 121 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1989-01-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Tej Cloth Weaving Factory1991 PTD 245 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1989-02-22Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Taj Printers1991 PTD 101 · Allahabad High Court · 1991-02-01Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs T.M. Porinchu1991 PTD 146 · Kerala High Court · 1989-03-03Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs T. Govindankutty Menon1991 PTD 181 · Kerala High Court · 1989-02-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Super Steels1991 PTD 48 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1989-03-01Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Sugan Chand & Sons1991 PTD 128 · Rajasthan High Court · 1988-08-11Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Sohan Lal Savinder Singh Jagadhri1991 PTD 55 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Society Hosiery Factory1991 PTD 155 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-21Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Shri Ram Avtar1991 PTD 270 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-08-23Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Service Iron & Steel Rolling Mills1991 PTD 92 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Saroj Devi1991 PTD 85 · Allahabad High Court · 1989-02-27Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Saraswati Ice Factory and Cold1991 PTD 153 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1989-01-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs S.S.M. Finishing Centre1991 PTD 446 · Madras High Court · 1990-07-06Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Roshan Lal Seth1991 PTD 741 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-21Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Pheros & Co. (P.) Ltd.1991 PTD 193 · Gauhati High Court · 1989-01-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Pakistan Oxygen Ltd.1991 PTD 914 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-30Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Motilal Chunnilal Branwarilal1991 PTD 724 · Rajasthan High Court · 1986-02-18Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Mool Chand Behari Lal1991 PTD 149 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1991-01-10Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Messrs United Insurance Co. of Pakistan, Karachi1991 PTD 571 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-04Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Maheshprasad Gupta1991 PTD 232 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1989-02-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Lilasons Breweries (Pvt.) Limited1991 PTD 722 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1989-03-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Leader Engineering Works1991 PTD 745 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1989-02-23Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Kumari Prabhawati Gupta and others1991 PTD 191 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1989-02-23Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Kumaran & Co.1991 PTD 267 · Kerala High Court · 1989-01-23Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Kumar Engineers1991 PTD 53 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1989-02-28Read full judgment →