Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs KR. Sadayappan1991 PTD 1099 · Supreme Court of India · 1990-07-10Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Kalra Medical Store1991 PTD 159 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1989-01-05Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs K.K. Dhanda (Huf)1991 PTD 78 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1989-02-23Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Jain Steel Rolling Mills1991 PTD 107 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-15Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Jahanganj Cold Storage1991 PTD 726 · Allahabad High Court · 1989-02-27Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs J.P. Shrivastava & Sons1991 PTD 234 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1987-09-29Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs J.K. Bankers.1991 PTD 190 · Allahabad High Court · 1989-02-27Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs International General Insurance Co.1991 PTD 401 · Sindh High Court · 1990-09-20Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Indian Timber Traders1991 PTD 88 · Kerala High Court · 1989-03-09Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Hindustan Electro-Graphites Ltd.1991 PTD 252 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1989-03-30Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Hardeep Hosiery Mills Ltd.1991 PTD 118 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-08Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Guryani Brij Ballabh Kaur Trust1991 PTD 68 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-16Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Gulraj Educational Trust1991 PTD 175 · Delhi High Court · 1988-12-20Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Gopi Ram Mulakh Raj1991 PTD 144 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-22Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Gobind Ram Vishan Dass1991 PTD 142 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1989-01-16Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Fazilka Dabnvali Transport Co. (Pvt.)1991 PTD 738 · Punjab and Haryana High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Des Raj Kul Bhushan1991 PTD 140 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-22Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Dayachand Hardial1991 PTD 255 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-07Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs D.S. Blackwood1991 PTD 230 · Calcutta High Court · 1988-12-22Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Chackolas Spinning and Weaving1991 PTD 71 · Kerala High Court · 1989-03-03Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Bhawani Prasad Girdhari Lal & Co.1991 PTD 443 · Allahabad High Court · 1990-07-30Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Bhandari Capacitors (P.) Ltd.1991 PTD 105 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1989-02-01Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Avery Freewheels (P.) Ltd.1991 PTD 179 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-15Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Associated Metals Co.1991 PTD 271 · Allahabad High Court · 1991-02-01Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Abbott Finance Co. Ltd1991 PTD 915 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-24Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income-Tax vs A.R.K: Perumal Chettiar1991 PTD 102 · Madras High Court · 1989-02-08Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Sakina And Others vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1316 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the detention of female prisoners with minor children in the Women Jail, Multan, and the broader issue of the incarceration of women with suckling infants in the Province of Punjab. The core legal question addressed is whether under-trial female prisoners accompanied by minor children are entitled to bail under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Upon reviewing the report from the Superintendent of Women Jail, Multan, the Court held that the identified under-trial female prisoners, who were caring for children aged between two months and two years, fell within the scope of the second proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court granted them bail, subject to furnishing surety bonds. Regarding convicted women, the Court clarified it lacked jurisdiction to suspend sentences for those convicted under the Hudood Ordinance, directing them to the Federal Shariat Court. The Court further emphasized the duty of Sessions Judges to inspect jails and ensure the welfare of suckling babies and minor children, affirming that courts possess inherent, extensive powers to protect their interests.
Questions settled- Are under-trial female prisoners with minor children entitled to bail under the second proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does the High Court have jurisdiction to suspend the execution of sentences for women convicted under the Hudood Ordinance?
- What are the powers of Sessions Judges regarding the inspection of jails and the protection of minor children detained with their mothers?
- Commissioner of Income-Tax (Central), Karachi vs Masers Fakir1991 PTD 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This case concerns the interpretation of the second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, specifically whether surplus arising from the sale of machinery and plant is taxable when the assessee has ceased business operations during the relevant accounting year. The Department contended that the proviso was an independent charging provision allowing taxation of such surplus regardless of business activity. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the proviso must be read in conjunction with Section 10(1), which requires that the business be carried on by the assessee during the accounting year. The Court reasoned that the phrase 'any such' in the proviso refers back to assets used for business purposes as defined in earlier clauses, and that the proviso does not create a standalone tax liability absent the existence of a business. The Court affirmed the High Court's view that the surplus is not exigible to tax unless the assessee conducted business during the accounting year and the assets were used for that business, dismissing the Department's appeals.
Questions settled- Is the second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, an independent charging provision that operates regardless of whether a business was carried on during the accounting year?
- Does the phrase 'any such' in the second proviso to Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, limit the application of the proviso to assets used for business purposes?
- Can surplus arising from the sale of machinery be assessed as profit under the Income Tax Act, 1922, if the assessee had ceased all business operations prior to the sale?
- Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi vs Brooke Bond Pakistan1991 PTD 912 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-14Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone, `A', Karachi vs Messrs1991 SCMR 2485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This case arises from two appeals filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax against a common order of the Sindh High Court regarding income tax references under section 66 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, concerning assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71. The respondent, a foreign insurance company carrying on non-life insurance business in Pakistan, had created and charged a provision for taxation to its Profit and Loss Account and deducted income tax provisions from interest and dividend income. The Income Tax Officer disallowed and added back these amounts. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal deleted the addition, and the High Court answered the reference in favor of the assessee. The core legal question was whether the Income Tax Officer was justified under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1922, in disallowing and adding back the provision for taxation (taxation reserve) shown in the annual accounts submitted to the Controller of Insurance. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that accounts submitted under the Insurance Act, 1938, are binding as a fait accompli, and the Income Tax Officer's power to adjust profits is strictly restricted to excluding items of `expenditure' that are not allowable under section 10 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. Since a taxation reserve is an appropriation of profit and does not constitute `expenditure' (defined as money paid out irretrievably), it falls outside the limited jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to add back under Rule 6. The Court laid down that finality attaches to the accounts submitted to the Controller of Insurance, and the Revenue cannot probe into or modify such accounts outside the explicit framework of the First Schedule.
Questions settled- Whether the provision for taxation or taxation reserve shown in the annual accounts of a non-life insurance company constitutes `expenditure' under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1922?
- Does the Income Tax Officer have the jurisdiction to probe into and modify the integrity of annual accounts submitted by an insurance company to the Controller of Insurance beyond excluding non-allowable expenditures?
- Are the annual accounts furnished by an insurance company to the Controller of Insurance binding as a fait accompli for the purpose of computing taxable profits under the Income Tax Act, 1922?
- Whether an Income Tax Officer can disallow a taxation reserve and add it back to the balance of profits of a non-life insurance business under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1922?
- Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Zone 'B', Karachi. vs Tarique SiddiquiPTCL 1991 CL. 384 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-20Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Of Income Tax vs M/s. Ranco Vichers Ltd., Karachi.PTCL 1991 CL. 351 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-15Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income Tax vs Anand Rubber and Plastics (Pvt) Ltd.1991 PTD 719 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1991-01-04Read full judgment →
- Collector of Customs (Preventive) and 2 others vs Muhammad1991 PLD Supreme Court 630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the High Court of Sindh's judgment declaring a search, seizure, and confiscation of imported tin ingots by Customs Officers to be without lawful authority. Customs authorities conducted a warrantless raid under Section 163 of the Customs Act, 1969 at premises located in Federal 'B' Area, Karachi, alleging foreign smuggling. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's ruling and dismissed the appeal. The Court held that Section 163 requires specific written grounds recording a genuine apprehension of danger that goods may be removed before a warrant under Section 162 can be obtained; a mere general assertion that obtaining a warrant is 'not expedient' is insufficient to bypass statutory safeguards protecting privacy and property. Additionally, the Court held that the phrase 'any place' in Section 163 is confined to places within the officer's legally notified territorial jurisdiction under Section 3 and Section 9 of the Act, which in this case was restricted to the Port of Karachi and did not extend to Federal 'B' Area.
Questions settled- Is a Customs officer required to record specific grounds justifying an apprehension of danger of removal of goods before dispensing with a search warrant under Section 163 of the Customs Act, 1969?
- Does the term 'any place' used in Section 163 of the Customs Act, 1969 empower Customs officers to conduct searches outside their notified territorial jurisdiction?
- Can search and seizure proceedings conducted by Customs officers outside their statutory territorial limits be sustained as lawful?
- Col. Mirza Dawood Ahmad vs Dr. Afsar Aijaz and others1991 CLC 1566 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-05Read full judgment →
- Col. (Retd.) Syed Muhammad Hassan vs Raza K. Minhas1991 CLC 2039 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the order of the Rent Controller dismissing an eviction application filed under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The appellant sought eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement for his son’s family. The respondent contested the application, alleging the requirement was not bona fide, citing the respondent's investment in property improvements and potential hardship. The Court held that the landlord's requirement was bona fide. It established that a landlord residing in rented premises or as a licensee is not required to prove homelessness to justify reclaiming their own property. The Court affirmed that the landlord has the prerogative to determine their own housing needs, and a tenant cannot object to the size or luxury of the accommodation chosen by the landlord. Furthermore, the Court held that once a bona fide requirement is established, the tenant's potential hardship or investment in property improvements does not constitute a valid defense against eviction. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and granted the tenant six months to vacate the premises.
Questions settled- Does a landlord residing in rented premises need to prove they are homeless to establish a bona fide requirement for their own property?
- Can a tenant successfully resist an eviction application based on personal requirement by citing the hardship caused by vacating the premises?
- Is it open to a tenant to challenge the bona fides of a landlord's requirement based on the size or luxury of the premises sought?
- Does the expiration of a fixed-term tenancy agreement without a renewal clause support a landlord's claim for personal use?
- Col. (Retd.) Fakhar Hussain Shah vs Raja Muhammad Aslam and others1991 MLD 243 · Lahore High Court · 1990-11-04Read full judgment →
- Cluett, Peabody and Company Inc. vs Assistant Registrar of Trade1991 SCMR 921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal with leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which maintained the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks' order dismissing the appellants' opposition to respondent No. 2's trade mark registration application. The core legal question revolved around the proper construction of the proviso to section 37(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, and whether an earlier order declining a rectification application but noting special circumstances and honest concurrent user constituted res judicata against the appellants' subsequent opposition. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of a rectification application does not operate as res judicata to bar an opposition under section 15(2) of the Act, as the scopes of rectification and opposition proceedings are distinct. The Court laid down the principle that observations made in favor of an applicant whose rectification application is dismissed do not create a binding estoppel or res judicata precluding the registered proprietor from raising objections during opposition proceedings.
Questions settled- Does the dismissal of a trade mark rectification application operate as res judicata against the registered proprietor's subsequent opposition to registration under section 15(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940?
- What is the correct construction of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 37 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 regarding the refusal of a rectification application?
- Are the scopes of a rectification proceeding under section 37 and an opposition proceeding under section 15(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 distinct?
- Does a finding of special circumstances and honest concurrent user in a dismissed rectification order constitute a binding final decision on the parties for all subsequent proceedings?
- Chughatta vs The Province of Punjab And Other1991 SCMR 1463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that he was entitled to the conferment of proprietary rights under a memorandum dated September 3, 1979, and challenging the allotment of the disputed land in favor of the respondents as illegal. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the land had already been allotted to the respondents prior to the promulgation of the memorandum, which could not be given retrospective effect. The appellate court and the High Court in civil revision concurrently affirmed the dismissal. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's contention was devoid of force because the land was allotted to the respondents before the scheme for proprietary rights came into effect, and the matter was conclusively settled by concurrent findings of fact by the courts below. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a notification or scheme for the conferment of proprietary rights can be given retrospective effect to affect prior land allotments?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by three lower courts regarding land allotment?
- Whether a person cultivating land prior to the expiry of another's lease is automatically entitled to proprietary rights over subsequent allotments?
- Choudhary Muhammad Afzal vs Azad Government of the State of J&K1991 PLC (C.S.) 194 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition challenged an order of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government, which transferred the petitioner from his position as Chief Engineer, P.W.D., to Officer on Special Duty and subsequently initiated disciplinary proceedings against him under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1977. The petitioner alleged mala fides, arguing that the Prime Minister did not independently apply his mind to the decision, that the appointment of the Law Secretary as the 'Authorised Officer' was improper, and that the transfer was punitive. The High Court held that the government possesses the inherent authority to transfer civil servants, provided that pay and service conditions remain protected under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act of 1976. The Court further ruled that the government maintains the competence to designate an 'Authorised Officer' other than the Chief Secretary in special cases. Emphasizing that the presumption of regularity attaches to official acts, the Court held that the petitioner failed to prove mala fides. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, reaffirming that the High Court’s writ jurisdiction is not an appellate forum for routine executive orders.
Questions settled- Does the government have the legal competence to appoint an 'Authorised Officer' other than the Chief Secretary under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1977?
- Can a civil servant challenge a transfer order on the grounds of mala fides without providing proof to rebut the presumption of regularity attached to official acts?
- Is an order of suspension of a civil servant amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
- Does the High Court possess the power to act as an appellate authority to correct errors in routine executive orders passed by the government?
- Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh vs Ali Gohar Abro1991 PLD Supreme Court 1016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, which had set aside the reversion of the respondent from the post of Executive Engineer back to his substantive post of Assistant Engineer. The respondent, initially promoted on probation, was reverted after the expiry of his probationary period because his service record was found to be average and his reputation for integrity poor. The core legal question was whether the reversion of a civil servant on probation due to unsatisfactory performance amounted to a penalty or punishment requiring a show-cause notice, or whether it was a reversion simpliciter under the relevant civil servant laws. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that terminating or reverting a probationer on the ground of unsatisfactory work does not amount to dismissal or removal from service, nor does it cast a stigma, provided it is not based on specific misconduct. The key principle laid down is that a probationer holds no right to the post, and reverting a probationer for general unsatisfactory performance during probation is in accordance with the terms of service and rules, requiring no disciplinary proceedings or show-cause notice.
Questions settled- Does the reversion of a civil servant during the probationary period on the ground of unsatisfactory work amount to reduction in rank or punishment requiring a show-cause notice?
- What is the legal status of a civil servant whose probation period has expired without a formal order of confirmation or extension under the Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1973?
- Can internal departmental proceedings and deliberations of a Departmental Promotion Committee be used to convert an order of reversion simpliciter into a penal order casting a stigma?
- When does the termination or reversion of a probationer constitute a dismissal or removal from service amounting to a stigma?
- Chief Secretary to the Government of N. W.F.P. And Another vs Mian1991 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, Chief Secretary to the Government of N.-W.F.P. and another, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal dated 16-10-1989, which had set aside the termination order of respondent No.1 dated 20-10-1988 and directed the implementation of the Governor's order dated 25-5-1988 appointing the respondent as Comptroller, Governor's House. The core legal question was whether the Governor's appointment order required a formal notification by the N.-W.F.P. Government to take effect and whether the Government could defeat the order by refraining from issuing such notification. The Supreme Court held that since the Governor had discretionary powers under the relevant rules to make the appointment, the Government could not defeat the formal order of the Governor by refusing to issue the necessary notification. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Provincial Government cannot nullify or defeat a valid discretionary appointment order made by the Governor by withholding the issuance of a consequential notification.
Questions settled- Can the Provincial Government defeat a formal appointment order made by the Governor by refraining from issuing a notification?
- Does the Governor possess discretionary powers to appoint officers of the Governor's House Staff under the Rules of Business?
- Whether the Service Tribunal has the jurisdiction to set aside the termination of a civil servant appointed by the Governor?
- Chief Engineer, Irrigation, Mailsi And Others vs Nazir Ahmad And Other1991 SCMR 974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court accepting a writ petition filed by the respondents, who sought the transfer of their lands from the Shujabad Canal Division to the Patti Minor Lodhran Canal Division for water supply. The core legal question concerned the proper procedure and authority under the Canal and Drainage Act for including lands in a culturable commandable area (C.C.A.) and whether statutory procedures, including notice to affected landowners, were followed. The Supreme Court observed that while the appellants' legal stand regarding the mandatory statutory procedure was correct, a strict technical application would cause grave hardship as the respondents had been receiving water since 1977. Through the cooperative intervention of the Court, the Chief Engineer (Irrigation) Bahawalpur agreed to take over the respondents' lands and supply a reduced quantum of water as a fair and equitable solution. The appeal was partly accepted, modifying the High Court's order to permit the supply of 0.42 cusecs of water pending proper permanent arrangements. The key principle laid down is that while statutory procedures regarding canal water allocation must be observed, equitable considerations and the prevention of public injury can shape practical resolutions in canal water disputes.
Questions settled- Whether land can be included in the culturable commandable area of a canal division without following the prescribed statutory procedure and notice to landowners?
- What is the legal effect of recommendations made by subordinate canal officers regarding water supply transfers?
- Can the Supreme Court facilitate an equitable settlement between canal authorities and landowners to prevent developed lands from becoming barren?
- Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab vs Sh. Muhammad Jahangir And Another1991 SCMR 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, Chief Administrator of Auqaf, sought leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the District Judge and the High Court, which had declared that the disputed property comprising Chilla Hazrat Mian Mir Sahib, a house, and shops was not Waqf property under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1960. The core legal question was whether the property constituted Waqf property by permanent dedication or user. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent factual findings by the lower courts—holding that the property had always been treated as private property, that the presence of a Chilla without permanent dedication did not convert it into Waqf, and that no public mosque existed on the site—suffered from no legal defect. The Court further ruled that the petitioner was rightly refused permission to produce additional documents at a belated stage after failing to do so for four years. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that the mere historical association of a saint with a site does not suffice to render it Waqf property without proof of permanent dedication or public religious user.
Questions settled- Does the mere performance of a Chilla by a saint on a property convert it into Waqf property in the absence of permanent dedication?
- Can a party be permitted to produce additional documents at a belated stage after failing to avail opportunities for several years?
- Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-existence of a Waqf property can be interfered with without showing a legal defect?
- Chhote Khan And 4 Others vs Deputy Commissioner, Sahiwal And 51991 SCMR 1825 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their Letters Patent Appeal, which had affirmed the dismissal in limine of their writ petition. The petitioners claimed to be the earlier informers (mukhbars) regarding an illegal allotment of evacuee land cancelled by settlement authorities, which land was subsequently allotted to respondents who were held to be the true informants. The core legal questions pertained to whether the petitioners had the locus standi to challenge the settlement authorities' order via a writ petition, and whether statutory protection under Section 14(2)(1-A)(a) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 (Act XLVII of 1958) applied to them. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of fact that the petitioners failed to establish their status as the valid informants. The Court held that an informer lacks locus standi to file a writ petition, and the statutory protections for allottees of resumed land were inapplicable to their factual circumstances.
Questions settled- Whether an informer (mukhbar) possesses the requisite locus standi to challenge an allotment or settlement order through a constitutional writ petition?
- Whether concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities and the High Court regarding the identity of an informant can be reopened before the Supreme Court?
- Whether statutory protections granted under Section 14(2)(1-A)(a) of Act XLVII of 1958 apply to claimants whose status as informants is negated on facts?
- Chaudhry Saleem Ullah Etc vs Noor MuhammadK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 289 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-23Read full judgment →
- Chaudhry Rahimuddin vs Chaudhry Jalaluddin1991 PLD Supreme Court 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside a Rent Controller’s order striking off a tenant’s defense for non-compliance with a tentative rent order under Section 16 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question concerned the scope of the summary inquiry required to determine rent tentatively for deposit purposes. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in requiring a full-fledged inquiry involving the examination of witnesses. The Court ruled that a Rent Controller is not obligated to conduct a detailed trial or frame issues at the tentative stage. The determination of rent under Section 16 is intended to be summary and approximate, serving only to regulate rent payments during the pendency of proceedings. Requiring an in-depth inquiry would defeat the legislative intent of ensuring speedy disposal of rent cases. The Court emphasized that the tentative nature of the order does not preclude a final determination of rent later, thereby protecting the interests of both parties. The Rent Controller’s original order was restored.
Questions settled- Is a Rent Controller required to conduct a full-fledged inquiry or examine witnesses before passing a tentative rent order under Section 16 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
- Does the failure to conduct a detailed inquiry into the rate of rent render a tentative rent order arbitrary or invalid?
- What is the legal purpose of a tentative rent order passed during the pendency of rent proceedings?
- Chaudhry Noor Nabi Javaid vs Chairman, Pakistan International1991 PLC (C.S.) 603 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1990-06-04Read full judgment →
- Chaudhry Muhammad Siddique and others vs Mian Abdul Haq1991 MLD 1479 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-13Read full judgment →
- Chaudhry Muhammad Shafi vs Additional Chief Secretary(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 130) · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1991-03-19Read full judgment →
- Chaudhri Sultan Mahmood vs Chief Election Commissioner, Azad1991 PLD Azad J & K 89 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
- Chaudhary Brothers vs Mst. Asma Irfan1991 CLC 937 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-18Read full judgment →
- Char Shambay vs Karachi Dock Labour Board, Karachi1991 PLC 826 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-10Read full judgment →
- Chandrakala Bai Naila vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1991 PTD 119 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1989-02-15Read full judgment →
- Chand Oil Depot vs Muhammad Ilyas Khan1991 CLC 339 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-13Read full judgment →
- Chan Baig and Another vs The StateK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 221 · Lahore High Court · 1990-09-02Read full judgment →
- Champion Clock Company vs Central Board of Revenue and others1991 PTD 778 · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged a ruling by the Central Board of Revenue and a subsequent show-cause notice directing the petitioner to pay sales tax on plastic bodies/cases manufactured for wall clocks. The core legal question was whether components (bodies/cases) manufactured by the petitioner and subsequently incorporated into an end-product (wall clocks)—which were themselves exempt from sales tax—remained liable for tax as independent goods. The Court held that because the end-product (wall clocks) enjoyed a wholesale exemption from sales tax, the components incorporated into them lost their separate identity for tax purposes. Relying on the Supreme Court's precedent in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Messrs Shaiq Corporation Ltd., the Court determined that where raw materials or partly manufactured goods are assimilated into an exempt end-product, they cannot be subjected to sales tax as independent items. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, restraining the authorities from levying sales tax on the clock bodies/cases as long as the exemption notification for wall clocks remained operative, ruling that the fiction of law regarding 'sale' under section 3(6) of the Act did not apply.
Questions settled- Whether components of an end-product are liable for sales tax when the end-product itself is exempt from such tax?
- Does the incorporation of a manufactured component into an end-product result in the loss of the component's separate identity for tax purposes?
- Can the fiction of law regarding 'sale' under section 3(6) of the Sales Tax Act 1951 be applied to components used by a manufacturer to produce an exempt end-product?
- Chambail Gul vs Imam Gul and 5 others1991 MLD 2198 · Peshawar High Court · 1991-05-29Read full judgment →
- Chairman, Regional Transport Authority, Rawalpindi vs Pakistan1991 PLD Supreme Court 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a High Court judgment accepting a constitutional petition filed by the respondent insurance company against the Chairman, Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Rawalpindi. The respondent had sought recognition as an approved guarantor under Sections 49 and 67 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965. The RTA rejected the request on discriminatory grounds, imposing an unjustified bank guarantee requirement and comparing statutory deposits unequally against a newer rival insurer. The Supreme Court examined whether the respondent possessed an enforceable legal right, the validity of the RTA's discretion, and whether the High Court improperly substituted its discretion. Dismissing the appeal with costs, the Supreme Court held that public office is a public trust requiring reasonable, timely, and non-discriminatory exercise of discretion. When statutory authorities fail to structure discretion or act arbitrarily upon irrelevant considerations, courts must intervene. The Court affirmed that an actionable legal right arises when an authority neglects its statutory duties, clarifying that the RTA's arbitrary conduct constituted established mala fides in law.
Questions settled- Can a statutory authority reject an application based on irrelevant considerations such as comparing historical statutory deposits of different entities?
- Does a citizen have an enforceable legal right through a constitutional petition when a public authority fails or refuses to exercise its statutory discretionary powers?
- Can a statutory functionary demand that an applicant show an express legal provision permitting the filing of an application where the law does not prohibit it?
- Does the arbitrary, discriminatory, and unguided exercise of statutory discretion constitute mala fides in law justifying judicial intervention?
- Chairman, District Evacuee Trust Committee, Rawalpindi vs Sharif1991 PLD Supreme Court 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals by leave of the Court challenged the High Court's judgment dismissing the appellant's settlement appeals as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the time spent in obtaining a copy of the Settlement Commissioner's order could be excluded when computing the period of limitation under Section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, by virtue of Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court held that since the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, is a special law, and Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908, explicitly provides that sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 apply unless expressly excluded, the time-exclusion provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act apply to appeals under Section 4(4) unless there is an express statutory exclusion. The Court ruled that implied exclusion through statutory interpretation or maxims is insufficient under Section 29(2)(a), overruled a contrary Lahore High Court precedent, approved the Sindh High Court view, allowed the appeals, and remanded the matters for decision on merits.
Questions settled- Whether the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, apply to appeals filed under Section 4(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Can the application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, be excluded by implication under Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908?
- Does Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908, require an express exclusion by a special or local law to oust the application of sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 of the Limitation Act?
- Chairman, Area Electricity Board, WAPDA, Multan And Another vs Muhammad Shafi1991 SCMR 1145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of a Service Tribunal, which had set aside the compulsory retirement of the respondent, Muhammad Shafi. The respondent, an employee of WAPDA, was initially removed from service for unauthorized absence from duty following a transfer. Upon departmental appeal, this was converted to compulsory retirement. The respondent challenged this before the Service Tribunal, asserting his absence was due to illness, supported by medical certification. The Tribunal found that the competent authority had subsequently sanctioned earned leave on medical grounds for the entire period of absence and had even paid the respondent's salary arrears for that duration. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the basis for the disciplinary action—alleged willful absence—was factually incorrect. The Supreme Court, upon review, affirmed the Tribunal's findings, noting that the grant of leave and payment of arrears effectively negated the charge of misconduct. The Court concluded that no question of law was involved and dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the reinstatement of the respondent.
Questions settled- Can disciplinary action for willful absence be sustained when the competent authority has subsequently sanctioned leave on medical grounds for the same period?
- Does the payment of salary arrears for a period of absence imply that the absence was authorized?
- Is a finding of fact by a Service Tribunal regarding the nature of an employee's absence subject to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of a question of law?
- Chairman, Admission Board of Medical Colleges of the Punjab And Another vs Muhammad Ayub And Another1991 SCMR 1827 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an interim order passed by the High Court concerning the admission of two respondents to a Medical College. The dispute arose after the petitioner, the Admission Board, initially granted admission to respondent No. 1 based on an inadvertent computer error, which was subsequently cancelled upon discovery of the mistake. The High Court initially intervened against this cancellation, but the Board later reaffirmed the cancellation and admitted respondent No. 2 in his place. By the time the matter reached the Supreme Court, respondent No. 2 had been studying for two years under the High Court's interim orders, while the status of respondent No. 1 remained unclear. The Supreme Court, noting the complexity and the need to ensure justice for both parties, converted the petition into an appeal. The Court directed the parties to file necessary documentation for a final disposal and ordered the petitioner to clarify the academic status of respondent No. 1 during the relevant period to facilitate a fair adjudication of the competing claims.
Questions settled- Can an admission granted due to a computer error be cancelled by the Admission Board?
- Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with the cancellation of an admission based on a clerical error?
- What factors should be considered when balancing the rights of two candidates in a medical college admission dispute?
- CH.Talib Nawaz vs Aurangzib Durrani Etc.K.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 286 · Lahore High Court · 1990-12-11Read full judgment →
- Ch. Sardar Muhammad Khan vs Muhammad Miskeen and 2 others1991 CLC 963 · Sindh High Court · 1990-10-22Read full judgment →
- Ch. Qadir Bakhsh vs Deputy Commissioner, Toba Tek Singh and others1991 CLC 154 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-10Read full judgment →
- Ch. Niaz Ahmad vs Dr. Muhammad Yusuf and others1991 CLC 1632 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-03Read full judgment →
- Ch. Nazir Ahmed, D.R. for Appellant. vs Halimur Rehman Khan, I.T.P. for Respondent1991 PTD (Trib) 1043 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1991-08-01Read full judgment →
- Ch. Nazir Ahmad, D.R. for Appellant. vs Inam Ghori, I.T.P. for Respondent.1991 PTD (Trib.) 26 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1990-10-29Read full judgment →
- Ch. Nasrullah Khan vs Muhammad Ramzan and others1991 CLC 104 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 challenged the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, which had set aside the trial court's judgment decreeing the petitioner's suit for specific performance of a contract. The core legal questions revolved around whether the execution of the agreement to sell and payment of earnest money were satisfactorily established by the plaintiff, and whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower appellate Court could be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction. The Lahore High Court held that the plaintiff failed to satisfactorily prove the execution of the agreement and the payment of consideration due to material contradictions in the testimony of witnesses, discrepancies regarding the identity of an attesting witness, failure to produce the second attesting witness or the registered power of attorney mentioned in the plaint, and the non-existence of the corpus of the bargain on the date of the alleged agreement. The Court laid down the principle that findings of fact recorded by an appellate court, being reasonable and sound, cannot be interfered with under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.
Questions settled- Can findings of fact recorded by an appellate court be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when they are based on sound and reasonable evaluation of evidence?
- Does the failure to produce an attesting witness or explain his absence through acceptable legal means weaken the proof of execution of a disputed agreement?
- Whether material contradictions among the plaintiff's witnesses regarding the date, manner of execution, and payment of consideration are sufficient to invalidate a claim for specific performance?
- Can an agreement to sell be effectively enforced when the corpus of the bargain was non-existent on the purported date of its execution?
- Ch. Muhammad Yousaf vs Mst. Ghulam Fatima through Legal Heirs1991 CLC 1096 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-24Read full judgment →
- Ch. Muhammad Shabbir vs Haji Muhammad Ashraf and others1991 CLC 863 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-19Read full judgment →
- Ch. Muhammad Rasheed and 5 others vs Abdul Waheed Rathor and others1991 MLD 1580 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-12Read full judgment →
- Ch. Muhammad Rafiq vs Additional District Judge and others1991 CLC 944 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-11Read full judgment →
- Ch. Muhammad Nazir Ahmad vs Income Tax Officer and others1991 CLC 2001 · Lahore High Court · 1991-07-01Read full judgment →
- Ch. Muhammad Masood Akhtar Khan vs Muhammad Siddique And Other1991 SCMR 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a pre-emption suit wherein the appellant claimed a superior right of pre-emption over the respondents regarding land sold in a village. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, finding that the respondents' exchange deeds were ante-dated and attested after the suit's institution. However, the High Court, in second appeal, set aside these concurrent findings and dismissed the suit. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact made by the lower courts. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly intervened because the lower courts had failed to properly appreciate the evidence. Specifically, the lower courts ignored crucial documentary evidence, including admitted exchange deeds and official records, while relying on scanty oral testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that concurrent findings of fact are not sacrosanct when lower courts fail to consider material evidence or misread the record, thereby justifying appellate interference.
Questions settled- Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal if the lower courts failed to properly appreciate the evidence?
- Is a court justified in setting aside concurrent findings of fact when material documentary evidence was ignored by the lower courts?
- Does the failure to consider official records and admitted deeds constitute a valid ground for appellate interference in second appeal?
- Ch. Muhammad Latif vs Azad Government of State of Jammu and Kashmir and 2 others1991 PLC (C.S.) 318 · Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal · 1990-04-08Read full judgment →
- Ch. Muhammad Khan And Others vs Allah Ditta And Other1991 SCMR 1750 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit instituted by the petitioners seeking a declaration of ownership regarding Ihata No. 64 in Village Abadi of Daultala. The petitioners claimed that the property belonged to their predecessor-in-interest, Saran Das, and challenged the validity of previous judicial decrees passed in 1978 and 1981, asserting that the respondents held only rights of residence and ownership of the malba, rather than full title. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had established their proprietary title to the disputed property and whether the lower courts erred in dismissing their claim. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the concurrent findings of the three lower courts, noting that the petitioners failed to prove their ownership or that the property had devolved upon them from Saran Das. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioners' failure to intervene in previous litigation concerning the property indicated a lack of clarity regarding their own title. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that concurrent findings of fact regarding title, absent proof of ownership, do not warrant interference in appellate jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Does a failure to intervene in prior litigation concerning a property indicate a lack of clear title by a claimant?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by three lower courts regarding property ownership?
- Is a party entitled to a declaration of ownership if they cannot prove the devolution of title from their predecessor-in-interest?
- Ch. Muhammad Hussain, Assistant Commissioner And Others vs Muhammad Jameel And Other1991 SCMR 1923 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by Settlement authorities challenging an order passed by the High Court in a writ petition. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned the propriety of the High Court's procedure in 'disposing' of a writ petition in a manner that granted significant relief to the respondents without formally accepting the petition or providing adequate justification. Upon hearing the arguments, the Supreme Court observed that the impugned order, which granted major relief without a formal acceptance of the petition, appeared prima facie inconsistent with the established practice of the High Court when adjudicating matters of vital importance to the parties involved. Consequently, the Court held that the petition for leave to appeal should be converted into a regular appeal to allow for a full review of the proceedings. The Court directed the parties to prepare the appeal based on the existing record while permitting the submission of necessary additional documents to facilitate a proper determination of the issues raised.
Questions settled- Can a High Court grant major relief in a writ petition without formally accepting the petition?
- Is the disposal of a writ petition without a formal order of acceptance consistent with established High Court practice in matters of vital importance?
- Ch. Muhammad Hussain vs Third Additional District and Sessions1991 SCMR 1861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his election petition and subsequent attempts to secure a recount of ballot-papers after losing an election to the Municipal Corporation, Faisalabad. After his initial election petition was dismissed on a technical ground, he pursued remedies through multiple constitutional petitions in the High Court and an additional application before the Election Tribunal, all of which failed. Seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the core legal question concerned the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal to order a recount after having already dismissed the election petition. The Supreme Court held that once the Election Tribunal dismissed the election petition, it became functus officio and was left with no jurisdiction to order a recount of the ballot-papers. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed as misconceived and without merit.
Questions settled- Does an Election Tribunal retain jurisdiction to order a recount of ballot-papers after dismissing an election petition?
- Can a candidate challenge the dismissal of an election petition through successive constitutional petitions and subsequent recount applications before the tribunal?
- Ch. Muhammad Hussain and 9 others vs Secretary, Local Government1991 CLC 1467 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-02Read full judgment →
- CH. Muhammad Farooq vs (Mst) Surrayya Naheed(K.L.R. 1991 Revenue Cases 108) · Lahore High Court · 1991-09-25Read full judgment →
- Ch. Muhammad Azim vs The Chief Engineer, Irrigation And Other1991 SCMR 255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a service appeal filed by an Assistant Vernacular Clerk against the dismissal of his service by the Irrigation Department, which was subsequently upheld by the Service Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the appellant was denied an opportunity to participate in the departmental inquiry prior to his termination. The appellant had been absent from duty for an extended period, claiming medical grounds, but failed to comply with departmental directives to undergo a second medical opinion and refused to attend a personal hearing before the Superintending Engineer. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the appellant had been provided with sufficient opportunity to defend himself and that his absence was willful. The Court held that the findings of the Service Tribunal regarding the appellant's conduct and the adequacy of the opportunity provided were findings of fact, which did not warrant interference by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as it raised no substantial question of law of public importance.
Questions settled- Can a finding of fact by a Service Tribunal be interfered with by the Supreme Court in the absence of a substantial question of law?
- Does the refusal of an employee to appear for a personal hearing despite being given an opportunity constitute a denial of the right to be heard?
- Is an employee's failure to comply with a directive to undergo a second medical opinion relevant to determining willful absence from duty?
- Ch. Muhammad Aslam vs Assistant Commissioner1991 SCMR 1318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Chairman of a Union Council challenging the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the High Court regarding a no-confidence motion passed against him. The core legal questions involve whether sufficient notice of a special meeting was provided and whether proceedings conducted after the appointed time, following the adjournment of the meeting by the Chairman upon the presiding officer's failure to arrive on time, were legal and valid. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention regarding the legality of holding the meeting after the appointed hour when the petitioner and members had left after waiting for half an hour needed examination, as it had allegedly prejudiced the petitioner. The key principle established is that holding a convened meeting outside the appointed time after the departure of the Chairman and members due to the absence of the presiding officer warrants detailed judicial examination regarding procedural fairness and prejudice.
Questions settled- Whether proceedings of a no-confidence meeting held after the appointed time and after the departure of the Chairman are legal?
- Does the failure of a nominated presiding officer to arrive at the appointed time justify the adjournment of a meeting by the Chairman?
- Whether insufficient notice and delayed proceedings of a no-confidence meeting cause material prejudice to the affected Chairman?
- Ch. Muhammad Aslam vs Amanullah And OtherPTCL 1991 CL. 421 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-10Read full judgment →
- CH. Mohammad Rafique Majithia vs Government of the PunjabK.L.R.1991 Labour & Service Cases183 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- CH. Mohammad Rafique Majithia Additional District &Sessions Judge, Bahawalnagar vs Government of the Punjab through Secretary, S.G.A. & Idepartment, Civil Secretariat, Lahore and AnotherK.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 134 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- Ch. Jamil Ahmad vs Nippon Bobbin Company (Pakistan) Ltd.1991 PLD Lahore 467 · Lahore High Court · 1991-03-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves two intra-court appeals arising between the same parties out of proceedings in a company case. The core legal question addressed by the Lahore High Court is the competency of an intra-court appeal before the High Court against orders passed under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, after a winding-up order of the company has already been made. The Court held that by virtue of Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, once a winding-up order has been passed, an appeal against any order, decision, or judgment of the Court lies exclusively to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, whereas Section 10(2) applies only where a winding-up order has not yet been directed. Consequently, the High Court ruled that the intra-court appeals were not competent before it and dismissed them accordingly, laying down the principle that the word 'any' in Section 10(1) has a sweeping connotation covering all orders, decisions, or judgments passed under the Ordinance post-winding-up.
Questions settled- Does an appeal against an order passed under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 lie to the High Court or the Supreme Court once a winding-up order has been made?
- What is the scope and interpretation of the word 'any' in Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
- When does Section 10(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 apply with respect to appeals against orders passed by the Court?
- Ch. Iftikhar Ahmad and anothers vs Muhammad Ayub and 3 others1991 CLC 296 · Lahore High Court · 1990-10-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition arises from the dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte decree. The petitioners, defendants in a recovery suit, failed to appear before the trial court, resulting in an ex parte decree. They subsequently filed an application to set aside the decree, alleging that their counsel had advised them that their personal attendance was unnecessary and that the counsel had been ill. The trial court and the appellate court concurrently dismissed the application after the petitioners' own counsel testified that he had received no instructions and had not advised them to stay away. The High Court examined the findings on the issue of 'sufficient cause' for non-appearance. The Court held that the determination of whether sufficient cause existed was a question of fact concurrently decided by the lower courts. Finding no misreading or non-reading of evidence, nor any jurisdictional defect or material irregularity in the lower courts' orders, the High Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings and dismissed the revision petition in limine.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court can interfere in revisional jurisdiction with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of 'sufficient cause' to set aside an ex parte decree?
- Does the failure of a party to appear in court based on alleged advice from counsel constitute sufficient cause to set aside an ex parte decree when the counsel denies giving such advice?
- Can an ex parte decree be set aside under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the applicant fails to prove sufficient cause for non-appearance?
- Ch. Bashir Ahmed and others vs Province of Punjab and others1991 CLC 1263 · Lahore High Court · 1991-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition arose from the dismissal of an appeal by the Additional District Judge on the sole ground that the petitioners failed to serve a prior notice on the respondents as required under Order XLIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether an appeal against an interim order, once admitted to regular hearing by the appellate court, can be dismissed for non-compliance with the pre-filing notice requirement of Order XLIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Lahore High Court accepted the revision, set aside the dismissal, and remanded the case for a decision on the merits. The Court held that the utility of the prior notice is restricted to the preliminary hearing stage to allow the respondent to contest admission in limine. Once the appeal is admitted to regular hearing, it cannot be dismissed for non-compliance with Order XLIII Rule 3, as any wrong entertainment or admission by the court cannot prejudice the appellant under the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal against an interim order can be dismissed after its admission to regular hearing for non-compliance with the prior notice requirement under Order XLIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does the requirement of giving previous notice of filing an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to the post-admission stage of an appeal?
- Can an appellant be penalized for the court's omission or wrong entertainment and admission of an appeal without prior notice?
- Ch. Akbar Ali vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi And Another1991 SCMR 2114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This service matter concerns a petitioner who sought to challenge his dismissal from service by filing a miscellaneous application over a decade after his initial petition for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The core legal question addressed was whether a litigant is permitted to reopen settled service litigation through frivolous applications based on technicalities to secure unearned financial gains. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the matter had long reached finality and that the petitioner’s attempt to revive it was an immoral effort to exploit the public exchequer. The Court laid down the principle that judicial forums must not act as passive spectators but must actively curb the tendency to prolong litigation through technicalities. It emphasized that the adversary system, when reliant solely on technicalities that ignore the root of the case, is outdated. Under the current Constitutional framework, which incorporates Islamic jurisprudence, the pursuit of substantial justice is paramount, and courts must look beyond technical traps to ensure justice for both citizens and the State.
Questions settled- Can a litigant reopen a service matter that has already been decided by the Supreme Court through a miscellaneous application filed years later?
- Is the adversary system of law in Pakistan permitted to rely on technicalities that defeat the ends of substantial justice?
- What is the duty of courts and legal forums when faced with frivolous litigation intended to extract unearned financial gains from the State?
- Ch. Ahmad Khan Chadhar, D.S.P. vs The Inspector-General of Police1991 PLC (C.S.) 539 · Lahore High Court · 1990-11-25Read full judgment →
- Ch. Abdul Majid vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1662 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-23Read full judgment →
- Ch. Abdul Ghafoor and 2 others vs Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Lahore and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute concerning the seniority of Deputy Superintendents of Central Excise and Land Customs. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the Service Tribunal could treat seniority as a vested right contrary to section 8 of the Civil Servants Act, whether qualifying examinations for promotion could be treated as competitive examinations, and the effect of departmental policies regarding promotion criteria from February 1957 to July 1959. The core legal question centered on whether the departmental examinations held during that specific period operated merely as qualifying tests or created a select list conferring vested rights to promotion without further selection. The Supreme Court held that during the period from February 1957 to July 1959, Departmental Promotion Committees were abolished, and the examinations held during this window functioned to prepare a select list of candidates awaiting promotion based purely on examination merit, thereby accruing vested rights unlike examinations held prior or subsequent thereto. The Court laid down the principle that pre-enactment seniority rights are governed by conditions and instructions prevailing under previous rules, and that where examinations during a specific window directly formed a select list without intervening selection boards, successful candidates acquired a distinct promotion status.
Questions settled- Whether the Service Tribunal could treat seniority as a vested right by reference to a rule of seniority of an earlier date in the face of section 8 of the Civil Servants Act?
- Whether departmental examinations held between February 1957 and July 1959 operated as competitive examinations creating a select list with vested promotion rights?
- How does the absence of Departmental Promotion Committees during a specific period affect the promotion and seniority rights of civil servants?
- Central Board of Revenue and another vs Messrs Sheikh Gulzar Ali and 21 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comprised old appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan involving public revenues, wherein leave to appeal had been granted to examine the validity of Rule 50 of the Income Tax Rules 1972 vis-a-vis the Income Tax Act 1922. Upon the hearing, the Advocate-on-Record (A.O.R.) requested an adjournment on the ground that the counsel was unavailable and that he himself was unprepared to argue the case. The core legal question was whether seeking casual adjournments and failing to prepare appeals involving public exchequer revenue constitutes a lack of diligence warranting dismissal for non-prosecution. The Supreme Court deprecated the casual practice of seeking adjournments in the apex Court, holding that lethargy and lack of preparation in apex litigation amount to glaring non-prosecution. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals for non-prosecution. However, considering that public revenues were involved, the Court granted the appellants liberty to seek revival of the appeals if the subject matter remained alive and if so advised.
Questions settled- Does the failure of counsel and Advocate-on-Record to prepare or appear for arguments in an apex court appeal justify dismissal for non-prosecution?
- Can an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution involving public revenue be left open for revival by the appellants?
- Captain Sarfaraz Ahmad Mufti vs Government of the Punjab And Other1991 SCMR 1637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that directed the Provincial Selection Board to consider the respondent's case for pro forma promotion to NPS-18. The respondent, a Superintendent of Jail, had been previously overlooked for promotion due to pending inquiries that resulted only in minor penalties. Despite government policy letters suggesting eligibility, his representation for pro forma promotion was rejected. The High Court found this rejection was improperly manoeuvred and that minor penalties did not legally justify withholding promotion. The petitioner, a junior officer who had been promoted, argued that the High Court's order effectively mandated the respondent's promotion, potentially affecting his own seniority. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's directions were merely to ensure the respondent's case was considered in accordance with government policy and did not foreclose the Board's discretion or predetermine the outcome. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the High Court had not expressed any final opinion on the issue of seniority, thereby preserving the rights of all parties involved.
Questions settled- Can minor penalties imposed during an inquiry serve as a valid legal ground to withhold promotion?
- Does a High Court direction to consider a candidate for promotion constitute an order to grant such promotion?
- Can a court order the consideration of a promotion case without foreclosing the discretion of the relevant selection board?
- Capt. Arif Hayat vs Pakistan International Airlines, Karachi1991 PLC (C.S.) 743 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1990-02-27Read full judgment →
- Capt. (Rtd.) Allah Ditta vs Muhammad Siddique1991 CLC 1881 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-06Read full judgment →
- Cantonment Board, Kharian Cantt. through Executive Officer vs Muhammad Shafi1991 PLD Supreme Court 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the dismissal of a revision petition regarding a time-barred appeal. The core legal question concerns whether the period between the preparation of certified copies and their actual delivery constitutes 'time requisite' under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, or if it requires condonation under Section 5. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions. It held that 'time requisite' under Section 12 is limited to the period between the application and the date the copies are ready. While specific rules allow for the exclusion of time if a delivery date is provided by the Copying Branch, an applicant cannot claim this benefit if no date was provided without demonstrating due diligence. The key principle laid down is that where no specific date for delivery is provided by the Copying Branch, the applicant must prove they exercised due diligence by regularly visiting the office to collect the copies. Failure to explain the delay or demonstrate such diligence precludes the exclusion of time under Section 12 or condonation under Section 5.
Questions settled- What constitutes 'time requisite' for obtaining certified copies under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
- Can an applicant claim the exclusion of time for the period between the preparation of certified copies and their delivery if no specific date was provided by the Copying Branch?
- Is an applicant required to demonstrate due diligence in collecting certified copies to seek condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
- Does the failure to obtain a delivery date from the Copying Branch automatically entitle an applicant to exclude the time taken for delivery from the limitation period?
- Caltex Oil (Pak). Ltd. vs Mian Ashiq Mohammad FaizK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 140 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-22Read full judgment →
- Calbin Klein Cosmetics Corporation vs The Registrar of Trade Marks1991 MLD 2402 · Sindh High Court · 1991-06-27Read full judgment →