Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Public Works Department, Azad Government of the State of J&K1990 PLD Azad J&K 10 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-12-10Read full judgment →
• Province of the Punjab, through its Secretary, Communication & Works1990 PLD Lahore 25 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-05
  arbitration awardrule of the courtlimitation periodobjections to awardfiling of awardarbitration act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore, making an arbitration award a rule of the court. The dispute arose from a contract for the construction of a bridge between the appellant, Province of the Punjab, and the respondents, M/s. M.A. Rashid Said Alam Khan, which was referred to arbitrators. After an award was rendered in favour of the respondents, they applied under section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, to make it a rule of the court. Notice was served on the appellant, but objections were not filed within the thirty-day limitation period prescribed by Article 158 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. The trial court declined to entertain the time-barred objections and made the award a rule of the court. Before the High Court, the appellant contended that the award was improperly filed under section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, that it lacked accompanying depositions and documents, and that service of notice was defective. The Lahore High Court held that any party to the arbitration may file the award pursuant to High Court rules framed under section 44 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and that a party filing the award is not strictly bound to attach depositions and documents concurrently. Finding no merit in the appellant's contentions, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party to an arbitration agreement can file an award in court under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Is a party filing an arbitration award legally mandated to concurrently submit all depositions and documents along with it?
  • Whether the period of limitation for filing objections to an arbitration award can be extended by the court?
  • Does the receipt of notice of an arbitration award by an official clerk constitute valid service upon a government department?
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• Province of Punjab vs Mst. Zenat Shaheen and 2 others1990 PLD Lahore 180 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-28
  closing of evidencecivil procedurediscretionary powerconstitutional petitionadjournmentstate property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three writ petitions filed by the Province of Punjab challenging orders passed by the trial court and the Additional District Judge, which closed the petitioner's evidence in civil suits involving state-owned land. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted with lawful authority in closing the petitioner's evidence when previous adjournments were granted without imposing costs or designating them as final opportunities, and where the court had previously adjourned the matter on a date that became a public holiday. The High Court held that the impugned orders were unsustainable and lacked lawful authority. The court reasoned that the trial judge failed to exercise discretion judiciously by closing evidence without prior warning or imposing costs, particularly given the nature of the state property involved. The key principle laid down is that a court should not abruptly close a party's evidence without having previously indicated that a specific adjournment was the final opportunity, or without attempting to secure compliance through the imposition of costs, especially in matters involving significant public interest or state property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court close a party's evidence without having previously imposed costs or warned that an adjournment was the final opportunity?
  • Does a trial court act without lawful authority when it closes evidence after failing to consider the procedural history of adjournments?
  • Is it a judicious exercise of discretion to close evidence in a suit involving state-owned land without granting a final opportunity subject to costs?
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• Province of Punjab vs Lt.Gen.(Retd.) Wajid Ali Burki1990 PLD Supreme Court 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-16
  ex parte decreecondonation of delayleave to appealwritten statementrecording of evidencecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit where the trial court decreed the respondent's suit ex parte against the petitioner (Province of Punjab) after an adjournment was allegedly sought by an unauthorized representative. The petitioner's subsequent appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the District Judge, and its civil revision was dismissed in limine by the Lahore High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that no authorized representative had appeared, and that the trial court failed to record any evidence before passing the ex parte decree. The Supreme Court examined the discretionary nature of passing a decree without recording evidence and analyzed the applicability of Order XVII Rule 2, Order IX Rule 6(1)(a), and Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Holding that these procedural questions required detailed examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and stayed the execution of the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can decree a suit ex parte without recording any evidence under Order XVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does Order IX Rule 6(1)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to adjourned dates or is it restricted to the initial date fixed in the summons?
  • Can a court invoke Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to decree a suit when it has not specifically directed the defendant to file a written statement?
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• Province of Punjab vs Ashiq Muhammad Khan1990 PLD Lahore 153 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-25
  compulsory retirementlimitation perioddeclaration suitestoppelsecond appealretrospective operation of rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular second appeal arose from a civil suit instituted by the respondent, a former Field Qanungo, challenging his compulsory retirement under the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions involved whether a civil suit seeking a declaration that an administrative order is null and void is governed by Article 14 or Article 120 of the Limitation Act, whether a plea of limitation or estoppel not raised in the lower courts can be urged in second appeal, and whether the Commissioner possessed the legal authority to pass an order of retirement after the appeal had already been validly decided by the Deputy Commissioner under unamended rules. The Lahore High Court held that new pleas not raised in pleadings or before the first appellate court cannot be entertained in second appeal, that Article 120 (and not Article 14) of the Limitation Act applies to suits for a mere declaration that an official order is void, and that subsequent amendments to rules cannot operate retrospectively to divest an authority of powers validly exercised prior to such amendment. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plea of limitation or estoppel not raised in the trial court or first appellate court can be allowed to be raised for the first time in a second appeal?
  • Does Article 14 or Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to a suit seeking a declaration that an official order of compulsory retirement is null and void?
  • Can an amendment to the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Rules 1959 operate with retrospective effect to invalidate an appeal already decided by the competent authority?
  • Whether an administrative order of compulsory retirement communicated to a civil servant but never actually signed or passed by the competent authority is legally operative?
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• Province of Punjab vs Abdul Latif and 2 others1990 PLD Lahore 66 · Lahore High Court · 1988-12-18
  Civil Court jurisdictionColonization of Government Lands Actallotment of landproprietary rightsRevenue Authoritiescancellation of allotmentRegular Second Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves eight Regular Second Appeals filed by the Province of Punjab against the appellate judgment of the District Judge, Bahawalpur, which declared the respondents as owners of disputed Ahatas and set aside an order of cancellation passed by the Additional Commissioner. The core legal questions were whether the Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the allotment cancellation under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, and whether the Revenue Authorities could cancel an allotment after the allottee had fulfilled the requisite conditions of payment and possession. The High Court held that the Civil Court maintains jurisdiction to determine the validity of actions taken under the Act and the legal effect of such orders. The Court affirmed that once the purchase price is deposited and possession is transferred, the allottee acquires full proprietary rights, rendering the allotment final. Consequently, the Revenue Authorities lacked the authority to interfere with the established ownership. The Court established that statutory provisions override conflicting departmental instructions, and the fulfillment of allotment conditions confers permanent rights upon the allottee.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of an order passed under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912?
  • At what point does an allottee of government land acquire full proprietary rights?
  • Can Revenue Authorities cancel an allotment of land after the allottee has deposited the purchase price and taken possession?
  • Do statutory provisions override conflicting departmental instructions regarding land allotment?
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• Province of Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura and others vs Akbar Ali and others1990 SCMR 899 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-16
  compulsory acquisitionland acquisitionmarket valuepotential valueLocal Commissioner reportcompensation assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arise from a judgment concerning the determination of compensation for land compulsorily acquired for the construction of a new carriage way between Lahore and Sheikhupura. The core legal question was whether the acquired land, predominantly used for agricultural purposes at the time of acquisition, should be assessed for compensation as agricultural land or as a potential building/factory site given its surrounding development. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that land is not to be valued solely by reference to the specific use to which it is put at the time of acquisition, but also with regard to its potential and reasonable future uses. Affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts and the unrebutted report of the Local Commissioner, the Court dismissed both the acquiring authority's appeal seeking a reduction in compensation and the land-owners' appeal seeking enhancement. The key principle laid down is that where land is surrounded by industrial and residential development, its potential as a building or factory site must be considered in assessing market value for compulsory acquisition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land used for agricultural purposes at the time of compulsory acquisition can be valued as a potential building or factory site?
  • Can a court interfere with the report of a Local Commissioner when it remains unrebutted by evidence?
  • Is a local commissioner's report and the evidence recorded by him admissible as evidence under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Province of Punjab through Collector, Bahawalpur vs Ghulam Rasool1990 SCMR 1106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-04
  execution proceedingsexecuting courtcivil decreejurisdictionpay fixationcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondents filed civil suits seeking declarations that their pay scales were incorrectly fixed and claiming arrears of salary. The Senior Civil Judge decreed the suits in their favour. The Provincial Government failed to file appeals against these decrees. Subsequently, during execution proceedings, the Provincial Government raised objections regarding the respondents' entitlement to the awarded pay scales. The executing court rejected these objections, and subsequent appeals and revisions before the Additional District Judge and the High Court were also dismissed. The Provincial Government sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the executing court cannot go behind the decree. Since it was undisputed that the Civil Court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain the original suits, the executing court was bound by the decree. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal, affirming the principle that an executing court lacks the authority to challenge or look behind a valid decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing court go behind a decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Is an objection regarding the merits of a decree maintainable during execution proceedings when no appeal was filed against the original decree?
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• Province of Punjab through Collector, 'Sialkot and 4 others vs Muhammad Sharif1990 PLD Lahore 208 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-22
  second appealpresentation of appealpower of attorneyvakalatnamaprocedural irregularitycontinuation of suitspecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a defendant's second appeal arising from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court dismissed the appellants' appeal in limine without examining the merits, holding that the appeal was not filed or presented by a duly authorized person. The core legal questions involve whether a counsel who represented parties in the trial court requires a fresh power of attorney to file an appeal, and whether a defect in the presentation or authorization of an appeal is fatal or merely a curable procedural irregularity. The Lahore High Court held that a power of attorney enures through the appellate stage as an appeal is a continuation of the suit, and that procedural defects regarding presentation or authorization are curable irregularities rather than grounds for summary dismissal. The court set aside the lower appellate court's judgment and remanded the matter for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a power of attorney given to a counsel in the trial court continue to authorize the counsel to file and represent the party in an appeal?
  • Whether a defect in the presentation of an appeal or lack of written authorization is a fatal illegality or a curable procedural irregularity?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal summarily on the ground of unauthorized presentation without affording an opportunity to rectify the defect?
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• Province of Punjab and anothers vs Ghazanfar Ahmad Bajwa1990 SCMR 1723 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-09
  court feedeficiency in court feememorandum of appealremandcivil procedureappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the payment of court fees on a memorandum of appeal. The appellants, the Province of the Punjab, filed an appeal against a final decree for rendition of accounts, affixing a court fee of Rs. 15, which corresponded to the valuation of the original suit rather than the decretal amount. The District Judge dismissed the appeal as incompetent due to deficient court fees without granting the appellants an opportunity to rectify the deficiency. The High Court dismissed the subsequent revision petition in limine. The Supreme Court, relying on the principles established in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan (PLD 1984 SC 289), held that an appellate court is legally obligated to provide an appellant at least one opportunity to make good any deficiency in court fees before dismissing the appeal. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter to the District Judge to allow the appellants to rectify the court fee deficiency, while preserving the respondent's right to raise the issue of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate court required to grant an opportunity to the appellant to make good a deficiency in court fees before dismissing the appeal?
  • Does the failure to provide an opportunity to rectify court fee deficiencies render an appellate order of dismissal liable to be set aside?
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• Project Director, Scarp Irrigation, Sukkur and 2 others vs Allah1990 PLC 447 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-05-21Read full judgment →
• Prof. Wiqar Ahmed and others vs Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat, Quetta, and another1990 SCMR 1508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-26
  civil servicecompulsory retirementpast and closed transactionlimitationprospective effectservice tribunal jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, civil servants retired under section 13(2) of the Balochistan Civil Servants Act, challenged their retirement before the Service Tribunal. Their initial appeals were dismissed in 1981 due to the jurisdictional bar imposed by the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Pakistan and others v. Public-at-Large and others (PLD 1987 SC 304), which struck down certain constitutional bars, the petitioners attempted to revive their claims. The Service Tribunal dismissed these subsequent appeals as time-barred. The Supreme Court, in refusing leave to appeal, held that the petitioners' failure to pursue their remedies earlier rendered the matter a past and closed transaction. The Court emphasized that there was no statutory provision allowing for the revival of such concluded matters. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench relied upon by the petitioners has only prospective effect and does not apply to cases that were already concluded or decided. Consequently, no question of law of public importance arose to warrant interference under Article 212(3) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can a past and closed matter be revived in the absence of express statutory provisions?
  • Does the judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench in Pakistan and others v. Public-at-Large and others have retrospective effect on concluded cases?
  • Does the dismissal of an appeal due to a constitutional bar render the matter a past and closed transaction if not pursued further?
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• Prof. Dr. Raja Muhammad Ayub Khan, Government Degree College, Mirpur1990 MLD 1283 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-01-17
  retrospective promotionpro forma promotionsenioritycivil servicecontinuous appointmentservice tribunaldirect recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a service appeal by the Service Tribunal regarding the seniority of a direct recruit versus promotees in the Education Department. The appellant challenged the retrospective promotion of the respondents to Basic Pay Scale 19, arguing that such ante-dating was unauthorized and that 'continuous appointment' under the relevant rules required actual assumption of charge. The core legal question was whether the Government possesses the authority to grant retrospective promotion to civil servants and whether such promotion affects seniority. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the Government is empowered under Section 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1976, to grant retrospective or pro forma promotion when circumstances warrant, provided vacancies were available. The Court clarified that the term 'continuous appointment' in seniority rules does not strictly mandate the date of actual assumption of charge but allows for notified dates to prevent hardship. Consequently, the Court affirmed the respondents' seniority, ruling that retrospective promotion is legally permissible and not prohibited by the Departmental Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'continuous appointment' in seniority rules strictly require the actual date of assuming charge of a post?
  • Is the Government empowered to grant retrospective or pro forma promotion to civil servants?
  • Can a party vary its case at the appellate stage to challenge the legality of a retrospective promotion?
  • Does Section 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1976, authorize the Government to grant retrospective promotion?
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• Printing Corporation of Pakistan vs Province of Sind and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-04
  education cessworkers' children educationservice of the stateservice of pakistancorporate veiljoint stock companyconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind dismissing a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution. The appellant, the Printing Corporation of Pakistan, challenged the demands for education cess made by the Excise and Taxation Department under the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972. The core legal question was whether the appellant corporation, incorporated as a limited liability company under the Companies Act, was an employer whose workers were in the service of the State, thereby exempting them from the definition of 'worker' under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the Federal Government subscribed to promotors' shares, transferred assets, absorbed former government press employees, and appointed majority directors did not make the corporation an instrumentality of the State or vest ultimate control in the Federal Government rather than its Board of Directors. The Court concluded that the appellant is a commercial joint-stock company and not a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a joint-stock company incorporated under the Companies Act whose shares are held by the Government can be regarded as performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation?
  • Does the power of the Government to appoint a majority of directors on the board of a corporate entity establish ultimate governmental control over its affairs?
  • Does the declaration under section 5 of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978, make a corporation employee a civil servant for all purposes?
  • Are employees of the Printing Corporation of Pakistan considered persons in the service of the State and thus exempt from the definition of worker under the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972?
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• Printing Corporation of Pakistan vs Province of Sind and others1990 PLC 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-04
  education cesscorporate veilservice of the Statestatutory corporationWorkers' Children (Education) Ordinanceseparate legal entityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment dismissing a petition by the Printing Corporation of Pakistan against the imposition of education cess under the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972. The core legal question was whether the Corporation, being government-owned, constitutes a state entity whose employees are in the 'service of the State,' thereby exempting the Corporation from paying the cess. The Supreme Court held that the Corporation, as a limited liability company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1913, remains a separate legal entity. The Court determined that government shareholding and the power to appoint directors do not equate to 'ultimate control' over the Corporation's affairs, nor do they render its employees civil servants for all purposes. The Court affirmed that a corporate body is not a state functionary merely because it is regulated by law or receives government funding. The principle laid down is that the 'service of the State' status is not conferred upon corporate employees simply by government investment or management participation, absent the exercise of sovereign or public power.

  Questions settled

  • Does government shareholding in a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1913, automatically render the company a state entity?
  • Are employees of a government-owned corporation considered to be in the 'service of the State' for the purposes of the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972?
  • Does the power to appoint directors in a limited liability company constitute 'ultimate control' over its affairs?
  • Does Section 5 of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978, confer the status of civil servant on corporation employees for all legal purposes?
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• Prince Suleman Daud vs Syed Abdul Qadir Gilani and others1990 SCMR 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-01
  interim custodysuperdariinfructuous petitioncriminal procedurepreservation of case property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions arising from a dispute over the interim custody of a vintage motor-car, a 1932 Pierce Arrow, allegedly belonging to the Khan of Kalat and historically associated with Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The core legal question addressed whether the High Court's order remanding the case to the Sessions Judge for determining interim custody remained relevant given subsequent developments. The Supreme Court observed that because the Sessions Judge, Kalat, had already passed an order regarding the interim custody pursuant to the High Court's remand, the petitions before the Supreme Court had become infructuous. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions. However, acknowledging the petitioner's concerns regarding the potential deterioration of the vehicle due to prolonged exposure at the police station, the Court clarified that the petitioner remains at liberty to approach the trial court (Sessions Judge) to seek appropriate orders for the proper care, maintenance, and preservation of the vehicle to prevent its damage pending the final disposal of the criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petition become infructuous when the relief sought has already been granted by the trial court pursuant to a remand order?
  • Can a party apply to the trial court for the preservation of case property to prevent deterioration during the pendency of criminal proceedings?
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• The State vs Madrasi1990 P Cr. L J 775 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1979-12-16Read full judgment →
• Prince Glass Works Welfare Union vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal1990 PLC 258 · Sindh High Court · 1988-11-21Read full judgment →
• Present: Shafiur Rahman, Afmal Mian and Rustam S. Sidhwa, H Fazal Elahi1990 PLD Supreme Court 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-10
  service tribunallimitationcompulsory retirementvoid orderdepartmental representationcondonation of delaycivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's service appeal against compulsory retirement on the ground of limitation. The core legal questions involved whether a void order of retirement overrides the law of limitation, how limitation periods are computed under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, read with departmental representations, and whether the Tribunal erred in dismissing the appeal solely on limitation without entering into the merits. The Supreme Court held that a void order still creates legal consequences and does not automatically bypass statutes of limitation or laches, particularly in service matters where limitation is applied strictly to maintain administrative integrity. The Court further held that under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, an aggrieved civil servant must file an appeal before the Tribunal within 120 days—comprising the 90-day waiting period after filing a departmental representation plus the 30 days prescribed for the appeal—and cannot wait indefinitely for a departmental decision. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's decision that the appeal was hopelessly time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a void order of compulsory retirement can be challenged before a Service Tribunal regardless of the laws of limitation and laches?
  • How is the period of limitation computed under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, when a departmental representation has been filed by a civil servant?
  • Is a Service Tribunal legally bound to examine a service appeal on its merits even when the appeal is patently barred by limitation?
  • Does the mere assertion that an official notification lacked the approval of the President displace the legal presumption of the regularity of official acts?
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• Post Master General, Central Circle, Lahore and another vs Danial1990 PLC 721 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Port Qasim Tally Staff Union vs Messrs Delta Ark Services (Pvt.) Ltd.1990 PLC 77 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-07-23Read full judgment →
• Police Department vs Javed Israr and others1990 MLD 1214 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-03-19Read full judgment →
• Plaza Hotel And Bar. vs Federation Of Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1990 CL. 596 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-14Read full judgment →
• Pir Muhammad vs Government of Sindh and 3 others1990 MLD 869 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-03Read full judgment →
• Pir Bakhsh and 2 others vs The State1989 P Cr. L J 1917 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-20Read full judgment →
• Pir Aftab Ahmad vs The Chief Administrator Auqaf Lahore1990 CLC 2033 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-23Read full judgment →
• Philips Electrical Company of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited vs Income-Tax1990 PTD 389 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-28
  bad debtsreopening of assessmentchange of opiniondefinite informationadditional assessmenttheory of mergerjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner company claimed a deduction for bad debts written off following the voluntary liquidation of a debtor company, which was eventually allowed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Subsequently, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice under section 65 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 to reopen the assessment. The petitioner challenged this notice through a constitutional petition, contending that the reopening was based merely on a change of opinion without any new 'definite information' and that the statutory pre-conditions were not met. The Sindh High Court held that an assessment that has attained finality cannot be reopened under section 65 based on a mere change of opinion or a different interpretation of facts already disclosed and considered. The Court further held that for the relevant period prior to the 1987 amendment, the word 'or' in section 65(2) must be read conjunctively as 'and', requiring both definite information and approval. The Court concluded that the impugned notice was issued without jurisdiction, and consequently, all subsequent proceedings and assessments built upon that invalid foundation were null and void.

  Questions settled

  • Can an income tax assessment be reopened under section 65 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 based solely on a change of opinion derived from facts already on record?
  • Whether the word 'or' in section 65(2) of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 should be read as 'and' for the period prior to the Finance Act, 1987 amendment?
  • Does the filing of a return under protest or the subsequent finalization of an assessment vitiate a challenge to the initial notice under section 65 based on the doctrine of merger?
  • Does section 154(6) of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979 bar an assessee from challenging the validity of a notice if the return was filed after the validity of the notice was already challenged in court?
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• Petrocon (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Hyderabad Development Authority, Hyderabad1990 MLD 1675 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-15
  foreign awardarbitration agreementinternational chamber of commercestamp actlimitation periodmaking award rule of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This application was filed under section 5 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention Act, 1937 by the petitioner, Petrocon (Pvt.) Limited, seeking to make an international arbitration award the rule of court against the respondent, Hyderabad Development Authority. The core legal questions involved whether an arbitration award rendered in Paris between Pakistani nationals under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce qualifies as a 'foreign award' under the 1937 Act, whether such an award requires stamping under the Stamp Act, 1899, and whether it is governed by the limitation period prescribed in the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Sindh High Court held that the award constitutes a valid 'foreign award' because the definition under section 2 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention Act, 1937 does not require one party to reside outside Pakistan as a condition precedent. The court further held that foreign awards are exempt from the stamping requirements of the Stamp Act, 1899 and the limitation period of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The award was accordingly made the rule of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration award rendered between Pakistani nationals outside Pakistan under International Chamber of Commerce rules qualifies as a 'foreign award' under the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention Act, 1937?
  • Are provisions of the Stamp Act, 1899 applicable to a 'foreign award' that relates to matters to be performed in Pakistan?
  • Does the ninety-day limitation period prescribed under Article 178 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 apply to an application for filing a foreign award under the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention Act, 1937?
  Read full judgment →
• Peshawar Motors Ltd. vs M. Altaf Hussain and 6 others1990 SCMR 942 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-10
  leave to appealejectmentdefault in rentlandlord and tenantunauthorized alterationsrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 13-9-1989, which accepted the respondents' first appeal and ordered the eviction of the petitioner tenant from the disputed shop. The core legal question concerned whether the tenant committed default in the payment of agreed rent and made unauthorized additions or alterations in the premises. The Supreme Court held that the findings arrived at by the High Court were based on proper appreciation of all material facts and suffered from no legal infirmity, thereby refusing leave to appeal. However, considering the petitioner's long-standing tenancy since 1937 and potential hardship in collecting dues, the Court granted a four-month period to vacate the premises subject to regular payment of monthly rent. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact by the appellate court based on proper appreciation of record will not be interfered with, and reasonable time to vacate may be granted by mutual agreement to prevent undue hardship.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's finding on default of rent based on appreciation of evidence warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can leave to appeal be refused when the impugned judgment suffers from no legal infirmity?
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• Pervaiz alias Puttar vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 956 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-21Read full judgment →
• Pervaiz Akhtar vs The State1990 SCMR 1288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-07
  leave to appealpetition for leave to appealSupreme Court of Pakistanappellate jurisdictionrefusal of leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner had established sufficient grounds to warrant the grant of leave to appeal against the impugned order. Upon consideration of the matter, the Court declined to grant the requested leave. The holding of the Court is that the petition for leave to appeal is refused, thereby maintaining the status quo established by the lower court's decision. No further legal principles were elaborated upon in this brief order.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court of Pakistan required to grant leave to appeal in all cases?
  • What is the effect of the Supreme Court refusing a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Pervaiz Akhtar and another vs The Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and 4 others1990 PLD Supreme Court 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-17
  evictiondefault in payment of renttime-barred debtlimitation actrent restriction ordinanceapprobation and reprobationlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding an eviction order against the petitioners for default in rent payment. The core legal question was whether an eviction application under the Rent Restriction Ordinance is incompetent if the underlying rent arrears are time-barred under the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that a landlord may seek eviction on the ground of default even if the legal remedy to recover the rent through a civil suit is barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the Rent Restriction Ordinance is a special statute governing tenancy, not merely a mechanism for debt recovery. While the Limitation Act bars the remedy of a suit, it does not extinguish the underlying right to the debt. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a tenant who acknowledges liability or tenders payment for time-barred rent may create a fresh period of limitation under the Contract Act. Consequently, the Court ruled that time-barred rent does not preclude a landlord from enforcing the right to evict a tenant for default, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord seek eviction of a tenant on the ground of default if the rent arrears are time-barred?
  • Does the bar of limitation on a suit for recovery of rent extinguish the landlord's right to seek eviction for default?
  • Does the payment or tender of time-barred rent constitute an acknowledgment or promise creating a fresh period of limitation?
  • Is the Rent Restriction Ordinance a statute for the recovery of rent or a special statute for eviction?
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• Panjal vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 2051 · Sindh High Court · 1990-07-24
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaydelay in trialframing of chargecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application was filed by Panjal before the Sindh High Court seeking post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay, facing trial under sections 307, 353, 332, and 333 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether an accused person is entitled to bail on the statutory delay ground under the third proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the trial has been delayed and charge has not yet been framed, despite adjournments sought by the accused. The court held that until a charge is framed, no delay in the trial can be attributed to the accused person even if adjournments were sought by them. Finding that the applicant had remained continuously in custody for almost two years without a charge being framed, the court granted bail, establishing the principle that the statutory exception withholding bail due to delay caused by an accused only applies after the framing of the charge.

  Questions settled

  • Can delay in trial be attributed to an accused person before the framing of the charge for the purpose of denying statutory bail?
  • Whether an accused who remains in continuous custody for nearly two years without a charge being framed is entitled to bail under the third proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Do adjournments sought by an accused prior to the framing of the charge disentitle them to the concession of statutory bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Pandurang Ramchandra Mandlik by his Legal Heirs and another vs Smt.1990 MLD 500 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-09-12Read full judgment →
• Pan Ocean Enterprises (Pvt.) Limited vs Thai Rayon Company Limited1990 PLD Karachi 395 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-01
  letter of creditinterim injunctionfraudulent bill of ladingcif contractsale of goodsstrict complianceindependent transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application for an interim injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking to restrain the defendants from claiming and making payments under an irrevocable Letter of Credit. The plaintiff-company contracted with defendant No. 1 for the import of Viscose Rayon Staple Fibre through an established Letter of Credit. The plaintiff subsequently discovered that the bills of lading contained false and fraudulent shipping dates and vessels, and that trans-shipment had occurred contrary to the terms of the Letter of Credit. The core legal question was whether the buyer, having taken delivery of the goods following protests, was entitled to an interim injunction restraining the encashment of the Letter of Credit on the ground of fraudulent and inaccurate shipping documents. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of fraud regarding the misdated bills of lading, which violated the terms of the Letter of Credit, and that taking delivery of the goods to inspect or minimize loss did not preclude the buyer from seeking injunctive relief against fraudulent encashment. The court laid down the principle that a letter of credit is a transaction independent of the underlying sales contract, and where bills of lading are prima facie fraudulent or fail to strictly comply with credit terms, an injunction may be granted, subject to the defendants furnishing a bank guarantee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a buyer under a letter of credit is precluded from seeking an injunction against encashment after taking delivery of the goods?
  • Does a false and inaccurate bill of lading regarding shipment dates constitute sufficient ground to restrain the encashment of an irrevocable letter of credit?
  • Are the obligations under a letter of credit independent of the underlying sales contract between the buyer and the seller?
  • Whether taking delivery of goods following a protest preserves the buyer's right to challenge the accuracy of shipping documents?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence vs Messrs Azhar1990 SCMR 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-28
  condonation of delaylimitationdepartmental delaygovernment litigationsufficient causecivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of the appellant's (Ministry of Defence) appeal by the High Court on the grounds of limitation. The appellant had sought condonation of a 46-day delay in filing an appeal against a civil decree under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay, particularly regarding the treatment of departmental delays by the Government. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly declined the application for condonation. It affirmed that the Government, as a litigant, is not entitled to preferential treatment or special indulgence regarding limitation compared to private parties. While departmental delays may be considered on their merits, the Court found that the appellant failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the delay, exhibiting gross negligence in the processing of the file. The Court further noted that an unpleaded allegation of collusion between departmental officials and the respondent could not be entertained for the first time on appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Government entitled to preferential treatment or special indulgence regarding the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act compared to an ordinary litigant?
  • Must the Government, like any other litigant, explain the delay of each day when seeking condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • Can an appellate court consider a ground for condonation of delay that was not pleaded in the original application before the lower court?
  • Does the existence of inherent departmental delay automatically constitute sufficient cause for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan1990 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-26
  condonation of delaydepartmental delaylimitationgovernment litigationpublic exchequerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed the petitioner's regular first appeal as time-barred and refused to condone the delay. The core legal question concerns the appropriate judicial approach toward condonation of delay when the Government is a party, specifically whether departmental delays should be automatically rejected or assessed on their own merits. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the indiscriminate application of the rule in Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Dari (1970 SCMR 558)—which suggested the Government should not receive extra indulgence—has led to an inflexible practice of shutting out pleas based on departmental negligence. The Court clarified that this approach is not mandated by law and causes immense loss to the public exchequer. The key principle laid down is that requests for condonation of delay involving Government entities must be treated on their own merits, similar to any other litigant, rather than being rejected through a rigid formula regarding departmental delay or negligence.

  Questions settled

  • Should requests for condonation of delay involving the Government be treated differently than those of ordinary litigants?
  • Does the law mandate an inflexible rule to reject condonation of delay pleas based on departmental negligence?
  • Is it a valid judicial approach to reject a plea for condonation of delay solely on the ground that it constitutes departmental delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan through General Manager, Pakistan Railways vs Messrs Q.M.R.1990 PLD Supreme Court 800 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-16
  arbitration awardnotice of filing awardlimitation periodtermination of counselmemo of appearancecivil procedure codesuo motu powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from civil litigation concerning arbitration proceedings wherein Pakistan Railways appealed against a Lahore High Court judgment holding that their objections to an arbitration award were time-barred. The core legal questions examined were whether a notice of the filing of an award under section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Arbitration Act was validly served on the appellant's former standing counsel whose appointment had been formally terminated prior to service, and whether Order XXVII Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code overrides Order III Rule 4 C.P.C. regarding the continuation of an advocate's authority. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an advocate's engagement and authority to accept process continues under Order III Rule 4(2) C.P.C. until the vakalatnama or memo of appearance is formally determined with the leave of the court, regardless of internal termination between client and counsel. The Court affirmed that service of notice on the counsel constituted valid service making limitation run from that date, while noting that courts retain suo motu powers under section 17 of the Arbitration Act to examine, modify, or set aside an award even if objections are time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether service of a notice regarding the filing of an award under section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act on a party's counsel constitutes valid service?
  • Does the termination of an advocate's appointment as standing counsel by a client automatically terminate their authority to act in pending proceedings without formal withdrawal under Order III Rule 4(2) of the C.P.C.?
  • Can a court suo motu modify or set aside an arbitration award under section 17 of the Arbitration Act when objections are time-barred or unfiled?
  • Does section 12(4) of the Limitation Act apply to exclude time for obtaining a copy of an award when the copy is furnished voluntarily by the opposing party's advocate rather than through formal application?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Sports Cooperative Industrial Society Ltd. vs Kh. Muhammad1990 SCMR 1607 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-21
  settlement disputeprovisional transfer orderproperty divisionevictionjurisdictionconformity of title deeds
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of a residential house and its adjacent industrial concern. The respondent was transferred the residential portion of a house, while two rooms of the same house, which were in possession of the appellant and used for the industrial concern, were ordered to be maintained under status quo by the Settlement Commissioner's order dated 6-12-1960. However, the respondent obtained a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) covering the entire house, including the two rooms, and successfully initiated eviction proceedings. Subsequently, the Settlement Commissioner (Industries) directed the correction of the P.T.O. to conform with the 1960 order. The High Court, in a constitutional petition, set aside this correction, relying on the eviction proceedings and earlier litigation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that the basic order of entitlement was the Settlement Commissioner's 1960 order, which divided the property. The Court ruled that the P.T.O. must strictly conform to the final transfer order, and eviction or rent proceedings cannot sanctify an erroneous P.T.O. that deviates from the foundational transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Provisional Transfer Order must strictly conform to the final transfer order passed by the Settlement Commissioner?
  • Can subsequent eviction or rent control proceedings sanctify an erroneous Provisional Transfer Order that deviates from the foundational transfer order?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with an order correcting a Provisional Transfer Order to bring it in line with the final division order of the Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Services Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone1990 PTD 832 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-05Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Services Limited vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Central ZonePTCL 1990 CL. 984 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-05Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Security Printing Corporation Ltd. vs Syed Arif Hussain1990 PLC 566 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1987-12-13Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways through Divisional Superintendent, Multan vs Niseer1990 PLC 537 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1987-10-11Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways through Divisional Superintendent, Multan Divisional1990 SCMR 849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-23
  jurisdictionpay revision ruleslabour courtpayment of wagesleave to appeallimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Pakistan Railways against a decision regarding the fixation and entitlement of pay under the Pay Revision Rules. The core legal question presented for the Court's consideration is whether the jurisdiction to determine disputes regarding the fixation or entitlement of pay under the Pay Revision Rules rests exclusively with the Labour Court, or whether the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act 1936 possesses the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate such matters. The Supreme Court, in granting leave to appeal, recognized the significance of this jurisdictional conflict. The Court ordered that these petitions be heard alongside Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 705 of 1983, which involves similar questions of law. The Court further noted that the hearing would be subject to the issue of limitation arising in certain petitions, granting the parties liberty to file additional documents to assist in the final determination of the jurisdictional scope of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act 1936 versus the Labour Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act 1936 have jurisdiction to determine disputes regarding the fixation or entitlement of pay under the Pay Revision Rules?
  • Is the determination of pay entitlement under the Pay Revision Rules a matter exclusively reserved for the Labour Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Railways and 2 others vs Ittefaq Foundries (Pvt.) Ltd. and another1990 SCMR 355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-20
  interim orderleave to appealrailway wagonsconstitutional petitionpublic functionariesdiscretionary reliefspecific relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Pakistan Railways and others against an interim order of the Lahore High Court, which directed the Railways to supply a minimum of thirty railway wagons per day to Ittefaq Foundries for transporting imported iron scrap. The core legal question involved the propriety and legality of granting mandatory interim relief in constitutional petitions that practically preempts the main controversy, alongside issues concerning the applicability of the Specific Relief Act and principles governing interim injunctions. The Supreme Court, by a majority decision, dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, holding that while operational constraints and the transportation of essential commodities and defense needs are paramount, the High Court's discretionary interim order could be modulated to balance public interest with the genuine grievances of parties against bureaucratic inaction, without substituting final adjudication. The key principle laid down is that interim relief in constitutional matters must balance operational realities of public functionaries with the prevention of arbitrary hardship, and appellate courts will generally not interfere with discretionary interim orders unless patently unjust or perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interim order in terms of Order XXXIX can be passed, making the decision of the pending cause itself inconsequential and futile?
  • Whether the requirements of section 56 of the Specific Relief Act even where attracted are not to govern an interim order passed under Order XXXIX, C.P.C.?
  • Whether an interim order could transcend and operate prima facie in violation of the requirements of law and procedure in a given case?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines and anothers vs F. M. Shamsi1990 PLD Supreme Court 943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-12
  service tribunal jurisdictioncivil servant statusretrospective application of lawexclusive jurisdictionservice appealPakistan International Airlinesindustrial relationstermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that reinstated a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) employee. The core legal question concerned whether the Tribunal possessed jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, given that the statutory amendments declaring PIA employees as civil servants under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, were enacted after the employee's termination. The appellants contended that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction as the law was not retrospective. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal correctly exercised jurisdiction. The Court established that when a statute is extended to a new class of persons, the commencement date synchronizes with the extension date. Furthermore, under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, once a Service Tribunal is established, it holds exclusive jurisdiction over service matters, ousting other courts. The Court also clarified that the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, does not preclude access to the Service Tribunal for adjudicatory purposes. Finding no legal infirmity in the Tribunal's decision on merits, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the reinstatement of the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the declaration of service under a corporation as 'service of Pakistan' confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Service Tribunal to hear service-related appeals?
  • When a statute is extended to a new class of persons, how is the date of commencement determined for the purpose of jurisdiction?
  • Does the application of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, bar an employee from approaching the Service Tribunal for the adjudication of service grievances?
  • Can a party that successfully argued for a specific forum's jurisdiction in a lower court later challenge that forum's jurisdiction in an appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Industrial Promotors Limited vs Monopoly Control1990 CLC 1008 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-10
  monopoly control authorityrestrictive trade practicesregistration of agreementspenalty for non-registrationwilful defaultdistributorship agreements
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 20 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 challenged an order of the Monopoly Control Authority imposing a penalty on the appellant for failing to register distributorship agreements under section 16(1)(k) of the Ordinance. The core legal question concerned whether the registration requirement under section 16 is independent of the exceptions relating to restrictive trade practices under section 6(2), and whether the appellant's omission to register was 'wilful' under section 19. The Lahore High Court held that the initial registration stage for data collection under section 16 is distinct from the subsequent inquiry stage under section 6, and that the appellant's deliberate inaction over a prolonged period constituted a wilful default attracting a penalty. The Court laid down that registration is a mandatory preliminary step for information gathering, independent of whether an agreement may ultimately qualify for exemptions under section 6, and that 'wilful' connotes a conscious, deliberate omission rather than inadvertence.

  Questions settled

  • Are the registration requirements under section 16 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 independent of the exceptions provided in section 6(2)?
  • What constitutes a 'wilful' failure to register agreements under section 19 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970?
  • Whether other parties to a registrable agreement are necessary parties entitled to a pre-registration hearing by the Monopoly Control Authority?
  • Does the statutory scheme of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) Ordinance, 1970 distinguish between the initial registration stage and the subsequent inquiry stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (Pvt.) Limited vs Chairman, Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal at Karachi and others1990 PLC 264 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-12Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Herald Workers' Union through General Secretary vs Sindh1990 PLC 802 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-16Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. and others vs United Bank Limited1990 SCMR 1375 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-28
  banking suitleave to defendinterlocutory orderappellate jurisdictionstatutory interpretationrecovery of loans
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a decision of a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court, which dismissed an appeal as incompetent regarding an order passed by a Single Judge in a banking suit. The Single Judge had granted the petitioners conditional leave to defend a suit filed by the respondent bank under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, requiring security of five million rupees. The petitioners challenged this, arguing that the order was appealable. The core legal question concerns the interpretation of the proviso to Section 12(1) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, specifically whether an order granting conditional leave to defend constitutes an interlocutory order that does not dispose of the 'entire case,' thereby barring an appeal. The Supreme Court observed that the arguments raised substantial legal questions of general importance regarding the scope of the term 'entire case' and the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under the Ordinance. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to resolve these statutory interpretation issues.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order granting conditional leave to defend a suit under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, constitute an interlocutory order that does not dispose of the entire case?
  • What is the scope of the term 'entire case' within the proviso to Section 12(1) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is an appeal competent against an interlocutory order passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in a suit filed under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Engineering Company Limited through its Managing Director vs Fazal Beg and others1990 SCMR 706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-11
  leave to appealworkmanStanding Orders OrdinanceSecurity Jamadarsecured right
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the status of a Security Jamadar and whether he falls within the definition of a workman under the relevant labor legislation. The core legal question is whether the petitioner qualifies as a workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance and what secured rights are available to him under the law if he does not. The court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions, directing the matter to be fixed at an early date while maintaining the interim order. The key principle laid down is the judicial examination of the statutory definition of a workman vis-a-vis supervisory or security personnel under labor laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Security Jamadar fall within the definition of a workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance?
  • What secured rights under the law are available to an employee who does not qualify as a workman?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Central Cotton Committee, Karachi vs Colony Thal Textile1990 PLD Supreme Court 832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-21
  cotton cesstaxing statuteraw cotton consumptioncotton waste deductioncharging sectionmill consumptionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Pakistan Central Cotton Committee challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 27-6-1977, which had accepted a writ petition filed by Colony Thal Textile Mills Limited. The core legal question was whether raw cotton ginned and consumed by a mill in the manufacturing process is liable to cotton cess on the total quantity brought under process, or whether an automatic deduction for cotton waste thrown up during production is permissible under section 3 of the Cotton Cess Act, 1923. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that cotton cess is leviable on the total raw ginned cotton utilized or brought under process by a mill, without any reduction or exclusion for cotton waste arising during production. The Court laid down the principle that the word "consumed" in taxing statutes must be given its natural and ordinary meaning denoting the total raw material utilized, and that internal consumers and exporters of raw cotton are to be treated at par under the charging provision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether raw cotton consumed by a mill is liable to cotton cess inclusive or exclusive of cotton waste thrown up during production?
  • Does the word "consumed" in section 3 of the Cotton Cess Act, 1923 permit a deduction for wastage arising from the manufacturing process?
  • Are internal consumers and exporters of raw ginned cotton placed at par under the charging provisions of the Cotton Cess Act, 1923?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation through Director, General vs Syed1990 SCMR 1501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-09
  Special leave to appealDiscriminationEquality before lawClassificationStatutory corporationService mattersEngineersWrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment in a writ petition. The respondents, holding M.Sc. degrees in Physics, joined Radio Pakistan as Engineers before its conversion into the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC). Following the enactment of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1975, which stipulated that only graduate engineers were qualified for engineering posts, the respondents, not being engineering graduates, were denied Class 1 status in NPS-17, which was granted to Senior Broadcasting Engineers holding prescribed engineering degrees. The High Court found this discriminatory. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether this treatment infringes Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Court observed, prima facie, that since the respondents (M.Sc. Physics graduates) and the other employees (engineering graduates) do not belong to the same class, the question of discrimination and differentiation may not arise.

  Read full judgment →
• Pak Labour Union (Piam), Harappa Textile Mills Ltd. vs Registrar of Trade Unions, Multan Region, Multan and 4 others1990 PLC 781 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1990-05-09Read full judgment →
• P.M. Mohammed Meerakhan vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kerala1990 PTD 591 · Supreme Court of India · 1969-02-12Read full judgment →
• P. Narasaiah vs P. Rajoo Reddy1990 MLD 431 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1988-04-29Read full judgment →
• P vs 'R'K.L.R 1990, Labour & Service Cases 3 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-19Read full judgment →
• Oshaque vs The State1990 MLD 1090 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-04Read full judgment →
• Omer Hayat vs Shahadat Khan and others1990 SCMR 611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationpolice investigationsupplementary challanleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondents, who were accused in a case registered under sections 302, 307, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The High Court had granted bail primarily considering that the respondents were found innocent during investigation by a Deputy Superintendent of Police and placed in column No. 2 of the challan. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that subsequent re-investigation ordered by the Inspector-General of Police implicated the respondents and a supplementary challan had been submitted. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's bail order based on new material not available before the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that it is not proper to interfere with an order on the basis of material that was not before the High Court, while observing that the petitioner may approach the High Court for cancellation of bail based on the new material.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with a bail order on the basis of material that was not before the High Court?
  • Can a petitioner seek cancellation of bail before the High Court on the basis of new material arising from a subsequent re-investigation?
  • Is the police opinion finding an accused innocent during investigation a relevant consideration in the matter of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Obeidullah Khan vs N.W.F.P. Service Tribunal and others1990 SCMR 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-04
  service lawleave without paycessation of servicedue processdisciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticeFundamental Rule 18
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a government employee, was granted extended leave without pay to work at a private entity. Following the closure of that entity, the petitioner sought to rejoin his parent department. The department subsequently issued an order declaring that the petitioner had ceased to be a government employee under Fundamental Rule 18 due to unauthorized absence. The N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's appeal against this order. Upon petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined the contention that the petitioner was declared to have ceased employment without being directed to report for duty, without a show-cause notice, and without the initiation of disciplinary proceedings under the N.-W.F.P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. The Court found that the contentions raised regarding the lack of due process and the misconstruction of relevant provisions required further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the summary termination of service without following prescribed disciplinary procedures was legally sustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government employee be declared to have ceased to be in service under Fundamental Rule 18 without being issued a show-cause notice?
  • Is it mandatory to initiate disciplinary proceedings under the N.-W.F.P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, before terminating a government servant for absence from duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Obaidullah vs Messrs Ulbricht's (Pakistan) Ltd1990 PLC 89 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-31Read full judgment →
• Nowshad and another vs Jehanzeb and 4 others1990 P Cr. L J 1902 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-06-16Read full judgment →
• Not vs Not1990 PTD (Trib.) 682 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1963-12-24Read full judgment →
• Noordin alias Katore vs The State and another1990 MLD 1154 · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-19Read full judgment →
• Nooral alias Noor Muhammad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1298 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-27Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 732 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-29
  post-arrest bailmisappropriationprohibitory clauseaccounting disputecriminal breach of trustforgerycheating
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail application filed by the petitioner, Noor Muhammad, who was charged under sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for alleged misappropriation of funds while working as a clerk. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the nature of the offence, the delay in the trial, and the fact that the petitioner was no longer required for investigation. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner should be released on bail. The court reasoned that the case involved accounting matters where the petitioner's continued detention would prejudice his ability to prepare his defence. Furthermore, the court noted that the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that in cases involving accounting disputes where the accused is no longer required for investigation, bail should generally be granted to ensure the accused can adequately prepare their defence, particularly when the trial is not likely to commence immediately.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail in cases involving accounting disputes when the investigation is complete?
  • Does an offence under sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the potential prejudice to an accused's defence due to incarceration be a valid ground for granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs The State1990 SCMR 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-19
  leave to appealmurdercapital punishmentocular evidencehostile witnesssafe administration of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal from jail by Noor Muhammad against his conviction and sentence of death on four counts under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court. The prosecution case involved the murder of four persons following an altercation over bringing fodder, supported by ocular testimony, motive, and recoveries. The Supreme Court considered the reliability of the eyewitnesses, including an allegedly hostile witness, a child witness not named in the first information report, and another whose presence was rendered doubtful by the circumstances of the motive. The Court held that the case warranted the grant of leave to appeal to examine whether the principles of safe administration of justice had been duly adhered to in evaluating the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a hostile eyewitness, a child witness not named in the first information report, and an allegedly doubtful witness is sufficient to sustain a quadruple murder conviction?
  • Does the failure to examine material eyewitnesses present at the scene affect the reliability of the prosecution case?
  • When can leave to appeal be granted in a capital sentence case to review the safe administration of criminal justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Muhammad Ashraf And 7 Other1990 CLC 1929 · Board of Revenue · 1990-03-21Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Gaman and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 1457 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-18Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Rawalpindi and others1990 PLC 788 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-10Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs District Magistrate, Hyderabad Sindh and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 2052 · Sindh High Court · 1990-06-24
  preventive detentionmaintenance of public ordervague groundsconstitutional petitionliberty of subjectdetention order
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged a detention order issued by the District Magistrate, Hyderabad, against the detenu, Bachoo, under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the detention order, based on allegations of harboring dacoits, involvement in past criminal cases, and general anti-social activities, was legally sustainable. The Sindh High Court held that the detention order was invalid. The court found that the allegations regarding the harboring of dacoits were vague and lacked specific particulars, rendering them unsustainable. Furthermore, the reliance on past criminal cases, in which the detenu had either been acquitted or the proceedings were stale, was insufficient to justify detention. The court reiterated the established principle that detention grounds must be precise and provide sufficient particulars to enable the detenu to make an effective representation. It further held that if any ground of detention is found to be unsustainable or vague, the entire detention order is vitiated, as it is impossible to determine the extent to which the invalid ground influenced the authority's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of vague or unsustainable grounds in a detention order vitiate the entire order?
  • Are detention grounds legally sufficient if they fail to provide specific particulars regarding the time, place, and manner of the alleged activities?
  • Can a detention order be sustained based on stale criminal cases where the detenu has already been acquitted?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Ahmad and another1990 PLD Lahore 176 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-13Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad Khan vs The Secretary to the Ministry of Law, Karachi, and OtherK.L.R 1990 labour & Service Cases 82 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad And Another vs Ch. Liaquat Ali Khan1990 CLC 929 · Lahore High Court · -
  civil procedurepre-admission noticedismissal of appealtechnicalities of lawstatus quo antemotion hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application filed by the respondent for the dismissal of an appeal on the ground of non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Order 43 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging that notice was not properly served before the pre-admission stage, depriving the respondent of the right of being heard. The core legal question is whether an appeal filed without complying with the pre-admission notice requirements under Order 43 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 must be dismissed, or if an alternative remedy exists. The Lahore High Court held that while the right to be heard at the pre-admission stage is mandatory and its infringement causes prejudice, the appeal itself should not be entirely defeated or dismissed solely due to this technical non-compliance. Instead, the court established that the appropriate course of action in such circumstances is to recall the admission order and any interim relief granted, restoring the status quo ante, and refixing the appeal for motion hearing in the presence of both parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to comply with the pre-admission notice requirement under Order 43 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 warrant the outright dismissal of an appeal?
  • What is the legal effect of infringing a respondent's right to be heard at the pre-admission stage of an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an admission order and interim relief be recalled by the High Court if the respondent was deprived of an opportunity to contest the admission of an appeal?
  • What procedure should be adopted when an appeal is entertained and admitted to regular hearing without prior service of notice upon the respondent as mandated by Order 43 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Noor Muhammad and 2 others vs The Assistant Settlement1990 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-18
  land allotmentrehabilitation commissionertemporary allotmentverified claimconstitutional jurisdictionproduce index units
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the cancellation of land allotments made to the appellants by the Rehabilitation Commissioner, specifically challenging the validity of an omnibus revisional order dated 23-11-1956. The primary legal questions were whether the appellants, as successors to a verified claim, were entitled to land despite the cancellation order, whether one appellant (a married woman residing elsewhere) qualified as a temporary allottee, and whether the appellants could rely on previous judgments quashing the Rehabilitation Commissioner's order to avoid the cancellation of their own allotments. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant residing elsewhere did not qualify as a temporary allottee. Furthermore, the Court found that the appellants could not rely on previous judgments to which they were not parties to avoid the effect of the general revision order. The Court affirmed that a general revisional order, even if previously challenged by others, remains binding on individuals who were not parties to those specific proceedings and failed to establish their own legal entitlement or rebut factual findings regarding their status and land shortage.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party rely on a judgment in a previous case to which they were not a party to avoid the effect of a general administrative order?
  • Does a married woman residing in a different district qualify as a temporary allottee for land settlement purposes?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with factual findings regarding land entitlement and produce index units when no evidence is provided to rebut them?
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• Noor Khan vs Senior Superintendent of Police, Rawalpindi and another1990 PLC (C.S.) 489 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1989-11-21Read full judgment →
• Noor Khan & 462 others vs Messrs Pakistan PVC Ltd. and another1990 PLC 108 · Labour Court · 1989-09-13Read full judgment →
• Noor Illahiarain vs Secretary to Government of Sindh Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Labour and Service Cases 78 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1989-04-27Read full judgment →
• Noor Illahi Arain vs Secretary, Government of Sindh, Zakat, Usher and Social Welfare Department1990 PLC (C.S.) 455 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1989-05-04Read full judgment →
• Noor Hussain vs Ali Gohar and another1990 MLD 1272 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-03-03Read full judgment →
• Noor Hussain Muhammad Hassan vs The State Noor Hussain and another1990 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-17
  leave to appealquantum of sentencecommutation of sentencedeath sentencemurdermitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 19th October 1985, wherein Noor Hussain's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ghulam Abbas was maintained, but his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Muhammad Hassan petitioned for the enhancement of the sentence back to death, while Noor Hussain sought acquittal. The core legal question concerns the propriety of commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment based on precedents involving close familial revenge, when the deceased in the present case was a distant relation. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal on both petitions to examine the quantum of sentence and the applicability of mitigating circumstances regarding distant relations. The Court held that leave should be granted to thoroughly examine whether the concession in sentencing was justified under the circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether it is just and proper to extend the concession in the quantum of sentence for the murder of a distant relation?
  • Does the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment require applicable precedents involving similar familial relationships?
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• Noor Alam vs Mehdi And 2 Other1990 CLC 321 · Lahore High Court · 1989-02-15
  mutationoral saleburden of proofrecord of rightssecond appealtitle declarationrevenue records
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil second appeal challenged the dismissal of a suit seeking a declaration of ownership and recovery of possession of land, based on an alleged fraudulent oral sale mutation. The core legal question concerned the genuineness of the sale and the evidentiary weight of mutation entries in establishing title. The High Court upheld the lower appellate court's dismissal, holding that the vendees had sufficiently discharged the burden of proving the sale's validity. The Court emphasized that mutation proceedings are not judicial determinations of title but fiscal inquiries for revenue purposes. Consequently, mutation entries do not confer title or terminate existing rights, nor do they possess an irrebuttable presumption of truth. When a mutation is challenged, the beneficiary of the transaction bears the initial burden of proving its authenticity. The Court concluded that the evidence, including the vendor's failure to challenge the transaction during his lifetime, supported the validity of the sale, and affirmed that findings of fact by the lower appellate court, when based on proper evidence, are binding in second appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in revenue records confer title or ownership rights?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a mutation entry in proving a disputed sale of land?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when the genuineness of a mutation entry is challenged?
  • Are findings of fact by a lower appellate court binding in a second appeal?
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• Noor Alam and others vs Muhammad Amir1990 SCMR 992 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-22
  ejectment petitiondemolition and reconstructionbona fide needcantonments rent restrictiondilapidated conditionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the ejectment of the petitioners from a shop in dispute. The respondent landlord had filed an ejectment petition under Section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 on the grounds of default in payment of rent, subletting, demolition and reconstruction, and personal requirement. The Rent Controller accepted the ejectment petition on the ground of demolition and reconstruction for personal use, which order was affirmed by the High Court in appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court failed to decide the question of the bona fide need of the disputed property by the landlord. The Supreme Court held that the High Court thoroughly considered the question of fact regarding the dilapidated condition of the property and its bona fide requirement for reconstruction. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide requirement of a rented premises for demolition and reconstruction due to dilapidated condition warrant no interference by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court failed to decide the question of bona fide need for the disputed shop?
  • Does the requirement of demolition and reconstruction of a dilapidated property constitute valid ground for ejectment?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the condition of rented premises be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
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• Nizam Din and anothers vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Vehari and another1990 SCMR 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-18
  land allotmentrehabilitation commissionernecessary partyres judicataconstitutional petitionallotment cancellationimpleadment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition concerning the cancellation of land allotments following an omnibus revisional order by the Rehabilitation Commissioner. The core legal question was whether a judgment obtained by the appellants in an earlier constitutional petition, which challenged the Rehabilitation Commissioner’s order, could be enforced against a private respondent who was not a party to those proceedings and had received an allotment of the land in the interim. The Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Commissioner’s omnibus order was valid and self-executing, and the appellants’ failure to implead the private respondent in their earlier petition meant that the resulting judgment could not bind him. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that a judgment cannot prejudice the rights of a person who was not a party to the litigation. The principle laid down is that a party cannot be deprived of their rights based on a judgment obtained in proceedings to which they were not a party and in which they were not afforded an opportunity to be heard.

  Questions settled

  • Does an omnibus revisional order by a Rehabilitation Commissioner require formal implementation in the R.L.II register to be effective?
  • Can a judgment obtained in a constitutional petition bind a private respondent who was not impleaded in the proceedings?
  • Is a private respondent who was not a party to a constitutional petition bound by the outcome of that petition?
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• Nizam Din And Another vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land), Vehari And Another1990 CLC 1250 · Lahore High Court · 1978-09-26Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad vs The State1990 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-22
  petition dismissalSupreme Court of Pakistanleave to appealappellate jurisdictionjudicial order
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan involved a petition for leave to appeal, the specific nature of which is not detailed in the provided text beyond the final order. The core legal question addressed by the Court concerned the merits of the petition presented before the bench. Upon consideration of the arguments and the record, the Court reached a definitive decision to dismiss the petition. The holding of the Court is limited to the rejection of the relief sought by the petitioner. As the judgment consists solely of a brief order dismissing the petition without providing detailed reasoning, specific legal principles or precedents were not articulated in this text. Consequently, the judgment serves as a final disposition of the case at the Supreme Court level, effectively concluding the proceedings initiated by the petitioner. No further legal analysis, statutory interpretation, or elaboration on the facts or law was provided in the order, rendering it a summary disposal of the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Is the petition dismissed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Nisar Ahmad vs The State?
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• Nisar Ahmad vs The General Manager (Mills) and another1990 PLC 48 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-08-08Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad Khan vs Noor Muhammad Khan and 6 others1990 SCMR 544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-13
  leave to appealejectmenttenant evictionpersonal requirementmala fidesrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld his ejectment under the Rent Restriction Law. The core legal question was whether a prior demand for an increase in rent by the landlord renders a subsequent ejectment application on the ground of personal requirement mala fide and legally unsustainable. The Supreme Court held that a mere demand for an increase in rent does not per se establish mala fides or invalidate a subsequent bona fide eviction application on the ground of personal requirement, unless specific circumstances demonstrate otherwise. The court established the key principle that a landlord's demand for increased rent cannot automatically be used to defeat a claim for personal requirement in rent restriction matters. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, while granting the tenant four months to surrender vacant possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's prior demand for an increase in rent automatically render a subsequent eviction application on the ground of personal requirement mala fide?
  • Can a demand for increased rent serve as a sole basis for the rejection of an ejectment application under the rent restriction laws?
  • Whether the High Court's dismissal of a tenant's writ petition against an ejectment order warrants interference by the Supreme Court where no mala fides are demonstrated?
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• Nirala & Company [M/s.] Jail Road, Lahore. vs Commissioner Of IncomePTCL1990 CL. 87 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-08Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 331 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-19Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad vs Election Tribunal, Peshawar and others1990 SCMR 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  election petitionleave to appealwrit jurisdictionfindings of factlocal councils electioncorrupt or illegal practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Peshawar High Court whereby an election petition filed against the success of the petitioner in the local council elections for ward No. 13 of Peshawar Municipal Corporation was accepted, the election was declared void as a whole, and re-election was ordered. The core legal questions involve the propriety of setting aside concurrent findings of fact of the Election Tribunal in writ jurisdiction and whether grounds existed under the relevant legal provisions to declare the election void. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contentions raised regarding the unjustified interference with findings of fact and the application of law by the High Court required consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine these matters and suspended the operation of the impugned judgment pending the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with findings of fact recorded by an Election Tribunal in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction?
  • Under what circumstances can an election be declared void as a whole under the local council laws?
  • Whether the violation of Rule 26 regarding re-election at a polling station was properly appreciated by the High Court?
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• Niaz Muhammad alias Jaja and another vs The State1990 MLD 1557 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-03-12Read full judgment →
• Niaz Ahmad vs Government of Sindh through Secretary Home1990 P Cr. L J 1267(1) · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-26Read full judgment →
• Niamat Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1015 · Lahore High Court · 1987-10-19Read full judgment →
• New Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Special Officer, Income Tax, Central ZonePTCL 1990 CL. 356 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• New Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Special Officer, Central Zone ---a---, Karachi and another1990 PTD 1 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-28
  constitutional petitionre-assessmentalternative remedyinfructuous petitionvested rightsincome taxlimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a re-assessment notice and order issued under the Income-tax Ordinance 1979 for the assessment year 1972-73. The core legal question was whether the petition remained maintainable after the impugned order was set aside by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), despite the Department filing a further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Court held that the petition had become infructuous because the impugned notice and order had merged into the favourable appellate decision, which removed the immediate detriment to the petitioner. Consequently, the Court found it could not grant relief on the current petition format. However, the Court laid down the principle that Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is only available where no adequate alternative remedy exists; if such a remedy has already succeeded, the constitutional petition is rendered infructuous. Additionally, the Court observed that vested rights accrued under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act 1922 could not be retroactively extinguished by the extended limitation periods provided in the Income-tax Ordinance 1979.

  Questions settled

  • Does a constitutional petition become infructuous when the impugned order has been set aside by an appellate authority?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 if an alternative remedy has already been successfully pursued?
  • Do the limitation provisions of the Income-tax Ordinance 1979 apply retrospectively to extinguish vested rights accrued under the Income-tax Act 1922?
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• Nek Muhammad vs Mu14ammad Aslam And 2 Other1990 CLC 1236 · Lahore High Court · 1989-03-11Read full judgment →
• Nek Muhammad Ropaal vs Government of the Punjab through Secretary1990 PLD Supreme Court 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-10
  inter se senioritycivil serviceretrospective seniorityad-hoc promotionestoppel in seniorityrectification of seniorityService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil service appeal, brought under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, involved an inter se seniority dispute between Grade-18 officers. The appellant challenged the Punjab Service Tribunal's judgment upholding the departmental determination of seniority in favor of respondent No. 3. The core legal question was whether an officer ineligible or unconsidered for promotion at the time a junior officer is regularly promoted (due to zonal quotas or adverse service record) can claim restoration of lower-grade seniority upon subsequent promotion, by relying on Explanation III to Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 or similar pre-existing rules. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Explanation III is a protective provision preserving interests of those deprived of consideration when eligible, not rewarding ineligible officers. Furthermore, the court held that issuing fresh seniority lists grants a fresh cause of action to represent, and the department's power to rectify past illegalities or erroneous seniority/confirmation dates is not barred by estoppel or limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant who was ineligible or not considered for promotion when a junior was regularly promoted regain lower-grade seniority upon subsequent promotion?
  • Does the issuance of a fresh seniority list give a civil servant a new right to represent against errors originating in earlier lists?
  • Can departmental authorities rectify illegal or erroneous seniority and confirmation dates despite long lapse of time or lack of earlier objection?
  • Does promotion to a higher grade automatically cure or govern seniority disputes in the lower feeding grade?
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• Nehar Khan vs Shaukat Ali and another1990 SCMR 1305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-22
  murdersentence mitigationlife imprisonmentdeath penaltyrevision petitioncriminal appealjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed his revision petition challenging the sentence awarded to the respondent. The respondent had been convicted for the murder of the petitioner's son under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but was sentenced to life imprisonment rather than the death penalty. The core legal question was whether the trial court and the High Court erred in exercising their discretion to impose the lesser penalty of life imprisonment instead of the death penalty. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly exercised their discretion, noting that the circumstances immediately preceding the crime were shrouded in mystery and that the possibility of provocation could not be ruled out. The Court affirmed that the lower courts had applied settled legal principles in determining the appropriate sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it, maintaining the sentence of life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court impose the lesser penalty of life imprisonment for a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the circumstances preceding the crime are unclear?
  • Is the possibility of provocation a valid ground for a court to decline the imposition of the death penalty in a murder case?
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• Nazra and another vs The State1990 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-19
  leave to appealcriminal revisionconviction and sentencetime-barred petitionmedical evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' criminal revision against their conviction and sentence for an offence under section 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners were convicted by a Judicial Magistrate for attacking the complainant, Muhammad Amir, with a Kassi and Dang, resulting in nine injuries, including an incised wound on the head. The petitioners contended that there was a delay in lodging the First Information Report and questioned the presence of eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting that the victim provided a detailed account of the occurrence and that the defence's claim of the injuries resulting from a bicycle fall was rightly rejected by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit and was also time-barred by two days. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal can be dismissed on the grounds of being time-barred?
  • Can a court reject a defence version attributing injuries to a fall from a bicycle when the victim provides a detailed account of an assault?
  • Does the presence of simple injuries and an incised wound on the head support a conviction under section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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