Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. vs Altaf Hussain and 3 others1990 MLD 1258 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-21
  summary suitex-parte decreeservice of summonslimitation periodbanking recoverysetting aside decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed by the defendants under Order 37, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside an ex-parte decree passed in a summary suit for recovery of money initiated by the plaintiff bank under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979. The core legal question was whether the service of summons by publication alone, without service of Form No. 4 of Appendix B of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 along with the plaint, constituted sufficient service to trigger the limitation period. The Court held that while service by publication is a valid mode under Rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Rules 1980, the limitation period for filing an appearance does not commence until the defendant is served with the summons in the prescribed form along with the plaint. Consequently, the Court set aside the decree, emphasizing that the law favors adjudication on merits and that an application to set aside a decree under Order 37, Rule 4 does not require the defendant to establish a defense on merits at that preliminary stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does service by publication alone satisfy the requirements for service of summons in a summary suit under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  • When does the limitation period for filing an appearance begin to run if a defendant is served by publication?
  • Is a defendant required to establish a defense on merits when applying to set aside an ex-parte decree under Order 37, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Must a defendant be served with Form No. 4 of Appendix B of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 along with the plaint for service to be considered complete?
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• Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and another vs Punjab Labour Appellate1990 PLC 325 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-25Read full judgment →
• Muslim Commercial Bank Limited vs Muzaffar Iqbal Mir Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service 73 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-25Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Masih vs Haji Muhammad Ashraf and another1990 P Cr. L J 1436 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-26Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Hussain vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 746 · Federal Shariat Court · 1989-05-04Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Hussain Shah vs Director, Food, Lahore Region and others1990 SCMR 1492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-23
  service lawpro forma promotionlimitation periodservice tribunal jurisdictionfitness for promotiondepartmental promotion committeecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal as incompetent. The petitioner, a former Assistant Food Controller, sought pro forma promotion after his reinstatement in service, claiming he was overlooked in favor of a junior colleague. Although the High Court had previously directed the authorities to consider his representations, the Departmental Promotion Committee rejected his promotion on 14-1-1987 due to an unsatisfactory service record. The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal in October 1987. The core legal question was whether the appeal before the Tribunal was time-barred and whether the Tribunal could adjudicate upon the fitness of a civil servant for promotion. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's own representations to the Secretary Food in February and July 1987 demonstrated his prior knowledge of the Committee's decision, rendering the appeal filed in October 1987 time-barred. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a Service Tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to re-evaluate evidence regarding a civil servant's fitness for promotion, as this is a departmental prerogative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Service Tribunal has the jurisdiction to re-evaluate evidence regarding a civil servant's fitness for promotion?
  • Does the filing of departmental representations toll the limitation period for an appeal before a Service Tribunal if the petitioner had prior knowledge of the adverse decision?
  • Is a decision regarding a civil servant's fitness for promotion by a Departmental Promotion Committee subject to judicial review on the merits of the service record?
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• Mushtaq Ahmad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1543 · Lahore High Court · 1990-09-30Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmad vs The State (Copy)1990 SCMR 405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-06
  capital convictiondying declarationocular testimonyreasonable doubtchance witnessescriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentences imposed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court for the murder of two individuals. The core legal question was whether the prosecution’s evidence, primarily comprising dying declarations and ocular testimony, was sufficient to sustain a capital conviction given significant evidentiary inconsistencies. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court identified critical flaws: the absence of blood at the alleged crime scene, medical evidence suggesting the use of two weapons rather than one, the lack of established motive, and the fact that police officials were unaware of the assailant's identity immediately after the incident, contradicting the prosecution's claim of eyewitness identification. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reaffirms the principle that where prosecution evidence is riddled with material contradictions and lacks independent corroboration, it cannot form the basis for a capital conviction, as the benefit of any reasonable doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on dying declarations and ocular testimony when significant physical evidence contradicts the prosecution's version of the crime scene?
  • Does the absence of blood at an alleged crime scene cast doubt on the prosecution's narrative of the occurrence?
  • Is ocular testimony reliable when the witnesses are employees of the complainant and their presence at the scene is unexplained?
  • Should an appellate court set aside a conviction if the prosecution fails to establish a motive and the evidence contains material inconsistencies?
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• Mushtaq Ahmad vs Chief Conservator of Forests, NWFP, Peshawar &K.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 261 · Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmad and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 806 · Lahore High Court · 1977-12-13Read full judgment →
• Mushtao Ahmed Khan And 3 Others vs Province of Punjab, Through District Collector, Vehari1990 CLC 970 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-08Read full judgment →
• Musarrat Bibi vs Liaqat Ali and another1990 P Cr. L J 1570 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-03
  bail cancellationZinaprohibitory clauserapejudicial discretioncriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal revision petition filed by the complainant seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent, who was accused of committing rape under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the trial court exercised its discretion judicially in granting bail despite the existence of incriminating material. The High Court held that the trial court erred in granting bail, noting that the absence of physical marks of violence on the prosecutrix did not negate the allegations, especially given the threat of death and the prosecutrix's age of fourteen. The Court emphasized that the respondent failed to provide a motive for the false implication of the prosecutrix. Furthermore, the trial court failed to consider the statements of two independent witnesses who corroborated the prosecution's version. Consequently, the High Court cancelled the bail, ruling that the offence fell within the prohibitory clause and that the concession of bail was not justified under the circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of physical marks of violence on a victim's body automatically entitle an accused to bail in a rape case?
  • Is the failure of a lower court to consider corroborating witness statements a valid ground for the High Court to cancel bail?
  • Can bail be denied in a case involving the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 if the offence falls within the prohibitory clause?
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• Musa Khan vs Begum Jan and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-11
  limited ownercustomary lawinheritancegift deedres judicatasuccessionalienation of propertyPunjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1948
  Summary & questions settled

  The appeal arose from a dispute over property inherited by a daughter as a limited owner under customary law. The core legal question was whether the enactment of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, transformed her limited interest into full ownership, thereby validating a gift made to her son, or whether her interest remained limited, causing the property to devolve upon the collaterals of the last full owner upon her death. The Supreme Court held that the 1948 Act did not retroactively confer full ownership rights on limited customary holders. Consequently, the female owner remained subject to customary restrictions, and the gift was invalid as she lacked the power to alienate the property beyond her life interest. The Court affirmed that under Section 3 of the Act, the limited interest terminates upon the female's death, and succession opens to the heirs of the last full owner. The principle established is that the 1948 Act does not abrogate customary limitations on property tenure unless specific rights are conferred, and limited owners cannot alienate property without established customary authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, retrospectively convert a limited customary interest into full ownership?
  • Can a female limited owner under customary law validly gift property to her son without proof of a specific custom authorizing such alienation?
  • Upon the death of a female limited owner, does the property devolve upon the heirs of the last full owner under Section 3 of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948?
  • Does a prior judicial finding regarding the nature of property as self-acquired operate as res judicata in subsequent litigation concerning the nature of the estate held by the successor?
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• Mureed vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 470 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-12Read full judgment →
• Murammadali vs Ali Muhammad And Other1990 CLC 1107 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-02Read full judgment →
• Munshi Gumane vs The Commissioner Hyderabad Division atK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 215 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Munshi Bar Kat Ali, Patwari vs Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore and others1990 SCMR 1469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-30
  service tribunaldismissal from servicetemporary embezzlementformal inquirypatwarileave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Patwari, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal. He had been dismissed from service by the Assistant Commissioner on allegations of temporary embezzlement of government dues collected by him, which he failed to deposit in the treasury in a timely manner. His departmental appeals before the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue were unsuccessful. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that his dismissal was illegal because no formal inquiry was conducted during the departmental proceedings. The core legal question was whether the dispensing with a formal inquiry vitiated the dismissal proceedings under the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that in light of the petitioner's own statement and admission before the Naib-Tehsildar and his failure to abide by his undertaking to deposit the recovered amounts, there was sufficient basis for the competent authority to dispense with a formal inquiry. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that a formal departmental inquiry may be dispensed with where the accused's own admissions and uncontroverted conduct provide sufficient evidentiary basis for establishing the charge. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a formal inquiry is mandatory in departmental proceedings when the accused admits to the default?
  • Can the competent authority dispense with a formal inquiry in light of an admission made during a preliminary inquiry?
  • Whether delayed deposit of government dues constitutes temporary embezzlement warranting dismissal?
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• Munir Hussain vs Sardar Muhammad and another1990 MLD 146 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-16Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmed Memon vs Mst. Mumtaz Begum1990 MLD 1689 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-19Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad vs The State and another1990 P Cr. L J 1547 · Lahore High Court · 1974-11-18Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad vs Punjab Service Tribunal and 2 others1990 SCMR 1005 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-25
  service tribunalleave to appealinterpolation in revenue recordquantum of penaltypast service recordfindings of factpatwaridismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by a dismissed Patwari challenging the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed his service appeal. The core legal questions involved whether concurrent findings of fact regarding tampering with revenue records could be interfered with, and whether pending enquiries could be considered while determining the quantum of penalty after establishing guilt. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact based on record examination and handwriting comparison by the Tribunal, confirming concurrent findings of lower authorities, are not open to challenge under Article 212(3). It further held that once a finding of guilty is recorded, past service record and pending enquiries can legitimately be reviewed to determine the appropriate penalty, provided they do not form the basis of the finding of guilt itself. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused, laying down the principle that factual determinations by the Service Tribunal are final and past service records are relevant for sentencing in disciplinary matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can findings of fact recorded by the Service Tribunal regarding tampering with revenue records be challenged in a petition under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Is it permissible to consider pending enquiries or past service records when determining the specific penalty to be imposed after a finding of guilt has been established?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by departmental authorities and the Service Tribunal?
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• Zahoor vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 841 · Sindh High Court · 1988-10-24Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad vs Bara Khan1990 SCMR 973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  landlord and tenantsublettingestoppelRent Restriction Ordinanceejectmentcompetency of application
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside an ejectment order against a respondent. The petitioner, himself a tenant of a plot, had sublet the property to the respondent in violation of his own tenancy agreement. Upon discovering this, the respondent attorned to the original owner. When the petitioner sought the respondent's eviction, the respondent denied the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The High Court held that the petitioner did not meet the statutory definition of 'landlord' under the Rent Restriction Ordinance because he lacked authorization to sublet. The Supreme Court examined whether the estoppel principle under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872, applied. The Court held that while Section 116 generally prevents a tenant from denying a landlord's title, the special definitions within the Rent Restriction Ordinance prevail in proceedings under that special law. Because the petitioner was not authorized to sublet, he did not qualify as a 'landlord' under the Ordinance, rendering the eviction application incompetent. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872 override the specific definitions of 'landlord' and 'tenant' provided in the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Can a tenant who sublets property without authorization maintain an eviction application against the sub-tenant under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Does a person who sublets property in violation of their own tenancy agreement qualify as a 'landlord' under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
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• Munir Ahmad Siddiqui and anothers vs Feroze Ahmed Siddiqui and 21990 MLD 1776 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-15
  banking jurisdictionSpecial Banking Courtouster of jurisdictionexistence of loanplaint returncivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit for declaration, injunction, and cancellation of documents filed by plaintiffs against the defendants, including a banking company, regarding a property transaction. The core legal question was whether the Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the suit or if it was barred by the provisions of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The Court held that the suit was barred under Section 6 of the Ordinance. Although the plaintiffs argued that the suit did not fall within the specific category of a claim by a borrower against a banking company or vice versa, the Court rejected this interpretation. It held that Section 6(4) of the Ordinance explicitly excludes the jurisdiction of Civil Courts not only in suits between borrowers and banks but also regarding any decision concerning the existence or otherwise of a loan. Consequently, the Court ruled that the suit, which sought to challenge the validity of a loan transaction, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Banking Court, and ordered the plaint returned for presentation to the proper forum.

  Questions settled

  • Does the jurisdiction of a Civil Court extend to matters concerning the existence or otherwise of a loan under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  • Is a suit challenging the validity of a loan transaction barred from being heard by a Civil Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the ouster of jurisdiction in Section 6(4) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 apply only to suits filed directly between a borrower and a banking company?
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• Munir Ahmad Khan vs Municipal Corporation LahoreK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Case 224 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-25Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad and others vs State of Rajasthan1990 MLD 1376 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-01-11Read full judgment →
• Municipal Corporation, Faisalabad vs Atta Muhammad and others1990 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-11
  octroi dutyoctroi limitsdefinition of useiron beamstemporary retentionre-exportpermanent injunctionmunicipal taxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arose out of a suit for permanent injunction filed by the respondents against the appellant, Municipal Corporation, Faisalabad. The respondents, who operated powerlooms outside the municipal octroi limits, regularly imported empty iron loom beams into the municipal limits to have cotton yarn re-wrapped onto them at a local mill before re-exporting the wrapped beams back to their looms. The core legal question was whether importing the empty iron beams into municipal limits solely for re-wrapping with yarn and subsequent re-export constituted an import for 'use' within the meaning of the West Pakistan Municipal Committees Octroi Rules, 1964, thereby attracting liability for octroi duty. Reversing the concurrent judgments of the trial court, appellate court, and the High Court, the Supreme Court held that the iron beams were brought into the octroi limits for 'use'. Relying on established precedent, the Court ruled that 'use' denotes utilization, employment, or application for a specific aim or purpose and is not limited to consumption or total transformation; subjecting articles to a processing operation such as re-filling or re-wrapping within municipal limits constitutes 'use' under the rules. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does importing empty iron beams into municipal octroi limits to be wrapped with yarn for subsequent re-export constitute an import for 'use' under the West Pakistan Municipal Committees Octroi Rules, 1964?
  • Whether subjecting imported goods to a processing or re-filling operation within municipal limits deprives the importer of exemption as mere temporary retention for export?
  • Is octroi duty leviable on articles that are repeatedly imported into municipal limits for a specific purpose even if they are not consumed or sold therein?
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• Municipal Committee, Mandi Bahauddin through its Chairman vs The Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division and anothers1990 PLD Lahore 344 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muneer Ahmad vs Director of Education and 2 others1990 PLC (C.S.) 701 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-13Read full judgment →
• Munawar Shah vs The State1990 SCMR 1293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-25
  criminal appealocular evidencemotivemurder convictioneyewitness credibilityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner, Munawar Shah, for the murder of Muhammad Hamayun, which was upheld by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive, that the failure to send medical swabs for chemical examination prejudiced his defense, and that discrepancies regarding the type of firearm used (gun versus Kalashnikov) undermined the credibility of the eyewitnesses. The Supreme Court addressed whether the failure to prove motive or minor discrepancies in witness testimony regarding the weapon type invalidates a conviction supported by strong ocular evidence. The Court held that the failure to prove a suggested motive does not inherently destroy a prosecution case, especially when independent eyewitness testimony is consistent and credible. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the failure to analyze medical swabs was immaterial absent a specific defense theory of an unnatural offense, and that lay witnesses cannot be expected to technically distinguish between firearms. Leave to appeal was refused, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to prove a suggested motive in a murder case automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can discrepancies in the description of a firearm by lay witnesses undermine the credibility of eyewitness testimony?
  • Does the failure to send medical swabs for chemical examination prejudice the defense if the defense does not allege an unnatural offense?
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• Munawar Hussain and 3 others vs Marine Services Ltd.1990 PLC 312 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1988-10-02Read full judgment →
• Munawar Etc. vs The StatePTCL 1990 CL. 1014 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-22Read full judgment →
• Munawar alias Nikka vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1540 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-03Read full judgment →
• Munawar Ali vs Imam Din1990 MLD 72 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-25Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 2055 · Federal Shariat Court · 1989-11-02
  abductioncriminal appealbenefit of doubtabscondenceburden of proofcorroborationOffence of Zina
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for the alleged abduction of the deceased. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the charge of abduction when the primary witnesses were disbelieved by the trial court regarding a co-accused and no independent corroboration existed to link the appellant to the crime. The Federal Shariat Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and acquitting the appellant. The court held that where prosecution witnesses are disbelieved regarding a co-accused, their testimony cannot be relied upon to convict another accused without independent corroboration. Furthermore, the court established that abscondence, in the absence of formal proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, constitutes weak corroboratory evidence and cannot sustain a conviction. The burden of proof remains strictly on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt where the prosecution's case rests on unreliable testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on the testimony of witnesses who have been disbelieved regarding a co-accused without independent corroboration?
  • Is abscondence sufficient to prove guilt in the absence of formal proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused if the prosecution fails to provide independent evidence of the alleged crime?
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• Mumtaz Hussain vs District Magistrate/Deputy Commissioner,1990 P Cr. L J 1784 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-31
  No-Objection Certificatepetrol filling stationpetroleum rulescancellation of NOClocus poenitentiaedistrict magistrateconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition before the Sindh High Court challenged the cancellation of a No-Objection Certificate (N.O.C.) issued for the installation of a petrol filling station. The core legal question was whether a District Magistrate could cancel an N.O.C. once granted and refuse to reconsider the site location after the Federal Government amended the initial sanction due to a minor variation in distance from the highway. The court held that while the District Authority possesses subjective satisfaction under the rules and is not bound to blindly follow federal directives, an N.O.C. once acted upon cannot be arbitrarily cancelled without proper consideration, fair hearing, and adherence to the principles of locus poenitentiae. The court set aside the cancellation order, ruling it to be without lawful authority, and directed the District Magistrate to reconsider the matter afresh after hearing the petitioner and relevant functionaries.

  Questions settled

  • Can a District Magistrate arbitrarily cancel a No-Objection Certificate once it has been issued and acted upon for the installation of a petrol filling station?
  • Whether the rule of locus poenitentiae prevents an authority from withdrawing a decision after it has been carried into effect?
  • Do the words 'subject to control of Central Government' under Rule 131-A of the Petroleum Rules 1937 curtail the discretionary power of a District Magistrate to issue or refuse a No-Objection Certificate under Rule 115(3)?
  • Is a District Magistrate bound to reconsider a site location for a filling station upon a request for amendment by the Federal Government?
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• Mumtaz H. Hadayatullah and 2 others vs Trinity Private School and another1990 MLD 1855 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-14Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz and another vs The State and 2 others1990 SCMR 1197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-17
  criminal petitionmurderenhancement of sentencesudden happeningimprisonment for lifeocular testimonyreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions filed respectively by the convict-petitioner against his conviction for murder and by the complainant for enhancement of sentence. The convict Mumtaz was tried under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ghulam Sarwar committed by firing an unlicensed gun following a dispute over the damaging of a water-course by a tractor. The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death, which the High Court subsequently altered on appeal to imprisonment for life, holding the incident to be a sudden happening. The core legal questions related to the sustainability of the conviction based on ocular testimony and weapon recovery, and whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence to imprisonment for life on the ground of a sudden occurrence. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was well-founded and that the High Court's finding of a sudden happening was neither a result of misreading of evidence nor perverse, declining to interfere with the alternate sentence. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily reappraise evidence to interfere with concurrent findings regarding suddenness of an occurrence where the alternate sentence is within jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's finding that an offence was the result of a sudden happening?
  • Is a single gun shot fired during a sudden dispute sufficient to warrant the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Can the Supreme Court reappraise evidence when the lower court's findings are shown not to be the result of misreading or perversity?
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• Mumtaz Ali Khan vs The State1990 MLD 2374 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-09Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Ali and 5 others vs Assistant Political Agent and another1990 PLD Quetta 51 · Balochistan High Court · 1989-12-04Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Ahmed and 2 others vs The State and anothers1990 PLD Karachi 478 · Sindh High Court · 1990-09-08Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Ahmad and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 189 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-04Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Ahmad and another vs Assistant Commissioner and anothers1990 PLD Supreme Court 1195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-17
  writ jurisdictionexhaustion of remediesMartial Law Regulation 115tenancy evictionIslamic injunctionsrepugnancyrevenue courts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's dismissal of a Constitutional Petition filed by tenants seeking the annulment of pending eviction proceedings. The petitioners contended that the Supreme Court's judgment in Qazilbash Wakf v. Chief Land Commissioner (PLD 1990 SC 99) had declared Paragraph 25(1) of Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972 repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, thereby rendering the eviction proceedings ineffective. The Supreme Court observed that the previous judgment did not strike down the entirety of Paragraph 25(1), but only to the extent that it failed to give sanctity to valid contracts between landlords and tenants. The Court held that the petitioners had prematurely approached the High Court under its writ jurisdiction without exhausting the available remedies within the hierarchy of Revenue Forums. The Court emphasized that complex questions regarding the interaction of repealed provisions with other prevailing laws and the potential conversion of proceedings should first be adjudicated by the appropriate Revenue Courts. Consequently, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioners failed to exhaust statutory remedies, rendering the writ petition premature.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction while proceedings are still pending before a special tribunal or revenue forum?
  • Does the declaration of a legal provision as repugnant to the injunctions of Islam under Article 203-D of the Constitution automatically invalidate the entirety of that provision?
  • Is it necessary for a party to exhaust all available remedies within the hierarchy of revenue forums before approaching the High Court for relief?
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• Mumrez Khan vs Muhammad Hussain and others1990 SCMR 1175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18
  leave to appealintra-court appealland settlementallotment cancellationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 30-11-1985, which dismissed the petitioner's Intra-Court Appeal. The underlying dispute relates to the cancellation and subsequent re-allotment of land originally confirmed in favor of the respondents' father, Ghulam Qadir, under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. After various administrative proceedings and an affidavit by the competing allottee disclaiming the land, the Additional Settlement Commissioner dismissed the respondents' application. However, a learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the respondents' writ petition, setting aside the Additional Settlement Commissioner's order and restoring the land to the respondents. A Division Bench subsequently dismissed the Intra-Court Appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the core legal question of whether the Intra-Court Appeal was competent or not, ordering security for costs and preparation of the appeal on the present record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal was competent against the order of the learned Single Judge passed in the writ petition?
  • Can land cancelled from the name of an allottee be restored pursuant to instructions of the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • What is the effect of an allottee's disavowal of an allotment during settlement proceedings?
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• Mumrez Khan and 2 others vs Commissioner, D.I. Khan Division, D.I.Khan1990 PLC (C.S.) 449 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mumrez Khan and 2 Other. vs Commissioner D.I Khan Division and 2K.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 175 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Multan Cotton Industries vs Khadim Hussain1990 PLC 711 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-06-28Read full judgment →
• Mulla Dur Muhammad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1741 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-09Read full judgment →
• Mulazim Shah vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 431 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-16Read full judgment →
• Mulazim Hussain Shah vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 152 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-16Read full judgment →
• Mulazim Hussain and others vs The State and others1990 P Cr. L J 44 · Sindh High Court · 1989-04-27Read full judgment →
• Mulazim Hussain and 4 others vs Noor Muhammad1990 SCMR 436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-27
  inheritancefindings of factregular second appealfamily settlementleave to appealproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal challenging the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court regarding a dispute over inheritance and property shares between cousins whose fathers were brothers. The core legal question concerns whether interference by the Supreme Court is justified when concurrent findings of fact have been rendered against the petitioners by all lower courts regarding both the inheritance claim based on incurred expenditure and the alleged family settlement or partition. The Supreme Court held that the main controversy stands concluded by concurrent findings of fact, and no point of law justifying interference is involved. The ratio decidendi is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact on inheritance and property disputes where no substantial question of law or justification for leave to appeal is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a property and inheritance dispute?
  • Can a regular second appeal be maintained against concurrent findings of fact regarding inheritance shares?
  • Does an alleged family settlement or partition raise a question of law sufficient to justify leave to appeal when rejected by lower courts?
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• Mukhtar Masih vs Muhammad Rafique Majhetia, Additional District1990 PLD Lahore 393 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-03Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Hussain vs Muhammad Iqbal Khan1990 CLC 1499 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-06Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Hussain vs Director Operation, Punjab Road Transport1990 PLC 687 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Mukhtar Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 555 · Lahore High Court · 1977-12-24Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Ahmad vs The State and 4 others1990 P Cr. L J 744 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-09Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Ahmad vs Giiafoor Ahmad and 3 others1990 PLD Lahore 484 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-08
  habeas corpuscustody of daughterparental authorityvalidity of NikahRukhsatiillegal detentionsui juris
  Summary & questions settled

  This habeas corpus petition was filed for the recovery of an alleged detenue, Mst. Shehzadi, aged 22, who claimed she was being detained by her father against her will and wished to join the petitioner, whom she claimed to have married. The respondents, the father and mother of the detenue, denied the existence of any valid Nikah. The core legal question was whether the Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to set the detenue at liberty and hand her over to the petitioner in the absence of Rukhsati and given the disputed validity of the marriage. The Court held that the detention by the father was neither illegal nor improper, noting that parental restraint, within reasonable limits, is not illegal unless it is patently cruel or unjust. The Court refused to intervene to facilitate a relationship of questionable legal standing or to effect a Rukhsati, emphasizing that the validity of the Nikah must be determined by a competent forum. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and custody was restored to the father.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court exercise its jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to effect a Rukhsati?
  • Is the restraint placed by a father on his daughter, in the absence of cruelty or maltreatment, considered illegal or improper detention?
  • Should a court grant a habeas corpus petition to hand over a daughter to a petitioner when the validity of the alleged Nikah is disputed by the parents?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zuloarnain vs Muhammad Anwar And Other1990 CLC 736 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-21
  election petitionrecounting of votesElection Tribunalconstitutional petitionjudicial reviewprocedure for election petitionssufficiency of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution, challenging an Election Tribunal's order in an election petition. The respondent had challenged the petitioner's election as Member District Council Gujrat, alleging illegalities in vote recounting and requesting a fresh recount. The Tribunal allowed the request based on the respondent's statement and averments in the election petition. The petitioner contended that the Tribunal erred by ordering recounting without overwhelming evidence and by not framing an issue and recording evidence as per the Code of Civil Procedure, citing Rule 8 of the Election Petitions Rules 1979. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal's satisfaction that a recounting request is reasonable, based on positive allegations and cross-examined statements, is sufficient, and overwhelming evidence is not a prerequisite. Furthermore, Rule 8 is merely an enabling provision and does not necessitate converting an election petition into a full-fledged suit trial for a recounting request.

  Questions settled

  • Is overwhelming evidence required for an Election Tribunal to order a recounting of votes?
  • Can an Election Tribunal order recounting based on a respondent's statement and averments in an election petition?
  • Does Rule 8 of the Election Petitions Rules 1979 mandate converting an election petition into a full-fledged suit trial for disposing of a recounting request?
  • What is the standard for an Election Tribunal's satisfaction when considering a request for recounting?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zubair vs The Commissioner, Lahore Division and others1990 SCMR 1254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  service promotionzila councilsubordinate services rulesfactual controversyremandconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the promotion to the post of Assistant Superintendent Vaccination in Zila Council Kasur. The core legal question was whether the West Pakistan Health Department Vaccination Subordinate Services Rules, 1968 or the West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committees Services Rules, 1963 governed the parties. Counsel for both parties conceded that the 1968 Rules had not been adopted by the concerned Zilla Council, rendering the 1963 Rules applicable. However, the Supreme Court found an unresolved factual controversy regarding whether the appointment constituted a promotion from a lower to a higher grade or a transfer between classes in the same grade. The Court held that the material on record was insufficient to determine this factual issue. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court and the Commissioner, and remanded the case to the Commissioner for a fresh decision in accordance with the applicable law. The key principle laid down is that unadopted subordinate rules do not govern local council service matters, and unresolved factual controversies regarding promotions necessitate a remand to the competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Do the West Pakistan Health Department Vaccination Subordinate Services Rules, 1968 govern employees of a Zilla Council without formal adoption?
  • What is the proper course of action when the record lacks sufficient material to resolve a factual controversy regarding promotion versus transfer?
  • Whether the Commissioner as an appellate authority correctly applied the 1968 Rules instead of the 1963 Rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zechariah and others vs The Government of Sindh through Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, Karachi East and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 704 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman vs Pir Muhammad Yunus Shah And 6 Other1990 CLC 155 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-11-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman vs Mst. Sardar Begum1990 SCMR 990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-15
  ejectmentrent defaultconcurrent findings of facttenancy disputesublettingleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal filed by a tenant against concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Lahore High Court, which ordered his ejectment from a shop and a residential flat. The core legal questions involved whether the tenant had committed default in the payment of rent and whether the unauthorized conversion and subletting of the residential premises justified eviction. The Rent Controller found that the tenant failed to pay the agreed rent and breached the terms of the tenancy, leading to eviction orders. The High Court upheld these findings, noting the tenant's failure to prove payment or obtain court permission to deposit rent. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the matter was concluded by concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts. The Court affirmed that where a tenant fails to pay rent as agreed and fails to produce evidence of payment or valid deposit, the finding of default is legally sound. The judgment reinforces the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts, absent legal defects, are generally not disturbed in appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's failure to produce evidence of rent payment or court-authorized deposit constitute default justifying ejectment?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in rent control matters?
  • Does the unauthorized conversion of a residential flat into an office and subsequent subletting constitute valid grounds for eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaki vs The State1990 MLD 249 · Lahore High Court · 1989-01-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zakaria Khan vs The Secretary, Establishment Division and 23 others1990 PLC (C.S.) 45 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1989-06-03
  service lawseniorityregularizationsurplus staffCivil Servants Act 1973retrospective effectdepartmental promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an Assistant in the Establishment Division, challenged his seniority ranking, claiming his service from 14-9-1976 in the erstwhile Ministry of Agrarian Management should be counted. The core legal questions concerned the reckonability of prior service upon absorption and the effective date of seniority for respondents whose appointments were regularized retrospectively. The Tribunal held that the appellant’s prior service must be counted for seniority purposes, as he was absorbed without a break. Regarding the respondents, the Tribunal determined that their regularization, despite being formalized later, related back to their original dates of appointment, as administrative delays in processing regularization should not prejudice the employees. The key principle laid down is that surplus staff transferred to another department in the same grade are entitled to count their past service towards seniority. Furthermore, where regularization is granted based on satisfactory service, the seniority of the employee is to be reckoned from the date of their initial appointment or promotion, rather than the date of the formal regularization order.

  Questions settled

  • Is service rendered by a government servant in a ministry that was subsequently disbanded reckonable for seniority purposes upon their absorption into another department?
  • Does the regularization of an irregular appointment, granted after a delay, relate back to the date of the initial appointment for the purpose of determining seniority?
  • Can an employee be denied seniority credit for prior service simply because the formal regularization order was issued at a later date?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yunis and others vs Riffat Hayat and others1990 MLD 120 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousif and another vs Province of Sindh and others1990 SCMR 922 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-20
  civil suit maintainabilitysettlement authorityland allotment cancellationrepealed statutesleave to appealadministrative orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment which held that a civil suit challenging an order of a Settlement Authority was not maintainable. The petitioners had filed a suit for declaration and injunction, contending that the Settlement Authority's order cancelling their land allotment was void because it was issued after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's finding regarding the non-maintainability of the suit was prima facie unsustainable, citing established precedents which suggest that such challenges are cognizable by civil courts. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, confirmed the existing interim order, and directed that the appeal be prepared on the current record with liberty for parties to submit additional documents. The core principle affirmed is that civil courts retain jurisdiction to examine the validity of administrative orders passed by authorities under repealed statutes when such orders are challenged as void.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit maintainable to challenge an order passed by a Settlement Authority after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Does the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, oust the jurisdiction of civil courts to declare orders passed thereunder as void?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs The State1990 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-30
  public servantanti-corruptioncriminal misappropriationjurisdiction of special judgeacquittal applicationevidentiary trialAfghan Refugees Organization
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner’s application for acquittal under sections 249-A and 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, charged under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, contended he was not a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and thus not triable by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption. The lower courts relied on certificates to determine his status. The Supreme Court observed that such status is a mixed question of law and fact that cannot be conclusively determined based solely on certificates produced by the parties. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and directed the Special Judge to decide the issue of the petitioner's status as a public servant during the trial, after affording both parties a full opportunity to lead evidence. This ensures that the jurisdictional question is resolved through a proper evidentiary process rather than summary determination.

  Questions settled

  • Can the status of an accused as a public servant be determined solely on the basis of certificates without a full trial?
  • Is an employee of the Afghan Refugees Organization a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Should the question of jurisdiction based on the definition of a public servant be decided during the trial after evidence is led?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs Pakistan Ordnance Factories and another1990 SCMR 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-17
  service tribunalback benefitsreinstatementcivil servantdismissal from serviceefficiency and discipline rulesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Service Tribunal which had set aside his dismissal from service on technical grounds while denying him back benefits and granting liberty to the department to hold a fresh inquiry. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in denying back benefits entirely upon setting aside a dismissal order on technical grounds when charges were not quashed. The Supreme Court held that since the dismissal order was set aside on technical grounds without quashing the charges, the Tribunal could properly defer regulating remuneration until the final disposal of the matter by the competent authority. The key principle laid down is that where a civil servant is reinstated due to procedural defects without the charges being quashed, the competent authority determines back benefits upon the final conclusion of the inquiry, and the Tribunal may lawfully withhold back benefits for the interim period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal can deny back benefits in entirety when setting aside a dismissal order on technical grounds without quashing the charges?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal take into consideration subsequent orders passed by the competent authority that were not before the Service Tribunal?
  • At what stage does the rule regarding remuneration of a reinstated civil servant get attracted under the civil service laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs Muhammad Bashir and others1990 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-05
  rent restrictionstriking off defencedeposit of rentrent controllerstatutory defaultleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant whose defence was struck off by the Rent Controller for failure to comply with a direction to deposit rent under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The petitioner challenged the High Court's dismissal of his writ petition, arguing that the one-day delay in depositing the rent for March 1986 was caused by unavoidable circumstances, specifically his father's illness, and that a single instance of delay should not warrant the striking off of his defence. The Supreme Court addressed the legal question of whether the Rent Controller possesses discretion to condone a default in depositing rent as ordered under Section 13(6). The Court held that the Rent Controller lacks the discretion to condone such defaults, distinguishing this specific statutory obligation from other rent payment provisions. Consequently, the Court refused the leave to appeal, affirming that the failure to comply with the deposit order is a strict liability matter, and found no merit in the petitioner's plea regarding mitigating circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the discretion to condone a default in the deposit of rent under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Is a delay of one day in depositing rent under a Rent Controller's order sufficient to justify striking off a tenant's defence?
  • Are compelling personal circumstances a valid legal ground to excuse a failure to comply with a rent deposit order under Section 13(6)?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs Mst. Sharifan and another1990 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  petition for leave to appealremandsettlement authoritiesland allotmentfindings of factwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court Bahawalpur Bench, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging the orders of the settlement authorities. The core legal question concerns whether the Settlement Commissioner decided the case in accordance with the terms of remand previously laid down by the High Court regarding the allotment of disputed land measuring 40 kanals. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner substantially complied with the terms of remand and that the respondent had a superior right to the allotment as she was not allotted any other land. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact concurrently recorded by the High Court and settlement authorities regarding the compliance of remand terms will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court when supported by the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner passed orders in accordance with the terms of remand?
  • Does a party have a superior right to land allotment if no other land was previously allotted to them?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the compliance of remand terms?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf Qureshi vs The Province of Punjab and others1990 SCMR 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-23
  departmental inquirydismissal from servicenatural justiceright to be heardservice lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal filed by a former Stamper in the District Treasury Office, Lahore, against the dismissal of his service following a significant financial defalcation. The petitioner challenged his dismissal, arguing that the departmental inquiry proceedings were conducted without his participation, thereby denying him a fair opportunity to defend himself. He contended that the Deputy Commissioner's reliance on the findings of an inquiry officer, to which the petitioner was not a party, violated fundamental principles of natural justice. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an order of dismissal based on inquiry proceedings conducted in the absence of the accused employee constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice. Upon examination of the contention, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine the validity of the dismissal order. The Court recognized the necessity of examining whether the departmental process adhered to due process requirements, specifically the right to be heard and the right to defend oneself against allegations leading to termination of employment.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of dismissal based on inquiry findings where the accused was not a party violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Is an employee entitled to defend themselves in departmental inquiry proceedings before a dismissal order can be passed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1390 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younus vs Karachi Transport Corporation and others1990 PLC 529 · Labour Court · 1989-12-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younus Khan and anothers vs Settlement Commissioner, Karachi and 3 others1990 SCMR 1164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-03
  evacuee propertyearmarkingtransfer of propertyconstitutional petitionres judicatasettlement lawsverified claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal concerning the entitlement to transfer of an evacuee property previously placed in earmarking and transferred to respondent No. 4. The core legal questions involved whether the appellants had a preferential right to the property as claimant occupants and whether previous adjudications regarding the non-filing of the C.H. Form and the nature of the property as a non-trust property operated as a bar. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the prior findings of the High Court in earlier writ proceedings were conclusive and that the appellants' claims regarding priority and the status of the property stood finally settled against them. The Court laid down that questions of fact and entitlement conclusively determined in earlier rounds of litigation between the same parties cannot be reopened or re-litigated through subsequent collateral proceedings in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether findings of fact recorded in earlier writ proceedings operate as a bar to re-agitating the same questions in subsequent litigation?
  • Can claimant occupants reopen the issue of preferential entitlement to an evacuee property after the issuance of a Provisional Transfer Order to another transferee?
  • Does an unsuccessful challenge to the transfer of an evacuee property in earlier rounds of litigation preclude a subsequent collateral challenge?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younus and others vs Muneer Ahmad and others1990 SCMR 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-04
  leave to appealcriminal revisionprivate complaintdismissal of complaintadditional sessions judgeinherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a criminal revision against an order of the Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerns the competency of a revision petition filed under Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against an order of a Magistrate dismissing a private complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether such an order is revisable under Section 436 or Section 439-A of the Code. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the powers of the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court merit detailed examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, stayed the proceedings before the trial court, and set the appeal for hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order dismissing a private complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is revisable under Section 436 or Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an Additional Sessions Judge direct a Magistrate to make a further probe into a matter upon setting aside an order of dismissal?
  • Whether the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a revision is barred as a second revision?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younas vs Secretary Education, Government of Punjab1990 CLC 825 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younas and another vs The State and others1990 SCMR 1272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-30
  murderocular evidencemedical evidenceinterested witnessacquittalleave to appeallalkara
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered two petitions for leave to appeal: one by the convict Muhammad Younas against his conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and another by the complainant Abdul Rehman against the acquittal of two co-accused. The prosecution alleged that the convict shot the deceased to avenge a previous murder, while the co-accused merely fired in the air and raised a 'Lalkara'. The convict argued that the eye-witnesses were interested relatives and that medical evidence conflicted with ocular testimony regarding the number of gunshots. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions. It held that the presence of the eye-witnesses was established and minor discrepancies in time did not invalidate their testimony. Furthermore, the Court ruled that ocular evidence accepted by the courts is not automatically overridden by conflicting medical expert opinions. The acquittal of the co-accused was upheld as their roles were distinguishable and lacked corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eye-witnesses must be discarded solely because they are related to the deceased?
  • Does medical expert evidence automatically override credible ocular testimony in case of a conflict?
  • Do minor discrepancies in the witnesses' estimation of the time of occurrence invalidate their testimony?
  • Can the acquittal of co-accused be maintained if their roles are distinguishable from the principal accused and lack corroborative evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• N/A vs State Bank of Pakistan1990 PLD Karachi 332 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-14
  official liquidatorwinding upmala fide transferbanking company liquidationfraudulent preferencesubsidiary company
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an objection filed by Mst. Samina Akhtar against the Official Liquidator’s report regarding the sale of property (Room No. 411, Sunny Plaza) by Syed Mohsin Ali Naqvi, a director/manager of M/s. Allied Syndicate, which was undergoing liquidation. The core legal question was whether the property transfer, occurring after the commencement of liquidation proceedings and the publication of a declaration under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, was valid. The Court held that the transaction was mala fide and void, as the property belonged to a subsidiary of the company in liquidation and the transfer was executed to defraud creditors. The Court affirmed that under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, any transaction involving the property of a company or its subsidiary after the publication of a declaration of insolvency is void. Furthermore, the Court established that property transferred within two years of the commencement of liquidation proceedings, without good faith and sufficient consideration, is subject to attachment and restoration for the benefit of creditors, rendering the applicant's claim invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Is a property transfer made by a director of a company in liquidation void if it occurs after the commencement of liquidation proceedings?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to attach property transferred by a director of a banking company within two years of the commencement of winding-up proceedings?
  • Can a property transfer be declared void if the Court is satisfied that the transfer was made without good faith and sufficient consideration?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin vs Abdul Majid Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Revenue Cases 125 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin and others vs Khan Muhammad and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 1060 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-07-18
  pre-emptionsuo motu reviewshariat appellate benchrepugnancy to injunctions of islamabatement of suitssupreme court rulesconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns the true effect, scope, and legal validity of the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgments regarding the repugnancy of sections 15 and 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, to the Injunctions of Islam, specifically following its suo motu review. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent clarification and interpretation rendered by the Shariat Appellate Bench in its suo motu review hold the field, superseding earlier conflicting interpretations by larger benches, and that sections 15 and 30 ceased to have legal effect from 31-7-1986, thereby abating pending pre-emption suits lacking pre-existing decrees. The key principles laid down are that the Shariat Appellate Bench has inherent jurisdiction to clarify, explain, or review its judgments suo motu, and such suo motu reviews are not barred by restrictions applicable to second private review applications under the Supreme Court Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judgment delivered by the Shariat Appellate Bench in suo motu review override earlier interpretations rendered by larger Benches of the Supreme Court?
  • Is the Shariat Appellate Bench empowered to explain, clarify, or review its own previous orders?
  • Does Rule 9 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, bar the Supreme Court or its Shariat Appellate Bench from undertaking a suo motu review after a prior review application has been disposed of?
  • What is the legal effect of the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgment on sections 15 and 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, with effect from 31-7-1986?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaseen and 4 others vs Abdullah Niazi1990 MLD 2287 · Sindh High Court · 1990-06-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar vs Superintendent of Police and 2 others1990 SCMR 1442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-30
  service appeallimitationtime-barreddismissal from servicecivil servantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 8-7-1987, which had dismissed his service appeal against dismissal as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal correctly dismissed the appeal as barred by time without any application for extension of the limitation period. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal passed a correct order on the question of law and no further question of law arose for examination. The key principle laid down is that an appeal filed before the Service Tribunal beyond the prescribed period of limitation, without any formal application for claiming an extension of time, is rightly dismissed as time-barred, and incompetent departmental remedies do not extend the period of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is liable to be dismissed if filed beyond the period of limitation without an application for extension of time?
  • Does the pursuit of an incompetent second departmental appeal extend the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar and others vs Additional Chief Land Commissioner and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-15
  non-prosecutionrestoration of petitionAdvocate-on-Recordduty of counseldismissal for defaultprofessional negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a miscellaneous application filed for the restoration of a Civil Review Petition that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioners sought restoration, citing the absence of their counsel due to a lack of telephonic communication at his office in Multan. The Supreme Court examined the circumstances surrounding the dismissal, noting that neither the petitioners, the Advocate-on-Record (A.O.R.), nor the Advocate were present on the date of the hearing. The Court held that the absence of the A.O.R. and the Advocate, which hindered the progress of the proceedings, constituted non-prosecution. The Court rejected the argument that the lack of a telephone connection excused the counsel's absence, emphasizing that lawyers practicing before the Supreme Court must ensure they have adequate arrangements to remain informed of case progress. The Court affirmed that non-prosecution includes any act of omission or commission that thwarts the progress of a hearing. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for restoration, finding the grounds offered insufficient to justify the failure to prosecute the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of an Advocate-on-Record and an Advocate constitute non-prosecution of a case?
  • Can a lack of telephonic communication be accepted as a valid ground for the restoration of a petition dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • What constitutes non-prosecution in the context of Supreme Court proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar and 2 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 360 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1487 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob vs The Punjab Labour Court No. 1 and 5 others--1990 SCMR 1539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-01
  work-charge establishmentpermanent workmantermination of servicelabour disputeconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had declined to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with an appellate court's decision reversing a Labour Court's order. The petitioner, employed as a Mate Mali on a work-charge basis for eight years by the Lahore Development Authority, challenged his oral termination. The core legal question was whether the length of employment on a work-charge basis automatically qualifies an employee as a permanent workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan refused leave to appeal, holding that a permanent workman is defined by reference to the nature of the work on which he is engaged, rather than the duration of his employment. The Court laid down the principle that if the underlying work is not of a permanent nature, an employee cannot be classified as a permanent workman, regardless of how long the period of employment may have lasted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the length of employment by itself determine whether an employee is a permanent workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance?
  • Can a work-charge employee be classified as a permanent workman if the nature of the work they are engaged in is not of a permanent character?
  • Whether an oral termination of a work-charge employee can be successfully challenged as a permanent workman solely based on eight years of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob vs Messrs Atlas Autos Ltd.1990 PLC 555 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1987-12-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 905 · Lahore High Court · 1989-03-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaq00b vs The State1990 SCMR 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-30
  bail pending trialmurderself-defenceprejudice to trialassessment of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the Baluchistan High Court's dismissal of a bail application in a murder case involving charges under Sections 302 and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, accused of murdering a traffic sergeant, sought bail on the grounds of self-defence. The High Court rejected the bail application, noting that six eyewitnesses supported the prosecution's version and that there was no evidence of a lethal weapon in the deceased's possession, while simultaneously acknowledging that a deeper assessment of evidence at the bail stage would be premature and could prejudice the trial court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner requested clarification that the High Court's observations would not prejudice the trial court's eventual determination of the case. The Supreme Court held that such clarification was unnecessary, as the High Court's observations were clearly not intended to influence the merits of the trial, and the High Court had correctly recognized its own limitations regarding the assessment of evidence at the bail stage. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Does an observation by a High Court regarding evidence at the bail stage bind or prejudice the trial court?
  • Is it appropriate for a High Court to conduct a detailed assessment of evidence during bail proceedings?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed as withdrawn if the petitioner seeks clarification on observations made by the lower court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yameenullah Per Vez Malik vs Mrs. Syeda Habiba Rizvi1990 MLD 2356 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yakoob vs Saleem Akhtar1990 SCMR 745 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-08
  ejectmentpersonal and bona fide requirementreappraisal of evidencefinding of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court, which had reversed the Rent Controller's findings and ordered the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement of the disputed premises by the respondent-landlord. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in reversing the factual finding of the Rent Controller regarding personal bona fide need upon reappraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the finding recorded by the High Court on the issue of personal requirement was based on a reappraisal of evidence and constituted a pure finding of fact, raising no question of law. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact rendered by the High Court on the question of personal requirement based on evidence do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of any substantial question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding on the issue of personal requirement of premises based on a reappraisal of evidence constitute a question of fact?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's factual finding regarding personal bona fide requirement when no question of law arises?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yahya Bajwa and 14 others vs Messrs Pakistan Steel1990 PLC 148 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-09-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Wasim Warsi and others vs Shamsuddin Shah and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service tribunalpromotion quotaseniority listcustoms departmentdepartmental promotion committeecivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from leave granted under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to examine whether the Service Tribunal correctly set aside the promotion of the appellants by reference to an outdated seniority list. The core legal question concerned the validity of selections made by the Departmental Promotion Committee based on a functional quota policy across multiple wings of the Customs Department, as opposed to a unified seniority list. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred by failing to examine the Departmental Promotion Committee's record, by invalidating matters not under challenge, and by ignoring the established policy of quota-based promotions across different departmental wings. The Court laid down the principle that promotion quotas determined on the basis of sanctioned cadre strength and approved by competent authorities take precedence over general or outdated combined seniority lists, and that service tribunals cannot substitute lawful administrative promotion policies with abstract notions of equity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Service Tribunal can set aside departmental promotions without examining the record of the Departmental Promotion Committee?
  • Does a combined seniority list override a functional quota policy adopted for promotions across different wings of a department?
  • Can a Service Tribunal invalidate past promotion and seniority orders that were not challenged in the appeal before it?
  • Whether equitable considerations can transcend applicable administrative rules and promotion policies in civil service matters?
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• Muhammad Warts alias Kuk vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 700 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad vs Allah Ditta1990 CLC 765 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-01-18
  pre-emptionright of prior purchasecompromise decreelimitationpleadingsco-sharercollateral
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts decreeing a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent against a compromise decree. The core legal questions involved whether the pre-emptor adequately pleaded his right of prior purchase based on being a co-sharer and collateral, and whether the suit was barred by limitation when challenged years after the compromise decree. The High Court held that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his relationship as a collateral by describing himself as 'yak jaddi' of the vendor, and that oral testimony establishing the common ancestor went unchallenged. On limitation, the Court held that the transaction, though couched as a compromise decree, was in substance an oral sale, and the right to sue accrued from the date of the decree. Consequently, the suit was within time under Section 29 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act and Article 120 of the Limitation Act. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor must specifically state the grounds constituting the right of prior purchase in the pleadings?
  • Does a compromise decree amounting to a sale give rise to a right of pre-emption?
  • When does the limitation period commence for filing a pre-emption suit against a transaction effected through a compromise decree?
  • What is the applicable article of limitation for a pre-emption suit not covered by specific provisions of the Limitation Act or the Right of Prior Purchase Act?
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• Muhammad Usman vs Mushtaq Ahmad and others1990 P Cr. L J 567 · Sindh High Court · 1981-11-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Usman vs Meer Khurshid and others1990 P Cr. L J 609 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Uris vs The State1990 MLD 1583 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-18
  criminal breach of trustquashment of proceedingsmens reainherent jurisdictionabuse of processpolice negligencecase property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal applications filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the quashment of proceedings against a former Station House Officer accused of criminal breach of trust under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the failure to enter seized case properties into the police register, absent evidence of dishonest misappropriation, constitutes a criminal offence. The High Court held that the proceedings must be quashed, reasoning that the essential element of mens rea was absent. The applicant had merely been negligent in record-keeping, and the case properties were eventually returned. The court emphasized that criminal breach of trust requires proof of dishonest misappropriation or conversion, not merely administrative oversight. Consequently, the court established the principle that where allegations, even if accepted at face value, fail to constitute the essential ingredients of the charged offence, the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 should be exercised to prevent the abuse of the court's process and unnecessary harassment of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to enter case properties in a police register automatically constitute criminal breach of trust?
  • Can the High Court exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings before the trial court has decided an application under Section 249-A?
  • Is mens rea an essential ingredient for the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Muhammad Umar Mtrza vs Waris Iqbal and others1990 SCMR 964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18
  documentary evidencelate production of documentsOrder XIII Rule 2 CPCcivil procedureprejudice to partyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a suit for possession of properties and cancellation of a partition deed, where the petitioner sought leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of his revision petition. The trial court had refused to allow the petitioner to introduce approximately eighty documents into evidence at the stage of recording his evidence, on the ground that the documents were neither produced nor relied upon earlier, and their late introduction would prejudice the respondents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined Order XIII, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, which bars the subsequent production of documentary evidence unless satisfactory cause is shown for its non-production at the first hearing. The Court held that while the rule is to be construed liberally, the petitioner failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Furthermore, the trial court's finding of prejudice to the opposite party justified the exclusion. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not act arbitrarily or violate any legal principle, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can documentary evidence in the possession of a party be received at a subsequent stage of a suit if it was not produced at the first hearing?
  • What constitutes sufficient cause under Order XIII, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code for the late production of documents?
  • Does the potential prejudice to the opposing party justify a trial court's refusal to admit late-filed documents under the Civil Procedure Code?
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