Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Manzur Ahmed and 7 others vs Abdul Khalid and 2 others1990 SCMR 1677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-18
  inheritanceMuslim Family Laws Ordinancerejection of plaintretrospectivityevacuee propertygrand-children inheritancecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the rejection of the appellants' plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appellants, grandchildren of a deceased displaced person, claimed inheritance rights in property, which were denied by lower courts on the premise that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, specifically Section 4, was not retrospective and thus inapplicable to the succession of their grandfather who died in 1950. The core legal questions involved the potential retrospective application of the 1961 Ordinance, the broader Islamic law implications regarding inheritance by grandchildren, and whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action sufficient to avoid summary rejection. The Supreme Court held that the matter involved complex questions of law and public importance regarding inheritance rights that required a full-fledged trial rather than summary dismissal. Consequently, the Court set aside the rejection of the plaint, remanding the case to the trial court for a full trial on all issues, directing that the previous judgments should not influence the fresh proceedings, thereby ensuring the parties receive a comprehensive adjudication on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaint can be summarily rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the case involves complex questions of law regarding inheritance?
  • Does Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 have retrospective effect regarding the inheritance rights of grandchildren?
  • Is the question of whether grandchildren inherit from a grandfather a matter that requires a full trial rather than summary dismissal?
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• Manzoor Hussain vs The State1990 SCMR 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-21
  criminal appealconvictionevidence reappraisementidentity of accusedmedical evidenceHudood lawsbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction under Section 10(3) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and Section 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant, having already served his term of imprisonment, challenged the remaining sentence of thirty stripes. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained given the evidentiary weaknesses in the prosecution's case. Upon reappraising the evidence, the Supreme Court noted significant contradictions: the prosecutrix admitted an inability to identify the appellant at the time of the occurrence, relying instead on a tracker's identification of footprints. Furthermore, the prosecutrix admitted to a subsisting enmity between the appellant and her maternal uncle, and her claims of receiving extensive injuries were contradicted by medical evidence. Finding the prosecution's case inherently doubtful, the Court held that the conviction could not be maintained. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the requirement to undergo the sentence of stripes was rendered moot as the appellant had already been released.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of medical evidence corroborating alleged injuries undermine the credibility of a prosecutrix's testimony in a Zina case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecutrix admits an inability to identify the accused at the time of the occurrence?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution's case relies on disputed footprint identification and admits to a motive of enmity?
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• Manzoor Hussain vs Punjab Service Tribunal and 2 others1990 SCMR 1488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-25
  departmental inquirydispensing with inquiryauthorised officerremoval from serviceservice tribunalcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Manzoor Hussain against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had upheld his removal from service. The petitioner, serving as a Registration Muharrir and Reader to Tehsildar, was proceeded against departmentally following an inspection report by the Inspector-General of Registration highlighting serious deficiencies in his work. The Deputy Commissioner served a charge-sheet, but the authorised officer subsequently dispensed with a formal inquiry and issued a show-cause notice, ultimately leading to the petitioner's removal from service by the Deputy Commissioner. The core legal question was whether dispensing with a formal inquiry after the issuance of a charge-sheet rendered the departmental proceedings illegal, and whether the authorised officer was competent to do so. The Supreme Court held that under Rule 6(2) of the applicable disciplinary rules, the authorised officer had the discretion to decide whether a formal inquiry was necessary, and given that the allegations were based on official records, the decision was not arbitrary. The petition was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an authorised officer can dispense with a formal inquiry after a charge-sheet has been served under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules?
  • Can the decision of an authorised officer to dispense with a formal inquiry be challenged as arbitrary when the charges are based on office records?
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• Manzoor Hussain vs Muhammad Ali and another1990 MLD 1227 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-13Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Anwar Khan and 2 others1990 SCMR 971 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-18
  pre-emptionreview petitioncontiguityownership rightspleading amendmentcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two review petitions arising from the dismissal of civil petitions related to pre-emption suits. The initial dismissal was based on the premise that, pursuant to the Supreme Court's judgment in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah, the absence of a decree by 31st July 1986 barred further consideration of the claims. The petitioners sought review of this order, relying on the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz, which clarified that where ownership in a Patti or estate is coupled with contiguity, such ownership remains a valid ground for pre-emption, and parties should be allowed to amend pleadings to adjudicate this fact. The Court held that the petitioners' position was prima facie supported by the reasoning in Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz. Consequently, the Court condoned the delay, admitted the review petitions for regular hearing, and directed that the matters be heard alongside other similar cases, while noting that the Shariat Appellate Bench was concurrently re-examining the foundational issues established in the Malik Said Kamal Shah case.

  Questions settled

  • Does ownership in a Patti or estate coupled with contiguity constitute a valid ground for pre-emption?
  • Should parties be permitted to amend their pleadings to adjudicate the factual question of ownership coupled with contiguity in pre-emption cases?
  • Does the judgment in Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz provide grounds for reviewing prior dismissals based on the Malik Said Kamal Shah precedent?
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• Manzoor Hussain vs Allah Ditta1990 MLD 743 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-29Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain Khan vs Mst. Asia Begum And 21 Other1990 CLC 1014 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-06
  specific performanceagreement to sellburden of proofbest evidence rulecivil revisionadverse inferenceexecution of document
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 18-11-1975, which was dismissed by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff had sufficiently proved the execution of the disputed agreement to sell (Ext. P1) to entitle him to relief. The High Court held that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof, noting that the marginal witnesses to the agreement were not produced, and the plaintiff’s reliance on the deed writer’s testimony was insufficient. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, emphasizing that a document does not prove itself and, when denied, must be proved in accordance with the law of evidence. The key principle laid down is that the "best evidence" rule applies in civil litigation; where a party withholds available witnesses, such as marginal witnesses to a deed, the court may draw adverse inferences. Furthermore, a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of their own case rather than the weakness of the defense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce marginal witnesses to a disputed agreement to sell justify an adverse inference against the party relying on the document?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to specific performance if they fail to prove the execution of the underlying agreement to sell?
  • Does the rule of best evidence require a party to produce available witnesses to prove the execution of a document?
  • Can a plaintiff succeed in a suit for specific performance based on the weakness of the defendant's case?
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• Manzoor Ahmad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1990 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-10Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs Syed Mushtaq Ahmad and another1990 PLD Lahore 390 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-15
  rejection of plaintcertified copy of decreeappellate procedurecivil revisionremand of suitdispensation of certified copy
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arose from a suit for permanent injunction where the trial court rejected the plaintiff's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The plaintiff appealed this rejection to the Additional District Judge, who accepted the appeal and remanded the case. The defendant challenged this remand in revision, arguing the appeal was not properly constituted because it lacked certified copies of the trial court's judgment and decree. The core legal questions were whether an appeal against the rejection of a plaint requires a certified copy of the decree, and whether an appellate court can impliedly dispense with the requirement of filing a certified copy of the judgment. The High Court held that in cases involving the rejection of a plaint, filing a certified copy of the decree is not mandatory. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an appellate court may impliedly dispense with the requirement of filing a certified copy of the judgment by admitting the appeal to a regular hearing and granting interim relief.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to file a certified copy of the decree when filing an appeal against the rejection of a plaint?
  • Can an appellate court impliedly dispense with the requirement of filing a certified copy of the trial court's judgment?
  • Does the admission of an appeal to a regular hearing and the granting of interim relief constitute an implied dispensation of filing a certified copy of the judgment?
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• Manzoor Ahmad vs S.S.P. EtcK.L.R 1990 Labour & Service Cases 201 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-19Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs S.S.P. and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 362 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-19Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs Muhammad Afzal, Branch Manager, M/s. Brooke1990 PLC 444 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-05-23Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad and another vs Sardar and 6 others1990 MLD 1744 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-20Read full judgment →
• Mansoor Azhar Farooqi vs Province of Punjab Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 34 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-29Read full judgment →
• Mansoor Azhar Farooqi vs Province of Punjab and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 350 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-29Read full judgment →
• Mansab Khan and another vs The State1990 MLD 632 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-17Read full judgment →
• Manoo Gul And Other. vs Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1990 CL. 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-17
  customs seizureshow-cause noticeservice of noticesmugglingconfiscation of goodslimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from the confiscation of a truck and goods of foreign origin by customs authorities under the Customs Act, 1969, after they were intercepted for suspected smuggling. The core legal question was whether the requirement under section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, to 'give' a show-cause notice within two months means the notice must be issued by the authorities or actually served upon and received by the owner within that timeframe. The Supreme Court held that the issuance and sending of the show-cause notice by registered post within the stipulated two-month period constitutes sufficient compliance under the Act, and its effectiveness is not contingent upon actual physical delivery or receipt by the addressee within that period. The Court laid down that under the self-contained mechanism of section 215 of the Customs Act, 1969, a notice is duly given when dispatched by registered post, preventing owners from frustrating confiscation proceedings by evading service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the words 'give notice' under section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, mean the issuance of notice or its actual receipt by the addressee within the statutory period?
  • Does section 27 of the General Clauses Act apply to determine the time of service when the Customs Act, 1969, provides its own self-sufficient mechanism for serving notices under section 215?
  • Does the failure to send a show-cause notice by registered post with acknowledgement due vitiate the service of notice where the addressee actually receives it and participates in the proceedings?
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• Manna N Gul and 4 others vs Messrs Sanaullah Woollen Mills Ltd.,1990 PLC 130 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-08-30Read full judgment →
• Managing Director, Messrs Allwin Engineering Industries Ltd. vs Jumer Din1990 PLC 767 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-10-09Read full judgment →
• Managing Director, Mechanized Construction of Pakistan vs Sind1990 PLC 595 · Sindh High Court · 1988-11-29Read full judgment →
• Managing Director, Lyallpur Cotton Mills, Faisalabad vs Labour1990 PLC 514 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-04
  grievance petitioncondonation of delaylimitation actwithdrawal of petitionmemorandum of appealindustrial relations ordinanceretrenchmentclosure of business
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged orders passed by the Punjab Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal which had allowed a retrenched employee's grievance petition and dismissed the employer's appeal. The core legal questions involved whether the delay in filing the second grievance petition after the voluntary withdrawal of the first could be condoned under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908, whether a memorandum of appeal filed under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1968 is incompetent if not signed personally by the appellant, and whether an employer has the exclusive right to close a business section. The Lahore High Court held that section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 does not apply to voluntarily withdrawn suits or petitions under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, that a memorandum of appeal under section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1968 does not strictly require the appellant's personal signature if signed by a duly authorized pleader, and that an employer has the absolute discretion to run or close a business section. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside and the employee's grievance petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to a case where a petition is voluntarily withdrawn under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is an appeal under section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 incompetent if the memorandum of appeal is signed only by the counsel and not personally by the appellant?
  • Can an employer be compelled to keep a business section running when the employer decides to close it down?
  • Whether the period during which a voluntarily withdrawn petition remained pending can be excluded for the purpose of limitation under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• Manager, Hameed Masood (Private Ltd.) vs Punjab Labour Appellate1990 PLC 559 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-03Read full judgment →
• Manager, Colony Woollen Mills Ltd., Multan vs Nazir Ahmad1990 PLC 734 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-04-18Read full judgment →
• Manager, Atlas Autos Ltd. and others vs Mumtaz Ahmed and others1990 PLC 115 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-08-29Read full judgment →
• Mamora vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 695 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-07Read full judgment →
• Maman and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1323 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-19Read full judgment →
• Malik Tilla Muhammad And Others, vs Sadiq Hussain And Other1990 CLC 1698 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-05-19Read full judgment →
• Malik Raheem Bakhsh Awan vs Ejaz Mahmood and anothers1990 PLD Lahore 37 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-01
  specific performanceremand of suitappellate court powersburden of proofadditional evidenceframing of issuescivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order by the Additional District Judge remanding a specific performance suit to the trial court. The appellate court had remanded the matter, citing the trial court's failure to frame an issue regarding whether the defendants were bona fide purchasers, the incorrect placement of the burden of proof, and a pending application for additional evidence. The High Court held that the remand was unjustified. It established that when parties are fully aware of the controversy and have led evidence, the failure to frame a specific issue or the incorrect placement of the onus of proof does not warrant a remand, provided no prejudice is caused. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an appellate court should not remand a case for additional evidence but must instead decide the application for additional evidence itself. If an issue is missing, the appellate court should exercise its powers to frame it rather than setting aside the entire decree. Consequently, the High Court set aside the remand order and directed the appellate court to decide the appeal on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court remand a case solely because the trial court failed to frame a specific issue, even if the parties were aware of the controversy and led evidence?
  • Does the incorrect placement of the burden of proof by a trial court justify a remand if the parties have already led evidence on the issue?
  • Is an appellate court permitted to set aside a trial court's decree and remand the case merely to allow the production of additional evidence?
  • What is the correct procedure for an appellate court to follow when it determines that a necessary issue was omitted by the trial court?
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• Malik Nazar Ellahi and another vs The State1990 SCMR 1092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-16
  surety bondsforfeiture of bondscriminal revisionleave to appealbail bondprohibition order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the dismissal by the Lahore High Court of the petitioners' criminal revision, which had upheld the forfeiture of their surety bonds in a criminal case with a minor modification reducing the penalty to 1/5th. The core legal question concerns the extent of discretion and grounds for reducing the forfeiture amount of surety bonds when the accused subsequently appears, is tried, and convicted. The Supreme Court held that since the High Court had already duly considered the subsequent appearance and conviction of the accused in exercising its discretion to reduce the surety amount, no justification existed for further interference. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, establishing that discretionary orders regarding surety bond forfeiture passed by the High Court will not be interfered with lightly where all relevant mitigating factors were duly factored into the assessment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the subsequent appearance, trial, and conviction of an absconding accused entitles the sureties to a further reduction in the forfeited surety bond amount?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a discretionary revisional order of the High Court regarding surety bond forfeiture when mitigating factors were already considered?
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• Malik Mukhtar Ahmad Awan vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 617 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-05
  interim protective bailanticipatory bailjurisdictioninter-provincial arrestcognizable offensewarrant of arrestremandHigh Court powersCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two applications for interim protective bail before arrest, filed by an applicant facing charges under Sections 302, 148, 149, 109, and 307, 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, in FIRs registered in Multan, Punjab. The core legal question was whether the Sindh High Court possessed jurisdiction to grant such bail for offenses committed and triable in another province. The Court held that it does have jurisdiction to grant interim protective bail to enable an accused person to approach the competent court in the province where the offense was registered. This decision was based on the interpretation of various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, including Sections 58, 61, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, and 167, which allow police to pursue and arrest individuals anywhere in Pakistan and for warrants to be executed across provincial boundaries. The Court also noted a consistent practice of both Lahore and Sindh High Courts in granting such inter-provincial protective bail. The applications were granted, admitting the applicant to interim protective bail for two weeks to approach the Sessions Judge, Multan.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have jurisdiction to grant interim protective bail for an offense registered in another province?
  • Can a police officer pursue and arrest an accused person anywhere in Pakistan, irrespective of where the offense was committed?
  • Is a warrant of arrest issued by a court in one province executable in any other place in Pakistan?
  • Can a Sessions Judge grant interim bail for a non-bailable offense when the person is arrested outside the issuing court's district?
  • What is the procedure for an accused person arrested outside the district where the warrant was issued, regarding their production before a Magistrate?
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• Malik Muhammad Shaft vs Malik Farzand Ali And Another1990 CLC 693 · Lahore High Court · 1984-12-08Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Riaz vs Senior Most Staff Officer, Irrigation, Multan1990 PLC (C.S.) 497 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1989-11-20Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Mukhtar vs Manager, Dehi Mazdoor Training Centre, Rawalpindi and 2 others1990 PLC 741 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Jaffar, Advocate vs Karachi Bar Association1990 SCMR 1292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-27
  contempt of courtparliamentary privilegefreedom of speech in parliamentconstitutional petitiondischarge of notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging a judgment of the Sindh High Court dated 7-2-1988, which answered a reference made in a contempt application filed by the Karachi Bar Association under Article 204 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan concerning speeches delivered by members of the National Assembly and the Senate on 29-11-1976. The core legal question referred to the Full Bench was whether such speeches enjoy absolute privilege under the Constitution and rules framed thereunder, rendering them immune from contempt of court proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the contempt application involved three persons, out of whom notices against two had been discharged by a learned Single Judge of the High Court, and the counsel was unable to satisfy the Court as to whether the High Court intended to proceed further against the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner may seek further orders from the High Court regarding his status and noted that an adequate remedy of appeal is available before the Supreme Court in the event of a final conviction for contempt. The petition was accordingly disposed of.

  Questions settled

  • Whether under the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan and the rules framed thereunder the speeches of the Members of the National Assembly enjoy absolute privilege and are not amenable to Contempt of Court proceedings?
  • Can a petitioner maintain a petition against an intermediate proceeding when notices against co-respondents have been discharged and no final order of conviction has been passed?
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• Malik Muhammad Bashir vs Muhammad Aslam and another1990 SCMR 1632 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-03
  specific performancebona fide purchaseragreement to sellremandconcurrent findingsnotice of prior agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The appellant entered into an agreement to purchase a house, but the vendor subsequently sold the property to a third party. The appellant filed a suit for specific performance, which was decreed by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. However, the High Court reversed these decisions, dismissing the suit. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court was justified in overturning concurrent findings and whether the subsequent purchaser was entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser without notice under the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in extending protection under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act and Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act without the necessary pleadings or evidence on record regarding the purchaser's bona fide status. Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court to frame and adjudicate upon an additional issue regarding whether the respondent was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court extend the protection of being a bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice under the Specific Relief Act and Transfer of Property Act without such a plea being raised and evidence led?
  • Is it legally permissible for a High Court to set aside concurrent findings of fact by lower courts without addressing the absence of evidence on a critical issue?
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• Malik Muhammad Aslam vs Mian Aftab Ahmed And 5 Other1990 CLC 1830 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-02Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Asif vs Province of Sindh through Its Chief Secretary, and 2 others1990 MLD 2192 · Sindh High Court · 1990-07-08
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionpolice appointmentcharacter verificationequitable reliefprevious criminal recordhonorable acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, filed by Malik Muhammad Asif seeking a direction to the Inspector General of Police, Sindh, to issue his appointment order as an Assistant Sub-Inspector after he was selected and cleared initial tests. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional writ jurisdiction, should compel the police department to appoint an individual who had a history of sixteen criminal theft cases, notwithstanding his previous acquittal. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's acquittal was not an honorable one and that writ jurisdiction is equitable in nature, meant to be exercised in aid of justice and good conscience rather than to perpetuate unfairness. The Court established the principle that it is not bound to grant relief to a petitioner simply on technical legal grounds if doing so would be contrary to public interest, equity, morality, and the dictates of fair play.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is bound to issue a writ in favor of a petitioner who is legally entitled to relief when the grant of such relief is contrary to equity and good conscience?
  • Can the Inspector General of Police refuse to issue an appointment order to a selected candidate based on character verification disclosing a history of criminal cases resulting in acquittal?
  • Does an acquittal resulting from the prosecution's failure to produce witnesses constitute an honorable acquittal for the purpose of public service employment?
  • Can the writ jurisdiction of the High Court be invoked to aid a person with a questionable background in securing a position in a law enforcement agency?
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• Malik Mitha vs Jamal Din and 2 others1990 PLD Lahore 186 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-25Read full judgment →
• Malik Khalil Ahmad vs Malik Habib Ahmad and others1990 SCMR 1480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-10
  partition suitconcurrent findings of factleave to appealsecond appealre-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal against a decree for partition granted in favor of his siblings. The petitioner contended that he was the exclusive owner of the disputed house, thereby negating any share for the respondents. The trial court, the first appellate court, and the High Court had all concurrently examined the matter and ruled against the petitioner. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner sought to challenge these findings. The Supreme Court declined to interfere, holding that it would not re-appraise evidence where there was no significant proposition of law to be examined, nor any instance of misreading or non-reading of evidence by the lower courts. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that concurrent findings of fact based on evidence will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal error or material misappraisal of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a second appeal where there is no misreading or non-reading of evidence by the lower courts?
  • Can a petitioner challenge concurrent findings of fact regarding property ownership in the Supreme Court without a substantial question of law?
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• Malik Jahangir Khan vs Syed Sibtul Hassan And Other1990 CLC 1659 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-13
  landlord and tenant relationshipeviction petitionsub-dealershiprent controller jurisdictionres judicatalis pendensnon-residential buildingpetrol pump
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenge concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, which ordered the eviction of the petitioner from a petrol pump premises. The core legal questions concerned the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner (sub-dealer) and the respondent (dealer), and whether the Rent Controller possessed jurisdiction under the relevant rent legislation. The Court held that the petitioner, having entered into a valid sub-dealership agreement with the respondent, could not deny the landlord-tenant relationship by asserting a direct dealership with the oil company, particularly when the supporting documents were fabricated during the pendency of the litigation. The Court affirmed that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction, as the premises constituted a non-residential building under the rent laws. The key principle laid down is that a sub-lessee cannot deny the landlord's title after executing a tenancy agreement, and findings of fact affirmed by superior courts in earlier stages of the same litigation operate as res judicata, precluding re-agitation of those issues in subsequent proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the sub-letting of a petrol pump business create a relationship of landlord and tenant under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a tenant deny the landlord's title by asserting a direct relationship with the head-lessor based on documents fabricated during the pendency of litigation?
  • Do findings of fact affirmed by a High Court in a previous writ petition operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings regarding the same parties?
  • Does the installation of machinery for pumping petroleum products exclude premises from the definition of a non-residential building under the rent laws?
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• Malik Iqbal Ahmad Khan Langrial vs Rai Ahmad Nawaz And Other1990 CL C 595 · Election Tribunal · 1989-07-01Read full judgment →
• Malik Inayat Ullah vs Memberii, Board of Revenue, Balochistan and others1990 SCMR 695 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-21
  civil appealevacuee propertywrit petitionboard of revenueappeal not pressed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal filed by Malik Inayat Ullah against the Member-II, Board of Revenue, Balochistan and others. The core legal question concerned the sustainability of the appellant's challenge against prior revenue and evacuee property orders, particularly in light of the dismissal of a connected writ petition by the High Court which upheld the orders of the Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Property and the Member Board of Revenue. Upon the matter being heard, the learned counsel for the appellant stated he no longer wished to press the appeal, recognizing that the High Court's dismissal of the earlier writ petition rendered the present proceedings unnecessary. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the appeal should be dismissed as not pressed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The key principle established is that an appeal explicitly abandoned by the appellant's counsel in light of prior conclusive judicial determinations will be dismissed accordingly without adjudication on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal can be dismissed as not pressed when the appellant's counsel elects not to pursue the matter further?
  • Does the dismissal of a related constitutional writ petition by the High Court render a subsequent appeal unnecessary?
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• Malik Imtiaz Ahmad And 2 Others vs Deputy Commissioner_Collector, Khushab And 4 Other1990 CLC 915 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-01Read full judgment →
• Malik Haji Nazar Muhammad and others vs WAPDA and others1990 SCMR 980 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-20
  compensationtransmission linejurisdictioncivil revisionleave to appeallicensee
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which dismissed the civil revision of the petitioners on 18-1-1986 regarding a suit for compensation for damage to buildings and fruit trees caused by the installation of a 500 K.V. Transmission line over their land by WAPDA. The core legal question revolves around whether the provisions of the Telegraph Act, 1885 regarding the determination of compensation by a District Judge apply to WAPDA as a licensee under the Electricity Act, 1910, or if the matter is governed exclusively by the WAPDA Act, 1958. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the case involves the interpretation of the provisions of the WAPDA Act, 1958 and the Electricity Act, 1910 of substantial legal importance, and directed the appeal to be prepared on the existing record with interim stay to continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Telegraph Act, 1885 regarding the determination of compensation by a District Judge apply to a licensee under the Electricity Act, 1910?
  • Does the WAPDA Act, 1958 exclude the application of compensation provisions under the Telegraph Act, 1885?
  • Is a civil suit maintainable before a District Judge for damages caused by the installation of transmission lines by WAPDA?
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• Malik Ghulam Yaseen and another vs The Deputy Director, F.I.A., Lahore1990 P Cr. L J 1834 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-06Read full judgment →
• Malik Ghulam Nabi and others vs Member III, Board of Revenue and 5 others1990 PLD Supreme Court 1043 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-16
  pre-emptionHanafi Lawright of pre-emptionabatement of suitTalab-i-MowasbatTalab-i-IshhadBalochistanreview petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged a Supreme Court judgment regarding a pre-emption suit in Balochistan. The core legal question was whether the right of pre-emption under Hanafi Law survives the death of the pre-emptor during the pendency of a suit, thereby allowing legal heirs to continue the litigation. The Supreme Court recalled its earlier order and dismissed the appeal, holding that under Hanafi Law, the right of pre-emption is a personal right that extinguishes upon the death of the pre-emptor before a decree is passed. The Court reasoned that because the plaintiff had specifically invoked the requirements of Talab-i-Mowasbat and Talab-i-Ishhad, the suit was governed by Hanafi principles. As there is no codified pre-emption law in Balochistan, the Court applied the established principle that the right to sue for pre-emption does not devolve upon heirs and abates upon the death of the original pre-emptor. Consequently, the legal representatives could not prosecute the suit, and the initial dismissal by the lower tribunals was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of pre-emption under Hanafi Law survive the death of the pre-emptor during the pendency of a suit?
  • Can legal heirs continue a pre-emption suit initiated by their predecessor under Hanafi Law?
  • Is the right of pre-emption in Balochistan governed by Muslim Law in the absence of codified legislation?
  • Does the performance of Talab-i-Mowasbat and Talab-i-Ishhad subject a pre-emption suit to the principles of Hanafi Law?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Ghulam Murtaza vs Superintendent, District Jail, Multan1990 P Cr. L J 565 · Lahore High Court · 1978-04-02Read full judgment →
• Malik Falak Sher vs The Registrar Cooperative Societies N.-W.F.P.1990 PLC (C.S.) 716 · Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal · 1987-12-03Read full judgment →
• Malik Din Muhammad vs Bashir Ahmad Bhatti1990 SCMR 1343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-04
  evictiondemised premisesvacant possessionconsensual orderlandlord and tenantpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal concerning the eviction of a tenant from demised premises. During the proceedings, the petitioner, through counsel, expressed an intention to vacate the premises upon the completion of his own house, which was expected within approximately six months. The core legal question addressed was whether the court could facilitate a consensual resolution regarding the timeline for the surrender of vacant possession of the property. The Court recorded the consent of both parties, whereby the respondent agreed to allow the petitioner to remain in the premises until a specified future date. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition while granting the petitioner time until 30th September, 1980, to hand over vacant possession, subject to the petitioner's undertaking to continue paying monthly rent. This judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts may dispose of petitions by recording mutual consent arrangements between landlords and tenants regarding eviction timelines, provided the parties voluntarily agree to the terms and conditions stipulated therein.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of a petition for leave to appeal based on a mutual consent agreement between the parties regarding eviction?
  • Is a tenant required to continue paying monthly rent during an extended period granted by the court for vacating premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Barkat Ali Dogar vs Muhammad Shafi and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-16
  pre-emptionzar-e-panjumextension of timedeposit of pre-emption moneyvested rightnotice to defendantsPunjab Pre-emption Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the plaintiff/pre-emptor examines whether a court can extend the time for depositing one-fifth of the pre-emption money (zar-e-panjum) under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, without notice to the defendants at a stage when they had not yet been served in the suit. The Supreme Court held that no notice to the defendants is necessary for fixing or extending the time for deposit when the defendants have not been served or put in an appearance, as no vested right of the defendants is infringed at that procedural stage. A vested right in favor of the defendants only arises upon the plaintiff's default or non-compliance resulting in a penalty. The Court ruled that the trial court's extension of time was a valid exercise of judicial discretion. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and restored the decrees of the courts below.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the power to extend time for depositing pre-emption money under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act can be exercised without notice to the defendants when they have not been served?
  • At what stage does a vested right accrue to defendants regarding the non-compliance of a pre-emption deposit order?
  • Does the absence of an express application preclude a court from suo motu extending the time for depositing pre-emption money?
  • Can a trial court alter an order for a cash deposit of pre-emption money to one of furnishing security while simultaneously extending the time for deposit?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Allah Ditta vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1861 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-29Read full judgment →
• Malik Allah Dad deceased through his legal representatives and others vs Yasin and another1990 SCMR 1638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-02
  pre-emptioncourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plaintmandatory opportunityprocedural lawcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a suit for pre-emption where the plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his Regular Second Appeal by the High Court regarding the payment of court-fee. The core legal question was whether the appellate court correctly rejected the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to non-payment of court-fee, despite the trial court failing to determine the exact deficiency or order the plaintiff to supply the requisite amount. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgments were unsustainable. Relying on the precedent set in Siddique Khan (PLD 1984 SC 289), the Court ruled that the penal provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 cannot be invoked unless the court has first determined the exact amount of court-fee deficiency and provided the plaintiff with a mandatory opportunity to deposit the amount. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower appellate court's judgment and remanded the case for a fresh decision on merits, establishing that a court must explicitly determine the deficiency and grant a mandatory chance for compliance before rejecting a plaint for insufficient court-fee.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court reject a plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for non-payment of court-fee without first determining the exact amount of deficiency?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to a mandatory opportunity to deposit court-fee after the court determines the deficiency?
  • Does the failure of a trial court to order the supply of court-fee preclude an appellate court from rejecting the plaint on that ground?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Alamgir And 3 Others vs Salam Gul And 10 Other1990 CLC 1915 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-03-17
  pre-emption suitrejection of plaintextension of timepredecessor-in-officereview jurisdictionlimitationdeposit of pre-emption money
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition arises from a pre-emption suit where the trial court dismissed the suit, later modified to rejection of the plaint, due to the plaintiffs' failure to comply with initial deposit orders. The core legal question was whether the trial court could effectively set aside a predecessor judge's order that had granted the plaintiffs extensions of time for depositing pre-emption money, particularly when the defendants had not appeared at the time of the extension. The High Court held that the trial court erred in ignoring the predecessor's order. The Court ruled that an order passed by a predecessor-in-office remains valid and binding until set aside through proper appellate or review proceedings. Furthermore, the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to review its predecessor’s order under Order 47 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and the defendants' application was time-barred. The Court established that notice to defendants for extending time for pre-emption money deposits is not mandatory if the limitation period for filing a fresh suit has not expired.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court, on a miscellaneous application, set aside an order extending time for deposit of pre-emption money passed by its predecessor-in-office?
  • Is notice to the defendant mandatory for an order extending the time for the deposit of pre-emption money if the limitation period for filing a fresh suit has not expired?
  • Does a trial court have the jurisdiction to review an order passed by its predecessor-in-office under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Abdul Wahid vs Abdul Qayum and others1990 SCMR 737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-18
  ejectmentrented landlandlord and tenantdefault in rentsublettingbusiness purpose
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a rent restriction matter where the appellant-landlord sought the eviction of the respondents (the original lessee and subsequent sub-lessees) on the grounds of subletting and non-payment of rent. The respondents resisted the application, contending that the plot was not 'rented land' under the law, that they had purchased the property, and that they had raised constructions on it. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, but the High Court reversed this decision, holding that the plot was not let out for business or trade purposes and thus did not constitute 'rented land'. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan analyzed the purpose of the lease, noting that the land was leased for the business of constructing small tenements to be rented out to sub-tenants. The Court held that such a purpose falls within the definition of 'rented land' used for business. Since the default in rent payment was established, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and ordered the eviction of the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an open plot leased for the purpose of constructing small tenements for subletting qualifies as 'rented land' used for business purposes?
  • Can sub-lessees be evicted on the ground of default if the primary tenant fails to pay or tender rent to the landlord?
  • Are the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding compromise and admission applicable to rent restriction proceedings in the interest of justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Abdul Qayyum vs Muhammad Hussain and others1990 SCMR 1716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-05
  landlord and tenantevictionburden of proofmisreading of evidenceconcurrent findingsrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an eviction application filed by the appellant against the respondent under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, based on personal requirement and default in rent payment. The respondent denied the landlord-tenant relationship, asserting tenancy under a third party. The Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge ordered eviction, but the High Court set these orders aside, finding them based on misreading of evidence. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in establishing the landlord-tenant relationship and whether the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to set aside concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to prove that the specific land in the respondent's possession was the land purchased by the appellant. The key principle laid down is that in eviction proceedings, a landlord must establish the identity and possession of the specific property in dispute; without evidence linking the purchased land to the respondent's possession, a decree for eviction cannot be sustained, and concurrent findings of fact based on 'no evidence' are subject to correction by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord obtain an eviction order without establishing that the specific land in the respondent's possession is the land the landlord purchased?
  • Is a High Court empowered to set aside concurrent findings of fact by lower courts if those findings are based on no evidence or misreading of evidence?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to a tenant to prove a third party's title when the tenant denies the landlord-tenant relationship?
  Read full judgment →
• Makum Tea Company (India) Ltd. and another vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1990 PTD 372 · Gauhati High Court · 1989-01-19Read full judgment →
• Makhdoom Ali Shah and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J.1324 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-04Read full judgment →
• Major Dr. Ghulam Rasul vs Chief Secretary Govt. of Punjab and others1990 SCMR 1478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-05
  service tribunaldismissal from servicemisconductunauthorized absenceleave to appealquantum of punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal upholding the petitioner's dismissal from service for willful and unauthorized absence from duty amounting to misconduct. The core legal question concerns the proportionality and appropriateness of the penalty of dismissal awarded to the petitioner following disciplinary proceedings and an inquiry report. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal restricted solely to the question of the quantum of punishment awarded to the petitioner, directing the appeal to be made ready for hearing on the present record with permission to file additional documents. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court may grant leave to examine the proportionality of a departmental punishment inflicted upon a civil servant in appropriate circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the penalty of dismissal from service for unauthorized absence from duty is disproportionate?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted solely to consider the question of punishment awarded in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Major Altaf Ali Khan vs Mst. Gaiti Ara and others1990 SCMR 1036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-22
  land allotmentsettlement authoritiesMukhbari applicationintra-court appealvested rightsDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing an Intra-Court Appeal regarding the allotment of disputed land. The core legal question concerned the validity of an allotment made to the petitioner (based on a Mukhbari application) when the land had already been confirmed in favor of the respondents by the Special (Garden) Allotment Committee in 1968 and affirmed by previous High Court writ proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land) acted in complete ignorance and disregard of the prior confirmed allotment and the High Court's earlier decision when allotting the land to the petitioner. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside the petitioner's allotment. The key principle laid down is that settlement authorities cannot allot land that has already been validly confirmed and vested in other parties, especially when such status has been affirmed by judicial orders. The petition was dismissed, with the Court observing that the petitioner may be considered for other available land under the amended Section 14(1-a) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958.

  Questions settled

  • Can settlement authorities allot land that has already been confirmed in favor of another party?
  • Does a Mukhbari application grant a right to land that is already subject to a prior confirmed allotment?
  • Is an allotment order passed in disregard of a High Court judgment sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Major Abdul Latif and anothers vs Land Acquisition Collectoriv, Terbela Dam and 2 others1990 PLD Supreme Court 848 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-15
  land acquisitioncompensationprivate overseer reportsuperstructure valuationevidencesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through leave of the Court is directed against the impugned judgment of the High Court, whereby respondents' appeal in a land acquisition award of compensation case was allowed and the Collector's award was restored. The dispute relates to the compensation for two houses acquired for the Tarbela Dam. The core legal question examined was whether the report of a private Overseer could be treated as evidence regarding the value of the superstructure in the absence of technical evidence from WAPDA. The Supreme Court held that there is nothing in law preventing the examination of a privately engaged Overseer, though the weight of such evidence depends on the circumstances and credibility of the witness, and the absence of the opposing party during the private inspection does not render it inadmissible. However, upon undertaking independent calculations of the covered area and material value based on the appellants' own figures, the Court concluded that the compensation awarded by the Collector was fair and on the higher side. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the report of a privately engaged Overseer be treated as evidence regarding the value of a building's superstructure in land acquisition proceedings?
  • Does the absence of the opposing party during a private inspection by an Overseer render their report inadmissible as evidence?
  • What factors determine the weight and value attached to the evidence of a privately engaged expert witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Majeeduddin Khan and others vs Sardar Khan and others1990 SCMR 1031 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-29
  leave to appealdeclaratory suitfraudlimitationdate of knowledgeconcurrent findingspleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the defendants against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed their civil revision in a suit for declaration. The respondents/plaintiffs challenged the alleged alienation of suit land by their predecessor-in-interest as fraudulent. All three courts below rendered concurrent findings of fact establishing fraud and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners' counsel conceded that the concurrent findings of fact could not be challenged, but argued that the suit was barred by limitation because paragraph 11 of the plaint asserted that the cause of action arose in 1965, whereas the suit was filed in 1976. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that paragraph 11 must be read in conjunction with paragraph 10 of the plaint. The Court held that where a party has been kept in the dark due to fraud, limitation runs from the date of knowledge of the fraud. Consequently, the suit was within time, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of limitation for a suit challenging a fraudulent transaction runs from the date of knowledge of the fraud when the plaintiff was kept in the dark?
  • Whether specific paragraphs of a plaint can be read in isolation to determine the bar of limitation without considering related explanatory paragraphs in the same pleading?
  Read full judgment →
• Mai Moona Sadiqa Hashml vs Government of the Punjab And OtherK.L.R 1990, Labour & Services Cases 343 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1990-02-04Read full judgment →
• Mahmud Ahmad vs Water and Power Development Authority and others1990 SCMR 1479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-20
  service appealremoval from servicemala fidesWAPDA employeeleave to appealmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a former Meter Reader of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal. The petitioner had been removed from service pursuant to Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's removal from service was tainted by mala fides, as alleged by the petitioner. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the record, noted that the petitioner had a history of misconduct, including being caught reversing an electric meter. The Court held that the petitioner failed to substantiate the allegation of mala fides, finding that the Federal Service Tribunal had correctly examined the facts and found no substance in the petitioner's claims. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the validity of the removal action taken by the authorities under the relevant statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed on merits despite being time-barred?
  • Does the removal of a WAPDA employee under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act require proof of mala fides to be set aside?
  • Is the finding of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the absence of mala fides in a service termination case subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood vs Additional District Judge, Bahawalpur and 4 others1990 SCMR 954 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-16
  ejectment applicationlandlord and tenantevacuee propertyconcurrent findings of factwrit jurisdictionconstitutional jurisdictionproof of title
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding an ejectment application. The core legal question was whether a relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the petitioner and the respondents concerning a shop, which the petitioner claimed was evacuee property, thereby denying the respondents' ownership. The Supreme Court found that the respondents had established their title through a registered sale deed and supporting judicial decrees, whereas the petitioner failed to produce any documentary evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership or possession as an evacuee property occupant. The Court held that the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship is a question of fact. Since the lower courts had concurrently decided this issue in favor of the respondents based on evidence, the High Court correctly declined to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, affirming that concurrent findings of fact regarding tenancy are not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction absent legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Is the existence of a landlord and tenant relationship a question of fact?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does a party claiming ownership of evacuee property bear the burden of proving title when a landlord-tenant relationship is contested?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Ullah vs The Administrator (Residual Properties Lahore1990 SCMR 1695 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-08
  Settlement Scheme No. 9property resumptionnon-payment of priceindivisibility of propertyresidual propertiestransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment concerning the resumption of a house by the Settlement Department due to the appellant's failure to pay the transfer price. The core legal questions were whether the property could be resumed for non-payment and whether a property previously declared "indivisible" could be partially transferred under Settlement Scheme No. 9. The Supreme Court held that the appellant had failed to pay the required price before the resumption order, rendering the resumption valid. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the previous finding of indivisibility pertained to entitlement under Settlement Scheme No. 1 and did not preclude the Administrator from transferring portions of the house under Settlement Scheme No. 9 once the property became available. The principle established is that property resumption for non-payment is valid when the price is not timely paid, and a property deemed indivisible under one scheme may be treated differently under a subsequent scheme if it becomes available for disposal by the Settlement authorities. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property previously declared indivisible under Settlement Scheme No. 1 be partially transferred under Settlement Scheme No. 9?
  • Does the failure to pay the transfer price justify the resumption of property by the Settlement Department?
  • Can a party challenge the transfer of a portion of a property after the property has been legally resumed by the Settlement authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Hayat vs Sh. Munir Ahmad and anothers1990 PLD Lahore 151 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-17Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Hassan vs Mst. Sheeran Bano1990 MLD 1107 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-11Read full judgment →
• Mahmood and 9 others vs Ahmad Yar and 5 others1990 SCMR 680 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  allotment of state landwrit petitionjoint disposalremandconsolidation of petitionsends of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of the petitioners' writ petition concerning the allotment of State land. The core legal question was whether the petitioners' writ petition and the respondents' pending writ petition, which arose from the same dispute, should be adjudicated independently or consolidated for a joint disposal. The Supreme Court observed that while the petitions were not strictly counter-petitions in a chronological sense, the subject matter was sufficiently intertwined that their joint disposal would best serve the ends of justice. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the same, and remanded the case to the High Court with the direction that it be heard afresh alongside the respondents' pending Writ Petition No. 3527 of 1985. The key principle laid down is that where two writ petitions involve the same subject matter and dispute, the interests of justice are best served by their joint disposal to ensure consistent adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Should two writ petitions involving the same subject matter be disposed of jointly to meet the ends of justice?
  • Can the Supreme Court remand a case to the High Court for joint disposal with a pending writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahboob Siddiqui vs Nafeesullah Rizvi and 2 others1990 MLD 1137 · Sindh High Court · 1989-03-28
  rejection of plaintinterim injunctioncooperative societies disputeallotment cancellationcivil court jurisdictionnecessary party
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter addresses applications for the rejection of a plaint and the issuance of an interim injunction in a dispute concerning the allotment, cancellation, and re-allotment of a residential plot originally allotted by a cooperative housing society. The plaintiff challenged the cancellation of his plot allotment, which was subsequently declared illegal and void by a nominee of the Deputy Registrar under the Cooperative Societies Act, leading to a formal restoration of the plot in his favour. Meanwhile, the society had executed a registered sub-licence in favour of the defendant. The core legal questions involved whether the civil court's jurisdiction was barred under sections 54 and 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action warranting rejection under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and whether an interim injunction should be granted. The court held that the dispute involved complex mixed questions of fact and law not exclusively barred by the Cooperative Societies Act and that the plaint disclosed a valid cause of action. The court established that while documents attached to a plaint may be examined, a plaint cannot be rejected based on the defendant's disputed factual pleas, and confirmed that an interim injunction is appropriate where a prima facie case and balance of convenience favour the earlier allottee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil court's jurisdiction to adjudicate a plot dispute involving a cooperative society member is barred under sections 54 and 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the basis of pleas and defences raised by the defendant?
  • Whether an interim injunction restraining construction should be granted in favour of an earlier allottee whose plot allotment was restored after a prior cancellation?
  • When is a municipal or regulatory authority considered a necessary and proper party in a suit relating to property construction and demolition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahboob Khan vs Hassan Khan Durrani1990 PLD Supreme Court 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-20
  execution of decreelimitation periodresiduary articlefresh applicationLaw Reforms Ordinancecivil proceduredecree holder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the limitation period for filing an execution application for a civil court decree following the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, which omitted Article 182 of the Limitation Act and amended Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.). The core legal question was whether the first application for execution is governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act (prescribing three years) or by Section 48 of the C.P.C. (prescribing six years). The Supreme Court held that Section 48, C.P.C. applies only to "fresh" applications—interpreted as subsequent applications filed after the first execution application has been disposed of. Consequently, the first application for execution remains governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a three-year limitation period from the date the right to apply accrues. The Court affirmed that if the initial execution application is not filed within the three-year period under Article 181, it becomes time-barred, rendering the extended six-year period under Section 48, C.P.C. inapplicable.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 48 of the C.P.C. apply to the first application for execution of a decree?
  • Is the first application for execution of a civil court decree governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act?
  • What is the legal effect of the omission of Article 182 of the Limitation Act on the limitation period for execution applications?
  • Does the term "fresh application" in Section 48 of the C.P.C. include the initial application for execution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahboob alias Booba and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 887 · Lahore High Court · 1987-09-09Read full judgment →
• Madhu Mehta vs Union of India1990 MLD 525 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-08-09Read full judgment →
• Ma. Hashmi vs Chief Secretary and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 666 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1989-09-12Read full judgment →
• m.v." Vali Pero" and others vs Fernandeo Lopez and others1990 MLD 486 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-09-19Read full judgment →
• M.H. Abidi vs State Life Insurance Corporation1990 MLD 563 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-30
  constitutional jurisdictioncontractual claimsinsurance agent commissionlachesdisputed questions of factstatutory bodywrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an insurance agent, challenged the State Life Insurance Corporation's refusal to pay commissions on Group Insurance Policies obtained for the Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction could be invoked to enforce contractual rights against a statutory body, whether the claim was barred by laches, and whether the court could determine the disputed nature of the insurance policies. The Court held that while constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is not ousted merely because a contract is involved—particularly when dealing with statutory bodies performing public functions—it is not the appropriate forum for resolving complex, disputed questions of fact. The Court found that the determination of whether the policies were for single-year or multi-year durations, which would dictate the petitioner's entitlement to commissions, required evidence beyond the scope of writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with the Court granting the petitioner liberty to seek redress through a civil suit where facts could be properly examined.

  Questions settled

  • Can constitutional jurisdiction be invoked to enforce contractual rights against a statutory body?
  • Is the High Court the appropriate forum to resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the nature and duration of insurance policies?
  • Does the mere involvement of a contract in a petition oust the constitutional jurisdiction of the superior courts?
  • Is the doctrine of laches synonymous with the statutory bar of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• M.Aobool Ahmad And 4 Others vs Syed Farzand Ali Shah And 15 Other1990 CLC 1756 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-06-17
  temporary injunctionprima facie caseOrder XXXIX Rule 3ex parte injunctionnotice to local councilprivate passagepublic thoroughfarerevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition before the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir was filed against the order of the Additional District Judge, Muzaffarabad, which upheld the trial court's order vacating a temporary injunction granted to the petitioners and continuing an injunction in favor of the respondents in a dispute over a passage between constructed houses. The core legal questions pertained to the essential requisites for granting a temporary injunction under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, specifically the requirement of a prima facie case, procedural compliance with Rule 3 regarding notice, and the necessity of statutory notice under Section 96 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Local Government Ordinance 1990.

  The High Court accepted the petition, setting aside the lower courts' orders. It held that the respondents' counter-suit failed to disclose any cause of action or right, precluding the existence of a prima facie case. Furthermore, temporary injunctions without prior notice must state explicit reasons of urgency, and notice to a municipal council under Section 96 of the Local Government Ordinance 1990 is only mandatory when relief is explicitly claimed against it.

  Questions settled

  • Is the existence of a prima facie case an indispensable prerequisite before a court can grant a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court issue a temporary injunction without prior notice to the opposite party under Order XXXIX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without recording explicit reasons for urgency?
  • Is a prior statutory notice under local government laws mandatory for initiating a suit where no relief is specifically sought against the local council or its officials?
  Read full judgment →
• M.A. Tanvir vs WAPDA through its Chairman1990 PLC (C.S.) 73 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1989-08-06Read full judgment →
• M.A. Rafique vs Managing Director (Power), WAPDA and 7 others1990 SCMR 927 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  vested rightpromotionsupersessionservice tribunalleave to appealgraduate engineers
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant Director in WAPDA and a non-graduate engineer, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing his appeal regarding his supersession and the promotion of his juniors. The core legal questions involved whether a civil servant possesses a vested right in future prospects of promotion despite a change in policy favoring graduate engineers, and whether the deferment of promotion by a Selection Board can be challenged before the Service Tribunal under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that no vested right exists with respect to posts not actually held but to which a civil servant aspires to be promoted at a future date, and that the finding of fact regarding the consideration and deferment of the petitioner by the Selection Board could not be challenged before the Tribunal under section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, establishing that policy changes affecting future promotion criteria do not violate vested rights and that fitness determinations by selection boards are generally not reviewable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right in future prospects of promotion to a post not currently held?
  • Can the deferment or unfitness for promotion determined by a Selection Board be challenged before the Service Tribunal under section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Does a change in policy giving preference to graduate engineers over non-graduate engineers violate the service rights of an employee who entered service prior to such policy change?
  Read full judgment →
• M.A. Hashmi vs Chief Secretary Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 41 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1989-08-29Read full judgment →
• M.A. Haleem Qais and another vs Hamid Hussain Khan1990 PLC 53 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-08-08Read full judgment →
• M. Zafar Khan vs Manager, Daily Jang and another1990 PLC 770 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-02-21Read full judgment →
• M. Siddiq Mirza and anothers vs Assistant Director, E.E. Cell (F.Ia.) and 31990 MLD 1588 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-02
  constitutional petitiondouble jeopardyquashment of FIRcustoms fraudFederal Investigation Agencyalternative remedyprosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed before the Sindh High Court seeking to restrain the Federal Investigation Agency from investigating a case involving the import of vehicles, and to quash an F.I.R. registered under the Customs Act 1969, on the grounds that multiple enquiries and F.I.Rs. relating to the same matter amount to double jeopardy. The core legal question was whether simultaneous investigations by different agencies or departmental proceedings alongside criminal investigation violate the protection against double jeopardy under Article 13(a) of the Constitution and section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that prosecution commences only when proceedings before a court of law are initiated, and since the petitioners had not been prosecuted twice for the same offence, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy was not attracted. Furthermore, an alternate remedy for quashment of the F.I.R. existed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether investigation by different agencies into the same subject-matter amounts to double jeopardy under Article 13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • At what stage does the prosecution of a person commence for the purpose of invoking the bar against double jeopardy?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 maintainable for the quashment of an F.I.R. when an alternate remedy under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is available?
  • Do departmental proceedings and a pending police investigation constitute multiple prosecutions for the same offence?
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• M. Shakeel Saigol and others vs The Incometax Officer and others1990 SCMR 1353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-09
  additional taxincome taxwrit petitionleave to appealtax recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of writ petitions by the Lahore High Court, which challenged the imposition and recovery of additional tax under section 45-A of the Income-Tax Act. The core legal question involves the validity of additional tax orders passed against the petitioners under the said Act. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that these petitions raise substantially the same questions of law as those in earlier petitions where leave had already been granted. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in the instant petitions, ordered them to be made ready on the present record with liberty to file additional documents, and directed that they be heard along with the connected appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether additional tax under section 45-A of the Income-Tax Act can be validly recovered?
  • Whether writ petitions challenging orders passed under the Income-Tax Act are maintainable?
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• M. Shakeel Saigol and others vs The Income-Tax Officer and others1990 PTD 843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-09Read full judgment →
• M. Samiullah Qureshi vs Director Agricultural Engineering, Faisalabad and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 172 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1985-11-24Read full judgment →
• M. Saleem Anjum vs Majid Nizami and 4 others1990 MLD 206 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-04
  private complaintacquittallimitation periodcondonation of delaydefamationSection 249-A CrPCjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a private complaint case regarding defamation. The core legal questions were whether the appeal was barred by limitation, whether the time spent pursuing a remedy in a wrong forum could be excluded, and whether a Magistrate could acquit all accused persons under Section 249-A when only some had filed the application, and without fresh material after process had already been issued. The Court held that the appeal was within time, as the period spent in the wrong forum was excludable under Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908. Furthermore, the Court set aside the acquittal, ruling that a Magistrate cannot review their own order of summoning accused persons without fresh material on record. Additionally, the Court held that it was a patent illegality to acquit accused persons who had neither appeared nor filed an application under Section 249-A, as this demonstrated a lack of judicial application of mind.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate acquit all accused persons under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when only some of the accused have filed an application for acquittal?
  • Is the time spent pursuing a case in a wrong forum excludable when computing the limitation period for filing an appeal?
  • Can a Magistrate review their own order of summoning an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without the introduction of fresh material?
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• M. Noor Muhammad vs Director of Education (Schools) and others1990 SCMR 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-24
  service lawdate of joiningcivil servantofficiating appointmentservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding the correction of his date of joining government service. The petitioner was appointed as an officiating/temporary Senior English Teacher via notification dated 15-11-1971 and directed to report to a specific school where no vacancy was available, preventing him from assuming charge on 23-11-1971. He was subsequently posted to another school where he took charge on 27-11-1971, which was recorded as his date of entry into service. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's service could be deemed to have commenced from the date he attempted to report at a school with no sanctioned vacancy, or from the date he actually assumed charge where a vacancy existed. The Supreme Court held that since no post was available at the first school and the appointment notification explicitly conditioned joining on available strength, the petitioner could not be treated as having joined service until he assumed charge at the school with an available vacancy on 27-11-1971. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can claim a date of joining service prior to actually assuming charge of a post where no sanctioned vacancy existed at the initially assigned school?
  • Does an appointment notification subject to available sanctioned strength confer a right to join duty where no vacancy is available?
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• M. Idrees vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 655 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-20
  statutory delaypost-arrest baildangerous criminalhabitual offenderattempted murdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two consolidated bail applications filed by an applicant detained in connection with multiple cases under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The applicant sought bail primarily on the ground of statutory delay, having been in custody for over one year without the conclusion of the trial. The core legal question was whether the applicant, despite the statutory delay, should be denied bail under the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which restricts bail for 'hardened, desperate or dangerous' criminals. The Court held that the applicant’s involvement in numerous cases of murder and attempted murder demonstrated a habitual tendency toward violence, justifying his classification as a dangerous criminal. Relying on the principles established in Jumo v. The State, the Court affirmed that the determination of a 'dangerous' character is a tentative opinion based on the nature of the accusation, the conduct during the incident, and the accused's criminal record. Consequently, the Court dismissed the bail applications, holding that the statutory delay did not mandate release where the accused poses a clear danger to society.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require a previous conviction to classify an accused as a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous' criminal?
  • What factors should a court consider when forming a tentative opinion on whether an accused is a 'dangerous' criminal for the purposes of bail?
  • Can an accused be denied bail on the grounds of being a 'dangerous criminal' even if the statutory period for trial delay has been exceeded?
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• M. Altaf Hussain and 5 others vs Peshawar Motors Limited1990 MLD 337 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-09-13Read full judgment →
• Lt.Col. (Retd.) G.M. Nizamuddin and anothers vs Syed Abdul Rahim and 31990 MLD 134 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-22Read full judgment →
• Lt. Col. (Retd.) Manzoor Ul Haq vs Muhammad Yousaf And Other1990 CLC 2000 · Board of Revenue · 1990-05-21Read full judgment →
• Liaquat vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 2068 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-17Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 403 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-02Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Ali vs Sindh Road Transport Corporation1990 PLC 451 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-05-13Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Ali Fani and another vs The State1990 SCMR 1391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-21
  leave to appealappraisal of evidencecriminal convictiondeath sentenceappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Narowal, under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Sain Muhammad and sentenced to death. Their appeal was subsequently dismissed by the High Court, which confirmed the death sentences. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had correctly applied the established principles for the appraisal of evidence in criminal cases. Upon hearing arguments from counsel, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court failed to adhere to the well-established principles for the appraisal of evidence regarding the accused petitioners. Consequently, the Court held that the cases required further consideration. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions, establishing the principle that a failure to properly apply established evidentiary standards in criminal convictions warrants a re-examination of the case by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure by the High Court to apply established principles for the appraisal of evidence in a criminal case constitute sufficient grounds for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal?
  • Is the conviction and sentence of death under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 subject to further consideration if the evidence appraisal is found to be flawed?
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• Liaqat Ali vs The State1990 MLD 1548 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-04Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali alias Doda vs The State1990 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-26
  leave to appealoutraging modestycriminal convictionrevision petitionwitness credibilitytrespass
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had previously dismissed the petitioner's revision against his conviction and sentence. The petitioner was tried and convicted under Section 354 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for trespassing into a residence and outraging the modesty of a woman, receiving a sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment and a fine. The core legal question was whether the evidence presented at trial, particularly the testimony of an independent witness, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had proven its case beyond any shadow of doubt. The Court found no merit in the petitioner's arguments, noting that the testimony of the independent witness, who lacked animus against the petitioner, remained unchallenged and credible. Consequently, the Court determined that the case was not a fit one for leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the lower courts' concurrent findings of guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of an independent witness without animus sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 354 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a petition for leave to appeal warrant interference when the prosecution has proven its case beyond any shadow of doubt?
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• Lever Brothers Pakistan Limited vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal1990 PLC 523 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-08Read full judgment →
• Lever Brothers (Pakistan) Limited vs M.T. "Singapore Clipper" and 41990 PLD Karachi 445 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-22Read full judgment →
• Leslie Sequeira. vs Income Tax Officer Circle v, Zone C And AnotherPTCL 1990 CL. 464 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-31Read full judgment →