Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Mst. Maroof Jan And 2 Others vs Yaqoob And 4, Other1990 CLC 19 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-01
  res judicatawithdrawal of suitpermission to file fresh suitremand of casecivil revisiondeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of a suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the petitioners regarding ownership of land and challenging certain mutations. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, deciding the issue of res judicata against the defendants. However, on appeal, the Additional District Judge remanded the case back to the trial court to decide the issue afresh. The core legal question before the High Court was whether a suit withdrawn with permission to file a fresh suit is barred by res judicata or affected by the provisions governing withdrawal of suits. The Peshawar High Court held that when a suit is withdrawn with permission to bring a fresh suit, the previous suit is regarded as never brought and neither a fresh suit on the same subject nor the enforcement of rights is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court laid down the principle that the appellate court erred in remanding the matter, as a suit withdrawn with the court's leave leaves the plaintiff free to institute a fresh action without being obstructed by res judicata. Consequently, the revision petition was allowed, the appellate remand order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the lower appellate court for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit withdrawn with the permission of the court to file a fresh suit is barred by the principle of res judicata?
  • What is the legal effect of withdrawing a suit with permission of the court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an appellate court remand a case to the trial court for re-deciding an issue when the legal position regarding the withdrawal of a suit is clear?
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• Mst. Mariam Bibi and anothers vs Mst. Ayesha Bibi and 5 others1990 MLD 920 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mariam Bi and 2 others vs The Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Religious and Minority Affairs and 4 others1990 PLD Karachi 427 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-25
  evacuee trust propertypermanent transfer deedprovisional transfer ordercompensation poolstatutory validationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This case came before the Full Bench of the Sindh High Court upon a reference to resolve a conflict of opinion regarding the interpretation of section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, specifically concerning the validation of transfers of urban evacuee trust properties. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had purchased a property in an open public auction held by the Settlement Authorities in 1964, utilizing a compensation book through an agreement of association, and was issued a Provisional Transfer Order. No Permanent Transfer Deed was ever issued. Subsequently, authorities declared the property to be an evacuee trust property attached to a Dharamshala and thus void ab initio, demanding rent and initiating cancellation proceedings under the Act. The core legal question was whether a Provisional Transfer Order coupled with full payment of the transfer price satisfies the statutory requirements for validation under section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, even in the absence of a Permanent Transfer Deed issued prior to June, 1968, and whether such an auction purchase constitutes a transfer in satisfaction of a verified claim. The court held that a Provisional Transfer Order is distinct from a Permanent Transfer Deed and cannot attain its status. For validation under section 10(1)(b) of the Act, both a bona fide transfer in satisfaction of a verified claim and the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed prior to June, 1968, are mandatory and cumulative conditions. Since the property was an evacuee trust property excluded from the compensation pool, the auction purchase by a non-claimant was void, and the lack of a Permanent Transfer Deed prior to the cut-off date precluded validation. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Provisional Transfer Order can be treated as equivalent to a Permanent Transfer Deed for the purposes of validation under section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
  • Does the purchase of an urban evacuee trust property by a non-claimant in an auction through an agreement of association with a claimant constitute a transfer in satisfaction of a verified claim under the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
  • Are the requirements of a bona fide transfer and the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed prior to June, 1968, mandatory for validating the transfer of an urban evacuee trust property under section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
  • Whether immovable evacuee properties attached to charitable, religious, or educational trusts could legally form part of the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
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• Mst. Majida Begum vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and others1990 SCMR 970 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-17
  settlement lawtransfer of propertyNCH formplinth areawrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the concurrent orders of settlement authorities and the Lahore High Court regarding the transfer of property under settlement laws. The core legal question concerns the propriety of rejecting the petitioner's NCH form and the extent of property lawfully transferable to the respondent as a 'house' including three times the plinth area. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the respondent was legally entitled to the annexe and the permissible plinth area, and that the petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn her application under Settlement Scheme No. VI. The Court laid down the principle that an occupant's claim to excess land or transfer under settlement forms remains subject to the prior lawful entitlement of the primary transferee regarding the plinth area, and concurrent factual findings by settlement authorities upheld by the High Court warrant no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an applicant is entitled to the transfer of property on an NCH form notwithstanding the voluntary withdrawal of an application under Settlement Scheme No. VI?
  • Does a primary transferee of a house under settlement laws have an entitlement to three times the plinth area in their possession?
  • Can concurrent findings of settlement authorities regarding the disposal of excess property be interfered with without legal justification?
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• Mst. Kishwar Sultana vs Municipal Corporation Faisalabad, through Mayor1990 MLD 1927 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khurshid Begum vs Qamar Ud Din And Other1990 CLC 1463 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-26
  ejectment applicationrent defaultstatutory noticeSection 13-Alandlord and tenantsubstantial compliancewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an appellate order which dismissed an ejectment application against a tenant solely due to the absence of a formal notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The core legal question was whether the filing of an ejectment petition itself constitutes substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirement under Section 13-A. The High Court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, held that the filing of an ejectment petition provides the tenant with sufficient knowledge of the landlord's title and entitlement to rent, thereby serving as substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirement. Consequently, the appellate court's dismissal of the petition based on the lack of formal notice was set aside. The High Court ruled that the appellate authority must decide the case on its merits, specifically regarding the issue of rent default, which had not been adjudicated. The matter was remanded to the District Judge for an expeditious decision on the remaining issues, affirming that formal notice is not an absolute bar when the tenant has actual knowledge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of an ejectment petition constitute substantial compliance with the notice requirement under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an ejectment petition solely for lack of formal notice under Section 13-A when the tenant has actual knowledge of the landlord's claim?
  • Is a tenant relieved of the obligation to pay rent during the pendency of an ejectment application until an order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 is passed?
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• Mst. Khurshid Begum vs Mir Muhammad And 8 Other1990 CLC 1614 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-03-24
  compromisecivil revisiondeclaration suitequity of redemptionremand of casejurisdiction failure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the concurrent dismissal of her suit for declaration regarding the equity of redemption of a property. She claimed the property was sold to her orally by defendant No.1, who later executed a sale-deed in favour of defendant No.2. During trial, an application for recording a compromise between the parties was submitted. The trial court examined witnesses regarding the compromise but ultimately dismissed the suit on merits without recording any finding on the genuineness of the compromise, a decision affirmed in appeal. The Peshawar High Court held that under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, it is a mandatory requirement for the court to record a finding either accepting or refusing a compromise when proved to its satisfaction, especially since an order under this provision is appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1 Clause (m). The High Court set aside the judgments of both courts below and remanded the matter to the trial court to first decide the validity of the compromise, and if rejected, to afford the parties an opportunity to lead evidence on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court legally bound to record a finding on a compromise agreement presented by the parties under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether an order refusing or recording a compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3 is appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What is the course of action for an appellate or revisional court when the trial court fails to adjudicate upon a lawful compromise reached between the parties?
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• Mst. Khalida Rehman and 2 others vs Muhammad Aqil and another1990 MLD 60 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kausar Bibi vs Muhammad Mushtaq And 6 Other1990 CLC 1205 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-11-22
  partition suitimpleadment of partiesnecessary partycivil revisioncase decidedjoinder of partiesmultiplicity of litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arose from a dispute regarding the impleadment of respondents 3 to 7 in a partition suit. The petitioner challenged the trial court's order allowing these respondents to be joined as parties, arguing that the suit did not involve inter se controversies among heirs and that the application was mala fide. The Peshawar High Court rejected these contentions, affirming that in a partition suit, all heirs and persons claiming an interest in the joint property are necessary and proper parties. The Court held that the trial court is duty-bound under Order XX Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to judicially ascertain all interested persons to ensure a proper decree. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an order impleading a party is not appealable, and a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is incompetent unless the order constitutes a 'case decided' that prejudices legal rights. Finding that the impleadment advanced justice and prevented multiplicity of litigation, the Court dismissed the petition in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Are all heirs and persons claiming an interest in joint property necessary parties in a partition suit?
  • Is an order directing the impleadment of a party in a pending suit appealable?
  • Does an order impleading a party in a pending suit constitute a 'case decided' for the purposes of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a trial court order the impleadment of parties in a partition suit even without a formal application?
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• Mst. Kaneez Bibi vs Muhammad Bakhsh and others1990 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-21
  child custodywelfare of the minorconstitutional petitionleave to appealguardian and wardcustody dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging an order of the District Judge regarding the custody of a minor. The petitioner, the mother of the minor, sought to restore the order of the Guardian Judge, which had originally granted her custody, arguing that her continued care and the minor's welfare necessitated her retaining custody. The Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings and noted that the High Court had thoroughly considered the relevant facts, finding no misreading or non-reading of evidence by the District Judge. The core legal question was whether the High Court's dismissal of the constitutional petition was legally sound. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment was in accordance with the law and declined to interfere, affirming that the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration in custody disputes. As the petitioner failed to raise any substantial legal point warranting interference, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the welfare of the minor the paramount consideration in child custody litigation?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court judgment that correctly evaluates the findings of a District Judge in a custody matter?
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• Mst. Jamila Hamid vs Atta Muhammad1990 SCMR 1651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-23
  ex parte decreelimitationfraudvoidable instrumentcivil appealexecution proceedingscompromise decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit filed by the appellant challenging an ex parte decree and subsequent execution proceedings on the grounds of fraud. The central legal question was whether the suit, which sought to set aside these judicial orders, was barred by limitation under Article 95 of the Limitation Act, 1908, or whether the claim for fraud was merely ancillary to a declaration of title. The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s suit was indeed time-barred. The Court reasoned that because the appellant had previously entered into a compromise regarding the ex parte decree, the decree was not void ab initio but merely voidable. Consequently, the appellant was required to seek the setting aside of the decree within the statutory period prescribed by Article 95. The Court established that a party cannot blow hot and cold by accepting the validity of a decree through a compromise and subsequently challenging it as fraudulent. As the primary relief sought required the nullification of the previous judicial orders, the suit was governed by the limitation period for setting aside fraudulent decrees.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit to set aside a decree on the grounds of fraud governed by Article 95 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a party challenge an ex parte decree as fraudulent after having previously entered into a compromise agreement acknowledging its validity?
  • Does a voidable instrument remain operative until it is set aside by a competent court?
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• Mst. Irshad Fatima vs Aijaz Nassar1990 MLD 1758 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Irshad Begum vs The State and others1990 SCMR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  private defenseright of self-defenseforcible dispossessionsuppression of injuriesacquittal appealcriminal trespassburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondents in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the respondent, Shujat Ali, exceeded the right of private defense of person and property by inflicting a fatal knife injury on the deceased, Usman, during a confrontation over the possession of a room. The prosecution alleged murder, while the defense claimed the deceased and his companion initiated the conflict by attempting to forcibly dispossess the respondent. The High Court had acquitted the respondents, noting the prosecution's suppression of injuries sustained by the accused and the lack of credibility in the prosecution's version. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding that the circumstances established a plausible case for the exercise of the right of private defense. The Court held that when the prosecution suppresses injuries on the accused and the complainant party initiates a forcible dispossession, the accused's plea of self-defense is justified, and the force used does not constitute an excess of that right.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused by the prosecution entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Can the right of private defense of person and property be invoked when the deceased initiates a forcible dispossession of the accused's property?
  • Is an acquittal based on the finding that the accused acted in self-defense liable to be set aside if the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on the accused?
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• Mst. Iqbal Bibi vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1831 · Federal Shariat Court · 1990-06-14
  post-arrest bailheroin recoveryjudicial remandnon-cognizable offencemandatory search provisionsprocedural lapsecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition was filed under Article 203-DD of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by Mst. Iqbal Bibi challenging the lower courts' orders refusing her post-arrest bail in a case involving the alleged recovery of 130 grams of heroin from her house. The core legal questions revolved around the legality of continued detention without proper judicial remand under section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the non-compliance with mandatory search provisions under section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the investigation of a non-cognizable offence without a Magistrate's order under section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Federal Shariat Court accepted the petition and held that procedural lapses in investigation, search, and the absence of a valid judicial remand, combined with compassionate grounds regarding the petitioner's status as a young lady, warranted the grant of bail. The court laid down that violation of mandatory procedural safeguards during search and detention entitles an accused to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to obtain continuous judicial remand under section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 justify the release of an accused on bail?
  • Does non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 during a house search render the recovery defective for the purpose of bail?
  • Can an investigation into a non-cognizable offence be conducted without the order of a Magistrate under section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether infirmities in investigation and search, coupled with compassionate grounds, constitute sufficient basis for granting post-arrest bail?
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• Mst. Iqbal Begum vs Punjab Province and 3 others1990 PLD Lahore 178 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Iffat Masood and 2 others vs Rehmat Ali1990 PLD Lahore 359 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-21
  default of appearancedeath of appellanttermination of counsel authoritynullity of orderlegal representativessubstitutioninherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from an order dismissing an appeal for default of appearance and a subsequent order refusing its restoration. The core legal question was whether an appeal could be validly dismissed in default when the appellant was already deceased at the time, and whether the authority of a counsel survives the client's death. The Lahore High Court held that upon the death of a client, the power of attorney given to a counsel terminates, and a dead person cannot be treated as a defaulter; consequently, any order dismissing a suit or appeal for default in appearance passed in ignorance of a party's death is a complete nullity. The court laid down the principle that procedural rules regarding default in appearance do not apply to a deceased litigant, and courts possess inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alongside provisions of Order XXII, to rectify such null and void orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power of attorney given to an advocate survive the death of the client?
  • Can an appeal or suit be legally dismissed for default of appearance when the party is already dead?
  • What is the effect of an order dismissing an appeal for default passed in ignorance of the appellant's death?
  • What are the remedies available to the legal representatives of a deceased appellant against whom an order of dismissal in default was passed?
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• Mst. Hussain Jan And 5 Others vs Mst. Channo Bi1990 CLC 1591 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-06
  sale deednon-payment of considerationpassing of titleoral evidencefraudulent transactioncivil revisionburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which decreed a suit for declaration of title in favor of the plaintiff-respondent after annulling a registered sale deed. The core legal questions concerned whether a vendor can prove non-payment of consideration despite a recital in the sale deed acknowledging receipt, and whether title passes if the sale price remains unpaid. The High Court held that a recital of payment in a sale deed is a statement of fact, not a term of the contract; therefore, Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872 does not bar a party from leading oral evidence to prove that consideration was not actually paid. The Court further affirmed that while the registration of a sale deed generally transfers title, this is subject to the parties' intention. Where evidence establishes that the parties intended ownership to transfer only upon payment, and such payment was never made, the transaction is ineffective. The revision petition was dismissed, upholding the lower courts' findings that the sale was fraudulent and title did not pass.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party lead oral evidence to prove that the consideration mentioned in a registered sale deed was not actually paid?
  • Does the recital of payment in a sale deed constitute a term of the contract that cannot be contradicted under Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872?
  • Does title to land pass upon the execution of a sale deed if the parties intended that ownership would only transfer upon payment of the sale price?
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• Mst. Hayat Bibi alias Badri Jamala vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 416 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hawwa And Others vs Karim Bakhsh And Other1990 CLC 1869 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hamida Mullick vs Syed Mushfiq Ali Zaidi1990 MLD 325 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hafeez Begum and others vs Muhammad Yousaf and others1990 SCMR 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-10
  petition for leave to appealpre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptioncollateralEvidence Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the petitioners' regular second appeal arising from a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns whether the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners possessed a superior right of pre-emption as a collateral of the vendor, and how this relationship is established under the law of evidence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the vendee was a collateral of the vendor in accordance with the test laid down by section 50 of the Evidence Act and consequently held a superior pre-emptive right against the respondent. The key principle laid down is that the establishment of relationship for determining superior pre-emption rights must be tested against the statutory provisions governing opinion as to relationship by blood.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Muhammad Afzal vendee was a collateral of Muhammad Naseeb vendor in accordance with the test laid down by section 50 of the Evidence Act?
  • Does a collateral have a superior pre-emptive right as against a respondent claiming through ownership in the estate?
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• Mst. Gul Part and others vs Said Ul Arifeen alias Khan Mull1990 PLD Peshawar 36 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Fatima vs Province of Punjab and others1990 SCMR 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-04
  compulsory acquisitionland compensationpotential value of landleave to appealagricultural landvaluation of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had partially allowed the petitioner's appeal regarding compensation for compulsorily acquired land. The petitioner, dissatisfied with the compensation awarded by the Senior Civil Judge, Sialkot, had sought higher compensation for her agricultural land and house. While the High Court granted additional compensation in the form of a 15% compulsory acquisition allowance and 8% compound interest from the time of possession, the petitioner contended that the courts below failed to adequately consider the potential value of the land. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the petitioner's submission regarding the potential value of the land, noting the reliance on previous judicial precedents. Finding that the issue of potential value deserved further consideration, the Court granted leave to appeal. The decision establishes that the determination of compensation for compulsorily acquired land must properly account for the potential value of the property, and where such consideration is alleged to be missing, the matter warrants a full hearing by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of lower courts to consider the potential value of compulsorily acquired land constitute a valid ground for granting leave to appeal?
  • Is the determination of compensation for land acquisition subject to review if the potential value of the land was not adequately assessed?
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• Mst. Ghulam Fatima vs Maulvi Muhammad Saeed Rehmani and 9 others1990 MLD 117 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Fatima and another vs Mst. Sablan and 7 others1990 SCMR 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-10
  leave to appealpersonal appearancejudicial discretionnon-suitingcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had accepted the respondents' First Appeal from Order and restored the trial court's order non-suiting the petitioners. The petitioners had failed to appear personally in court as required under Order X, Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court observed that the grounds urged, particularly regarding the proper exercise of judicial discretion under the second part of sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order X, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whether such discretion should have been exercised against female plaintiffs under the circumstances of the case, required detailed examination. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal subject to furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a party to appear personally in court under Order X Rule 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 automatically warrant non-suiting without specific examination of discretion?
  • How should judicial discretion under the second part of sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order X of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be exercised in the case of female litigants?
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• Mst. Ghulam Fatima And 6 Others vs Imam Bux Nasikh Saift Through Legal1990 CLC 1399 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Fatima and 3 otherss vs Talib Hussain and 3 others1990 MLD 1782 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-15
  court-feesextension of timefunctus officiodefault clauserejection of plaintfatal accidents
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two civil miscellaneous applications filed by the plaintiffs seeking an extension of time to pay deficient court-fees and amendment of a judgment passed under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, where the suit had been decreed in favor of the widow and minor children of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the High Court retained jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of court-fees or amend the judgment after a conditional decree had been passed stating that the plaint would stand rejected upon default of payment within thirty days. The court held that because the default clause was self-operating and the prescribed period had elapsed without payment, the decree became operative of its own force, rendering the court functus officio with no remaining seizin over the matter. The key principle laid down is that where a judgment or decree directs that a suit or plaint shall stand dismissed or rejected upon default of payment within a specified time, the provision operates automatically, and the court lacks power under sections 148, 149, or 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to enlarge the time once that period has expired.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court has the power to extend the time for payment of court-fees under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after the expiry of the period originally fixed by a self-executing decree?
  • Does a court become functus officio once it pronounces a judgment containing a conditional clause that the plaint shall stand rejected upon default of payment within a specified time?
  • Can an appellate or trial court modify a decree or enlarge time under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the default clause operates automatically of its own force?
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• Mst. Firdaus Begum vs The Additional District Judge and another's1990 MLD 1921 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fatimunnisa and others vs Mrs. Zubaida1990 SCMR 750 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-22
  rent evictioncondonation of delaydiscretionary jurisdictionrent arrearsappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sindh, which had set aside an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller. The Rent Controller had originally ordered the eviction of the respondent due to a failure to deposit rent arrears by the specified deadline of 10-11-1981, as directed by an earlier order dated 28-10-1981. The respondent appealed this eviction, arguing that the delay in depositing the rent was unintentional and caused by the respondent's counsel's absence from court due to illness on the date the order was passed, a claim supported by a medical certificate. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in condoning the delay in the deposit of rent. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its lawful discretionary jurisdiction in condoning the delay. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition in limine, affirming the principle that appellate courts possess the discretion to condone procedural delays where sufficient cause is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court condone a delay in the deposit of rent arrears if the failure to deposit was due to counsel's illness?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere with the discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court regarding procedural delays in rent matters?
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• Mst. Fatima and 3 others vs Malik Abdul Wahid (deceased) through his1990 SCMR 1221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-27
  rented landrent restrictionjurisdiction of rent controllerlease agreement interpretationtenancy disputeevictionbusiness purpose
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether a leased property constitutes 'rented land' under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The dispute arose from two lease agreements dated 1936 and 1939. The landlord sought eviction, alleging the land was let for business purposes (a fuel stall) and that the tenant had committed default and unauthorized subletting. The Rent Controller initially held the property was not 'rented land' and lacked jurisdiction, but the High Court reversed this, interpreting the lease deeds as creating a tenancy for business purposes. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the definition of 'rented land' under Section 2(f) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, which requires the land to be let separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade. The Court held that the 1939 lease agreement superseded the 1936 deed and contained no provision indicating the land was let for business or trade. Consequently, the Court ruled the property did not meet the statutory definition of 'rented land,' set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Rent Controller's order dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does land leased for the purpose of constructing and letting out residential houses fall within the definition of 'rented land' under the Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does a subsequent lease agreement supersede an earlier agreement regarding the permitted use of the property?
  • What is the statutory definition of 'rented land' under the Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
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• Mst. Farkhanda Akhtar vs Mian Naeemurrehman and 12 others1990 MLD 2148 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Falawat Jan and another vs The State1990 PLD Shariat Court (AJ&K) 1 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-06-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dani and 5 others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Vehari and others1990 SCMR 553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-18
  land settlementreallotmentrevisional ordernecessary partiesconstitutional petitionallotment cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal examines the validity of the reallotment of land previously allotted to the appellants, following conflicting claims and historical revisional orders passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner in November 1956. The core legal question concerns whether a previous constitutional judgment setting aside the cancellation of allotments operates in favour of the allottees against third parties who were not impleaded in those earlier proceedings, and whether rights acquired through subsequent confirmed allotments can be reopened after a significant lapse of time. The Supreme Court held that judgments in constitutional petitions do not bind persons who were not made parties to the proceedings, and failure to implead necessary parties or their legal representatives is fatal to the challenge against those specific allotments. The Court laid down that in settlement matters where rights are traceable to official allotments rather than mere possession, allottees cannot remain oblivious to competing allotments made to third parties, and un-challenged concluded settlement transactions of 1958 cannot be reopened decades later.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment in a constitutional petition setting aside an allotment cancellation binds parties who were not impleaded in that petition?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained against a deceased person without timeously bringing their correct legal representatives on record?
  • Does mere long-standing physical possession excuse an allottee from challenging competing settlement allotments made to third parties within the statutory framework?
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• Mst. Bismillah Bano and 9 others vs The Member, Board of Revenue1990 MLD 977 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Shahida vs Mst. Bibi Nawab Jana And 4 Other1990 CLC 1905 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-03-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Musarrat vs Sarfaraz1990 CLC 1908 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-05-23
  past maintenanceMuslim Family Lawsmaintenance of wifeconstitutional petitiondesertionFamily Courts Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by Mst. Bibi Musarrat against the judgment of the District Judge, Mansehra, which had disallowed her claim for past maintenance. The core legal question was whether a Muslim wife is entitled to claim past maintenance from her husband in the absence of a prior agreement or court decree when she has been neglected or forced into involuntary desertion. The Peshawar High Court held that a neglected wife is indeed entitled to past maintenance, and arrears of maintenance constitute a debt upon the husband, provided she did not desert the conjugal abode or disobey without a valid cause. The absence of a prior agreement or decree does not bar her from recovering past maintenance. The Court set aside the appellate judgment and restored the wife's right to maintenance for the period of forced desertion up to the period of idat, following established precedents of the superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Muslim wife is entitled to a decree for past maintenance in the absence of a specific prior agreement or court decree?
  • Does the absence of a prior agreement or decree bar a neglected wife from claiming past maintenance from her husband?
  • Whether past maintenance is treated as a debt upon the husband under Islamic law when the wife is neglected without her fault?
  • What is the effect of involuntary desertion on a wife's entitlement to maintenance allowance?
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• Mst. Bhurian and others vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands)1990 SCMR 396 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-03
  leave to appealbogus allotmentlachessplitting of remediessettlement commissionerwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an Intra-Court Appeal dismissed by the High Court, which upheld the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the cancellation of land allotments by the Settlement Commissioner (Land) on the ground that they were bogus. Mst. Bhurian and her sisters had filed a second writ petition concerning allotments in village Manga Hithar after failing to include them in their earlier writ petition, which the High Court rejected for splitting grievances and for laches regarding the sisters. The core legal question is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the subsequent writ petition on the grounds of splitting of remedies and laches. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the question of laches did not properly arise for petitioners who were unaware of the cancellation order, and that it would be inequitable to oust long-term possessors solely on grounds of laches under the circumstances. The key principle laid down is that laches should not be strictly invoked against parties unaware of the impugned order who have long-standing possession, where equitable considerations warrant a substantive examination of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner can be barred from challenging an administrative order on the ground of splitting of remedies when multiple properties are involved?
  • Does the doctrine of laches apply to petitioners who were unaware of the cancellation order affecting their property rights?
  • Is it equitable to oust long-term possessors of land on the sole ground of laches without considering the circumstances of the case?
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• Mst. Bashiran Bibi vs Nisar Ahmad Khan and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-15
  cancellation of bailfurther inquirySection 497 Cr.P.C.oath on Holy Qur'anArticle 163 Qanun-e-Shahadatnon-bailable offencecriminal administration of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court order granting bail to accused respondents charged with non-bailable offences punishable with death involving the public stripping, assault, and humiliation of a woman. The complainant challenged the High Court's grant of bail, which was based on the premise that the case required 'further inquiry' after the accused swore innocence on the Holy Qur'an and after advocates submitted affidavits of innocence. The core legal questions pertained to the proper interpretation of subsection (2) of Section 497 Cr.P.C. regarding 'further inquiry' and the legal permissibility of oath proceedings in criminal matters. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and cancelled the respondents' bail. The Court held that under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C., bail cannot be granted on the mere ground of 'further inquiry' without a tentative conclusion that no reasonable grounds exist for believing the accused committed a non-bailable offence. Furthermore, under Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, oath proceedings are expressly inapplicable to criminal cases and cannot be approved by courts during bail proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. on the ground of 'further inquiry' without a finding that there are no reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed a non-bailable offence?
  • Does Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order apply to criminal proceedings or bail applications?
  • Can the High Court countenance oath proceedings on the Holy Qur'an to decide the guilt or innocence of an accused during bail proceedings?
  • Do affidavits filed by advocates in favour of an accused's innocence automatically create a case for 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bashiran Bibi And Others vs Additional District Judge And Other1990 CLC 901 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bashir Bibi and others vs Mst. Wallan Bibi and others1990 SCMR 1588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-22
  compromiseout-of-court settlementsuit for declarationannulment of giftpartition of propertyconsent decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, brought by leave of the Court, arose from a High Court judgment in a Regular Second Appeal that reversed an appellate court's decision in favor of the appellants and restored the trial court's decree in a suit for declaration seeking the annulment of a gift. Given the close familial relationship between the parties, the Supreme Court directed them to explore an out-of-court settlement. Consequently, the parties reached an amicable agreement and submitted a written compromise partitioning the disputed land among the legal heirs of the respondent, Mst. Wallan Bibi, in specified shares, with possession to be delivered by a set date. The Supreme Court found the compromise fair, practicable, and free of legal impediments. The Court accepted the compromise, made it the order of the Court, and directed that a decree be drawn up accordingly, disposing of the appeal in terms of the settlement with no order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of an appeal by recording and giving effect to a compromise agreement entered into by the parties?
  • Whether a compromise partitioning suit property among legal heirs can be accepted by the Court if it is found to be fair, practicable, and free of legal impediments?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Barkat Bibi and others vs Muhammad Rafique and others1990 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-10
  specific performanceagreement to reconveyunilateral offercontract formationjural obligationscivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to reconvey land, originally sold via oral mutation in 1953. The plaintiffs alleged that the purchaser, Muhammad Din, had executed an 'Iqrarnama' (agreement) on 24-7-1953, promising to reconvey the land upon payment of the original sale price. The trial court, the District Judge, and the High Court all decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court, however, examined the 'Iqrarnama' and found it to be a unilateral offer by the purchaser, lacking any signature or acceptance by the vendors. The core legal question was whether this document constituted an enforceable agreement. The Court held that because the document was merely a proposal and not a bilateral agreement, it did not create a legal relationship or jural obligations. Consequently, the suit for specific performance was incompetent. The Court distinguished this case from previous precedents where valid, bilateral agreements for reconveyance existed. The appeal was allowed, and the lower courts' judgments were set aside, establishing that a unilateral offer lacking acceptance cannot be specifically enforced.

  Questions settled

  • Does a unilateral offer to reconvey property, lacking acceptance by the other party, constitute an enforceable agreement?
  • Can a suit for specific performance be maintained on the basis of a document that does not qualify as a legal agreement?
  • What is the distinction between a mere proposal and an enforceable agreement in the context of specific performance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bakhtan Mai vs Murad Hussain And Other1990 CLC 1985 · Board of Revenue · 1989-11-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bakhshi and 5 others vs The Deputy Setttlement Commissioner1990 SCMR 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-18
  land allotmentrevisional orderjudgment in personamnecessary partiesconstitutional jurisdictionrehabilitation settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a batch of appeals examining the validity of the cancellation and readjustment of agricultural land allotments originally made in 1951 in Tehsil and District Vehari, following a general revisional order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner on 23-11-1956 annulling prior allotments due to widespread illegalities. The core legal question is whether subsequent allottees, whose rights accrued in 1958 before a stay order was issued, are bound by a subsequent constitutional judgment in favor of the original allottees when those subsequent allottees were not impleaded as parties in that prior writ petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that a judgment in personam does not bind parties who were not impleaded in the litigation, and therefore allotments finalized in favor of third parties in 1958 remained protected and could not be disturbed to the prejudice of those unrepresented parties. The key principle laid down is that the benefit of a judgment quashing an administrative order cannot prejudice third-party allottees whose independent allotment rights had already been proposed and confirmed, unless such third parties were formally joined as parties to the constitutional proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment annulling an administrative order in a writ petition binds third parties who were not impleaded as respondents in the proceedings?
  • Do prior allottees have a vested right to challenge intervening allotments made in favor of third parties who were not parties to the original constitutional litigation?
  • What is the legal effect of a general revisional order by a Rehabilitation Commissioner cancelling prior land allotments?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bakhi and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1706 · Federal Shariat Court · 1990-05-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bakhat Khatoon vs Awwal Jang and others1990 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  acquittalcorroborationcriminal appealappellate reviewsafe administration of criminal justicerecovery evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court, resulting in the acquittal of the respondents. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's appellate judgment, which acquitted the respondents due to a lack of corroborative evidence and the inconsequential nature of alleged recoveries, was legally justified or resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the appellate court had properly scanned the entire evidence and correctly determined that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses lacked necessary corroboration and that the recoveries were not connected to the crime. The Court held that the High Court's judgment aligned with the established principles governing the safe administration of criminal justice. Consequently, finding no grounds for interference, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that an acquittal based on a proper evaluation of evidence and lack of corroboration is legally sound.

  Questions settled

  • Does the lack of corroborative evidence for prosecution witnesses justify the acquittal of the accused?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an appellate judgment that has properly evaluated the evidence on record?
  • Are recoveries that are not connected to the crime sufficient to sustain a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bai And 3 Others vs Malla And 8 Other1990 CLC 1981 · Board of Revenue · 1989-12-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bachal Mai vs Allah Ditta and another1990 P Cr. L J 93 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Baboo Jana vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 326 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-11
  post-arrest bailwoman accusedsickness groundprohibitory clausecustoms offenceheroin recoveryjudicial discretionmedical board report
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal miscellaneous application filed by applicant Mst. Baboo Jana seeking post-arrest bail after being apprehended at Karachi Airport with over five kilograms of heroin powder, leading to a case registered under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal questions involved whether a female accused and a sick, elderly person facing a non-bailable offence falling within the prohibitory clause is entitled to bail as a matter of judicial discretion under the first proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and how expert medical reports should be evaluated by the courts. The Sindh High Court held that being a woman and an elderly sick person suffering from hypertension, osteoarthritis, and piles, combined with inadequate jail hospital facilities, her case warranted the grant of bail. The court laid down the principle that the first proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, empowers courts to exercise sound judicial discretion in favor of women, minors, and sick or infirm persons, even in heinous cases, and that a judge is not bound to surrender judicial judgment blindly to expert medical opinions lacking cogent reasoning.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a woman accused of an offence falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is generally entitled to the grant of bail as a matter of sound judicial discretion?
  • Is a court legally bound to surrender its judgment blindly to an expert medical board report regarding the health condition of an accused person?
  • Whether inadequate medical facilities in a jail hospital for an elderly and sick accused can be a ground for releasing the accused on bail under the first proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aziz Begum Etc. vs Federation of Pakistan Etc_K.L.R. 1990 Revenue Cases 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptionshariat appellate benchreview jurisdictionrepugnancy to islamabatement of suits
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses multiple petitions and appeals concerning pre-emption suits filed under Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913, where claims were based on co-sharership or contiguity. The core legal questions involve the true scope and effect of the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgment in Government of NWFP v. Said Kamal Shah regarding the repugnancy of Section 15 and Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 to the Injunctions of Islam, the jurisdictional competence of the Shariat Appellate Bench to review and clarify its own judgments under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and the status of pending suits and the effect of the subsequent Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance 1990. The court held that the Shariat Appellate Bench is an integral bench of the Supreme Court possessing inherent and constitutional powers of review under Article 188 of the Constitution, and that its explanatory judgment holding the entirety of Sections 15 and 30 to have ceased to have legal effect as from 31 July 1986 operates retrospectively as an explanation. Consequently, all pre-emption suits wherein no decree had been passed prior to 31 July 1986 stand abated, and pending petitions and appeals must be dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to review and clarify its own earlier judgments?
  • Did the judgment in Government of NWFP v. Said Kamal Shah render the entirety of Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 ineffective from 31 July 1986?
  • Are pre-emption suits in which no decree was passed prior to 31 July 1986 liable to abate following the declarations of repugnancy?
  • Whether the Shariat Appellate Bench is an independent court distinct from the Supreme Court or merely a bench thereof?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aziz Begum and others Khushi Muhammad Ali Muhammad and others S_f08dfdcb1990 PLD Supreme Court 899 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-02
  pre-emptionShariat Appellate Benchreview jurisdictionPunjab Pre-emption Act 1913repugnancy to injunctions of Islamabatement of suits
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses several petitions and appeals concerning pre-emption suits filed under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, based on co-sharership or contiguity. The core legal question revolves around the effect and scope of the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgment in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360) and its subsequent suo motu review judgment delivered on May 26, 1990, which declared that sections 15 and 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, ceased to have legal effect in their entirety from July 31, 1986. The Supreme Court held that the Shariat Appellate Bench is an integral part of the Supreme Court and possesses the inherent power under Article 188 of the Constitution to review and clarify its judgments, and that its explanatory review order takes effect retrospectively from the target date of July 31, 1986. Consequently, all pending pre-emption suits and appeals where no decrees were passed prior to July 31, 1986, stand abated and dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Shariat Appellate Bench's clarifications of its judgments are explanatory in nature and binding on all courts, rendering undecreed pre-emption claims ineffective during the interregnum period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to review and clarify its own judgments and orders?
  • Does the Shariat Appellate Bench constitute an independent court or an integral bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • What is the true legal effect of the Shariat Appellate Bench's review judgment regarding sections 15 and 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, on pending pre-emption suits?
  • Can pre-emption suits continue on the basis of repealed statutory provisions that ceased to have legal effect prior to the promulgation of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance, 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Azeemun Nisa Begum vs Alt Muhammad1990 PLD Supreme Court 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-21
  ejectmentdefault in rentlandlord and tenantagreement to sellpart performanceTransfer of Property Acttenant possessionrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh setting aside an ejectment order passed against the respondent tenant. The appellant landlady sought eviction on the grounds of subletting and wilful default in rent payment. The respondent resisted the ejectment by pleading an agreement to sell concerning the demised premises, arguing that under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, his possession had converted from that of a tenant to a vendee in part performance, thereby terminating the landlord-tenant relationship. The Rent Controller found in favor of the landlady on default and ordered eviction, which the High Court reversed. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the agreement to sell terminated the tenancy and satisfied the requirements of section 53-A. The Court held that an agreement to sell does not automatically terminate a prior tenancy unless there is an unequivocal stipulation or act converting the permissive possession into that of a vendee, such as exemption from rent or clear delivery of possession in the new capacity. Since the agreement contained no exemption from rent and merely stated possession was on a 'care-taker basis', the tenant failed to prove he continued in possession in part performance as a vendee. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Rent Controller's eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement to sell between a landlord and a tenant automatically terminates the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Can a tenant resist an ejectment application by invoking the doctrine of part performance under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act without proving exemption from rent?
  • What constitutes sufficient conversion of a tenant's permissive possession into possession as a vendee under an agreement to sell?
  • Does a clause designating possession on a care-taker basis in an agreement to sell suffice to terminate a prior tenancy agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Arsha Begum vs Habibullah And 4 Other1990 CLC 1812 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-04-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Arita Amjad And 2 Others vs Abbas Tayyab Dar And Another1990 CLC 1743 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-05
  partition suitadjournmentdismissal for defaultwant of proofrestoration of suitdouble defaultappellate powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This first appeal arose from a trial court's order closing the plaintiffs' evidence and dismissing their partition suit for want of proof in their absence. The Lahore High Court examined the distinction between Order XVII Rule 2 and Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court held that Rule 3 is penal in nature and applies only when time has been granted at the party's request to perform a specific act, the party is present or deemed present, and there is sufficient material on record for a decision on the merits. Since the adjournment was not at the plaintiffs' request and they were absent, Rule 3 was inapplicable. The proper course was to treat the dismissal as one for default under Rule 2. Exercising its appellate powers under Section 107, the High Court found sufficient cause for the plaintiffs' non-appearance, set aside the dismissal, and restored the suit for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • What are the necessary conditions for the application of Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to decide a suit forthwith?
  • Can a court dismiss a suit on the merits under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the absence of the plaintiff and without any evidence on record?
  • Whether an appellate court can convert an erroneous dismissal under Order XVII Rule 3 into a dismissal for default under Order XVII Rule 2 and restore the suit on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Anwar Begum alias Noor Begum vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1559 · Lahore High Court · 1989-08-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amna Bibi vs Muhammad Iqbal1990 CLC 1492 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-21
  civil revisioncompromise decreeauthority of counselvakalatnamareferee's statementadmissiondowry recoverydissolution of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from the dismissal of the petitioner-plaintiff's appeal by the District Judge, Okara, upholding a compromise decree passed in matrimonial and financial litigation between spouses. The core legal questions involved whether a party could resile from a compromise and an agreement to be bound by a third party referee's statement, and whether a counsel had the implied authority to bind the client through such a compromise statement. The Lahore High Court held that a compromise is a binding contract that cannot be unilaterally rescinded, and that a counsel acting under a Vakalatnama possesses implied authority to sign a compromise statement binding the client. Furthermore, the Court held that an agreement to be bound by a third person's statement operates as an admission under the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, preventing a party from avoiding its legal effects. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can resile from a compromise agreement and an undertaking to be bound by a referee's statement?
  • Does a counsel have the implied authority under a Vakalatnama to sign a compromise statement binding the client?
  • Can an agreement to be bound by a third person's statement operate as an admission under the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984?
  • Is a compromise decree passed on the basis of a joint statement and referee report appealable or revisable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Allawan Bibi alias Saha Bibi vs Umar Hayat and 4 others1990 P Cr. L J 1002 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Akhtarunnisa Begum vs Dr. Surayya Matin and others1990 MLD 1821 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Akber Sultan vs Murtaza Khan and others1990 SCMR 1344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-09
  stay orderstatus quoleave to appealscope of interim reliefcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application filed by the respondents for the vacation or clarification of a stay order granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on 29-6-1979 in a property dispute between Mst. Akber Sultan and Murtaza Khan and others. The core legal question concerned the exact scope and extent of the interim stay order and whether it covered the entire land or only a specific portion. The Court held and clarified that leave to appeal was granted solely in respect of Khasra No. 47/28 measuring 9 Kanals and 18 Marlas, and the dispute regarding the remaining land stood concluded by the trial court's unchallenged judgment and decree. The key principle laid down is that an interim stay or status quo order granted by an appellate court operates strictly within the confines of the subject matter for which leave to appeal has been granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does an interim stay order granted by an appellate court cover land outside the scope of leave to appeal?
  • Are decree-holders entitled to possession of land not subject to a pending appeal?
  • What is the effect of failing to challenge a trial court judgment and decree regarding a portion of disputed property?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aasia vs Mashhud Ahmed and another1990 P Cr. L J 847 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-22
  habeas corpuscustody of minorshizanatguardianshipjurisdiction of high courtminors of tender age
  Summary & questions settled

  This application under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was filed by a mother seeking the recovery and custody of her two minor children of tender age, alleging that their father deceitfully removed them and wrongfully confined them outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The core legal question involved whether a High Court can exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction for the custody of minors under Section 491, Cr.P.C., or if the matter falls exclusively within the domain of the Guardian Judge under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The Sindh High Court held that the remedies under Section 491, Cr.P.C. and the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 are not mutually exclusive, and in exceptional cases of illegal or improper removal of minors of tender age, the High Court can exercise its summary jurisdiction to restore custody to the lawful guardian without prejudice to regular adjudication by a Guardian Judge. The court established that a mother's right of hizanat is superior for infants and that removing minors to defeat court proceedings is illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is maintainable for the custody of minor children?
  • Do the remedies under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 overlap or exclude each other?
  • Can the High Court order the restoration of custody of minors of tender age removed outside its territorial jurisdiction?
  • What is the extent of the High Court's power to deal with minors in habeas corpus proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aalima Ahmed vs The State and another1990 P Cr. L J 989 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-20Read full judgment →
• Mst Aisha Begum vs Habibullah EtcK.L.R. 1990 Revenue Cases 162 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-04-30Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Yasmeen Lari vs Registrar, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal1990 PTD 967 · Sindh High Court · 1990-07-19
  constitutional petitionalternative remedyincome tax referenceself-assessment schemecomputer ballotremand orderjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions were filed by a husband and wife challenging the selection of their income tax returns for detailed scrutiny through a computer ballot under the Self-Assessment Scheme, the subsequent assessment and remand orders by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and the transfer of their appeals between Commissioners of Income Tax. The core legal question addressed by the court was whether constitutional petitions under Article 199 are maintainable when an equally adequate and efficacious alternative remedy by way of a reference to the High Court exists under section 136 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the statutory reference procedure under section 136 provides a comprehensive and adequate remedy capable of addressing questions of law, including jurisdictional errors, findings based on surmises, and matters of statutory construction, and that the High Court is fully competent to grant interim and ancillary relief in such references. Consequently, constitutional intervention is unwarranted unless exceptional circumstances of blatant mala fides or complete absence of jurisdiction are conclusively established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan are maintainable when an adequate alternative remedy by way of reference is available under section 136 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the scope of a reference under section 136 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, encompass questions of law arising from findings of fact based on conjectures, surmises, or no evidence?
  • Is the remedy by way of a tax reference under section 136 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, rendered inadequate due to procedural bottlenecks or lack of power to grant interim relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Shahnaz Sehgal vs Mrs. Fatima Ashraf and another1990 SCMR 920 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-08
  review petitionsub-tenantejectmentlandlord and tenantSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for review of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan which had recalled a previous order and dismissed an appeal arising from an ejectment proceeding. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner, a sub-tenant, was a lawful sub-tenant with the express consent of the landlady and whether her defence and tenancy rights were properly adjudicated by the Rent Controller and the High Court. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant's counsel was unable to demonstrate from the original record of the appeal that the sub-tenancy was created with the consent of the first respondent, and because new documents introduced in the review petition were not part of the original record and could have been produced earlier, no error apparent on the face of the record existed. The principle laid down is that a review petition cannot succeed on the basis of new documents not part of the original record when such documents were within the party's knowledge and could have been presented at the hearing of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be entertained on the basis of documents that were not part of the original record of the case and were within the knowledge of the party at the time of the hearing?
  • Is a Rent Controller required to decide the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant as a preliminary issue when denied by a sub-tenant?
  • What are the grounds for entertaining a review petition against a judgment of the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Sabiha Shahid Raza vs Ahmad Construction Company (Private)1990 PLD Karachi 191 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-09
  winding upcompanies ordinancestatutory noticeinability to pay debtscreditor petitioncommercial insolvency
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition filed under Section 309 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for the winding up of the respondent company on the ground that it is unable to pay its debts. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner, an allottee of a flat claiming refund and damages, fulfilled the mandatory statutory requirements of notice and debt under Section 306 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 to maintain a winding-up petition. The court held that the statutory notices issued by the petitioner were uncertain, ambiguous, and failed to comply with the thirty-day requirement under Section 306(a), and that the petitioner could not invoke Section 306(b) as she was not a decree-holder. The key principle laid down is that a statutory demand notice under the winding-up provisions must be clear, unambiguous, and strictly compliant with the statutory timeframes and formal requirements, and any defect renders the winding-up petition defective ab initio.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential legal requirements for a valid statutory demand notice under Section 306(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Can a person who is an allottee of property with disputed claims maintain a winding-up petition as a creditor without a clear and unambiguous debt?
  • Does the provision relating to unsatisfied execution under Section 306(b) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 extend to creditors who are not decree-holders?
  • What is the consequence of failing to provide the mandatory thirty-day notice period under Section 306(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 prior to filing a winding-up petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Razia Bhutta vs Deputy Director, Social Welfare, Multan and others1990 SCMR 925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-02
  service appealmisrepresentation of ageforged certificatedismissal from serviceleave to appealfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, employed as an auxiliary worker in the Social Welfare Directorate, was dismissed from service after being found to have misstated her age and produced a forged birth certificate at the time of joining. Her departmental appeal and subsequent appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal were both dismissed. The petitioner then sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the concurrent finding of fact regarding misrepresentation in obtaining employment was sustainable and justified dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal's finding of fact regarding the misstatement of age suffered from no infirmity, and once employment was established to have been obtained through misrepresentation, the Directorate was fully justified in terminating the service. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that employment obtained through misrepresentation or fraud can be lawfully terminated by the employer upon establishing the finding of fact regarding such misstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employment obtained through misrepresentation of age and a forged certificate can be lawfully terminated?
  • Does a finding of fact by the Service Tribunal regarding misstatement of age warrant interference when it suffers from no infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Nishat Aslam vs Messrs Becon House Public School (Pvt.) Ltd.1990 PLC 675 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-01-30
  workmanschool teachercommercial establishmenttermination of serviceburden of proofgrievance petitionback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of the Sindh Labour Court dismissing the appellant's grievance petition as not maintainable. The appellant, employed as a school teacher by a private limited company running a chain of schools, had her services terminated, prompting her to file a grievance petition under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The core legal questions involved whether a school teacher qualifies as a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, whether the burden of proof regarding the number of employees lies on the employer, and whether a private limited company running schools is exempt from labour laws as an educational institution. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that teaching involves manual and clerical work such as writing on blackboards, qualifying the teacher as a workman; that the burden to prove the threshold of employees lay upon the employer; and that a profit-making private limited company running schools does not enjoy blanket exemption from the Standing Orders Ordinance. The Tribunal established that stating 'services no longer required' in a termination order violates Standing Order 12(3) when actual reasons relate to misconduct, thereby setting aside the termination and ordering reinstatement with back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a school teacher employed by a private institution performs manual or clerical work so as to qualify as a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does the burden of proof regarding the number of employees employed in an establishment lie upon the employer when the applicability of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is disputed?
  • Whether a private limited company operating schools for profit is exempt from the application of labour laws as an educational institution?
  • Does the statement that services are 'no longer required' constitute a valid and sufficient reason for termination under Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
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• Mrs. Munasingh Arachchige vs The StatePTCL 1990 CL. 555 · Special Appellate Court Customs · 1989-09-14Read full judgment →
• MRS. Malika Jabeen Abbas vs Chief Secretary to Govt. of Sindhh Etc.K.L.R.1990 Labour & Service Cases 226 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1990-05-23Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Majeeda Fatima vs District Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner, District Central, Karachi and 3 others1990 PLD Karachi 470 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-23
  preventive detentionMaintenance of Public Orderjudicial reviewobjective satisfactionvague groundsconstitutional petitionquashment of detention
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the detention of her husband under Section 3(1) of the Sindh Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, issued by the District Magistrate, Karachi Central, ordering his detention for 30 days. The detention was based on a police report asserting vague grounds that the detenu had nefarious designs, created unrest, and instigated people against the Government, without detailing specific instances. The High Court considered whether executive satisfaction under Section 3 must be objective and substantiated by sufficient material subject to judicial review. The Court held that the statutory satisfaction must be objective rather than subjective, precluding authorities from acting arbitrarily. The High Court possesses the constitutional authority to review the underlying material to ensure lawful exercise of power. Since the respondents submitted no counter-affidavit, produced no supporting material, and relied on vague allegations without specific instances, the detention order lacked judicious application of mind. Consequently, the High Court quashed the detention order and ordered the detenu's immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the satisfaction of the detaining authority under Section 3 of the Sindh Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 must be objective in nature based on concrete material rather than subjective?
  • Can the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction require the executive authority to disclose the material underlying a preventive detention order?
  • Is a preventive detention order legally sustainable if it is based on vague and general allegations without any specific instances or supporting material?
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• Mrs. Mah-E-Rukh and 24 others vs The Literacy and Mass Education1990 PLC (C.S.) 628 · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-12Read full judgment →
• Mrs. M.N. Arshad and others vs Miss Naeema Khan and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil servant definitioncorporate body creationService Tribunal jurisdictionDepartmental Promotion Committeenon-statutory rules enforcementmodel educational institutionspromotion process
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arose from appeals challenging the Federal Service Tribunal's decision setting aside the promotion of an appellant to the post of Headmistress of Islamabad College for Boys and ordering fresh consideration. The core legal questions were whether teachers in Islamabad model educational institutions are civil servants or employees of a Board of Governors constituted via executive resolution, and whether the Service Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the composition of the Departmental Promotion Committee and enforce non-statutory service rules. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that an executive resolution without delegated statutory power cannot create a corporate or juristic body; thus, the teachers hold civil posts in connection with the affairs of the Federation and are civil servants under Section 2(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Court laid down that while the Tribunal cannot determine fitness under Section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, it has jurisdiction to review the lawful constitution of a promotion committee and can enforce consistently followed non-statutory departmental rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executive resolution by a Ministry legally create a juristic corporate body capable of employing staff without statutory authority or delegated legislation?
  • Does a teacher employed in an educational institution established and funded by the Federal Government in Islamabad qualify as a civil servant under Section 2(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does Section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 bar the Service Tribunal from examining whether a Departmental Promotion Committee was lawfully constituted?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal take cognizance of and enforce a breach of non-statutory departmental rules or instructions that have been continuously and consistently acted upon?
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• Mrs. Khalida Muzaffar vs Tariq Sultan, Secretary, Education1990 PLC (C.S) 754 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-21Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Jana Bai vs Mst. Gulshan and another1990 SCMR 1137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-02
  evictionpersonal requirementremandamendment of pleadingsleave to appealrent controlprejudice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which set aside an eviction order against a tenant and remanded the case to the Rent Controller. The landlords originally sought eviction based on personal requirement, specifically citing the needs of one respondent. However, during the trial, evidence was introduced regarding the requirements of the second respondent and his son. The High Court, identifying a conflict between the pleadings and the evidence, concluded that the tenant was prejudiced. Consequently, the High Court set aside the eviction order but remanded the case, granting the landlords permission to amend their pleadings. The petitioner challenged this remand and the amendment permission, arguing they were impermissible under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal, holding that if the initial setting aside of the eviction order was justified, the subsequent order of remand with leave to amend the pleadings constituted an eminently fair and equitable approach in the circumstances of the case, rendering further examination of the legal contentions unnecessary.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court remand a case to allow for the amendment of pleadings in an eviction matter?
  • Is it permissible to allow an amendment to pleadings when there is a conflict between the initial pleadings and the evidence presented at trial?
  • Does the appellate court have the discretion to order a remand to ensure a fair trial when pleadings are found to be deficient?
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• Mrs. Ghulam Fatima vs Director, Federal Government Educational1990 PLC (C.S.) 842 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1990-03-04Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Daud Sultana vs Director of Health Services, Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and another1990 PLC (C.S.) 785 · Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal · 1990-01-31Read full judgment →
• Mrs. B.S. Patel vs Messrs British Airways1990 PLC 772 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Aqeela Asghar Ali vs Miss Khalida Khatoon Malik and others1990 SCMR 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-21
  leave to appealservice tribunalservice mattersupreme court practicequestion of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from four separate petitions for special leave to appeal assailing the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, filed by both private parties and the Government who remained unsatisfied with the decision. The core legal question involves an important matter of law of public importance requiring an authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the petitions warrant detailed examination and accordingly granted leave to appeal in all four petitions, directing the appeals to be made ready on the present record with permission to file additional documents, while ordering the continuation of the interim order dated 10-5-1989. The key principle laid down is that matters involving substantial questions of law of public importance merit a full hearing and authoritative pronouncement by the apex court upon the grant of leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a service matter involving a question of law of public importance warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  • Can both private parties and the Government challenge a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal through petitions for special leave to appeal?
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• MRs, Shaila Joseph vs Chairman, Hazara Hill Tract Improvement Trust, Abbottabad and 3 others1990 MLD 807 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-12-10Read full judgment →
• Mr. Muhammad Khuram. In Re: Kotri Textile Mills Limited. vs MianPTCL 1990 CL. 1092 · Corporate Law Authority · 1990-09-24Read full judgment →
• Mr. M.M. Ansari vs Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others1990 SCMR 1538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-14
  service tribunalpromotionfitness for promotiondefermentdisciplinary caseleave to appealcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his supersession for promotion to the post of Cypher Officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The core legal question concerns whether an appeal lies against the deferment of promotion due to a pending disciplinary case and the determination of fitness for promotion. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Service Tribunal correctly dismissed the appeal pursuant to the statutory bar under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, which stipulates that no appeal lies against an order determining the fitness of a person to be promoted to a higher post. The key principle laid down is that matters relating to the fitness of a civil servant for promotion and the consequent deferment based on pending disciplinary proceedings do not furnish a valid ground for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie before the Service Tribunal against an order determining the fitness of a person to be promoted to a higher post?
  • Can a civil servant challenge the deferment of his promotion when a disciplinary case is pending against him?
  • Does the deferment of promotion due to pending disciplinary proceedings raise a question of fitness not appealable under the Service Tribunals Act?
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• MR. Khajoo Mal D. Bhuptani, Head Master. vs The Chief Secretary, Govt.K.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 122 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Moundar and others vs The State1990 PLD Supreme Court 934 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-01
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayhardened desperate or dangerous criminalfourth proviso to section 497(1) Cr.P.C.tentative assessmentpresumption of innocenceprior convictions
  Summary & questions settled

  These two consolidated criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan involved the interpretation of the expression "hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" occurring in the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). The appellants had sought post-arrest bail on the statutory ground of continuous detention exceeding two years without conclusion of trial. The High Courts had refused bail, holding them disentitled as dangerous, desperate, or hardened criminals based solely on prosecution allegations in the pending trial and lists of prior registered cases. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and granted bail. The Court held that the word "criminal" in the fourth proviso is not restricted to previously convicted persons, as that would render the proviso redundant. The Court ruled that judges may make a tentative assessment of the material in the pending case or extraneous material to form an opinion regarding whether an accused is a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal. However, mere registration of prior cases without examining their outcome, or unsupported prosecution allegations, is insufficient to deny statutory bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the expression "hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" in the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. apply only to previously convicted offenders?
  • Can a court rely on the prosecution evidence and allegations in the pending trial to form an opinion on whether an accused is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal?
  • Does the mere registration of prior criminal cases against an accused, without examining their nature and final outcome, suffice to classify the accused as a hardened criminal under Section 497(1) Cr.P.C.?
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• Moulvi Abdul Ghani vs Mir Muhammad Amin and others1990 SCMR 671 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-23
  ex parte decreerevisional jurisdictionprocedural defectsufficient causeamended plaintservice of processremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit where the petitioner obtained an ex parte decree against the respondents. The trial court had proceeded ex parte despite the fact that an amended plaint, as previously ordered, had not been filed, and the legal heirs of a deceased defendant had not been served. The respondent challenged the ex parte decree, citing illness as the reason for his absence on the date of the hearing, supported by a medical certificate. The High Court set aside the ex parte decree and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication, observing that the proceedings were defective due to the failure to file the amended plaint and serve the heirs. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the trial court's proceedings were premature and defective. The Court held that where a party provides a plausible explanation for absence, supported by medical evidence, and where the suit itself is not ripe for final adjudication due to procedural defects like non-service of heirs or failure to file amended pleadings, an ex parte decree cannot be sustained.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ex parte decree be sustained if the suit proceedings were procedurally defective due to the failure to file an amended plaint?
  • Is a medical certificate sufficient to establish 'sufficient cause' for setting aside an ex parte order due to absence?
  • Does the failure to serve newly-impleaded heirs of a deceased defendant render subsequent ex parte proceedings against other defendants defective?
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• Moula Bakhsh vs Muhammad Zahid and another1990 PLD Supreme Court 596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-08
  withdrawal of suitfresh suitOrder XXIII Rule 1 C.P.C.indivisible applicationcivil revisionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a civil revision, which stemmed from an appellate court order permitting the plaintiff to withdraw his suit but refusing permission to re-file it under Order XXIII of the C.P.C. The core legal question was whether an application under Order XXIII, Rule 1, C.P.C. for withdrawal of a suit with permission to bring a fresh suit is an indivisible prayer that must be accepted or rejected as a whole. The Supreme Court held that the application is indivisible, and a court cannot permit the withdrawal of a suit while refusing permission to institute a fresh suit on the same subject-matter. The Court laid down the principle that the right to bring a fresh suit follows the withdrawal permitted under sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII, C.P.C., and such an application must be treated as one and indivisible, meaning the court must either accept or reject both prayers together.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application for the withdrawal of a suit and permission to file a fresh suit under Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. to be treated as indivisible?
  • Can a court allow the withdrawal of a suit while simultaneously refusing permission to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter?
  • Does the right to bring a fresh suit follow the withdrawal permitted under sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure?
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• Momen Khan vs Thestate1990 P Cr. L J 951 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-21Read full judgment →
• Molasses Trading & Export Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan1990 MLD 893 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-05Read full judgment →
• Molasses Trading & Export Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Govemment Of PakistanPTCL 1990 CL. 669 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mohyuddin and anothers vs Muhammad Ashraf and 4 others1990 MLD 1243 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-01Read full judgment →
• Mohsab Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1510 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-25Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Yakoob vs Director School Education, Sukkur Region, Sukkurand 5 OtherK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 266 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1989-10-02Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Saleh vs Commissioner Sukkur EtcK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 211 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1989-11-23Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ramzan vs Rafhan Maize Product Etc.K.L.R. 1990, Labour & Service Cases 263 · Lahore High Court · 1988-02-02Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Bashir vs Lal DinK.L.R. 1990 Revenue Cases 129 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-21Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Azhar vs Gjvi.WAPDAK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 243 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-24Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Asif vs Secretary to Govt EtcK.L.R.1990 Labour & Service Cases 235 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-06Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Asif vs Secretary Govt of Punjab Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Labour and Service Cases 319 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-20Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Arshad Kalim vs Chairman Town Committee Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 205 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-07Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Amin vs Divisional Forest Officer, Swari(Daggar) SwatK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 260 · Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal · 1989-05-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Badar UN Nisa And Others vs Tufail Ahmad1990 CLC 1154 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-17Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ali Patwari vs Consolidation Officer Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Revenue Cases 145 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-12Read full judgment →