Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• M. A. HAMID REHMANI AND 6 OTHERS vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, IRRIGATION & POWER DEPARTMENT1982 PLC (C. S.) 494 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• M. A. GHAFOOR vs SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION AND 2 OTHERS1982 PLC (C. S.) 547 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1981-12-20Read full judgment →
• LT. COL. Sardar FAROOQ SHAUKAT KHAN LODHI vs TALEH MUHAMMAD ETC.S1982 SCMR 886 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-30
  tenancy resumptionColonization of Government Landsrectification of breachwrit jurisdictionwithdrawal of suittenancy renewal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the terms and conditions of a tenancy under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The core legal questions presented to the Supreme Court involve the procedural requirements for the resumption of tenancy following a breach of conditions. Specifically, the Court is tasked with determining whether the resumption of a tenancy is contingent upon affording the tenant an opportunity for rectification, and how Section 27 of the Act interacts with the rectification provisions found in Section 24 and the relevant Scheme. Furthermore, the Court must examine the relationship between clauses (xxvi) and (xxix) of the Scheme regarding rectification opportunities. Additionally, the petition questions the propriety of granting relief in writ jurisdiction when the initial tenancy period had expired without renewal, and when the respondent had previously withdrawn a civil suit concerning the same grievance without obtaining permission to refile. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to resolve these issues, emphasizing the necessity of interpreting the statutory framework governing state land tenancies.

  Questions settled

  • Is the resumption of a tenancy under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, subject to providing the tenant an opportunity for rectification?
  • What is the effect of Section 27 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, on the rectification provisions contained in Section 24?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained regarding a tenancy dispute if the petitioner previously withdrew a civil suit on the same matter without permission to refile?
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• LOUNG KHAN AND 2 Others vs MUHAMMAD JUMMAN AND 2 OTHERS1982 P Cr. L J 1039 · Sindh High Court · 1982-04-21
  quashment of proceedingsprivate complaintcivil disputeabuse of processSection 249-A CrPCSection 561-A CrPCpreliminary inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated via a private complaint against the applicants for alleged offenses under Sections 419, 423, 465, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether an accused must first exhaust the remedy under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before approaching the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of a private complaint. The Court held that the requirement to move the trial court first, as established in police cases, is distinguishable in private complaints where the Magistrate has already issued process after a preliminary inquiry. Requiring an application under Section 249-A in such instances would be a futile exercise. Consequently, the Court determined that the underlying dispute was purely civil in nature, involving conflicting claims over land ownership and registered sale deeds. Finding that the criminal proceedings were an abuse of the court's process, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the pending proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to move the trial court under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before filing a petition for quashment under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a private complaint case?
  • Does the term 'prosecutor' in Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 refer exclusively to a Public Prosecutor?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed when the underlying dispute is essentially of a civil nature?
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• LOUNG ANU 2 Others vs Tile STATE1982 P Cr. L J 1069 · Sindh High Court · 1982-04-10Read full judgment →
• LONDON ASSURANCE Co. LTD. vs AINI AMIN NIZAMI AND 6 Other1982 PLD Karachi 841 · Sindh High Court · 1982-05-18Read full judgment →
• LIBERTY MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs S. M. YOUNUS AND 2 OTHER1982 CLC 616 · Sindh High Court · 1981-10-14Read full judgment →
• LIAQUAT RAFI vs THB STATE1982 P Cr. L J 1049 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-15Read full judgment →
• LIAQUAT ALI vs The STATE1982 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-18
  leave to appealmurdersolitary witnessappreciation of evidencedeath sentencemitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the sentence of death for the murder of his paternal-uncle. The core legal question involves the sufficiency of solitary ocular testimony and the presence of mitigating circumstances regarding the manner of occurrence and age. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appreciation of evidence and the credibility of witnesses are questions of fact, and in the absence of any violation of legal principles governing the appreciation of evidence, interference is unwarranted. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not reappraise evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless a legal principle regarding evidence appreciation has been violated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a solitary eye-witness is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Can the Supreme Court reappraise evidence in a criminal petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the absence of evidence regarding how an occurrence began constitute a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence?
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• LIAQAT vs The STATE1982 SCMR 1085 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-22
  leave to appealappreciation of evidencecriminal revisionconvictionSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of their criminal revision by the High Court, which had maintained their conviction and sentence under sections 366 and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 as passed by a Magistrate Section 30, Lahore. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether re-appreciation of evidence is a valid ground for granting leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent appreciation of evidence by the lower courts cannot be re-examined merely on the ground that the courts below failed to correctly appreciate the evidence, as this does not constitute a valid ground for the grant of leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, laying down the principle that the Supreme Court will not grant leave to appeal solely on the contention of incorrect appreciation of evidence by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Is incorrect appreciation of evidence by lower courts a valid ground for the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence?
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• LIAQAT SHAH AND 4 Others vs The STATE1982 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-04
  criminal appealappreciation of evidencecorroborationcapital sentencecompromisefalsus in uno falsus in omnibusleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal conviction for murder. The petitioners, five brothers, were convicted by the trial court for the murder of four individuals, receiving death sentences, which were maintained by the High Court. The prosecution case relied on eyewitness testimony and the recovery of firearms. However, the High Court acquitted a co-accused, Mst. Batan, noting that the prosecution had improved its case by falsely implicating her. The petitioners challenged their convictions, arguing that the unreliability of the prosecution's case regarding Mst. Batan necessitated independent corroboration for the remaining accused, which they contended was lacking for most petitioners. Additionally, the petitioners submitted a compromise deed between the parties. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-evaluate the evidence, specifically to determine whether the lower courts adhered to established principles of criminal evidence appreciation, particularly regarding the reliability of witnesses whose testimony was found partially fabricated, and to consider the legal implications of the compromise deed in a capital case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the finding that the prosecution improved its case by falsely implicating one co-accused necessitate independent corroboration for the conviction of the remaining accused?
  • What is the effect of a compromise deed on a conviction for murder in a capital case?
  • To what extent must evidence be reappraised when the prosecution's case is found to be partially unreliable?
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• LIAQAT AND Another vs LIAQAT AND Another1982 SCMR 960 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurdercriminal conspiracyfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which cancelled the bail granted to the petitioners by the Additional Sessions Judge in a case involving charges of murder and rioting. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting post-arrest bail to accused persons facing serious capital charges involving a brazen subsequent attack inside a hospital room while the deceased was under medical examination. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was entirely justified in cancelling the bail, as the reasons advanced by the Sessions Court were flimsy and premature, and the case involved active participation in a heinous crime not warranting the concession of bail under the law. The key principle laid down is that where the material on record and the specific roles attributed to the accused in a heinous crime prima facie connect them to the offence, the grant of bail by the lower court on superficial or premature grounds is unsustainable and liable to be interfered with by superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted on flimsy or premature grounds when an accused is charged with a capital offence?
  • Is a High Court justified in interfering with the discretion of a Sessions Court in granting bail if the order is based on premature findings?
  • Does a case fall under further inquiry merely because the distance to the scene of the crime is contested at the bail stage?
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• LIAQAT ALI vs THE STATE1982 PLD Lahore 539 · Lahore High Court · 1982-03-21Read full judgment →
• LEEMON vs Mst. KAZBANO AND 2 Other'1982 PLD Karachi 449 · Sindh High Court · 1982-01-30Read full judgment →
• LATIF AND 2 Others vs FAZAL DIN AND 2 Other1982 SCMR 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-26
  limitationcondonation of delayreview applicationallotment of landsettlement claimwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the cancellation of an allotment of agricultural land. The petitioners, legal heirs of a deceased claimant, had their allotment confirmed in 1957. A decade later, the first respondent challenged this allotment, leading to an order by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner cancelling a portion of the land. The petitioners' subsequent revision was dismissed by the Settlement Commissioner, and their writ petition was dismissed by the High Court in 1974. Instead of filing for leave to appeal, the petitioners filed a review application, which was also dismissed. The core legal question is whether the time spent pursuing an incompetent or time-barred review application can be excluded for the purpose of condoning the delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition was time-barred by eighty days. It ruled that the petitioners had no valid grounds for review, and since the review application itself was filed beyond the statutory limitation period, the time spent prosecuting it could not be excluded. The court affirmed that legal advice or being misguided by counsel does not constitute sufficient grounds for condoning delay.

  Questions settled

  • Can the time spent prosecuting an incompetent or time-barred review application be excluded when calculating the limitation period for a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the fact that a party was misguided by their advocate constitute sufficient ground for condoning a delay in filing a petition?
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• LATAFAT KARIM SIDDIQUI vs NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION LTD.1982 PLC 102 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-09-27Read full judgment →
• LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR AND Others vs HIKMAT KHAN AND Other1982 SCMR 1019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-19
  land acquisitionmarket value assessmentcompensation enhancementcomparable salesleave to appealvaluation methodology
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld an enhancement of compensation awarded by an Additional District Judge for land acquisition. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in determining the market value of the acquired land by relying on compensation rates fixed for an adjacent village, Topi, due to the absence of prior sale transactions in the subject village. The petitioner contended that the valuation relied upon by the lower courts was based on prices post-dating the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the petitioner failed to raise this specific objection before the High Court and could not demonstrate that any evidence regarding the market value of the lands prior to the notification had been placed on the record. The Court affirmed that in the absence of alternative evidence or methodology, the reliance on comparable valuations from adjacent areas was not legally infirm.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court rely on compensation rates from an adjacent village to determine market value when no prior sales occurred in the subject village?
  • Is a party permitted to raise a new ground of objection regarding valuation for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal?
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• LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR AND Another vs MUHAMMAD SALEEM AND Other1982 SCMR 1009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-09
  land acquisitionenhanced compensationtime-barred appealSupreme Court practicemistake of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition jointly recognized by the parties' counsel as constituting a direct appeal as of right due to the subject amount exceeding Rs. 50,000, having been mistakenly filed as a petition. The core legal question addressed is whether the respondents are entitled to an enhanced rate of compensation regarding their land share as assessed by the High Court, and how to dispose of the improperly designated filing. The court held, based on the joint statement and agreement of the learned counsel for both appellants and respondents, that the respondents are indeed entitled to the enhanced rate of compensation assessed by the High Court in its order dated 1-12-1980. However, the appeal itself stands dismissed as being time-barred, with no order as to costs. The key principle laid down relates to the procedural conversion of a mistaken petition into a direct appeal when meeting the pecuniary threshold, while maintaining the application of limitation periods resulting in the dismissal of a time-barred appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition mistakenly filed in the Supreme Court be treated as a direct appeal when the statutory pecuniary threshold is met?
  • Whether an appeal agreed upon by the parties regarding enhanced compensation can still be dismissed on the ground of being time-barred?
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• LAL ZARIF vs THE STATE1982 PLD Peshawar 148 · Peshawar High Court · 1982-07-12
  dying declarationmurderabsconsionmotiveappellate jurisdictioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal from jail challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his first cousin. The core legal question involves the reliability and evidentiary value of a dying declaration as the sole basis for a murder conviction, and whether it requires medical attestation or corroboration. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life. The court held that a genuine dying declaration made while the injured person is in full possession of their senses, free from prompting, and consistent with medical evidence and circumstances can form the sole satisfactory basis for a conviction. The key principle laid down is that the mere absence of a doctor's endorsement on a dying declaration does not affect its credibility if it is otherwise proved to be true, and such statements are further corroborated by the unexplained long absconsion of the accused and the existence of a strong motive.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dying declaration form the sole basis of a conviction for murder without medical endorsement?
  • Does the absence of a doctor's attestation affect the credibility of an otherwise genuine dying declaration?
  • What constitutes sufficient corroboration for a dying declaration in a murder case?
  • Can unexplained absconsion coupled with motive corroborate a dying declaration?
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• LAL MUHAMMAD AND 4 OTHERS vs Moulvi DOST MUHAMMAD AND 2 OTHERS1982 CLC 1781 · Sindh High Court · 1982-01-13Read full judgment →
• LAL MUHAMMAD AND 4 Others vs Moulvi DOST MUHAMMAD AND 2 OTHER1982 CLC 1781 · Sindh High Court · 1982-01-13Read full judgment →
• LAL KHAN vs GULAB KHAN1982 CLC 1991 · Lahore High Court · 1978-10-10Read full judgment →
• LAL DINO AND Others vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND Other1982 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-18
  limitation perioddismissal for non-prosecutionre-admission of appealtime-barred petitionresiduary articlecondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind High Court, which had dismissed an application for the re-admission of an appeal that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether an application for re-admission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution is governed by Article 168 (providing a thirty-day limitation period) or the residuary Article 181 (providing a three-year limitation period) of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court held that the application clearly fell under Article 168, as the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. Consequently, the High Court's dismissal of the application as time-barred was upheld. The Court further noted that the petition for leave to appeal itself was time-barred by thirty days without sufficient cause shown for the delay. The key principle laid down is that applications for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution are strictly governed by the specific limitation period prescribed in Article 168 of the Limitation Act 1908, rather than the residuary Article 181.

  Questions settled

  • Does an application for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution fall under Article 168 or Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is an application for re-admission of an appeal filed more than thirty days after the dismissal for non-prosecution time-barred?
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• LAL DIN vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 927 · Lahore High Court · 1982-03-14Read full judgment →
• LAL DIN vs Mst. KARIMAN BIBI1982 PLD Lahore 187 · Lahore High Court · 1981-12-11Read full judgment →
• LAL DIN AND Another vs RASUL BIBI1982 PLD Lahore 615 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-10Read full judgment →
• LAKHERA vs WARYAM1982 CLC 681 · Lahore High Court · 1980-10-31Read full judgment →
• LAKHA vs ATA MUHAMMAD AND 3 OTHERS1982 P Cr. L J 155 · Lahore High Court · 1981-05-11Read full judgment →
• Lahore] ALI MUHAMMAD AND Others vs MUHAMMAD HAYAT AND OTHERS1982 CLC 2383 · Lahore High Court · 1981-03-05Read full judgment →
• LAHORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-- vs Syed NAZIR HUSSAIN SHAH AND Other1982 PLD Lahore 461 · Lahore High Court · 1982-01-17
  revision petitionpermanent injunctionevacuee propertydemarcation plansettlement departmentrevisional jurisdictionlaches
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition was filed against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Lahore, which decreed a suit for permanent injunction in favor of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest, restraining the petitioner from interfering with his possession over a disputed piece of land adjacent to his house. The core legal question involved whether the disputed land was legally transferred to the plaintiff as part of an evacuee property by the Settlement Department, and whether the demarcation plan relied upon was valid despite not consulting the revenue record. The Lahore High Court held that the demarcation plan prepared by the Settlement Inspector and approved by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was a valid piece of evidence proving ownership, and that the petitioner failed to establish its own title to the land. Furthermore, the petition suffered from unexplained laches. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that findings based on proper appraisal of evidence do not warrant interference under revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a demarcation plan prepared by a Settlement Inspector without consulting the revenue record loses its evidentiary value regarding property transfer?
  • Is a revisional petition liable to be dismissed on the ground of unexplained delay in filing?
  • Whether concurrent or appellate findings based on a proper appraisal of evidence can be interfered with under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• LAHORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION vs Mian HAMID RASHID1982 CLC 1608 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-12Read full judgment →
• LAHORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs RAO DASTGIR AHMAD KHAN1982C L C 646 · Lahore High Court · 1981-11-22Read full judgment →
• L. H. SUGAR FACTORY AND OIL MILLS (P.) LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OE INCOME45 TAX 192 · Supreme Court of IndiaRead full judgment →
• MAQSOOD ALI vs THE STATE1982 PLD Karachi 352 · Sindh High Court · 1981-04-18Read full judgment →
• KUNJPURA KILN CO. vs COMMISSIONER OE INCOME TAX45 TAX 85 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1981-02-04Read full judgment →
• KOTRI ASSOCIATION OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY vs GOVERNMENT OF SINDH AND ANOTHER1982 CLC 1252 · Sindh High Court · 1982-06-03Read full judgment →
• KORANGI NO. 2 FALAHI COMMITTEE vs KARACHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY1982 CLC 587 · Sindh High Court · 1981-09-01Read full judgment →
• KOHINOOR RAYON LTD. vs NASEER AHMAD AND 5 OTHERS1982 PLC 709 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-12-21Read full judgment →
• KOHINOOR RAYON LTD. vs MUHAMMAD YAQOOB1982 PLC 708 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-12-21Read full judgment →
• KISHWAR SULTANA AND Others vs COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA DIVISION, SARGODHA AND Other1982 SCMR 984 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-13
  pre-emptiondisplaced personsconstitutional jurisdictionfinding of factwrit petitionChashma Barragespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order that set aside a decision by the Commissioner regarding the status of the petitioners as displaced persons. The petitioners, who purchased land in District Mianwali, claimed exemption from pre-emption rights on the basis that they were displaced persons affected by the construction of the Chashma Barrage, supported by a certificate issued by the Commissioner. The opposing party challenged this certificate, leading to inquiries by revenue authorities. While the Commissioner initially upheld the certificate, the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, quashed this order and directed a re-examination of the facts. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the High Court may have erred by interfering with a concurrent finding of fact made by the Revenue Authorities. The Court established that in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, a High Court should generally refrain from re-opening questions of fact that have already been determined through a proper inquiry by the competent revenue authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction re-open a concurrent finding of fact made by revenue authorities?
  • Does the status of being a displaced person from the Chashma Barrage project exempt land from pre-emption claims?
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• KIFAYAT HUSSAIN vs UNITED BANK LTD.1982 PLC 116 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-04-08Read full judgment →
• KHYAM FILMS AND ANOTHER vs BANK OF BAHAWALPUR LTD.1982 CLC 1275 · Lahore High Court · 1966-02-23
  revision petitionpower of attorneyvalidity of power of attorneyratification of authoritypreliminary objectionsuit maintainabilitylimitation periodprocedural delaybank management takeover
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a revision petition challenging the dismissal of a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of a suit. The core legal questions concerned the validity of a power of attorney (POA) where the authority of its executants was questioned, the effect of a bank's management takeover on an existing POA, and the impact of filing a POA after the period of limitation. The court held that objections to an agent's authority to institute a suit can only be effectively raised by the principal, and if the principal continues to recognize the agent's authority, it amounts to ratification, validating the suit. The court deprecated the practice of framing preliminary issues on such points and trying them separately for extended periods, stating they should be tried along with the main suit to prevent delays. It was further held that an authority given by a bank continues even after its management is taken over by another bank, unless explicitly cancelled. Finally, the mere fact that a power of attorney was filed after the limitation period does not affect the question of limitation if the authority to institute the suit existed at the relevant time.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant effectively challenge the validity of a power of attorney on the grounds that the executants lacked authority under the company's articles or memorandum?
  • Does a principal's continued recognition of an agent's authority amount to ratification, thereby validating a suit instituted by the agent?
  • Should preliminary objections regarding an agent's authority to institute a suit be framed as separate issues and tried over an extended period?
  • Does an authority granted by a bank cease to be valid upon the bank's management being taken over by another bank?
  • Does the filing of a power of attorney after the period of limitation affect the limitation of the suit if the authority to institute the suit existed?
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• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs MUHAMMAD YAHYA AND Other1982 SCMR 1197 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-19
  constitutional petitionsettlement matterproduce index unitsleave to appealtransfer of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition directed against an order of the Lahore High Court dated 28-6-1981, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition in a settlement matter. The petitioner held a verified claim of produce index units and had been transferred land accordingly, with a small balance remaining unsatisfied. Sixteen years later, Settlement Authorities divided a contiguous piece of land and transferred portions of it to both the petitioner and a respondent to satisfy their respective remaining produce index units. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in upholding the transfer and dismissal of the constitutional petition. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to make out any good ground for interference, finding that the transfer of land by the Settlement Authorities to satisfy the remaining produce index units was just and proper under the circumstances. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that discretionary interference in settlement matters will be withheld where the administrative allocation of land to satisfy verified claims is found to be just and proper.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition in a settlement matter where the transfer of land is found to be just and proper?
  • Does the possession of contiguous land create a preferential right to allotment over the adjustment of verified produce index units by Settlement Authorities?
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• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs MUHAMMAD DIN1982 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24
  petition for leave to appealevacuee propertyconcurrent findings of factjurisdictionsettlement schemedeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a civil dispute regarding an ihata in Bahawalnagar claimed by the petitioner under Settlement Scheme No. VII as evacuee property formerly owned by one Kartar Singh. The petitioner challenged the transfer of the ihata to the respondent through a declaratory suit, which was dismissed by the Civil Judge, Chishtian, on 24-3-1973. Subsequent appeals to the District Judge and the Lahore High Court were likewise dismissed, with concurrent findings of fact establishing that the property was never transferred to Kartar Singh. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Civil Judge lacked jurisdiction to decide the status of the property without referring it to the Custodian under section 41 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a question of jurisdiction not raised in the three courts below cannot be entertained for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal, in accordance with established court practice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a question of jurisdiction be raised for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by three lower courts regarding the status of property warrant interference when unchallenged on any error of law?
  • Is a civil court required to refer the question of the status of an evacuee property to the Custodian under Section 41 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957 when the point is not raised below?
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• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs MUHAMMAD AKRAM1982 P Cr. L J 1300 · Lahore High Court · 1982-07-17Read full judgment →
• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION AND Other1982 SCMR 866 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-07
  locus standilachesconstitutional petitionland commissionerleave to appeallessee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld an order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner under Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The core legal questions involve the maintainability of a constitutional petition against a land commissioner's order, the existence of laches, and whether a lessee possesses the requisite locus standi to challenge such orders. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court as it suffered from an inordinate delay of nearly two years constituting laches, and furthermore, that a mere lessee of the land in dispute had acquired no proprietary rights and consequently lacked locus standi to maintain a writ petition. The key principle laid down is that a lessee without underlying proprietary rights lacks standing to challenge land resumption or administrative orders through a constitutional petition, particularly when the petition suffers from unexplained laches.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a lessee of land has the locus standi to file a constitutional petition against an order passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 115?
  • Does a delay of two years in filing a constitutional petition constitute laches sufficient to warrant its dismissal?
  • Is the High Court justified in dismissing a writ petition where no serious question of law has been raised?
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• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs ATA MUHAMMAD1982 CLC 1647 · Lahore High Court · 1981-07-04
  temporary injunctionpermanent injunctionbalance of convenienceirreparable losscivil revisioneasementary rightsdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a dispute over the digging of a drain for sullage water. The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the petitioners from constructing a drain through his property. While the trial court initially refused a temporary injunction, the appellate court reversed this decision, granting the injunction. The petitioners challenged this in the High Court, arguing that they had an easementary right and that stopping the flow would damage their homes. The High Court, in dismissing the revision petition, held that the grant of a temporary injunction in a suit for a permanent injunction is generally the rule, while refusal is the exception, particularly where refusal would defeat the object of the suit. The Court found that the respondent had an arguable case, that he would suffer irreparable loss if the drain were constructed, and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent. Consequently, the Court affirmed the appellate court's exercise of discretion and declined to interfere under its revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of a temporary injunction in a suit for permanent injunction considered the rule or the exception?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with the discretionary order of an appellate court regarding a temporary injunction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What are the primary considerations for a court when deciding whether to grant a temporary injunction?
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• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs ANWAR BEGUM ETC.1982 PLD Lahore 295 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-18
  ejectment petitionbona fide personal usereconstruction of buildingsecond appealmisreading of evidencelandlord and tenantconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal challenges the concurrent dismissal of an ejectment petition by the Rent Controller and the District Judge. The appellant-landlord sought eviction of the respondents on grounds of default, damage to property, reconstruction, and bona fide personal use for his sons. The lower courts dismissed the petition, citing the landlord's failure to obtain specific permissions for converting residential property to commercial use and his alleged mala fide intent to increase rent. The High Court reversed these findings, holding that the lower courts misapplied the law and misread the evidence. The Court clarified that Section 11 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 does not govern Section 13, and there is no legal requirement for a landlord to notify tenants of reconstruction plans or to produce family members as witnesses to prove personal need. The Court affirmed that a landlord's desire to develop property is a legitimate ground for ejectment, and concurrent findings of fact are reviewable when based on irrelevant considerations or misconstruction of law. The appeal was accepted, and the respondents were ordered to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 11 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 govern the provisions of Section 13 regarding ejectment?
  • Is a landlord required to produce his family members as witnesses to prove the bona fide personal need for premises?
  • Can a court in second appeal interfere with concurrent findings of fact if they are based on misreading of evidence or irrelevant considerations?
  • Does a landlord have a legal obligation to notify a tenant before obtaining sanction for a building plan for reconstruction?
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• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD AND Others vs MUQARRAB ALI1982 SCMR 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-27
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentconcurrent findings of factrent receiptslandlord and tenantappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an ejectment application filed by a landlord against tenants for default in payment of rent. The Rent Controller ordered the tenants' ejectment, a decision upheld by the appellate courts. Before the Supreme Court, the tenants challenged these findings, arguing that the landlord’s prior notice to vacate did not mention rent default and that the lower courts erred in rejecting rent receipts as forged, despite a handwriting expert's report regarding one receipt. The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether a tenant is in default of rent and the assessment of the authenticity of rent receipts are purely questions of fact. Having been concurrently decided by the lower courts, these findings were not subject to reappraisal by the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact, dismissed the appeal, and directed the tenants to vacate the premises within one month.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rent default in an ejectment case?
  • Is the determination of the authenticity of rent receipts a question of fact that cannot be reopened in the Supreme Court?
  • Does the failure of a landlord to mention rent default in a prior notice to vacate preclude a subsequent claim of default?
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• KHUSHI MUHAMMAD AND 4 Other vs THE STATE1982 PLD Lahore 694 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-01Read full judgment →
• KHUSHI MOHAMMAD vs MOHAMMAD DIN1982 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-24
  evacuee propertyconcurrent findings of factjurisdictiondeclaratory suitsettlement schemeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the ownership of an ihata in Bahawalnagar. The petitioner claimed the property under Settlement Scheme No. VII, asserting it was owned by an evacuee, Kartar Singh. Following the transfer of the property to the respondent by Settlement Authorities, the petitioner filed a declaratory suit, which was dismissed by the Civil Judge. Subsequent appeals to the District Court and the Lahore High Court were also dismissed, with the High Court affirming the concurrent finding of fact that the property was never transferred to the evacuee. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the Civil Judge lacked jurisdiction and should have referred the status of the property to the Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1956. The Supreme Court held that the petition was meritless, noting that the concurrent findings of fact remained unchallenged. Furthermore, the Court refused to entertain the jurisdictional objection, as it was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court, contrary to established practice regarding issues not agitated in the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a jurisdictional objection for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a concurrent finding of fact by three lower courts subject to interference by the Supreme Court when no error of law is demonstrated?
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• KHURSHID vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND Another1982 SCMR 753 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-28
  pre-emption suitcourt fee deficiencyconstitutional jurisdictionHigh Court interferenceBoard of Revenueprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a pre-emption suit where the plaintiffs initially affixed a deficient court fee of Rs. 2.00 upon the institution of the suit on July 17, 1974. The deficiency remained unrectified for nearly six years until January 19, 1979, shortly before the trial court passed a decree. While the appellate court remanded the matter, the Member, Board of Revenue, subsequently non-suited the plaintiffs due to the prolonged failure to pay the requisite court fee. The High Court, exercising constitutional jurisdiction, set aside the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, reasoning that the issue of late payment of court fees could not be introduced belatedly if it had not been raised during the suit or in the memorandum of appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court's interference with the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, was legally justified within the scope of its constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction interfere with an order of the Member, Board of Revenue, regarding the late payment of court fees?
  • Is it permissible to raise the issue of late payment of court fees for the first time after the suit and appeal stages?
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• KHURSHID ALAM vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 1198 · Lahore High Court · 1978-06-27Read full judgment →
• KHURSHID ALAM vs NAZIR AHMAD AND 2 OTHERS1982 CLC 854 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-11Read full judgment →
• KHURSHID ALAM vs NAZI R AHMAD AND 2 OTHER1982 CLC 854 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-11Read full judgment →
• KHURSHID AKBAR vs Mian MANZUR AHMED AND Another1982 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-01
  pre-emptionstay orderappellate decreereasonable timedeposit of pre-emption moneycivil revisionsuspension of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the trial court decreed the claim, ordering the deposit of pre-emption money by a specific date. The appellate court suspended the decree's operation, including the deposit requirement, during the pendency of the appeal. Upon the dismissal of the appeal, the appellate court did not extend the time for deposit. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to an extension of time or a "reasonable time" to deposit the money after the appeal's dismissal. The Supreme Court held that while an appellate stay order suspends the time for performance, the dismissal of the appeal restores the original decree. Consequently, the unexpired period for performance revives from the date of the appellate order. The pre-emptor must perform the act within this remaining time, failing which the suit is liable to be dismissed. The Court affirmed that the appellant failed to deposit the money within a reasonable time after the appeal's dismissal, thus justifying the dismissal of the suit. The principle established is that stay orders revive the original time limit upon the appeal's conclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suspension of a pre-emption decree by an appellate court automatically extend the time for depositing the pre-emption money?
  • What is the effect of an appellate court's dismissal of an appeal on the time limit for performance fixed by the trial court?
  • Is a pre-emptor entitled to a 'reasonable time' to deposit pre-emption money if the appellate court fails to fix a new date upon dismissing the appeal?
  • Can a court interfere with the exercise of discretion by a lower appellate court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the extension of time for deposit?
  Read full judgment →
• KHURSHID AHMAD QAIS vs SHAHABUDDIN AND 2 Other1982 PLD Lahore 13 · Lahore High Court · 1981-09-26Read full judgment →
• KHURSHID AHMAD AND Others vs FAJAR ALI1982 SCMR 575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-14
  pre-emption suitcourt-feedeficiency in court-feerevenue recordprocedural lapseplaintiff's obligationcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the decision of the first appellate court in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit should be penalized for a deficiency in court-fee payment when that deficiency arose from an error by revenue officials in calculating net profits, and whether the trial court failed to properly exercise its duty under procedural law. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, dismissing the petition in limine. The holding established that where a plaintiff acts in good faith and complies with the court's directions regarding court-fee payments, they cannot be penalized for deficiencies resulting from the errors or lapses of revenue officials in preparing the necessary statements of net profit. The Court emphasized that it is the obligation of the trial court to provide clear, positive directions for making up any deficiency in court-fee, and that a plaintiff should not suffer for administrative mistakes beyond their control.

  Questions settled

  • Is a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit liable for a deficiency in court-fee caused by an error in the revenue official's calculation of net profits?
  • Does Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require the court to pass a positive direction for making up a court-fee deficiency?
  • Can a suit be dismissed for a court-fee deficiency when the plaintiff has complied with the court's directions to pay the amount as calculated by revenue records?
  Read full judgment →
• KHURSHID AHMAD AND Another vs SULTAN KHAN AND Other1982 SCMR 462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-24
  dismissal for defaultrevision petitionreview applicationsufficient causenon-appearancepre-emption suitlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' review application concerning a previously dismissed revision petition. The revision petition had been dismissed for default due to the petitioners' non-appearance on the scheduled date of hearing. The petitioners sought to challenge both the dismissal of the revision petition and the subsequent dismissal of their review application, which had attempted to re-argue the merits of the original revision. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had demonstrated sufficient cause for their non-appearance and whether the High Court correctly dismissed the review application. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' assumption that the case had been adjourned to the following week rather than the specific date fixed by the court did not constitute sufficient cause for absence. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a review application cannot be utilized to re-argue the merits of a case already decided. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that review jurisdiction is limited and cannot serve as an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a counsel's mistaken assumption regarding the date of a hearing constitute sufficient cause for non-appearance?
  • Can a review application be used to re-argue the merits of a revision petition that was dismissed for default?
  • Is a review application maintainable when the underlying revision petition was dismissed for default due to the petitioner's absence?
  Read full judgment →
• KHUDA BAKHSH vs M. QAMARUL ISLAM, MANAGING DIRECTOR, METROPOLITAN1982 PLC 691 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1981-12-28Read full judgment →
• KHUDA BAKHSH vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND ANOTHER1982 CLC 262 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-19Read full judgment →
• KHUDA BAKHSH AND Others vs MEHR DIN AND ANOTHER1982 CLC 2047 · Lahore High Court · 1974-07-09Read full judgment →
• KHUDA BAKHSH AND 5 Other vs SULTAN AHMAD AND 8 Other1982 PLD Lahore 218 · Lahore High Court · 1982-01-09Read full judgment →
• KHUDA BAKHSH AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 934 · Lahore High Court · 1982-03-05Read full judgment →
• KHAWAR IQBAL AND ANOTHER vs GHULAM RASOOL AND 2 OTHERS1982 CLC 1787 · Lahore High Court · 1982-01-10Read full judgment →
• KHAWAR IQBAL AND ANOTHER vs GHULAM RASOOL AND 2 OTHER1982 CLC 1787 · Lahore High Court · 1982-01-10Read full judgment →
• KHAWAND BAKHSH vs GHULAM SARWAR AND 2 Other/Accused1982 PLD Karachi 965 · Sindh High Court · 1981-12-22
  bail cancellationmurderstatutory delaydelay in trialpost-arrest bailstatutory right to bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the cancellation of bail granted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2, who were facing trial under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The trial court had granted bail to the respondents under the third proviso to subsection (2) (read as subsection (1)) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground that they had completed two years in detention. The core legal question was whether the delay in the trial was occasioned by an act or omission of the accused persons, thereby disentitling them to the statutory concession of bail. The High Court held that the delay in the commencement of the trial was not attributable to the respondents, and isolated adjournment applications by a co-accused or a single adjournment after the commencement of trial did not warrant the cancellation of bail. Consequently, the petition for cancellation of bail was dismissed, while directing the trial court to conclude the trial expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail as of right after completing two years in detention under the third proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does delay caused by the conduct of a co-accused disentitle another accused person from claiming the statutory benefit of bail due to delay in trial?
  • At what point does delay caused by an act or omission of the accused become relevant for denying bail under the third proviso of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Khawaja MOHAMMAD RAZZAQUE vs OMAR FAROUK1982 CLC 318 · Sindh High Court · 1981-08-18
  rented premisessummary evictionlandlord-tenant relationshipbirth certificateEvidence Actstatutory interpretationnotice to vacateRent Controller
  Summary & questions settled

  These First Rent Appeals challenged a Rent Controller's order allowing eviction applications under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal questions concerned whether the landlord, seeking summary eviction upon attaining 60 years of age, satisfied the statutory prerequisites, whether the Evidence Act applied to proceedings before the Rent Controller, and the validity of the eviction notice. The Court held that the Rent Controller functions as a court, thereby rendering the Evidence Act applicable to such proceedings. Consequently, the landlord failed to prove his age because the submitted birth certificate was not properly certified in accordance with the Evidence Act. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the eviction notice was invalid because it demanded vacation within two months, failing to strictly comply with the statutory requirement for notice. The Court established that special statutes conferring summary powers must be strictly obeyed and that substantive legal amendments are generally prospective. Accordingly, the eviction orders were set aside, as the landlord failed to establish the necessary conditions for summary eviction under the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Rent Controller a court for the purposes of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Does a notice requiring a tenant to vacate within two months satisfy the statutory requirement for a two-month notice period?
  • Can a landlord contract out of the statutory protections provided to tenants under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Are substantive amendments to the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 retrospective in nature?
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• KHAQAN vs The STATE1982 PLD Lahore 344 · Lahore High Court · 1974-05-03
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonycorroborationrecoveriespolice officer evidenceacquittal set asideretrial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, murder reference, and connected revision petition arose from a trial where the appellant was convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentenced to death, while his co-accused was acquitted. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony from injured and related witnesses, the necessity of independent corroboration for recoveries proved solely through police officers when private witnesses are won over, and the grounds for setting aside an acquittal in revision. The Lahore High Court held that despite some resiling by an injured witness whose statement was transferred under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the prosecution case was fully corroborated by prompt and reliable recoveries, including a revolver part and blood-stained items. The court laid down the principle that the solitary testimony of an investigating officer can sufficiently prove recoveries when independent recovery witnesses have been won over, and that an unsatisfactory acquittal based on a failure to consider material corroborative evidence may be set aside for a retrial.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of an investigating officer alone sufficiently prove recoveries under section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the private recovery witnesses have been won over?
  • Whether the statement of a witness recorded during the committal inquiry can be transferred as evidence under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 upon the witness resiling during the trial?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court set aside an acquittal and order a retrial in a criminal revision petition?
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• Khan MUHAMMAD AHMAD KHAN AND 4 Others vs OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION1982 CLC 1945 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-16Read full judgment →
• KHAN BAHADUR AND Another vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 26 · Lahore High Court · 1981-02-21Read full judgment →
• KHAN AHMAD SALEEM ALI MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE THE STATE AND ABDUL1982 PLD Supreme Court 152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-25
  murderappreciation of evidenceconfirmatory circumstanceadmission of presenceacquittalbenefit of doubteye-witness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected petitions arise out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning an incident involving firing and a subsequent scuffle resulting in one death and multiple injuries. The core legal question revolves around the appreciation of ocular evidence, the sustainability of convictions based on testimony of injured and independent witnesses, and the value of an accused's admission of presence as a confirmatory circumstance. The Supreme Court held that while contradictions in the testimony concerning the second part of the incident justified acquittals for that portion, the eyewitness testimony regarding the initial firing was credible and sufficiently corroborated, particularly in respect of the appellant Khan Ahmad whose presence and participation were admitted. Consequently, the conviction of Khan Ahmad under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was upheld with a lesser sentence, while the conviction of Saleem was set aside due to lack of independent corroboration. The key principle laid down is that an accused person's admission of presence and participation at the scene can serve as a strong confirmatory circumstance supporting eyewitness testimony, even when other parts of the prosecution case suffer from suppression of origin.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person's admission of presence and participation at the crime scene can serve as a confirmatory circumstance to support eyewitness testimony?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on eyewitness testimony when the prosecution has suppressed the real origin of the incident?
  • Whether contradictions in the statements of witnesses regarding a distinct portion of an occurrence justify giving the benefit of the doubt and acquitting the accused involved therein?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAMOON vs Haji ABDUL WAHID1982 CLC 844 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• KHAMISO AND 18 Others vs BOARD OF REVENUE AND 4 Orherss1982 CLC 1069 · Sindh High Court · 1981-11-29Read full judgment →
• KHAMISO AND 18 Others vs BOARD OF REVENUE AND 4 ORHERS1982 CLC 1069 · Sindh High Court · 1981-11-29Read full judgment →
• KHALIQ DAD AND 7 Others vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 713 · Lahore High Court · 1981-12-08Read full judgment →
• KHALILUR REHMAN vs MESSRS GLOBE TEXTILE LTD.1982 PLC 57 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-07-12Read full judgment →
• KHALILUR RAHMAN vs Mst. AZMAT SULTANA ETC.1982 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-06
  leave to appealrevision petitioncase decidedproduction of documentsinterlocutory order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner-plaintiff sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed his revision petition against the trial court's refusal to permit him to produce documents and witnesses at the trial, relying on the precedent that such an interlocutory order did not constitute a "case decided" for the purpose of revision. The core legal question was whether the refusal to allow the plaintiff to produce evidence relied upon at the time of filing the suit, and before issues were framed, amounted to "a case decided" making a revision petition competent, and whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances warranted an examination of whether the order constituted a "case decided" and whether the High Court was powerless to remedy the wrong and principle violated. Leave to appeal was accordingly granted with directions regarding security and record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the refusal by a trial court to allow the production of documents and witnesses relied upon at the time of filing the suit constitutes "a case decided" under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a revision petition competent against an interlocutory order denying a party the right to produce evidence at the trial before issues are framed?
  • Whether the High Court has revisional jurisdiction to correct jurisdictional errors or legal wrongs committed by trial courts regarding the right of hearing and evidence?
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• KHALIL AHMAD MALIK vs Mst. HABIBA BEGUM1982 CLC 1496 . · Sindh High Court · 1980-08-29Read full judgment →
• KHALIL AHMAD AND Others vs KAMAL DIN AND OTHER1982 CLC 1614 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-22Read full judgment →
• KHALIL AHM AD AND Others vs ICAMAL DIN AND OTHERS1982 CLC 1614 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-22Read full judgment →
• KHALID ZAMAN vs The STATE1982 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-12
  criminal revisionattempt to murderconcurrent findingsleave to appealsentence appropriatenessidentification of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Khalid Zaman against the dismissal of his criminal revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld his conviction and sentence for an offence under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, having been sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine for causing an abdominal injury to the complainant, challenged the concurrent findings of the trial court and the appellate court. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt and the nature of the injury were sustainable. The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence took place in a well-lit environment, facilitating identification, and that the prosecution witnesses consistently supported the complainant's account of the attack. Finding no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the three courts below, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the conviction and the sentence awarded were appropriate given the circumstances of the case and the dangerous nature of the injury inflicted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a criminal revision petition?
  • Is an abdominal injury caused by a knife blow considered a dangerous injury for the purpose of Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• KHALID vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 839 · Lahore High Court · 1982-12-19Read full judgment →
• KHALID TAQI KHAN vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERS s1982 P Cr. L J 1313 · Sindh High Court · 1982-05-02Read full judgment →
• KHALID MAHMOOD vs PUNJAB URBAN TRANSPORT CORPORATION1982 PLC 387 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-07-06Read full judgment →
• KHALID MAHMOOD vs HOME SECRETARY, PUNJAB AND 3 OTHERS1982 PLC (C. S.) 461 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1981-11-15Read full judgment →
• KHALID MAHMOOD KHAN vs MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, KHANEWAL1982 CLC 2268 · Lahore High Court · 1982-02-07Read full judgment →
• KHALID MAHMOOD AND Others vs Ch. GHULAM MUHAMMAD1982 SCMR 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-05-02
  evacuee trust propertypermanent transfer deedstatutory validationsettlement lawejectment proceedingsrent control
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the validity of a permanent transfer deed for an evacuee property in Lahore. The property was transferred to the respondent in 1959, and a permanent transfer deed was issued in 1964. Although subsequent proceedings determined the property was evacuee trust property, no specific order was ever passed to cancel the respondent’s permanent transfer deed. The petitioners challenged the respondent's ejectment application, arguing that the deed was invalid. The High Court, in second appeal, held that the deed remained operative and was protected by statutory provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that while the property was indeed evacuee trust property, the permanent transfer deed had not been cancelled by any competent authority. The Court ruled that under Section 10(b) of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, such transfers made prior to June 1968 were validated, regardless of the property's trust status. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, confirming that the permanent transfer deed remained valid and effective.

  Questions settled

  • Does a permanent transfer deed for evacuee property remain valid if no specific order for its cancellation is passed, even if the property is later declared evacuee trust property?
  • Does Section 10(b) of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 validate permanent transfer deeds issued prior to June 1968?
  • What is the effect of Sections 31 and 32 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 on previous orders made by settlement authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• KHALID MAHBOOB vs "VICE CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF KARACHI AND1982 PLD Karachi 581 · Sindh High Court · 1981-08-27Read full judgment →
• KHALID HUSSAIN CHANNA vs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1982 PLC 81 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-08-31Read full judgment →
• KHALID HASAN vs DIRECTOR OF SCHOOL EDUCATION, KARACHI REGION, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1982 PLC (C. S.) 306 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• KHALID AMIR. vs HAVEEZULLAH KHAN1982 CLC 1558 · Lahore High Court · 1980-10-28Read full judgment →
• KHALID AMIR vs HAFEEZULLAH KHAN1982 CLC 1558 · Lahore High Court · 1980-10-28Read full judgment →
• KHALEEL AHMAD AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 175 · Sindh High Court · 1980-02-16Read full judgment →
• KHAIR MUHAMMAD vs ABDUL HAMID1982 CLC 101 · Sindh High Court · 1980-09-08Read full judgment →
• KHAIR MUHAMMAD AND Others vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 881 (1) · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1979-02-24Read full judgment →
• KHAIR MUHAMMAD AND 2 Other vs Mst. TAHIRA BIBI AND 5 Other1982 PLD Quetta 31 · Balochistan High Court · 1981-10-16Read full judgment →
• KHAIR DIN vs THE STATE1982 PLD Supreme Court 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-14
  corruptionillegal gratificationhostile witnessraidtainted currency notesperjuryappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal in a corruption matter. The petitioner, a Food Inspector, was convicted under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for demanding and accepting illegal gratification from a depot-holder. The core legal question involved the correct appreciation of evidence, particularly where the complainant turned hostile at the trial while the raiding magistrate and police officers fully supported the prosecution case, and the accused made a self-incriminatory initial statement. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the disinterested raiding magistrate and police officers, corroborated by the contemporaneous statements and recovery of tainted currency notes, firmly established the guilt of the petitioner, despite the hostile turn of the complainant. The court dismissed the petition and further directed the trial court to consider prosecuting the hostile complainant for perjury to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a raiding magistrate and police officers is sufficient to sustain a conviction under corruption laws when the complainant turns hostile?
  • Can a conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 be maintained based on the immediate post-occurrence statement of the accused?
  • Is it appropriate for the court to direct the prosecution of a witness for perjury when they brazenly resile from their previous statements at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAIR DIN vs THE STATE- Respondent1982 P Cr. L J 346 · Lahore High Court · 1981-11-27Read full judgment →
• KHADIM SHAH ZAHIR SHAH AND Others vs PRESIDENT, SPECIAL MILITARY1982 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-02
  Special Military CourtMartial LawWrit JurisdictionDeath SentenceCriminal ProcedurePardonRight to CounselLeave to Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, convicted of dacoity and murder by a Special Military Court, challenged their convictions through writ petitions in the Peshawar High Court, which were dismissed. The petitioners subsequently filed criminal petitions for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions concern the jurisdiction of the Special Military Court to try offences under ordinary law, the legality of transferring cases directly to military courts at the investigation stage, the procedural validity of granting pardons by military courts, and the court's duty to appoint counsel when defence counsel withdraws. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised significant legal issues regarding the validity of the trial, thereby granting leave to appeal. The Court dismissed one petition as infructuous due to the conclusion of the trial and the filing of a subsequent writ petition. It further ordered that the death sentences awarded to the petitioners remain unexecuted pending the final disposal of the appeal. The judgment establishes that substantial questions regarding the procedural and jurisdictional limits of Special Military Courts warrant appellate review.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petition for leave to appeal become infructuous if the underlying trial concludes and a subsequent writ petition is filed?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to stay the execution of a death sentence pending the disposal of an appeal?
  • Do contentions regarding the jurisdiction of a Special Military Court and procedural irregularities in trial constitute sufficient grounds for granting leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →