Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- IQBAL vs The STATE1982 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, armed with a stick, along with three co-accused armed with firearms and a hatchet, attacked and killed the deceased while he was asleep, and subsequently stole money from his pocket. The petitioner argued for bail on the grounds that he was only armed with a stick, no blunt weapon injury was found on the deceased, and he was young. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether a co-accused who did not inflict the fatal blow but acted in pre-concert and played an active role in the crime is entitled to bail. The Court held that the lack of a blunt weapon injury does not exculpate the petitioner given the prima facie evidence of pre-concert and his active role in robbing the deceased. Furthermore, the Court ruled that his age (17/18 years) and potential trial delay did not justify bail. The petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the absence of an injury attributed to a weapon carried by a co-accused exculpate them from liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the purposes of bail?
- Can a co-accused claim bail on the ground of minor age if they were 17 or 18 years old at the time of the offense?
- Is the likely delay in the trial of a murder case, by itself, a sufficient ground for granting bail to an accused?
- IQBAL UD DIN AHMED SIDDIQUI vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND Another1982 SCMR 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's challenge to his compulsory retirement from service as a P.C.S. Officer under Martial Law Regulation 114. The Tribunal had dismissed the appeal primarily on the ground that the appellant failed to prove mala fide against the President of Pakistan, the competent authority, despite allegations of personal enmity against the then Governor of the Punjab. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal, upon finding no mala fide against the competent authority, was relieved of its obligation to examine the merits of the retirement order based on the appellant's service record. The Supreme Court, relying on the precedent set in Muhammad Israr Nabi v. Province of Punjab, held that the Tribunal erred by failing to examine the case on its merits. The Court ruled that the Tribunal, acting as an appellate body, is obligated to review the service record and relevant material to determine if the retirement was justified, regardless of the failure to prove mala fide. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside and the case remanded for a fresh decision on merits.
Questions settled- Does the failure to prove mala fide against the competent authority relieve a Service Tribunal of its duty to examine the merits of a compulsory retirement order?
- Is a Service Tribunal required to examine the service record of an employee when reviewing a compulsory retirement order under Martial Law Regulation 114?
- IQBAL SHARIF AND ANOTHER vs THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND 21982 CLC 1143 · Sindh High Court · 1981-11-25Read full judgment →
- IQBAL HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 236 · Sindh High Court · 1981-04-25Read full judgment →
- IQBAL HUSSAIN vs CHAIRMAN, RAILWAY BOARD1982 PLC (C. S.) 484 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1981-09-20Read full judgment →
- IQBAL BADRE ALAM vs ANWAR MUHAMMAD KHAN1982 PLC 996 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-02-22Read full judgment →
- IQBAL AHMAD vs JAMIAT PUNJABI SAUDAGARAN-E-DELHI1982 PLC 488 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-01-24Read full judgment →
- IQBAL AHMAD KHAN vs SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION ETC.S1982 SCMR 868 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition sought leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal order dismissing the petitioner's challenge to his seniority fixation. The petitioner, a civil servant, had been subjected to a major penalty of reduction in rank for three years. Upon the expiry of this period, he was restored to his original grade. The core legal question concerned whether such restoration automatically entitled the civil servant to retain his original seniority, or if the disciplinary authority could deny it. The Service Tribunal had dismissed the petitioner's appeal, finding that the competent authority had specifically decided against allowing seniority for the period of punishment, in accordance with the Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1930. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the legal arguments regarding the interpretation of restoration versus re-promotion and the interplay of relevant disciplinary rules were raised before or considered by the Service Tribunal. Consequently, the Court declined to allow the petitioner to introduce these new points at the appellate stage and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Is a petitioner permitted to introduce new legal arguments in the Supreme Court that were not urged before the Service Tribunal?
- Does the failure to raise specific legal contentions before the Service Tribunal preclude their consideration in a petition for leave to appeal?
- INTERNATIONAL FOOD CENTRE LTD. LAHORE vs UNITED BANK LTD., KARACHI1982 CLC 108 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged an interlocutory order passed by a trial court in a suit for recovery of money filed by a bank. The petitioner, a defendant, was granted conditional leave to defend the suit, requiring the deposit of a substantial sum or the furnishing of a bank guarantee. The petitioner contended that this condition was oppressive, particularly given the existence of security and a pending cross-claim. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with an interlocutory order passed under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, when the statute itself bars appeals against such orders. The Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that it would not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to circumvent the legislative intent which expressly bars appeals against interlocutory orders to ensure speedy recovery of loans. The principle laid down is that the constitutional jurisdiction of superior courts cannot be invoked to defeat the express provisions of statutory law or to interfere with interlocutory orders, as such interference would delay proceedings and frustrate the legislative objective of providing a speedy recovery mechanism.
Questions settled- Can the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with an interlocutory order where the statute expressly bars an appeal?
- Does the trial court have the discretion to impose conditions, such as the deposit of money or furnishing of security, while granting leave to defend a suit under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
- Is a writ petition maintainable against an interlocutory order when the relevant statute provides no remedy of appeal or revision?
- INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN vs MESSERS LARKANA TEXTILE1982 PLD Karachi 1 · Sindh High Court · 1981-11-12Read full judgment →
- INDUS VALLEY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD. vs COMENTATION INTRAFOR1982 SCMR 1127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside an order directing the filing of arbitration agreements under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the application on the premise that a third, non-impleaded company was a party to one of the agreements, thereby rendering the proceedings incompetent. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was erroneous because the respondent had explicitly admitted in its pleadings that it was a party to the agreement in question, thereby estopping it from later asserting that the agreement was with a third party. Furthermore, the Court noted that the High Court failed to address the undisputed existence of an earlier arbitration agreement between the parties. The Court reaffirmed that while the principle of separate legal entity is established, courts may pierce the corporate veil in appropriate circumstances. Ultimately, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the trial court's order directing the filing of the agreements.
Questions settled- Can a party that admits to being a signatory to an agreement in its pleadings later deny its liability by claiming the agreement was with a third party?
- Is it necessary to implead a third party in proceedings under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 when the respondent has already admitted to being bound by the agreement?
- Does the principle of separate legal entity prevent a court from looking behind the corporate veil when the respondent has admitted to the contract?
- Can an appellate court dismiss an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 in its entirety if one of the arbitration agreements is undisputed?
- KHAISTA KHAN vs GHULAM FATIMA1982 CLC 2188 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-21Read full judgment →
- INDUS VALLEY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD. AND 3 Other vs PAKISTAN1982 PLD Lahore 290 · Lahore High Court · 1982-01-20Read full judgment →
- INDRIAS JAUSPH vs The STATE1982 SCMR 1153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against the High Court's order dated 20-12-1981, which dismissed his application for post-arrest bail. The petitioner, along with his co-accused, was accused of fraudulently collecting Rs. 1,50,000 from the complainant party on the pretext of arranging visas for employment in Singapore while claiming to be recruiting agents. The core question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court committed any legal error or violated established legal principles in refusing bail to the petitioner. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had duly applied its mind to the case and provided valid reasons for its order, noting that police investigations revealed the money was handed over directly to the petitioner. Finding no violation of legal principles to justify interference, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The key principle affirmed is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with a High Court order refusing bail where the High Court has exercised its discretion with proper application of mind.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order refusing bail when the High Court has properly applied its mind to the facts?
- Does direct receipt of fraudulently collected funds by an accused justify the refusal of post-arrest bail?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an order of the High Court refusing bail?
- INCOME TAX OFFICER, COMPANY CIRCLE, BANGALORE vs MARGARINE AND REFINED OIL CO. LTD46 TAX 191 · karnataka High CourtRead full judgment →
- INAYATUR RAHMAN vs MUHAMMAD IQBAL QURESHI1982 PLC 444 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-01-13Read full judgment →
- INAYATULLAH vs ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND Other1982 SCMR 1162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of the petitioner's constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of a land allotment. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner could successfully challenge the land allotment cancellation after a prolonged delay and whether being a Jammu & Kashmir refugee grants any preferential right over another refugee. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit, affirming the High Court's findings that the cancellation order passed in 1957 remained unchallenged and that the petitioner could not validly claim preference over another Jammu & Kashmir refugee. The key principle laid down is that failure to challenge a cancellation order in a timely manner precludes subsequent legal recourse, and a refugee status identical to that of a contesting party confers no preferential claim without specific statutory backing.
Questions settled- Can a party challenge an unchallenging land cancellation order after an inordinate delay?
- Does the status of a Jammu & Kashmir refugee confer a preferential right to land allotment over another refugee?
- Will a petition for special leave to appeal be maintained against a well-reasoned High Court judgment based on concurrent factual findings?
- INAYATULLAH AND 3 Other vs THE STATE1982 PLD Lahore 26 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-27Read full judgment →
- INAYAT SUBHAN vs WAPDA1982 PLC 417 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1981-11-22Read full judgment →
- INAYAT MASIH vs CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER AND Another1982 SCMR 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition upholding the concurrent findings of the Land Commission authorities. The petitioner claimed the benefit of paragraph 15 of the Land Reforms Act, 1977, seeking allotment of resumed land as a cultivating tenant. The core legal question was whether the petitioner fulfilled the mandatory statutory requirement of being recorded in the revenue records as being in cultivating possession during Kharif 1976 and Rabi 1975-76. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to establish cultivating possession during the crucial crops as required by law, rendering his claim untenable. Furthermore, the Court held that new and contradictory grounds raised for the first time before the apex court, challenging the legality of the resumption and the vires of the law, could not be entertained. The petition was accordingly dismissed, and leave to appeal refused, laying down that revenue record entries regarding cultivating possession are foundational for statutory land allotment claims.
Questions settled- Whether a tenant claiming land allotment under paragraph 15 of the Land Reforms Act, 1977 must be recorded in cultivating possession during the crucial crop seasons?
- Can a petitioner raise new and contradictory grounds regarding the vires of a statute for the first time before the Supreme Court?
- Does a person challenging land resumption properly forfeit the right to claim allotment under the same statutory framework?
- In Re: SHALIMAR GENERAL INSURANCE Co. LTD. vs NOT1982 CLC 2137 · Balochistan High Court · 1981-11-13Read full judgment →
- In re: SHALIMAR GENERAL INSURANCE Co. LTD vs NOT1982 CLC 2137 · Balochistan High Court · 1981-11-13Read full judgment →
- In Re: PACKAGES LIMITED vs NOT1982 CLC 2426 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-15Read full judgment →
- In re: OFFICE REFERENCE vs N/A1982 PLD Karachi 250 · Sindh High Court · 1981-05-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns office references regarding the status of cases heard by judges who ceased to hold office before finalizing their judgments. The core legal questions were whether an orally announced decision without a signed order constitutes a valid judgment, and whether a short order signed by a judge who later ceases to hold office is operative, and if so, whether reasons can be recorded subsequently. The Court held that an oral decision without a signed order is not a valid, operative judgment in law, and such cases must be reheard. Conversely, cases where short orders were recorded and signed are fully operative and disposed of. The Court established that a judgment must be in writing, signed, and delivered to be effective. While a judge who has ceased to hold office cannot record reasons, if a member of the original bench remains a sitting judge, they may record their individual reasons for the decision, which will serve as minutes of their opinion for potential appellate review, though they do not constitute the judgment of the bench.
Questions settled- Is an orally announced decision without a signed order a valid and operative judgment?
- Does a short order signed by a judge who subsequently ceases to hold office constitute a final disposal of a case?
- Can a judge who remains in office record reasons for a decision made by a bench that included a judge who has since ceased to hold office?
- Is a court competent to reconsider an orally pronounced order before it has been signed and sealed?
- In Re: Humber Iron Works And Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. (1869) 4 Ch. 643; Esmail1982 CLC 2660 · Lahore High Court · 1981-11-11Read full judgment →
- In Re : PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF TWO LAWYERS IN CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS1982 SCMR 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These original proceedings arose from Civil Petition No. 55 of 1982 and an accompanying civil miscellaneous application for an interim stay, drawn and filed by Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Chahal, Advocate, and Sh. Abdul Karim, Advocate-on-Record. During the hearing of the stay application, the presiding Judge noted certain objectionable words and phrases in the pleadings—such as "miserably failed," "one-sided," "lack of good faith," "perverse," "arbitrary," and "without a look"—which prima facie showed contempt, rancour, and an attempt to ridicule the High Court. Consequently, show-cause notices were issued to both respondents. At the subsequent hearing, numerous Advocates of the Lahore High Court appeared along with the respondents, stating that the respondents were genuinely sorry and apologetic. The respondents tendered unconditional apologies, begged to be pardoned, and submitted written apologies alongside proposed amendments to delete the objectionable phrases and an undertaking to be careful in the future. The Supreme Court accepted the apologies in the interest of the smooth administration of justice and discharged the show-cause notices.
Questions settled- Whether use of contemptuous and rancorous language against a High Court judge in pleadings amounts to professional misconduct warranting show-cause notices?
- Can contempt proceedings be dropped upon the tendering of a genuine and unconditional written apology by the erring advocates?
- In re : PAKISTA N TELEVISION SERVICE RALES vs NOT1982 PLC 456 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1981-01-03Read full judgment →
- IMRAN AND 2 Other vs Mst. QAMAR SULTAN BEGUM AND 2 Other1982 PLD Karachi 908 · Sindh High Court · 1981-11-28Read full judgment →
- IMAM DIN vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 589 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-01Read full judgment →
- IMAM BAKHSH vs THE COLLECTOR AND Other1982 SCMR 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the resumption of state land. The petitioner challenged the resumption of his land, which occurred due to his failure to cultivate the required area and pay the lease dues (lagan). The core legal questions were whether the mandatory notice required under the lease conditions was served, and whether the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to rectify the breach under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court held that the finding regarding the issuance and service of notice was a factual determination by the departmental authorities and the High Court, which showed no misreading of evidence. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioner had failed to cultivate the land for a significant period, rendering the breach unrectifiable. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no legal error in the lower courts' decisions. The judgment reinforces the principle that factual findings by departmental authorities, when affirmed by the High Court and free from misreading, are generally not subject to interference in appellate proceedings.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court interfere with factual findings regarding the service of notice when such findings have been affirmed by the High Court?
- Does the failure to cultivate land for a long period constitute an unrectifiable breach under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912?
- Is a notice of breach sufficient to satisfy the requirement of providing an opportunity to rectify a default under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912?
- ILYAS AHMAD AND Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1982 P Cr. L J 1336 · Sindh High Court · 1982-05-15Read full judgment →
- ILLAHI BUX AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 733 · Sindh High Court · 1981-01-29Read full judgment →
- ILAM DIN vs MIRZA MUBARIK ALI AND 2 Other1982 SCMR 1001 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that declared an order by a Settlement Commissioner illegal and without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether a successor Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to review and set aside a final revisional order passed by their predecessor regarding the cancellation of an auction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the impugned order dated 22-7-1971 was passed without jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the revisional order dated 24-7-1965 had attained finality and could not be reopened by a successor in office. Furthermore, the Court noted that Section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, had been repealed by Ordinance II of 1962, thereby stripping the Settlement Commissioner of the legal authority to interfere with the earlier final order. The principle laid down is that a statutory officer lacks the inherent power to review or set aside a predecessor's final order in the absence of explicit statutory authority, especially after the relevant revisional powers have been repealed.
Questions settled- Does a successor Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to review or set aside a final order passed by their predecessor?
- Can an order passed by a Settlement Commissioner be sustained if the statutory power of revision has been repealed?
- Does a party have locus standi to challenge an order if their application for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII remains pending?
- ILAM DIN vs ILAM DIN AND ANOTHER1982 PLD Lahore 9 · Lahore High Court · 1981-05-16Read full judgment →
- ILAM DIN AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 1009 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-03Read full judgment →
- ILAHI BUX vs The STATE1982 SC MR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for murder and related offences. The core legal question concerns the reliability of eyewitness testimony when the prosecution witnesses have materially contradicted their initial statements and the FIR by filing a subsequent private complaint introducing a new version of events. The Supreme Court held that the convictions could not be sustained. The Court observed that the prosecution witnesses had deliberately perjured themselves by shifting their narratives, and the medical evidence regarding the gunshot distance contradicted the eyewitness account. The Court established the principle that where prosecution witnesses have deliberately perjured themselves and the prosecution’s case is tainted by dishonest investigative practices, such as false recoveries, the court cannot rely on their testimony without unimpeachable and wholly independent corroboration. Since such corroboration was absent and the prosecution’s version was fundamentally compromised, the Court set aside the convictions, emphasizing that the prosecution cannot expect the court to sift grain from chaff when the entire testimony is unreliable.
Questions settled- Can a conviction be sustained when prosecution witnesses have materially contradicted their initial statements in a subsequent private complaint?
- Is medical evidence regarding the distance of a gunshot sufficient to discredit eyewitness testimony that contradicts the physical findings?
- Under what circumstances must a court require unimpeachable independent corroboration for the testimony of prosecution witnesses who have perjured themselves?
- IKRAM UD DIN vs THE STATE-1982 P Cr. L J 693 · Lahore High Court · 1981-07-07Read full judgment →
- IJAZ AHMAD PIRACHA vs JUDGE, SPECIAL COURT BANKING AND OTHERS1982 CLC 2367 · Lahore High Court · 1981-11-17Read full judgment →
- IJAZ AHMAD PIRACHA vs JUDGE, SPECIAL COURT BANKING AND OTHER1982 CLC 2367 · Lahore High Court · 1981-11-17Read full judgment →
- IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN AWAN vs TROLLOPE COLLS CEMENTATION OVERSEAS LTD.1982 PLC 843 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- IFTIKHAR ELAHI vs MESSRS BUTT ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES AND ANOTHER1982 SCMR 1207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the interpretation of Section 25-A(6) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, specifically regarding the scope and limitation period for challenging the termination of employment. The appellant, a workman, challenged his dismissal before the Junior Labour Court, which granted relief. The High Court, however, quashed this order, holding that Section 25-A(6) only applied to terminations occurring within two months preceding the enactment of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court rejected this restrictive interpretation. The Court held that Section 25-A(6) provides an independent remedy for aggrieved workmen, dispensing with the grievance procedure required under subsections (1) to (4) of Section 25-A. The Court clarified that the provision is not limited to a specific two-month window preceding the Ordinance but applies to terminations generally, subject to the prescribed limitation periods. By including alternative limitation periods—two months from the enactment or two months from the termination—the statute clearly contemplates causes of action arising after the enactment. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside, restoring the Labour Court’s decision.
Questions settled- Does Section 25-A(6) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 apply only to terminations occurring within two months preceding the enactment of the Ordinance?
- Is the grievance procedure prescribed in subsections (1) to (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 applicable to cases of termination governed by subsection (6)?
- What is the correct interpretation of the limitation periods provided in Section 25-A(6) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
- IFTIKHAR AHMED MALIK vs DIRECTOR-GENERAL, SOIL SURVEY OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1982 PLC (C. S.) 659 · Federal Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- IFTIKHAR AHMAD, ETC vs UNIVERSITY TOWN COMMITTEE, PHSHAWAR AND Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's suit for a declaration regarding the validity of a land sale. The petitioner purchased a plot from the Administrator of the University Town Committee, Peshawar, which was subsequently cancelled by the Committee. The core legal question was whether the Administrator possessed the unilateral authority to sell Committee property without a formal resolution or authorization. The Supreme Court held that the Administrator is not synonymous with the Committee and lacks independent power to alienate Committee property. The Court affirmed that the Administrator's executive functions are subordinate to the Committee and subject to Government oversight and the University Town Committee Rules, 1974. The principle laid down is that an Administrator of a local body cannot exercise powers of alienation of property independently of the Committee, and any such unauthorized contract is voidable. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the absence of other members does not automatically vest plenary powers in the Administrator absent specific statutory authorization. The petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the Administrator of a local committee possess the inherent power to sell committee property without a resolution from the committee?
- Can an Administrator exercise plenary powers of a committee simply because other committee members have vacated their offices?
- Is a contract entered into by an Administrator without lawful authority subject to cancellation by the committee?
- Are the executive powers of an Administrator under the North-West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance III of 1972 subject to the oversight of the committee and the government?
- IFTIKHAR AHMAD vs THE STATE1982 PLD Supreme Court 277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Iftikhar Ahmad, who was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentenced to death by the trial court, with the conviction and sentence subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a compromise between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased, entered into without any financial compensation, can be treated as a mitigating circumstance to warrant the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that a compromise even without compensation constitutes a valid mitigating circumstance that can be taken into account for reducing a sentence. Consequently, the court converted the petition into an appeal, accepted the prayer, and reduced the appellant's death sentence to imprisonment for life, while maintaining the fines under the relevant sections. The key principle laid down is that a genuine compromise between the parties, regardless of the absence of monetary compensation, serves as a sufficient mitigating factor for sentence reduction in murder cases.
Questions settled- Can a compromise between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased be treated as a mitigating circumstance for reducing a sentence of death?
- Is a compromise valid for sentence reduction even if it is made without any financial compensation?
- IFTIKHAR AHMAD vs MUHAMMAD YOUNUS KHAN1982 CLC 2114 · Sindh High Court · 1981-05-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This first appeal challenges the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge in a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the recovery of Rs. 10,000 based on a promissory note. The appellant contended that the original promissory note was not filed with the plaint, the document was a bond rather than a promissory note, the trial court failed to give reasons, and the rejection of the surety was unjustified. The High Court held that producing the original at presentation and filing a photostat copy constitutes sufficient compliance with Order VII Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the instrument qualifies as a promissory note under Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, a reasoned judgment is not required under Order XX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when allegations are deemed admitted due to failure to furnish conditional leave-to-defend surety, and local immovable property is a valid requirement for sureties in execution. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether filing a photostat copy of a promissory note along with the plaint while producing the original at presentation constitutes sufficient compliance with Order VII Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does an instrument containing an unconditional undertaking to pay a sum of money by a fixed date qualify as a promissory note under Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 despite attestation by witnesses?
- Is a trial court obligated to write a detailed reasoned judgment under Order XX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a defendant fails to fulfill the condition for leave to defend under Order XXXVII?
- Can a court reject a surety for failing to own immovable property within the local jurisdiction of the court where the suit is pending?
- IFTIKHAR AHMAD AND ANOTHER vs SENIOR EXECUTIVE, V. P. PERSONNEL1982 PLC 52 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- IDEAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. vs Haji USMAN AND 2 OTHERS1982 CLC 2191 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-27Read full judgment →
- IDEAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. vs Haji USMAN AND 2 OTHER1982 CLC 2191 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-28Read full judgment →
- IBRAHIM KHAN AND 3 Others vs Ch. IQBAL AHMAD MAHMOOD, SETTLEMENT1982 CLC 2094 · Lahore High Court · 1981-05-16Read full judgment →
- IBRAHIM AND Another vs The STATE1982 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which had previously dismissed the petitioners' application for post-arrest bail in a murder case. The petitioners, Ibrahim and Pervez, were charged with the murder of Noor Elahi in furtherance of a common intention. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's refusal to grant bail was legally infirm or warranted interference. The Supreme Court held that the refusal to grant bail in cases involving offences punishable with death or transportation for life is a matter of judicial discretion, subject to the limitation that bail is generally not to be allowed. The Court emphasized that in bail proceedings, courts are not required to probe into the merits of the case but should instead focus on the material placed before them. Finding no infirmity in the impugned order, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Is a court required to probe into the merits of a case when deciding a bail application for offences punishable with death or transportation?
- Does the refusal to grant bail in a murder case constitute a matter of judicial discretion for the trial court?
- What is the limitation on the discretion of a court to grant bail for offences punishable with death or transportation?
- IBRAHEEM KHAN vs AMINA BAI1982 CLC 133 · Sindh High Court · 1981-04-13Read full judgment →
- I. A. ZAFAR vs Mian KARAM ELAHI1982 PLC 880 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-02-10Read full judgment →
- HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1982 PLD Karachi 288 · Sindh High Court · 1981-05-27Read full judgment →
- HUSSAIN SUGAR MILLS LIMITED, SARAMIALA AND ANOTHER vs COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB EMPLOYEES SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION1982 PLC 366 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-02-15Read full judgment →
- HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION, DACCA vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DACCA ZONE45 TAX 177 · Supreme Court of BangladeshRead full judgment →
- HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION vs MESSRS SHAHENSHAH JEHANGIR1982 CLC 103 · Sindh High Court · 1980-10-15Read full judgment →
- HOTI vs THE STATE-Opponent1982 P Cr. L J 763 · Sindh High Court · 1982-01-25Read full judgment →
- HOTEL METROPOLE LTD. vs GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND 2 Other1982 PLD Karachi 810 · Sindh High Court · 1981-11-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition was filed by a private limited company operating a hotel, challenging a notification issued by the Government of Sind under subsection (3) of section 33 of the Stamp Act, 1899, which declared all commercial concerns, companies registered under the Companies Act, and various other bodies to be public offices for the purpose of impounding unstamped instruments. The core legal question was whether the Government possesses the authority under section 33(3) to issue a blanket notification encompassing private commercial entities and companies as public offices in the absence of any genuine doubt regarding a specific office. The Sindh High Court held that the power to determine public offices in cases of doubt presupposes an office having the semblance of a public department wherein the public is directly interested in its functions, and a private limited company cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered a public office. Consequently, the Court ruled the notification to be ultra vires to the extent that it included private limited companies as public offices. The key principle established is that section 33(3) of the Stamp Act requires a specific case of doubt regarding the public nature of a particular office and cannot be used to issue a sweeping, general declaration converting private commercial entities into public offices.
Questions settled- Can the collecting Government issue a general notification under section 33(3) of the Stamp Act 1899 declaring all commercial concerns and private companies to be public offices?
- What constitutes a public office for the purpose of examining and impounding instruments under section 33 of the Stamp Act 1899?
- Does the power of the Government under section 33(3) of the Stamp Act 1899 to determine public offices require the pre-existence of doubt regarding a particular office?
- HIRJINA SALT CHEMICALS (PAK.) LTD INTERNATIONAL BONEMEL INDUSTRIES1982 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves civil appeals directed against a judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing constitutional petitions challenging the imposition of market fees (dharat) on salt works and bone-crushing factories by the Union Council Gharo. The core legal questions concern whether rule 4 of the West Pakistan Union Council Dharat (Market Fees) Rules, 1961, is ultra vires the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, by extending the definition of 'market' to premises used for manufacturing goods for sale; whether the levy constitutes a fee or an unconstitutional tax; whether local councils are barred from levying fees on salt under constitutional provisions; and whether bone crushing constitutes manufacturing. The Supreme Court held that rule 4 is intra vires because sales occur at the manufacturing premises when goods are separated from bulk and appropriated under the Sale of Goods Act, that sufficient quid pro quo exists through municipal services, that the levy is a market fee rather than a central duty on salt, and that bone crushing amounts to manufacturing. The appeals were dismissed accordingly.
Questions settled- Whether rule 4 of the West Pakistan Union Council Dharat (Market Fees) Rules, 1961 is ultra vires the Basic Democracies Order, 1959 for including manufacturing premises within the definition of a market?
- At what point does a sale occur for the purposes of market fee levy under the Sale of Goods Act when goods are manufactured at a factory and agreements are concluded elsewhere?
- Whether the levy of market fees on premises where salt is manufactured constitutes an unconstitutional encroachment upon the central legislature's power to levy duty on salt?
- Does the process of crushing raw bones into powder constitute the manufacture of goods for the purposes of market fee rules?
- HIDDU Alias HIDAYATULLAH vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 30 · Sindh High Court · 1980-10-12Read full judgment →
- HAYAT SHAH vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 1165 · Lahore High Court · 1981-08-22Read full judgment →
- HAYAT BAKHSH AND Others vs The STATE1982 SCMR 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the conviction of multiple appellants. The core legal question addressed by the Court pertains to the merits of the appellants' convictions and the procedural status of one appellant who is a fugitive from justice. The Court, in its order, accepted the appeals of Hayat Bakhsh, Muhammad Afzal, and Allah Bakhsh (son of Sikandar), resulting in their acquittal and immediate release, provided they are not required in any other legal matter. Conversely, the Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant Allah Bakhsh (son of Muhammad Bakhsh) on the specific ground that he is a fugitive from justice. The judgment establishes the principle that the appellate court may decline to entertain or dismiss an appeal filed by a convict who remains a fugitive from justice, while simultaneously granting relief to co-appellants whose convictions are found to be unsustainable upon review.
Questions settled- Can an appeal be dismissed if the appellant is a fugitive from justice?
- Are co-appellants entitled to acquittal if their convictions are found to be unsustainable despite the fugitive status of another co-appellant?
- HATIM ALI AND 2 Others vs ADDITIONAL, SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LAND)1982 CLC 2192 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-20Read full judgment →
- HATIM ALI AND 2 Others vs ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LAND)1982 CLC 2192 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-20Read full judgment →
- HASSAN vs THE STATE1982 PLD Karachi 323 · Sindh High Court · 1980-01-13Read full judgment →
- HASSAN MUHAMMAD vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1982 SCMR 969 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition filed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the transfer of a property divided into separate units by settlement authorities. The core legal question concerns the extent of the Settlement Authority's jurisdiction to divide a property into separate units and whether such division is amenable to interference under constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the settlement authorities possess the jurisdiction to divide a property, and the matter of division lies within their discretion, which ordinarily should not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that the division of property by settlement authorities is a matter of administrative discretion and will not be disturbed under Article 199 unless shown to be without lawful authority, particularly when the allocation is fair, just, and achieves rehabilitation of multiple parties.
Questions settled- Does the Settlement Authority have the jurisdiction to divide a property into separate units?
- Should a High Court interfere with the division of property by settlement authorities in its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
- Is the division of property by settlement authorities subject to interference if it is substantially fair and just?
- HASSAN DIN vs KHADIM HUSSAIN AND Other1982 SCMR 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, father of the deceased, sought special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had maintained the respondents' convictions under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but reduced their death sentence to imprisonment for life on the ground that the crime was committed to vindicate family honour. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence of the respondents from death to imprisonment for life based on the motivation of family honour. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court committed no violation of any principle of law in reducing the sentence, noting that the prosecution's own First Information Report established that the respondents suspected the deceased of having illicit connections with their sister. The Court laid down the principle that it does not interfere with a legal sentence where no principle of law has been violated and the reduction is based on mitigating circumstances such as the vindication of family honour.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court is justified in reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life when the crime is committed for the vindication of family honour?
- Does the Supreme Court interfere with a legal sentence passed by the High Court when no principle of law has been violated?
- HASSAN ALI ETC. vs THE STATE1982 P C r. L J 138 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-02Read full judgment →
- HASHWANI HOTELS LTD vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND 2 Other1982 PLD Lahore 621 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-02Read full judgment →
- HASHMAT ALI vs SUPERINTENIDENT OP POLICE, BAHAWALPUR AND ANOTHER1982 PLC (C. S.) 172 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1981-12-13Read full judgment →
- HASHMAT ALI vs MUHAMMAD ALI ETC.1982 CLC 2377 · Labour Court · 1980-11-14Read full judgment →
- HASHMAT ALI vs ABDUL HAMEED1982 CLC 1856 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-18Read full judgment →
- HASHMAIL ALI vs MUHAMMAD ALI ETC.1982 CLC 2377 · Lahore High Court · 1980-11-14Read full judgment →
- HASHIM BIBI AND ANOTHER vs DEPUTY SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, SIALKOT1982 CLC 1435 · Lahore High Court · 1975-11-27Read full judgment →
- HASHIM BHAI vs MUHAMMAD FAROOQ1982 CLC 2 · Sindh High Court · 1980-02-29Read full judgment →
- HASAN ABID vs HABIBULLAH AND ANOTHER1982 CLC 172. · Sindh High Court · 1981-05-24Read full judgment →
- HAROON AND 2 Others vs UMAR1982 CLC 1244 · Sindh High Court · 1982-04-17Read full judgment →
- HARI KISHAN MEHRA vs CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY AND Other1982 SCMR 929 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1966-03-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged an order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property concerning properties originally belonging to one Dhanpat R.I. The core legal questions involved whether revision proceedings abated upon the death of the original applicant, whether the Custodian had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the personal status of the appellant and his brothers, whether the Custodian could make declarations regarding properties outside the specific scope of the initial application, and whether certain properties were protected under Section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the revision did not abate, that the Custodian possessed jurisdiction to determine the status of the parties as it was directly in issue, but that the Custodian exceeded his jurisdiction by extending declarations to properties other than the specific premises (No. 4-Chamberlane Road) raised in the original application. The Court laid down that while Custodian authorities have wide powers to determine evacuee status and property character, an adjudication must be confined to a proper lis and cannot extend to properties never brought into issue without conscious expansion of scope and compliance with statutory cutoff dates.
Questions settled- Does a revision proceeding before the Custodian abate upon the death of the original applicant when the legal representatives are already parties to the proceedings?
- Can the Custodian authorities adjudicate upon the evacuee status of individuals when the question is expressly raised and framed as an issue in the inquiry?
- Does the Custodian have jurisdiction to issue declarations regarding properties that were never mentioned in the initial application or brought into issue during the proceedings?
- Are properties protected under Section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, if they were treated as evacuee property prior to the relevant statutory date?
- HARI CHAND vs THE PROVINCE OF SIND AND 3 Other .1982 PLD Karachi 814 · Sindh High Court · 1982-03-30Read full judgment →
- HARBANS SINGH vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, AMRITSAR45 TAX 80 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1981-03-01Read full judgment →
- HAQUE vs SPECIAL JUDGE, ANTI. CORRUPTION1982 P Cr. L J 551 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-27Read full judgment →
- HAQ NAWAZ vs THE STATE1982 P Cr. L J 859 · Lahore High Court · 1981-08-03Read full judgment →
- HAQ NAWAZ vs TAJ MUHAMMAD1982 CLC 64 · Lahore High Court · 1980-12-07Read full judgment →
- HANIFJEE & SONS, HYDERABAD vs COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX (WEST)45 TAX 258 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- HAMIDULLAH KHAN vs MUHAMMAD NAWAZ QASURI1982 PLD Lahore 203 · Lahore High Court · 1981-12-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The respondent filed a suit against the petitioner under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the recovery of money based on dishonoured cheques. The petitioner sought permission to defend the suit, claiming the cheques were without consideration, but the trial court refused leave and decreed the suit. The petitioner filed a revision petition before the Lahore High Court, raising a new plea that the cheques were issued at the request of a third party. The core legal question was whether the petitioner disclosed facts sufficient to warrant granting leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court dismissed the revision in limine, holding that a mere denial of consideration without disclosing plausible facts or substantial questions of fact or law does not entitle the defendant to leave to defend, and that the new plea raised was an afterthought devoid of substance. The court laid down that leave to defend a summary suit should be refused where the defendant fails to disclose sufficient facts making it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration or showing a plausible defence.
Questions settled- Whether a mere denial of consideration in an application for leave to defend a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is sufficient to grant permission to defend?
- Can a defendant raise a new factual plea for the first time in revision when it was not pleaded before the trial court in the application for leave to defend?
- When is a defendant entitled to leave to defend a suit based on negotiable instruments under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- HAMID AND Other vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER1982 PLD SC 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-11-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of urban agricultural land to refugees. The appellants, temporary allottees of land in Chishtian, challenged the classification of the land as urban, which rendered them ineligible for confirmation of their claims. Following a series of administrative orders and writ petitions, the land was confirmed in favour of the respondents. A subsequent order by a Chief Settlement Commissioner, which had favoured the appellants, was later set aside by his successor in a suo motu review, restoring the land to the respondents. The appellants challenged this, arguing the review was without jurisdiction and relying on a proviso to Supplementary Scheme No. 11. The Supreme Court held that the initial order favouring the appellants was a nullity, as it was a colourable exercise of jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that the respondents' allotment was lawful at the time it was made, as the land was urban agricultural property and the appellants' reliance on the subsequent proviso was misplaced due to its lack of retrospective effect. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a Chief Settlement Commissioner exercise suo motu review powers to set aside an order passed by a predecessor that is found to be a nullity?
- Does a proviso added to a settlement scheme have retrospective effect on allotments already confirmed?
- Is an order passed by a Settlement Commissioner that constitutes a colourable exercise of jurisdiction considered a nullity in the eyes of the law?
- HAMID ALI KHAN vs PAKISTAN INSURANCE CORPORATION, KARACHI AND 31982 PLC 200 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-08-17Read full judgment →
- HAMID ALI KHAN vs MUHAMMAD Mursaleens1982 CLC 87 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-20Read full judgment →
- HALIM ALI AND Others vs DILBAR MUHAMMAD AND Other1982 SC M R170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order refusing to readmit an appeal dismissed in default. The petitioners argued that their newly engaged counsel were not listed in the cause list, which only displayed the name of their former counsel, Sh. Nasir Ahmad. The core legal question was whether the omission of the new counsel's names from the cause list constituted 'sufficient cause' for non-appearance and restoration of the appeal. The Supreme Court distinguished this case from precedent where a counsel's name was wrongly printed. It held that because the case particulars were correctly listed and the former counsel's name appeared, the new counsel had a duty to be vigilant and track the case. The Court affirmed that the High Court's refusal to readmit the appeal was not an illegal, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of discretion. The principle laid down is that where a case is correctly listed, the failure of newly engaged counsel to notice the case, despite the presence of the former counsel's name on the cause list, does not constitute sufficient cause for restoration of an appeal dismissed in default.
Questions settled- Does the omission of a new counsel's name from the cause list, when the case particulars and former counsel's name are correctly listed, constitute sufficient cause for the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default?
- Is the negligence of counsel in failing to note a case in the cause list a valid ground for the readmission of an appeal?
- Does the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in refusing to readmit an appeal if the discretion was not exercised illegally, arbitrarily, or capriciously?
- HAKIMSONS CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. vs HAKIMSONS GROUP EMPLOYEES'1982 PLC 499 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-12-13Read full judgment →
- HAKIMA AND 5 Others vs ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND 21982 CLC 571 · Sindh High Court · 1981-09-23Read full judgment →
- HAKIM SALEEM AIMED AND 8 Others vs GOVERNMENT OF SINDH AND 3 OTHER1982 CLC 269 · Sindh High Court · 1981-10-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision application challenges an appellate court order that reversed the trial court's rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether a civil suit challenging settlement authorities' orders on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, and mala fides is barred under Sections 22 and 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, and whether questions of limitation, res judicata, and estoppel can warrant the rejection of a plaint at the threshold stage. The Sindh High Court held that notwithstanding statutory bars on civil court jurisdiction, orders procured through fraud, misrepresentation, or mala fides remain open to civil court scrutiny, and that defenses such as limitation based on knowledge, res judicata, and estoppel cannot be resolved at the Order VII, Rule 11 stage without trial. The court affirmed the appellate order, establishing that a plaint containing specific allegations of fraud and mala fides discloses a cause of action and is not liable to summary rejection.
Questions settled- Does the bar on civil court jurisdiction under Sections 22 and 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 extend to orders passed fraudulently, through misrepresentation, or mala fidely?
- Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by examining the merits of the defendant's pleas and defenses such as res judicata or estoppel?
- What is the starting point of limitation under Article 95 of the Limitation Act 1908 when setting aside a transaction or decree obtained by fraud?
- Whether the civil court is precluded from examining acts of special tribunals when such acts are alleged to be illegal or mala fide?
- Hakim MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI vs MUHAMMAD FAYYAZ Andanother1982 PLD Lahore 194 · Lahore High Court · 1981-12-04Read full judgment →
- Hakim FAZAL DIN vs BABU NAWAB DIN AND 2 OTHERS1982 CLC 784 · Lahore High Court · 1981-10-24Read full judgment →
- Hakim FAZAL DIN vs BABU NAWAB DIN AND 2 OTHER1982 CLC 784 · Lahore High Court · 1981-10-24Read full judgment →
- HAKIM ALI vs SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON, KARACHI AND ANOTHERs1982 P Cr. L J 170 · Sindh High Court · 1979-06-18Read full judgment →
- HAKIM ALI AND OTHERS vs Syed IMAM ALI AHMAD QADRI AND OTHERS1982 CLC 946 · Sindh High Court · 1977-04-18Read full judgment →
- HAKIM ALI AND Others vs Syed IMAM ALI AHMAD QADRI AND OTHER1982 CLC 946 · Sindh High Court · 1977-04-18Read full judgment →
- HAKIM ALI AND Others vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS1982 CLC 1498 · Lahore High Court · 1981-01-30Read full judgment →
- HAKIM ALI AND Others vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHER1982 CLC 1498 · Lahore High Court · 1981-01-30Read full judgment →