Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• JUMMA KHAN vs MEHAR ALI AND 3 OTHERs1981 CLC 260 · Sindh High Court · 1980-11-10Read full judgment →
• JHANDA vs MAQBOOL HUSSAIN ETC.1981 SCMR 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-28
  condonation of delaylimitationnegligence of counselsufficient causepetition for leave to appealduty of litigant
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed an application for condonation of a 103-day delay in filing a petition seeking leave to appeal against a decision of the Lahore High Court. The petitioner claimed the delay resulted from his advocate's failure to communicate the High Court's adverse order due to a heart attack, producing a medical certificate that lacked specific dates of illness. The petitioner further asserted he only learned of the order months later through a local patwari. The Court evaluated whether counsel's omission and medical indisposition constituted sufficient cause for condonation when valuable rights had accrued to the respondent by lapse of time. Rejecting the reliance on precedents concerning suit restorations for non-appearance, the Court held that gross negligence by counsel does not per se justify condoning inordinate delay. Furthermore, litigants bear an independent duty to track the progress and fate of their proceedings. Consequently, the Court found no justification to excuse the 103-day delay and dismissed the petition as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of counsel to inform a client of a judgment due to unspecified illness constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay?
  • Can gross negligence by counsel justify condoning delay when valuable rights have accrued to the opposite party by efflux of time?
  • Does a litigant have an independent duty to keep informed about the progress and outcome of their case in court?
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• JEHANZEB KHAN vs WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY THROUGH IT S CHAIRMAN1981 SCMR 1178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-20
  compulsory retirementservice tribunal jurisdictionWAPDA employeeprovincial allocationcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) arose from an order of the N. W. F. P. Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's appeal against compulsory retirement as incompetent. The appellant, originally an employee of the Electricity Department of West Pakistan, was transferred to the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority upon its creation under the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act (XXXI of 1958). He was subsequently retired by the Authority under section 17(1-A) of the Act. After conflicting determinations by different tribunals regarding jurisdiction, subsequent legislative changes—namely the Employees of the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (Allocation to Provinces) Order, 1979 and the WAPDA Amendment Ordinance, 1979—clarified the legal status and allocation of such employees. The Supreme Court held that in view of the amended law and the appellant's permanent residence and place of service, he stood reverted to the Province of N.-W. F. P., rendering him a civil servant of that Province entitled to pursue his remedy before the Provincial Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee transferred from the West Pakistan Electricity Department to WAPDA falls under the jurisdiction of the Federal or Provincial Service Tribunal upon compulsory retirement?
  • How does the enactment of the Employees of the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (Allocation to Provinces) Order, 1979 affect the service status of transferred WAPDA employees?
  • What is the effect of the explanations added to section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958 by the WAPDA Amendment Ordinance, 1979 regarding retirement and reversion?
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• JEHANGIR vs MALLAH Etc.S MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE Etc.1981 SCMR1146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-24
  Land Reforms Regulationtenant evictionrestoration of possessionpre-emptionrevenue authorities jurisdictionagricultural landstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether the forcible eviction of an agricultural tenant by a rival pre-emptor, rather than the landlord, falls within the jurisdiction of revenue authorities under paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 115). The appellant, a tenant, sought restoration of possession after being evicted by a rival pre-emptor. The High Court had previously ruled that proceedings under the Regulation could only be initiated against a landlord, thereby denying the revenue authorities jurisdiction. The Supreme Court rejected this narrow interpretation. It held that the Regulation’s purpose is to protect tenants' rights, and restricting jurisdiction solely to landlords would frustrate this objective. The Court ruled that where a tenant is dispossessed by any party to defeat their rights, the revenue authorities possess the jurisdiction to order restoration of possession. The Court emphasized that remedial statutes must be interpreted to advance their objects rather than creating absurd restraints. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, affirming the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities to protect the tenant against the rival pre-emptor.

  Questions settled

  • Does the jurisdiction of revenue authorities under paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 115) to restore possession extend to cases where a tenant is evicted by a person other than the landlord?
  • Can a rival pre-emptor be proceeded against under the Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 115) for the forcible eviction of a tenant?
  • Is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 discretionary in matters involving the restoration of possession of agricultural land?
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• JEHAN KHAN ETC. vs MEMBER, FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION, RAWALPINDI1981 CLC 1200 · Lahore High Court · 1980-12-05
  land reformsgift mutationFederal Land Commissionsuo motu powersconstitutional petitionagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Member, Federal Land Commission, invalidating a gift mutation of agricultural land made by the predecessor-in-interest in favour of his sons. The core legal question concerns whether the validity of a gift made in favour of heirs between 1-3-1967 and 19-12-1971 could be questioned by the Commission under paragraph 7(1)(b) of Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The Lahore High Court held that transfers by way of gift made in favour of heirs within the specified period are immune from having their bona fides determined by the Commission. The key principle laid down is that bona fide gifts made in favour of heirs prior to the cut-off date are protected under the provisos to paragraph 7(1)(b) of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 and cannot be declared void by the Federal Land Commission.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the validity of a gift made in favour of heirs before 20-12-1971 could be questioned by the Commission under paragraph 7(1)(b) of Martial Law Regulation No. 115?
  • Are transfers of land by way of gift made in favour of heirs falling within the period 1-3-1967 to 19-3-1971 immune from having their bona fides determined by the Commission?
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• JEEVANBAI NADIRSHAW GOLWALLA (REPRESENTED BY LEGAL. HEIRS) vs DARAB1981 CLC 503 · Sindh High Court
  inheritanceadverse possessionlimitationtrustcoal mines leaseParsi law of intestate successionpartnership deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil suit was instituted by the legal heirs of the deceased plaintiff Jeevanbai against the defendants seeking a declaration, rendition of accounts, and a permanent injunction regarding leasehold rights in two coal mines at Quetta and Mach originally owned by their predecessor who died intestate in 1934 under Parsi law. The core legal question was whether the deceased's two sons managed the mines in trust for all legal heirs or as exclusive owners, and whether the suit was barred by limitation and acquiescence. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the sons held the mines in trust, finding instead that the sons had exclusively managed and appropriated the income from the mines openly to the exclusion of other heirs since 1934, and that the plaintiff's original claim was lost through adverse title, lapse of time, and acquiescence upon accepting a limited life interest under a subsequent will and partnership deed. The court laid down that exclusion from joint property coupled with continuous exercise of hostile title for over the statutory limitation period bars an inheritance-based claim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the management of ancestral property by co-heirs constitutes a trust for all legal heirs or an exclusive business to the exclusion of others?
  • What is the applicable period of limitation for a suit claiming a share in joint family property upon exclusion?
  • What is the effect of accepting a limited life interest under a will and a subsequent partnership deed on an original claim of inheritance?
  • Whether a suit for administration is hit by Section 212 of the Succession Act without obtaining letters of administration?
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• JAWAID AKHTAR BUTT vs THE STATE-1981 P Cr. L J 379 · Sindh High Court · 1980-09-26Read full judgment →
• JAVED MANZOOR AND Another vs MEMBER (REVENUE), BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB AND Other1981 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-20
  pre-emptioncourt-feedeficiency in court-feewrit petitionjurisdictiondiscretionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from concurrent dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had challenged orders passed by revenue authorities in a pre-emption matter. The petitioners purchased agricultural land, against which respondent No. 3 filed a pre-emption suit. The plaintiff repeatedly filed deficient court-fees, and the trial court and subsequent revenue authorities allowed time to make good the deficiency. The core legal question was whether the High Court could interfere in writ jurisdiction with the discretionary order of a court or tribunal having jurisdiction to extend time for paying court-fee deficits. The Supreme Court held that writ petitions are meant to correct excess of jurisdiction and not to interfere with the proper exercise of discretion by courts possessing competent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court laid down that superior courts exercising writ jurisdiction should not interfere with the discretionary powers of subordinate tribunals regarding the extension of time for making up deficient court-fees where such tribunals have acted within their jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere under writ jurisdiction with the discretionary exercise of power by revenue courts extending time for making good a deficient court-fee?
  • Does a Member, Board of Revenue violate legal requirements by upholding a reasoned order of a subordinate revenue officer without repeating all the reasons in detail?
  • Can a court permit the making good of a deficient court-fee in a pre-emption suit beyond the period of limitation?
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• JAVED AHMAD AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 160 · Lahore High Court · 1980-09-27Read full judgment →
• JAVAID LATIF DAR vs UNITED BANK LTD., KARACHI1981 PLC 852 · Labour Court · 1980-10-29Read full judgment →
• JAVAID KHAN vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 756 · Lahore High Court · 1980-08-04Read full judgment →
• JAVAID DASTGIR MIRZA vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 246 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-24Read full judgment →
• JAVAID AKHTAR vs JUPITER TEXTILE MILLS LTD., HYDERABAD1981 PLC 821 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-09-20Read full judgment →
• JARO vs THE STATE-Opponent1981 P Cr. L J 565 · Sindh High Court · 1980-06-03Read full judgment →
• JAN MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1981 PLD Karachi 682 · Sindh High Court · 1980-11-08
  Sind Crimes Control Actnon-bailable warrantspolice reporthabitual offenderconstitutional petitioncognizance of offenceprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate/Tribunal, Khairpur, issuing non-bailable warrants against the petitioner based on a police report filed under the Sind Crimes Control Act, 1975. The core legal questions were whether the Tribunal could take cognizance of a report filed by an officer below the rank of Sub-Inspector, whether the issuance of non-bailable warrants was justified without recorded reasons, and whether the report met the statutory requirements for specificity regarding alleged acts. The Court held that the order was passed without lawful authority. It established that under the Act, a Tribunal cannot take cognizance of a report unless filed by an officer of at least Sub-Inspector rank. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the issuance of non-bailable warrants requires specific reasons demonstrating that the alleged acts cannot be prevented otherwise. Finally, it held that a police report must contain specific particulars of the acts, including time and place, and that merely citing pending criminal cases is insufficient to establish habitual criminality or justify proceedings under the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Tribunal take cognizance of a report under the Sind Crimes Control Act 1975 if filed by a police officer below the rank of Sub-Inspector?
  • Is a mere list of pending criminal cases sufficient to establish that a person is a habitual offender under the Sind Crimes Control Act 1975?
  • What are the essential requirements for a police report submitted under section 14 of the Sind Crimes Control Act 1975?
  • Does the issuance of non-bailable warrants under the Sind Crimes Control Act 1975 require the recording of specific reasons?
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• JAN MUHAMMAD vs MUHAMMAD ASGHAR1981 PLD Supreme Court 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-04
  restoration of revisiondismissal for non-prosecutionsufficient causemisreading of recorddiscretionary jurisdictionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing an application for restoration of a Civil Revision petition that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in finding no 'sufficient cause' for restoration, where its order was partly based on the premise that the appellant's attorney was present outside the courtroom but failed to appear. The Supreme Court observed that whether sufficient cause exists is a question of fact to be determined in the peculiar circumstances of each case following accepted judicial principles. Upon examining the record, the Supreme Court discovered that the affidavit relied upon by the High Court did not contain any assertion that the attorney was present outside the courtroom. The Court held that this misreading of material evidence adversely influenced the High Court's exercise of discretion, requiring a fresh determination. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination of sufficient cause for restoration of a petition is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each case?
  • Whether a court's exercise of discretion regarding restoration is vitiated when based on a misreading of material evidence on record?
  • Whether an appellate court should remand a restoration application for fresh decision when the lower court's discretion was influenced by a factual error on record?
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• JAMSHAID AND OTHERS vs THE STATE---1981 P Cr. L J 1102 · Lahore High Court · 1980-11-04Read full judgment →
• JAMILUR RAHMAN KHAN vs Mst. SARA BEGUM1981 PLD Karachi 26 · Sindh High Court · 1980-04-18
  bona fide requirementrented premisespersonal useevictionconcurrent findings of factsecond appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a second appeal against the concurrent findings of two lower courts ordering the eviction of a tenant from residential premises on the ground of the landlady's bona fide personal requirement for her son. The core legal question was whether the statutory requirement that a landlord or their child must not be occupying another suitable residential building extends to include rented premises currently occupied by the child. The appellant argued that the landlady's son's occupation of rented premises necessitated a finding on the suitability of that accommodation before eviction could be ordered. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory phrase 'another residential building' refers exclusively to premises owned by the landlord, not rented accommodation. The Court affirmed that the question of bona fide requirement is a finding of fact, which cannot be reviewed in second appeal absent misreading of evidence or procedural error. The key principle laid down is that in eviction proceedings for personal use, the suitability of alternative accommodation occupied by a landlord or their child is irrelevant if that accommodation is rented rather than owned.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory requirement that a landlord or their child not occupy another suitable residential building include rented premises?
  • Can a High Court in second appeal review concurrent findings of fact regarding bona fide requirement?
  • Does the term 'another residential building' in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 extend to cover rented premises occupied by a landlord or their child?
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• JAMIL AKHTAR vs THE PROVINCE OF SIND AND Other1981 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-06
  pay fixationnational pay scalesservice tribunaleducational qualificationsdiscrimination in payleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against an order of the Sind Services Tribunal, which summarily dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning the correct fixation of his pay in the national pay scales as a librarian. The core legal question raised is whether the Government has the authority to discriminate between incumbents of the same post by prescribing differential pay scales based on educational qualifications. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that an employer is fully competent to offer higher compensation for higher qualifications within the same post, provided such qualifications have a direct relevance to the functions assigned. The Court established the principle that prescribing higher pay scales for persons possessing higher qualifications is legally justified to attract better-qualified personnel and does not constitute unlawful discrimination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government can prescribe differential pay scales for incumbents of the same post based on educational qualifications?
  • Is an employer legally competent to offer higher compensation for higher qualifications within the same post?
  • Does the prescription of a higher pay scale for higher qualifications relevant to the functions of a post constitute unlawful discrimination?
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• JAMES ILYAS MASIH vs PUNJAB LOCAL COUNCILS ELECTION AUTHORITY, LAHORE AND Other1981 SCMR 919 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-12
  local government electionsnomination paperrejection of nominationElection AuthorityElection Tribunalelection petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a local councils election dispute in Punjab where the petitioner was declared elected unopposed after the Returning Officer rejected the nomination paper of a rival candidate, respondent No. 3, for non-appearance. The core legal question was whether the Election Authority was competent under section 17 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 to interfere and order fresh elections after the declaration of the result, or whether the aggrieved candidate's only remedy was an election petition before the Election Tribunal under section 24 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that since the nomination paper was illegally rejected and no notification of the election result had yet been published in the official Gazette, an election petition before the Tribunal was premature and incompetent, thereby justifying the invocation of the Election Authority's powers under section 17(1). The key principle laid down is that where a nomination paper is illegally rejected and no result has been officially notified, the Election Authority is competent to intervene and direct fresh elections, as a standard election petition remedy is not available at that stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Election Authority is competent under section 17 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 to interfere with an election process and order fresh elections before the official notification of the election result?
  • Can an aggrieved candidate maintain an election petition before the Election Tribunal when the election result has not yet been published in the official Gazette?
  • Does the rejection of a nomination paper and subsequent declaration of a candidate as elected unopposed constitute a completed election barring intervention by the Election Authority?
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• JAMES ILYAS MASIH vs PUNJAB LOCAL COUNCILS ELECTION AUTHORITY, LAHORE AND 3 OTHERS1981 CLC 237 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• JAMEEL YOUSAF SIDDIQUI vs A. H. KHAN AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 858 · Sindh High Court · 1980-04-15Read full judgment →
• JAMAL vs Mst. TAJ BAKHT AND ANOTHER1981 PLC 378 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-11-04Read full judgment →
• JALAL vs ASHFAQ ETC1981 P Cr. L J 1033 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-07Read full judgment →
• JALAL SHAH AND Other vs THE CUSTODIAN AND Other1981 PLD SC 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-25
  adverse possessionevacuee propertyconstitutional jurisdictionsymbolic possessionprescriptionallotment
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants filed an application under Section 22 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 seeking a declaration that they were owners in adverse possession of certain agricultural land and that the land was not evacuee property, rendering its subsequent allotment illegal. The Deputy Custodian initially allowed the petition, but upon remand by the Custodian, ultimately dismissed it after reviewing the revenue records and finding no matured adverse possession. The Custodian and subsequently the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction upheld this dismissal. On appeal by special leave, the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core legal questions of whether the appellants had perfected title through adverse possession and whether the land was protected under Section 3 of the Act as property not treated as evacuee property prior to the cutoff date. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that concurrent findings of fact against the adverse possession claim could not be disturbed, that the continuity of adverse possession was broken by civil court proceedings and symbolic possession, and that the protection of Section 3 did not apply to hidden evacuee property where occupants failed to inform the Custodian.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction can upset concurrent findings of fact regarding adverse possession?
  • Does the institution of a civil suit within the limitation period break the continuity of adverse possession?
  • Is symbolic possession obtained by a judgment-debtor as good as actual possession against a judgment-debtor for breaking adverse possession?
  • Does Section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 protect hidden evacuee property where the occupant failed to inform the Custodian?
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• JALAL DIN ETC. vs OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, CENTRAL RECORD OFFICE AND.1981 SCMR 818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-16
  land claim verificationsettlement and rehabilitationadministrative correctionfraudulent claimjurisdiction of OSDFard-e-Haqiat
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an order by the Officer on Special Duty (OSD), Board of Revenue, regarding the verification of land claims. The core legal question was whether the OSD possessed the jurisdiction to reopen and correct a previously verified claim form after discovering that the petitioners had obtained an inflated land entitlement by exploiting the similarity of names between their predecessor-in-interest and the respondent's predecessor. The Supreme Court held that the OSD acted within its jurisdiction and authority. The Court found that the petitioners had wrongfully secured verification for land abandoned by the respondent due to a confusion of identity in the records. Consequently, the Court affirmed the OSD's decision to cancel the erroneous claim and issue a fresh entitlement based on the accurate records. The key principle laid down is that administrative authorities possess the inherent power and duty to correct records and rectify errors when it is established that a party has obtained an undue advantage through the misrepresentation or confusion of identity in official claim documents.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Officer on Special Duty have the jurisdiction to correct a previously verified land claim upon discovering a mistake in the record?
  • Can a party retain land entitlement obtained through the exploitation of similar names of predecessors-in-interest?
  • Is an administrative authority justified in reopening a claim file to rectify errors based on official records like Jamabandis?
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• JAFFAR ALI AMD ANOTHER vs SIND ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 1106 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• J. M. EFFENDI vs PAKISTAN RAILWAY BOARD AND ANOTHER, . (1981 PLC (C. S.) 568 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-06Read full judgment →
• IZHAR HAIDER vs ZAHID HUSSAIN AND Another1981 SCMR 847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-12-04
  bail cancellationmedical grounds for bailjudicial discretioninfirm personcriminal proceduremurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, accused of murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, challenged the cancellation of his bail by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner had initially been granted bail by the Sessions Court on grounds of illness. Subsequently, the High Court cancelled this bail after reviewing a medical report from a neurosurgeon, concluding that the petitioner was not suffering from any serious illness. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the High Court misread the medical report and that, even if not 'sick,' he qualified as an 'infirm' person under the second proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, thereby warranting bail. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the medical document relied upon was merely a prescription, not a formal medical report. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the second proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not create an automatic entitlement to bail for infirm persons but merely confers judicial discretion, which the High Court had exercised correctly.

  Questions settled

  • Does the second proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 create an automatic entitlement to bail for infirm persons?
  • Can a court cancel bail if the medical evidence presented does not substantiate the claim of serious illness?
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• ISRAR vs The STATE1981 SCMR 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-23
  culpable homicidesentence reductionleave to appealmitigating circumstancesabscondencecriminal appealtender age
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a conviction and sentence under Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The petitioner sought a reduction in the ten-year rigorous imprisonment sentence imposed by the High Court, arguing that the offence occurred suddenly and that he was of tender age at the time. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the sentence based on these mitigating factors. The Supreme Court, while condoning a two-day delay in filing the petition, dismissed the appeal on its merits. The Court held that it would not interfere with a legally awarded sentence, particularly as the petitioner failed to provide evidence on the record to substantiate his claim of tender age and had absconded for five months following the occurrence. The judgment establishes the principle that the Supreme Court will not exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence where the petitioner fails to substantiate mitigating claims and where the conduct of the accused, such as abscondence, undermines the request for leniency.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a legal sentence awarded by lower courts solely on the basis of a claim of tender age that is not supported by the record?
  • Is a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal condonable when a reasonable explanation is provided?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused after an occurrence weigh against the request for leniency in sentencing?
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• ISRAR AHMAD vs PRESIDENT, SUMMARY MILITARY COURT, SANGHAR AND 61981 PLD Karachi 47 · Sindh High Court · 1980-09-09Read full judgment →
• ISMAIL vs THE STATE-Opponent1981 P Cr. L J 507 · Sindh High Court · 1979-11-25Read full judgment →
• ISMAIL Brother vs KEVAL RAM1981 PLD Supreme Court 545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-30
  ad interim injunctioneviction orderfraudlandlord and tenantbona fide personal needestoppel of tenantstay of executionprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order refusing ad interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in a civil suit filed by a tenant challenging an eviction order. The tenant alleged that the landlord had obtained the eviction order from the Rent Controller by concealing a prior civil court decree wherein ownership of the property was declared in favor of his son, and the landlord was permanently restrained from interfering with the property. The tenant argued that this suppression amounted to extrinsic fraud vitiating the eviction order. The High Court had refused interim relief, holding that the tenant was prima facie estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872 from questioning the landlord's title. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted an interim injunction staying the eviction, holding that the tenant had established a prima facie case raising serious questions regarding fraud and the bona fides of the landlord's personal need.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit lies to challenge an eviction order obtained by alleged fraud and misrepresentation?
  • Does Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872 estop a tenant from questioning the landlord's title regarding events occurring after the commencement of the tenancy?
  • Whether a party seeking temporary injunction under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 only needs to show a good prima facie case raising serious triable questions.
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• ISMAIL AND Another BASHIR AHMADAND 4 Others vs Mst. RAZIA BEGUM AND 31981 SCMR 687 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10
  pre-emption suitsigning of plaintverification of plaintprocedural irregularitylimitation periodremand ordernew factual plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose out of pre-emption suits filed by the respondents against the petitioners regarding land situated in Zafarwal, Tehsil Narowal, District Sialkot. The trial Judge initially dismissed the suits because the plaints were neither signed nor verified by the respondents. On appeal, the District Judge allowed the appeals and remanded the cases to the trial Judge to have the plaints properly signed and verified. Following compliance, the trial Judge decreed the suits, and subsequent appeals by the petitioners to the District Judge and the High Court were dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that signing the plaints after the limitation period rendered the suits time-barred and raised a new factual contention regarding municipal ownership of part of the land. The Supreme Court held that since the respondents diligently prosecuted their suits, the initial omission to sign the plaints was a mere technical irregularity that was validly cured without prejudice to the petitioners. Furthermore, new factual arguments cannot be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a plaintiff to sign or verify a plaint at the time of filing constitute a mere technical irregularity that can be rectified after the period of limitation has expired?
  • Can a party raise a new question of fact for the first time in an appeal before the Supreme Court?
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• ISLAMUDDIN vs THE DEPUTY SETTLEMENT COMMISSIOIIER AND Other1981 SCMR 835 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-25
  Permanent Transfer OrderSettlement lawAuction cancellationDefault in paymentResumption of propertyDiscretionary jurisdictionRestitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of the petitioner's Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) regarding a property in Bahawalpur. The petitioner had purchased the property at auction in 1971 but failed to pay the balance of the transfer price despite multiple notices. Consequently, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner cancelled the P.T.O. and re-auctioned the property, which was then purchased by the respondent. The core legal question was whether the cancellation of the P.T.O. and subsequent re-auction were valid given the petitioner's persistent default. The Supreme Court held that the cancellation of the P.T.O. constituted a valid order of resumption. While the Court acknowledged the petitioner's argument regarding the lower price obtained at the second auction, it refused to set aside the confirmed auction in favor of the respondent, citing the petitioner's own default. However, the Court directed the authorities to refund the initial deposit of Rs. 5,100 to the petitioner. The principle established is that a defaulting party forfeits their right to property, precluding equitable relief, though they remain entitled to the restitution of deposited funds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the cancellation of a Permanent Transfer Order by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner constitute a valid order of resumption?
  • Can a party who has defaulted on payment obligations for a property auction successfully challenge the subsequent re-auction of that property?
  • Is a defaulting auction purchaser entitled to the refund of their initial deposit after the property has been re-auctioned to another party?
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• ISLAMUDDIN vs DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION1981 PLC (C. S.) 843 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-22Read full judgment →
• ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN vs ISRARUL HAQ AND 23 Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-05
  promotionseniorityex-cadre postPolice Service of PakistanService Tribunalestoppel against statuteSelection Boardcivil serviceDeputy SecretaryDeputy Inspector General
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under Article 212(3) of the Constitution, concerned a former Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) officer's claim for promotion as Deputy Inspector General (DIG) and seniority. The core legal questions were whether his appointment as Deputy Secretary, Federal Government (Grade 19), automatically implied promotion as DIG (Grade 19) in the PSP Cadre, and how his seniority should be reckoned. The Supreme Court held that appointment to an ex-cadre post, even of an equivalent grade, does not amount to promotion within the parent cadre, nor can such promotion be implied or deemed. Advancement on an ex-cadre post does not automatically confer rights within the original cadre. The Court emphasized that promotion requires adherence to specific rules and procedures, and a Service Tribunal cannot substitute its judgment on an officer's suitability for promotion for that of the competent Selection Board. Furthermore, the principle of estoppel does not apply against a statute or statutory functionaries acting beyond their powers. The appeal was accepted, the Service Tribunal's order was set aside, and the respondent's claim for seniority as DIG was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does appointment to an ex-cadre post of an equivalent grade automatically imply promotion within the officer's parent cadre?
  • Can advancement gained on an ex-cadre post be carried as of right to the officer's parent cadre?
  • Can a Service Tribunal substitute its decision regarding an officer's suitability for promotion for that of the Selection Board?
  • Does the principle of estoppel apply against a statute or statutory functionaries acting beyond their powers?
  • How is seniority determined for officers promoted to higher posts after the enforcement of the Civil Servants Ordinance, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN vs ABDUL QADIR HAYE AND OTHER1981 SCMR 501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-15
  civil servicepresidential powersenioritypromotionservices tribunaladministrative justicevested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, through the Secretary, Establishment Division, challenging an order of the Services Tribunal, Islamabad. The respondent, a police officer, had been suspended and transferred under a previous regime, but was subsequently reinstated and restored to his position by the President of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the Services Tribunal erred in directing the respondent's promotion to Grade 19 based on the President's orders, despite the government's contention that the respondent lacked a vested right to such promotion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal's decision was both just and equitable. The Court reasoned that the President possesses plenary power under the Civil Servants Act to deal with the case of any civil servant in a manner deemed just and equitable. The principle laid down is that the President's authority to rectify administrative injustices regarding civil servants remains broad and overriding, provided the action taken is not less favorable than the statutory provisions or rules applicable to the servant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the President of Pakistan have the authority to deal with the case of a civil servant in a manner that appears just and equitable under the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Can the Services Tribunal direct the promotion of a civil servant to rectify an administrative injustice when the President has already exercised his power to restore the officer's position?
  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to promotion that precludes the President from exercising his powers under Section 23 of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• ISLAMABAD CLUB vs PUNJAB LABOUR COURT No. 2 Em1981 PLD Supreme Court 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-29
  retrenchmentIslamabad Capital Territoryexisting lawslast in first outstatutory rules of serviceadaptation of lawslabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment setting aside the retrenchment of respondents (gardeners) by the Islamabad Club. The respondents had challenged their retrenchment under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, asserting violation of the 'last in, first out' rule in Standing Order 13 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968. The appellant contended that the 1968 Ordinance did not apply to the centrally administered Islamabad Capital Territory, or alternatively that Ordinance III of 1960 governed, or that the Club was an exempt Government establishment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under President's Order No. 1 of 1970 and subsequent constitutional arrangements, existing laws operating prior to the dissolution of West Pakistan continued in force in Islamabad until altered or repealed. The Court further noted that exemptions under the 1968 Ordinance require statutory rules of service, which were absent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 continue to apply to establishments located in the Islamabad Capital Territory as an existing law?
  • Does the separation of Islamabad into a centrally administered area automatically revive previously repealed central legislation in place of existing provincial laws?
  • Can an establishment claim exemption from the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 as a government establishment in the absence of statutory rules of service, conduct, or discipline?
  Read full judgment →
• ISHAQUE vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 649 · Sindh High Court · 1980-07-27Read full judgment →
• ISHAQ vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 841 · Sindh High Court · 1980-07-15Read full judgment →
• IRSHAD RASHID MIR vs MESSRS PRINCE GLASS WORKS LTD., KARACHI1981 PLC 978 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-02-02Read full judgment →
• IRSHAD ALI vs ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1981 CLC 111 · Sindh High Court · 1979-12-08
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilityunconditional withdrawalres judicataprofessional misconductPakistan Medical Councildisciplinary enquiryprocedural violation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition before the Sindh High Court challenged a decision of the Pakistan Medical Council restoring the registration of a medical practitioner (respondent No. 3) and dropping disciplinary proceedings against her following a complaint of professional misconduct lodged by the petitioner. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the petition on the ground that an earlier constitutional petition on the same cause of action had been unconditionally withdrawn. On the preliminary issue, the High Court held that the unconditional withdrawal of a prior constitutional petition before hearing on merits does not bar a subsequent petition on the same cause of action under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. On the merits, the Court observed that the Council failed to adhere to the mandatory statutory procedure under Regulation 37 of the Pakistan Registration of Medical and Dental Practitioners Regulation 1966, which required giving the complainant an opportunity to state his case and produce evidence. Consequently, the High Court declared the Council's order to be without lawful authority and remanded the matter for fresh determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unconditional withdrawal of a constitutional petition prior to hearing on merits bar the filing of a second petition on the same cause of action under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a statutory body bound to follow the mandatory enquiry procedure prescribed by its governing regulations when adjudicating allegations of professional misconduct?
  • Can a decision of a professional regulatory body be sustained if it fails to afford a complainant the opportunity to produce evidence and cross-examine witnesses as required by statutory rules?
  Read full judgment →
• IRSHAD ALI AND 2 Other vs MUHAMMAD UMAR1981 PLD Karachi 273 · Sindh High Court · 1980-05-09
  ejectmentpersonal bona fide needdefault in rentnotice of transferlegal heirssecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal arose from an ejectment application filed by a landlady under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on grounds of default and personal bona fide need. Both lower courts dismissed the application. During the pendency of the second appeal, the landlady passed away, and her legal heirs were substituted. The High Court addressed two main questions: first, whether the personal requirement of the deceased landlady could be claimed by her legal heirs; and second, whether the tenant committed a default in rent payment given that the notice of ownership transfer under Section 13-A of the Ordinance was returned unserved. The High Court held that the personal requirement of a deceased landlord does not automatically devolve upon legal heirs, who must establish their own independent needs in fresh proceedings. Additionally, the court ruled that under Section 13-A, actual service of notice is essential to establish default, and a postal return of 'addressee not found' cannot be equated with service or refusal. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the personal and bona fide requirement of a deceased landlord automatically devolve upon their legal heirs during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Is the mere posting of a notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 sufficient to establish default if the notice is returned unserved?
  • Can a postal endorsement of 'addressee not found' be treated as equivalent to 'refused' for the purpose of proving service of notice?
  Read full judgment →
• IRSHAD AHMED vs SHAFI MUHAMMAD 5 OTHERS1981 CLC 1332 · Sindh High Court · 1981-01-25
  election disputeinvalid votesballot papervoter intentionconstitutional petitionelection tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Election Tribunal unseating the petitioner from a local council membership and declaring the first respondent as the returned candidate. The core legal question revolves around the validity of five disputed ballot papers that initially bore a stamp mark on the petitioner's symbol as well as extra stamp marks on redundant symbols, leading the Tribunal to reject them as invalid. The High Court held that the mere presence of an extra mark does not render a ballot paper ipso facto invalid if the unambiguous intention of the voter to vote for a particular candidate can be ascertained from the ballot paper. The ratio decidendi is that statutory election provisions should not be interpreted to disenfranchise voters where their clear intent is manifest and no uncertainty exists as to their choice. Consequently, the petition was allowed, the Tribunal's order was set aside, and the petitioner was restored to his seat.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of an extra mark on a ballot paper render it ipso facto invalid under the election rules?
  • Whether a ballot paper should be counted if the unambiguous intention of the voter to vote for a specific candidate is clearly ascertainable?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against an order of an Election Tribunal where no alternative statutory remedy is available?
  Read full judgment →
• IRSHAD AHMAD vs THE SETTLEMENT AUTHORITY, PUNJAB1981 SCMR 758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-11
  evacuee propertysettlement schemewrit jurisdictionfinding of facttransfer of propertypossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee building site measuring 11 Marlas and 68 Sq. Ft. situated in Lahore, originally allotted to the petitioner Irshad Ahmad under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, which was later partially diverted to the respondent Sain Miraj Din by the Lahore High Court in writ jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the High Court was competent in its writ jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact regarding possession and whether the respondent was entitled to a portion of the plot. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly interfered with findings of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner as they were contradicted by the record and based on no evidence, and that an applicant cannot claim a portion of a building site not in their possession. The Court laid down the principle that the High Court can set aside a finding of fact in writ jurisdiction if it is contrary to the material on record or proceeds in disregard of evidence, and that a claimant for a building site is restricted to the portion actually in their possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact recorded by a settlement authority in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction?
  • Is an applicant for the transfer of an evacuee building site entitled to claim a portion of the property not in their possession?
  • Does a finding of fact that is contradicted by the record or based on no evidence warrant interference in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• IQBAL SHAH vs THE STATE1981 PLD F SC 284 · Federal Shariat Court · 1981-05-26Read full judgment →
• IQBAL MUJEEB AND ANOTHER vs HABIB BANK LTD,, KARACHI , ,1981 PLC 376 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-02-20Read full judgment →
• INTERHOM LTD., KARACHI vs MAJOR NISAR AHMED KHAN (RETD.)1981 CLC 981 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-26
  second appealsale deedancestral propertylegal necessitysale considerationremandadditional evidenceOrder XLI Rule 27 CPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal arises out of a civil dispute challenging the judgments and decrees of the lower courts concerning the validity and consideration of a sale deed (Exh. D-1) involving ancestral property. The primary legal question before the High Court was whether the lower courts erred in concluding that the sale transaction was an act of good management for legal necessity without properly examining and reconciling the payment of the agreed sale consideration. The High Court observed that there were clear discrepancies between the recitals in the sale deed and the oral testimony of the witness regarding amounts paid as earnest money, cash paid before the Registrar, and the value/particulars of the transferred mortgagee rights, causing the actual proven sum to fall short of the agreed Rs. 22,000 consideration. Consequently, the High Court set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts and remanded the case to the Senior Civil Judge to allow the respondents an opportunity to produce revenue record documents under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to establish the identity of the land and determine the bona fides of the transaction and payment of consideration afresh.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of legal necessity and valid alienation be sustained if the payment of the stipulated sale consideration has not been properly reconciled or established by the trial court?
  • Whether an appellate court may remand a matter under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to permit additional documentary evidence when the identity of property comprising part of the sale consideration is in dispute?
  • Can the judgment and decree of lower courts be set aside on second appeal where both courts failed to apply their minds to discrepancies in the proof of consideration?
  Read full judgment →
• INSPECTOR GENERAL, POLICF, PUNJAB, LAHORE, AND ANOTHBR vs MASOOD1981 SCMR 840 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-09
  Annual Confidential ReportService TribunalTerms and conditions of serviceExpunction of remarksPolice officer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the order of the Punjab Services Tribunal dated 17th June, 1979, whereby adverse remarks recorded in the Annual Confidential Report of Masood Ahmad Khan, a Prosecuting Inspector of Police, for the period between 15th August, 1975 and 31st December, 1975 were expunged. The core legal questions before the court were whether an appeal is maintainable against entries in an Annual Confidential Report, and whether such entries pertain to the terms and conditions of service. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that entries in Annual Confidential Reports constitute final orders subject to expunction by a higher authority and form an integral part of the terms and conditions of service of an employee, especially as they can serve as the basis for compulsory retirement. The key principle laid down is that Annual Confidential Reports directly relate to service terms and conditions and are appealable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether entries in an Annual Confidential Report constitute a final order subject to appeal?
  • Do entries in an Annual Confidential Report form part of the terms and conditions of service of an employee?
  Read full judgment →
• INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTANEMPLOYEES' FEDERATION AND ANOTHER vs INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN, .(1981 PLC 429 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1981-05-02Read full judgment →
• INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN vs MESSRS NADEEM FLOUR1981 SCMR 143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-29
  recovery of loansbanking courtjurisdictiontransfer of casessummary proceduremortgagestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a decision of the High Court of Sind returning the petitioner's application for the attachment and sale of the respondents' mills for presentation before the Special Court. The petitioner, established under the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance 1961, argued that its application under Section 39 of the said Ordinance remained maintainable in the High Court despite the enactment of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the interplay between the two statutes, particularly Section 3 and Section 6(4) of the 1979 Ordinance. The Court held that because the petitioner is a banking company and its claim exceeded one lakh rupees, its pending proceedings stood automatically transferred to the Special Court by operation of law. The Court observed that while the 1979 Ordinance created procedural anomalies by depriving the petitioner of more efficacious remedies under its parent Act, the plain language of the statute left no room for exemption. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 override the recovery procedures prescribed under the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance 1961?
  • Does a claim by a banking company exceeding one lakh rupees stand automatically transferred to the Special Court under Section 6(4) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  • Can the heading of a statutory section curtail or restrict the plain meaning of the words used within that section?
  Read full judgment →
• INAYAT ULLAH AND ANOTHER vs NOOR AHMAD1981 CLC 1845 · Lahore High Court · 1981-03-20Read full judgment →
• INAYAT MASIH AND Another vs THE STATE1981 PLD Supreme Court 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-25
  briberyillegal gratificationcriminal appealraiding partyaccomplice liabilitycorroboration of evidencepolice corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of two police officials, an Assistant Sub-Inspector and a Constable, for offences under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The appellants had detained a citizen and demanded illegal gratification for his release. A bribery raid was conducted, during which the Constable was caught receiving the marked currency notes. The core legal question was whether the main accused could be held liable for bribery when the money was physically received by an intermediary, and whether the raid evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, holding that the receipt of money by an intermediary for the benefit of the main accused constitutes material evidence against the main accused. The Court established that in bribery cases, the demand and agreement by the main accused, corroborated by the intermediary's receipt of funds during a supervised raid, provides sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, rejecting the argument that such a scenario constitutes no evidence against the principal offender.

  Questions settled

  • Can a main accused be held liable for bribery when the illegal gratification is physically received by an intermediary?
  • Does the receipt of money by an intermediary for the benefit of a main accused provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a bribery conviction?
  • Is the resistance of an accused during a bribery raid sufficient to discredit the testimony of the supervising Magistrate?
  Read full judgment →
• INAYAT AND Another vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE AND 4 Other1981 SCMR 1021 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-27
  writ jurisdictionconsolidation of holdingsdiscretionary reliefduty of counselleave to appealmortgagee rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging a consolidation order. The petitioners contended that the High Court erred by failing to independently investigate and discover specific instructions supporting their argument that a third party, Taj Din, held only mortgagee rights and should have been settled on Central Government land. The petitioners argued that the High Court had a duty to locate these instructions even if their counsel failed to produce them. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the High Court's writ jurisdiction is discretionary. The Court affirmed that it is not the duty of the High Court to act as an investigator for a party's case or to discover evidence or instructions that counsel fails to provide. Because the petitioners' counsel failed to substantiate the main point of their argument, the High Court was not obligated to grant relief. Finding no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court under a legal duty to independently discover instructions or evidence to support a contention raised by a petitioner if their counsel fails to provide them?
  • Does the failure of a petitioner's counsel to substantiate a primary argument justify the dismissal of a writ petition?
  • Is the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court mandatory or discretionary when a party fails to support their claims?
  Read full judgment →
• INAYAT ALI KHAN AND Others vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, HYDERABAD1981 SCMR 579 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-26
  evacuee propertysettlement lawstransfer of propertyMartial Law Regulationlandlord and tenantentitlementrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the transfer of a shop constructed on an evacuee building site in Hyderabad. The core legal questions involved whether the declaration of property as hidden evacuee property under Martial Law Regulation No. 49 forfeited a claimant's rights under settlement laws, whether the respondent’s application for the plot sufficiently covered the shop, and whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to determine entitlement. The Supreme Court held that a declaration under Martial Law Regulation No. 49 does not extinguish rights under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Court affirmed the transfer of the shop to the respondent, finding that he was the builder and that the appellants, as tenants, held no superior entitlement. Furthermore, the Court clarified that appellate or revisional authorities may exercise jurisdiction where the original authority fails to act in accordance with the law. The judgment establishes that possession by a tenant is deemed possession of the landlord for the purposes of determining entitlement under the relevant Settlement Scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Does the declaration of property under Martial Law Regulation No. 49 extinguish a claimant's rights under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can an Additional Settlement Commissioner determine entitlement if the Deputy Settlement Commissioner fails to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the law?
  • Is the possession of a tenant considered the possession of the landlord for the purpose of determining entitlement under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• INAMUR RAHIM AND Another vs The STATE1981 SCMR 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-19
  pre-arrest bailappellate jurisdictionSupreme Court interferenceineffective firingjudicial discretionbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's refusal to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioners, who were accused of offences under sections 302 and 307 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners contended that their role was limited to ineffective firing in the air, which should have entitled them to bail. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretion in bail matters where the allegations involve serious offences. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that it is primarily a Constitutional Court and should not routinely interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in bail matters. The Court reaffirmed that it will only intervene if the High Court's order is such that it could not have possibly been passed under the law. Finding that the impugned order did not meet this high threshold of error, the Court declined to interfere, emphasizing the limited scope of its appellate jurisdiction in bail proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court regarding the grant or refusal of bail?
  • Is the Supreme Court of Pakistan expected to routinely adjudicate on matters concerning the grant of bail by the High Court?
  • Does the allegation of ineffective firing in a murder case automatically entitle an accused to the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• INAMUL HAQ vs The STATE1981 SCMR 152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-30
  misappropriationcriminal breach of trustfalsification of accountsbenefit of doubtcircumstantial evidencecorruptionchain of custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the convictions of the appellant under sections 409, 420, and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1941, for allegedly misappropriating state funds through the inflation of contingency bills while serving as a Junior Clerk. The core legal question concerns whether the circumstantial chain connecting the appellant to the preparation, presentation, and encashment of the fraudulent bills was sufficiently established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that while the presentation of the bills by the appellant was proved, the prosecution failed to establish the preparation of the bills by the appellant without corroboration of an interested witness, and crucially failed to prove the actual receipt of payments by the appellant. The Court laid down the principle that suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot take the place of legal proof, and where a vital link in the chain of circumstantial evidence—such as the actual receipt of misappropriated funds—is missing, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for misappropriation be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove the receipt of payments under fraudulent bills?
  • Does the mere presentation of inflated contingency bills to the treasury, without proof of their preparation or encashment by the accused, establish guilt?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an uncorroborated testimony from a witness possessing personal animus against the accused?
  • Can suspicion alone take the place of legal proof in criminal cases?
  Read full judgment →
• In Re:OFFICE REFERENCE IN RESPECT OF CIVIL COURTS (SIND AMENDMENT)1981 PLD Karachi 210 · Sindh High Court
  original civil jurisdictionpecuniary jurisdictionDistrict CourtHigh Court original sidecivil courts amendmentconcurrent jurisdictionlowest grade court
  Summary & questions settled

  This office reference, considered by a Full Bench of the Sindh High Court, arose from the promulgation of the Civil Courts (Sind Amendment) Ordinance, 1970, which amended Article 4 of the Karachi Courts Order, 1956 and section 24 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, raising the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge, Additional District Judge, and First Class Civil Judge from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 50,000. The core legal question was whether these amendments affected the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court in suits valued between Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 50,000, and whether section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applied to the original side of the High Court. The Court held that the High Court continues to have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain and try suits where the subject-matter exceeds Rs. 25,000, and that section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not apply to the original side of the High Court as it is a rule of procedure rather than of jurisdiction and does not oust the powers of higher courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amendments made by the Civil Courts (Sind Amendment) Ordinance, 1970 affected the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court in suits valued between Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 50,000?
  • Does section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply to suits instituted on the original side of the High Court?
  • Whether section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ousts the jurisdiction of courts of a higher grade?
  Read full judgment →
• In Re: MESSRS QUETTA COLD STORAGE & ICE PLANT COMPANY LTD vs NOT1981 PLD Karachi 447 · Sindh High Court · 1980-04-20Read full judgment →
• In re : FRANCIS JOHN JOSEPH PEREIRA vs NOT1981 CLC 1054 · Sindh High Court · 1967-05-21Read full judgment →
• IMRAN vs SIND LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, KARACHI AND ANOTHER .S1981 PLD Karachi 620 · Sindh High Court · 1981-02-11Read full judgment →
• IMRAN RAVJI vs SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 1487 · Sindh High Court · 1980-09-20Read full judgment →
• IMDADULLAH AND 12 Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER----1981 P Cr. L J 1161 · Sindh High Court · 1981-08-09Read full judgment →
• IMAM & IMAM vs THE KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, KARACHI1981 CLC 744 · Sindh High Court · 1980-11-08Read full judgment →
• ILYAS vs The STATE1981 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-19
  leave to appealconcurrent findingsocular evidencemedical evidenceballistic expertrecovery of weaponmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which maintained the petitioner's conviction and sentence of death for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular versus medical evidence, minor discrepancies regarding the timing of the First Information Report and arrest, the identification of the accused, and the integrity of the ballistic evidence. The Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding guilt will not be interfered with under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 unless a grave miscarriage of justice or misreading of evidence is established. The Court found that the eyewitness testimony was corroborated by immediate chase and arrest of the petitioner with the murder weapon, matching ballistic reports, and medical evidence. The key principle laid down is that minor investigative flaws and discrepancies do not vitiate a conviction where overwhelming ocular and circumstantial evidence proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a criminal case under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does a discrepancy in the timing of the First Information Report and the arrest vitiate the conviction when eyewitness and circumstantial evidence are overwhelming?
  • How is medical evidence evaluated when it appears inconsistent with the site plan regarding the distance of firing?
  • Can perfunctory investigation by the police alone serve as a ground to doubt the direct involvement of an accused who is caught red-handed after a chase?
  Read full judgment →
• ILYAS vs THE STATE--1981 P Cr. L J 83 · Sindh High Court · 1980-05-30Read full judgment →
• ILYAS HUSSAIN vs Haji SHAHABUDDIN AND 2 OTHERS1981 CLC 1416 · Sindh High Court · 1979-08-06Read full judgment →
• ILLAHI BUX vs S. YOUSUFALI & SONS LTD., KARACHI1981 CLC 1132 · Sindh High Court · 1981-03-23Read full judgment →
• ILLAHI BAKHSH DAHRI vs MUHAMMAD SIDDIK AND Another1981 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-30
  murderappreciation of evidenceindependent witnesspolice constable testimonyballistic expertmitigating circumstancestransportation for lifecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which, by a majority view, set aside the conviction and death sentence of respondent No. 1 under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ghulam Kader. The incident occurred outside a court room immediately after proceedings regarding a murder complaint were adjourned upon the production of a High Court quashment order. The Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, particularly considering the testimony of an independent police constable who witnessed the occurrence, chased, and apprehended the accused with the crime weapon. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the independent police witness, corroborated by ballistic evidence and the immediate apprehension of the accused at the scene, was fully reliable and sufficient to prove the charge, notwithstanding minor discrepancies or the reluctance of local bystanders to testify. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the acquittal was set aside, and the conviction under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was restored, though the sentence was commuted from death to transportation for life in view of the mitigating circumstances of grave provocation and sudden heat of passion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a single independent police witness who apprehended the accused at the spot is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to examine local bystanders as eye-witnesses vitiate the conviction in cases of high-profile or politically charged murders?
  • Whether a lesser sentence of transportation for life is warranted instead of death when a murder is committed in a sudden state of disappointment and rage upon discovering the quashment of proceedings against the suspected killer of one's son?
  Read full judgment →
• IFTIKHAR AKHTA R vs THE CUSTODIAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, MUZAFFARABAD1981 CLC 1666 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1981-05-30Read full judgment →
• IFTIKHAR AHMAD vs ABDUL RAZZAQ AND 6 Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-28
  suspension of sentencebail pending appealsuccessive bail applicationsjurisdiction of High Courtreview of judicial orderscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court confirming the interim bail granted to respondents after suspending their sentences of imprisonment upon conviction under various provisions including section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involves the propriety and jurisdictional competence of a Single Judge of the High Court suspending a convict's sentence and granting bail under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after such relief had already been refused on merits by another Judge of the High Court and subsequently by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that a Judge of the High Court has no jurisdiction to review or bypass an earlier order of a brother Judge or of the Supreme Court refusing bail on merits, nor can regular bail be granted solely by reopening the merits of the case without a genuine fresh ground. The ratio is that while successive bail applications on truly fresh grounds are permissible, a court cannot re-evaluate evidence to override previous higher or coordinate judicial decisions. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned bail orders, and directed that the respondents may seek relief strictly on new statutory grounds or request an expeditious hearing of their main appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Judge of the High Court can entertain a fresh application for suspension of sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and grant bail after such relief has already been refused on merits by another Judge of the same High Court and by the Supreme Court?
  • Can an evaluation of the merits of a criminal case, previously rejected by appellate and superior courts, constitute a valid fresh ground for granting bail?
  • What is the appropriate legal recourse for a convict seeking release from prison when compassionate family grounds are raised during the pendency of a criminal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• IFTIKHAR AHMAD KHAN vs MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM (REPRESENTED BY LEGAL1981 SCMR 893(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-12
  condonation of delaylimitation periodSupreme Court registryvacationstime-barred petitionsufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a challenge to an order of the High Court dated 4-4-1974, which had accepted a constitutional petition filed by the respondents. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court seeking leave to appeal against this order. However, the petition was filed with a delay of three days beyond the prescribed limitation period. To address this, the petitioner submitted an application for condonation of delay, contending that he was under the mistaken impression that the Supreme Court registry remained closed during vacations and that legal filings were impermissible during that period. Upon review, the Court found this explanation insufficient to justify the delay. The Court held that a misunderstanding regarding the operational status of the Court registry during vacations does not constitute a valid or sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing a petition. Consequently, the Court determined that the petition lacked merit due to the time-barred nature of the filing and dismissed the petition accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Is a mistaken belief that the Supreme Court registry is closed during vacations a sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
  • Can a petition filed beyond the limitation period be entertained if the delay is based on a misunderstanding of court procedures?
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• IDAN vs THE STATE---1981 P Cr. L J 784 · Sindh High Court · 1980-03-01Read full judgment →
• IBRAHIM ISMAIL vs BRIG. (RETD.) S. H. A. GARDEZI1981 PLD Karachi 622 · Sindh High Court · 1981-02-06
  summary evictionnatural justicerent controllercross-examinationaffidavit evidenceSind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979landlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Rent Controller's order directing the appellant's eviction under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, without conducting an inquiry. The core legal question was whether the summary nature of Section 14 proceedings excludes the requirement for the Rent Controller to hold an inquiry or allow the tenant to defend against the landlord's claims. The Court held that the Rent Controller's order was legally flawed for failing to provide the tenant an opportunity to be heard. The ratio established is that principles of natural justice are not excluded in Section 14 proceedings. Furthermore, the Court determined that Section 19(4) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, which permits evidence by affidavit and cross-examination, applies to all cases under the Ordinance, including those under Section 14. Therefore, when a tenant disputes the landlord's allegations, the Rent Controller must hold an inquiry, allow the tenant to present a defense, and permit cross-examination of the landlord. Consequently, the eviction order was set aside, and the case was remanded for a proper inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the summary nature of proceedings under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 exclude the application of principles of natural justice?
  • Is a Rent Controller required to hold an inquiry and allow cross-examination in proceedings initiated under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Does Section 19(4) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 apply to proceedings filed under Section 14 of the same Ordinance?
  • Can a Rent Controller pass an eviction order under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 without providing the tenant an opportunity to rebut the landlord's allegations?
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• IBRAHIM ETC. vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE ETC.1981 CLC 823 · Lahore High Court · 1981-05-10Read full judgment →
• IBADURRAHMAN vs THE KARACHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 1260 · Sindh High Court · 1980-01-15Read full judgment →
• IBAD & COMPANY vs PAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION LTD. AND 3 OTHERS1981 CLC 106 · Sindh High Court · 1980-04-28Read full judgment →
• I. A. MALICK vs MESSRS CHLORIDE PAKISTAN LTD., KARACHI,1981 PLC 625 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-03-10Read full judgment →
• HYDER KHAN vs Syed MUHAMMAD NAZEER1981 CLC 160 · Sindh High Court · 1980-09-30Read full judgment →
• HUSSAIN vs RAJAB ALI1981 CLC 1 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-19
  summary suitleave to defendnegotiable instrumentconditional leavepresumption of considerationcivil revisiondiscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a suit based on a pronote, where the defendant sought leave to defend, alleging the instrument lacked consideration and was executed as security for 'Watta' marriages. The trial court, while noting the presumption of consideration under the Negotiable Instruments Act, found the defense vague but nonetheless granted conditional leave to defend upon the deposit of Rs. 20,000. The petitioner challenged this condition as contradictory and excessive. The High Court held that the trial court's findings were indeed self-contradictory, as the defense lacked sufficient substance to warrant leave under Order XXXVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. However, the Court affirmed that once a trial court exercises its discretion to grant conditional leave, it possesses the jurisdiction to impose conditions, including the deposit of the suit amount. The Court emphasized that trial judges must strictly verify whether a case genuinely falls under the requirements of Order XXXVII, Rule 3 before granting leave to defend, and dismissed the revision petition as the petitioner had no valid grievance against a conditional concession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presumption of consideration under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 apply to a suit based on a pronote?
  • Can a court impose conditions, such as a monetary deposit, when granting leave to defend in a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a revision petition competent against the exercise of judicial discretion in imposing conditions for leave to defend?
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• HUSSAIN INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI vs MOMIN KHAN1981 PLC 887 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-02-11Read full judgment →
• HUSSAIN BAKHSH vs MUHAMMAD ARSHAD AND 2 Others1981 P Cr. L J 1298 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• HUSSAIN BAKHSH vs ALLAH BAKHSH ETC1981 SCMR 410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-04
  condonation of delaylimitation periodpetition for leave to appealacquittaldue diligencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside murder convictions and acquitted several respondents, while convicting others under a lesser charge of culpable homicide. The petition was filed three days beyond the period of limitation. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, attributing the lapse to a bona fide mistake by counsel in failing to obtain a necessary certified copy of the grounds of appeal in time. The Supreme Court held that the delay was not excusable, as the rules of the Court clearly required the document, and the failure to file on time reflected a lack of due diligence rather than a bona fide mistake. The Court reaffirmed the principle that in petitions against acquittal, delay cannot be condoned unless the petitioner was prevented from filing by an act of the acquitted respondents or by compelling circumstances beyond the petitioner's control. Finding no such justification, the Court dismissed the petition as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Can a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal be condoned based on a claim of bona fide mistake by counsel?
  • What are the specific circumstances under which a delay in filing a petition against an acquittal may be condoned by the Supreme Court?
  • Is a failure to comply with procedural filing rules due to counsel's oversight considered a valid ground for condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• HUSSAIN AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 915 · Sindh High Court · 1980-01-29Read full judgment →
• His HOLINESS DR. SYBDNA MUHAMMAD BURHANUD DIN SAHEB vs MESSERS1981 PLD Karachi 164 · Sindh High Court · 1980-11-09Read full judgment →
• HIDAYATULLAH AND Others vs MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM AND Other1981 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-13
  pre-emption suitcourt fee deficiencyOrder VII Rule 11Section 149 CPClimitation periodcontumacious conductrejection of plaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit for possession by pre-emption filed by the petitioners on the final day of the limitation period with a grossly deficient court-fee stamp of Rs. 10 instead of the required Rs. 5,485. The Civil Judge rejected the defendants' preliminary objection demanding rejection of the plaint, but the High Court allowed the defendants' revision petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that Order VII Rule 11(c) and Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 must be read and applied together when addressing a deficiency in court-fee after the expiration of limitation. The Court established that where the failure to pay the proper court-fee is contumacious or actuated by positive mala fides, judicial discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 will not be exercised to allow the plaintiff to make up the deficiency after limitation has lapsed. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Must Order VII Rule 11(c) and Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be read together when court-fee deficiency is sought to be made good after limitation expires?
  • Can a court permit a plaintiff to make good a deficiency in court-fee after limitation has expired if the non-payment was contumacious or mala fide?
  • Does filing a pre-emption suit on the last day of limitation with nominal court-fee constitute contumacious conduct precluding relief under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• HIDAYAT ULLAH AND Others vs MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM AND Another1981 SCMR 1242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-07
  review petitionpre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencylimitation periodextension of timecontumacious conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a review petition seeking review of an earlier order dated 14-2-1981, which had dismissed the applicants' civil petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question involved the validity of an extension of time granted by the trial court to make up a deficient court-fee in a pre-emption suit instituted on the last day of limitation with a nominal court-fee. The High Court had previously held that the trial court's mechanical extension of time beyond the limitation period was unjustified and the applicants' conduct was contumacious, relying on precedent. The Supreme Court held that no good ground was made out for reviewing its earlier dismissal order, as the points urged regarding the unchallenging of the trial court's initial order and compliance within permitted time had already been addressed expressly or impliedly. The Court reaffirmed that extending time to make up court-fee in a manner that condones contumacious conduct and circumvents limitation is impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of the trial court extending time to make up a deficient court-fee can be challenged when the extension is granted beyond the period of limitation?
  • Does the institution of a pre-emption suit with a nominal court-fee on the last day of limitation amount to contumacious conduct?
  • Are there sufficient grounds for review when the points urged in the review petition were already dealt with expressly or impliedly in the original order?
  Read full judgment →
• HAZOOR BAKHSH, M. I. CHAUDHRY AND OTHER vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN1981 PLD F SC 145 · Federal Shariat Court · -Read full judgment →
• HAYAT MUHAMMAD AND Another vs The STATE1981 SCMR 1153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-26
  criminal appealmurderocular testimonyprompt FIRmotivemedical evidencedeath sentence confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the death sentences of the appellants for the murder of Ghulam Hassan. The prosecution case was that the appellants harbored a grievance against the deceased because he failed to procure alternative land for them as agreed upon after they sold their land to his relative, leading them to commit the murder. The trial court and the High Court believed the ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses and circumstantial evidence regarding the motive and the fleeing of the accused. The Supreme Court granted leave to re-appraise the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were credible, unblemished, corroborated by medical evidence, and unaffected by minor discrepancies. The Court affirmed that the prompt lodging of the First Information Report, the established motive, and the reliable ocular account conclusively proved the guilt of the appellants. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the convictions and sentences were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies and variations in estimating firing distances between ocular testimony and medical evidence are sufficient to discredit eyewitness accounts?
  • Can the presence of eyewitnesses at the scene of a crime be doubted solely on the basis of speculative suggestions and unproved alternative theories of involvement by third parties?
  • Whether the prompt lodging of an FIR naming the accused and detailing the incident excludes the possibility of fabrication or false implication stemming from mere suspicion?
  • Does the failure to prove a recovered firearm as the exact crime weapon vitiate a conviction that is otherwise firmly supported by reliable ocular and circumstantial evidence?
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• HAYAT BAKHSH AND Others vs The STATE1981 SCMR 1203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-07-07
  criminal appealdying declarationocular evidencemedical evidencebenefit of doubtrecovery of weaponacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which reversed an acquittal order passed by the Sessions Judge regarding charges of murder and kidnapping. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, given the conflicting medical and ocular evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed. The Court found that the medical evidence regarding the severity and location of the victim's injuries rendered the alleged dying declaration and the testimony of eye-witnesses unreliable, as the victim would have been unable to speak. Furthermore, the Court determined that the recovery of the weapon was fabricated, as the gun was shown to be in police custody under a Martial Law order at the time of the alleged recovery. Consequently, the Court restored the acquittal, emphasizing that where prosecution evidence is contradicted by medical findings and circumstantial proof, convictions cannot be sustained. This judgment reinforces the principle that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused when the prosecution's narrative is demonstrably inconsistent with established facts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when medical evidence contradicts the testimony of eye-witnesses regarding the victim's ability to speak?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon from police custody, which was allegedly deposited under a Martial Law order, invalidate the prosecution's recovery evidence?
  • When ocular evidence is contradicted by medical findings regarding the distance of the fire and the victim's physical state, should the prosecution's case be rejected?
  • Is an appeal maintainable by a fugitive from justice?
  Read full judgment →
• HAYAT BAKHSH AND Others MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs THE STATE MUHAMMAD ALI AND Other1981 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-26
  absconsionfugitive from justiceright of hearingcriminal appealappeal against acquittalabuse of processcomplete justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses the legal question of whether a criminal accused or convict who has not surrendered to legal processes is entitled to a hearing in criminal appeals against conviction or acquittal. The matter arose in two connected criminal appeals involving absconding appellants and respondents. The core legal questions revolved around whether fugitive convicts filing appeals as of right can demand a hearing in absentia and how appeals against non-surrendering respondents should be managed. The Supreme Court held that a fugitive from justice has no right of audience or hearing, and the court is not bound to hear such an appeal on merits or keep it pending indefinitely, as absconding constitutes an abuse of the court's process. The court affirmed that while it must independently examine the merits in appeals against acquittal, an absconding party forfeits their right to be heard through counsel. The key principles laid down include that the court will not act in aid of a person who is a fugitive from justice, and that inherent powers under the Constitution and court rules can be invoked to dismiss appeals of absconders to prevent the abuse of judicial processes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person who is a fugitive from justice is entitled to the hearing of their criminal appeal on merits in their absence without surrendering?
  • Can a criminal appeal filed by a convict be dismissed solely on the ground of their non-surrender and abscondence?
  • Does an appeal filed as of right under the Constitution compel the court to decide it on merits even if the appellant is an absconder?
  • How should an appellate court deal with an appeal against acquittal where one of the respondents has not surrendered to custody?
  • Can an absconding accused claim a right to be heard through a representative or counsel while remaining a fugitive from law?
  Read full judgment →
• HAYAT BAKHSH AND Other, MUHAMMAD SADIQ vs THE STATE MUHAMMAD ALI AND Other Link 11981 PLD Supreme Court 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-26
  absconding convictfugitive from justiceright of audiencecriminal appealappeal against acquittalcomplete justiceabuse of processsurrender
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses the legal question of whether an accused person or convict who is a fugitive from justice (absconding and failing to surrender to court processes) has a right to a hearing on merits in criminal appeals against conviction or acquittal. The Supreme Court consolidated two criminal appeals to resolve this controversy. Reviewing established precedents including Chan Shah v. The Crown and Gul Hassan v. State, the Court held that a fugitive from justice forfeits the right of audience and cannot demand a hearing on merits while actively defying court processes, regardless of whether the appeal is filed as of right under constitutional provisions or via special leave. The Court affirmed that its inherent powers under Article 187 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court Rules allow it to prevent the abuse of judicial process. Consequently, while an appeal against acquittal must still be examined on its merits by the court to do complete justice, the absconding respondent has no right to be heard either personally or through counsel until surrender.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person who is a fugitive from justice is entitled to a hearing of his criminal appeal on merits in his absence without surrendering to the court?
  • Does an appeal filed as of right under the Constitution stand on a different footing regarding non-surrender compared to an appeal by special leave?
  • Can an appellate court hear and dispose of an appeal against acquittal on merits in the absence of a respondent who has absconded?
  • Whether the inherent power of the Supreme Court to do complete justice permits dismissing or dealing with an appeal when the appellant abuses the process of law by absconding?
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• HAYAT ALI AND ANOTHER vs GHAZAN (REPRENENTED BY HIS HEIRS)1981 CLC 456 · Lahore High Court · 1980-07-07
  pre-emptiongift deeddisguised salepassing of considerationcircumstantial evidenceregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular second appeal arose from a suit for pre-emption filed by the appellants regarding land transferred by respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 1 via a registered gift deed. The plaintiffs asserted that the transaction was fraudulently disguised as a gift to defeat their pre-emptive rights and was in reality a sale for consideration. The trial court decreed the suit, finding the transaction to be a sale, but the District Judge reversed this judgment on appeal, holding that the appellants failed to establish the passing of monetary consideration. Re-evaluating the evidence and circumstantial factors, the Lahore High Court found no evidence of services rendered by the alleged donee to justify a gift. The Court held that in appropriate cases, courts can look at surrounding circumstances to determine the true nature of a transaction and hold a ostensible gift to be a sale, even without direct proof of monetary consideration passing. The appeal was accepted, restoring the trial court's decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court determine an ostensible gift to be a sale for the purpose of pre-emption based on surrounding circumstances without direct proof of passing of consideration?
  • Whether alleged past services form sufficient consideration to uphold a transaction as a valid gift against a claim of pre-emption?
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• HAYA KHAN AND ANOTHER vs Haji SAID KHAN1981 SCMR 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-02
  pre-emptionmarket valuesale considerationlocal commissioner reportleave to appealconcurrent findingsnew plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land in Nowshera, District Peshawar. The petitioners contested the valuation of the suit property, claiming the sale price was Rs. 10,000 rather than Rs. 45,000 as reflected in the mutation. The trial court decreed the suit subject to payment of Rs. 45,000, finding it to be the genuine sale price, which was affirmed by the Peshawar High Court upon re-examining the testimony of witnesses and two local Commissioners' reports. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the trial court lacked authority to appoint Commissioners under Section 27 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1950 and that evidence regarding the property's valuation was misread. The Supreme Court held that Section 27 does not restrict the court's power to appoint local Commissioners for determining market value. Moreover, new pleas raised for the first time before the apex court could not be entertained. Finding concurrent factual determinations supported by evidence, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 27 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1950 bar the trial court from appointing local Commissioners to determine the market value of suit property?
  • Can a legal plea raised for the first time before the Supreme Court be entertained where it was not raised in the courts below?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding genuine sale consideration in a pre-emption suit when supported by evidence?
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• HASSAN MUHAMMAD AND 3 Others vs Mst. ZEENAT BEGUM AND 8 Other1981 SCMR 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-10
  pre-emptioncourt-feesrejection of plaintwrit petitionpetition for leave to appealnegligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit regarding land in Sheikhupura District, originally filed by the petitioners-tenants under paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The trial court ordered the petitioners to deposit a portion of the pre-emption money and make up the deficiency in court-fees by a specified date. The petitioners failed to do so and delayed applying for the produce statement necessary for determining the court-fees for one year. Consequently, the Assistant Commissioner rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Additional Commissioner and a revision forum upheld this decision, and the Lahore High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition in limine. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were clearly negligent in complying with the trial court's order and that the lower tribunals and High Court committed no error in law, especially given the concurrent findings of fact and the petitioners' suppression of material facts in the writ petition. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff's failure to make up deficient court-fees within the time allowed justifies the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact rendered by revenue authorities regarding a party's negligence?
  • Does the suppression of material facts in a writ petition disentitle a petitioner to discretionary relief from the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• HASSAN MAHMOOD AND OTHERS vs FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION1981 CLC 952 · Lahore High Court · 1980-08-17Read full judgment →
• HASIB HUSSAIN vs DISTRICT JUDGE, MULTAN And2 Other .1981 SCMR 845 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-29
  ejectmentsublettingcantonments rent restrictionconcurrent findings of factspecial leave to appealtenantsub-tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition in limine against concurrent orders of ejectment. Respondent No. 3 had filed an ejectment application under section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 against the petitioner on the ground of illegal subletting of parts of the rented shop to third parties. The Rent Controller and the District Judge both found on the basis of oral and documentary evidence that portions of the premises were indeed sublet to sub-tenants running independent businesses. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the matter was concluded by concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave, holding that the factual findings regarding subletting were rightly arrived at by the lower tribunals and that the cited precedents were distinguishable on facts. The court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact on the question of subletting in rent matters will not be interfered with in writ or leave jurisdiction where supported by evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding subletting by rent forums can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does permitting a third party to run an independent business on a portion of demised premises amount to subletting?
  • Are findings of fact based on oral and documentary evidence by lower rent tribunals open to challenge under special leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• HASHWANI HOTELS LTD., KARACHI vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB AND ANOTHER1981 PLD Lahore 211 · Lahore High Court · 1980-12-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs The STATE1981SCMR 850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-25
  post-arrest bailvicarious liabilityunlawful assemblyparity in bailprolonged incarcerationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had previously dismissed the petitioner's application for bail in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was alleged to have held the deceased (Japha) while co-accused inflicted fatal injuries, was entitled to bail given that other co-accused persons facing similar allegations of participation in the unlawful assembly had already been granted bail, and considering the significant delay in the commencement of the trial. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner deserved to be released on bail during the pendency of the trial. The Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted bail, noting the parity in the treatment of co-accused persons and the prolonged incarceration of the petitioner without the trial commencing. The key principle laid down is that where co-accused persons facing similar allegations of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 have been granted bail, the principle of consistency and parity applies, particularly when coupled with an inordinate delay in the trial process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner is entitled to bail when co-accused persons facing similar allegations of vicarious liability have already been granted bail?
  • Does a significant delay in the commencement of a trial justify the grant of bail to an accused charged with murder?
  • Is an accused who allegedly facilitated a murder by holding the deceased entitled to bail if the fatal blow was attributed to a co-accused?
  Read full judgment →