Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- ENAYAT BIBI AND 4 Others vs Mst. SALAMAT BIBI AND ANOTHER1981 SC MR 724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court order dismissing a writ petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee property, specifically a double-storeyed shop in Lyallpur. The core dispute arose between the auction purchaser and the original tenant, who claimed entitlement to the property as a 'converted property' (hotel) under specific administrative instructions. The petitioners alleged that the tenant's transfer application (L.H. Form) was a forged document and that the property was unavailable for transfer to the tenant because it had already been auctioned. The Supreme Court held that the genuineness of the L.H. Form was a question of fact, which the Settlement Commissioner had conclusively determined in favor of the respondent after a remand by the High Court. Furthermore, the Court found that the tenant had applied for the transfer as a converted property in June 1960, prior to the auction in August 1960. Consequently, the property remained available for transfer to the tenant. The petition was dismissed, affirming that findings of fact by competent authorities, when properly examined, are not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Is the genuineness of a transfer application form a question of fact that can be re-examined in writ jurisdiction?
- Does the prior auction of an evacuee property preclude its transfer as a converted property if an application for such transfer was filed before the auction?
- Can a finding of fact made by a Settlement Commissioner after a remand order be interfered with by the High Court in writ proceedings?
- EMPLOYEES' WELFARE UNION vs MESSRS ADAM SILK MILLS LTD. AND ANOTHER , .1981 PLC 615 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-03-15Read full judgment →
- EMPLOYEES' UNION, JAMIA, KARACHI vs REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS, SIND1981 PLC 403 · Sindh High Court · 1981-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These constitution petitions challenged the cancellation of trade union registrations and the dismissal of employees, raising the core legal question of whether the University of Karachi and the Board of Intermediate Education, Karachi, constitute an "industry" as defined under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Court held that these educational institutions do not qualify as industries. The ratio of the decision is that while the statutory definition of "industry" includes "service," this term must be interpreted in the context of organized, systematic economic activity aimed at providing "material service" through the cooperation of employer and employee. The Court determined that education is a public duty rather than a commercial or material service. Consequently, the activities of the University and the Board, being fundamentally non-commercial and non-material in nature, fall outside the scope of the Ordinance. The Court further established that the incidental or ancillary duties performed by employees do not alter the essential character of the institution, and therefore, the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, are inapplicable to these bodies.
Questions settled- Does the definition of 'industry' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, encompass educational institutions like universities?
- What constitutes 'material service' for the purpose of determining whether an organization is an industry under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
- Are the employees of the Board of Intermediate Education, Karachi, subject to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
- Does the performance of incidental or ancillary duties by employees change the character of an institution for the purposes of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
- EMPLOYEES' UNION vs STATE BANK OF INDIA, KARACHI, .(1981 PLC 154 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-01-28Read full judgment →
- EMPLOYEES' UNION vs PREMIER TOBACCO INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI , .1981 PLC 932 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-02-04Read full judgment →
- EMPLOYEES' UNION vs MESSRS NEW JUBILEE INSURANCE Co. LTD. KARACHI1981 PLC 705 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-11-26Read full judgment →
- EMPLOYEES' UNION vs GAMMON PAKISTAN LTD., RAWALPINDI1981 PLC 609 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1981-07-10Read full judgment →
- EMPLOYEES UNION vs MSSERS GOLDEN INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI1981 PLC 796 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-08-09Read full judgment →
- EMMANUEL BAHADUR JOSEPH PAUL JACKSON vs PAUL JACKSON AND ANOTHER THE STATE1981 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two cross-appeals arising from a criminal trial where the accused, Paul Jackson, was initially convicted of murder (Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860) by the trial court, but the High Court subsequently altered the conviction to causing grievous hurt (Section 326, Pakistan Penal Code 1860). The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in acquitting the accused of murder and whether the medical intervention (or lack thereof) could mitigate the liability for the death. The Court held that the High Court's reliance on potential medical negligence to reduce the charge was legally flawed, as Explanation 2 to Section 299, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, dictates that an accused remains liable for death caused by their injury even if medical treatment contributes to the outcome. However, based on the specific circumstances—a single blow, lack of premeditation, and the nature of the struggle—the Court concluded that the accused lacked the specific intent to kill, instead possessing the knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. Consequently, the Court converted the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 (Part II), Pakistan Penal Code 1860.
Questions settled- Does medical negligence or the failure of medical treatment during an operation absolve an accused of liability for causing death under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can a conviction be altered from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder if the evidence suggests knowledge of likely death rather than specific intent to kill?
- Is an accused responsible for the consequences of an operation performed to treat an injury they inflicted, even if the operation contributes to the victim's death?
- ELECTRIC INSPECTOR, GOVERNMENT OF SIND, HYDERABED vs S. TASNEEM1981 PLC 741 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-09-21Read full judgment →
- ELAHI BAKHSH AND Others vs ALLAH BAKHSH AND Other1981 SCMR 723 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners filed two separate suits to pre-empt sales of land measuring 10 marlas each situated in Multan, claiming the land was agricultural and that they possessed a preferential right of pre-emption. The trial court decreed the suits, and the Additional District Judge dismissed the vendees' appeals. However, upon second appeal, the High Court reversed the decisions and held that the land was urban immovable property rather than agricultural land, rendering the pre-emption suits unsuccessful. The petitioners then sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the land in dispute constituted agricultural land or urban immovable property. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the High Court correctly appreciated the evidence—considering that the small plots were surrounded by houses, located within municipal limits, and intended for construction purposes—and committed no legal error. The court affirmed that small plots located within municipal limits and used or intended for construction do not qualify as agricultural land for pre-emption purposes.
Questions settled- Whether land measuring 10 marlas located within municipal limits and surrounded by houses qualifies as agricultural land for the purpose of pre-emption?
- Did the High Court commit any error in appreciating evidence regarding the nature of the property in dispute as urban immovable property?
- ELAHI AND 5 Others vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 993 · Lahore High Court · 1981-03-06Read full judgment →
- ELAHEE BUKSH SHAH vs ALLAH BUKSH AND ANOTHER1981 SCMR 1050 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner instituted a pre-emption suit claiming that the vendor Ahmad Ali had executed a deed of exchange instead of a sale deed to defeat the petitioner's right of pre-emption. The trial court decreed the suit, but the District Judge reversed the decision on appeal and dismissed the suit, holding the transaction to be a genuine exchange. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioner's second appeal, finding the matter concluded by a finding of fact. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the transaction in question constituted a sale or an exchange. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court was fully competent to appreciate the evidence and conclude that the transaction was an exchange based on the registered exchange deed and admissions in cross-examination. The petition was dismissed in limine, affirming that a finding of fact regarding the nature of a transaction by the appellate court cannot be interfered with in second appeal.
Questions settled- Whether a transaction structured as a deed of exchange constitutes a sale for the purpose of a pre-emption suit?
- Is the finding of fact by a first appellate court regarding the nature of a transaction binding in second appeal?
- Does an appellate court have the competence to prefer one set of evidence over another when determining whether a transaction was a sale or an exchange?
- EISO vs THE STATE--1981 P Cr. L J 917 · Sindh High Court · 1980-01-15Read full judgment →
- EIDU Alias EID MUHAMMAD vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA1981 SCMR 804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld a decision by the Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of property. The core dispute involved two competing agreements of association entered into by the original transferee, Allah Ditta, concerning the same property. The first agreement was with Nathu, and the second was with the petitioner, Eidu. The Settlement Commissioner prioritized the first agreement, effectively canceling the second. The petitioner argued that the first agreement was not acted upon and should have been superseded, or alternatively, that both agreements could be given effect. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Authorities correctly determined that the first agreement rendered the second agreement invalid. Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioner's alternative argument regarding the division of the property, noting that this contention was not raised in previous rounds of litigation and could not be introduced for the first time. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that a valid prior agreement of association precludes a subsequent conflicting agreement, and that new legal contentions cannot be raised for the first time in appellate proceedings.
Questions settled- Can a second agreement of association be given effect when a valid prior agreement regarding the same property exists?
- Is a party permitted to raise a new contention for the first time during proceedings before the Supreme Court that was not raised in earlier rounds of litigation?
- EHTASHAMUL HAQ vs THE STATE-1981 P Cr. L J 324 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-06Read full judgment →
- EHSAN-UL-HAQUE vs MULTAN ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY LTD. , .1981 PLC 458 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1981-02-16Read full judgment →
- EASTERN INDUSTRIAL AGENCIES LTD. Appellant vs SIR E. H. JAFFER & SONS LTD.1981 CLC 601 · Sindh High Court · 1980-04-01Read full judgment →
- DUR MUHAMMAD vs ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER. (0), RAHIMYAR1981 PLC (C. S.) 859 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- DUR MUHAMMAD SHAH vs AKBAR HUSSAIN SHAH (REPRESENTED BY LEGAL1981 CLC 783 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- DR.MUHAMMAD AFRAZ BHATTI vs DEPUTY SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER Etc.S1981 SCMR 985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition directed against an order of the High Court in an Inter-Court Appeal which maintained the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the transfer of a property. The core legal question concerns the validity of a property transfer versus a subsequent auction of the same property, specifically whether an earlier transfer order was bogus or genuine. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower forums and the High Court establishing the genuineness and subsistence of the initial transfer order were unexceptionable, rendering any subsequent auction invalid. The key principle laid down is that during the subsistence of a valid prior transfer order of a property, no subsequent auction of the same property can lawfully take place, and concurrent findings of fact regarding the genuineness of a transfer order will not be interfered with absent any misreading of evidence or error of law.
Questions settled- Whether a subsequent auction of a property can validly take place during the subsistence of a prior transfer order?
- Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the genuineness of a property transfer be interfered with without showing misreading of evidence or violation of law?
- DR. ZAHID HUSSAIN vs Syed WAHAJUL HASAN RIZVI1981 CLC 1141 · Sindh High Court · 1981-03-21Read full judgment →
- DR. SHAMIM RAZA BUKHARI vs GOVERNMENT OP THE PUNJAB THROUGH THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF THE HEALTH DEPARTMENT AND ANOTHER, .(1981 PLC (C. S.) 763 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- DR. SAKINA TAPAL vs Mst. RASHIDA BANO1981 CLC 656 · Sindh High Court · 1980-09-17Read full judgment →
- DR. S. M. QAIM vs RAISUL HASSAN NAQVI AND 2 Other1981 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for review of a previous order passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could resile from a consent order regarding the ownership of construction on the first floor of a property, on the grounds that he was not properly represented or did not consent to the arrangement recorded by the Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the previous order was in the nature of a consent order. The Court found that the petitioner’s counsel of record was present during the proceedings when the order was passed, and the petitioner himself was present and aware of the arrangement. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot resile from a consent order where the record demonstrates that their authorized legal representation was present and the party was aware of the proceedings, thereby precluding the exercise of review jurisdiction to reopen the matter.
Questions settled- Can a party resile from a consent order passed by the Supreme Court?
- Does the presence of an Advocate-on-Record during court proceedings bind a party to a consent order?
- Is a review petition maintainable when a party claims lack of consent to an order despite the presence of their legal representative?
- DR. S. F. MARTIN AND Another vs SARDAR MASIH AND 3 Other1981 SCMR 510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-11-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a long-standing dispute regarding the control and possession of a church and its properties in Sangla Hill, Sheikhupura District, following a split in the United Presbyterian Church. The Magistrate First Class initially decided the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in favour of the petitioners, but the Lahore High Court set aside that order in revision, holding that the respondents were in possession on the relevant date. The core legal question concerned the correct determination of the date of possession under section 145(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's finding of fact regarding possession was supported by evidence and involved no error of law, and noted that the proper remedy for the petitioners to enforce their alleged rights would be to file a civil suit. The key principle laid down is that factual determinations of possession by the High Court based on evidence in section 145 proceedings will not be interfered with under special leave where no legal error is shown, and summary criminal proceedings are not a substitute for a civil suit in complex sectarian property disputes.
Questions settled- Whether the date for determining possession under subsection (4) of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was correctly fixed by the High Court?
- Can a High Court's finding of fact regarding possession in section 145 proceedings be interfered with under special leave to appeal when supported by evidence?
- Is a summary proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 the appropriate forum for resolving complex church property and sectarian disputes?
- DR. RA ZIA WAHID vs SHAH DIN AND 6 OTHERS1981 CLC 662 · Sindh High Court · 1980-02-24Read full judgment →
- DR. MUHAMMAD YAQUB SHEIKH vs CHAIRMAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY AND Other1981 SCMR 253 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over an evacuee property in Hyderabad, initially auctioned by the Settlement Department to the petitioner, who received a Permanent Transfer Order. Subsequently, the District Evacuee Trust Committee moved a reference under Section 4(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, seeking a declaration that the property, formerly a temple, was charitable and religious evacuee trust property. The Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, acting in his dual capacity as Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board and Settlement Commissioner, allowed the application. The petitioner's subsequent writ petition was dismissed by the Sind High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner raised a new legal objection regarding the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, to decide a matter concerning property in Sind after January 1, 1971. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the order was passed by the official in his capacity as Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, and further, that having taken a chance before the authority, the petitioner was estopped from challenging its jurisdiction for the first time before the apex court.
Questions settled- Whether a party who has taken a chance before an authority can subsequently challenge the jurisdiction of that authority for the first time before the Supreme Court?
- Can the Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, exercise powers as Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board in respect of property situated in Sind?
- Whether a finding of fact supported by evidence regarding the character of an evacuee property as a temple can be set aside in constitutional jurisdiction?
- DR. MUHAMMAD SAGHIR YAHYA AND ANOTHER vs SIDDIQ AND 6 OTHERS1981 CLC 513 · Sindh High Court · 1980-12-13Read full judgment →
- DR. ISLAM MEHMOOD vs REGISTRAR UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR AND 2 OTHERS1981 CLC 712 · Peshawar High Court · 1978-11-19Read full judgment →
- DR. BEGUM RAZI KHALILI vs ABDUL GHAFOOR1981 CLC 1736 · Sindh High Court · 1980-05-31Read full judgment →
- DR. ABDUL WAHEED vs GOVERNMENT OF SIND THROUGH SECRETARY, HEALTH1981 PLC (C. S.) 589 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- DR. ABDUL REHMAN vs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 740 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- DOST MUHAMMAD BHOJANI vs QUALITY STEEL WORKS1981 PLC 16 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-10-25Read full judgment →
- DOST MUHAMMAD AND Another vs MUHAMMAD SHABBIR HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER1981 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order passed against the petitioners on the grounds of personal need and default. The petitioners contended that the second ejectment application was barred under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, as a previous application filed by the respondents on the same grounds had already been rejected. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, but the Additional District Judge and the Lahore High Court allowed the ejectment, holding that a radical change in circumstances had occurred since the dismissal of the first petition, thereby rendering the second application competent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed that where a genuine change of circumstances occurs, a subsequent ejectment petition is not barred by the principle of res judicata under Section 14 of the Ordinance. The Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the change of circumstances and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether a second ejectment application on the ground of personal need is barred under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 if there has been a material change in circumstances since the dismissal of the first application?
- Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding a change in circumstances be interfered with by the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
- DOST MUHAMMAD AND Another vs Mst. SATAN AND Other1981 PLD Karachi 339 · Sindh High Court · 1980-11-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a certificated Letters Patent Appeal arising from a second appeal concerning agricultural land in District Sukkur. The original plaintiff, Hussain Bakhsh, filed a suit for a declaration that he was the real owner of the suit properties and that the entries in the Revenue Records standing in the name of his grandson, Dost Muhammad (appellant), were benami. The trial court decreed the suit, but the District Judge in first appeal reversed the judgment, holding that Hussain Bakhsh had purchased the land for the benefit of his grandson. On second appeal, a learned Single Judge restored the trial court decree, holding that the transaction was benami and that the English principle of advancement did not apply. In the present appeal, the High Court evaluated the evidence of intention, including witness depositions, and held that the plaintiff failed to discharge the heavy onus of proving the benami character of the transaction. The court concluded that the evidence pointed to an intention to benefit the grandson and that the statutory presumption attached to the revenue records under the Sind Land Revenue Code further supported the appellant's ownership. The appeal was accordingly accepted, setting aside the judgment of the Single Judge.
Questions settled- Upon whom lies the onus probandi to establish the benami character of a transaction where property stands in the name of another?
- Can a plaintiff succeed in a declaration of ownership based on the weakness of the defendant's case?
- What is the evidentiary value of entries in the Record of Rights and Register of Mutation under the Sind Land Revenue Code, 1879?
- How is the true intention determined in a transaction where consideration is provided by one person and property stands in the name of a minor?
- DOST MUHAMMAD AND 2 Other vs THE STATE1981 PLD Lahore 633 · Lahore High Court · 1981-03-17Read full judgment →
- Dorab Patel And G. Safdar Shah vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER ETC.S1981 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a review petition filed against the Supreme Court's earlier order dismissing a petition for leave to appeal due to a 166-day delay in filing. The petitioner sought to justify the delay by submitting a medical certificate alleging paralysis, which had been previously dismissed as vague and unconvincing. The Court observed that the petitioner failed to explain the ailment during the initial hearing and that the new medical evidence could have been produced earlier. Furthermore, the petitioner challenged the High Court's dismissal of his writ petition on the grounds of res judicata, alleging that the High Court erred in its assessment. However, the petitioner failed to provide the necessary documentation—specifically the earlier writ petition and the judgment dismissing it—to demonstrate any legal error. The Court held that a review petition cannot be used to introduce evidence that was available but not produced at the time of the original order, nor can it be used to summon records that were not requested during the initial proceedings. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed as meritless.
Questions settled- Can a review petition be entertained on the basis of evidence that was available but not produced at the time of the original order?
- Is it permissible to summon records in a review petition if those records were not requested during the initial hearing?
- Does a vague medical certificate constitute sufficient grounds for condonation of delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, SUKKUR AND ANOTHER vs WAZIR AHMAD,1981 PLC 618 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-03-01Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, MULTAN AND 2 OTHERS vs ATTA MUHAMMAD1981 PLC 85 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-09-20Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, KARACHI vs SIND LABOUR1981 PLC (C. S,) 542 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, KARACHI vs ORIS , .1981 PLC 332 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-11-04Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, KARACHI vs MRS. NASIM1981 PLC 653 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-03-08Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS vs PRESIDING OFFICER, SIND1981 PLC 728 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-10-21Read full judgment →
- DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS vs ABDUL MAJID1981 PLC 389 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-01-13Read full judgment →
- DISTRICT MANAGER, SIND ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, HYDERABAD vs SODHAL SHAH,1981 PLC 757 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-09-19Read full judgment →
- DISTRICT MANACIER, ORANGI DEPOT, KARACI TITANSPORT CORPORATION AND 2 OTHERS vs NOT1981 PLC 973 · Labour Court · 1981-07-13Read full judgment →
- DILSHAD MUHAMMAD vs Mst. ZUBAIDA BEGUM1981 SCMR 895 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order passed against the petitioner-tenant by the Rent Controller, which was subsequently upheld by both the Additional District Judge and the Lahore High Court. The respondent-landlady sought eviction on the grounds of personal need and damage to the property. The core legal question was whether the landlady had established a good faith requirement for the shop, given that her eviction application stated the shop was for her personal use, whereas her testimony indicated it was for her son's business, and the son himself was not examined. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the tenant was fully aware of the landlady's position and was not taken by surprise. Furthermore, the non-appearance of the landlady's son as a witness was not fatal to the claim. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, concluding that the landlady had amply established her good faith requirement, and dismissed the petition while granting the tenant four months to vacate.
Questions settled- Whether the non-appearance of a landlord's son, for whose benefit the premises are required, is fatal to an eviction claim based on personal need?
- Can a landlord establish a good faith requirement for personal use if the evidence specifies the premises are needed for a family member's business?
- Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's good faith requirement can be interfered with by the Supreme Court in the absence of illegality?
- DILDAR HUSSAIN vs SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, MULTAN AND 2 OTHERS , .1981 PLC (C. S.) 617 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1981-05-10Read full judgment →
- DILBAR vs MUHAMMAD SHARTF AND 8 OTHERS1981 CLC 86 · Peshawar High Court · 1980-04-12Read full judgment →
- DILBAR KHAN AND ANOTHER vs MOSSRS ADAMME COTTON MILLS1981 PLC 694 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-12-13Read full judgment →
- DIL MUHAMMAD vs CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY AND OTHERS1981 CLC 319 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1980-12-09Read full judgment →
- DHANI BUX vs Mst. MAHMOODUNNISA.1981 PLD Karachi 650 · Sindh High Court · 1980-11-22Read full judgment →
- Dewan GHULAM QUTABUDDIN AND 2 Other vs CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR, AUQAF, PUNJAB AND ANOTHER1981 PLD Lahore 722 · Lahore High Court · 1981-04-19Read full judgment →
- DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY, LAHORE vs A. R.1981 CLC 1006 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition challenged an order passed by the Federal Government in revisional jurisdiction under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, which set aside a finding that a specific property was evacuee trust property. The core legal questions concerned the locus standi of the Deputy Administrator to file a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and whether mere revenue record entries are sufficient to establish the existence of a trust. The Court held that the Deputy Administrator lacks locus standi as the Evacuee Trust Property Board is the statutory corporate body vested with control. Furthermore, the Court held that entries in the Record-of-Rights are not documents of title and are insufficient to prove a trust without evidence regarding the author, intention, purpose, property, and beneficiaries. Finally, the Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to correct mere errors of fact or law by a tribunal acting within its jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed in limine.
Questions settled- Does a Deputy Administrator have the locus standi to file a writ petition as an aggrieved person under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Is a mere entry in the revenue record sufficient to establish the existence of a trust?
- Can a court interfere in the decision of a tribunal acting within its jurisdiction merely because the decision contains an error of fact or law?
- DAOOD-UL-HASSAN QURESHI vs UNITED BANK LTD., KARACHI AND ANOTHER , .1981 PLC 72 · Labour Court · 1979-02-24Read full judgment →
- DADA LTD vs MADERSA MUZHARUL ULOOM ASSOCIATION1981 CLC 1101 · Sindh High Court · 1980-11-04Read full judgment →
- CUSTOINAN OF EVACUEE PROPERTY, LAHORE vs Syed' SAIFUDDIN SHAH1981 PLD Supreme Court 565 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the maintainability of review petitions filed by allottees of evacuee property before the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The respondent had obtained an order from the Custodian declaring his title to certain land based on adverse possession. Subsequently, allottees of the property filed review petitions alleging that the respondent had suppressed material facts, amounting to fraud. The Custodian reviewed and recalled the earlier order. The High Court, however, set aside the Custodian's review orders, ruling that the allottees lacked locus standi. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that allottees, despite lacking a vested right, possess sufficient interest in the property to maintain review applications. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Custodian possesses an inherent, overriding power to recall any order obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, irrespective of the applicant's standing. The principle established is that tribunals possess an inherent power to correct orders procured by fraud, and parties with a substantial interest in the subject matter are entitled to seek such relief.
Questions settled- Can allottees of evacuee property maintain a review petition before the Custodian of Evacuee Property?
- Does the Custodian of Evacuee Property possess the inherent power to recall an order obtained through fraud?
- Does an applicant for review need to have a vested right in the property to challenge an order affecting that property?
- CRESCENT JUTE PRODUCTS LTD. AND ANOTHER vs NOOR MUHAMMAD AND 21981 PLC 21 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- COTTON TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD, vs SHEIKH SULTAN TRUST, KARACHI1981 CLC 623 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- COTTON TRADING CORPORATION (PAKISTAN), FAISALABAD vs Rana SHABBIR1981 PLC 984 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition was filed by an employer challenging the judgment of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which held that the respondent was a workman and that his services were terminated in violation of the principles of retrenchment. The petitioner raised two primary contentions: first, that the Appellate Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the remedy under Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 only incorporates Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 and not the right of appeal under Section 37; and second, that the respondent was not a workman as he was the highest officer in his unit. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that where two concurrent remedies are available, the one more beneficial to the aggrieved party—which includes the right of appeal—must be preferred. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the status of a 'workman' is determined by the actual nature of the duties performed (clerical tabulation of data) rather than the employee's designation.
Questions settled- Whether an employee can avail the right of appeal under Section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 when seeking relief under Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
- Should a more beneficial legal remedy that provides a right of appeal be preferred over a remedy that restricts or shuts out such an appeal?
- Is the designation of an employee or the actual nature of their duties the determining factor in establishing whether they qualify as a 'workman'?
- COOPER's INCORPORATED (NOW NAMED JOCKEY INTERNATIONAL INC.) vs PAKISTAN GENERAL STORES AND Another1981 SCMR 1039 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a trade mark dispute concerning the registration of the trade mark 'Jockey'. The appellant, an American company, is the registered owner of the trade mark in Pakistan since 1959, although its sales were restricted due to import bans. The respondent subsequently commenced selling products under the same trade mark and applied for its registration, alongside seeking to strike off the appellant's mark. The Deputy Registrar dismissed the respondent's application, finding that the respondent had dishonestly copied the appellant's trade mark. The High Court allowed the respondent's appeal, prompting the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question is whether dishonest copying of a registered trade mark can be condoned under the exception of 'honest concurrent use or of other special circumstances' pursuant to section 10 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The Supreme Court held that dishonest imitation cannot constitute a 'special circumstance' under Section 10(2), as the law of trade marks aims to prevent fraudulent use and public deception. The Court ruled that no amount of user can justify registration where adoption is dishonest, thereby setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the Deputy Registrar's order.
Questions settled- Can dishonest copying of a registered trade mark be justified under 'other special circumstances' pursuant to section 10(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940?
- Whether the inability of a foreign proprietor to sell products in Pakistan due to import restrictions entitles another party to copy its registered trade mark?
- Does the statutory discretion of the Registrar under section 10 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 extend to encouraging dishonesty under the guise of socio-economic considerations?
- What is the burden of proof when a party is found to have copied an established trade mark?
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CENTRAL, KARACHI vs Messrs ALPHA1981 PLD Supreme Court 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These four appeals concerned whether management expenses incurred by non-life insurance companies in excess of limits prescribed under Section 40-C of the Insurance Act 1938 and Rule 40 of the Insurance Rules 1939 must be disallowed as business expenses under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act 1922. The Revenue argued that exceeding the prescribed statutory limit amounted to an illegal act, rendering excess management expenses non-deductible. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and held that under Section 10(7) of the Income-tax Act 1922, the computation of profits and gains of an insurance business is governed exhaustively by the First Schedule of the Act. Unlike Rule 2 governing life insurance, Rule 6 of the First Schedule does not impose a ceiling on deductible management expenses for non-life insurance business. The Assessing Authority's power under Rule 6 is limited to excluding expenses not permissible under Section 10 of the Income-tax Act 1922. Expenses exceeding statutory management ceilings under insurance law are not penalties or fines and remain deductible if incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes.
Questions settled- Are the rules contained in the First Schedule to the Income-tax Act 1922 exhaustive for computing the profits and gains of an insurance business?
- Can management expenses incurred by a non-life insurance company in excess of limits prescribed under Section 40-C of the Insurance Act 1938 be automatically disallowed under Rule 6 of the First Schedule to the Income-tax Act 1922?
- Are business expenses incurred in excess of statutory limits under the Insurance Act 1938 treated as non-deductible fines or penalties for income tax assessment purposes?
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE1981 SCMR 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought condonation of a 108-day delay in filing petitions for special leave to appeal, attributing the delay to internal departmental processing and correspondence between legal advisors and the Central Board of Revenue. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether such administrative delays constituted sufficient cause for condonation. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the delay was inexcusable. It reaffirmed the principle that the Government, despite its resources, cannot be treated differently from an ordinary litigant regarding the law of limitation. The Court emphasized that internal bureaucratic delays, such as files remaining under examination at various departmental levels, do not provide a valid ground for extending the limitation period. The Court reiterated that each day of delay must be properly and satisfactorily explained. Consequently, the Court held that the Government must organize its business to ensure legal cases are instituted within the prescribed time limits, as failure to do so results in the dismissal of time-barred petitions.
Questions settled- Can the Government claim special treatment regarding the law of limitation compared to an ordinary litigant?
- Does internal departmental processing of a legal file constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay?
- Is it necessary to explain each day of delay in an application for condonation of delay?
- COLONY. SARHAD TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs SUPERINTENDENT CENTRAL EXCISES1981 SCMR 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a review petition filed against a Supreme Court judgment that had previously dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding excise duty on textile products. The appellant contended that the judgment contained errors apparent on the face of the record, specifically regarding the classification of fabric and yarn categories, the validity of a Ministry of Finance notification, the definition of 'drawback,' and the interpretation of 'excise' duty in relation to exported goods. The Court examined these contentions and held that the arguments were merely attempts to re-argue the appeal rather than identifying material errors. The Court clarified that a review petition is only maintainable if an error is material to the conclusion reached, and since the previous judgment was supported by multiple legal authorities and dictionary definitions, the alleged errors were not material. Consequently, the Court dismissed the review petition, reaffirming that a review cannot be used as a mechanism to re-litigate settled issues.
Questions settled- Can a review petition be maintained on grounds that merely seek to re-argue the original appeal?
- Is a review petition maintainable if the alleged error is not material to the conclusion reached in the judgment?
- Does the definition of 'drawback' in commerce support a claim for rebate exceeding the duty actually paid on exports?
- COL. SHER AFZAL vs SHAMIM FIRDAUS AND ANOTHER1981 PLD Supreme Court 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil miscellaneous application was filed by the second wife of the defendant seeking to be impleaded as a party in a dismissed review petition arising out of a long-standing matrimonial litigation regarding a declaration of marriage and paternity. The Supreme Court held that the application was incompetent, misconceived, devoid of merit, suffering from lack of locus standi, inordinate delay, and want of bona fides, as no proceedings remained pending before the Court and the applicant sought to reopen a finally concluded case through a retrial and additional evidence. The Court laid down that third parties cannot be permitted to intervene after the final conclusion of litigation to protract proceedings or reagitate settled issues, and that repeated attempts to reopen findings of fact based on concurrent lower court judgments and prior apex court decisions through newly fronted relatives are an abuse of the process of law.
Questions settled- Whether a third party can be impleaded as a party in a review petition that has already been dismissed by the Supreme Court?
- Does a second wife have the locus standi to file an application for being added as a party after the conclusion of litigation between her husband and his first wife?
- Can a finally concluded case be reopened for the introduction of additional evidence at the behest of a relative of a party?
- COFCOT TEXTILES PEOPLES UNION vs MESSRS COFCOT TEXTILE MILLS LTD., HYDERABAD, .(1981 PLC 336 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-10-26Read full judgment →
- CHIEF PERSONNEL OFFICER, PAKISTAN RAILWAY, LAHORE AND ANOTHER vs AKHTAR IQBAL ,1981 PLC 504 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-01-02Read full judgment →
- CHIEF OFFICER (A & B), PAKISTAN RAILWAYS AND ANOTHER vs ABDUL SATTAR1981 PLC 928 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-02-28Read full judgment →
- CHIEF ENGINEER, BUILDING DEPARTMENT, PROVINCIAL P. W. D. GOVERNMENT OF SIND vs MESSRS PAK NATIONAL CONSTUCTION COMPANY1981 PLD Karachi 553 · Sindh High Court · 1981-03-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This High Court Appeal was filed against a Single Judge's decision dismissing objections under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and making an arbitration award a rule of the court. The appellant, a government department, contended that the sole arbitrator's appointment was invalid because he was not a departmental Superintending Engineer as required by the arbitration agreement. The respondent argued that the appellant had actively participated in the arbitration proceedings, filed a written statement, and consented to a joint application under Section 28 of the Act for extension of time, thereby waiving any objections. The High Court observed that while the arbitrator initially lacked the specified qualifications, the appellant's subsequent unconditional participation and consent to the extension of time constituted clear acquiescence and waiver. The Court held that a party cannot take a chance on a favorable award and later challenge the arbitrator's qualification. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the principles of estoppel and waiver apply to cure defects in an arbitrator's appointment.
Questions settled- Can a party challenge the qualification of an arbitrator after actively participating in the proceedings and consenting to an extension of time?
- Whether the principles of waiver and estoppel apply to cure an irregularity or defect in the appointment of an arbitrator?
- Does a government department's participation in arbitration proceedings without protest bind it under the rule of estoppel?
- CHHOTEY KHAN vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, THARPARKAR AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 989 · Sindh High Court · 1980-09-15Read full judgment →
- CHAN PIR SHAH vs CONGOTHENE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. ETC., .(1981 PLC 981 · Lahore High Court · 1975-11-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, founder and President of a labour union, challenged his dismissal from service through a constitutional writ petition after his departmental appeals under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 were dismissed by the Junior Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Court. The petitioner faced three charges of misconduct under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and was dismissed upon all three being found proven. The core legal question was whether the specific allegations leveled against the petitioner constituted 'misconduct' under the relevant statutory provisions and whether a dismissal based partly on non-misconduct charges is sustainable. The Lahore High Court held that two of the three charges did not amount to misconduct under the law—one failing to satisfy the definition of habitual negligence and the other lacking proof of an actual 'go-slow' output reduction. Consequently, because extraneous and non-misconduct charges influenced the dismissal, the entire order was vitiated. The Court ruled that the dismissal was without lawful authority, declared the petitioner to still be in service, and set aside the lower tribunal orders.
Questions settled- Does instigating workers without an actual reduction in normal output constitute 'go-slow' misconduct under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
- Whether a dismissal order based on multiple charges is vitiated when some of those charges do not amount to misconduct under the law?
- Does an employee roaming about inside the workshop and offices while holding a union office amount to habitual negligence or neglect of work?
- CHAMPION TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES UNION,1981 PLC 845 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-01-26Read full judgment →
- CHAIRMAN, RAILWAY BOARD, LAHORE AND Other vs MESSRS WAHABUDDIN &1981 PLD Peshawar 92 · Peshawar High Court · 1981-01-24Read full judgment →
- Ch. ZAHUR ILAHI vs The STATE1981 SCMR 935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-02-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court refusing to confirm the ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the appellant, an opposition Member of the National Assembly implicated under Sections 302, 34, and 120-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for criminal conspiracy in the murder of a provincial legislator. The core legal questions pertained to whether delayed co-accused confessional statements and police statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute reasonable grounds to disentitle an accused to bail, and whether the circumstances warranted bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted bail. The Court held that the appellant was not named in the First Information Report lodged by a confidant of the deceased, the co-accused's confession and witness statements were recorded with unexplained delays of twelve and eleven days respectively, and multiple unsubstantiated criminal cases indicated political harassment, thereby placing the case within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code.
Questions settled- Whether the omission of an accused's name from the initial First Information Report lodged by an eye-witness confidant of the deceased justifies the grant of bail?
- Can a delayed confessional statement of a co-accused recorded twelve days post-occurrence, along with belated police statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, make a case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Whether unrebutted allegations of repeated registration of criminal cases without commencement of proceedings substantiate mala fides justifying the grant of bail?
- Ch. QADIR BAK HSH vs ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL, PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB1981 PLC (C. S.) 573 · Lahore High Court · 1981-03-21Read full judgment →
- Ch. MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs ELECTION TRIBUNAL AND Other1981 PLD Lahore 374 · Lahore High Court · 1981-02-09Read full judgment →
- Ch. MUHAMMAD ANWAR SIPRA vs Malik MUHAMMAD DIN Etc.1981 PLD Supreme Court 491 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a landlord's ejectment application against a tenant on grounds of personal requirement, unauthorized construction, damage to the property, and default in payment of rent. The tenant, an advocate, argued that because he used a portion of the premises as a lawyer's office, the property had become a 'scheduled building' and could not be vacated for residential purposes. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, finding the landlord required the premises as a scheduled building (for residence and office). The Additional District Judge reversed this, but the High Court restored the ejectment order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the tenant's appeal, holding that even if the principles of Section 108(p) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 were not invoked, the tenant was liable to ejectment under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. By converting a residential house into a lawyer's office without consent, the tenant used the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased and infringed the conditions of the tenancy.
Questions settled- Whether a tenant's conversion of a residential premises into a lawyer's office without the landlord's consent constitutes a change of user under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- Can a tenant make structural additions or alterations to a leased building without the landlord's consent where the lease deed is silent on construction?
- Whether a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant from a scheduled building if the landlord requires the premises for both residence and office purposes?
- Ch. MUHAMMAD AKBAR vs CHAIRMAN, MUNICIPAL. COMMITTEE, JALALPUR1981 SC M R837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from an interim order passed by the Lahore High Court in a civil revision proceeding. The petitioner, a contractor for a cattle fair market, had initially obtained a temporary injunction from the Senior Civil Judge, later upheld by the Additional District Judge, against an order by the Assistant Director, Local Government, Gujrat, which had stopped the holding of cattle fairs. The High Court, in revision, suspended the operation of the lower courts' judgments pending further hearing. The core legal question was whether an ad interim order passed by the High Court, which is subject to confirmation after hearing the parties, is appealable to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that such an interim order is not appealable, as it is not a final determination of the rights of the parties. The Court dismissed the petition, directing the petitioner to seek relief by applying to the High Court to set aside the interim order, emphasizing that the High Court is the competent forum to decide the matter expeditiously.
Questions settled- Is an ad interim order passed by the High Court, subject to confirmation after notice, appealable to the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
- What is the appropriate remedy for a party aggrieved by an ad interim order passed by the High Court in civil revision proceedings?
- Ch. MEHRAJ DIN vs MSI. ZOHRA BEGUM (REPRESENTED BY HER HEIRS) AND Other1981 PLD Lahore 451 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Ch. MEHRAJ DIN vs LAHORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY1981 SCMR 862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision by the Lahore High Court, upholding the vacation of a temporary injunction regarding the threatened demolition of shops by the Lahore Development Authority (LDA). The core legal question is whether the LDA can issue a demolition notice under section 40 of the LDA Act for structures erected prior to the enactment of the statute. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Lahore Development Authority Act, including section 40, are prospective in operation and do not apply to constructions raised before the statute came into force. Finding that the LDA had tacitly admitted in its written statement that the shops were constructed in 1958, prior to the establishment of the LDA, the Court concluded that the petitioner had a strong prima facie case. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted a temporary injunction restraining the LDA from demolishing the remaining shops during the pendency of the underlying civil suit.
Questions settled- Whether section 40 of the Lahore Development Authority Act 1975 is prospective in nature?
- Can the Lahore Development Authority demolish structures constructed before the enactment of the Lahore Development Authority Act 1975?
- Does an admission in a written statement regarding the date of construction preclude a party from contending otherwise?
- Ch. KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 392 · Lahore High Court · 1980-12-21Read full judgment →
- Ch. IMDAD ALI vs MEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE II CUM SATTELMENT AUTHORITY, BALOCHISTAN AND 5 Other1981 PLD Quetta 9 · Balochistan High Court · 1981-04-19Read full judgment →
- Ch. GHULAM RASOOL AND 2 OTHERS vs DEPUTY LAND COMMISSIONER, DERA1981 CLC 227 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
- Ch. GHULAM ALI vs COMMISSIONER, LAHORE DIVISION, LAHORE1981 PLD Lahore 368 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged orders passed by the District Magistrate, Sheikhupura, and affirmed by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, cancelling the petitioner's arms licences for a revolver and shot-gun under Section 12(1)(a) of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965. The cancellation was based on allegations of delayed renewal and alleged record tampering by a postal official, alongside a generalized assertion that keeping the weapons threatened public peace. The core legal questions were whether an arms licence can be cancelled on subjective assumptions without material connecting the holder's conduct to public peace risks, and whether the pendency of a departmental appeal precludes constitutional jurisdiction. The Lahore High Court declared the cancellation orders to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The Court held that while granting a licence is an executive privilege, its revocation imposes a penalty requiring strict adherence to statutory procedure. Executive discretion under Section 12 is not absolute; cancellation must be founded upon objective material demonstrably related to public peace security rather than arbitrary executive satisfaction.
Questions settled- Can an arms licence be cancelled under Section 12 of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 without objective material showing a threat to public peace?
- Does the revocation or cancellation of an existing licence constitute a penalty requiring strict compliance with statutory procedure?
- Is the discretion vested in an executive authority to cancel a licence absolute or circumscribed by the statutory purpose?
- Does the pendency of an administrative appeal preclude the High Court from exercising constitutional jurisdiction when the alternative remedy is ineffectual?
- Ch. ATTA MUHAMMAD AND 2 Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1981 P Cr. L J 55 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-04Read full judgment →
- Ch. ABDUL RAHMAN vs PUNJAB SERVICE TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER1981S C M R 1164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a Federal civil servant, sought leave to appeal against a Punjab Service Tribunal decision regarding his reversion from the post of Deputy Secretary. The petitioner had been appointed to the post on a regular basis by the Punjab Government, but his promotion was subsequently cancelled, leading to his reversion to the Federal Government. The Service Tribunal had previously ruled that while the initial appointment and promotion were regular, the appointment was made 'until further orders,' implying a reserved power to terminate. The Supreme Court examined whether the Government could interfere with an appointment made 'until further orders' without strictly adhering to specific reversion rules. The Court held that the appointment was made in isolation, bypassing competing claims of other eligible candidates. Furthermore, the Court determined that even if the promotion were regular, it would inherently be subject to a probationary period, which had not been dispensed with. As the reversion occurred within one year, the petitioner had no valid grievance. Consequently, the Court found no substantial question of law and refused leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Can a civil servant challenge a reversion order when the appointment was made 'until further orders' and occurred within the probationary period?
- Does an appointment made in isolation without considering competing candidates confer a vested right against reversion?
- Is an appointment to a higher post inherently subject to probation if not explicitly dispensed with?
- Ch. ABDUL GHANI GHUMMAN vs MURREE IMPROVEMENT TRUST, MURREE1981 SCMR 454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a long-standing dispute concerning the provision of a suitable approach road and passage to Plot No. 53 in Murree, allotted to the appellant by the Murree Improvement Trust in 1954. After arbitration proceedings failed and lower courts dismissed challenges, leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to examine whether the dispute fell within the arbitration clause of the sale agreement. During the appeal, a Local Commissioner's report revealed that the access provided was inconvenient, and the plot had meanwhile been resumed and auctioned by the Trust due to non-construction. Ultimately, the parties reached an amicable understanding before the Court: the appellant agreed to accept the existing passage provided by the Trust and pursue the pending civil suit regarding the plot's resumption, while counsel for the Trust undertook to place the matter before the trustees for recommendation of restoration. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal in these terms, granting liberty to revive the appeal if grievances remained unredressed.
Questions settled- Whether an arbitration clause in an agreement for sale covers a dispute regarding the provision of an approach road to an allotted plot?
- Can an improvement trust resume an allotted plot for failure to construct when the failure stems from the trust's own default in providing a suitable passage?
- CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE ETC. vs COLONY THAL TEXTILE MILLS LTD.1981 SCMR 303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the timing of excise duty liability. The core legal question was whether excise duty on manufactured goods is governed by the notification in force at the time of the goods' production or by a subsequent notification issued after the goods were already manufactured. The Supreme Court held that excise duty is a tax on the production and manufacture of goods, not on their subsequent sale, consumption, or disposal. Consequently, the liability for excise duty crystallizes at the moment of manufacture. The Court affirmed that goods manufactured prior to the issuance of a new notification are governed by the legal regime in force at the time of their production. The Court rejected the argument that subsequent notifications could retrospectively apply to goods already manufactured, thereby upholding the High Court's decision to grant relief to the respondent. The principle established is that excise duty is essentially a duty on production, independent of subsequent events like sale or export.
Questions settled- Is excise duty on goods leviable at the time of their manufacture or at the time of their sale?
- Does a notification imposing or withdrawing excise duty apply to goods already manufactured prior to its issuance?
- Is the liability for excise duty dependent on the intended consumption or export of the goods?
- CAPT. SHAH SA WAR AND Others vs MUHAMMAD ASLAM ETC.S1981 SCMR911 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The dispute concerns a land grant awarded for gallantry, which the Board of Revenue attempted to cancel. The petitioners, who sought the land, challenged the High Court's decision to set aside the cancellation order. The core legal questions were whether the Board of Revenue could cancel such a grant without a hearing, and whether a subsequent review application cured the initial procedural illegality. The Supreme Court held that the Board of Revenue's order was void because it was passed without hearing the grantee. Furthermore, the Court determined that the illegality was not cured by the review application, as the scope of a review is too narrow to provide the "fair opportunity" required by natural justice to present one's case. Additionally, the petitioners failed to demonstrate any statutory authority empowering the Board of Revenue to cancel a grant awarded for valour. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The principle established is that a procedural defect involving the denial of a hearing is only cured by a subsequent proceeding if that proceeding offers a full and fair opportunity to be heard, which a limited review does not satisfy.
Questions settled- Does a review application provide a sufficient opportunity to cure an initial order that is void for lack of a hearing?
- Can an order cancelling a land grant be sustained if the authority fails to demonstrate statutory power for such cancellation?
- Is a failure to implead legal heirs of deceased respondents a ground for leave to appeal if the point was not raised before the High Court?
- CAPT. MAHMOOD JAN vs MADAD KHAN AND Another1981 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a Peshawar High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent of murder, overturning a trial court conviction. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in disbelieving the ocular witnesses and the prosecution's evidence regarding motive and abscondence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning was flawed. It found the presence of eye-witnesses natural and credible, rejecting the High Court's view that their presence was artificial. The Court further held that the High Court misconstrued medical evidence regarding the angle of the injury to suggest a "blind murder" theory, noting the absence of evidence regarding the wall's height or distance. Additionally, the Court ruled that the High Court improperly used the acquittal of co-accused to discredit the witnesses, citing Section 43 of the Evidence Act 1872. The Court affirmed that abscondence and established motive corroborated the ocular testimony. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's acquittal, and restored the trial court's conviction and sentence.
Questions settled- Can the acquittal of co-accused be used to discredit eye-witnesses in a separate trial?
- Does the medical opinion of an injury angle from 'above downward' necessarily exclude the presence of an identified assailant?
- Is the abscondence of an accused a valid incriminating circumstance to corroborate ocular testimony?
- Can a court rely on the acquittal of co-accused to reject evidence against a remaining accused under the Evidence Act 1872?
- CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs Ch. ABDUL MAJID FAROOQI Em1981 PLD Lahore 341 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-29Read full judgment →
- BULAND KHAN vs CHIRAGH DIN AND 3 OTHERs1981 CLC 249 · Lahore High Court · 1980-06-29Read full judgment →
- BOOTA vs THE STATE1981 PLD Supreme Court 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged a High Court judgment that confirmed the appellant's conviction and death sentence for murder and attempted murder. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution's evidence sufficiently established guilt and whether the admitted motive—related to family honor—constituted a mitigating factor for sentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding the testimony of injured eyewitnesses credible and corroborated by forensic evidence, including ballistics and physical damage to the crime scene. However, the Court held that the High Court erred in ignoring the mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense. The appellant had repeatedly sought the return of his sister, who had been abducted by the deceased's brother, and the deceased's family had failed to assist in her recovery, leading the appellant to act in a state of extreme exasperation. Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but reduced the sentence from death to transportation for life, ordering that the substantive sentences for murder and attempted murder run concurrently.
Questions settled- Does the presence of a second, unidentified assailant necessarily invalidate the testimony of eyewitnesses who identify the primary accused?
- Can the abduction of a family member and the failure of the victim's family to assist in her recovery serve as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing in a murder case?
- Should substantive sentences for multiple offenses, such as murder and attempted murder, run concurrently or consecutively?
- BOOR UZ ZAMAN AHMAD vs THE PUNJAB SERVICES TRIBUNAL AND Other1981 SCMR 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Punjab Administrative Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's service appeal. The core legal question was whether a quorum of two members of the Tribunal was legally competent to decide the appeal on 10-2-1975, given the statutory requirements regarding the Tribunal's composition. The petitioner contended that the Tribunal, consisting of two members and a Chairman, could not be validly constituted by only two members. The respondent argued that Section 7 of the Punjab Administrative Tribunal Act IX of 1974 permitted such disposal in the absence of a Chairman. The Supreme Court held that Section 7 had been deleted by the Punjab Administrative Tribunal Ordinance IX of 1975, effective 8-2-1975. Consequently, as of 10-2-1975, the two-member quorum lacked the legal authority to dispose of the case. The Court accepted the appeal, quashed the Tribunal's order, and remanded the matter for a fresh decision on the merits, establishing that statutory provisions governing tribunal composition must be strictly adhered to at the time of adjudication.
Questions settled- Was a two-member quorum of the Punjab Administrative Tribunal competent to decide a case on 10-2-1975?
- Did the deletion of Section 7 of the Punjab Administrative Tribunal Act IX of 1974 by the Punjab Administrative Tribunal Ordinance IX of 1975 affect the composition requirements of the Tribunal?
- Can a tribunal dispose of a matter without the legally required quorum?
- BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KARACHI vs MESSRS NATIONAL1981 PLD Karachi 377 · Sindh High Court · 1980-05-12Read full judgment →
- BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS vs Malik KHAN MUHAMMAD AND Other1981 SCMR 1063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which, while disposing of a writ petition filed by a government tenant against the cancellation and resumption of his lease, directed the Collector to pay compensation for improvements made to the land. The respondent had originally challenged the cancellation orders, seeking a declaration that they were without lawful authority and requesting the grant of proprietary rights. Although the respondent did not seek compensation in his petition, the High Court, noting that the respondent had sunk a well on the land, held him entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether, under condition 4(d) of the lease agreement, the respondent was entitled to such compensation. Upon appeal, the respondent did not contest the proceedings and did not support the impugned order. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal and set aside the High Court's order, noting that the relief granted by the High Court had not been sought by the respondent in his original petition.
Questions settled- Is a court empowered to grant relief, such as compensation for improvements, when such relief was not specifically sought by the petitioner in their writ petition?
- Does a government tenant have a legal right to claim compensation for improvements made to land upon the cancellation and resumption of their lease, notwithstanding the specific terms of the lease agreement?
- BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, SARGODHA AND ANOTHER vs AKHTAR BROTHERS1981 CLC 221 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
A civil suit for recovery was filed against the petitioner, who subsequently applied under section 34 of the Arbitration Act for stay of proceedings based on an arbitration agreement. The trial court dismissed the application, and the petitioner filed a revision petition before the District Judge, which was held to be not maintainable and dismissed on merits. The Lahore High Court examined whether the District Judge was justified in refusing to convert the revision petition into an appeal and whether obtaining an adjournment to file a written statement constituted a 'step in the proceedings' under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The High Court held that while a revision petition filed within limitation and properly stamped should generally be allowed to be converted into an appeal, the petitioner had indeed taken a step in the proceedings by seeking time to file a written statement, which displayed an unequivocal intention to proceed with the suit rather than arbitrate. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether obtaining an adjournment to file a written statement amounts to a step in the proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act?
- Can a revision petition filed within the period of limitation for an appeal be permitted to be converted into an appeal?
- What is the true test for determining whether an act constitutes a step in the proceedings in an arbitration matter?
- BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, RAWALPINDI vs SULEMAN MANSOOR AHMAD1981 SCMR 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which allowed a constitutional petition filed by the respondent. The respondent secured 490 marks in the Intermediate Pre-Medical Group Examination and subsequently appeared for improvement of his position in the Pre-Engineering Group Examination. Although he passed, the petitioner Board declared him failed on the ground that relevant rules did not permit a change of group for improvement. The core legal question concerned the interpretation and application of the examination rules regarding the change of groups for the improvement of marks. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that, notwithstanding any potential force in the petitioner's interpretation of the rules, leave to appeal was unwarranted because the educational authorities themselves permitted the respondent to take the examination and contributed to the confusion. The key principle laid down is that where authorities permit a candidate to appear in an examination through their own contributory conduct and confusion, the discretionary relief under constitutional jurisdiction will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court.
Questions settled- Can a candidate appear in an examination for improvement of marks in a group different from their earlier group under the relevant rules?
- Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal when the educational authorities' own conduct contributed to the confusion regarding examination rules?
- BOARD OF FOREIGN MISSIONS vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB Ere.1981 PLD Supreme Court 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, sought special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed its writ petition regarding the ownership of a building occupied by a school. The petitioner contended that while it allowed the Provincial Government to use the premises rent-free for school operations, it remained the legal owner of the property. The core legal question is whether a building owned by a third party, rather than the school itself, constitutes 'property attached to the school' under paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation No. 118, thereby vesting in the Provincial Government upon the nationalization of the school. The Supreme Court observed that the interpretation of whether privately owned property occupied by a school falls within the scope of property 'attached to' the school under the Regulation presents a substantial question of law with significant implications for numerous cases. Consequently, the Court granted special leave to appeal to provide an authoritative interpretation of the statutory provision and issued notice regarding the petitioner's request for interim relief.
Questions settled- Does property owned by a third party, which is occupied by a school, constitute 'property attached to the school' under paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation No. 118?
- Can property not owned by a privately-managed school vest in the Provincial Government under the provisions of Martial Law Regulation No. 118?