Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE Versus HAMEEDULLAH1993 SCMR 451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-30Read full judgment →
- AHMAD SAEED KIRMANI Versus MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD., ISLAMABAD1993 SCMR 441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a banking suit where the appellant challenged a decree for the recovery of a loan, claiming an equitable set-off for damages allegedly caused by the respondent bank's failure to disburse the full loan amount. The core legal questions were whether the appellant had sufficiently pleaded and proved the claim for damages, and whether the bank's failure to disburse the full loan absolved the appellant from the obligation to repay the loan or pay interest. The Supreme Court held that while an equitable set-off for unascertained sums is maintainable when claims arise from the same transaction, the party claiming it must adhere to strict rules of pleading and prove the quantum of damages. The Court found the appellant's pleadings vague and the evidence insufficient to establish the alleged loss of rent or the contract with a third party. The Court further held that the bank's failure to disburse the full loan did not automatically relieve the borrower of the obligation to repay the loan, as the covenants were not conditional or reciprocal. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a defendant claim an equitable set-off for an unascertained sum of money?
- Does a bank's failure to disburse the full loan amount automatically relieve the borrower of the obligation to repay the loan?
- What are the requirements for a party to successfully claim damages for breach of contract under Section 73 of the Contract Act 1872?
- Is a party claiming equitable set-off required to follow the rules of pleading regarding the particulars of the claim?
- MUHAMMAD YASIN Versus HANIF AHMED1993 SCMR 437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-18Read full judgment →
- HIKMAT KHAN Versus SHAMSUR REHMAN1993 SCMR 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-30Read full judgment →
- ASHIQ HUSSAIN Versus STATE1993 SCMR 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the appellant's murder conviction but reduced his death sentence to life imprisonment, while dismissing the complainant's revision against the acquittal of co-accused. The Supreme Court considered whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the acquittal of co-accused on similar evidence, discrepancies in ocular and medical evidence, and issues with the investigation and recovery of weapons. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond doubt, highlighting inconsistencies in witness statements, the unreliability of recovery evidence, and the questionable handling of the investigation. It reiterated that the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond doubt remains constant, irrespective of the strength or weakness of the defense's alibi. Consequently, the Supreme Court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant, setting aside his conviction and sentence.
Questions settled- Can the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused when co-accused, named by the same eye-witnesses, are acquitted due to lack of corroborative evidence?
- Does the prosecution's burden to prove its case beyond doubt diminish if the defense fails to substantiate its plea of alibi?
- What impact do significant discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence have on the prosecution's case?
- Is recovery evidence reliable if there are unexplained delays in arrest and recovery, and inconsistencies in the recovery memo and witness testimony?
- Can a defense plea, even if not fully proven, be sufficient to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's case?
- QUDRAT ALI Versus GOVERNMENT OF N.-W.F.P.1993 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-09-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal, filed under Article 203-F of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged a decision of the Federal Shariat Court which dismissed a petition against certain entries in the Wajibul Arz of village Bhooja, Mansehra, concerning village common property (Shamilat) and customary rights. The core legal question was whether entries in a Wajibul Arz reflecting village agreements regarding the apportionment and limitation of common land rights constitute 'law' under the Constitution and whether they are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The Supreme Court held that the entries in the Wajibul Arz regarding the distribution and reservation of Shamilat land were based on mutual agreements and covenants among the original settlers and proprietors rather than on custom having the force of law, and thus did not fall within the definition of law reviewable by the Federal Shariat Court. Furthermore, the court held that such private covenants are fully consistent with Islamic injunctions upholding the sanctity of contracts. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether entries in a Wajibul Arz recording village common property rights amount to law or private agreement?
- Does the Federal Shariat Court have jurisdiction under the Constitution to examine agreements and compacts relating to immovable property?
- Are restrictive entries in a Wajibul Arz concerning Shamilat land repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
- EXCISE AND TAXATION OFFICER, KARACHI Versus BURMAH SHELL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION COMPANY OF PAKISTAN LTD.1993 SCMR 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This consolidated appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan, which declared the levy and demand of tax under sections 10 and 8 of the West Pakistan Finance Acts, 1962 and 1963, along with penalties, to be illegal, without lawful authority, and of no legal effect. The core legal question was whether an apparent irreconcilable inconsistency between the charging sections and the Third Schedules of the Acts—where the charging section levied tax on the value of goods imported or exported under an import/export licence, while the Third Schedule provided a fixed amount of tax based on the value of the licence itself—could be resolved through judicial interpretation to harmonize the provisions and achieve the legislative object. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that in fiscal and taxing statutes, courts must look strictly to the letter of the law, and where a conflict between the body of an Act and its schedule creates an insuperable ambiguity that cannot be reconciled without rewriting the statute, the enactment cannot be enforced. The key principle laid down is that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly according to their plain language, allowing no room for intendment, equity, presumption, or supplying assumed deficiencies by judicial legislation.
Questions settled- Whether an irreconcilable inconsistency between the charging section and the schedule of a taxing statute can be resolved by judicial construction to enforce the levy?
- Can courts supply an omission or rewrite provisions in a fiscal statute to support an assumed legislative deficiency?
- Does a tax schedule that prescribes the amount of tax based on the value of a licence prevail over a charging section that levies tax on the value of goods imported?
- What are the established canons of construction when interpreting fiscal and taxing statutes regarding intendment, equity, and the plain meaning of words?
- IBRAHIM ISHAQ JOHRI Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (WEST), KARACHI1993 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave challenges the Sindh High Court's judgment regarding the taxability of income earned by an ordinary resident of Pakistan from business in Swat State, a tribal area where the Income-tax Act, 1922 was not formally extended. The core legal questions involved whether an ordinary resident of Pakistan is liable to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1922 for income derived from Swat State despite its constitutional exemption, and whether the inference that the appellant maintained a dwelling place in Pakistan for the requisite statutory period was correct in law. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant had the status of a resident and ordinary resident in taxable territory in Pakistan, his global income, including income from Swat State, was subject to tax under the charging and application provisions of the Act, equating Swat State income in this context to foreign income of a resident. Furthermore, the court held that concurrent findings regarding the maintenance of a dwelling place and residential status were findings of fact conclusive upon the tribunal. The appeals were consequently dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether an ordinary resident of Pakistan is liable to pay income tax under the Income-tax Act, 1922 in respect of business income earned in Swat State when the said Act was not formally applied to Swat State under Article 223 of the Constitution of 1962?
- Whether the maintenance of a dwelling house by an assessee's wife in Karachi where a telephone is installed in the assessee's name constitutes the maintenance of a dwelling place for the assessee under section 4-A(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
- Whether the findings of fact regarding an assessee's residential status and maintenance of a dwelling place recorded by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal can be disturbed by the High Court in reference jurisdiction under section 66 of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
- REGIONAL COMMISSIONER, INCOME-TAX COMPANIES II, KARACHI Versus S. SULTAN ALI JEOFFREY S. Muhammad Shahudul Haque, Advocate Supreme Court and Akhlaque Ahmed Siddiqui1993 SCMR 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of two connected appeals arising from a dispute over a cash reward claimed by a non-official informer under the Cash Reward to Informers Scheme, 1974, for supplying information regarding tax evasion by Valika Chemical Industries. The core legal question was whether the informer was entitled to cash rewards for information concerning the evasion of income tax and sales tax where assessments resulted in reduced losses or additional tax demands without subsequent recovery. The Supreme Court held that the informer was entitled to a reward regarding sales tax because the information led to the detection of evaded sales tax and the creation of an additional demand, and recovery was not a prerequisite under the Scheme. However, the Court held that the informer was not entitled to a reward for income tax because the company remained in a net loss position, making it impossible to quantify the amount of tax sought to be evaded, which is a mandatory basis for calculating rewards under paragraph 2 of the Scheme. The appeals were disposed of accordingly.
Questions settled- Is an informer entitled to a cash reward under the Cash Reward to Informers Scheme when information leads to the detection of tax evasion but no tax recovery is made due to the company going into liquidation?
- Does the reduction of carried-over losses resulting from an informer's information constitute evasion of income tax for the purpose of calculating a cash reward under the Scheme?
- Can a cash reward be granted under the Cash Reward to Informers Scheme when the amount of tax sought to be evaded cannot be quantified?
- MUHAMMAD JAFFAR Versus STATE1993 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-29Read full judgment →
- MEHBOOB KHAN Versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1993 SCMR 2385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-13Read full judgment →
- RIFFAT AKRAM Versus CHAIRMAN, ADMISSION BOARD/PRINCIPAL, KING EDWARD MEDICAL COLLEGE, LAHORE , Abdul Samad Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Mehdi Khan Mehtab, Advocate -on-Record1993 SCMR 2370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-08-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition filed by a student seeking admission to a medical college under a reserved quota for disabled persons. The petitioner, suffering from polio, was denied admission after a Board of Medical Specialists determined she was not physically fit to pursue medical studies or perform professional duties, as required by the prospectus governing the 1992-93 academic session. The core legal question was whether the court could interfere with the expert determination of a medical board regarding a candidate's physical fitness for a professional course. The Supreme Court held that the Admission Board's decision, based on the expert opinion of five senior specialists, was valid and that the court could not substitute its own opinion for that of the specialized medical board. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition, affirming that judicial review does not extend to replacing expert medical assessments with judicial findings, and accordingly refused leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Can a court substitute its own opinion for the findings of a specialized medical board regarding a candidate's physical fitness for medical studies?
- Is the decision of an admission board to deny entry to a disabled student based on an expert medical report subject to judicial interference?
- GHULAM ABBAS Versus MUHAMMAD ASHRAF1993 SCMR 2289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit regarding the sale of occupancy rights. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s suit, holding that the ground of 'ownership in the estate' was not explicitly pleaded in the plaint. The Supreme Court examined whether the strict construction of pleadings in Mofussil areas was appropriate and whether the court should permit an amendment to the plaint to clarify the grounds for pre-emption. The Court held that the right of pre-emption is a valid legal right under Islamic jurisprudence and should not be treated as 'predatory' or denied on technical grounds. Emphasizing that pleadings from Mofussil areas should be construed liberally, the Court ruled that where a fact is essentially established or undisputed, the court has a duty to allow the amendment of pleadings in the interest of justice, even at a late stage. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the amendment, set aside the High Court's judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court for a fresh trial, subject to the payment of costs.
Questions settled- Should pleadings in Mofussil areas be subjected to strict rules of construction?
- Is the right of pre-emption considered a predatory right under Pakistani Islamic jurisprudence?
- Can a court allow the amendment of a plaint at a late stage if the underlying facts are undeniable?
- Does the failure to explicitly state a ground in a plaint necessarily preclude a plaintiff from relief if the fact is otherwise established?
- SHAHBAZ AFGHAN Versus STATE1993 SCMR 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a convict sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment, whipping, and a fine under section 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 following the recovery of large quantities of narcotics including charas, opium, and heroin. The core legal questions involve whether the convict was entitled to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, whether such relief could be granted by the Federal Shariat Court, and whether the principle of repentance or Tauba could be applied to mitigate the sentence. The Supreme Court held that while the general principle underlying section 9(5) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 regarding reformation and Tauba may be applied where not prohibited, the petitioner had already received adequate leniency through a substantial reduction of his heavy sentence by the Federal Shariat Court. The Court affirmed that no further interference was warranted given the heinous nature of the crime, thereby refusing leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that equitable considerations of reformation like Tauba can be considered in criminal sentencing unless prohibited by law, but adequate relief already granted by lower forums precludes further interference.
Questions settled- Whether the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be claimed in narcotics cases?
- Can the principle of repentance or Tauba be applied in sentencing under laws dealing with crimes other than property offences?
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a sentence substantially reduced by the Federal Shariat Court for a heinous narcotics offense?
- AMEENA BI Versus KUPPUSWAMI NAIDU1993 SCMR 2172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that dismissed the appellant's suit for possession, holding it barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act. The core legal question was whether a money decree obtained against a Receiver, specifically targeting the estate of a co-defendant (Muhammad Sheriff), could be legally executed against properties allotted to the appellant (Ameena Bi) in a separate partition suit, and whether the appellant's subsequent suit for recovery of possession was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the decree in question was limited to the personal liability of Muhammad Sheriff and his share in the estate held by the Receiver; it did not bind the estate of the appellant's father. Consequently, the execution proceedings against the appellant's properties were unauthorized and void. The Court affirmed that the appellant, not being a party to the original suit, was not subject to Section 47 proceedings. Furthermore, the suit for possession, filed within twelve years of dispossession, was within the limitation period under Article 65 of the Limitation Act.
Questions settled- Can a money decree passed against a specific defendant's estate in the hands of a Receiver be executed against properties allotted to a third party in a separate partition suit?
- Is a suit for possession filed by a third party whose property was illegally auctioned in execution proceedings barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- When does the limitation period begin to run for a suit for possession based on title under Article 65 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- KAMU ALIAS KAMU AMMAL Versus M. MUTHAYYA1993 SCMR 2153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-09-25Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE Versus STATE1993 SCMR 2114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These criminal appeals arise out of a murder case involving a dispute over a plot of land, which resulted in the death of Muhammad Ajmal and injuries to other parties. The trial court convicted Muhammad Siddique under section 302/34, P.P.C., and sentenced him to death, while acquitting some co-accused and convicting others. The Lahore High Court maintained the conviction and death sentence of Muhammad Siddique, dismissed the State's appeal against certain acquittals, but acquitted Inayatullah. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined the conflicting versions of the occurrence, the medical evidence showing injuries on the accused party, and the question of self-defense. The Supreme Court held that the appellant caused the death without premeditation while exceeding his right of private defence, thereby altering the conviction from section 302, P.P.C. to section 304, Part I, P.P.C., and sentenced him accordingly, while also convicting Inayatullah under section 304, Part I/34, P.P.C. The key legal principle laid down is that where the prosecution suppresses injuries sustained by the accused and the evidence reveals a sudden fight arising from a property dispute, the accused may be entitled to the partial benefit of the right of private defence, converting a murder conviction under section 302 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304, Part I, P.P.C.
Questions settled- Whether the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused in a criminal altercation affects the veracity of the prosecution case?
- When does an accused person exceed the right of private defence of person and property?
- Can a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to section 304, Part I, P.P.C. when the homicide is committed without premeditation during a sudden dispute?
- Is a co-accused liable under section 304 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for acting in furtherance of a common intention during a sudden fight?
- ABDUL AZIZ Versus SAINAN BIBI ALIAS HUSSAINA BIBI1993 SCMR 2110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-17Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YAQOOB Versus JEHANGIR KHAN1993 SCMR 2108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-09Read full judgment →
- QUETTA HINDU PANCHAYAT Versus DILSHAD AKHTAR1993 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by the Quetta Hindu Panchayat challenges the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which had set aside the Member, Board of Revenue's order declaring a disputed cremation ground property as non-evacuee. The core legal questions concerned whether the property was ever validly treated as evacuee property prior to the statutory target date under evacuee laws, and whether it could be legally allotted to displaced claimants given its ownership by a non-migrating religious community and continuous use for religious purposes. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant Hindu Panchayat did not migrate and retained physical and administrative control of the property, it was never legally declared or treated as evacuee property prior to the critical date under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957, making the subsequent allotments and transfers void, coram non judice, and without lawful authority. The ratio is that property belonging to a non-migrated religious institution and used for religious purposes cannot be treated as evacuee property or included in the compensation pool without a valid declaration by the Custodian before the relevant statutory cutoff date.
Questions settled- Whether property belonging to a non-migrating religious institution can be treated as evacuee property?
- Can property be validly treated as evacuee property after the target date mentioned in section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957?
- Does the Board of Revenue acting under the Settlement Laws (Repeal) Act 1974 have jurisdiction to determine if a property is non-evacuee?
- Are allotments of religious or trust properties made to claimants in satisfaction of claims valid without a prior determination by the Custodian?
- MUHAMMAD WARIS Versus SOHBAT KHAN1993 SCMR 2093 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals by leave of the Court are directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 25-11-1985, which dismissed the appellants' regular first appeal arising from concurrent findings regarding a disputed land transaction and pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the High Court and trial court misread or ignored material evidence regarding an alleged agreement to sell and whether the appellants proved their status as co-vendees. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly interpreted the document as an agreement to sell rather than a sale deed, and that concurrent findings regarding discrepancies, interpolations in the scribe's register, and lack of proof of consideration were based on proper appreciation of evidence without any misreading. The Court laid down that concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence and the validity of transaction documents will not be interfered with by the apex court unless clear misreading or omission of material evidence is established.
Questions settled- Whether an agreement to sell can be construed as a completed sale deed?
- Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding document interpolation be interfered with in appeal?
- Whether the High Court misread the evidence regarding the status of co-vendees in the disputed land transaction?
- NOOR MUHAMMAD Versus STATE1993 SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder, where the appellant challenged the findings of the lower courts. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s plea of sudden and grave provocation—arising from discovering his sister in a compromising position with the deceased—was sufficient to mitigate the offence, particularly when the prosecution’s version of a planned attack was contested. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution’s evidence was not free from reasonable doubt and that the defence version could not be dismissed as entirely false. The Court held that in such marginal cases, where the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit must be extended to the accused. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction for murder, substituting it with a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the relevant statutory provision. The principle established is that where the defence version of sudden and grave provocation is plausible and the prosecution case is doubtful, the benefit of the doubt warrants a reduction in the offence and sentence.
Questions settled- Does the discovery of a sister in a compromising position with a man constitute sudden and grave provocation sufficient to mitigate a murder charge?
- When the prosecution case is not free from reasonable doubt and the defence version is plausible, is the accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt?
- Can a conviction for murder be converted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder based on the plea of sudden and grave provocation?
- M. K. MUHAMMAD Versus MUHAMMAD ABU BAKAR1993 SCMR 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-01Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ISHAQ ALIAS KALI Versus STATE1993 SCMR 1989 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, Muhammad Ishaq alias Kali, was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Muhammad Ashraf and sentenced to death. While his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the legal heirs of the deceased—specifically the mother, father, and brother—entered into a compromise with the appellant. They acknowledged receiving Rs. 2,25,000 as Badal-e-Sulh and formally forgave the appellant. The Court examined and approved this compromise in chambers and verified it in open court. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant, ordering his immediate release unless required in any other case. This judgment affirms the legal validity of a compromise (Badal-e-Sulh) between the heirs of a deceased and the accused in a murder case, leading to the acquittal of the accused.
Questions settled- Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code be set aside based on a compromise between the accused and the heirs of the deceased?
- Does the payment of Badal-e-Sulh to the legal heirs of a deceased victim justify the acquittal of an appellant convicted of murder?
- SHAFI MUHAMMAD Versus IMAM DIN1993 SCMR 1953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-16Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD TARIQ Versus HASIN JAHAN1993 SCMR 1949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a revision petition arising from a suit's dismissal for default. The appellant filed a civil suit seeking a share in property and applied for a temporary injunction. The trial court fixed a date solely for hearing arguments on the injunction application, but on that date, neither the appellant nor his counsel appeared, whereupon the trial court dismissed the entire suit for want of prosecution. Subsequent applications for restoration and appeals up to the High Court were unsuccessful. The core legal question was whether a date fixed for hearing arguments on an interim injunction application constitutes a date of hearing of the suit itself, empowering the court to dismiss the suit for non-prosecution under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the trial court could only dismiss the injunction application in the plaintiff's absence and lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the suit itself on a date not fixed for its hearing, rendering the dismissal order void. The Supreme Court established that a date fixed exclusively for interlocutory matters such as temporary injunctions is not a date of hearing for the substantive suit, and a dismissal of the suit on such a date is void without jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Is a date fixed for hearing arguments on a temporary injunction application considered the date of hearing of the main suit under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Whether a trial court is competent to dismiss a substantive suit for non-prosecution on a date fixed solely for hearing an interlocutory application?
- What is the legal status of an order dismissing a suit for non-prosecution on a date not fixed for the hearing of the suit?
- BASHARAT IQBAL Versus STATE1993 SCMR 1901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a quashment application filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The underlying dispute involved a private complaint against the petitioner for allegedly abetting a second marriage without requisite proceedings before an arbitration council, in violation of Section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961. The petitioner challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the Lahore court, arguing the marriage occurred in Hyderabad. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that under Section 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, both the courts at Hyderabad and Lahore possessed jurisdiction to try the matter. Regarding the merits of the case and the applicability of Section 6(5), the Court declined to intervene, directing the petitioner to raise these arguments before the trial court, with the liberty to seek further remedies if unsuccessful. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently refused.
Questions settled- Does Section 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 confer concurrent territorial jurisdiction on courts in different cities for the trial of a criminal complaint?
- Can a High Court dismiss a quashment application filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the trial court has not yet adjudicated the merits of the case?
- STATE Versus MUHAMMAD NASEER1993 SCMR 1822 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The State appealed against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which set aside the respondent's conviction and death sentence under Section 6(3)(b) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, and acquitted him of committing Zina with a deceased woman's exhumed corpse. The primary issue was whether the respondent could be convicted for Zina liable to Tazir based exclusively on his retracted judicial confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, purportedly corroborated by medical evidence and recovery. The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal, holding that conviction on a retracted confession requires strong, independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused to the crime. The Court observed that the confession was doubtful as to voluntariness because the respondent was provided negligible reflection time and was returned to police custody rather than sent to judicial lock-up. Furthermore, medical evidence established only the act itself without linking the respondent to it. Adhering to the settled principles governing appeals against acquittal, the Court found no misreading or disregard of material evidence justifying interference.
Questions settled- Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on a retracted confession without independent corroboration connecting the accused to the commission of the offence?
- Does remanding an accused to police custody instead of judicial lock-up immediately after recording a confession under Section 164 Cr.P.C. render its voluntariness doubtful?
- Does medical evidence confirming the commission of an offence suffice as corroboration to link an accused to a retracted confession?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal rendered by an appellate court?
- M. ISMAIL QURESHI Versus M. AWAIS QASIM, SECRETARY-GENERAL, ISLAMI LAMIAT TULBA, PAK1993 SCMR 1781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the regulation of student conduct and examination integrity in educational institutions across Pakistan. The Supreme Court addressed two primary issues: the prohibition of student "indulgence in politics" and the management of examination malpractices. Regarding student politics, the Court confirmed its interim order requiring students and guardians to provide an undertaking against political involvement, while clarifying that such measures must adhere to principles of natural justice, including the right to a fair opportunity of defense. The Court prohibited the association of student unions with the organizational setup of educational institutions but permitted the formation of student groups focused on educational and extra-curricular activities under institutional supervision. Regarding examination malpractices, the Court established a procedural framework requiring institutional decisions to be reviewed by the Advocate-General of the respective province, with subsequent references to the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that while it exercises parental jurisdiction, institutional authorities must ensure fairness, reasonableness, and the avoidance of coercion, maintaining that the Supreme Court retains supervisory oversight over these matters.
Questions settled- Can educational institutions require students to sign an undertaking prohibiting indulgence in politics as a condition for admission?
- Does the prohibition of student politics in educational institutions violate fundamental rights?
- What is the required procedure for handling examination malpractices in educational institutions to ensure fairness?
- Can student unions be prohibited from associating with the organizational setup of educational institutions?
- MUHAMMAD NASIM BUTT Versus STATE1993 SCMR 177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for the possession of 65 kilograms of heroin. The petitioner contended that the prosecution evidence was unreliable, citing the failure of independent witnesses (Mashirs) to support the case, alleged collusion between a raiding officer and a co-accused, and the inadmissibility of a confession made before the police. The petitioner further argued that, excluding the inadmissible confession, he should be treated as a mere carrier rather than an owner. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding that the failure of independent witnesses to support the prosecution, in the context of high-stakes narcotics cases, often indicates the winning over of witnesses rather than the falsity of the prosecution's case. The Court found that, even excluding the petitioner's statement to the police, sufficient evidence existed to establish his culpability beyond that of a mere carrier. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the conviction and sentence.
Questions settled- Does the failure of independent witnesses (Mashirs) to support the prosecution case necessarily invalidate a conviction in a narcotics case?
- Can a conviction for narcotics possession be sustained if the accused's confession before the police is excluded from consideration?
- Is an accused person who is found in possession of a large quantity of narcotics automatically entitled to be treated as a mere carrier?
- REHMAT ALI Versus CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB1993 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ILYAS Versus STATE1993 SCMR 1602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal with leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code and their sentence of death for the murder of two persons. The core legal questions involved the credibility of related eye-witnesses, the presence of corroborative evidence, and the direct conflict between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding the distance and angle of firing. The Supreme Court evaluated the evidence and noted serious infirmities, including delay in the First Information Report, unexplained delays in police investigation, the withholding of a material eye-witness, and medical testimony confirming scorching and direct trajectories inconsistent with firing from a rooftop at a distance of 18 feet. Holding that the ocular testimony was unreliable and uncorroborated, and that tainted evidence cannot corroborate another piece of tainted evidence, the Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the appellants. The appeal was consequently allowed, the conviction and sentences were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted.
Questions settled- Whether tainted evidence can be used to corroborate another piece of tainted evidence?
- Can a conviction for murder be sustained when there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the distance of firing?
- Does the withholding of a material eye-witness by the prosecution give rise to an adverse inference against its case?
- Whether inconsistencies in recovery evidence and delayed first information reports warrant extending the benefit of the doubt to the accused in a capital case?
- MUHAMMAD NAWAZ Versus MUHAMMAD ASLAM1993 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the acquittal of respondents in a case involving charges under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, and the Pakistan Penal Code, following a husband's accusation of Zina against his wife. The trial court had conducted the procedure of Lian under Section 14 of the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979, dissolving the marriage and acquitting all respondents, a decision affirmed by the Federal Shariat Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the wife's demand is a prerequisite for Lian and if a wife can be punished for Zina (Tazir) after Lian. The Court held that while Lian ideally requires the wife's demand, mutual participation without objection validates the procedure. It also found the wife failed to prove her claim of divorce, confirming the marriage's subsistence. The Court dismissed the appeal, noting insufficient evidence for Zina against the wife, thus declining to rule on the Tazir punishment question.
Questions settled- Is a wife's demand a prerequisite for initiating the procedure of Lian?
- Can the procedure of Lian be nullified if the parties participated without objection, even if the wife did not formally demand it?
- Does the burden of proof for divorce lie with the party claiming it when a previous marriage is admitted?
- Is mere presence of a woman with a male relative sufficient to prove the offence of Zina?
- SAHIBZADA MUSTAFA Versus WAZIR MUHAMMAD AWAN1993 SCMR 1584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-12Read full judgment →
- JAVAID MASIH Versus STATE1993 SCMR 1574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a conviction for the murder of the petitioner's sister and another individual, Shahzad. The petitioner sought to challenge the conviction, arguing that the confession was retracted and inadmissible, and further attempted to file a compromise application under Islamic law provisions. The core legal questions were whether the conviction could be sustained upon a retracted confession corroborated by other evidence, and whether a compromise could be accepted when the legal heirs of one of the two victims were not identified or present. The Court held that the conviction was sound, as the retracted confession was sufficiently corroborated by the recovery of the weapon, cartridges, and the petitioner's own conduct. Regarding the compromise, the Court held that it could not be accepted because the legal heirs of one victim were absent, and the alleged representative failed to prove his status as a Wali. The Court affirmed that under the law, where multiple victims exist, a waiver by the Wali of one victim does not affect the rights of the Wali of another victim.
Questions settled- Can a retracted confession be used to sustain a conviction if it is corroborated by independent evidence?
- Does a waiver of Qisas by the legal heirs of one victim affect the rights of the legal heirs of another victim in a case involving multiple murders?
- Can a compromise application be accepted in a murder case if the legal heirs of one of the victims are not identified or present?
- PROVINCE OF SINDH Versus DIN MUHAMMAD1993 SCMR 1551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside an order of the Provincial Government detaining a youthful offender, Muhammad Jamil, for seven years. The core legal question was whether the Provincial Government, when acting under Section 68(2) of the Sindh Children Act, 1955, possesses unlimited power to sentence a youthful offender, or whether it is bound by the age-related detention limits prescribed in the Act. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government’s power is not absolute and remains subject to the statutory limitations of the Act. The Court affirmed that Section 68(1) prohibits sentencing a youthful offender to imprisonment, and Section 71 restricts detention beyond the age of eighteen. The Court clarified that the Provincial Government cannot exercise authority wider than that of the trial court and must adhere to the Act's protective framework. Additionally, the Court interpreted Section 68(2), ruling that the grounds for reporting a case to the Provincial Government are disjunctive, meaning a finding on any one of the specified grounds is sufficient to trigger the reporting mechanism.
Questions settled- Does the Provincial Government have unlimited power to sentence a youthful offender under Section 68(2) of the Sindh Children Act 1955?
- Are the grounds for reporting a case to the Provincial Government under Section 68(2) of the Sindh Children Act 1955 conjunctive or disjunctive?
- Can a youthful offender be detained beyond the age of eighteen under the Sindh Children Act 1955?
- Does the prohibition against imprisonment in Section 68(1) of the Sindh Children Act 1955 apply to the Provincial Government?
- SAIDULLAH Versus FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION1993 SCMR 1550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-26Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD OZAIR Versus PROVINCE OF PUNJAB Shah Abdul Rashid and Ejaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate-on-Record1993 SCMR 1548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-24Read full judgment →
- NASIR AHMED Versus STATE1993 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant bail to the petitioner, who was charged under Sections 295-A, 295-C, and 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The charges arose from the use of specific religious expressions on a wedding invitation card, which the prosecution alleged constituted defiling the name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and outraging religious feelings. The core legal question was whether the act of 'defiling' is determined solely by the words used ex facie or whether it requires an examination of the broader context, including the accused's faith, intention, and background. The Supreme Court observed that the expressions used did not prima facie appear derogatory or offensive in isolation, noting that the alleged offense only arises when external knowledge of the accused's background is applied. Consequently, the Court held that the case presented serious questions requiring in-depth examination at trial. The petition was converted into an appeal, the High Court's order was set aside, and the petitioner's bail was confirmed.
Questions settled- Does the offense of defiling the name of the Holy Prophet require an examination of the accused's background and intent, or is it determined solely by the words used?
- Does the use of specific religious expressions on a wedding invitation card constitute an offense under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Is an offense punishable by three years' imprisonment subject to the prohibitory clause regarding the grant of bail?
- BADSHAH JAN Versus SHAHZADA SIRAJUDDIN1993 SCMR 1444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal through leave of the court arises from the refusal of the High Court to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction regarding a land dispute in Chitral, which had traversed through various forums including the Chitral Land Inquiry Commission, the Federal Land Commission, and the Tribunal Land Disputes. The core legal questions pertained to the nature of the appellants' rights under an old Sanad granted by the former Ruler of Chitral, the legal competence of a successor Ruler to disregard that Sanad, and the validity of proprietary rights claimed through subsequent forced ejectments and exaction of services. The Supreme Court held that the successor Ruler's act contrary to the ancestor's command and the general Islamic Law was illegal and without lawful authority, and that the appellants' long-standing possession exempted from service and rent constituted a valid proprietary grant. The key principle laid down is that under Islamic common law, unconstitutional and oppressive acts of an autocratic ruler cannot create rights for beneficiaries or operate as an estoppel against subjects who submitted under coercion, and where a vacuum exists in statutory dispensation, Islamic common law applies.
Questions settled- What was the nature of rights as tenants or otherwise of the appellants under the Sanad granted in the previous century?
- Whether a successor Ruler could defy the previous Ruler's command regarding the rights of the appellants in the land in dispute?
- If the act of the successor Ruler is rendered without lawful authority, do the appellants have any right in the land on account of their possession without the obligation of rendering Khidmat or Qalang?
- Does the passive submission of subjects to unconstitutional and illegal acts of an autocratic ruler operate as an estoppel against them under Islamic common law?
- S. MANZOOR RAZA Versus MEMBER (ADMN.), CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD1993 SCMR 1438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-05-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld a departmental order imposing a penalty of withholding four increments without cumulative effect upon the petitioner, an Assistant Income-tax Officer. The petitioner was charge-sheeted for finalizing an assessment for the year 1984-85 within one day of receiving a duplicate return, despite ongoing investigation proceedings against the assessee. While the Inquiry Officer exonerated the petitioner regarding the first charge, he found the petitioner guilty of the second charge concerning the assessment procedure. The petitioner contended that the assessment was justified based on the assessee's past history as a salaried person qualifying for self-assessment and argued he lacked jurisdiction over the association of persons involved in the complaint. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether, given the specific facts and the assessee's history, the petitioner's decision to proceed with the assessment under the Income-tax Ordinance was legally justified or constituted misconduct warranting disciplinary action under the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules.
Questions settled- Was the petitioner justified in making an assessment under Section 59 of the Income-tax Ordinance given the assessee's history?
- Did the petitioner's actions in finalizing the assessment constitute misconduct under the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules?
- MUHAMMAD YOUNIS Versus MUQADAM SULTAN1993 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed a revision petition regarding execution proceedings. The petitioner, a judgment-debtor under an eviction order, filed an objection petition alleging that the decree-holders had entered into a compromise with him, effectively renewing the tenancy and superseding the eviction order. The executing court, the appellate court, and the High Court all concurrently rejected this contention, finding that the petitioner failed to discharge the heavy burden of proof regarding the alleged compromise, particularly given the status of the decree-holders as Pardahnashin ladies. The Supreme Court upheld these findings, noting that if a genuine compromise existed, the petitioner should have produced the respondents before the court to withdraw the execution. The Court affirmed that judgment-debtors have a legal and moral obligation to honor decrees and surrender possession. Finding the litigation frivolous and intended to delay execution, the Court dismissed the petition and imposed compensatory costs on the petitioner for the undue financial loss and agony caused to the decree-holders.
Questions settled- Does an alleged compromise between a judgment-debtor and a decree-holder, which is not formally recorded or verified before the executing court, suffice to supersede an existing eviction order?
- Is the burden of proof on a party asserting a compromise with Pardahnashin ladies to prove the execution of documents and the validity of the transaction?
- Can the Supreme Court impose compensatory costs on a judgment-debtor for filing frivolous objections that delay the execution of a decree?
- PAKISTAN SERVICES LIMITED Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (REVISION), KARACHI1993 SCMR 1406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the admissibility of trading losses claimed by various assessees regarding fixed assets located in former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) that were lost following the 1971 war. The core legal question was whether such losses, arising from the compulsory acquisition of assets by the Bangladesh government, qualified for deduction under Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and whether the statutory requirement to 'write off' such assets in the books of account could be waived given the impossibility of performance. The Supreme Court held that the compulsory acquisition of assets by the Bangladesh government constituted a valid ground for claiming loss under Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, once the State of Bangladesh was recognized by the Government of Pakistan. The Court further held that the legal maxim 'lex non cogit ad impossibilia' (the law does not compel the impossible) applied, excusing assessees from the strict requirement of writing off assets in their books when such action was rendered impossible by the circumstances of the war and subsequent political events.
Questions settled- Does the compulsory acquisition of assets by the Bangladesh government qualify as a loss under Section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act 1922?
- Can the statutory requirement to write off assets in the books of account be waived if the circumstances make such an act impossible?
- Does the retrospective recognition of Bangladesh by the Government of Pakistan validate the compulsory acquisition of assets for the purpose of tax deductions?
- Is a reference application under Section 136 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 time-barred if the order was passed after the repeal of the Income-tax Act 1922?
- CHAIRMAN, WAPDA, LAHORE Versus ZAHOOR AHMAD1993 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had converted the respondent's removal from service into retirement without first adjudicating the threshold issue of limitation. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal could bypass the mandatory determination of limitation—specifically after a remand order from the Supreme Court—and proceed to grant relief on merits by converting the penalty of removal into retirement. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to address the limitation issue, which was a condition precedent for exercising jurisdiction. The Court further held that the Tribunal's conversion of removal into retirement was unsupported by findings of mala fides or bias, and lacked the requisite speaking reasons. The key principle laid down is that Service Tribunals, despite their broad powers to mould relief, must strictly adhere to procedural norms, including the mandatory resolution of limitation issues before reaching the merits, and must provide cogent, reasoned orders that demonstrate a conscious application of mind to the facts and law.
Questions settled- Can a Service Tribunal convert a penalty of removal from service into retirement without first determining the question of limitation?
- Is a Service Tribunal required to provide cogent, speaking reasons when modifying the quantum of punishment awarded to a civil servant?
- Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to modify a penalty under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act without a finding of mala fides or bias?
- WALI MUHAMMAD Versus MUHAMMAD SHAH1993 SCMR 1365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-13Read full judgment →
- ARSHAD KAMAL KHAN Versus SAEEDA KHALID KAMAL KHAN , Abdul Rauf, Advocate Supreme Court and M.A.I. Qarni, Advocate-on-Record1993 SCMR 1360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-29Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD SAID AMIR Versus DEPUTY COMMISSIONER/DISTRICT COLLECTOR, SARGODHA1993 SCMR 1358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-21Read full judgment →
- SUMMERI Versus MUHAMMAD SALEH , Khan Muhammad Bajwa, Advocate instructed by S. Abul Asim Jaferi, Advocate-on-Record1993 SCMR 1353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-20Read full judgment →
- FATEH KHAN Versus BEGUM JAN1993 SCMR 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent judgments of the lower courts decreeing the respondents' suit for possession of land based on occupancy rights. The core legal question was whether the occupancy rights had extinguished due to abandonment under section 38 of the Tenancy Act. The Supreme Court held that the lower forums correctly concluded that abandonment was not established, as the revenue records consistently showed the occupancy tenant cultivated the land through tenants-at-will, including co-owners, and the conditions for statutory abandonment were not met. The key principle laid down is that physical self-cultivation by an occupancy tenant is not mandatory, and cultivation through sub-tenants or lessees—even if they are co-owners—prevents the extinguishment of occupancy rights under section 38 of the Tenancy Act, provided the requirements of cultivation and rent arrangement are satisfied.
Questions settled- Whether the occupancy rights of a tenant are extinguished under section 38 of the Tenancy Act when the land is cultivated through a tenant-at-will?
- Is physical self-cultivation by an occupancy tenant obligatory under the law to prevent abandonment?
- Can co-owners in possession of land as tenants-under the occupancy tenant deny the rights of the occupancy tenant?
- RASUL BIBI Versus SIKANDAR HAYAT1993 SCMR 1336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the plaintiff claimed a superior right of pre-emption based on ownership within a specific 'Patti' (sub-division). The core legal question was whether the mere mention of a 'Patti' in revenue records sufficiently establishes a 'recognized sub-division' of a village under Section 15(c) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the mere nomenclature of 'Patti' in revenue documents does not automatically constitute a recognized sub-division. The Court affirmed that to satisfy the statutory requirement, a claimant must demonstrate that the sub-division possesses well-defined attributes, specifically homogeneity of area or descent of the proprietors. Such attributes must be established through evidence regarding the history of the village or settlement records, such as the Kafiayat-e-Deh. Revenue entries created primarily for fiscal purposes are insufficient to discharge the burden of proof. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the plaintiff failed to provide the necessary evidence to prove that the claimed Patti was a recognized sub-division.
Questions settled- Does the mere mention of a 'Patti' in revenue records establish a recognized sub-division of a village for the purposes of a pre-emption claim?
- What criteria must be met to prove that a 'Patti' constitutes a recognized sub-division under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
- Is homogeneity of area or descent a necessary attribute for a village sub-division to qualify under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
- RASAB Versus STATE1993 SCMR 1323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency and legality of the corroborative evidence relied upon by the High Court to sustain the conviction of the petitioner Rasab, particularly where the trial court found no personal motive attributable to him and the High Court excluded the testimony of the primary eyewitness. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether required corroboration was legally forthcoming on the record against the convict Rasab, while refusing the complainant's petition seeking enhanced relief against the accused. The key principle laid down is that where an eyewitness account requires corroboration due to enmity, a generalized motive not linked to a specific accused cannot serve as valid corroboration against that individual.
Questions settled- Can a general motive lacking personal connection to an accused serve as valid corroboration for an eyewitness account?
- Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the High Court relies on tainted eyewitness testimony and questionable corroborative pieces of evidence?
- Is the exclusion of an eyewitness's presence at the crime scene sufficient to necessitate independent corroboration for remaining testimony?
- MUSA KHAN Versus ABDUL HAQUE1993 SCMR 1304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-12Read full judgment →
- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, COMPANIES II, KARACHI Versus S. SULTAN ALI JEOFFREY1993 SCMR 1267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of two connected appeals arising from a dispute over the payment of a cash reward to an informer under the Cash Reward to Informer Scheme introduced by the Central Board of Revenue. Respondent No.1 supplied specific information regarding the evasion of central excise duty, sales tax, and income tax by an industrial company. While the tax authorities granted a reward for excise duty, they initially declined rewards for sales tax and income tax. The High Court of Sindh allowed the respondent's constitutional petition and directed payment for both sales tax and income tax evasions. The Supreme Court heard appeals filed by the tax authorities. The core legal question was whether an informer is entitled to a cash reward under the Scheme where the information leads to the reduction of declared losses rather than the quantification of evaded tax, and whether tax recovery is a prerequisite for the reward. The Supreme Court held that since the company remained in a net loss position despite adjustments, no specific amount of tax sought to be evaded could be quantified, which is a mandatory prerequisite for calculating rewards under the Scheme; however, recovery of tax is not required. Consequently, the Court allowed the income tax appeal denying the reward, but dismissed the sales tax and excise duty appeal.
Questions settled- Whether an informer is entitled to a cash reward under the Cash Reward to Informer Scheme when the information leads to a reduction of declared losses but no tax is assessed or quantified?
- Does the Cash Reward to Informer Scheme make the actual recovery of evaded tax a mandatory condition for paying the reward to an informer?
- What constitutes tax evasion as distinguished from tax avoidance under taxation law?
- HABIB BANK LTD. Versus MUSSADIQ HUSSAIN1993 SCMR 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-29Read full judgment →
- MUKHI CHATROMAL Versus KHUBCHAND1993 SCMR 1113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from an Intra-Court Appeal dismissed by the High Court due to delay in supplying the deficient court-fee, treated as a matter of discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question involved the effect of delay in paying the court-fee and whether an appeal could be dismissed on limitation and court-fee grounds when the court failed to specify the exact date and amount for making up the deficiency. The Supreme Court held that where the court fails to specify the exact date and amount of deficient court-fee to be deposited, no penal action such as dismissal of the appeal can be taken against the appellants on the ground of delayed payment or limitation. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the impugned judgment set aside, and the case remanded for a decision on merits, affirming the principle that the defect stands cured from the date the appeal was originally filed.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal can be dismissed for deficient court-fee when the court failed to specify the exact amount and date for deposit?
- Does the payment of deficient court-fee cure the defect from the date the appeal was originally filed?
- Can penal action be taken against an appellant for delayed court-fee when the court did not fix a specific date or amount for compliance?
- ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY OLD BOYS' COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. Versus MUHAMMAD HISAMUDDIN ANSARI1993 SCMR 1062 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the court arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh which directed the official authorities to satisfy the land claim of respondent No. 1 out of evacuee land comprised in Survey No. 21 of Deh Bitti Amri. The respondent had originally been allotted garden land in Larkana, which was subsequently cancelled to transfer the property to the municipality, leading to decades of litigation and efforts by the respondent to obtain alternate land in Karachi. The appellant cooperative housing society challenged the allotment, claiming the land was part of its own allotted area under Scheme No. 33. The core legal questions centered on the availability of the disputed land, the validity of the respondent's pending claim under the repealed evacuee laws, and the propriety of the High Court's direction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent's claim was valid and pending, and that the appellant society's allotment exceeded permissible limits under the applicable statement of conditions, though protecting the appellant's broader holdings to prevent prejudice to its members.
Questions settled- Whether an unsettled claim for garden land under repealed evacuee laws qualifies as a pending case to be settled by the Board of Revenue?
- Whether a housing society can claim additional land allotment beyond the maximum unit limits prescribed under the statement of conditions?
- Does non-implementation of a Provincial Government's decision regarding land allotment without cogent reason entitle a claimant to invoke constitutional jurisdiction?
- ALLAH BACHAYO Versus STATE1993 SCMR 1058 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged the convictions for dacoity and wrongful restraint. The core legal questions were whether the offence of Harabah was established against the appellants and whether the sentence of life imprisonment for dacoity under Section 395, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 remained legally permissible following the 1980 amendments. The Supreme Court held that the conviction for Harabah could not be sustained because the prosecution failed to produce the requisite number of witnesses mandated by the relevant Ordinance. Regarding the sentencing, the Court clarified that the Criminal Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980, while introducing a minimum sentence of four years for dacoity, did not remove the punishment of life imprisonment. Therefore, the trial court acted within its legal authority in imposing life imprisonment. The Court affirmed that the legislative amendments merely established a sentencing floor rather than capping the maximum penalty at ten years. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the convictions and sentences imposed by the lower courts were upheld, as the evidence sufficiently established the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Questions settled- Does the 1980 amendment to Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 abolish the punishment of life imprisonment for dacoity?
- Is the offence of Harabah liable to Hadd proved when the required number of witnesses fail to support the prosecution's case at trial?
- What is the effect of the Criminal Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 on the sentencing range for dacoity under Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN Versus PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL1993 SCMR 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-15Read full judgment →
- SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, IRRIGATION AND POWER DEPARTMENT, LAHORE Versus ABDUL MAJID MIRZA Abid Hassan Minto, Advocate Supreme Court (absent) and Sh. Masud Akhtar1993 SCMR 1010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These eight appeals by special leave arise from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding the promotion and seniority of diploma-holder Overseers who were promoted on an officiating basis as Sub-Divisional Officers in the Irrigation Branch. The core legal question is whether these officiating promotees were entitled to seniority and permanent absorption in Class-II service and further promotion to Class-I service, regardless of prescribed promotion quotas and Public Service Commission approval. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in declaring the respondents as appointed on a permanent basis without first determining whether their promotions fell within the applicable 20% quota under the West Pakistan Irrigation Engineering Service (Class-II) Rules, 1967, and without verifying the requisite approval of the Public Service Commission. The appeals were accordingly accepted, the Tribunal's judgment was set aside, and the cases were remanded for proper determination of available vacancies and quotas.
Questions settled- Whether officiating promotees can claim seniority from the date of continuous officiation without establishing that their promotions fall within the prescribed service quota?
- Does the mere length of service as an officiating Sub-Divisional Officer convert an appointment into a substantive or permanent basis under the service rules?
- Can a Service Tribunal declare employees as appointed on a permanent basis without determining the available vacancies under the applicable rules?
- STATE Versus WAQAR AHMAD1992 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the High Court which had acquitted the respondent of charges involving the murder of a young girl. The core legal questions concerned the evidentiary value and reliability of a retracted judicial confession, the necessity of independent corroboration, and whether the circumstantial evidence sufficiently connected the accused to the crime. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in discarding the retracted confession and corroborative recoveries. It established that a retracted judicial confession, once proven to be voluntary and true in its details, can form the basis of a conviction when supported by attending circumstances and material corroboration such as matching blood-stains, recovery of the weapon, and medical evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal, restored the conviction recorded by the trial court, and commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life in view of intervening general amnesty.
Questions settled- Can a retracted judicial confession be used as the basis for a criminal conviction?
- Whether independent corroboration is strictly mandatory as a rule of law for a retracted confession, or merely a matter of prudence?
- Does the High Court's misreading of material evidence justify setting aside an order of acquittal?
- Whether the uncorroborated delay in retracting a judicial confession renders the retraction an afterthought?
- SARDAR Versus NEHMAT BI1992 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arises from a dispute over the inheritance of agricultural land following the termination of a limited estate held by a Muslim female under customary law. The core legal question is whether, upon the termination of a life estate under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, the devolution of property from the last full owner includes the right of inheritance for children of a predeceased daughter pursuant to Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Supreme Court held that upon the termination of the life estate, succession opens with reference to the last full owner, and the term Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) is a comprehensive expression that encompasses the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Consequently, the children of a predeceased daughter are entitled to inherit the share their mother would have received if she were alive. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the judgment of the Lahore High Court.
Questions settled- Whether the term Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) includes the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 for the purpose of devolution of property upon the termination of a life estate?
- Are the children of a predeceased daughter entitled to inherit a per stirpes share from the estate of the last full owner under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
- How does the termination of a limited estate under Section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 affect the opening of succession to the last full owner?
- ABDUL QAYYUM Versus NIAZ MUHAMMAD , Nemo1992 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-28Read full judgment →
- KHALIL-UR-REHMAN Versus MUHAMMAD YOUNIS1992 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal by leave to appeal filed by a pre-emptor whose plaint was rejected due to non-compliance with an order under section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The subsequent appeal and revision before the High Court were also dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned the enforceability and survival of a pre-emption suit where the pre-emptor claimed a superior right as a co-sharer in the Khata, but no decree had yet been passed in his favour. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was hit by the authoritative rule laid down in precedent cases since no decree had been passed. The key principle laid down is that a pre-emption suit based on a right which is no longer sustainable under the applicable law and binding judgments, where no decree has yet been passed, cannot succeed.
Questions settled- Does a pre-emption suit abate or fail if no decree has been passed in favour of the pre-emptor and the claim is hit by the rule laid down in Malik Said Kamal Shah's case?
- Can a pre-emptor maintain a suit founded on a co-sharer right when no decree has been passed by the lower courts?
- ABDUL QAYYUM Versus NIAZ MUHAMMAD1992 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the dismantling of a watercourse and the subsequent order by the Divisional Canal Officer for its restoration under Section 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873. The core legal question was whether the Divisional Canal Officer could exercise jurisdiction under Section 68-A to order interim restoration of a watercourse in the absence of a pending dispute under Section 68 of the same Act. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that Section 68-A is an ancillary, interim provision that is functionally dependent on the existence of a main dispute under Section 68. Consequently, the pendency of proceedings under Section 68 is a condition precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of the Divisional Canal Officer under Section 68-A. The Court ruled that because no such proceedings were pending, the Divisional Canal Officer’s order was passed without lawful authority and was subject to challenge in a civil court. The principle established is that interim relief under Section 68-A cannot be granted in a vacuum; it must be a step in aid of a main dispute already initiated under Section 68.
Questions settled- Can a Divisional Canal Officer order the interim restoration of a watercourse under Section 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, without a pending dispute under Section 68?
- Is the pendency of proceedings under Section 68 of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, a condition precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of the Divisional Canal Officer under Section 68-A?
- Can a civil court entertain a suit challenging an order passed by a Divisional Canal Officer under Section 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, if the officer lacked the necessary jurisdictional prerequisites?
- ROZI KHAN Versus KARIM SHAH Mian Younus Shah, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Haji Bashir Ahmad, Mian Younus Shah, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Mian Shakirullah Jan, Haji Bashir Ahmad, Abdul Samad Khan, Z. Mahfuz Khan, S. Safdar Hussain, Mian Shakirullah Jan, , Jan Muhammad Khan, Nemo, Mehfooz Khan, K.G. Sabir, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by M. Zahoor Qureshi,1992 SCMR 445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This batch of appeals concerns the interpretation of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, specifically regarding the impact of its repeal section (Section 35) on pending litigation initiated under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950. The Court addressed two primary questions: the effect of Section 35 on pending suits and the eligibility criteria for pre-emption under the 1987 Act. The Supreme Court held that the term "final" in Section 35(2) refers to judgments or decrees where the pre-emptor’s suit was successfully decreed by the court rendering it. Consequently, cases where a final decree in favor of the pre-emptor existed before the 1987 Act's enforcement are governed by the 1950 Act. Conversely, pending suits lacking such a decree lapse unless the pre-emptor fulfills the statutory requirements of the 1987 Act, including the essential "Talabs" (demands) stipulated in Section 13. The Court affirmed that the demand of pre-emption is a sine qua non for enforcing the right of pre-emption, and failure to comply extinguishes the right.
Questions settled- What is the impact of Section 35 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 on suits and appeals instituted under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950 that were pending at the time of the 1987 Act's enforcement?
- What constitutes a 'final' judgment or decree under Section 35(2) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
- Is the making of demands (Talabs) a mandatory requirement for the enforcement of the right of pre-emption under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
- PUNJAB EMPLOYEES SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION, LAHORE and others Versus MANZOOR HUSSAIN KHAN and others1992 SCMR 441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-11Read full judgment →
- ABDUL SATTAR Versus SARDAR BEGUM1992 SCMR 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-21Read full judgment →
- SAJJAD AHMAD Versus STATE1992 SCMR 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges convictions for robbery, attempted murder, and illegal arms possession. The core legal questions concern the admissibility of medical evidence when the examining doctor is not produced, the necessity of proving the lack of a license for arms convictions, and the effect of failing to administer an oath to witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the convictions under sections 394 and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 were unsustainable because the medical reports were improperly admitted through a junior clerk without establishing the doctor's unavailability. Similarly, the conviction under the Surrender of Illicit Arms Ordinance 1991 was set aside for lack of evidence regarding the absence of licenses. However, the Court upheld the conviction for robbery under section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, finding the eyewitness testimony credible. The Court established that while failure to administer an oath is a curable irregularity under section 13 of the Oaths Act 1873, the prosecution must strictly prove medical evidence and statutory elements of arms offenses.
Questions settled- Can medical evidence be admitted through a secondary witness if the examining doctor is not produced?
- Does the failure to administer an oath to a witness vitiate the entire trial?
- Is a conviction under the Surrender of Illicit Arms Ordinance 1991 sustainable without evidence proving the lack of a license?
- Can a conviction for robbery be sustained based on eyewitness testimony despite the failure of other charges?
- NIZAM-UD-DIN Versus GHULAM MUHAMMAD1992 SCMR 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-30Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD SHAFI Versus AKBAR ALI1992 SCMR 2462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by Muhammad Shafi against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted co-accused Asghar Ali and converted the conviction of main accused Akbar Ali from Section 302/34 to Section 304-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to five years' rigorous imprisonment based on his own admission under grave and sudden provocation. The High Court had disbelieved the eye-witnesses as chance witnesses, discredited the recovery evidence due to lack of independent locality witnesses, and found the FIR to be recorded after preliminary investigation. The petitioner contended that the ocular, recovery, and medical evidence conclusively proved the guilt of the respondents under Section 302/34 PPC. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were reasonable and grounded in the evidence. The Court reiterated that the mere possibility of forming a different view does not warrant interference with an acquittal order. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.
Questions settled- Does the mere possibility of forming an alternative view of evidence justify interference by the Supreme Court against an acquittal order?
- Can a conviction be based on the accused's admission under Section 342 Cr.P.C. when the prosecution's ocular and recovery evidence is disbelieved?
- HABIBUR REHMAN Versus ALI ZAFAR SIDDIQI1992 SCMR 2351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from an ejectment order against a tenant for converting a premises described as a "shop" in the tenancy agreement into a "godown". The core legal question was whether, in the absence of an express restrictive covenant in the lease, the use of a premises let as a "shop" for a "godown" constitutes a change of purpose under Section 15(2)(iii)(b) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that the terms "shop" and "godown" are distinct, with the former implying a place for retail business transactions and the latter a place for storage. Consequently, using a premises let as a shop for a godown constitutes a change of user, rendering the tenant liable for eviction under the Ordinance. The principle laid down is that where a tenancy agreement describes premises as a "shop" without specifying the purpose, it is presumed to be let for the normal use of a shop, and conversion to a godown without the landlord's written consent violates the statutory prohibition against changing the purpose of the letting.
Questions settled- Does the use of a premises let as a 'shop' for a 'godown' constitute a change of purpose under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
- In the absence of an express restrictive covenant, can a tenant convert a premises described as a 'shop' into a 'godown' without the landlord's consent?
- Does the term 'shop' in a tenancy agreement include a 'godown' for the purposes of Section 15(2)(iii)(b) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
- MAQBOOL AHMED Versus STATE1992 SCMR 2279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
An appeal was filed by the convict Maqbool Ahmed against his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and sentence of death as Qisas, and under section 201/511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for attempting to destroy evidence, handed down by the Special Court for Speedy Trials. The core legal questions involved the reliability of circumstantial evidence, the presence of motive, the credibility of the investigation, and whether the conviction could be sustained under Qisas or Ta'zir. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt due to a complete lack of motive, a hostile and tainted investigation, and uninspiring ocular and circumstantial evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal by majority, set aside the conviction and sentence, and ordered the immediate release of the appellant unless required in any other case, establishing principles regarding the strict requirements of proof in circumstantial evidence cases.
Questions settled- Is the evidence of last seen by itself sufficient to sustain a charge of murder in a case based on circumstantial evidence?
- Can a conviction for murder under Qisas be sustained when eye-witnesses are disbelieved and the required number of witnesses under Islamic injunctions is lacking?
- Does a far-fetched or non-existent motive weaken a prosecution case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence?
- What is the effect of a hostile and tainted police investigation on the credibility of the prosecution's case?
- SHAHADAT Versus STATE1992 SCMR 2276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-16Read full judgment →
- ASGHAR ALI ALIAS SABAH Versus STATE1992 SCMR 2088 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the convictions under sections 302/34, 324, and 337-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the refusal of a key injured witness to testify and conflicting evidence regarding the lighting conditions at the time of the occurrence. The Supreme Court held that the convictions were unsustainable and ordered the acquittal of the appellants. The Court reasoned that the injured witness's refusal to testify created a significant evidentiary gap, which, combined with the credible defense evidence of load-shedding and the failure of the identification parade, rendered the prosecution's case doubtful. The Court laid down the principle that the withholding of evidence by a party, particularly an injured witness, permits an adverse inference that the evidence would be unfavorable to that party. Furthermore, under Islamic law, an injured party's refusal to testify may be construed as a waiver of the right to Qisas, precluding conviction on that basis.
Questions settled- Does the refusal of an injured witness to testify regarding their own injury and the murder of a relative create an adverse inference against the prosecution?
- Can a conviction for Qisas be sustained if the injured party refuses to testify in court?
- Is identification of an accused in court months after the occurrence, without a valid identification parade, sufficient to prove identity?
- Does the failure of the prosecution to produce an important witness, without satisfactory reason, raise a presumption under the Evidence Act?
- NOOR MUHAMMAD ALIAS NOORA Versus STATE1992 SCMR 2079 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-16Read full judgment →
- STATE Versus MUHAMMAD HANIF1992 SCMR 2047 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by the State challenged a judgment of the Special Court for Speedy Trials, which convicted the respondent under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 while acquitting his co-accused. The State contended that the conviction should have been under Section 302(a) and that the co-accused were jointly liable. The Supreme Court addressed two primary legal questions: the effect of the total rejection of prosecution evidence on the accused's statement, and whether the requirements of Section 302(c) constitute an exception to be proved by the accused or a substantive element for the prosecution. The Court held that when prosecution evidence is rejected in its entirety, the accused's statement must be accepted as a whole, including exculpatory parts. Furthermore, the Court determined that Section 302(c) is substantive law, not an exception; thus, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the elements of the offense, including the applicability of Qisas. Finding no error in the trial court's appraisal of evidence or application of Islamic Injunctions, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
Questions settled- When prosecution evidence is rejected in its entirety, must the statement of the accused be accepted in its entirety?
- Is the requirement of Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 an exception to be proved by the accused or a substantive element to be proved by the prosecution?
- Does the total rejection of ocular evidence necessitate the acceptance of the accused's exculpatory statement?
- MANZOOR Versus STATE1992 SCMR 2037 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Special Court for Speedy Trials, involving cross-appeals by the State and the convicts against convictions and sentences for murder and attempted murder arising out of an armed confrontation. The core legal question concerned the proper application of Islamic criminal law (Qisas and Ta'zir) regarding evidentiary requirements such as Tazkiya-tul-Shahood, the availability of the right of private defence to an initial aggressor, and the legality of awarding compensation under Section 544-A of the Criminal Procedure Code when punishments are converted from Qisas to Ta'zir. The Supreme Court held that since the strict evidentiary requirements for Qisas, including Tazkiya-tul-Shahood and specific naming of assailants by all injured witnesses, were not fully met, the convictions could not be sustained under Qisas and were properly maintainable under Ta'zir. The Court also held that an initial aggressor cannot claim the right of self-defence, and that compensation under Section 544-A becomes applicable when an offense is reduced from Qisas to Ta'zir. Consequently, the death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment, fines and compensation orders were added, and the State's appeal against acquittals was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether an aggressor can claim the right of self-defence under criminal law?
- Can a conviction under Islamic law for Qisas be sustained without fulfilling the requirement of Tazkiya-tul-Shahood?
- Does Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply when an offense is converted from Qisas to Ta'zir?
- Whether medical opinion regarding the level of injuries can override reliable ocular evidence?
- DANIEL BOYD (MUSLIM NAME SAIFULLAH) Versus STATE1992 SCMR 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the conviction and sentences of the appellants for Haraabah (robbery) under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, which included Hadd punishments of amputation. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence to sustain Hadd and Tazir convictions, the validity of the Tazkiya-al-Shuhood (purgation of witnesses) process, and the admissibility of a retracted confession. The Supreme Court acquitted the appellants, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court ruled that the trial court’s Tazkiya-al-Shuhood was a mockery because it relied solely on superficial police reports rather than a rigorous, independent inquiry into the witnesses' character. Furthermore, the Court held that a retracted confession, unsupported by independent evidence, cannot sustain a conviction. The judgment reaffirmed that Hadd punishments require stringent proof, and any doubt—whether regarding the evidence or the procedural requirements—must result in the acquittal of the accused. The Court emphasized that Hudood laws are not to be applied mechanically but require strict adherence to evidentiary and procedural safeguards.
Questions settled- Is a secret police report regarding a witness's character sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Tazkiya-al-Shuhood in Hudood cases?
- Can a conviction for Hadd punishment be sustained based solely on a retracted confession?
- Does the failure to record the victim's statement before the statements of eyewitnesses violate the procedural requirements of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
- Is it legally permissible to convict an accused for both Haraabah and dishonestly retaining stolen property arising from the same transaction?
- ZAFAR ALI Versus ZAINUL ABIDIN1992 SCMR 1886 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a leave to appeal petition filed by a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit, challenging the High Court's dismissal of his civil revision. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had complied with the mandatory requirements of Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad under Section 13 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the petitioner failed to perform Talb-i-Muwathibat immediately upon acquiring knowledge of the sale, instead delaying the process to obtain documentation. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to satisfy the statutory requirement of having Talb-i-Ishhad attested by two truthful witnesses. The Court held that the right of pre-emption is extinguished if these procedural demands are not strictly met. The principle laid down is that Talb-i-Muwathibat must be declared immediately upon knowledge of the sale, and subsequent inquiries or attempts to obtain copies do not toll the time for this declaration. Additionally, Talb-i-Ishhad serves as a confirmation of the first Talb; without a valid initial Talb, the second cannot legally exist.
Questions settled- Does the act of obtaining a copy of a sale mutation extend the time limit for making Talb-i-Muwathibat?
- Is the attestation of two truthful witnesses mandatory for Talb-i-Ishhad under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
- Can a valid Talb-i-Ishhad exist if the initial Talb-i-Muwathibat was not performed in accordance with the law?
- KAMINA Versus AL-AMIN GOODS TRANSPORT AGENCY1992 SCMR 1715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-29Read full judgment →
- GULAB Versus STATE1992 SCMR 1502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which upheld the appellant's conviction under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for the possession of heroin. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of significant evidentiary discrepancies. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution’s case suffered from fatal infirmities, most notably regarding the chain of custody of the forensic samples. Conflicting dates provided by witnesses and the chemical examiner regarding when the samples were submitted and received created uncertainty as to whether the forensic report actually pertained to the recovered contraband. Additionally, the Court noted the failure to associate independent public witnesses during a raid conducted in a populated city, and the failure to produce the recovered narcotics in court during trial. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case with the required degree of judicial certainty. The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentences were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.
Questions settled- Does a discrepancy in the dates of submission and receipt of forensic samples by a laboratory invalidate the chemical examiner's report?
- Is the failure to associate public witnesses during a raid in a populated area a fatal flaw in the prosecution's case?
- What is the legal consequence of the prosecution's failure to produce the recovered case property in court during trial?
- Malik RIAZ AHMED Versus Mian INAYAT ULLAH1992 SCMR 1488 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appeal challenged a High Court judgment decreeing specific performance of a sale agreement for a bungalow. The core legal question was whether the agent (respondent No. 2) possessed valid authority under powers of attorney to sell the appellants' shares, specifically considering the status of some appellants as Pardahnashin ladies. The Supreme Court held that the powers of attorney were limited to management and did not explicitly authorize the sale of the property. The Court emphasized that a general power of attorney does not inherently include the power to alienate property, which requires a clear, separate clause. Furthermore, the agent failed to discharge his fiduciary duty under Section 214 of the Contract Act 1872 to communicate with his principals in a 'case of difficulty,' especially given his personal interest in the transaction. Consequently, the Court set aside the decree against the appellants, limiting specific performance to the agent's own share in the property. The judgment establishes that courts must strictly construe powers of attorney, particularly where fraud or lack of authorization is alleged.
Questions settled- Does a general power of attorney automatically include the authority to alienate or sell the principal's property?
- What is the duty of an agent under the Contract Act 1872 when facing a 'case of difficulty' regarding the principal's property?
- Can an agent who has a personal interest in a transaction be held to a higher standard of disclosure to the principal?
- Is a person who signs an agreement as a witness automatically bound by the terms of that agreement?
- KHALID MEHMOOD Versus MUZAFFAR ALI KHAN1992 SCMR 1471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a family dispute between a father and his children regarding the validity of a gift deed executed in 1980. The father filed a suit claiming the gift was the result of fraud and forgery, which was initially dismissed by the trial court but subsequently reversed by the High Court. Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the proceedings were marked by allegations of abduction and ill-treatment of the father by his children. Recognizing the sensitive nature of the familial conflict and the Islamic injunctions regarding filial piety and parental compassion, the Court encouraged the parties to pursue an out-of-court settlement. The parties reached an amicable compromise, which was presented to and accepted by the Court. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal in terms of this compromise, modifying the High Court's decree accordingly. The Court emphasized the importance of familial harmony and the duties enjoined by Islamic principles, while noting that the compromise was to be implemented in its true spirit, with liberty reserved for the parties to approach the Court in case of non-compliance.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court dispose of an appeal based on an amicable compromise reached between family members?
- Does the Supreme Court retain jurisdiction to enforce a compromise decree if it is not implemented in its true spirit?
- What is the role of the Court in facilitating settlements in disputes involving familial relationships?
- SULTAN Versus ABDULLAH-KHAN1992 SCMR 1457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-02Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ANWAR Versus MUHAMMAD SHARIF1992 SCMR 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court challenges a Peshawar High Court order upholding the dismissal of a partition suit for non-prosecution. The plaintiff failed to appear on the date fixed for recording her statement due to alleged illness, leading the trial court to dismiss the suit under Order 9, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the dismissal of the suit was warranted under Order IX, Rule 8 or if Order XVII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applied, and whether the trial judge erroneously considered dismissal as the only mandatory option. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge acted erroneously under a conceptual misunderstanding that he had no option other than to dismiss the suit, whereas both under Order XVII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the relevant Family Courts rules, judicial discretion existed to adjourn the matter rather than penalize the plaintiff. The Court laid down that trial courts possess discretionary powers to adjourn matters rather than resort strictly to dismissal for non-prosecution.
Questions settled- Whether the dismissal of a suit for non-prosecution when evidence has already been partially recorded falls under Order IX Rule 8 or Order XVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does a trial court have the discretion to grant an adjournment instead of mandatorily dismissing a suit for non-prosecution?
- Can the Supreme Court convert a civil revision petition into a constitutional petition in the interest of justice?
- TAZA KHAN Versus AHMAD KHAN1992 SCMR 1371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-25Read full judgment →
- MIAN DAD Versus STATE1992 SCMR 1286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order cancelling the bail previously granted to the petitioner. The petitioner was initially charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but the First Information Report suggested a case under Section 304, Part I, based on the petitioner's claim of acting under grave and sudden provocation upon finding his wife with a paramour. The High Court cancelled the bail, reasoning that since the offence was punishable by imprisonment for life, bail was prohibited. The petitioner argued that while Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandates the refusal of bail for certain offences, the power to cancel bail under Section 497(5) is discretionary rather than mandatory, even for offences punishable by death or life imprisonment. The Supreme Court found prima facie merit in the argument that the discretion under Section 497(5) is distinct from the prohibition in Section 497(1) and is analogous to the principles governing the setting aside of acquittals. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Is the power to cancel bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory or discretionary when the offence is punishable by death or life imprisonment?
- Does the prohibition against granting bail under Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically dictate the cancellation of bail under Section 497(5)?
- ARULA Versus SHAHZADA GHULAM JILANI , M. Aman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Nur Ahmad Khan, Mian Shakirullah Jan1992 SCMR 1099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-30Read full judgment →
- ABDUL AZIZ ZEHRI Versus CHAIRMAN, SELECTION COMMITTEE1992 SCMR 1078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-17Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD GUL Versus THE STATE1991 SCMR 942 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves fourteen criminal appeals filed by four convicts against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which upheld their convictions and sentences awarded by the Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorists Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, for bomb blasts at Yousaf Musafir Khana and Almarkaz Hotel in Quetta, along with multiple recoveries of explosive materials. The core legal questions relate to the admissibility and reliability of retracted judicial confessions, the effect of delay in recording and forwarding them, the presence of corroborative evidence, the shifting of the burden of proof, and the validity of recoveries witnessed by police personnel. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that retracted judicial confessions, when voluntary and corroborated by independent evidence such as recoveries of explosives, diaries, and eyewitness identification, are sufficient to sustain convictions. The Court laid down that delay in recording confessions is not fatal when probed for complex subversive acts, that police personnel can act as competent mashirs where public witnesses are unavailable, and that the statutory presumption under special anti-terrorism legislation places the burden on the accused to disprove guilt upon possession of explosive materials.
Questions settled- Whether a retracted judicial confession can form the basis of a conviction if corroborated by other material particulars on record?
- Does delay in recording and forwarding a judicial confession render it involuntary or inadmissible?
- Can police personnel act as valid mashirs for the recovery of explosive materials in the absence of public witnesses?
- How does the burden of proof shift under the Suppression of Terrorists Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, and the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, when an accused is found in possession of incriminating articles?
- ALI AKBAR Versus MALOOK1991 SCMR 829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which had reversed concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts, decreeing the respondents' suit for ownership and compensation regarding land. The respondents had claimed ownership based on revenue record entries and, alternatively, adverse possession. The core legal question was whether revenue entries of 'Bila Lagan ba Tasawar Malkiet' (without rent under the concept of ownership) alongside 'Ghair Dakhilkaran' (non-occupancy tenants) in the cultivation column were sufficient to establish adverse possession, and whether claims of ownership and adverse possession could be pleaded simultaneously. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its findings. The Court determined that such revenue entries do not establish adverse possession, as they do not constitute a clear, unequivocal, and notorious disavowal of the true owner's title. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that pleas of valid title and adverse possession are contradictory and irreconcilable in law. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the dismissal of the respondents' suit.
Questions settled- Can a party simultaneously plead valid title and adverse possession over the same property?
- Are revenue entries of 'Bila Lagan ba Tasawar Malkiet' sufficient to establish adverse possession?
- What is the legal requirement for establishing adverse possession against a true owner?
- ZABITA KHAN Versus GANDERI GUL1991 SCMR 771 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-21Read full judgment →
- NOOR ALAM KHAN Versus SOHABAT KHAN1991 SCMR 661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from three consolidated appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the distribution of compensation for trees cut from land previously held under occupancy tenancies in Village Jareed, District Hazara. The core legal question was whether erstwhile occupancy tenants, who became full owners under section 4 of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, retained their entitlement to a half-share of tree compensation as previously prescribed in the Wajib-ul-Arz, or whether their acquisition of full ownership extinguished those rights in favour of the original proprietors. The Supreme Court held that despite the extinction of occupancy tenancies, the Wajib-ul-Arz—read alongside the Hazara Forests Act, 1936 and construed under section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and section 7 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956—retains statutory force, and references to occupancy tenants in such instruments must be construed as references to those who became full owners under the re-enacted tenancy legislation. Consequently, the Court dismissed all three appeals, upholding the High Court's decision that the former occupancy tenants are entitled to half of the compensation.
Questions settled- Whether erstwhile occupancy tenants who become full owners under the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act retain their pre-existing rights to tree compensation as recorded in the Wajib-ul-Arz?
- Do entries in the Wajib-ul-Arz acquire statutory recognition and force through the provisions of the Hazara Forests Act, 1936?
- How does the repeal and re-enactment of tenancy legislation affect references to occupancy tenancies in existing instruments pursuant to section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
- MUHAMMAD QASIM KHAN Versus MEHBOOBA1991 SCMR 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment arises from two cross-appeals by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the inheritance rights of female heirs (Mst. Mahbooba and Mst. Maqboola) over ancestral property held by female predecessors. The core issues involved determining whether a female holder (Mst. Ameera) possessed the property as a 'guzarakhur' (maintenance holder) or as a limited estate holder under customary law; whether the inheritance of a predecessor dying in 1945 was governed by Shariat or Custom; and whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation against co-heirs. The Supreme Court dismissed the defendants' appeal regarding limitation, holding that time does not run against female co-heirs in inheritance claims. On the plaintiffs' appeal, the Court held that since revenue entries (Jamabandi) recorded Mst. Ameera identically with other limited owners as an owner, she was a limited owner rather than a mere maintenance holder. Consequently, her estate devolved under the prevailing law upon her death post-1962. Further, invoking Order XLI Rule 33 CPC and Order XXXIII Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, relief was extended to a non-appealing/pro forma defendant.
Questions settled- Whether an entry in the revenue record (Jamabandi) designating a female relative as an owner indicates a limited estate holder rather than a mere maintenance holder (guzarakhur)?
- Whether a claim for inheritance by a female co-heir can be barred by limitation against other co-heirs?
- Whether the appellate court can grant relief under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to a pro forma defendant who did not file an appeal?
- FAZAL-UR-REHMAN Versus CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER1991 SCMR 423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought to challenge the sale of agricultural land by the Government of the Punjab to the University of the Punjab, claiming that they held prior agreements to sell from the original allottees of said land. The High Court dismissed their writ petition on the grounds that an agreement to sell did not vest any legal right in the land, thereby denying the petitioners locus standi. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a prospective vendee possesses the locus standi to maintain a writ petition. While the Court acknowledged that a prospective vendee or an affected person may have standing, it ultimately upheld the dismissal of the petition on merits. The Court found that the original allotments in favor of the petitioners' vendors were obtained fraudulently and illegally, as determined by the Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, since the underlying allotments were void, the petitioners' claims based on agreements to sell were unsustainable. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, concluding that the petitioners had no valid case on the merits.
Questions settled- Does a prospective vendee under an agreement to sell have the locus standi to maintain a writ petition?
- Can a claim based on an agreement to sell survive if the underlying allotment of the vendor is found to be fraudulent and illegal?
- CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE Versus CRAFTMAN1991 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-31Read full judgment →
- ABDUL BAQI Versus MITHA KHAN1991 SCMR 379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 27-3-1990, which dismissed an objection petition filed under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 concerning eviction proceedings in the Tribal Area. The core legal question revolves around whether Article 247 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was attracted when Ordinance X of 1980 was promulgated by the C.M.L.A. under the Laws Continuance in Force Order 1977, and whether the Civil Procedure Code (Amended Ordinance X of 1980) applied to the Tribal Area without specific extension under Article 247(3). The Supreme Court held that a substantial point of constitutional interpretation requiring examination by a larger bench was involved, thereby granting leave to appeal. However, the Court declined to grant interim relief of status quo regarding possession, noting that the petitioner had full knowledge of the prior eviction proceedings yet failed to seek impleadment in a timely manner.
Questions settled- Whether Article 247 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan was attracted when the C.M.L.A. promulgated Ordinance X of 1980 under the Laws Continuance in Force Order, 1977?
- Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Civil Procedure Code (Amended Ordinance X of 1980) was not specifically extended to the Tribal Area?
- Can interim relief in the nature of status quo be granted to a petitioner who had full knowledge of eviction proceedings but failed to seek impleadment as a party?
- MUHAMMAD ASALAT Versus NADIR MASIH1991 SCMR 369 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- SHABRATI Versus QAMAR SULTAN1991 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an application for leave to appeal seeking enhancement of sentence against a High Court judgment. The respondents were initially convicted by the trial court under Section 304, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Section 324/34, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, receiving 3.5 years' R.I. for the former. The High Court subsequently convicted them under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, sentencing them to life imprisonment each, maintaining the fine and compensation. The petitioner argued that the High Court, having found the accused guilty of murder, should have awarded the normal capital punishment under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and failed to provide reasons for not doing so. The Supreme Court, while noting the High Court's lack of explicit reasons, declined to grant leave to appeal for sentence enhancement, considering that the respondents would have benefited from a Presidential Order of Amnesty if capital punishment had been awarded after a certain date, and also considering the nature of the deceased's injury and subsequent medical complications. The petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court refuse to enhance a sentence of life imprisonment to capital punishment in a murder case, even if the High Court did not explicitly state reasons for not awarding capital punishment?
- Should the Supreme Court consider the potential benefit of a Presidential Amnesty Order for convicts when deciding on an application for enhancement of sentence?
- Is the nature of the injury and subsequent medical complications leading to death a relevant factor when determining the appropriateness of a life sentence versus capital punishment for murder?
- Does the Supreme Court have discretion to refuse leave to appeal for sentence enhancement based on specific circumstances of the case, even if the High Court's reasoning for the original sentence was not fully elaborated?
- MUHAMMAD ZULFIQAR Versus GULAB KHAN1991 SCMR 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning the sale of agricultural land in Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether the respondents, as displaced persons resulting from the construction of Islamabad, were exempt from the right of pre-emption under a notification issued pursuant to Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, and whether the certificate of displacement issued by the Assistant Director (Lands) of the Capital Development Authority was valid. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' findings that the respondents were indeed displaced persons and that the certificate issued by the Assistant Director was sufficient. The Court held that the mandatory exemption provided under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, extinguished the right of pre-emption against the respondents. The Court further clarified that where a statutory exemption exists for displaced persons, the right of pre-emption is extinguished, and the rule of sinker does not override the mandatory effect of such statutory exemptions.
Questions settled- Does the right of pre-emption exist against a person certified as a displaced person by the Capital Development Authority under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
- Is a certificate issued by the Assistant Director (Lands) of the Capital Development Authority sufficient to establish the status of a displaced person for the purpose of pre-emption exemption?
- Does the rule of sinker apply to a sale transaction that is otherwise exempt from pre-emption under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?