Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• ABDUL QAYYUM Versus SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION, ISLAMABAD1994 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-29
  leave to appealservice matterequivalence of degreesDeeni AsnadseniorityUniversity Grants Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal which had dismissed the petitioner's service appeal as not maintainable. The petitioner, appearing in person, argued that the Tribunal failed to correctly appreciate his contention regarding the equivalence of 'Deeni Asnad' (religious qualifications) held by the respondents. The petitioner did not challenge the general recognition of these qualifications by the University Grants Commission, but contended that the respondents failed to satisfy the specific conditions prescribed in the Commission's circular dated 17-11-1982. Specifically, the circular required such 'Sanad' holders to qualify in additional elective papers (Pakistan Studies and Islamic Studies) at the B.A. level to be treated at par with regular degree holders for seniority. Finding that the question raised was of general importance and likely to affect a large number of persons employed in educational institutions under the circular, the Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider the contention.

  Questions settled

  • Whether holders of 'Deeni Asnad' must qualify in the additional subjects prescribed by the University Grants Commission's circular to be treated at par with regular degree holders for the purpose of seniority?
  • Did the Federal Service Tribunal err in dismissing the service appeal as not maintainable without considering whether the respondents met the specific conditions for degree equivalence?
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• MUHAMMAD BAKHSH Versus MUHAMMAD JAN , Muhammad Younas (Office Assistant)1994 SCMR 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN Versus ABDUL GHANI , Yousaf Rafi, Advocate-on-Record1994 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-20Read full judgment →
• PROVINCE OF PUNJAB Versus ZAFAR ALI SHAH1994 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-12Read full judgment →
• STATE Versus MUHAMMAD ARSHAD AMIN1994 SCMR 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-23
  appeal against acquittalcriminal conspiracyappreciation of evidenceinterested witnessperverse findingocular evidencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal by the State against the acquittal of several respondents by the Special Court for Speedy Trials, Lahore, in a case involving charges of murder and criminal conspiracy. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal was perverse or unsupported by the evidence, thereby warranting appellate interference. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were sound and that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found the evidence regarding the alleged criminal conspiracy unreliable due to the inconsistent testimony of the key witness. Furthermore, the ocular evidence was deemed insufficient, as the eye-witnesses were either found to be inimical, interested, or unreliable, and the initial version of the incident recorded in the inquest report contradicted the subsequent First Information Report. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court should not interfere with a judgment of acquittal merely because it might reach a different conclusion on re-appraisal of evidence, provided the trial court's findings are reasonably possible and not perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances may an appellate court interfere with a trial court's judgment of acquittal?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution's initial version of the occurrence, as recorded in the inquest report, contradicts the subsequent First Information Report?
  • Can a criminal conspiracy charge be sustained solely on the testimony of a witness who has provided contradictory affidavits?
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• NOOR MUHAMMAD ARAIN Versus MUHAMMAD MUBARIK KHAN , Nemo1994 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-17
  displaced personscompensation poolexcess areasettlement authoritiesplinth areapermanent transfer deedauction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside the auction of an "excess area" of land associated with a bungalow transferred to the respondent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The respondent, a displaced person, had been transferred the "full house" including appurtenant land. Settlement authorities later determined that 4,413 square yards of this land exceeded the permissible limit under the Act and auctioned it. The High Court held the auction invalid, reasoning that the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) removed the property from the Compensation Pool and that the respondent was not heard during the review. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that under the second proviso to Section 2(4) of the 1958 Act, land exceeding three times the plinth area of a house is not treated as part of the house unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise. Since no such order existed, the excess land was never legally transferred to the respondent, rendering the High Court's decision unsustainable in law.

  Questions settled

  • Does land exceeding three times the plinth area of a house automatically form part of the house transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) be construed to transfer land that is legally excluded from the definition of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Is the Chief Settlement Commissioner's specific order required to include land exceeding three times the plinth area in the transfer of a house?
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• SAEED AKHTAR HUSSAIN BOKHARI Versus MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED1994 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-09
  mortgage suitconsent decreeconditional admissionbanking recoveryinterest ratepreliminary decreesummary procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside a Special Judge's decree in a mortgage suit filed by a bank against the appellants. The core legal questions were whether the Special Judge's decree constituted a consent decree immune to appeal, and whether the appellant's statement admitting liability while requesting concessions in interest and installments constituted a conditional admission requiring acceptance in its entirety or rejection. The Supreme Court held that the Special Judge's decree was not a consent decree, as the bank did not consent to the reduced interest and installment terms imposed. Furthermore, the appellant's admission of the debt was unconditional, and the request for concessions did not invalidate the admission of liability. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision to pass a preliminary decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, but modified the interest rate to reflect the law applicable at the time of the suit's institution. The principle established is that a debtor's request for concessions does not render an admission of liability conditional, nor does a court's unilateral grant of such concessions create a consent decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a debtor's request for concessions in interest and installments render an admission of liability conditional?
  • Does a decree passed by a Special Judge granting concessions not agreed to by the creditor constitute a consent decree?
  • Is a preliminary decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 required in a mortgage suit filed under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  • Can interest rates be reduced by a court below the contracted rate in a banking recovery suit?
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• LAL KHAN Versus KHIZAR HAYAT1994 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-21Read full judgment →
• UNION OF INDIA Versus W.N. CHADHA1994 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-17Read full judgment →
• GLAXO LABORATORIES OF PAKISTAN LTD. Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN1994 SCMR 2316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-12Read full judgment →
• MUKHTAR AHMED Versus STATE1994 SCMR 2311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-30
  acquittal appealpresumption of innocenceocular evidencedying declarationappellate interferencemisreading of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a High Court judgment that overturned the appellants' acquittal for murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's acquittal based on a re-evaluation of ocular evidence and dying declarations. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and restored the acquittal. The Court held that an order of acquittal strengthens the initial presumption of innocence, and appellate interference is only permissible if the acquittal is perverse or based on unreasonable grounds. The Supreme Court determined that the High Court misread the evidence regarding the independence of a key witness and failed to demonstrate that the trial court's view was unreasonable. Since the trial court’s acquittal was a reasonably possible view of the evidence, the High Court erred in substituting its own assessment. The Court affirmed that the mere possibility of a different evidentiary interpretation does not constitute valid grounds for overturning an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Does the mere possibility of a different view of evidence justify overturning an acquittal?
  • Is an appellate court permitted to interfere with an acquittal if the trial court's view is reasonably possible?
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• MUHAMMAD ZAFAR IQBAL Versus ASSISTANT CHIEF ORDNANCE1994 SCMR 2310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-09
  leave to appealservice tribunaldismissal from servicemisconductright of cross-examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his dismissal from service for misconduct. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the departmental inquiry conducted against the petitioner suffered from legal infirmities, specifically the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, the failure to furnish copies of witness statements, and insufficient time to respond to the charge-sheet. The Supreme Court held that sufficient grounds were made out to grant leave to appeal to examine whether the inquiry suffered from legal infirmity warranting interference. The key principle laid down is that a civil servant facing disciplinary proceedings must be afforded adequate procedural safeguards, including the right to cross-examine witnesses and receive copies of witness statements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inquiry held against a civil servant suffers from legal infirmity if he is denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses?
  • Is a civil servant entitled to copies of statements of witnesses during a departmental inquiry?
  • Does failure to provide sufficient time to reply to a charge-sheet vitiate dismissal from service?
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• MUHAMMAD AKRAM Versus P.I.A1994 SCMR 2308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  martial law removalreinstatementreview boardindustrial relations commissionterminal benefitsgolden handshakesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Haji Muhammad Akram, a former Canteen Supervisor of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), aggrieved by his removal from service on August 11, 1982, alongside numerous other employees under Martial Law Order No. 52. Following the establishment of a Review Board in 1989 to examine cases of employees removed under martial law provisions, and subsequent proceedings before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), the petitioner sought reinstatement. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to mandatory reinstatement based on recommendations and orders passed in relation to the review process and NIRC proceedings, and whether the matter involved a constitutional violation of public importance. The Supreme Court held that the Review Board acted merely as a recommendatory body whose recommendations were subject to government acceptance, and that the Government lawfully declined the petitioner's re-employment due to his age and the prior settlement of all terminal dues under a golden handshake policy nearly a decade prior. Consequently, the Court ruled that no human rights violation of public importance was involved and dismissed the petition as incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether recommendations made by a review board set up to review termination of employees under martial law orders are binding on the Government?
  • Does a petition seeking reinstatement after a delayed challenge from 1982 to 1989 involve a human rights violation of public importance and great urgency?
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• MUHAMMAD NAEEM Versus MUHAMMAD HAROON KHAN1994 SCMR 2306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-19
  service lawlocus standimaintainability of appealreinstatementaggrieved personservice tribunal jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the N.W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had reinstated respondent No. 1, Muhammad Haroon Khan, into service after his termination by the Local Government and Rural Development Department. The appellant, Muhammad Naeem, challenged this reinstatement, claiming he had originally secured the first position in a competitive test for the post of Supervisor, whereas the respondent had been appointed on political grounds despite being over-aged. The core legal question was whether the appellant, who was serving as a Secretary, Union Council, at the time of the respondent's appointment and subsequent termination, possessed the necessary locus standi to challenge the Service Tribunal's order reinstating the respondent. The Supreme Court upheld a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal. It held that because the appellant was not holding the post of Supervisor at the relevant times and had not challenged the respondent's initial appointment, he was not an aggrieved person entitled to contest the reinstatement order. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a candidate who did not challenge an initial appointment have the locus standi to challenge a subsequent reinstatement order of that appointee?
  • Can an individual who was not holding the specific post in question at the time of a service dispute maintain an appeal against an order regarding that post?
  • Is an appeal maintainable before the Supreme Court when the appellant fails to demonstrate they are an aggrieved person?
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• MUHAMMAD IDREES Versus PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LAHORE1994 SCMR 2303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  back benefitsreinstatementlabour lawreview petitionerror on the face of the recordadditional evidenceprocedural technicalities
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged a Supreme Court judgment that denied back benefits to a reinstated employee. The core legal question was whether the denial of back benefits was based on a factual error regarding the petitioner's failure to assert his unemployment status during the period of severance. The Court held that an error patent on the face of the record had occurred, as the Court had mistakenly attributed findings from a connected appeal to the petitioner's case, thereby ignoring that the petitioner had explicitly sought to lead additional evidence regarding his unemployment status. The Court established the principle that procedural and technical rules should not be strictly enforced to impede the ascertainment of the true position of a case, particularly in labour proceedings. Consequently, the Court set aside the previous order and remanded the matter to the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, directing it to allow the petitioner to lead evidence on his employment status during the period of severance, with the respondents granted liberty to rebut such evidence before a fresh decision is rendered.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court review its own judgment if it contains an error patent on the face of the record?
  • Should procedural and technical rules be strictly enforced if they impede the ascertainment of the true position of a case in labour proceedings?
  • Is an employee entitled to lead additional evidence to prove they remained unemployed during the period of severance to claim back benefits?
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• MUHAMMAD RAFI Versus MUHAMMAD ASHFAQ, CIVIL JUDGE,HASILPIR1994 SCMR 2301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-08Read full judgment →
• SARDARA Versus MUHAMMAD1994 SCMR 2299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  cancellation of sale deedregistered sale deedfraud and misrepresentationlimitationburden of proofleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for declaration and cancellation of a registered sale deed dated 12-11-1960. The plaintiff (predecessor of the petitioners) alleged that the sale deed was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, asserting he had intended to execute a lease deed due to his illness. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court decreed it. The High Court, in a regular second appeal, reversed the appellate court's decision and dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dismissing the petition, held that the petitioners failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation. The Court emphasized that the sale deed was a registered document, executed before a Registering Officer where the parties were identified by an Advocate, and the consideration was paid. Furthermore, the suit was filed six years after the registration of the deed, and the mere fact of the plaintiff remaining in possession of the land was insufficient to prove the allegations of fraud. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a registered sale deed can be cancelled on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation without strong and satisfactory evidence?
  • Does the mere fact of a vendor remaining in possession of land after executing a registered sale deed constitute sufficient proof of fraud or misrepresentation?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a sale deed registered before a Registering Officer where the parties were identified by an Advocate?
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• MANZOOR HUSSAIN ALIAS FAQIR SAIN Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, SIALKOT1994 SCMR 2297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-08
  pre-emption suitrestoration of suitlimitation periodstatutory interpretationPunjab Pre-emption Act 1991condonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld an order setting aside the restoration of a pre-emption suit. The petitioner had filed a pre-emption suit that was rejected in 1990 following the Supreme Court's declaration that the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 was contrary to Islamic Injunctions. Following the enactment of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, the petitioner sought restoration of the suit under section 35 of the new Act. The core legal question was whether the application for restoration was time-barred and whether the provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 excluded reliance on Muslim Personal Law or the application of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court held that the application for restoration was filed beyond the statutory 60-day period prescribed by the 1991 Act. The Court affirmed that the 1991 Act occupied the field, precluding reliance on general Muslim Personal Law, and that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was inapplicable to the statutory limitation period provided for such restoration applications.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 exclude the application of Muslim Personal Law regarding the right of pre-emption?
  • Is section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to an application for restoration of a suit filed under section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991?
  • What is the limitation period for filing an application for the restoration of a pre-emption suit under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991?
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• MANZOOR OADIR Versus RAJAB ALI1994 SCMR 2295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09Read full judgment →
• IMAM HUSSAIN Versus SHER ALI SHAH1994 SCMR 2293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11Read full judgment →
• BAIGAN Versus MUHAMMAD ANWAR A.R. Sheikh, Raja Muhammad Anwar and Salim Ahmad , Ch. Khurshid Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Aslam Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record1994 SCMR 2292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  inheritancelimited interestShajra Nasabpedigree tableleave to appealpossession of landheirship
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed a decree granting possession of land to the respondent, Muhammad Anwar. The dispute concerns the inheritance of property originally owned by one Fateh Din, who died in 1905. Following the death of the last male owner and the subsequent termination of the limited interest held by his widow, Mst. Baigan, the respondent claimed entitlement to the estate as the grandson (Nawasa) of Mst. Mehran, alleged to be the sister of the deceased. The petitioners contested the respondent's status as an heir, arguing that the inclusion of Mst. Mehran and Mst. Roshnai as sisters of the deceased in the pedigree table (Shajra Nasab) was erroneous and lacked evidentiary value. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the evidence on record sufficiently establishes the relationship of Mst. Mehran as the sister of the deceased and the respondent as her grandson, and consequently, the extent of his entitlement to inherit from the estate of the last male owner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the evidence on record is sufficient to prove that Mst. Mehran was the sister of the last male owner, Fateh Din?
  • Whether the respondent is entitled to inherit from the estate of the last male owner as the grandson of his alleged sister?
  • To what share of the estate is the respondent entitled if his relationship as the grandson of the deceased's sister is established?
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• AMANULLAH JAN Versus REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION, ISLAMABAD1994 SCMR 2291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21Read full judgment →
• ARSHAD MUHAMMAD KHAN Versus KALSOOM BIBI1994 SCMR 2288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-24
  rent restrictionevictiondefault in payment of rentburden of prooflandlord and tenantsuccessor-in-interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a landlord's attempt to evict a tenant on the grounds of rent default. The Rent Controller had initially ordered eviction, but the Peshawar High Court set aside that order. The Supreme Court examined whether the landlord had sufficiently proven the alleged default. The Court held that the burden of proving default lies squarely on the landlord. In this case, the landlord failed to specify critical details, such as the date of death of the original tenant (the respondent's mother) or the timeline of the respondent's exclusive possession, making it impossible to establish liability for the alleged arrears. The Court affirmed that rent restriction laws are designed to protect tenants from arbitrary eviction, and such eviction can only occur when statutory conditions are strictly satisfied. Finding that the landlord failed to affirmatively establish the default and that the High Court's factual findings contained no legal infirmity, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish default in payment of rent in an eviction proceeding?
  • Is a successor-in-interest liable for rent default committed by the original tenant without proof of the timing of succession and possession?
  • Can a High Court's factual findings regarding rent default be interfered with by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal infirmity or misreading of evidence?
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• MUHAMMAD MUMTAZ MASUD Versus HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION1994 SCMR 2287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-26Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD MUSHTAQ Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN1994 SCMR 2286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-05
  Constitutional PetitionWrit JurisdictionFundamental RightsArmed ForcesJurisdictional Bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Constitutional Petition by the High Court. The petitioner challenged the High Court's order, arguing that despite the bar under Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the High Court should have entertained the petition because it involved the enforcement of fundamental rights. The core legal question was whether the constitutional bar on the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199(3) could be bypassed when a petitioner invokes fundamental rights. The Supreme Court held that the relief sought under Article 199(1) regarding fundamental rights is explicitly subject to the bar imposed by Article 199(3). Consequently, the High Court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The Court affirmed that the jurisdictional restriction in Article 199(3) is absolute and cannot be circumvented by pleading fundamental rights. Leave to appeal was refused as the impugned order was legally sound.

  Questions settled

  • Can the bar under Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be ignored if a petition involves fundamental rights?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199(1) to grant relief in matters barred by Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• MUHAMMAD JAVED SHAFI Versus HANIFA BEGUM1994 SCMR 2284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-21
  petition for leave to appealinterlocutory ordernon-maintainabilitycompany jurisdictionproduction of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against an interlocutory order passed by the Company Judge of the Lahore High Court, whereby notice was issued to an advocate to bring certain blank transfer deeds that were allegedly handed over to him according to the petitioner's own statement. The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard the matter and dismissed the petition on the short ground of non-maintainability. The Court held that the impugned order was not adverse to the interest of the petitioner in any manner, noting that if the petitioner had any objection to the production of the documents, such objections could be raised before the High Court to be decided on merits. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that an interlocutory order which does not prejudice a party or adversely affect their legal rights is not maintainable for challenge by way of a petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is an interlocutory order that is not adverse to the interest of a petitioner maintainable for leave to appeal?
  • Can a party object to the production of documents before the trial court rather than challenging an interlocutory notice?
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• RAMZAN SUGAR MILLS LTD. Versus MIAN MIRAJ-UD-DIN1994 SCMR 2281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-21
  interlocutory ordersleave to appealcompany benchinterim relieflocal commissionerdiscretionary powersCompanies Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from interlocutory orders passed by the Company Judge of the Lahore High Court in civil original petitions filed under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, seeking the appointment of an inspector and interim relief including the appointment of a local commissioner to inspect factory premises and inventory sugar stocks. The core legal question concerned whether the Supreme Court should interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a court of competent jurisdiction where the matters and applications for interim relief remained pending adjudication before the lower court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that non-interference with interim orders is the general rule and interference is an exception, especially when the impugned orders were passed subject to notice and the petitioners had the opportunity to raise all objections before the Company Judge. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court ordinarily declines to interfere with interlocutory orders under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, leaving parties to agitate their grievances before the original forum.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with interlocutory orders passed by a court of competent jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can a party challenge an interim order before the Supreme Court when the main petition and miscellaneous applications are still pending before the High Court?
  • Does the appointment of a local commissioner to inspect factory premises and inventory stocks amount to an absolute final decision?
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• MUHAMMAD AKRAM BUNDA Versus PAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION, PTV HEADQUARTERS, ISLAMABAD1994 SCMR 2279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-17Read full judgment →
• BIBI RANI Versus NAJABAT ALI1994 SCMR 2277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-28Read full judgment →
• NOUROZ KHAN Versus ZULEKHA1994 SCMR 2276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-28Read full judgment →
• JAVED IQBAL Versus MANAGER, PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION, P.N. DOCKYARD, KARACHI1994 SCMR 2274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-29
  service lawlimitation periodtime-barred appealdepartmental appealFederal Service Tribunalunauthorized absenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal as time-barred. The petitioner, a former Store House Assistant in the Pakistan Navy, was removed from service for unauthorized absence. He filed a departmental appeal, which was rejected, and subsequently filed an appeal before the Tribunal well beyond the prescribed limitation period. The core legal question addressed was whether the petitioner had demonstrated sufficient cause for the delay in filing his appeal before the Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was indeed time-barred, noting that the petitioner failed to file within the statutory period, whether calculated from the date of the departmental decision or from the expiry of the period for non-disposal of a departmental appeal. The Court affirmed that subsequent applications after a final departmental order do not extend the limitation period. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that strict adherence to limitation periods is required in service matters and that ignorance or failure to act within statutory deadlines without sufficient cause is fatal to an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a departmental appeal filed after the final order of the departmental authority stop the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • What is the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal in the event of non-disposal of a departmental appeal?
  • Can an appeal be filed before the Service Tribunal if the departmental appeal has not yet been decided?
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• NABIL DAR Versus SUHAIR MAMDOUH SUDKI DEAIS DAR1994 SCMR 2271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-24Read full judgment →
• RANI Versus RAZIA SULTANA1994 SCMR 2268 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• NOOR JAHAN Versus ROSHAN JAHAN1994 SCMR 2265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-15Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAMEED Versus NEK MUHAMMAD1994 SCMR 2255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-22
  own occupation or useejectmentlandlord and tenantpartnership firmpersonal useSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether a landlord who is a partner in a business firm can seek the ejectment of a tenant under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, on the ground that the premises are required for the "own occupation or use" of the landlord, when the premises are intended to be utilized for the business of the partnership firm in which the landlord holds a fractional share alongside other partners. The core legal question concerns the proper interpretation of the expression "his own occupation or use" under section 15(2)(vii) of the Ordinance and whether it extends to encompass a partnership business. The Court held that while the expression "own occupation or use" admits a liberal interpretation to include family members and dependents residing with the landlord, it cannot be stretched to include commercial or business partnerships where third parties possess an independent interest in the business. The ratio is that occupation by a partnership firm of which the landlord is only a fractional partner does not constitute "own occupation or use" of the landlord alone, as a partnership business is run for the benefit of all partners. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the expression 'his own occupation or use' under section 15(2)(vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 include the business requirements of a partnership firm of which the landlord is a partner?
  • Can commercial and business relationships be treated at par with family and personal relationships for the purpose of a liberal interpretation of 'own occupation or use'?
  • Does occupation by a partnership firm amount to exclusive possession and occupation by a landlord partner alone?
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• INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN Versus MAIDA LIMITED , S.M. Noorul Hasan, Advocate Supreme Court1994 SCMR 2248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-13Read full judgment →
• ELAHI BAKHSH Versus BHIRAWAN1994 SCMR 2246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-12Read full judgment →
• DEPUTY INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, BAHAWALNAGAR Versus MUHAMMAD AFZAL ABBASI1994 SCMR 2245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service tribunalconfidential reportsexpunction of remarkslimitationleave to appealservice record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Bahawalnagar, against an order of the Service Tribunal. The core legal question presented for the Supreme Court's consideration is whether the Service Tribunal erred in law by expunging adverse remarks recorded in the respondent's confidential reports without properly addressing the critical issue of limitation. Furthermore, the Court seeks to determine if the Tribunal failed to adequately consider the material evidence, specifically the comments of the Reporting Officer and the relevant appellate orders, which were duly placed on the record by the department. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to examine these procedural and substantive oversights. The Court directed that the record of the appeals before the Service Tribunal be produced and ordered that the matter be heard in conjunction with another related appeal, thereby setting the stage for a determination on whether the Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction was legally sound regarding the expunction of service record entries.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal expunge adverse remarks from a confidential report without addressing the question of limitation?
  • Is a Service Tribunal required to consider the comments of the Reporting Officer and appellate orders when deciding on the expunction of service record remarks?
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• ALLAH RAKHI Versus IRSHAD BIBI1994 SCMR 2244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  leave to appealtime-barred petitioncondonation of delaycivil revisionlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a civil revision in limine. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petition, which was barred by a significant delay of 377 days, could be entertained without an application for condonation of delay or a satisfactory explanation from the counsel. The Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by time and could not be entertained in the absence of any application for condonation of delay or a satisfactory explanation. The key principle laid down is that a time-barred petition without proper application or justification for the delay is liable to be dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition filed beyond the period of limitation can be entertained without an application for condonation of delay?
  • Can a time-barred petition be maintained when the counsel fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay?
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• WALI MUHAMMAD Versus MEENA1994 SCMR 2243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-28Read full judgment →
• BARKAT BIBI Versus KHUSHI MUHAMMAD1994 SCMR 2240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  specific performanceamendment of plaintevacuee propertylimitationleave to appealcause of actionrelation back doctrine
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over an agreement to sell an evacuee property. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner had agreed to sell a house to the respondent's predecessor, receiving full consideration and handing over possession, but failed to execute the sale deed. The respondent initially filed a suit for declaration, which was later amended by the appellate court to include a prayer for specific performance. The petitioner challenged the amendment, arguing it was time-barred and fundamentally altered the nature of the suit. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that once an amendment is granted, it relates back to the date of the suit's filing, rendering limitation arguments regarding the amendment ineffective. Furthermore, the Court established that adding a prayer for specific performance based on existing averments does not change the nature of the suit or the cause of action. The Court emphasized its broad discretion to allow amendments in the interest of justice, particularly where the underlying facts remain consistent and the opposing party suffers no injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Does an amendment to a plaint relate back to the date of the original suit filing for the purposes of limitation?
  • Does the addition of a prayer for specific performance to an existing declaratory suit fundamentally change the nature of the suit?
  • Can an amendment to a plaint be disallowed if the underlying averments and cause of action remain unchanged?
  Read full judgment →
• ANISA REHMAN Versus P.IA.C.1994 SCMR 2232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-28
  natural justiceaudi alteram partemmaster and servantstatutory corporationconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the dismissal of a Constitutional petition regarding the reversion of an employee of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (P.I.A.C.). The core legal question was whether the principles of natural justice, specifically the maxim audi alteram partem, apply to an employee of a statutory corporation in the absence of statutory service rules, and whether a Constitutional petition is maintainable despite the 'Master and Servant' doctrine. The Supreme Court held that the principle of audi alteram partem is applicable to both judicial and non-judicial proceedings and must be read into every statute if not expressly provided. The Court ruled that a violation of natural justice is equivalent to a violation of law, thereby warranting the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court established that the 'Master and Servant' relationship does not negate the requirement of natural justice; an order affecting an employee's rights without a hearing is void. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the reversion order was declared without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'Master and Servant' relationship between a statutory corporation and its employee exclude the application of the principles of natural justice?
  • Can a Constitutional petition be maintained for the violation of the principles of natural justice in the absence of statutory service rules?
  • Is the maxim audi alteram partem applicable to non-judicial proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• ZAIN PACKAGING INDUSTRIES LIMITED, KARACHI Versus ABDUL RASHID1994 SCMR 2222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-25
  wagesgratuitystanding orderscost of living allowanceregular allowanceslabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses the interpretation of the term 'wages' under Standing Order 12(6) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, specifically whether allowances such as house rent, conveyance, tea, and cost of living allowance form part of wages for calculating an employee's gratuity upon resignation. The core legal question is whether definitions of 'wages' from other unallied labour statutes, such as the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, can be imported to interpret the Standing Orders Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that statutes not in pari materia cannot be used to transplant definitions unless expressly provided. In its absence, 'wages' in the Standing Orders Ordinance must be construed in its ordinary meaning to include all regular, permanent payments made periodically in lieu of services, excluding contingent payments. The Court established the principle that regular allowances paid without contingencies form part of a worker's wages for gratuity calculation, and upheld the lower court's decision dismissing the employer's constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the definition of wages in the Payment of Wages Act 1936 be used to interpret the term wages under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • What constitutes wages in their ordinary meaning under Standing Order 12(6) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Whether regular and permanent allowances such as house rent, conveyance allowance, and tea allowance form part of a workman's wages for the calculation of gratuity?
  • Does the cost of living allowance form part of wages for the recovery of gratuity under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF KARACHI Versus MUHAMMAD SALEEM1994 SCMR 2213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-11
  industrial relationsworker definitiongrievance petitiondismissed employeeindustrial disputePort Trustratio decidendiprecedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court addressed whether a dismissed employee of the Trustees of the Port of Karachi, whose dismissal was unrelated to an industrial dispute, qualifies as a worker or workman under clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, so as to maintain a grievance petition under section 25‑A of that Ordinance. The respondent carpenter was dismissed from service following disciplinary proceedings under the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886, and subsequently invoked section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Labour Court, which dismissed his petition. The High Court, relying on a prior precedent, ultimately held the petition maintainable. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and held that under section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, a dismissed person is not a worker unless their dismissal is connected with or in consequence of an industrial dispute. Since the respondent's dismissal was unrelated to an industrial dispute, he was not a worker for the purposes of section 25‑A, rendering the grievance remedy unavailable to him.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dismissed employee whose dismissal is unrelated to an industrial dispute falls within the definition of worker under section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can a dismissed employee maintain a grievance petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 if their removal from service has no connection with an industrial dispute?
  • Does a precedent sub silentio or a case that did not actually decide a specific question of law serve as a binding authority on that question?
  • Are the remedies under section 23 of the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886 and section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 available when the statutory definition of worker excludes individuals whose dismissals are unconnected to industrial disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• MUSSARAT SHAUKAT ALI Versus SAFIA KHATOON1994 SCMR 2189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-25
  specific performanceoral agreementnovation of contractconstructive noticebona fide purchaserabandonment of contracttransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a suit for specific performance of an oral agreement for the sale of a house. The appellant, having entered into an oral agreement to purchase property, sought enforcement after the vendor's death. The High Court dismissed the suit, finding that the appellant had abandoned the contract by pleading novation and claiming damages in a legal notice. The Supreme Court reversed this, holding that an oral agreement for the sale of immovable property is enforceable. The Court clarified that failing to prove a pleaded novation does not automatically abrogate the original contract, nor does claiming compensation in a notice constitute abandonment of the right to specific performance, provided the party's conduct does not indicate such intent. Furthermore, the Court held that a person in actual possession of property provides constructive notice to subsequent purchasers under Explanation II to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. Consequently, the Court restored the trial court's decree, ordering specific performance upon payment of the enhanced price previously offered by the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to prove a pleaded novation of a contract automatically result in the abandonment of the original agreement?
  • Does a claim for compensation in a legal notice, without the use of 'without prejudice', necessarily constitute an abandonment of the right to seek specific performance?
  • Does a person in actual possession of immovable property provide constructive notice of their title to a subsequent purchaser under the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • Can a court grant specific performance of an oral agreement for the sale of immovable property?
  Read full judgment →
• RIFFAT HAYAT Versus JUDGE SPECIAL COURT FOR SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, LAHORE1994 SCMR 2177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-25
  cognizanceprivate complaintpolice challanSpecial Courtsuppression of terrorist activitiescriminal procedurejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition that challenged a Special Court's issuance of summons to the appellant and others in a case under sections 302/324 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether a Special Court could entertain a private complaint under section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975, after a police challan had already been filed or initiated in respect of the same case. The Supreme Court held that the Special Court acted within its jurisdiction in taking direct cognizance of the case based on a private complaint filed before the submission of the police report, as section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act does not expressly or impliedly exclude the entertainment of direct complaints. The principle laid down is that a Special Court is competent to take direct cognizance of a scheduled offence on a private complaint under its governing statute where no police report has been submitted to it at the time of filing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Special Court can entertain a private complaint under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 after a police challan has been filed?
  • Does section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 exclude the procedure of entertaining a direct complaint available under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What is the correct procedure to be adopted by a trial court when it is seized of a case based both on a private complaint and a police challan?
  • Can a trial court summon accused persons who have been placed in column No.2 of a police report upon a private complaint?
  Read full judgment →
• FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Versus MUHAMMAD AZAM1994 SCMR 2176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-09
  leave to appealprobation periodtermination of serviceservice lawextended probation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, involving the termination of service of a public employee. The core legal question addressed is whether the service of respondent No. 1 was lawfully terminated prior to the expiry of the extended period of probation in accordance with the applicable law and rules. The Court heard the counsel for the parties and granted leave to appeal to examine the legality of the termination vis-a-vis the probationary period. The holding of the Court is that leave to appeal is granted to consider the proper interpretation and application of the relevant termination rules during an extended probation period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service of a probationer can be terminated before the expiry of the extended period of probation?
  • Was the termination of service in accordance with the provisions of the relevant law and rules?
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• ABDUL RASHID Versus MAHMOOD ALI KHAN1994 SCMR 2163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HAROON Versus STATE1994 SCMR 2161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-22Read full judgment →
• ZAHIDA SHAHEEN Versus STATE1994 SCMR 2098 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-08
  ZinaOffence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979TalaqIrregular marriageFasid marriageCriminal intentMuslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961Reasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants under Section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for allegedly contracting an illegal marriage. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellants' marriage was valid based on a disputed prior divorce, whether ignorance of the law constitutes a valid defense, and whether an irregular (Fasid) marriage falls within the definition of Zina. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellants, holding that the evidence regarding the earlier divorce deed was sufficient to create reasonable doubt regarding the subsistence of the prior marriage. The Court established that failure to provide notice of Talaq to the Chairman of the Union Council does not render a divorce ineffective under Shariah. Furthermore, the Court clarified that ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for Zina, and that irregular marriages fall within the definition of Zina under the Ordinance, though they may be liable to Tazir rather than Hadd.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to send a notice of Talaq to the Chairman of the Union Council render a divorce ineffective under Shariah?
  • Does an irregular (Fasid) marriage fall within the definition of Zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can ignorance of the law be pleaded as a defense to the charge of Zina?
  Read full judgment →
• ZUBEDA Versus ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, MULTAN1994 SCMR 2046 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HASSAN Versus ZAKIR HUSSAIN1994 SCMR 2015 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• SADIQ HUSSAIN SHAH Versus ZAMIN SHAH1994 SCMR 1868 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BAKHSH Versus PROVINCE OF PUNJAB1994 SCMR 1836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF N.-W.F.P. Versus DEVLIKUND FOREST AND MULTIPURPOSES COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED1994 SCMR 1829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-31Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BASHIR Versus SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, LAHORE1994 SCMR 1801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-16
  back benefitsservice lawreinstatementintervening periodcivil servantarrears of payservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Subject Specialist, challenged his retirement from service under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Punjab Service Tribunal allowed his appeal, reinstating him but treating the intervening period of his absence as leave without pay, thereby denying back benefits. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in withholding back benefits without proper inquiry or reasoning. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred by failing to adhere to the prescribed procedure for determining back benefits. The Court emphasized that under F.R. 54 and Section 16 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, the determination of arrears and the adjustment of income earned during the period of absence requires a specific process involving a committee. The Court rejected the respondents' claim that the appellant had waived his right to back benefits, noting this was not recorded in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the case was remanded to the official respondents to determine the appellant's entitlement to arrears in accordance with the relevant rules and statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Service Tribunal authorized to deny back benefits to a reinstated civil servant without assigning reasons?
  • Does the determination of back benefits for a reinstated civil servant require the constitution of a committee under F.R. 54?
  • Can a Service Tribunal rely on unrecorded oral concessions regarding the waiver of back benefits to deny such claims in its judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• AMIR SIAB Versus GOVERNMENT OF N.-W.F.P.1994 SCMR 1778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-07
  land disputeconcurrent findings of factrevisional jurisdictionappreciation of evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a civil land dispute where the petitioners sought a declaration regarding title to the suit land situated in the erstwhile Swat State, but lost before the lower forums and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the two courts below in its revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined to interfere, as there was no compelling reason to set aside concurrent findings of fact that did not suffer from any infirmity of law or principle, and the mere possibility of a different conclusion upon reappraisal of evidence is no ground for interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts upheld in revisional jurisdiction unless the appreciation of evidence suffers from a serious legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction without compelling reasons?
  • Does the mere possibility of a different conclusion upon reappraisal of material constitute sufficient ground for interference by the Supreme Court?
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• MUHAMMAD ARSHAD Versus STATE1994 SCMR 1749 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-27
  leave to appealappreciation of evidenceocular evidencemedical evidencematerial discrepanciescriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the convictions and sentences of the petitioners for the murder of the deceased under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners were sentenced to death and life imprisonment respectively for causing fatal injuries to the deceased using a dagger and a hatchet. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the lower courts failed to properly appreciate the evidence, specifically regarding alleged contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, and material discrepancies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses concerning the timing and circumstances of the petitioners' arrest. The Supreme Court, finding that the petitioners' contentions regarding these evidentiary infirmities and discrepancies required deeper judicial scrutiny, granted leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that where material discrepancies in prosecution evidence—such as conflicting accounts of the arrest of the accused and potential suppression of initial medical reports—are raised, the appellate court must examine the record to ensure the conviction is based on reliable and consistent evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant discrepancy between the testimony of prosecution witnesses and the investigating officer regarding the date of arrest warrant a re-examination of the conviction?
  • Is leave to appeal justified when there are allegations of material contradictions between ocular and medical evidence that were not adequately addressed by the lower courts?
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• BARKAT ULLAH Versus WALI MUHAMMAD1994 SCMR 1737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-14
  specific performancealternative reliefnovation of contractimmovable propertydiscretionary reliefbreach of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent findings of the lower courts decreeing a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The petitioners challenged the decree on two grounds: first, that the respondents had prayed for compensation in the alternative, thereby precluding a decree for specific performance; and second, that an agreement to postpone the execution of the sale pending the outcome of a separate litigation constituted a novation of the original contract, which was not binding on the heirs of a deceased party. The Supreme Court rejected both contentions. Relying on established legal principles, the Court held that seeking compensation as an alternative relief does not waive the right to specific performance, as courts are empowered to grant specific performance even where compensation is mentioned. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an agreement to extend the time for performance does not amount to a novation of the original contract, but merely defers its execution. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prayer for compensation in the alternative in a suit for specific performance preclude the court from granting specific performance?
  • Can a court grant specific performance of a contract even if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of breach?
  • Does an agreement to extend the time for the performance of a contract constitute a novation of the original agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• MAJEEDAN Versus AMANULLAH1994 SCMR 1735 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BAKHSH Versus MUHAMMAD JAN , Muhammad Younas (Office Assistant)1994 SCMR 1668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30Read full judgment →
• TEXAS Versus GREGORY LEE JHONSON1994 SCMR 1569 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• ABDUL WAHID ALIAS WAHDI Versus STATE1994 SCMR 1517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08Read full judgment →
• ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR HONG KONG Versus REID1994 SCMR 1431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constructive trustbribefiduciary dutybreach of trustsecret profitequitable remedies
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal from New Zealand addressed whether a bribe accepted by a fiduciary in breach of duty, and any property representing it, is held on a constructive trust for the injured principal, or whether the relationship is merely that of debtor and creditor. The respondent, a former Crown prosecutor in Hong Kong, accepted substantial bribes and invested a portion of the proceeds in freehold properties in New Zealand. The Privy Council held that as soon as a bribe is received, the fiduciary holds it and any property derived from it on a constructive trust for the injured person, and is accountable for any subsequent increase in value. The Board overruled prior English authorities, including Lister & Co v. Stubbs and Metropolitan Bank v. Heiron, concluding that a fiduciary must not be permitted to retain any profit or benefit derived from a criminal breach of duty. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, recognizing the Crown's equitable interest in the properties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bribe accepted by a fiduciary in breach of duty is held on a constructive trust for the injured principal?
  • Does a fiduciary who invests a bribe account for the increased value of the property representing the bribe?
  • Whether the decision in Lister & Co v. Stubbs correctly states the equitable principles regarding bribes received by fiduciaries?
  Read full judgment →
• PRATT Versus ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR JAMAICA Anthony Metzer and Anthony Bradley (instructed by Simons Muirhead & Burton) , The Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica (Glen R. Andrade QC) and Lloyd Hibbert (Senior Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica) (instructed by Charles Russell) for the Suprerintendent1994 SCMR 1405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-24
  death penaltyconstitutional appealinhuman or degrading treatmentdeath row phenomenoninordinate delaycommutation of sentencedue processhuman rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional appeal addressed whether the execution of prisoners after prolonged detention on death row constitutes "inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment" under the Constitution of Jamaica. The appellants had been held under sentence of death for 14 years. The Privy Council departed from its previous majority decision in Riley v. A-G of Jamaica, holding that the constitutional prohibition against inhuman treatment is not restricted by pre-independence laws. The Board determined that while capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional, the state has an imperative duty to ensure executions follow swiftly after sentencing. Prolonged delay, particularly when attributable to the state's failure to expedite appellate processes, renders the execution of a death sentence inhuman and degrading. Consequently, the Board held that executing the appellants after such inordinate delay would violate their constitutional rights. The death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. The Board further indicated that a delay exceeding five years between sentencing and execution provides strong grounds for finding a violation of constitutional protections, necessitating commutation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the constitutional prohibition against inhuman or degrading punishment apply to the execution of a death sentence after an inordinate delay?
  • Does Section 17(2) of the Constitution of Jamaica authorize the execution of a death sentence regardless of the length of delay between sentencing and execution?
  • Is the delay caused by an accused's pursuit of appellate procedures to be excluded when determining if the total delay in execution is inhuman or degrading?
  • What is the constitutional effect of a delay exceeding five years between the imposition of a death sentence and the execution?
  Read full judgment →
• MCCARTHY & STONE (DEVELOPMENTS) LTD. Versus LONDON BOROUGH OF RICHMOND UPON THAMES1994 SCMR 1393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  statutory interpretationlocal government powersultra viresplanning permissionlevy of chargespre-application adviceimplied powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned the legality of a policy adopted by the London Borough of Richmond upon Thames, which imposed a fee for consultations regarding speculative development proposals prior to formal planning applications. The core legal question was whether the council possessed the statutory authority to charge for such pre-application advice. The House of Lords allowed the appeal, holding that the council lacked the power to levy these charges. The court affirmed the fundamental principle that no pecuniary burden, such as a fee or tax, can be imposed upon the subject without clear and distinct statutory authority. While Section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 permits local authorities to perform acts incidental to their functions, the court ruled that this does not grant an implied power to charge for services that are merely incidental to the council's duties. The court rejected the argument that charging for a discretionary service is permissible simply because the service itself is discretionary, emphasizing that an activity being 'incidental to the incidental' is insufficient to establish statutory authority for levying charges.

  Questions settled

  • Does a local authority have the implied power under Section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 to charge for pre-application planning advice?
  • Can a local authority impose a pecuniary burden on the public without express statutory authority?
  • Is a service that is incidental to a statutory function automatically subject to a power to charge for that service?
  Read full judgment →
• NOOR MUHAMMAD Versus MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE1994 SCMR 1248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-23Read full judgment →
• ABDUL HAQ Versus SARDAR SHAH1994 SCMR 1238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-22Read full judgment →
• FATEH BIBI Versus TALIB HUSSAIN1994 SCMR 1232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-29
  leave to appealsentence reductiondeath penaltyimprisonment for lifemotivecriminal appealfactual error
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that had converted the death sentences of two convicts into life imprisonment for the murder of an eighteen-year-old youth. The petitioner challenged the reduction of the sentence, arguing that the High Court proceeded on the erroneous factual assumption that the complainant party still resided in the village where the incident occurred, despite evidence of their prior migration. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s reduction of the death sentence to life imprisonment was legally sustainable given the alleged factual error regarding the parties' residence. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court may have erred regarding the residency status of the complainant party, the reduction of the sentence remained justified. The Court reasoned that the motive for the murder was directed against the deceased's brother, Zulfiqar, rather than the deceased himself, who was a minor at the time of the prior incident. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that the reduction of the sentence did not constitute an error of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a factual error regarding the residence of the complainant party necessarily invalidate the High Court's decision to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment legally sustainable when the prosecution fails to prove motive beyond doubt?
  • Can the appellate court maintain a conviction while altering the quantum of sentence based on the specific circumstances of the motive?
  Read full judgment →
• BAHADUR KHAN Versus NOOR MUHAMMAD1994 SCMR 1228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM Versus STATE1994 SCMR 1218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-16
  Zina-bil-Jabrcriminal appealdelay in FIRaccomplice testimonycorroborationmiscarriagebenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan calls in question the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had modified the appellant's conviction for Zina-bil-Jabr from section 10(3) to section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, and upheld his conviction under section 312 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing a miscarriage. The core legal questions involved the justification of the conviction based on the evidence, the effect of an inordinate and unexplained delay of nine months in lodging the First Information Report, and whether the prosecutrix's testimony required independent corroboration as an accomplice. The Supreme Court held that given the finding that the prosecutrix was a consenting party, her status was that of an accomplice, and her uncorroborated testimony could not safely sustain a conviction, especially in light of the unexplained delay in reporting and medical evidence indicating prior sexual habits. The appeal was consequently allowed, the lower courts' judgments were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the evidence in the case justified the conviction of the petitioner under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and section 312 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Was the delay of 9 months in lodging the F.I.R. fatal in the circumstances of the case?
  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a consenting party, treated as an accomplice, is sufficient to base a conviction for Zina?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AFZAL Versus MUHAMMAD HAYAT1994 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE Versus STATE1994 SCMR 1179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-15Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, ZONE D, KARACHI Versus JENNINGS PRIVATE SCHOOL1993 SCMR 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-20Read full judgment →
• SINDH INDUSTRIAL TRADING ESTATE LTD. Versus PROVINCIAL OMBUDSMAN1993 SCMR 948 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-13
  Provincial OmbudsmanAgencySindh Industrial Trading EstateGovernment DepartmentLeave to AppealConstitutional Petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition which impugned a notice issued by the Provincial Ombudsman. The core question before the court was whether the petitioner, Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd., falls within the definition of 'Agency' under clause 1 of section 2 of the Establishment of the Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act, 1991. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is an 'Agency' under the said Act, as previous judicial pronouncements established that the petitioner operates just like a department of the Provincial Government despite its corporate incorporation. Consequently, the petition was found to be without merit, and leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that corporate incorporation does not prevent an institution from being treated as a government department or agency for statutory and constitutional purposes when it performs essential governmental functions for and on behalf of the Provincial Government.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. falls within the definition of 'Agency' under the Establishment of the Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act, 1991?
  • Does corporate incorporation prevent an entity from acting as a department of the Provincial Government for statutory purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SADIQ Versus STATE , Nemo1993 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-05
  acquittalinterference with acquittalreappraisal of evidencecriminal appealmurderattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal appeals against a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had set aside the trial court's acquittal of the accused persons and convicted them under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with a well-reasoned order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The Supreme Court held that an order of acquittal is not to be interfered with unless it is perverse, totally unreasonable, or based on a misreading of evidence, which was not the case here, especially given that the eyewitnesses were related or chance witnesses and the defence plea had been ignored. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restored the trial court's order of acquittal, and dismissed the complainant's petition.

  Questions settled

  • When can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by a trial court?
  • Whether the testimony of related and chance witnesses requires corroboration when co-accused on the same evidence stand acquitted?
  • Does an acquittal order based on reasoning flowing from the record warrant reversal by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• BASHIR AHMAD Versus STATE1993 SCMR 919 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-01Read full judgment →
• SOJHRO KHAN Versus GHULAM MURTAZA1993 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-02-16
  murderocular testimonyinterested witnessminor witnessre-appraisal of evidenceacquittal appealremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh which set aside the conviction and death sentence of respondent No. 1 under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, addresses the proper evaluation of ocular and circumstantial evidence in a murder trial. The core legal questions involved whether a conviction can be sustained on the testimony of a minor or related eye-witness, how relationship and alleged enmity affect witness credibility, and the applicability of evidentiary standards under Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 in trials under ordinary law. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misevaluated the evidence by erroneously rejecting related and minor eye-witnesses without analyzing their rigorous cross-examination, misinterpreting the requirements of Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 for cases tried under ordinary penal law, and disregarding corroborative recovery evidence. The Court laid down that mere relationship to the deceased does not render a witness 'interested' unless animosity or a motive to falsely implicate is established, that a minor's evidence is subject to scrutiny rather than summary dismissal, and that ocular testimony must be properly evaluated in light of cross-examination. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the High Court for a fresh hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a minor eye-witness can be discarded solely on the ground of minority?
  • Does mere relationship to the deceased or complainant render an eye-witness an interested witness requiring corroboration?
  • Are the strict evidentiary requirements of Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 regarding adult male witnesses applicable to murder cases tried under ordinary penal law?
  • Can the evidence of a recovery mashir be brushed aside solely on the ground that the mashir is related or acts as a common mashir for the police?
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• SUJANMAL Versus ABDUL HAI1993 SCMR 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-29Read full judgment →
• ABDUL AZIZ Versus MANZUR MAI (MST.)1993 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD MATLUB KHAN Versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN Faqir Muhammad Khokhar, Deputy Attorney-General instructed by Ch. Akhtar Ali , M.S. Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Imtiaz Muhammad Khan & Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Advocate Supreme Court1993 SCMR 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-22
  service tribunalretrospective absorptionseniority disputedeputation and contractintelligence bureauinduction policy
  Summary & questions settled

  These cross-appeals challenge a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the service seniority and retrospective regular absorption of an army officer deputed to the Intelligence Bureau. The core legal question concerned whether an armed forces officer could be absorbed into the civil service on a regular basis retrospectively from the date of his initial secondment, bypassing statutory recruitment and induction policies, and thereby superseding existing civil servants. The Supreme Court held that retrospective regular absorption and grant of seniority from a date prior to the completion of the mandatory qualifying service and in contravention of applicable service rules and induction policies was unlawful. The Court laid down that civil servants appointed on contract or deputation cannot be regularized retrospectively to the detriment of the legally vested seniority rights of other civil servants, and that executive directives cannot override mandatory statutory service rules governing absorption and seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be absorbed into a civilian department retrospectively from the date of initial secondment in violation of recruitment rules?
  • Does a contract employee acquire the status of a civil servant for the purpose of claiming seniority from the date of initial contract employment?
  • Can an executive directive override statutory service rules and policies to grant retrospective seniority affecting other civil servants?
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• ABDUL FATEH Versus ABDUL SATTAR1993 SCMR 736 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-03
  right of pre-emptionSerai exemptionpartial pre-emptionco-sharerurban immovable propertyagricultural landburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court addresses the dismissal of a pre-emption suit by the Peshawar High Court, which had set aside the trial court's decree in favor of the plaintiff/appellant, Haji Abdul Fateh. The core legal questions involved whether the suit property was pre-emptible, whether the sale transaction was exempt from pre-emption as a 'Serai' under section 5(a) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, and whether the suit was barred by the principle of partial pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the land in dispute fell within the definition of pre-emptible property under the Act, that the vendee/respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof to establish that the property was a 'Serai' or used as such at the relevant time, and that the suit was not hit by partial pre-emption. The appeal was accepted, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's decree was restored, subject to conditions regarding compensation for new construction or its removal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property claimed as a 'Serai' is exempt from pre-emption under section 5 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, in the absence of evidence showing its use for temporary accommodation of travellers?
  • Does a suit for pre-emption covering the entire area purchased through the sale-deeds violate the principle of partial pre-emption?
  • Upon whom lies the burden of proof to establish an exemption from pre-emption under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950?
  • What are the essential legal ingredients that constitute a building as a 'Serai' for the purposes of pre-emption law?
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• KHIZAR HAYAT Versus ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, TOBA TEK SINGH1993 SCMR 724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-08Read full judgment →
• CHENA Versus SHABBIR AHMAD1993 SCMR 705 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• GHULAM MURTAZA Versus MUHAMMAD ARIF1993 SCMR 693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  death sentencecommutation of sentenceGeneral Amnesty Orderculpable homicideappellate interferencesentencing discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a High Court judgment that commuted a death sentence to life imprisonment for a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant party challenged the High Court's decision, specifically questioning whether the absence of an immediate motive for the murder was sufficient legal justification to deviate from the normal penalty of death. The Supreme Court examined the timeline of the case, noting that the occurrence took place in 1981 and the trial court judgment was delivered in 1984. Crucially, a General Amnesty Order was issued by the President in December 1988. The Supreme Court held that had the High Court confirmed the death sentence, the respondent would have been entitled to the benefits of this General Amnesty Order. Consequently, the Court determined that it would be inappropriate to interfere with the sentence imposed by the High Court at this stage. The appeal was dismissed, effectively maintaining the life imprisonment sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of an immediate motive for murder provide sufficient justification for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with a commuted sentence if the respondent would have been eligible for a General Amnesty Order had the original death sentence been confirmed?
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• ZARINA DOOSANI Versus ABDUL MEHDI1993 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-24
  urban rent restrictionevictionreconstructionsanction for reconstructionleave to appealdilapidated building
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the dismissal of her First Rent Appeal by the High Court, which affirmed her eviction order passed by the Rent Controller on the ground of property reconstruction. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the sanction for reconstruction obtained by the landlord continues to enure for his benefit even after the original period for which it was granted has expired. The Court held that whether a sanction enures in favour of the landlord till the conclusion of proceedings depends upon the circumstances of each case, noting that eviction proceedings ordinarily take longer than the standard one-year validity of such sanctions. Furthermore, the Court observed that the building was in a dilapidated condition, other tenants had already vacated, and the tenant had a statutory right to reoccupy after reconstruction. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the validity of a reconstruction sanction during protracted litigation depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sanction for reconstruction obtained by a landlord enures for their benefit notwithstanding the expiration of the original period for which it was granted?
  • Does the expiration of a reconstruction sanction prior to or during eviction proceedings invalidate the landlord's right to seek eviction for reconstruction?
  • Is resistance to eviction by a tenant based on bona fide reasons when the building is in a dilapidated condition and other tenants have vacated?
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• ASLAM INDUSTRIES LTD., KHANPUR Versus PAKISTAN EDIBLE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN1993 SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-11Read full judgment →
• NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN Versus PUNJAB LABOUR COURT NO.5, FAISALABAD1993 SCMR 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAMZAN Versus SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA , Nemo1993 SCMR 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-24
  evacuee propertyproperty identitysettlement authoritiesmistake of counselsubstantial justicesuo motu review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning the identity and transfer of evacuee shops bearing numbers 46 and 53 in Sargodha, involving conflicting claims by auction-purchasers and local occupants. The core legal question revolves around the correct identification and demarcation of the independent units claimed by the respective parties, and whether relief can be granted to satisfy substantial justice when parties make bona fide mistakes or concessions regarding property identification. The Supreme Court held that the properties in question constituted distinct units and, after correcting an initial concession made under a mistake of fact prior to the signing of the judgment, adjusted the claims equitably between the parties to ensure substantial justice. The key principle laid down is that courts may rectify unfinalized or unsigned orders rendered under a mistaken concession of counsel and mould relief to ensure substantial justice between competing claimants of evacuee property based on equity and factual inspection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can reconsider a matter upon a request regarding a mistake in marking property units before the judgment is formally signed?
  • Can rival claimants be granted portions of disputed evacuee property based on equitable adjustment of possession and auction rights?
  • Whether separate independent properties wrongly merged or confused under settlement proceedings can be demarcated through site plans and counsel endorsements?
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• SULTAN Versus STATE1993 SCMR 654 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-21
  eye-witness testimonySection 164 Cr.P.C. statementpolice detentioncorroborationres gestaecriminal appealmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal appeals filed by the appellant, Sultan, against his conviction for murder and illegal possession of arms. The core legal question was whether the testimony of the sole eye-witness, Kasho (P.W.6), was reliable given his admission in cross-examination that he was detained by the police for several days to secure a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court examined whether this detention rendered the witness's testimony involuntary or coerced. The Court held that while the witness's detention by the police was improper, his testimony remained credible because it was corroborated by the independent testimony of another witness, Ahmed Shah (P.W.7), and by the witness's own contemporaneous declarations to villagers shortly after the incident. The Court established the principle that where a witness's testimony is otherwise consistent and supported by independent evidence or res gestae, the fact that the police improperly secured a statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C. does not automatically invalidate the witness's substantive evidence, especially when the witness is vulnerable to external influence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the improper detention of a witness by police to secure a statement under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically render their testimony unreliable?
  • Can testimony recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be considered credible if it is corroborated by independent evidence and contemporaneous declarations?
  • Does the doctrine of res gestae apply to statements made by bystanders or witnesses shortly after a crime occurs?
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• KHAN MUHAMMAD Versus STATE1993 SCMR 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-24Read full judgment →
• CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, PUNJAB, LAHORE Versus GHULAM FAREED1993 SCMR 643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-11Read full judgment →
• ARZ MUHAMMAD UMRANI, ASSISTANT POLITICAL AGENT, DERA BUGTI Versus ATTA MUHAMMAD1993 SCMR 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-13
  adverse remarksexpungementjudicial immunityconstitutional jurisdictionrepealed lawsmalafideadministrative control of courts
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, seeking the expungement of adverse remarks passed against the appellant, an Assistant Political Agent who had tried and convicted a person under sections 497 and 498 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether a judicial or quasi-judicial officer is entitled to immunity from adverse remarks or a prior hearing when their judgment is set aside under constitutional jurisdiction for acting without jurisdiction on repealed laws. The Supreme Court held that while judicial officers enjoy statutory immunity for bona fide acts, the High Court acting under Article 199 of the Constitution is fully competent to examine the legality of subordinate judicial orders, comment on the conduct of the officer, and direct adverse remarks to be placed on their confidential record without granting a prior hearing, especially when the officer acted mala fide and without jurisdiction on repealed provisions. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are judicial officers entitled to a prior hearing before a superior court makes adverse remarks regarding their judicial conduct?
  • Does the statutory immunity provided under section 77 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prevent a High Court from recording adverse remarks against a judicial officer exercising judicial functions?
  • Is the High Court competent under Article 199 and Article 203 of the Constitution of Pakistan to supervise subordinate courts and pass strictures on their judgments?
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• MUHAMMAD YOUNIS KHAN Versus GOVERNMENT OF N.-W.F.P. , M. Munir Peracha, Advocate Supreme Court and Ejaz M. Khan, Advocate-on-Record1993 SCMR 618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-10
  land reformsmutationfraudpartitionco-ownershiprevenue recordsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants challenged the dismissal of their writ petition by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of land mutations (Nos. 36 and 41) by the Chief Land Commissioner. The appellants claimed ownership of land in village Naryala, District Mansehra, as co-sharers with the Nawab of Amb, based on revenue entries made after the Nawab surrendered land under Martial Law Regulation No. 64. The respondents alleged that these mutations were fraudulent, collusive, and executed after the land had already vested in the Provincial Government. The Supreme Court, by a majority, dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the appellants failed to establish their entitlement to be recorded as co-sharers. It was affirmed that entries in mutation records are fiscal in nature and do not conclusively establish title, serving only as rebuttable evidence. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, should not interfere with factual controversies or substitute findings of fact made by lower tribunals unless they are based on no evidence or misreading of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the entry of a name in a mutation record conclusively establish ownership of land?
  • Can a High Court interfere with findings of fact made by lower tribunals in a constitutional petition?
  • Is a mutation entry in revenue records rebuttable evidence of title?
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• FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Versus RAIS KHAN1993 SCMR 609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-17
  ad hoc servicelength of servicepromotioncurrent charge basiscivil servantseniorityservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Federation of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which partly allowed the respondent employee's appeal by treating his promotion from BPS-17 to BPS-18 as regular from an earlier date rather than on a current charge basis. The core legal question was whether continuous ad hoc service in a lower pay scale, followed by regular appointment in the same scale, can be counted towards the minimum length of service prescribed for promotion to a higher scale. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any statutory prohibition or rule excluding ad hoc service, such service counts towards the required length of experience for promotion, a position supported by official government memoranda. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the principle that ad hoc service followed by regular service in the same scale qualifies for calculating length of service for promotion or move-over.

  Questions settled

  • Can ad hoc service followed by regular appointment in the same scale be counted towards the length of service prescribed for promotion to a higher post?
  • Does an ad hoc appointment confer any right to seniority under the civil servants law?
  • What is the scope of powers of the Federal Service Tribunal under the Civil Servants Act 1973 on appeal?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal grant relief under section 23 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 if such relief is not granted by the President?
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• NAZAR AHMAD Versus MEMBER (REVENUE), BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE , S. Abul Aasim Jafferi, Ejaz Ahmad Khan & Nemo1993 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-27
  seniorityservice tribunalvested righttransfer of servicedistrict establishmentretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two appeals by special leave against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed service appeals filed by the appellants regarding their seniority. The appellants originally served under the Thal Development Authority, which was wound up and its functions transferred to the Thal Project Colony under the Provincial Government in 1957. Later, the colony was wound up, and the staff was transferred to the District Administration. The Board of Revenue initially determined that the appellants' seniority should be fixed from the date of continuous service in their cadre, but subsequently reversed this decision, treating them as new entrants. The core legal question was whether the Board of Revenue was competent to alter the seniority rule retrospectively to the detriment of the appellants who had already been promoted based on the earlier determination. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' seniority was governed by Rule 9(1)(b) of the West Pakistan Revenue Department District Ministerial Services Rules, 1964, and that the initial determination by the Board was in accordance with the rules. The Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and restored the seniority based on the Board's earlier direction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the seniority of government servants transferred along with their posts to a district establishment is to be determined from the date of continuous service in their cadre?
  • Can the Board of Revenue retrospectively alter a previously determined seniority rule to the detriment of civil servants who have already been promoted?
  • Does Rule 9(1)(b) of the West Pakistan Revenue Department District Ministerial Services Rules, 1964 apply to members appointed otherwise than by initial recruitment?
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• ALAMGIR Versus DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, MULTAN1993 SCMR 603 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-04
  service appealefficiency and disciplineshow-cause noticeformal inquirycontroverted factsreduction in ranknatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal by two forest department employees against the dismissal of their service appeals by the Service Tribunal, challenging their reduction in rank following disciplinary proceedings. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether rule 6(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 is ultra vires of Article 25 of the Constitution and whether the departmental action was justified. The Supreme Court observed that the penalty was imposed through a summary show-cause procedure without holding a formal inquiry or associating the appellants with the preliminary fact-finding inquiry, despite controverted questions of fact. The Court held that where charges involve disputed questions of fact requiring evidence and cross-examination, resorting to the shorter show-cause procedure is unjustified, and findings based on visual inspection and conjectures rather than proper evidence cannot sustain. Declining to address the larger constitutional question regarding the vires of the rules, the Court accepted the appeals, set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment and the punishment orders, while clarifying that the competent authority is not precluded from initiating a fresh formal inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether recourse to the shorter show-cause procedure is justified for resolving controverted questions of fact in civil servant disciplinary proceedings?
  • Is a formal inquiry mandatory where charges of misconduct against a civil servant are disputed and require the recording of evidence and cross-examination?
  • Does a finding of guilt based on visual inspection and preliminary inquiry conducted behind the back of the accused employee sustain under service law?
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• AMANULLAH KHAN Versus AKHTAR BEGUM1993 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-05Read full judgment →
• UNION COUNCIL, ALI WAHAN, SUKKUR Versus ASSOCIATED CEMENT (PVT.) LIMITED1993 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-07
  octroi taxlifting the corporate veiltax exemptionFederal Governmentconstitutional petitionseparate legal entitycommercial activity
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court addressed whether Associated Cement (Pvt.) Limited, a company managed by the State Cement Corporation of Pakistan whose shares are owned by the Federal Government, is entitled to exemption from octroi tax under Article 165 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The High Court had allowed the respondent's petition by lifting the corporate veil and holding that the respondent essentially performed functions of the Federal Government. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that the respondent is engaged in the commercial manufacture and sale of cement like any other private company, and that no justifiable reason existed to lift the corporate veil to grant tax exemption. The Court laid down that the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil cannot be pressed into service as a matter of course to reduce tax burdens or grant tax immunities to commercial corporations competing in the market, particularly in light of the distinct legal personality recognized by company law and Article 165-A of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a company owned or controlled by the Federal Government engaged in commercial manufacturing is entitled to tax exemption under Article 165 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil be invoked to grant tax immunity to a commercial corporation competing with other private entities?
  • What is the impact of Article 165-A of the Constitution of Pakistan on the legal ownership of property and corporate identity for fiscal purposes?
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• ZILA COUNCIL, JHELUM Versus I.C.I. PAKISTAN LTD. (FORMERLY ICI PAKISTAN MANUFACTURERS LIMITED), KHEWRA, DISTRICT JHELUM1993 SCMR 454 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →