Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- KAILA KHAN Versus YASIN1996 SCMR 747 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-13Read full judgment →
- MACDONALD LAYTON & COMPANY PAKISTAN LTD. Versus UZIN EXPORT IMPORT FOREIGN TRADE CO. , M. Jamil Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Muzaffar Ali Khan1996 SCMR 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside a decree granted under Order XII, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether a court should exercise its discretion to pass a judgment on admission when the defendant disputes the liability and raises significant legal objections regarding the suit's maintainability. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly set aside the decree, finding that the discretion to grant a summary judgment on admission was improperly exercised. The Court affirmed that for an admission to justify a decree under Order XII, Rule 6, it must be unequivocal, clear, unconditional, and unambiguous regarding both the amount and the liability. Furthermore, the Court established that where a factual admission is accompanied by qualifications or legal challenges to the suit's maintainability, the court must not exercise its discretion to pass a decree on admission. Such legal defenses must be adjudicated through a full trial rather than a summary proceeding. The appeal was consequently dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a court pass a decree under Order XII, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the defendant raises legal objections to the maintainability of the suit?
- What are the essential requirements for an admission to form the basis of a decree under Order XII, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is the power to pass a decree on admission under Order XII, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 a matter of right or judicial discretion?
- SIRBALAND Versus ALLAH LOKE1996 SCMR 575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had restored a trial court decree granting specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land, thereby setting aside the first appellate court's dismissal of the suit. The core legal questions involved whether an unregistered and unstamped agreement to sell was admissible and enforceable, whether the second appellate court properly interfered with findings of fact, and whether the trial court was justified in comparing handwriting despite expert evidence. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the second appellate court erred in re-assessing and interfering with findings of fact properly rendered by the first appellate court, and that the first appellate court's appreciation of the evidence was legally sustainable. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal by majority, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the dismissal of the suit by the first appellate court. The key principle laid down is that a second appellate court's scope for reassessing evidence is strictly limited unless there is clear non-reading or misreading of evidence by the first appellate court.
Questions settled- Can a second appellate court interfere with findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court in the absence of non-reading or misreading of evidence?
- Is a trial court justified in comparing disputed signatures with specimen handwriting when a handwriting expert has already testified?
- Whether an agreement to sell requires registration at the stage of its execution?
- What are the consequences of admitting an unstamped or insufficiently stamped document into evidence under the Stamp Act 1899?
- MUHAMMAD ASHIQ Versus SECRETARY INTERIOR, NARCOTICS, ISLAMABAD1996 SCMR 454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-31Read full judgment →
- HABIB-UD-DIN Versus HARNIDA BANO , M. Aslam Uns, Advocate Supreme Court and Ejaz Muhmmad Khan1996 SCMR 416 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-12Read full judgment →
- GOVERNMENT OF N.-W.F.P. Versus WAHAB GUL1996 SCMR 403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-15Read full judgment →
- KHUSHI MUHAMMAD Versus STATE1996 SCMR 390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-28Read full judgment →
- SHAFI MUHAMMAD Versus MUHAMMAD HAZAR KHAN1996 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-13Read full judgment →
- FAZALE WAHID Versus ADDITIONAL HOME SECRETARY N.-W.F.P.1996 SCMR 1974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-20Read full judgment →
- THE STATE Versus MUHAMMAD TAHIR ABID1996 SCMR 1972 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had declared the trial of the respondent before a Special Court to be without lawful authority. The respondent was accused of offences under section 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 25-D of the Telegraph Act 1885, involving alleged trespass into the residence of a police officer and making harassing telephone calls. The core legal question was whether the Special Court, established under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975, possessed the requisite jurisdiction to try the respondent for these specific offences. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of Special Courts is strictly confined to the offences enumerated in the Schedule to the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975. Since the offences charged were not included in said Schedule, the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the trial was coram non judice, and dismissed the State's petition for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Does a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975 have jurisdiction to try offences not listed in the Schedule to that Act?
- Is the trial of an accused for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Telegraph Act 1885 by a Special Court valid if those offences are not included in the Schedule of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975?
- MANZOOR HUSSAIN Versus SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER1996 SCMR 1971 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-10Read full judgment →
- SPEAKER BALOCHISTAN PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY Versus MUHAMMAD AZAM DAVI1996 SCMR 1969 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that declared a notification appointing a former Secretary to the Balochistan Provincial Assembly on a contract basis to be of no legal effect. The core legal questions involve the extent of judicial review over administrative actions taken by the Speaker of a Provincial Assembly, specifically whether such actions enjoy immunity under Article 69 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to review appointments made by the Speaker. The High Court held that acts performed by the Speaker outside the proceedings of the House are amenable to judicial review and that such actions are not immune if they violate existing rules. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the contentions raised regarding the interpretation of constitutional provisions and recruitment rules—specifically Rule 15 of the Recruitment Rules, 1975—are of general public importance, particularly concerning the Speaker's authority to re-employ retired personnel and the applicability of constitutional bars on jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Are acts performed by the Speaker of a Provincial Assembly, other than proceedings inside the House, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
- Does the immunity provided under Article 69 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 extend to administrative appointments made by the Speaker?
- Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to review an appointment made by the Speaker in violation of recruitment rules?
- MUHAMMAD TAYYAB Versus MUHAMMAD SHARIF MALIK1996 SCMR 1967 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision petition and upholding the trial court's order. The petitioner had instituted a suit for damages for malicious prosecution in August 1987. During the proceedings, the trial court closed the petitioner's right to cross-examine a defense witness under Order 17, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to repeated adjournments and deliberate delays by the plaintiff's counsel, which the courts construed as an abuse of the process of the court. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in invoking Order 17, Rule 3 to close the right of cross-examination upon repeated defaults. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings and exercise of discretion by the lower courts were lawful and warranted, as the plaintiff was attempting to employ delaying tactics. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that courts are not obligated to countenance dilatory tactics or abuse of judicial process.
Questions settled- Whether a trial court can close the right to cross-examine witnesses under Order 17 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to repeated delays by a party?
- Does failure to cross-examine witnesses despite multiple opportunities amount to an abuse of the process of the court?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent orders of lower courts refusing to countenance dilatory tactics in civil proceedings?
- MUHAMMAD SULEMAN Versus ZUBAIDA BIBI1996 SCMR 1965 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-16Read full judgment →
- NANNAH KHAN Versus BARKHURDAR1996 SCMR 1964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-18Read full judgment →
- NANNAH KHAN Versus BASHIR AHMED1996 SCMR 1962 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-23Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD RAMZAN Versus MEMBER (REVENUE), BOARD OF REVENUE/CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER M. Zainul Abidin, Raja Dilshad A. Khan, S. Abul Aasim Jafri, Hamid Ali Mirza, Ehsanullah Khan , Ch. Qadir Bux, Rana M.A. Qadri, Nemo , Malik Saeed Hasan, Saeed-ur-Rehman Farrukh, Sh. Salahuddin,1996 SCMR 1960 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the validity of allotments of evacuee lands made to the petitioners in the year 1992. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether such allotments were legally permissible following the repeal of the Evacuee Laws. The Court noted that with the enforcement of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 (Act XIV of 1975), all evacuee laws stood repealed effective from 1st July 1974. Under Section 3 of the Act, all available evacuee properties, both urban and rural, were transferred to the Provincial Government for disposal according to specific schemes prepared by the relevant authorities. The Court granted leave to appeal to specifically examine the legality of the 1992 allotments in light of this statutory transfer of property and the subsequent repeal of the governing evacuee legislation. The holding establishes that the legal framework for disposing of evacuee property shifted entirely to the Provincial Government post-1974, necessitating a review of whether subsequent allotments adhered to these statutory requirements.
Questions settled- Whether allotments of evacuee lands made in 1992 are valid in law following the repeal of Evacuee Laws?
- Did evacuee properties stand transferred to the Provincial Government after the repeal of the Evacuee Laws on 1st July 1974?
- FAIZ MUHAMMAD Versus JAWAHIR1996 SCMR 1959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-17Read full judgment →
- RASHID AHMAD Versus HAJRAN BIBI1996 SCMR 1957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-11Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE Versus GHULAM MUHAMMAD1996 SCMR 1955 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-11Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MUHAMMAD Versus PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB1996 SCMR 1953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-11Read full judgment →
- ABDUL RASHID Versus MUHAMMAD HALEEM1996 SCMR 1950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. The core legal question concerns the effect of non-compliance with mandatory procedural provisions when a compromise decree is entered into involving minors without the express leave of the court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal, holding that under Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a next friend or guardian cannot enter into a compromise on behalf of a minor without the express leave of the court recorded in the proceedings, and any compromise without such leave is voidable against all parties other than the minor. The key principle laid down is that the provisions of Order XXXII Rule 7, C.P.C. are mandatory in nature, and failure to comply with them renders the compromise agreement voidable.
Questions settled- What is the legal effect of entering into a compromise on behalf of a minor without obtaining the express leave of the court under Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Whether the provisions of Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 requiring leave of the court for a compromise involving a minor are mandatory?
- WARRAYAM Versus SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LAND)1996 SCMR 1949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Lahore High Court in a land settlement dispute. The petitioners purchased litigated property originally allotted to respondent No. 4 against claim forms. Subsequently, respondents 2 and 3 filed a Mukhbari application before the Chief Settlement Commissioner (Land), who cancelled the allotment on the ground that the claim forms lacked a valid transfer order to the district. The Lahore High Court declared the cancellation without lawful authority and remanded the matter to determine the original allottee's entitlement and any excess area for re-allotment to the informant. The core legal question concerned the maintainability and validity of the Mukhbari proceedings and the subsequent remand. The Supreme Court held that the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 was repealed in July 1974, leaving no provision for moving a Mukhbari application thereafter, and noted that persons named in the application were already dead. Finding no cause to interfere with the remand order, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether a Mukhbari application is maintainable after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
- Can an allotment be cancelled on the basis of a Mukhbari application filed after July 1974?
- PUNJAB SEED CORPORATION Versus PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL1996 SCMR 1947 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- CHIEF SECRETARY GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB Versus MUMTAZ AHMED SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE1996 SCMR 1945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-18Read full judgment →
- IFTIKHAR RASHID Versus HAMEED AKHTAR NIAZI1996 SCMR 1942 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals against a High Court order regarding the allotment of a government house. The dispute arose between the appellant and respondent No. 1, both claiming entitlement to the property. During Intra-Court Appeal proceedings, the parties reached a compromise, recorded by the Court, requiring the appellant to vacate the premises and the government to provide alternative accommodation. Subsequently, the appellant filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking to set aside the compromise order on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation, alleging that respondent No. 1 had concealed his retirement status. The Supreme Court held that the application under Section 12(2) was unsustainable because the retirement notification was a matter of public record and did not constitute fraud or misrepresentation. Furthermore, the Court observed that the government, having participated in and partially complied with the compromise, could not resile from it. The Court affirmed that a consent decree cannot be challenged on such grounds when the alleged 'concealed' fact was publicly available and did not invalidate the underlying agreement.
Questions settled- Can a consent decree be set aside under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the grounds of non-disclosure of a publicly gazetted retirement notification?
- Is a party who has accepted and acted upon a compromise order permitted to subsequently resile from it?
- Does the failure to disclose a retirement notification that is already published in the official Gazette constitute fraud or misrepresentation sufficient to invalidate a compromise decree?
- NASARULLAH Versus THE STATE1996 SCMR 1926 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-28Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD SAIN Versus MUHAMMAD DIN1996 SCMR 1918 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-26Read full judgment →
- FAUJI FOUNDATION Versus BAKHTIAR AHMED SYED1996 SCMR 1915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that refused to cancel the bail granted to the respondent, who was accused of financial fraud involving the Fauji Foundation. The core legal questions were whether the Sessions Judge and Special Judge (Central) possessed the jurisdiction to grant bail for offences triable exclusively by the Special Court (Offences in Respect of Banks), and whether the bail order was sustainable on merits. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that since the prosecution (FIA) had explicitly stated there was no incriminating material against the respondent and had placed his name in column No. 2 of the challan, the refusal to cancel bail was justified on merits. Regarding the jurisdictional challenge, the Court declined to interfere, noting that the complainant had not raised this objection before the trial court or relevant administrative authorities. The Court clarified that the petitioner could still raise the issue of jurisdiction before the trial court, which would be required to decide the matter in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Can a court decline to interfere with a bail order on jurisdictional grounds if the objection was not raised before the trial court or administrative authorities?
- Is a bail order sustainable when the prosecution explicitly states there is no incriminating material against the accused?
- Does the placement of an accused in column No. 2 of the challan by the Investigating Officer provide a valid basis for maintaining bail?
- AHMAD JAWAD SARWAR Versus ZENIA1996 SCMR 1907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition filed by the respondent-mother under section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the recovery and custody of her minor son from the appellant-father. The High Court allowed the petition and handed over the custody of the child to the mother. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was rightly invoked in the absence of material indicating illegal deprivation, and in light of the significant delay in approaching the court and conflicting pleas of the parties. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to consider the palpable delay in filing the petition and omitted to examine the correctness of the conflicting stands regarding whether the mother was illegally deprived of custody. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the High Court for a fresh decision, while making an interim arrangement for visitation rights.
Questions settled- Whether section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be invoked without examining conflicting pleas regarding the alleged illegal deprivation of a minor's custody?
- Does a significant delay in filing a petition under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require specific consideration by the court?
- GHULAM ULLAH Versus THE STATE1996 SCMR 1894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from concurrent findings of guilt under Articles 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, where the appellants were convicted for the possession and transportation of 180 bags of heroin concealed in a jeep. The trial court convicted and sentenced them to life imprisonment, whipping, and fine, which was upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and whether the defence of planting and the plea of tender age warranted interference. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the large quantity of narcotics recovered from the vehicle—which belonged to one of the appellants—sufficiently connected the accused to the crime, that the defence plea of planting was an afterthought, and that no credible evidence supported the claim of minority. The Court laid down that recovery of massive contraband from a vehicle occupied jointly by the accused warrants conviction absent credible rebuttal, and that unsubstantiated pleas of young age do not merit leniency in heinous drug offenses.
Questions settled- Whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery of contraband drugs from the vehicle beyond reasonable doubt?
- Does a huge quantity of recovered heroin negate the defence plea of false implication and planting?
- Can an unverified plea of tender age serve as a ground for reduction of sentence in heinous narcotics offences?
- MUHAMMAD SHAFI CHOUDHARY Versus SAEED AHMED1996 SCMR 1784 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-24Read full judgment →
- AMINA BEGUM Versus MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE1996 SCMR 1773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-12Read full judgment →
- SOHARA Versus MUHAMMAD NAWAZ1996 SCMR 1719 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a civil dispute over a parcel of land. The plaintiff, Sohara, filed a suit for possession alleging forcible occupation by the defendants, while the defendants claimed ownership through adverse possession exceeding twelve years. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, but the District Judge accepted the defendants' appeal and dismissed the suit. A subsequent civil revision before the Lahore High Court was also dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that revenue records designated the respondents as tenants, precluding a claim of ownership by prescription. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the revenue entries showed no rent was paid and indicated occupation by force for decades, contradicting the plaintiff's claim of recent forcible dispossession and establishing continuous possession since 1939. The Court held that the mere mention of the word 'tenant' in the revenue record, devoid of rent payment and coupled with long-standing hostile possession, did not negate the defendants' acquisition of title through prescription. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the entry of the word 'tenant' in the revenue record precludes a claim of ownership through adverse possession when no rent is paid?
- Does long-standing possession reflected in revenue records since 1939 substantiate a claim of ownership by prescription?
- Can a party claim forcible occupation within one year of filing the suit when revenue records establish continuous possession by the opposing party for decades?
- DAD MUHAMMAD Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE-11996 SCMR 1688 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the withdrawal of a civil suit and the revisional jurisdiction of the District Court. The core legal questions were whether the "omission" of subsections (2), (3), and (4) of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by Ordinance XXXIII of 1993 constituted a repeal, and whether the acceptance of costs by one defendant precludes other defendants from objecting to the filing of a fresh suit. The Court held that the "omission" of a statutory provision by an amending statute is legally equivalent to a repeal. Consequently, pursuant to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897, pending proceedings are not abated but must be decided by the court where they were originally pending. The Court affirmed the District Judge's jurisdiction to decide the revision application. Additionally, the Court granted leave to appeal specifically to determine whether the acceptance of costs by one defendant, upon the withdrawal of a suit, entitles other defendants to object to the filing of a fresh suit.
Questions settled- Does the omission of a statutory provision by an amending statute amount to a repeal?
- Are pending legal proceedings saved by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 when the statute governing jurisdiction is amended by omission?
- Is the District Court competent to exercise revisional jurisdiction following the enactment of the Civil Laws (Reforms) Act 1994?
- MUHAMMAD SADIQ Versus STATE1996 SCMR 1663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-03Read full judgment →
- SUBA Versus FATIMA BIBI1996 SCMR 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-05Read full judgment →
- TANVIR AHMED Versus STATE1996 SCMR 1549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-24Read full judgment →
- ASGHAR ALI Versus STATE1996 SCMR 1541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for the alleged transportation of heroin. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, considering significant evidentiary discrepancies. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, noting that while 34 packets of heroin were allegedly recovered, only 17 were produced in court. Furthermore, the court identified unexplained discrepancies between the weight of samples taken and those analyzed, alongside an unexplained three-day delay in transmitting samples to the chemical examiner, raising the possibility of tampering. The Court emphasized that the appellant was a mere taxi driver, and the prosecution’s failure to reconcile these material contradictions rendered the case doubtful. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The judgment reaffirms the established legal principle that any reasonable doubt arising from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Questions settled- Does the failure of the prosecution to produce the entire quantity of recovered contraband in court create reasonable doubt?
- Does a discrepancy between the weight of samples taken at the scene and the weight reported by the chemical examiner vitiate the prosecution's case?
- Does an unexplained delay in sending samples to the chemical examiner entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
- SALAH-UD-DIN Versus ZIA FARHAT1996 SCMR 1528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-04Read full judgment →
- ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED Versus SHABBIR AHMAD1996 SCMR 1525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-04Read full judgment →
- WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Versus BASHIR AHMAD1996 SCMR 1516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-07Read full judgment →
- MARYAM BIBI Versus CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, PUNJAB, LAHORE1996 SCMR 1483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, a Pakistani citizen who embraced Islam in 1942, sought a declaration that certain properties, including a bungalow at 10-Montgomery Road, Lahore, were non-evacuee properties. These properties were inherited by the appellant through a will from her mother, who had received them from the appellant's father prior to the 1947 partition. The Custodian of Evacuee Property had previously declared the entire 10-Montgomery Road property as evacuee property, relying on a prior decision involving a third party, and dismissed the appellant's application on the grounds of res judicata. The Supreme Court held that the Custodian's previous order was based on a misreading of an arbitration award and evidence, as the specific property in question had been excluded from the settlement between the appellant's father and his brothers. The Court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply where the prior decision is fundamentally flawed, illegal, or based on a misreading of the record, especially when the cause of justice demands a decision on merits. Consequently, the Court declared the specific property to be non-evacuee, setting aside the lower authorities' orders.
Questions settled- Can the doctrine of res judicata be invoked to bar a claim if the prior decision relied upon is based on a clear misreading of the record or is otherwise illegal?
- Does an order passed by a Custodian of Evacuee Property that exceeds the scope of the original application operate as a binding determination for all subsequent proceedings?
- Is a property inherited by a Pakistani citizen prior to the partition of 1947, which was never treated as evacuee property, subject to the jurisdiction of the Custodian of Evacuee Property?
- CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE Versus CHAMPION CLOCK COMPANY1996 SCMR 1468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-02Read full judgment →
- JAVAID IQBAL ABBASI & COMPANY Versus PROVINCE OF PUNJAB1996 SCMR 1433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-09Read full judgment →
- SUGHRAN BIBI Versus AZIZ BEGUM1996 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell occupancy rights in land. The trial court and first appellate court concurrently decreed the suit, finding that the initial agreement (Exh. P-1) was executed by all five co-owners, and a subsequent agreement (Exh. P-2) for additional payment was executed by one co-owner (Nazar Hussain) who managed the ladies' affairs. The High Court, in second appeal, reversed these findings and dismissed the suit, holding that the transaction was doubtful and the plaintiff's husband being a patwari suggested bad faith. The Supreme Court of Pakistan analyzed the scope of second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, reiterating that concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless there is a substantial procedural error, misreading, or perverse appreciation of evidence. The Court held that the High Court erred by relying on extraneous factors and ignoring the adverse inference arising from Nazar Hussain's failure to testify. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the decree for specific performance subject to the appellant paying the remaining co-owners their proportionate shares of the disputed payments.
Questions settled- Can a High Court in a second appeal disturb concurrent findings of fact solely because it disagrees with the lower courts' view of the evidence?
- What is the legal effect of a defendant's failure to testify to deny the execution of an agreement and receipt of consideration when the onus is on them?
- Can the equitable relief of specific performance be denied based on extraneous factors, such as the plaintiff's spouse being a local revenue official, without proof of undue advantage?
- MAROOF GILANI Versus PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN1996 SCMR 1353 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
- AKHTAR MAHMOOD, ADVOCATE Versus STATE1996 SCMR 1342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing the bail applications of the petitioners, who were charged with rioting, conspiracy, and other offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. The core legal questions were whether bail could be granted based solely on the State's non-opposition and whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the evidence and the principle of consistency. The Supreme Court held that bail cannot be granted merely on the State's concession without judicial examination of the merits. Furthermore, the Court determined that the prosecution failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe the petitioners committed the non-bailable offenses, as no specific role or evidence of firing was attributed to them, unlike other co-accused who had already been granted bail. The principle laid down is that while the State may seek to withdraw or not oppose prosecution, the Court must independently verify the existence of reasonable grounds for detention, ensuring consistency in the treatment of similarly situated accused persons.
Questions settled- Can a court grant bail merely on the basis of a concession made by the State counsel?
- What are the requirements for a court to grant consent for the withdrawal of prosecution under Section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does the principle of consistency apply when determining bail for co-accused persons facing similar allegations?
- Is a court required to independently examine the merits of a bail application even when the State does not oppose it?
- TAIMAR KHAN Versus FAZAL RABI1996 SCMR 123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-21Read full judgment →
- NASRULLAH JAN Versus RASTABAZ KHAN1996 SCMR 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-16Read full judgment →
- BASHIRAN BIBI Versus HIDAYATULLAH1996 SCMR 1051 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-15Read full judgment →
- ABDUL BARI Versus MUHAMMAD RASHEED KHAN1995 SCMR 974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding the restitution of property to the respondent. The dispute arose from competing claims over a shop, where the petitioner had initially obtained possession through a civil court decree that was later effectively superseded by a Supreme Court order recognizing the respondent's entitlement to the property upon payment of the auction price. The core legal question was whether the Civil Court could properly order restitution of the property to the respondent following the Supreme Court's final determination. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Court acted correctly in ordering restitution, emphasizing that its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, allowed it to ensure justice. The Court affirmed that when a decree under which possession was taken is subsequently reversed or modified by a higher forum, restitution is appropriate to prevent injustice. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, finding that interference would perpetuate an injustice rather than advance the cause of justice.
Questions settled- Can a Civil Court invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to order the restitution of property?
- Is restitution of property appropriate when the decree under which possession was originally obtained is subsequently reversed or modified by a higher court?
- Does the Supreme Court exercise its constitutional discretion to interfere with an order that, while potentially procedurally challenged, serves the ends of justice?
- ZARIN GUL Versus MALIK SAN1995 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-26Read full judgment →
- BABU Versus STATE1995 SCMR 862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-03Read full judgment →
- IRSHAD BIBI Versus MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE1995 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Constitution petition by the High Court, which had upheld an order of the Senior Member, Board of Revenue concerning the transfer of evacuee property. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner was in lawful pre-1961 occupation and entitled to the transfer of the disputed shop situated on Khasra No. 628, and whether he had validly relinquished his claim in favor of the National Bank of Pakistan. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the Board of Revenue and the High Court were unexceptionable, as the petitioner failed to prove possession of the correct Khasra number through his documents and had attempted to obtain orders through misrepresentation after relinquishing his claim. The key principle laid down is that constitutional jurisdiction will not be exercised to interfere with well-reasoned findings of fact based on thorough inquiries and record assessment where the petitioner's conduct involves misrepresentation and relinquishment of rights.
Questions settled- Whether High Court can interfere with findings of fact by the Board of Revenue based on thorough inquiry?
- Does relinquishment of a claim to evacuee property disentitle a party from its transfer?
- Is a party who misrepresents facts in judicial proceedings entitled to discretionary constitutional relief?
- HASSAN MASUD MALIK Versus MUHAMMAD IQBAL1995 SCMR 766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02Read full judgment →
- CHAIRMAN, PAKISTAN COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH, ISLAMABAD Versus KHALIDA RAZI1995 SCMR 698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-08Read full judgment →
- MIR MUHAMMAD Versus STATE1995 SCMR 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant under Section 13-E of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, for the possession of an unlicensed firearm, which was affirmed by the High Court of Balochistan. The core legal question presented was whether the recovery of the weapon was rendered illegal due to the failure of the police to associate two respectable inhabitants of the locality as witnesses, as purportedly required by Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court clarified that the provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply only to searches conducted by the police on their own initiative, not to recoveries made pursuant to information provided by or the pointation of the accused. The key principle laid down is that the mandatory requirement of associating independent witnesses from the locality under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is inapplicable where an accused person leads the police to a location and voluntarily facilitates the recovery of incriminating evidence.
Questions settled- Does the failure to associate independent witnesses from the locality under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 invalidate a recovery made on the pointation of an accused?
- Are police officials considered competent witnesses in criminal trials?
- Does Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to recoveries made pursuant to information provided by an accused?
- MUHAMMAD ANWAR KHAN Versus MUHAMMAD HASHIM1995 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-03Read full judgment →
- NOOR MUHAMMAD Versus ABDUL QADEEM1995 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This direct appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan which maintained the decree of the Majlis-e-Shoora in favor of the respondent regarding an evacuee shop. The core legal question concerned whether the appellant had established title to the property through adverse possession and whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Article 144 applies to suits for possession where the plaintiff was not previously dispossessed, placing the burden of proof squarely on the defendant to plead and prove open, continuous, and hostile possession. The Court laid down the principle that mere long-standing possession by a trespasser without specific pleading and proof of hostile intent and overt acts is insufficient to establish adverse possession, and that referring a dispute to arbitration breaks the continuity of any alleged adverse possession.
Questions settled- What is the distinction between Article 142 and Article 144 of the Limitation Act 1908 regarding the burden of proof and the computation of the limitation period?
- Can a defendant sustain a plea of adverse possession without expressly pleading and proving material facts such as the date of asserting hostile title and specific overt acts?
- Does referring a property dispute to arbitration constitute a break in the continuity of adverse possession?
- Is mere possession of an immovable property by a trespasser for more than twelve years sufficient in itself to establish adverse possession?
- GHULAM RASOOL Versus MUHAMMAD WARIS BISMAL1995 SCMR 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-21Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF Versus STATE1995 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 20-3-1994. The core legal questions raised involve the evaluation of the plea of self-defence, whether it must be accepted or rejected as a whole along with the accompanying explanation, the sustainability of a conviction under Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code based on the evidentiary record, the granting of the benefit of doubt when the defence plea appears more plausible than the prosecution version, and the legal effect of an unexplained two-day delay in lodging the first information report. The Supreme Court considered these contentions and held that leave to appeal should be granted to examine them in detail. The key principle laid down relates to the proper judicial scrutiny of self-defence pleas, the evaluation of prosecution delays, and the application of the benefit of the doubt to criminal defendants.
Questions settled- Whether the plea of self-defence must be accepted or rejected as a whole along with the explanation given by the accused?
- Whether an offence under Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code is made out from the evidence on record in the present case?
- Does an unexplained delay of two days in lodging the first information report cast serious doubt on the prosecution case?
- Is the benefit of the doubt to be extended to the accused if the defence plea sounds more plausible than the prosecution version?
- ALLAH BAKHSH Versus ABDUL REHMAN1995 SCMR 459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-15Read full judgment →
- PERVAIZ ANJUM GHAURI Versus ABDUL RAHIM1995 SCMR 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-11Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN Versus ABDUL QADAR1995 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-13Read full judgment →
- SULAIMAN Versus MUHAMMAD DAUD KHAN1995 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-25Read full judgment →
- BASHIRAN Versus ABDUL GHANI1995 SCMR 1833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-06Read full judgment →
- GHULAM MUSTAFA Versus STATE1995 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-01Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD SHAFQAT BAIG Versus MAZHAR HUSSAIN MINHAS, ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, RAWALPINDI1995 SCMR 1720 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the liability to pay court fees on a memorandum of appeal arising from a family court decree for maintenance. The core legal question was whether the appellant was required to pay court fees on an appeal against a maintenance decree, specifically considering the impact of the Punjab Court Fees (Abolition) Ordinance, 1983, and the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not liable to pay court fees. The Court reasoned that the artificial valuation method for maintenance suits under Section 7(ii) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, does not apply to the appellate stage. Furthermore, since the subject matter of the appeal—the total maintenance decreed—was less than the Rs. 25,000 threshold, the exemption under Section 2 of the Punjab Court Fees (Abolition) Ordinance, 1983, applied. The Court established the principle that the fiction of 'ten times the annual amount' used for valuing maintenance suits at the trial stage cannot be extended to determine the value of the subject matter for court fee purposes at the appellate stage.
Questions settled- Does the artificial valuation method for maintenance suits under Section 7(ii) of the Court Fees Act 1870 apply to the valuation of a memorandum of appeal?
- Is Section 19 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 applicable to the memorandum of appeal filed against a family court judgment?
- Does the exemption from court fees under Section 2 of the Punjab Court Fees (Abolition) Ordinance 1983 apply to appeals where the subject matter is less than twenty-five thousand rupees?
- Can the court-fee valuation fiction for maintenance suits be extended to the appellate stage?
- ABDUR RAZZAQ Versus SAEEDA FATIMA1995 SCMR 1697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a 'Mukhbari' application filed by the appellants challenging the allotment of agricultural land to respondent No. 1 in Mauza Dipalpur. The appellants contended that the respondent's verified claim was in respect of 'Muafi' (charitable/trust) land, which under Paragraph 57 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme 1956 was capped at 500 Produce Index Units (P.I. Units). They also claimed a preferential right to the allotment as they had transferred their units to the village earlier. The Supreme Court examined the relevant Jamabandis and found that, except for 63 units, the land was registered as the personal inherited property of the respondent and her father, and the mere remission of land revenue for charitable purposes did not convert personal ownership into a trust. The Court further held that as a temporary allottee in the village, the respondent possessed a preferential right under Paragraph 9-A of the Scheme. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment.
Questions settled- Does the mere remission of land revenue for charitable purposes convert personal ownership of land into a charitable trust or 'Muafi' land under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme 1956?
- Does a temporary allottee of land have a preferential right of settlement over other claimants who transfer their units to the same village before the allotment is finalized?
- What is the statutory limit on the allotment of land against verified claims for 'Muafi' land under Paragraph 57 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme 1956?
- TARIQ Versus STATE1995 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the sentencing of the appellant, Arif, who was convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Barkat Ali. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to the lesser penalty of life imprisonment rather than the death sentence, given that he committed the offense under the influence and exhortation of his mother and sister following a family dispute over a marriage proposal. The Court held that the appellant's actions were driven by the pressure and influence of his relatives, which served as a mitigating factor. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeal, maintaining the conviction but altering the sentence from death to imprisonment for life, while also imposing a fine and granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The judgment reinforces the principle that mitigating circumstances, such as acting under the undue influence or exhortation of family members, may justify the imposition of a lesser penalty in capital cases.
Questions settled- Can acting under the influence and exhortation of family members serve as a mitigating factor for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
- Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a sentence of life imprisonment?
- MUSHARAF KHAN Versus SHERIN KHAN1995 SCMR 1661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns four appeals against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding the ejectment of a tenant from a shop. The core legal questions were whether the tenant's removal of a temporary partition wall between two rented portions of the shop constituted impairment of the property's value or utility, and whether the tenant had engaged in unauthorized subletting. The Supreme Court held that the removal of a non-structural partition wall, particularly when it facilitates the intended use of the premises, does not ipso facto impair the value or utility of the property. The Court found that the landlord failed to prove structural damage or that the removal was likely to cause such impairment. Regarding subletting, the Court held that while the burden of proof shifts to the tenant once a landlord shows a third party is using the premises, the tenant here provided a satisfactory explanation that the alleged sub-tenant was merely a former servant. Consequently, the Court set aside the ejectment order, ruling that neither ground for eviction was established.
Questions settled- Does the removal of a non-structural partition wall by a tenant automatically constitute impairment of the value or utility of the rented premises?
- When does the burden of proof shift from the landlord to the tenant regarding the allegation of subletting?
- Is a tenant liable for ejectment if they remove a partition wall that was not structural and whose removal was consistent with the intended use of the premises?
- RIAZ AHMAD Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-19Read full judgment →
- ZAHID FAROOQ Versus ANJUMAN JAMIA MASJID1995 SCMR 1584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that declared a plot of land to be Waqf property and set aside its unauthorized sale. The core legal questions were whether the plot, purchased for a mosque, constituted Waqf property and whether the person who purchased it, acting as a Mutawalli, possessed the legal authority to alienate it without judicial sanction. The Supreme Court held that the plot was indeed Waqf property, as it was permanently dedicated to the mosque, evidenced by the Property Transfer Document. The Court affirmed that under Islamic Law, a Mutawalli lacks the power to sell, mortgage, or exchange Waqf property without the express permission of a court, unless the Waqf deed explicitly authorizes such alienation. The Court emphasized that the Civil Court has effectively replaced the Kazi as the state functionary responsible for overseeing Waqf administration. Consequently, the sale was declared void for lack of judicial authorization. The principle established is that Waqf property vests in the Almighty, and any alienation by a manager requires judicial oversight to protect the trust.
Questions settled- Does a Mutawalli have the authority to sell, mortgage, or exchange Waqf property without the permission of a court?
- What is the legal status of a person who purchases property for a mosque in terms of their power to alienate that property?
- Which state functionary has replaced the Kazi in the administration and oversight of Waqf properties in Pakistan?
- Does the use of sale proceeds for the benefit of a mosque constitute sufficient evidence to establish that the property sold was Waqf property?
- ABDUL GHAFOOR Versus MUHAMMAD FAZIL1995 SCMR 1561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a High Court judgment concerning a pre-emption suit originally filed on grounds of tenancy and co-ownership. The core legal question was whether the enactment of the Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1976, which added sub-paragraph (5) to paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, mandating the exclusive transfer of pre-emption suits involving tenancy rights to the Collector, rendered the Civil Court's proceedings coram non judice. The Supreme Court held that the appeal should be dismissed. The Court reasoned that because the plaintiffs had abandoned their tenancy claims during the proceedings, the suit was no longer founded on tenancy rights, thereby falling outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector. Consequently, the Civil Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the remaining claim based on co-ownership. The Court further observed that the appellants' objection regarding jurisdiction, raised for the first time at the appellate stage without demonstrating any prejudice, was hyper-technical and legally untenable. The judgment affirms that procedural technicalities regarding jurisdiction do not invalidate proceedings where the substantive basis for the special jurisdiction has been abandoned.
Questions settled- Does a pre-emption suit based on composite rights (tenancy and co-ownership) automatically stand transferred to the Collector under sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972?
- Can a party raise an objection to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for the first time in the Supreme Court when the objection was not pursued in the lower courts?
- Does a Civil Court lose jurisdiction over a pre-emption suit if the plaintiff abandons the claim based on tenancy rights during the pendency of the suit?
- ABDUR RAZZAQ Versus SHAH JEHAN1995 SCMR 1489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a property dispute between the heirs of the deceased, Miangul Sherin. The appellants claimed ownership of the suit property based on documents executed by the deceased, while the respondents sought their share of the inheritance. The core legal question was whether these documents constituted valid gifts (Hiba) or wills. The Supreme Court held that the nature of a document is determined by its substance rather than its title. Under Islamic law, a valid gift requires the immediate transfer of possession, whereas a will takes effect after death and, if made in favor of an heir, requires the consent of other heirs to be valid. The Court found that one document regarding a house constituted a valid gift due to the delivery of possession, while other documents regarding land were wills and, lacking the consent of other heirs, were invalid. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that objections regarding the formal proof of documents must be raised at the trial stage and cannot be introduced for the first time during an appeal.
Questions settled- Is the nature of a document determined by its title or its substance?
- What is the essential requirement for the validity of a gift (Hiba) under Islamic law?
- Is a will made in favor of an heir valid without the consent of other heirs?
- Can an objection regarding the formal proof of a document be raised for the first time at the appellate stage?
- FAZAL QADEEM Versus AMIN KHAN1995 SCMR 1426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the parties entered into a compromise before the trial court. Pursuant to the compromise application, the trial court passed a consent decree allowing pre-emption of a portion of the land upon payment of a specified sum directly to the vendees within one month. The pre-emptor failed to pay the pre-emption money within the prescribed timeframe, leading the respondents to seek dismissal of the suit. The trial court, Additional District Judge, and Peshawar High Court consecutively held that non-payment resulted in the dismissal of the suit. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower decisions, holding that a consent decree passed in a pre-emption suit remains governed by Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The court held that fixing a timeframe for payment is required by law, and default in paying the pre-emption money within the period specified by the court automatically results in dismissal of the suit, notwithstanding the omission of a explicit default clause in the decree.
Questions settled- Does a consent decree passed in a pre-emption suit attract the statutory requirements of Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a court specify a timeframe for payment of pre-emption money under Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the compromise application does not provide one?
- Does the non-payment of pre-emption money within the court-specified time entail dismissal of the pre-emption suit even if the consent order omits a default clause?
- MUHAMMAD MANSHA Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 for possessing 20 kg of heroin. The core legal questions involve the mandatory compliance with search witness requirements under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the evaluation of a plea of false police implication arising from a prior habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that the failure of the investigating officer to associate two respectable inhabitants of the locality as search witnesses—relying instead on a single public witness—vitiated the search proceedings. Furthermore, the Court established that when a habeas corpus petition is filed against the arresting police officer immediately prior to the alleged recovery, a reasonable possibility of false implication exists, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt.
Questions settled- Does the failure to associate two respectable inhabitants of the locality as witnesses vitiate search proceedings under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does joining only a single witness from the public fulfill the mandatory requirements of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Whether the filing of a habeas corpus petition against the arresting officer immediately prior to an alleged recovery creates a reasonable probability of false implication?
- ABDUL KHALIQ Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge for the offences of abduction and Zina-bil-Jabr, which was subsequently upheld and the sentence enhanced by the Federal Shariat Court. The core legal question was whether the testimony of the prosecutrix could be relied upon to sustain a conviction for Zina-bil-Jabr when both the trial court and the appellate court had concurrently found that the prosecutrix was a consenting party to the sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutrix, having been found to be a woman of easy virtue who voluntarily submitted to the appellant's lust, lacked credibility. By falsely alleging forcible abduction and rape, she compromised her integrity, rendering her an undependable witness whose testimony could not be rehabilitated by corroborative evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence, establishing the principle that where a prosecutrix is found to be a consenting party and has made false allegations of force, her testimony is unreliable and insufficient to support a conviction for Zina-bil-Jabr.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for Zina-bil-Jabr be sustained based on the testimony of a prosecutrix who has been found to be a consenting party?
- Does the making of a false allegation of abduction and rape by a prosecutrix render her testimony unreliable for the purpose of a criminal conviction?
- Can corroborative evidence rehabilitate the testimony of a witness who has been found to be fundamentally untruthful regarding the core allegations of force?
- ATTA MUHAMMAD ALIAS FAUJI Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Atta Muhammad alias Fauji, who was convicted by a Magistrate under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for the possession of heroin and opium. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution successfully established the time and circumstances of the appellant's arrest and the subsequent recovery of narcotics, given the appellant's defense of false implication. The Court examined the testimony of defense witnesses, including journalists, who corroborated the appellant's claim that he was in police custody prior to the date of the alleged recovery, as evidenced by press reports regarding a police press conference held before the purported arrest date. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's version of events was demonstrably false, as the appellant was clearly in police custody at least two days before the alleged recovery. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The key principle established is that when defense evidence, supported by contemporaneous public records, contradicts the prosecution's timeline of arrest and recovery, the prosecution's case cannot be sustained.
Questions settled- Can a conviction be sustained when defense evidence proves the accused was in police custody prior to the alleged date of recovery?
- Does the publication of news reports regarding an arrest prior to the official recovery date undermine the credibility of prosecution witnesses?
- Is the statement of an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sufficient to raise a plea of false involvement if supported by independent evidence?
- SHAMOON ALIAS SHAMMA Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The trial court had rejected the ocular testimony but convicted the appellant based solely on his statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, wherein he admitted to the killing but claimed it was committed under grave and sudden provocation upon finding the deceased with his wife. The trial court accepted the admission of the killing but discarded the plea of provocation. The core legal question was whether a court can selectively accept only the inculpatory part of an accused's statement while rejecting the exculpatory part. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt before the burden shifts to the accused. If a conviction is based solely on a statement under Section 342, the court must accept the statement in its entirety or reject it; it cannot pick and choose parts to secure a conviction. Consequently, the Court accepted the plea of grave and sudden provocation, converted the conviction to Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone.
Questions settled- Can a court selectively accept the inculpatory part of an accused's statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, while rejecting the exculpatory part?
- Does the prosecution need to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt before the burden of proof shifts to the accused to establish a defense?
- Is it permissible to convict an accused based solely on a partial reliance on his statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- RASOOL MUHAMMAD Versus ASAL MUHAMMAD1995 SCMR 1373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a murder case where the respondents were initially convicted by the trial court but subsequently acquitted by the Peshawar High Court. The complainant challenged the acquittal, arguing that the ocular evidence was corroborated by medical evidence and the respondents' abscondence. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court’s acquittal was perverse or disregarded evidence. The Court held that the High Court’s assessment of the evidence was supportable. Crucially, the Court ruled that an accused cannot be prejudiced by a circumstance—such as the contents of an FIR lodged by the accused—if that specific circumstance was not put to the accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that abscondence, while suspicious, does not constitute per se proof of guilt. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the acquittal, establishing that it will not disturb an acquittal unless the findings are perverse or in total disregard of the evidence on record.
Questions settled- Can a circumstance not put to an accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used against him?
- Is abscondence of an accused sufficient proof of guilt in a murder case?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court?
- FALAK SHER ALIAS SHERU Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for robbery under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The core legal question concerns whether the conviction of an accused, who was previously known to the complainant but omitted from the First Information Report (FIR), can be sustained based on a subsequent supplementary statement. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was unsustainable and acquitted the appellant. The Court established the principle that a supplementary statement recorded by the police during investigation cannot be equated with or read as part of the FIR. Where an accused is previously known to the complainant, the failure to name them in the FIR creates a significant doubt regarding their involvement, which cannot be cured by later improvements. The Court observed that such improvements by the complainant and witnesses render their testimony unreliable. Consequently, the Court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellant, set aside the conviction, and ordered his immediate release.
Questions settled- Can a supplementary statement recorded during investigation be equated with or read as part of the First Information Report?
- Does the failure to name a previously known accused in the First Information Report entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
- Is the testimony of witnesses reliable when they make improvements to their initial statements during trial?
- TARIQ PERVEZ Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1345 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, Tariq Pervez, was tried and convicted under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 for selling and possessing heroin. The Federal Shariat Court set aside the conviction under Article 3 but maintained the conviction and sentence under Article 4. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the core legal question was whether the failure of the prosecution to send the correct sample parcel to the Chemical Examiner creates a reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that where two separate parcels of heroin were prepared but only one was sent to the Chemical Examiner, and it cannot be identified with certainty which parcel was examined, a reasonable doubt arises. The key principle laid down is that an accused person is entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the prosecution's case.
Questions settled- Does the failure to send the correct sample parcel to the Chemical Examiner entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
- Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when a reasonable doubt is created in a prudent mind?
- What is the effect on the prosecution case when two separate sample parcels are prepared but only one is sent for chemical analysis?
- ZAHOOR AHMAD Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-26Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD FAZIL Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from criminal proceedings wherein the petitioner, Muhammad Fazil, along with others, was convicted under Section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, Section 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the forcible abduction of a minor girl and the murder of her grandfather during the occurrence. The convictions and sentences were upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner could be held constructively liable under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder committed by a co-accused when the petitioner himself was empty-handed and did not inflict any injury on the deceased. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner shared a common object as part of an unlawful assembly to commit abduction, and given that a co-accused was openly carrying a firearm, the petitioner could foresee resistance and knew that murder was a likely outcome. The key principle laid down is that in cases of forcible abduction by an unlawful assembly where a member is visibly armed with a lethal weapon, participating members are fixed with the knowledge that resistance may result in homicide, thus attracting constructive liability under the second part of Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.
Questions settled- Whether an unarmed member of an unlawful assembly can be convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for a murder committed by a co-accused during the course of a forcible abduction?
- Does an assembly that was initially lawful subsequently become an unlawful assembly under Section 141 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if its members proceed to commit a crime?
- Is a participant in the forcible abduction of a woman fixed with the knowledge under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 that resistance by relatives might lead to murder when a co-accused is visibly carrying a firearm?
- SHAUKAT ALI Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-03Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD SHARIF SABIR Versus SECRETARY, INTERIOR DIVISION, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD1995 SCMR 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-29Read full judgment →
- JAMIA MAHMOODIA MASJID Versus ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER (REVENUE), MULTAN DIVISION1995 SCMR 1243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that interfered with findings of fact made by settlement tribunals regarding the transfer of urban property. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, was justified in setting aside the findings of the Deputy Administrator and the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) that the respondents were tenants of the appellant mosque, rather than owners entitled to the transfer of the disputed property. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by re-evaluating evidence and acting as an appellate court, thereby exceeding its constitutional jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that findings of fact recorded by tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction are not open to interference in constitutional jurisdiction unless based on no evidence, misreading, or non-reading of evidence. The Court established that where tribunals have relied on valid evidence—such as rent receipts, excise records, and admissions—the High Court cannot substitute its own assessment of facts or re-weigh evidence, as judicial review is not an appeal.
Questions settled- Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact recorded by a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
- Is a finding of fact by a tribunal immune from interference in constitutional jurisdiction if it is supported by oral and documentary evidence?
- Does the High Court have the authority to re-weigh evidence or act as a court of appeal when exercising its constitutional jurisdiction?
- KHURSHID BEGUM Versus CHIRAGH MUHAMMAD1995 SCMR 1237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-09Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD SANAULLAH Versus SHAMIM NAZ KAUSAR1995 SCMR 1208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-14Read full judgment →
- ALLAH DITTA Versus KHURSHID BIBI1995 SCMR 1203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-12Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD NAWAZ Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1094-02-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's judgment, which had upheld the petitioner's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the subsequent sentence of death. The core legal question concerned the applicability of a Presidential Amnesty order dated 7-12-1988 to the petitioner's death sentence, given that the trial court's judgment was rendered on 22-1-1986. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but held that the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the Amnesty order, which extended to all convicts sentenced to death by courts up to 6-12-1988, regardless of whether the sentence had been confirmed by higher courts on appeal. Consequently, the Court commuted the petitioner's death sentence to life imprisonment and directed that the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be applied regarding the computation of the sentence. The principle laid down is that presidential amnesty orders covering death sentences apply to all such sentences passed by the cut-off date, irrespective of appellate confirmation status.
Questions settled- Does a Presidential Amnesty order covering death sentences apply to convicts whose sentences were confirmed by higher courts after the amnesty date?
- Is a convict entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment?
- Does the cut-off date for a Presidential Amnesty order regarding death sentences apply to the date of the trial court's judgment?
- MUHAMMAD RAMZAN Versus GENERAL IRON STORES1995 SCMR 1125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-09-01Read full judgment →
- MEHBOOB SHAH Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-21Read full judgment →
- UMAR HAYAT Versus STATE1995 SCMR 1005 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09Read full judgment →
- FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Versus MUHAMMAD SHAFI MUHAMMADI, ADVOCATE1994 SCMR 932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves appeals directed against a common judgment of the Federal Shariat Court concerning the validity of Article 16 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, relating to the competency and evidentiary value of an accomplice's testimony under Islamic Injunctions. The core legal questions revolved around whether the testimony of an accomplice is admissible in offenses punishable with Hadd, Qisas, and Ta'zir, and whether a conviction based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony is legally sustainable. By majority view, the Supreme Court held that the evidence of an accomplice is completely inadmissible in offenses punishable with Hadd or Qisas. In cases of Ta'zir, an accomplice's testimony is admissible and can form the basis of a conviction provided it is corroborated in material particulars, though the majority noted that in exceptional cases, for reasons recorded, uncorroborated testimony might suffice, whereas the minority view maintained that corroboration is strictly mandatory. The Court laid down that statutory provisions must harmonize with Islamic Injunctions, rendering accomplice evidence inadmissible in Hadd and Qisas, and subject to strict corroboration requirements in Ta'zir.
Questions settled- Is the testimony of an accomplice admissible in offenses punishable with Hadd or Qisas under Islamic law?
- Can a conviction for an offense punishable with Ta'zir be based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice?
- How is Article 16 to be harmonized with illustration (b) to Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984?
- Does the Holy Qur'an require the verification of news brought by a sinful person before taking action upon it?
- AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN Versus MUHAMMAD ANWAR BAJWA1994 SCMR 852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-26Read full judgment →
- ANNAPORNA DUTT Versus STATE OF U.P.1994 SCMR 611 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-09-24Read full judgment →
- SHAH MUHAMMAD Versus IMTIAZ AHMAD1994 SCMR 579 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-19Read full judgment →