Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• GHULAM HUSSAIN AND Another vs THE STATE .1970 P Cr. L J 165 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-15Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HAIDER vs The STATE1970 P Cr. L J 640 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-03Read full judgment →
• GHULAM FATIMA vs Syed ZAFAR HUSSAIN WASTI AND Other1970 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-12
  special leave to appealproperty transferestoppelProvisional Transfer Ordersettlement authoritiesdisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside a transfer order issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in favor of the petitioner, Mst. Ghulam Fatima, regarding a disputed property. The respondent, a non-claimant displaced person, had successfully challenged the transfer, obtaining a direction for the transfer of the ground floor to himself. The petitioner, a claimant displaced person, contends that the respondent is estopped from challenging the transfer because he failed to object when the Deputy Settlement Commissioner visited the premises, and because she incurred significant renovation expenses on the property in reliance on his conduct. Furthermore, the petitioner challenges the legal validity of the Additional Settlement Commissioner accepting the respondent's transfer form after a Provisional Transfer Order had already been issued to her. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the issues regarding estoppel and the authority of the Additional Settlement Commissioner to accept late transfer applications after the issuance of a Provisional Transfer Order merit further judicial consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party be estopped from challenging a property transfer if they failed to object when the property was initially transferred to another person?
  • Is it legally permissible for an Additional Settlement Commissioner to accept a transfer form after a Provisional Transfer Order has already been issued to another party?
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• GHULAM AKBER vs THE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 268 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-12-18Read full judgment →
• GHULAM AKBAR vs "THE STATE '1970 P Cr. L J 1309 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-04Read full judgment →
• GHULAM AKBAR Alias CHAPOO vs THE STATE1970 PLD Karachi 621 · Sindh High Court · 1970-02-10Read full judgment →
• GHULAM AHMAD AND Other vs Mst. RABIA BIBI AND OTHSRS1970 PLD Azad J & K 1 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1969-11-03Read full judgment →
• GHULAM AHMAD AND 42 Others vs D. C., GUJRAT AND Another1970 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-13
  limitationcondonation of delayspecial leave to appealsenior counsel absencecivil matter
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for special leave directed against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan summarily dismissing a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution. The petition was filed seven days beyond the period of limitation. The core legal question concerns whether the absence of a senior counsel during court vacation constitutes a sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing a civil petition. The Supreme Court held that the unavailability of a senior counsel is not a sufficient excuse for delay, as a junior counsel or alternative counsel could have filed the petition, and valuable rights accruing to the opposite party cannot be defeated on such grounds. The court dismissed the petition as being barred by time, laying down the principle that courts will not condone delay merely to suit the personal convenience of counsel.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a senior counsel during court vacation constitute a sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing a petition?
  • Can valuable rights accrued to an opposite party be defeated on the grounds of counsel's convenience?
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• GHULAM ABBAS vs ZAFAR ALI AND 3 OTHERSs1970 P Cr. L J 1075 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-25
  murderinterested witnesscorroborationacquittalspecial leave to appealappreciation of evidenceblood-feud
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the testimony of interested eye-witnesses due to a lack of independent corroboration in a case marked by long-standing blood-feud enmity. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was justified, noting that the prosecution failed to provide reliable corroborative evidence, such as the Ballistic Expert report, and that the eye-witnesses were close relatives of the deceased. Furthermore, the Court observed that the prosecution had attempted to implicate individuals with no clear motive, and that the eye-witnesses had made improvements to their statements to align with medical evidence. The principle laid down is that where eye-witnesses are interested and there is deep-seated enmity, their testimony requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction, and the appellate court's refusal to rely on uncorroborated evidence in such circumstances is not perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of interested eye-witnesses sufficient for conviction in a murder case without independent corroboration?
  • Can an appellate court reject the evidence of eye-witnesses if they are found to be interested and their testimony lacks corroboration?
  • Does the failure to produce a Ballistic Expert report weaken the prosecution's case in a murder trial?
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• M. A. CHOWDHURY MD. AYUB SIDDIQUE vs MESSRS MITSUI O. S. K. LINES LTD.1970 PLD Supreme Court 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  exclusive jurisdiction clausebill of ladingouster of jurisdictionContract Act section 28stay of suitforeign jurisdictionarbitration clausediscretion of court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These appeals raised a common question of law concerning the validity and effect of exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses contained in bills of lading. The trial court and the High Court had treated such a clause as ousting the jurisdiction of domestic courts, leading to the return of plaints or dismissal. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether such clauses violate section 28 of the Contract Act and whether they completely oust the jurisdiction of municipal courts. The Court held that an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause does not absolutely oust the jurisdiction of domestic courts, but is properly construed as being in the nature of an arbitration clause falling within the exceptions to section 28 of the Contract Act. Consequently, domestic courts retain a judicial discretion to stay proceedings or allow the suit to proceed, applying principles analogous to arbitration stay applications, and the burden lies upon the party seeking to enforce the foreign jurisdiction clause to satisfy the court that it is just and equitable to do so. The appeals were accordingly allowed and the matters remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause in a bill of lading absolutely oust the jurisdiction of municipal courts in Pakistan?
  • How should exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses be treated under section 28 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Whether domestic courts possess the discretion to stay proceedings instituted in breach of an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause?
  • Upon which party lies the burden of proof to justify staying proceedings in the face of a foreign jurisdiction clause?
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• GHULAM ABBAS vs ZAFAR ALI AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 52 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-25
  special leave to appealacquittalinterested witnessescorroborationblood-feudappreciation of evidencemurder
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a criminal judgment of the West Pakistan High Court, Lahore, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The petitioner, brother of one of the deceased, challenged the acquittal. The core legal question involved the propriety of the High Court's appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the necessity of corroboration for interested and related witnesses in a double murder case arising from a blood-feud, and the evaluation of circumstantial evidence such as recoveries and abscondence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court was fully justified in acquitting the respondents, as the eye-witnesses were closely related and interested, their testimony lacked independent corroboration, and medical and recovery evidence did not support the prosecution case. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an acquittal order based on a plausible and proper appreciation of evidence unless the conclusions of the appellate court are perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related and interested eye-witnesses requires independent corroboration in a murder case?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an appellate court's order of acquittal that is based on a proper appreciation of evidence?
  • Does the mere abscondence of accused persons for a short duration provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction?
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• GHAZANFAR KHAN AND Others vs TAJ MUHAMMAD AND Other1970 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-02
  warabandiwater rightscanal authoritiesstatutory noticeevacuee landleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a civil dispute concerning water rights and warabandi alterations. The core legal question is whether a canal order altering water rights, made without issuing the statutory notice required to affected landowners, is binding upon them and whether subsequent construction of brickwork outlets can substitute for such notice. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts and the High Court correctly decided in favor of the respondents, ruling that the 1952 canal order was legally ineffective against the plaintiffs because they were not given the mandatory notice under Section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act before their water rights were curtailed. The key principle laid down is that landowners possessing vested water rights cannot be bound by unnotified administrative orders affecting those rights, and any alteration must be strictly preceded by due notice and process of law.

  Questions settled

  • Is a canal order altering warabandi binding on landowners when issued without the statutory notice required by Section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act?
  • Does the construction of brickwork outlets in compliance with an unnotified order cure the lack of statutory notice to affected parties?
  • Are allottees of evacuee land entitled to hold their vested water rights intact until disturbed in due course of law?
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• GHALIB HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 969 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-30Read full judgment →
• GENERAL SECRETARY, UNION KARKUNANE BROOKE BOND (PAKISTAN) LTD., RAWALPINDI vs THE CHAIRMAN, BROOKE BOND (PAKISTAN) LTD, KARACHI1970 PLC 670 · Industrial Court · 1970-07-20Read full judgment →
• GENERAL SECRETARY, P. W. R. STORES UNION (Ret3d.), LAHORE vs THE MANAGEMENT OF PAKISTAN WESTERN RAILWAY AND 2 OTHERS1970 PLC 186 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-06-21Read full judgment →
• GENERAL SECRETARY, P. P. L. WORKERS' UNION (REGD.) vs MANAGEMENT, PROGRESSIVE PAPERS- LTD., LAHORE1970 PLC 671 · Industrial Court · 1970-08-13Read full judgment →
• GENERAL SECRETARY, FERTILIZER FACTORY EMPLOYEES' UNION vs MESSRS PAK-1970 PLC 195 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-04-30Read full judgment →
• GENERAL MANAGER, PROGRESSIVE PAPERS LTD. vs GENERAL SECRETARY, PROGRESSIVE PAPERS LIMITED WORKERS' UNION AND OTHERS1970 PLC 504 · Industrial Court · 1970-04-24Read full judgment →
• G.D. AMIN vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 3 · Sindh High Court · 1970-06-23Read full judgment →
• G. M. PFAFF A. G.S vs SARTAJ ENGINEEEZING Co. LTD., LAHORE AND 3 Other1970 PLD Lahore 184 · Lahore High Court · 1969-04-24
  stay of suitforeign arbitrationinternational chamber of commercewritten statementstep in the proceedingsarticles of associationtrademark infringementtemporary injunction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This first appeal from order was filed against the decision of the District Judge, Lahore, which stayed a suit brought by the appellant (a foreign public company) against respondent No. 3 (a joint venture company) pursuant to Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 and discharged an ad interim temporary injunction. The appellant had sued for trademark infringement, seeking damages and injunctions. Respondent No. 3 resisted the suit relying on arbitration clauses in its Articles of Association providing for settlement of disputes under the International Chamber of Commerce rules. The appellant argued that the arbitration clause violated Section 152 of the Companies Act 1913, that no formal application under Section 34 had been filed, and that submitting a reply to an injunction application constituted a step in the proceedings.

  The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 47 of the Arbitration Act 1940 saves arbitrations governed by other laws, specifically the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937, under which foreign arbitral agreements and awards are valid and enforceable. Filing a reply to a temporary injunction application does not constitute a 'written statement' or a 'step in the proceedings' that disentitles a defendant from seeking a stay. A formal application under Section 34 is not strictly required if non-submission to the court's jurisdiction is unequivocally raised.

  Questions settled

  • Does an arbitration clause in the Articles of Association specifying International Chamber of Commerce rules violate Section 152 of the Companies Act 1913?
  • Does filing a reply to a temporary injunction application constitute filing a written statement or taking a step in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Is a formal separate application mandatory for seeking a stay of suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Are foreign arbitration agreements governed by the International Chamber of Commerce rules recognized and enforceable under the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937?
  Read full judgment →
• G. E. C. (PRIVATE) LTD., NAINI vs LABOUR COURT, ALLAHABAD AND OTHERS1970 PLC 530 · Supreme Court of India · -Read full judgment →
• G HAFFAR vs Tim STATE-1970 P Cr. L J 696 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-14Read full judgment →
• FIVE REPRESENTATIVES OF WORKMEN OF BATALA ENGINEERING Co. LTD. vs MANAGING DIRECTOR, BATALA ENGINEERING Co. LTD., LAHORE1970 PLC 506 · Industrial Court · 1970-03-05Read full judgment →
• FIVE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WORKMEN OF MEHAR TEXTILE MILLS1970 PLC 25 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-03-11Read full judgment →
• FIRDUS KHAN vs Sayid AZAM SHAH AND 14 Other1970 PLD Peshawar 141 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-06-05
  redemption of mortgageunregistered mortgage deedmutation proceedingsco-mortgagormode of proofsuo motu powerssecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arises from a suit for the redemption of mortgaged land. The core legal questions involve whether a co-mortgagor can maintain a redemption suit for the entire estate, whether an unregistered mortgage deed coupled with a revenue mutation creates a valid interest or can be received in evidence, whether objections to the mode of proof of documents can be raised for the first time in appeal, and whether an appellate court can interfere with a decree suo motu without an appeal or cross-objections. The Peshawar High Court held that a co-mortgagor can sue to redeem the entire estate to avoid multiplicity of suits, that an unregistered mortgage requiring registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act is inadmissible in evidence under Section 49 and cannot be validated by mutation proceedings, that objections to the mode of proof cannot be raised for the first time in appeal, and that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to modify a decree suo motu without an appeal or cross-objections. The appeal was accepted and a preliminary decree for redemption was granted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-mortgagor maintain a suit for the redemption of the entire mortgaged estate?
  • Does an unregistered mortgage deed requiring registration create a valid interest or become admissible in evidence through mutation proceedings?
  • At what stage must an objection to the mode of proof of a document be raised?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with a trial court decree suo motu without an appeal or cross-objections being filed?
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• FEROZE KHAN vs THB STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1141 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-27Read full judgment →
• FEROZ DIN vs SHEIKH AHMAD1970 PLD Peshawar 54 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-10-17Read full judgment →
• FAZAL MUHAMMAD vs MUHAMMAD USMAN1970 PLD Lahore 560 · Lahore High Court · 1968-12-03
  specific reliefrestoration of possessiondisplaced personsrevisional jurisdictioncivil court jurisdictionagreement to sellcompensation pool
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision petition challenges a trial court decree in a suit for restoration of possession filed under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The petitioner contended that the suit was barred by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, arguing that the property formed part of the compensation pool and that the underlying sale agreement was void. The core legal questions concerned whether civil courts possess jurisdiction to entertain such suits despite the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, and whether an agreement to sell property pending the issuance of a permanent transfer order is legally enforceable. The Court held that the suit was competent, ruling that Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 does not conflict with the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, as the former concerns possessory rights rather than title or settlement claims. It further established that agreements to sell property in anticipation of future title are not void. Finally, the Court affirmed that findings of fact regarding possession are not subject to interference in revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for restoration of possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 barred by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Is an agreement to sell property, made pending the issuance of a permanent transfer order, void?
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to determine a suit for possession of property that is part of a compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can findings of fact regarding possession be challenged in revisional proceedings under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• FAZAL MUHAMMAD AND Another LAL vs THF STATE- THF STATE (a) Criminal1970 P Cr. L J 858 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08Read full judgment →
• FAZAL MUHAMMAD AND Another LAL vs THE STATE THE STATE1970 SCMR 405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  criminal appealmurderunlawful assemblyinterested witnessesmedical evidencebenefit of doubtsuppression of injuriesjudicial consistency
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the guilt of the appellants, given the reliance on interested witnesses and the presence of significant contradictions in the prosecution's narrative. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was inherently improbable and failed to inspire confidence. Specifically, the court noted that the medical evidence regarding the trajectory of wounds contradicted the prosecution's theory that assailants fired from a rooftop. Furthermore, the prosecution suppressed the fact that members of the accused party also sustained injuries, indicating a mutual confrontation. The Court also criticized the lower courts for ignoring findings from a prior trial that no unlawful assembly existed, leading to inconsistent judicial outcomes. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution suppresses material facts, relies on interested witnesses, and presents a narrative contradicted by physical evidence, the resulting doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, necessitating acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution suppresses material circumstances such as injuries sustained by the accused party?
  • Does medical evidence regarding wound trajectories that contradicts the prosecution's theory of the crime create sufficient doubt to warrant acquittal?
  • Is it legally permissible for a trial court to ignore findings of fact regarding the existence of an unlawful assembly established in a previous trial involving the same incident?
  • Under what conditions can evidence from a previous judicial proceeding be admitted in a subsequent trial under the Evidence Act 1872?
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• FAZAL DIN vs WALI MUHAMMAD AND 5 Other1970 SCMR 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-24
  compromise decreewrit jurisdictionspecial leave to appealestoppeljurisdictionproperty dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated from a property transfer dispute, which was initially decided by the Settlement Commissioner and subsequently brought before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. During the High Court proceedings, the parties reached a compromise, which a learned Single Judge accepted after recording their statements. The petitioner, who was a party to this compromise, later sought to reverse it through review and Letters Patent appeal, both of which were dismissed. The petitioner then sought Special Leave to Appeal from the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution to make orders based on a compromise. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner, having been a party to the compromise and having invoked the High Court's jurisdiction to accept it, was disqualified from raising the plea regarding the High Court's competence to pass orders on a compromise in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party to a compromise, accepted by the High Court in writ jurisdiction, later challenge the High Court's jurisdiction to pass orders based on that compromise?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution to make orders based on a compromise reached by parties in writ proceedings?
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• FAZAL DIN AND Others vs KHUSHI MUHAMMAD AND Other1970 SCMR 70 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  special leave to appealexcess landrehabilitation authoritiesjurisdictionwrit jurisdictionquestion of fact
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition challenging departmental orders regarding the resumption of excess land. The core legal questions involved whether the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner (Land) possessed the jurisdiction to pass the order taking away land found in excess of the petitioners' entitlement, and whether a question of fact regarding possession of excess land could be raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that since the final authority, the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, admittedly had jurisdiction and upheld the action, the jurisdictional challenge lost substance, and questions of fact not raised before departmental authorities could not be agitated for the first time in the High Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an objection regarding the jurisdiction of a subordinate rehabilitation authority loses substance when the final appellate authority admittedly possesses jurisdiction?
  • Can a question of fact regarding the possession of excess land be raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction before the High Court?
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• FAZAL DAD vs The STATE1970 SCMR 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-25
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonydelay in FIRrecovery of weaponappreciation of evidencecriminal petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Fazal Dad, under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Sahib Khatoon. The trial court convicted and sentenced the petitioner to death, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, the credibility of witnesses, and whether there was inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the delay in lodging the FIR was adequately explained by the transportation of the injured victim and subsequent search for the police station, and that the ocular account, corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of blood-stained articles at the instance of the petitioner, was properly appreciated by the courts below. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence and eyewitness credibility by the lower courts will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court where properly supported by corroborative evidence and natural witness presence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in lodging the First Information Report is adequately explained when the injured victim is being transported for medical aid and police reporting?
  • Can the testimony of an eyewitness accompanying the victim be relied upon despite allegations of being an interested witness?
  • Does the recovery of blood-stained articles at the instance of the accused provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
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• FAZAL AND 5 Others vs The STATE1970 SCMR 525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-07
  criminal petitionhouse trespasscommon objectcriminal abductionleave to appealPakistan Penal Code
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of criminal proceedings where the petitioners were convicted by the Sessions Judge under section 452 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment along with a fine, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerns the legality of the petitioners' conviction under section 452/149 P.P.C. in light of the evidence regarding common object and forcible house trespass, notwithstanding the acquittal under other charges due to witnesses being won over. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was fully justified as the evidence established that the common object of all petitioners was to commit house trespass to forcibly take away the abductee. The court laid down the principle that where a common object to commit house trespass for an unlawful purpose is proved by credible testimony of victims and witnesses, the conviction under section 452 read with section 149 P.P.C. is sustainable even if some witnesses resile or compromise on other distinct charges. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conviction under section 452 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is sustainable when the common object to commit house trespass is established by evidence?
  • Can the conviction for house trespass be maintained when witnesses have been won over regarding other charges of abduction and attempt to murder?
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• FATEH KHAN vs THE STATE-1970 P Cr. L J 1326 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-12Read full judgment →
• FATEH ALI KHAN vs SUBEDAR MUHAMMAD KHAN1970 SCMR 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-08
  condonation of delaypetition for special leave to appeallimitationsummer vacationpre-emptionLetters Patent Appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was directed against a High Court judgment decreeing a pre-emption suit. The office raised an objection that the petition was barred by 186 days. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for the condonation of delay in filing the petition for special leave to appeal, and whether the time spent pursuing an incompetent certificate for a Letters Patent Appeal or the period of summer vacation entitled the petitioner to an extension under Section 4 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that the petition was hopelessly barred by time and no sufficient ground for condonation was made out, observing that time spent on mistaken remedies does not automatically excuse prolonged delay and that Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not apply when the Court's registries remain open for filing petitions during vacation. The key principle laid down is that a petitioner is only entitled to condonation of delay for the time properly taken in exhausting available legal remedies, and the summer vacation does not extend limitation when registries are functioning for the receipt of matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time spent in pursuing an incompetent application for a certificate to file a Letters Patent Appeal can be excluded for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Does the summer vacation of the Supreme Court prevent time from running for the purposes of limitation when the registries of the Court remain open for receiving petitions?
  • Can a petitioner claim the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act when alternative arrangements exist for the transaction of court business during a vacation?
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• FARZAND ALI vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 966 · Sindh High Court · 1970-11-26Read full judgment →
• FAROOK HAJI SIDDIK vs MESSRS FECTO-YAMAGEN ELECTRONICS LTD.1970 PLC 894 · Labour Court · 1970-05-25Read full judgment →
• FARID vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1232 · Lahore High Court · 1966-06-15Read full judgment →
• FARID AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 272 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-07Read full judgment →
• FARID Alias GHAYASUDDIN vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 364 · Sindh High Court · 1968-12-12Read full judgment →
• FARID AHMED vs THE ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (GENL.), DACCA1970 PLD Dacca 422 · Dacca · 1968-08-08Read full judgment →
• FARID (REPRESENTED BY HEIR) vs Mst. NUR BIBI1970 PLD Lahore 502 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-21
  hibagift of corpuslife estate conditiondelivery of possessionmutationadverse possessionlimitationariatIslamic law of giftdeclaratory suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This regular second appeal arose from a suit filed by a husband seeking a declaration that a gift of land made by him to his wife was invalid for lack of delivery of possession or, alternatively, was restricted to a life interest or until remarriage under the condition 'ta hain hayaat ta nikkah saani'. The trial court and District Judge dismissed the suit, holding the gift complete and the life-estate condition void under Islamic law. The Lahore High Court affirmed the concurrent findings, holding that the documentary evidence (mutation entries, jamabandis, khasra girdawaris) and oral testimony established that physical possession of the specific land was delivered to the donee at the time of the gift. Applying Islamic jurisprudence, the High Court held that where the corpus of immovable property is transferred subject to a life condition, the gift (hiba) takes effect as an absolute and complete transfer, while the restrictive condition is void. Furthermore, the court affirmed that the suit was time-barred and that the donee had alternatively established title by adverse possession. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Under Islamic law, does a gift of the corpus of immovable property burdened with a life-estate condition take effect as an absolute gift with the condition rendered void?
  • Whether entries in revenue records and reports of revenue officers showing delivery of physical possession are sufficient to prove completion of a gift under Islamic law?
  • Can a donee establish title through adverse possession if the donor subsequently claims the original gift was invalid or incomplete?
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• FAQIR MUHAMMAD vs FAZAL RAHMAN AND 13 Other1970 SCMR 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-01
  res judicataapprobate and reprobateadverse possessionadmissionwillinheritancedeclaratory suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a suit for a declaration filed by the appellant, Faqir Muhammad, claiming to be the sole owner of land left by his father, Rahim Gul, and challenging a mutation in favor of the respondent, Fazal Rahman, who claimed a one-third share under a will. The core legal questions involved whether the prior decision in a suit filed by a co-heir operated as res judicata regarding the will, and whether the appellant's previous admission in court estopped him from challenging the legatee's title. The Supreme Court held that all ingredients of res judicata were complete since the question of the legatee's one-third share was directly and substantially in issue and finally decided in the previous litigation, and further held that the appellant could not approbate and reprobate by resiling from his previous admission. The Court laid down the principle that a litigant is precluded from blowing hot and cold by disclaiming a title previously admitted in judicial proceedings, and that a co-sharer admitting joint possession cannot claim adverse possession against another.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior decision on a will in a co-heir's suit operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between co-defendants?
  • Can a litigant approbate and reprobate by resiling from a formal admission made in previous judicial proceedings?
  • Whether a co-sharer admitting joint possession and enjoyment of usufruct can claim adverse possession against another co-sharer?
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• FALAH-UL-MOMINEEN TRUST vs V. P. ABDULLAH1970 PLD Karachi 179 · Sindh High Court · 1969-10-13
  execution of decreewrit of ejectmentpolice aidinherent powerscivil revisionpossession of immovable propertyrefusal to exercise jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision application challenges an order by the Civil Judge, Karachi, refusing to grant police aid for the execution of a writ of ejectment. The core legal question is whether a civil court possesses the inherent power to order police assistance for executing a decree for possession, notwithstanding the absence of an explicit provision in the Civil Procedure Code 1908 or the Sind Civil Courts Rules. The Court held that while the Civil Procedure Code 1908 and the Sind Civil Courts Rules do not explicitly provide for police aid, the court inherently possesses the power to take necessary steps to enforce its mandates and execute its decrees. The Court reasoned that a grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary incidental powers to effectuate it, and preventing violence during execution is a valid exercise of this inherent authority. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the Civil Judge to reconsider the request for police aid, establishing that courts have the inherent power under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to provide police assistance when necessary for the administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have the inherent power to grant police aid for the execution of a decree for possession?
  • Is a revision application maintainable against an order refusing to exercise inherent powers to grant police aid?
  • Does the refusal to exercise inherent power to grant police aid constitute a refusal to exercise jurisdiction?
  • Is the stay of execution proceedings mandatory under Order XXI Rule 29, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a separate suit is pending?
  Read full judgment →
• FAJAR ALI AND Another vs Mst. JAMILA AND 3 Other1970 SCMR 706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-20
  settlement operationsreview proceedingstransfer of propertyclaimant versus non-claimantjurisdictionpending proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves a property dispute over a house in Jhang previously transferred to a claimant, Mst. Jamila, and subsequently divided among claimants and non-claimants by a successor Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The core legal questions relate to the competency of review proceedings, the validity of subsequent transfer orders, and the interpretation of saving clauses under amending ordinances governing settlement operations. The Supreme Court held that the initial division of the property without setting aside the original transfer order was a nullity without jurisdiction, whereas the subsequent review order restoring the entire property to the sole claimant was competently passed after obtaining the requisite permission. The Court affirmed that pending review proceedings were lawfully saved under section 7 of Ordinance No. XIII of 1962, as permission to review was granted prior to the bar imposed by Ordinance II of 1962. The key principles laid down affirm that an order passed in review without jurisdiction is a nullity and that pending review proceedings properly instituted and saved by statutory provisions remain competent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of review passed by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner without obtaining prior permission is a nullity?
  • When do review proceedings become pending for the purpose of saving clauses under Amending Ordinance No. XIII of 1962?
  • Does a claimant have a preferential right over non-claimants when a property is found to be indivisible?
  Read full judgment →
• FAIZUR RAHMAN SARKAR vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERSs1970 P Cr. L J 844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-04
  bailsuspension of sentencecondition of bailpayment of finecriminal revisionCode of Criminal Procedure 1898
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave addresses whether bail granted under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be made conditional upon the payment of a fine imposed by the trial court. The appellant was convicted under Section 407 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentenced to imprisonment and a fine, and subsequently filed a revision petition in the High Court. The High Court granted bail pending revision but attached a condition that the bail would stand cancelled if the fine was not paid within one month. The Supreme Court held that Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 contains no provision for attaching conditions such as the payment of a fine to an order suspending sentence and granting bail, as bail is fundamentally intended to secure the appearance of the accused. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the bail was confirmed without the condition.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail granted under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be made conditional on the payment of a fine?
  • Does the High Court have the power to attach terms requiring the payment of a fine to an order suspending a sentence and granting bail?
  • What is the primary legal connotation and purpose of granting bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• FAIZUR RAHMAN SARKAR vs THE STATE And 2 Other1970 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-04
  bailsuspension of sentencepayment of finecriminal breach of trustrevision petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave addresses whether bail granted under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be made conditional upon the payment of a fine imposed by the trial court. The appellant was convicted of criminal breach of trust by a public servant under section 407 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to imprisonment and a fine. The High Court suspended his sentence and granted him bail, but stipulated that the bail would stand cancelled if he failed to pay the fine within a specified period. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 contains no provision authorizing the imposition of conditions, such as the payment of a fine, to an order suspending a sentence or granting bail. The court reaffirmed that bail is fundamentally intended to secure the appearance of the accused and cannot be used as a coercive mechanism to enforce the recovery of a fine. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the bail was confirmed without the condition.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail granted under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be made conditional on the payment of a fine?
  • Does section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empower the High Court to attach terms to an order suspending the execution of a sentence?
  • Can bail be used as a means of enforcing the recovery of a fine imposed upon conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• FAIZ MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT1970 PLC 113 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-06-10Read full judgment →
• ERUCH MANECKJI AND 2 Others vs INCOME TAX OFFICER, CENTRAL CIRCLE III, KARACHI1970 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-11
  leave to appealpenal interestadvance taxinterim orderdiscretionary jurisdictionstay of recoveryincome tax
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an interlocutory order of the High Court, which refused to suspend the recovery of penal interest amounting to Rs. 4,86,186 imposed by the Income Tax Officer under Section 18-A (3) and (6) of the Income Tax Act 1922 for failure to deposit advance tax. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether interference was warranted with the discretionary interim order of the High Court. The Court held that no exception could be taken to the interim order refusing to stay the recovery of money, noting that courts generally do not stay the execution of a money decree pending appeal as no irreparable loss is caused thereby, and observed that the petitioners should have first moved the income tax authorities for redress. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretionary interim order of the High Court refusing to stay the recovery of penal interest?
  • Should a taxpayer approach the income tax authorities for redress before invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court against the imposition of penal interest?
  • Does the refusal to stay the execution of a money claim pending final adjudication cause irreparable loss?
  Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs NATURAL GAS FERTILIZER FACTORY LTD., SYLHET1970 PLC 828 · Labour Court · 1970-05-30Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs AHMED ABDUL GANI TEXTILE MILLS, KARACHI1970 PLC 675 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-05-30Read full judgment →
• EMDAD UDDIN vs MESSRS RAJ BROTHERS, DACCA1970 PLC 884 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• EJAZ HUSSAIN AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 361 · Lahore High Court · 1969-08-13Read full judgment →
• EAST PAKISTAN INDUSTRIES, DACCA AND Another vs COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CHITTAGONG AND 3 Other1970 PLD Dacca 622 · Dacca · 1967-06-07Read full judgment →
• EAST PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT SETTLEMENT PRESS EMPLOYEES' UNION vs GOVERNMENT OF EAST PAKISTAN1970 PLC 841 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• EAGLE STAR INSURANCE Co. LTD., KARACHI vs RAHMANIA TRADING COMPANY, CHITTAGONG1970 PLD Dacca 445 · Dacca · 1968-07-24Read full judgment →
• DR: M. A. A. AZIZ vs Mst. AISHA RAHIM AND ANOTHER1970 P Cr. L J 721 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-23Read full judgment →
• DR. HASHMAT ALI vs G. AKBAR, SPECIAL MAGISTRATE (FOOD)1970 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-18
  special leave to appealfood offencespecial magistrateno evidenceconstitutional jurisdictionessential commodities
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the High Court, which had declined to interfere with his conviction and sentence of 20 months' rigorous imprisonment for possessing excess Joshi rice in violation of a notified order, under section 6 of the East Pakistan Food (Special Courts) Act, 1956. The core legal questions involved whether the violation of the notified order was punishable under the said Act, and whether the conviction was based on "no evidence" warranting interference under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962. The Supreme Court held that the trial was competently held as the relevant orders and notifications were duly saved through successive legislative enactments, and that the finding of the key to the godown in the petitioner's possession constituted sufficient evidence to support the conviction, meaning the case was not one of "no evidence". The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the violation of a notified order issued under the East Bengal Foodstuffs Price Control Order, 1953, is punishable under section 6 of the East Pakistan Food (Special Courts) Act, 1956?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a conviction under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 on the ground that a case is one of no evidence?
  • Does the possession of the key to a godown from which a prohibited commodity is recovered constitute prima facie evidence of possession of the commodity?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. HABIBUR RAHMAN vs MD. MANSUR AND Another1970 SCMR 882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-12
  small cause courtejectmentlandlord and tenantquestion of titlespecial leave to appealjurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which dismissed a revision petition against a decree for ejectment passed by a Court of Small Causes. The respondent sought to evict the petitioner from the disputed property, claiming ownership under a registered deed of lease executed by the Shebait of a Debuttor Estate, while the petitioner contested the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for ejectment of a tenant is triable by a Court of Small Causes and whether such a court has the discretion to adjudicate questions of title under section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. The Supreme Court held that the suit was maintainable in the Court of Small Causes, and that the said court possesses the discretion under section 23 of the Act to return or not to return a plaint when a question of title to immovable property is raised. The petition was dismissed as no substantial question of law arose.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for the ejectment of a tenant triable by a Court of Small Causes?
  • Does a Court of Small Causes have the discretion to adjudicate upon questions of title to immovable property under section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887?
  • Can a new question regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, not raised in the trial Court or the High Court, be allowed to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. FAIZ ALI SHAH vs (1) PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN, THROUGH CHIEF1970 PLD Lahore 137 · Lahore High Court · 1969-06-11Read full judgment →
• DR. BURJOUR ANKLESARIA NURSING HOME, KARACHI vs EMPLOYEES' UNION1970 PLC 653 · Industrial Court · 1970-06-15Read full judgment →
• DR. AKHTAR ALI vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Lahore 450 · Lahore High Court · 1969-08-13Read full judgment →
• DR. ABDUS SALAM AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1306 · Lahore High Court · 1969-10-20Read full judgment →
• DR. ABDUL AHAD vs THE POLITICAL AGENT, KURRAM AGENCY AND 2 Other1970 PLD Lahore 888 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-04Read full judgment →
• DR. A. N. M. MAHMOOD vs THE SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DACCA AND Other1970 PLD Dacca 85 · Dacca · 1966-03-24Read full judgment →
• DOST MUHAMMAD AND 3 Other vs MESSRS FATEHALLY CHEMICAL LTD., KARACHI1970 PLC 162 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-09-17Read full judgment →
• DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT (WORKSHOP), P. W. R., LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD1970 PLC 742 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-06Read full judgment →
• DIVISIONAL EVACUEE TRUST COMMITTEE, KARACHI vs ABDULLAH AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  Evacuee Trust PropertyCharitable TrustSettlement TransferPanchayatReligious InstitutionLeave to Appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the status of House No. O. T. 3/138, Mithadar, Karachi, which was transferred to the respondents by the Settlement authorities. The petitioner, the Divisional Evacuee Trust Committee, claimed that the property was attached to a charitable trust and that the evacuee owner, the Nasarpuri Community Panchayat, was a charitable or religious institution. The core legal question was whether the property constituted trust property under the relevant evacuee laws. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner failed to lead any cogent evidence to establish that the Panchayat was a religious or charitable institution, or that the property was trust property. The Court noted that no constitutional documents of the Panchayat were produced, and a sale deed of another property acquired for maintaining Hindu widows did not suffice to prove the trust status of the disputed property. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the decisions of the Settlement authorities and the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquisition of a separate property for a charitable purpose by a Panchayat automatically prove that the Panchayat itself is a religious or charitable institution?
  • Can a property be classified as evacuee trust property under Section 4(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 in the absence of cogent evidence or constitutional documents of the owning institution?
  Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, LAHORE OMNIBUS SERVICE, LAHORE vs ABDUL RAZAQUE1970 PLC 466 · Industrial Court · 1970-04-18Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, RAWALPINDI vs MOHAMMAD ISHAQUE1970 PLC 462 · Industrial Court · 1970-04-25Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs ZARIN1970 PLC 347 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-03-26Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs MAJID AKHTAR AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 75 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-02-15Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs AMANULLAH QURESHI AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 58 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1968-11-07Read full judgment →
• DIRECTOR-GENERAL, ORDNANCE FACTORIES EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION vs UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 676 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-02-01Read full judgment →
• DIN MUHAMMAD vs The STATE1970 SCMR 857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1956-10-10
  appeal against acquittalconfessional statementmurdermedical evidenceappraisal of evidenceculpable homicide
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal on special leave by the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan which set aside the acquittal of the appellant and convicted him under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of his brother's wife, sentencing him to death. The core legal questions involved the admissibility of an initial police report made by the accused as a confessional statement, and whether the High Court properly reappraised the ocular and medical evidence in an appeal against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that a statement containing self-exculpatory matter or failing to admit all facts constituting the offence does not amount to a confession, thereby upholding the High Court's view on admissibility, but found that the High Court misread the medical evidence and disregarded well-established principles regarding appeals against acquittal by interfering with the trial court's assessment of unreliable eye-witnesses. The Court laid down the principle that a statement cannot be considered a confession under section 25 of the Evidence Act if it contains self-exculpatory facts that negative the alleged offence, and reiterated the principles governing appellate interference with findings of acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statement containing self-exculpatory matter amount to a confession?
  • Can an admission of a gravely incriminating fact by itself be treated as a confession?
  • What are the principles governing the High Court's interference with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Whether minor injuries inflicted by an accused can establish causation of death when medical evidence points to a different cause?
  Read full judgment →
• DIN MUHAMMAD AND 3 Other vs FAQIR MUHAMMAD AND 2 Other1970 PLD Lahore 442 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-18
  Fatal Accidents ActMotor Vehicles Actlimitation periodimpleading insurerres ipsa loquiturrash and negligent drivingquantum of compensationdependants
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This first appeal in forma pauperis arose from the dismissal of a suit for damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855, brought by the legal heirs of a tractor driver killed in a collision with a speeding bus. The trial court had dismissed the suit, holding that negligence was not established against the bus driver. Before the High Court, the insurer raised a preliminary objection that impleading it after the period prescribed by Article 21 of the Limitation Act 1908 rendered the suit time-barred, while the appellants contested the trial court's finding on negligence. The High Court rejected the limitation objection, holding that notice was duly sought under Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 with the original plaint, making the insurer's formal addition within time under the doctrine of nunc pro tunc. Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and crediting eye-witness evidence, the Court reversed the finding on negligence and held the driver liable. The Court assessed the deceased's monthly earning capacity and awarded Rs. 25,920 as damages, apportioned among his dependants according to their respective life expectancies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether impleading an insurer company after the period of limitation renders a suit under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855 time-barred when notice was sought under Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 along with the original plaint?
  • Whether an insurer company impleaded under Section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 can raise defenses beyond those explicitly provided under that subsection?
  • Whether the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies to establish negligence when the undisputed physical facts and evidence clearly point to rash driving by the defendant?
  • How should pecuniary loss and compensation be calculated and apportioned among surviving dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855?
  Read full judgment →
• DILMIR KHAN vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1011 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-18Read full judgment →
• DILAWAR KHAN AND Another vs PORDIL KHAN1970 SCMR 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-27
  petition for leave to appealpossessionjoint propertyco-sharersmutationJamabanditenant-at-willattornmentfinding of fact
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit filed by the petitioners seeking possession of a two-thirds share in joint lands, claiming that only one co-owner brother had sold his individual one-third share to the respondent. The respondent asserted that all three brothers sold the entire property, or alternatively, that he acquired title by adverse possession. While the appellate court decreed the suit, the High Court in second appeal reversed that decision, upholding the trial court's dismissal of the suit based on a factual finding that the entire property was sold. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, refusing leave to appeal. The Court held that the High Court's conclusion was a finding of fact supported by oral and documentary evidence, including revenue records. Furthermore, entries in the Jamabandi showed that one petitioner was himself recorded as a tenant-at-will under the respondent, confirming attornment to the transferee and precluding the petitioners from denying the sale of the entire property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-owner dispute a sale of the entire joint property after having attorned as a tenant under the transferee in revenue records?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere in a petition for leave to appeal with a finding of fact by the High Court based on adequate oral and documentary evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• DES DEWAN vs Major NAZIR BEG AND OTHER1970 PLD Lahore 790 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-10Read full judgment →
• DELWAR HOSSAIN vs Maulvi ABDUL JALIL CHOWDHURY AND Other1970 SCMR 871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  amendment of plaintcivil procedurerevisional jurisdictionlimitationvested rightssuit valuation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of East Pakistan, which upheld a trial court's decision to allow an amendment to a plaint. The original suit was filed for a declaration of title and confirmation of possession regarding a single plot of land. During the hearing, after the plaintiff's examination, the plaintiff sought to amend the plaint to include an additional plot and increase the suit's valuation. The petitioner opposed this, arguing that the amendment introduced a new case and prejudiced their rights regarding the limitation period. The Supreme Court examined whether the amendment fundamentally altered the suit's character or unfairly deprived the petitioner of vested rights. The Court held that the amendment did not alter the nature of the suit and that the petitioner suffered no prejudice, as they were granted leave to file an additional written statement to raise any limitation defenses. The petition was dismissed, affirming that procedural amendments allowing for the inclusion of property are permissible provided the defendant is not deprived of the opportunity to contest the new claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does an amendment to a plaint that adds a new plot of land and increases the suit valuation fundamentally alter the character of the suit?
  • Can a defendant raise the issue of limitation in an additional written statement following an amendment to the plaint?
  • Is an amendment to a plaint permissible if it does not cause prejudice to the defendant's ability to raise available defenses?
  Read full judgment →
• DALMIR AND Another MOHAMMAD MUNIR vs THE STATE THE STATE (A) Penal Code (XLV Of 1860),1970 SCMR 840 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-09
  murdercommon intentionocular testimonycorroborationrecovery of weaponbenefit of doubtculpable homicide
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ibrahim. The prosecution alleged that two of the appellants held the deceased while the third appellant, Dalmir, inflicted multiple hatchet blows on his leg, resulting in his death from hemorrhage and shock. The core legal questions involved whether the evidence was appreciated correctly and what offence, if any, was proved against the appellants. The Supreme Court held that Dalmir's conviction was well-founded, being supported by credible ocular testimony corroborated by the recovery of a blood-stained hatchet at his instance, and that his act fell under clause thirdly of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 as the intended injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. However, regarding the other two appellants, the Court held that in the absence of corroborative evidence and given their relationship and enmity with the complainants, the possibility of false implication could not be excluded. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal of Dalmir while accepting the appeals of the other co-accused by giving them the benefit of the doubt. The key principle laid down is that while interested ocular testimony may be relied upon if it inspires confidence, safe administration of justice requires independent corroboration, particularly in cases involving multiple accused where false implication of collateral relatives cannot be ruled out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple blows inflicted exclusively on the non-vital parts of the body with a sharp-nosed weapon can constitute murder under clause thirdly of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the uncorroborated testimony of interested and inimical eye-witnesses warrant the conviction of co-accused in a murder trial?
  • Is the recovery of a blood-stained weapon at the instance of an accused sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Whether the possibility of false implication of collateral family members requires independent corroborative evidence for safe dispensation of criminal justice?
  Read full judgment →
• D M. Karim, Members MD. RASHID QUDRATULLAH vs MESSRS STAR ALKAID1970 PLC 814 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• CRICKET CLUB OF INDIA LTD. vs BOMBAY LABOUR UNION AND ANOTHER1970 PLC 630 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-07Read full judgment →
• CRESCENT PAK SOAP AND OIL MILLS LABOUR UNION vs MESSRS CRESCENT PAK1970 PLC 271 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-11-05Read full judgment →
• COOPER & COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS COOPER '& COMPANY1970 PLC 206 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1969-05-14Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (CENTRAL) KARACHI vs MESSRS UNITED1970 PLD Karachi 148 · Sindh High Court · 1969-08-19Read full judgment →
• COLONY TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED, LAHORE vs ZUHAIR SIDDIQUI AND 4 OTHERS1970 PLC 489 · Industrial Appellate Tribunal · 1970-05-12Read full judgment →
• COLLECTOR, QUETTA-PISHIN, QUETTA vs HABIBULLAH AND 14 Other1970 PLD Quetta 35 · Balochistan High Court · 1969-11-07
  land acquisitionmarket valuepotential building sitecompulsory acquisition allowancenotice under section 9reference to courtcourt fee
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal was filed by the Government under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 against an award of compensation made by the District Judge, Quetta. The Collector had initially valued the acquired land purely as agricultural, whereas the District Judge determined its market value based on its potential as a building site, while also awarding compensation for a tube-well and a brick kiln to a lessee. The core legal questions involved whether the land ought to be assessed based on its potentiality as a building site rather than its present agricultural use, whether an interested person who was not served notice under Section 9 of the Act could seek compensation before the District Judge under Section 18 without being barred by Section 25(2), and the correct computation of court-fees on appeal under Section 8 of the Court Fees Act 1870. The High Court modified the District Judge's award, holding that market value under Section 23 must account for reasonable future potential use. It further held that failure to serve notice under Section 9 prevents the operation of the statutory penalty under Section 25(2).

  Questions settled

  • Whether the market value of acquired land under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 should be assessed based on its potential future use as a building site or strictly according to its present use?
  • Can the penal provisions of Section 25(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 be invoked to bar a claimant's enhanced compensation claim if the Collector failed to serve him mandatory notice under Section 9?
  • Does an additional ad valorem fee under statutory amendments applicable to the institution of suits apply to a memorandum of appeal under Section 8 of the Court Fees Act 1870?
  Read full judgment →
• COL. BASHIR HUSSAIN AND 10 Other vs LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR, LAHORE1970 PLD Lahore 321 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-12
  land acquisitionawardnoticelimitation periodreference to courtmandatory provisionscompensation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged land acquisition proceedings and the validity of an award made under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The core legal questions centered on whether the requirement of giving immediate notice of an award under section 12(2) of the Act is mandatory or directory, and whether failure by the Collector to issue timely notice vitiates the award by depriving the landowners of their statutory right to seek a reference to the court under section 18. The Lahore High Court held that the provision requiring notice is imperative and obligatory, and that failure to notify landowners within a reasonable time—such that they are barred by the absolute six-month limitation period—amounts to a fraud on the statute. The court ruled that non-compliance vitiates the award. The key principle laid down is that where a statute prescribes a mode and time for performing a public duty intended to protect citizen's rights, failure to perform that duty which results in a complete deprivation of a statutory remedy renders the action a nullity, requiring fresh proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement of giving immediate notice of an award under section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 mandatory or directory?
  • Does the failure of the Collector to serve notice of an award within the statutory period vitiate the award?
  • Can an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 be entertained after the expiry of six months from the date of the award?
  • What are the legal consequences when a public functionary's omission deprives an aggrieved party of their right to seek a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  Read full judgment →
• Chowdhry MUHAMMAD IQBAL vs Mst. AHMED JAHAN BEGUM1970 PLD Karachi 548 · Sindh High Court · 1969-11-07Read full judgment →
• CHIRAGH vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 1199 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-06Read full judgment →
• CHIRAGH DIN AND Another vs CHAIRMAN, THAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY1970 SCMR 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-10
  mandatory injunctioninterim injunctionrestoration of possessiondeclaration of ownershipcivil procedurependente lite dispossession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revisional application by the High Court, which had upheld the District Judge's order setting aside a mandatory injunction issued by the trial court. The trial court had directed the respondent authority to restore possession of agricultural land to the petitioners, which land the authority had resumed during the pendency of the petitioners' suit for a declaration of ownership. The core legal question is whether a court can issue a mandatory injunction under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to restore possession of land resumed by an authority during the pendency of a declaration suit. The Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff is dispossessed during a suit for declaration of ownership, such dispossession does not affect the maintainability of the suit, and restitution can be granted as a consequential relief if the suit succeeds, rendering a mandatory injunction for interim restoration inapplicable. The Court affirmed that interim injunction rules do not empower the court to direct restoration of possession in such circumstances, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court can issue a mandatory injunction under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to restore possession of land resumed during the pendency of a declaration suit?
  • Does the dispossession of a plaintiff during the pendency of a suit for a declaration of ownership affect the maintainability of the suit?
  • Are foreign decisions regarding easement rights and mandatory injunctions applicable to suits for declaration of ownership and permanent injunction?
  Read full judgment →
• CHANAN DIN vs GULZAR MUHAMMAD KHAN AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Peshawar 94 · Peshawar High Court · -Read full judgment →
• CHAIRMAN, DISTRICT COUNCIL, JEHLUM vs ALI AKBAR AND 2 Other1970 SCMR 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-02
  taxationBasic Democracies Orderstatutory interpretationlegislative intentDistrict Counciltax on employment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated from petitions filed by the Chairman, District Council, Jhelum, seeking leave to appeal against a High Court order. The underlying dispute involved writ petitions filed by employees of the Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited and railway employees challenging the legality of a tax on "professions, trades and callings" levied by District Councils. The core legal question was whether the District Council had the authority to levy this tax on "employment" under the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, given that the term "employment" was explicitly omitted from the Fifth Schedule of that Order, unlike the previous legislative framework under the Government of India Act, 1935. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the conscious legislative omission of the word "employment" from the Fifth Schedule of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, demonstrated a clear intent to exclude "employment" from the scope of taxable activities. The Court affirmed that when a legislature repeals and re-enacts law, it is presumed to be aware of the previous state of the law, and any deliberate change indicates an intention to alter the legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of the word 'employment' from the Fifth Schedule of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, preclude a District Council from levying a tax on employment?
  • Is a legislature presumed to intend a change in law when it omits specific terms during the re-enactment of legislation?
  • Can a tax on 'professions, trades and callings' be interpreted to include 'employment' in the absence of an explicit statutory explanation?
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• CHAIN ROCHIRAM MANGHIRAMALANI vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN1970 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-14
  disciplinary proceedingsgovernment servantnatural justicedismissal from serviceinquiry committeeshow-cause noticeunauthorized foreign travel
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a government servant, challenged his dismissal from service, which was based on allegations of holding anti-Pakistan views, writing objectionable letters to state dignitaries, and making an unauthorized visit to Iran. The petitioner contended that the Inquiry Committee failed to conduct the proceedings in his presence, denied him access to documents, and failed to provide a copy of the inquiry findings, thereby violating principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court reviewed the findings of the High Court, which had determined that the petitioner was confronted with the evidence, admitted to authoring the letters, and was granted adequate opportunity to defend himself. The Court held that the inquiry was conducted properly and that the petitioner was not condemned unheard. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the petitioner was denied access to the inquiry record, noting that it was available for inspection. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that procedural fairness was maintained throughout the disciplinary process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide a copy of an inquiry report to a government servant automatically invalidate a dismissal order if the servant was otherwise given an opportunity to defend?
  • Is a disciplinary inquiry against a government servant vitiated if the servant admits to the underlying facts, such as authorship of letters, during the proceedings?
  • Can a government servant challenge a dismissal order on the grounds of procedural irregularity if the record demonstrates that they were confronted with the evidence and allowed to respond?
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• Ch. SARDAR ALI vs Ch. ALI MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER1970 PLD Lahore 647 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-11
  Settlement Scheme No. 1Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958void ab initiolimitationrent arrearstransfer of propertypossessionauction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns writ petitions challenging the auction of residential units in a property by Settlement authorities, where the petitioners' transfer applications were ignored. The core legal questions were whether the auction order was void for lack of notice, whether limitation barred the challenge, and whether rent clearance by a specific date was a mandatory condition for eligibility. The Court held that the initial order directing the auction was void ab initio for failing to provide the petitioners an opportunity to be heard as required by Settlement Scheme No. 1. Consequently, the bar of limitation did not apply to the challenge. The Court established the principle that while rent clearance is a condition for 'possession' under the relevant notification, the Chief Settlement Commissioner lacks the power to set a final date for such clearance that negates statutory entitlement. Once arrears are cleared, the occupant becomes eligible for transfer, provided the property has not been validly transferred elsewhere. The Court set aside the auction orders and directed the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to consider the applications on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a Deputy Settlement Commissioner to provide a hearing to an applicant under Settlement Scheme No. 1 render an auction order void ab initio?
  • Does the law of limitation apply to an order that is void ab initio?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the legal authority to set a final date for the clearance of rent arrears that negates an applicant's statutory eligibility for transfer?
  • Is the clearance of rent arrears a condition precedent for an occupant to be deemed in possession under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
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• Ch. RIASAT ALI AND Another vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 445 · Lahore High Court · 1969-05-13
  quashment of proceedingscheatingpost-dated chequedishonour of chequebreach of promisecriminal liability
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition was filed by the accused, Riasat Ali and Muhammad Anwar, under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking to quash the criminal proceedings of cheating initiated against them. The prosecution's case was based on an agreement where the accused allegedly promised to sell imported chemicals to the complainants, received money, and subsequently failed to deliver the consignment. Following a compromise mediated by respectables, the accused issued a receipt acknowledging a loan and provided a post-dated cheque, which was subsequently dishonoured by the bank upon presentation. The Lahore High Court held that the facts did not disclose any criminal offence. The Court ruled that a post-dated cheque serves as an acknowledgement of a debt and a promise to pay on a future date. Consequently, a broken promise or the dishonour of such a cheque does not constitute a criminal offence, even if it represents discreditable business behavior. The petition was allowed, and the criminal proceedings were quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dishonour of a post-dated cheque issued as a promise to pay a debt on a future date constitute a criminal offence?
  • Can criminal proceedings for cheating be quashed if the underlying transaction and subsequent compromise represent a civil breach of promise rather than a penal offence?
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• Ch. NAZIR AHMAD BHATTI vs Ch. NOOR MUHAMMAD AND 3 Other1970 SC M. R 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritieswrit jurisdictionfindings of factrevisionary powersconsent of parties
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee residential property in Lahore. The petitioner, claiming to be an allottee in possession, sought the transfer of the property, which had instead been transferred to the respondent. After multiple rounds of litigation before settlement authorities, the Settlement and Claims Commissioner, with the consent of both parties, decided the case on merits, finding that the petitioner's possession and claim were not substantiated. The petitioner challenged this in the High Court via a writ petition, which was dismissed on the grounds that the findings were factual and not perverse. A Letters Patent Appeal was subsequently dismissed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Settlement Commissioner had jurisdiction to decide the case on merits and whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to decide the case on merits in revision, and that findings of fact based on evidence are not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to decide a case on merits while exercising revisionary powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can a party who consents to a tribunal deciding a matter on merits subsequently challenge that jurisdiction on appeal?
  • Is a finding of fact arrived at upon consideration of evidence subject to interference by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction?
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• Ch. MUHAMMAD NAWAZ vs THE STATE1970 P Cr. L J 109 · Lahore High Court · 1969-07-22Read full judgment →